Conflict Resolution: Theories and Practice

Edited by Stefan Wolff and Christalla Yakinthou

London and New York: Routledge, 2011
Two major global trends since the end of the Cold War have been the spread of democracy over autocracy as a form of government, and the ongoing prominence of intrastate rather than interstate warfare. Between them, these countervailing forces have defined world politics for much of the post-Cold War period. Beginning with the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Spain and Portugal in 1974 and working its way through Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia, what Samuel Huntington (1991) dubbed the ‘third wave’ of democracy has led to a threefold increase in the number of democracies around the globe. At the same time, however, the world has also witnessed a drastic change in the expression of large-scale conflict, with most armed conflict today the result of internal violence, rather than the wars between states of the past. Simply put, democratization and internal conflict comprise two of the most important currents of political change in the contemporary world.

This reality has led to a renewed focus in both scholarly and policy worlds on the optimal democratic designs for conflict-prone societies. As third wave democracies drafted new constitutions and forged new political systems, there was an upsurge of interest in optimal strategies for democratic consolidation in post-conflict or transitional states. Accompanying this has been a change in the dynamics of international development assistance and the role of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. Spurred by the liberalization of previously autocratic states in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America, the international community has invested heavily in concepts of democracy promotion, electoral support and ‘good governance’ as key elements in the creation of stable and peaceful states.

The past decade has thus seen an explosion of creative institutional design in new democracies, particularly those in which the international community has invested heavily. Scholars interested in the management of ethnic conflict have advocated overt ‘political engineering’ as a means of promoting stable democracy in deeply divided societies. Amongst advocates, several contrasting approaches to political engineering for the management of social cleavages have been evident. One is the scholarly orthodoxy of consociationalism, discussed elsewhere in this volume, which has seen something of resurgence in recent years (Taylor 2009). Consociational political settlements rely on elite cooperation between leaders of different communities, as described in a wealth of studies of (mostly) European countries by scholars following in the tradition of Arend Lijphart. Under this model, specific democratic institutions – such as grand coalition cabinets, proportional representation elections, minority veto powers and communal autonomy – collectively maximize the independence and influence of the main ethnic communities in a given society. Taken to an extreme, entire political
systems can be structured around ethnic interests, thereby becoming examples of communalism, in which explicit ethnic criteria of representation such as ethnically predetermined seat ratios or voter rolls are used, as in Lebanon.

An alternative prescription for divided societies to consociationalism and communalism is what has been called centripetalism – ‘because the explicit aim is to engineer a centripetal spin to the political system – to pull the parties towards moderate, compromising policies and to discover and reinforce the centre of a deeply divided political spectrum’ (Sisk 1995: 19). Advocating political systems or strategies designed to focus electoral competition at the moderate centre rather than the extremes, centripetalism eschews the reification of ethnic identity inherent in consociationalism and communalism, instead advocating the need for aggregative, centrist and inter-ethnic politics in divided societies. Prominent centripetal scholars such as Donald Horowitz (1985, 1991) argue that deeply divided societies should seek to foster intercommunal moderation by promoting multiethnic political parties which can encourage inter-group accommodation. In a similar vein, my own work has highlighted how centripetal reforms centred upon cross-cutting electoral incentives have lowered electoral violence in ethnically-fragmented states such as Papua New Guinea (Reilly, 2001).

The various claims for and against these different institutional models of ethnic conflict management constitutes one of the major political science debates of the past decade, and have had a significant impact on constitutional choices in a range of post-conflict societies. But while proponents of both consociationalism and centripetalism can point to some successes (and more failures) of their preferred models, developments over the past decade have seen something of a bifurcation in terms of the “real world” experience of each model. On the one hand, high profile cases of post-conflict peacebuilding such as Bosnia, Northern Ireland and most recently Iraq have all adopted broadly consociational political settlements in recent years, with proportional elections and grand coalition governments. On the other hand, many emerging democracies in Africa, Asia and Latin America have adopted explicit centripetal reforms when refashioning their own domestic institutions without international involvement. This chapter examines the key institutional elements of centripetalism as a practical model of political engineering in such developing democracies, focussing particularly on the key democratic institutions such as electoral systems, political parties, and other mechanisms of representation.
Centripetalism compared

In terms of political engineering, centripetalists (like consociationalists) tend to focus much of their attention on core democratic institutions such as political parties, electoral systems, and cabinet governments, and on the territorial division of state powers via federalism. However, their specific recommendations regarding each of these institutions differ enormously. In terms of the development of political parties and party systems, for instance, the two approaches are almost diametrically opposed. Consociationalists favour parties which can represent social cleavages explicitly, via “bonding” rather than “bridging” campaign strategies – that is, parties which “focus upon gaining votes from a narrower home-base among particular segmented sectors of the electorate” (Norris 2004: 10). The ideal consociational party system is one in which individual parties are based around clear social cleavages, and in which all significant social groups, including minorities, can “define themselves” into ethnically-based political parties. Only by parties formed around segmental cleavages, consociationalists contend, can political elites negotiate delicate ethnic issues effectively.¹

Centripetalists reject this elite-driven approach, and the reification of ethnicity which goes with it. Rather than “making plural societies more truly plural” (Lijphart 1977: 42) as consociationalists propose, centripetal reforms instead seek to dilute the ethnic character of competitive politics and promote multiethnic outcomes instead. This means that, for instance, rather than focussing on the fair representation of ethnically-defined political parties, centripetalists place a premium on promoting multiethnic parties and cross-ethnic activity instead. In so doing, they emphasise the importance of institutional designs which can encourage cooperation, accommodation and integration across ethnic divides, and thus work to break down the salience of ethnicity rather than fostering its representation institutionally. In direct opposition to consociational theory, centripetalism maintains that the best way to manage democracy in divided societies is not to replicate existing ethnic divisions in the legislature and other representative organs, but rather to depoliticize ethnicity by putting in place institutional incentives for cross-ethnic behaviour, in order to encourage patterns of accommodation between rival groups.

Both consociational and centripetal proposals for conflict management tend to focus on electoral systems as offering the most potential for effective political engineering. Again, however, centripetal recommendations made by run sharply counter to the prevailing orthodoxy. Perhaps the clearest distinction between the two approaches is in relation to electoral system design. One of the most fundamental relationships in political science is that between electoral and party systems, and specifically between
fair representation of minorities and proportional electoral systems. Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems are frequently advocated as a key reform in ethnically-plural societies, so as to ensure fair representation of minorities and majorities alike. However, there is a difference between representation and power: a minority can be fairly represented in a legislature but completely shut out of political power in government. In addition, PR electoral systems are much kinder to small parties and thus tend to fragment the party system or encourage parties to craft their appeals around narrow sectarian interests, such as ethnicity -- precisely because they can be secure in gaining election by appealing to a relatively narrow section of society.

For this reason, centripetalist often see PR as a cause of rather than a solution to problems of ethnic politics. Instead, they endorse electoral rules that make politicians reciprocally dependent on the votes of members of groups other than their own, and more broadly the need to promote multiethnic political parties and other representative bodies. Specific institutional devices to achieve this outcome include the use of preferential or cross-regional electoral systems, political party laws which require multi-regional party organisation, and legislative selection procedures which encourage median, centrist outcomes. Institutions which give parties and candidates electoral incentives to ‘pool votes’ across ethnic lines, centripetalists contend, can encourage vote-seeking politicians to reach out across the ethnic divide and, in so doing, help to take the heat out of ethnic politics.²

In an earlier book on electoral engineering for divided societies (Reilly 2001: 11), I examined the record of centripetalism as a conflict management strategy, and identified three facilitating components which seem to recur across different countries and contexts:

(i) the presentation of *electoral incentives* for campaigning politicians to reach out to and attract votes from a range of ethnic groups other than their own, thus encouraging candidates to moderate their political rhetoric on potentially divisive issues and forcing them to broaden their policy positions;

(ii) the presence of multiethnic *arenas of bargaining* such as parliamentary and executive forums, in which political actors representing different identity groups have an incentive to come together and cut deals on reciprocal electoral support, and hence perhaps on other more substantial policy issues as well; and

(iii) the development of *centrist, aggregative and multiethnic political parties* or coalitions of parties which are capable of making cross-ethnic appeals and presenting a complex and diverse range of policy options to the electorate.
By what specific institutional designs can such desirable outcomes be encouraged in divided societies, where cooperation across social cleavages is, by definition, lacking? One approach is to structure electoral processes so as to require successful candidates to gain support across different regions of a country, thus helping to break down the appeal of narrow parochialism or regionalism. Another is to give campaigning politicians incentives to seek the second-preference votes of rival electors under vote-transfer electoral systems which allow the expression of a gradation of political preferences. A third is to mandate some degree of multiethnicity within political parties and other representative bodies, via requirements that parties must put forward heterogeneous candidate lists or organise on a cross-regional basis, thus making parties themselves a potential site for multiethnic bargaining. While having very different impacts and effects, these diverse strategies all represent centripetal approaches to institutional design, in that they all seek to nudge the basis of representative democracy away from the politics of ethnic solidarity and towards more interethnic politics.

**Institutional designs**

The ‘distribution requirement’ applied at presidential elections in Nigeria, Kenya and Indonesia is an example of the first kind of approach, which seeks to encourage cross-regional politics by requiring winning presidential candidates to gain not just a majority of the vote, but a spread of the vote across most parts of the country, in order to be elected. First introduced in Nigeria in 1979, distribution requirements have been mostly used for presidential elections in large, ethnically-diverse states in order to ensure that winning candidates receive a broad cross-national spread of electoral support, rather than drawing their votes from one region only. Nigeria, for instance, requires a president to win a majority overall and at least one-third of the vote in at least two-thirds of all states. The Kenyan constitution provides a similar threshold, requiring successful candidates to win a plurality of the vote overall as well one-quarter of valid votes cast in at least five of the eight provinces. In Indonesia, the winners of presidential elections have to gain over 50 percent of all votes nationally as well as at least 20 percent in half of all provinces to avoid a second-round runoff.

There is disagreement amongst scholars as to the utility of devices, with some interpreting them as impotent or even harmful interferences with the democratic process, while others see them as important mechanisms for muting ethnic conflict and ensuring the election of broad, pan-ethnic presidents (Sisk 1996: 55). The empirical evidence to date reflects this divergence of opinion. In both Kenya and Nigeria, problems have arisen with the operation of the system when no candidate has met the required cross-national vote spread. But
despite these problems, distribution requirements have remained a feature of national electoral politics, and in Nigeria have been extended to parliamentary elections as well via reforms that make national party registration dependent on the vote shares at local elections (Bogaards 2008: 54). In Indonesia, distribution laws have proved more successful. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won overwhelming electoral victories in both 2004 and 2009, easily amassing the necessary distribution of votes across the archipelago to take the presidency. Indeed, SBY (as he is commonly known) provides a good example of the kind of president centripetalists endorse: centrist, moderate, with broad-based support from a range of different regions and groups. For this reason, distribution requirements have also been proposed for presidential elections in Iraq (Wimmer 2003: 122).

A more direct and potentially more powerful centripetal approach to electoral system design is to use preferential, rank-order electoral systems such as the alternative vote (AV) or the single transferable vote (STV), which require voters to declare not only their first choice of candidate, but also their second, third and subsequent choices amongst all candidates standing. Under AV rules, if no-one gains an outright majority, these votes are transferred according to their rankings in order to elect a majority-supported winner. STV, as a proportional system, uses a quota rather than a majority threshold for election, but the same basic principle applies. While the best known examples of such vote-transfer systems are the established democracies of Australia and Ireland, such systems have also been used in a number of ethnically-divided developing democracies, including Papua New Guinea, Northern Ireland and Fiji, as well as one-off uses at parliamentary elections in Estonia (1990) and sub-regional presidential polls in Bosnia (2000). AV and STV systems also have a history of use in several Canadian provinces and US cities. Related systems include the supplementary vote used for presidential elections in Sri Lanka and London mayoral elections, and variants of the Borda count which are used for parliamentary elections in Nauru and some seats in Slovenia (Reilly 2004).

[INSERT on the experience of second preference votes at the 2010 Sri Lankan presidential election, the first peace-time poll in that country in over thirty year?]

Because they enable politicians to make deals for reciprocal vote transfers with their rivals, in ethnically-diverse societies such systems present vote-maximising candidates with incentives to attract secondary preference votes from groups other than their own, so as to ensure the broadest possible range of support for their candidacy. To obtain such cross-ethnic support, candidates may need to behave accommodatively on core
issues, tempering their rhetorical and policy positions so as to attract broader support. There is evidence of this practice occurring in very different types of multiethnic societies including Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Northern Ireland at different times.\(^3\) However, the utility of using such systems in deeply-divided societies remains a subject of debate: the accommodation-inducing potential of ‘preference-swapping’ is dependent on a range of facilitating conditions, including a competitive party system, an ethnically heterogeneous electorate and a degree of moderate sentiment existing in the community at large. For this reason, critics have pointed to the difficulties of inducing accommodation via electoral engineering, and questioned whether vote transfers have indeed promoted moderate outcomes in cases such as Northern Ireland and Fiji.\(^4\)

Other centripetal electoral reforms seek to undercut the logic of ethnic politics by requiring political parties to present ethnically-mixed slates of candidates for ‘at-large’ elections, thus making voter choice contingent, at some level, upon issues other than ethnicity. In multiethnic societies as diverse as Singapore, Lebanon and Djibouti, electoral laws require parties to include ethnic minorities on their candidate lists in multi-member districts, meaning that some degree of cross-ethnic voting is mandated by the electoral system. However, these kinds of stipulations are often more tokenistic than substantive. In Singapore, for instance, parties and alliances contesting the 14 multimember districts designated as ‘Group Representation Constituencies’ must include candidates from designated ethnic minorities on their ticket – an arrangement which requires only a minimal degree of cross-ethnic voting, while guaranteeing that nine seats in the Singaporean parliament will be occupied by Malays, and five by Indians or other minorities. In Africa, the island states of the Comoros and Mauritius use similar measures to ensure ethnic minority representation via “best loser” schemes for members of under-represented groups or parties.

Other cross-voting schemes mix centripetal and communal incentives. Lebanon’s ‘confessional’ political system, in which parliamentary seats are equally divided between Christian and Muslim members, with key executive offices such as the president and prime minister also allocated on a sectarian basis, is perhaps the best-known example. There, the composition of the 128-seat national assembly is pre-ordained according to communal ratios, with an even split between Christians and Muslims, as well as specified seat balances for Sunni, Shi’a, Maronite, Druze and other confessional groups within each religious community. Key executive offices such as the presidency, prime ministership, and the parliamentary speaker are also allocated on a sectarian basis. Elections are contested by inter-ethnic (or, more accurately, inter-confessional) electoral alliances which must match the pre-ordained confessional structure of each multi-member electoral district. In practice, this requires electors to
engage in a degree of cross-voting by choosing candidates who hail from outside as well as within their own confessional identity group. But the Lebanese model also has real drawbacks, fixing ethnic identities in place and making communal affiliation the basis of the entire political system.  

Fiji provides another, even more complex, example of mandated cross-voting in the shape of the political system which existed there from independence in 1970 until the ethnically-motivated coup of 1987. As in Lebanon, the ethnic balance of the 52-seat parliament was pre-determined, with 22 seats reserved for Fijians, another 22 reserved for Indo-Fijians, and the remaining 8 seats reserved for ‘General Electors’ (ie. Europeans, Chinese and other minorities). In addition, 23 electorates were designated as ‘national’ seats which required voters from one ethnic community to vote for candidates from a different community, in order to ensure that elected members from these seats would have to draw a degree of cross-communal support from all groups. To do this, the system required each elector to cast no less than four votes: one for their communal (co-ethnic) representative, and one each for a ‘national’ candidate from each of the other three designated communal groups. An indigenous Fijian voter, for example, would vote for a Fijian candidate in his or her communal electorate, and then cast three additional votes — one for a Fijian, one for an Indo-Fijian and one for a General Elector — in the appropriate national electorates.  

There is also the intriguing case of the ‘constituency pooling’ model proposed (but never implemented) in Uganda in the 1970s. According to Matthijs Bogaards (2003), this was first introduced in the Ugandan electoral law of 1971 as a means of overcoming regional, ethnic, and religious differences and of encouraging the creation of national political parties. Under this proposal, candidates would stand for election in four different electoral districts at the same time: their ‘basic’ district and three ‘national’ districts. The country was divided into four regions (North, East, West, and South) and each district belonged to a different region. Lots were drawn to link constituencies from the four regions to each other. In each basic district, two to three candidates of the same party were allowed to run. The candidate who received the largest overall percentage of votes, combining both the ‘basic’ constituency and the ‘national’ constituencies, would win the seat. As in Fiji, each elector had four votes: one for a candidate in their basic constituency, plus three for national candidates. Unfortunately for comparative purposes, Idi Amin seized power in a military coup and cancelled the elections. However, the cross-voting nature of this proposal clearly makes it another example of centripetal electoral system design.  

A final area of focus by political engineers to promote centripetal outcomes has seen direct attempts to shape the nature of political parties and party systems. Indeed,
efforts to foster large, aggregative parties, and discourage sectional or minority ones, have been a distinctive feature of democratization in Africa, Asia and Latin America.\(^6\) Again, one of the clearest examples is to be found in Indonesia – the world’s most populous emerging democracy and largest Muslim country. There, parties must establish an organisational network across a set proportion of provinces (initially one-third, then two-thirds and now 60% of all provinces), as well as offices in at least half of the districts or municipalities within these provinces, before they could contest the election, while a separate threshold has also been introduced to limit the representation of splinter parties. These rules are intended not just to make it difficult for regionally-based or secessionist movements to organise (although an exception has been made for local parties in Aceh under the terms of the 2005 peace deal there), but also to promote the development of nationally-focussed political parties.\(^7\) As such, the party law shares a common centripetal logic with Indonesia’s presidential electoral system, which also includes (weaker) incentives for cross-regional support.

Political party engineering is also popular in other regions. In Africa, some 22 countries include requirements that parties have a national presence, or what Bogaards (2008: 48-66), in an important contribution, refers to as strategies of “aggregation”. But most of these are also accompanied by overt bans on ethnic parties, which tend to have little if any impact on actual party development. In Latin America, ethnic parties are not a major issue, but there have been similar attempts to encourage aggregative and nationally-oriented parties with a cross-regional organisational base. States such as Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Mexico, and Peru have all introduced spatial registration rules for political parties. In Mexico, for example, parties must have at least 3000 affiliates in ten out of the 32 states, or one-third of federal districts, while in Ecuador and Peru, parties must meet officially-inscribed membership levels in at least half of all provinces. However Ecuador, which introduced spatial registration rules in the 1970s to combat party fragmentation, also provides a cautionary tale. There, the introduction of spatial rules helped consolidate the party system, but at the cost of wiping out parties representing the country’s indigenous minority, which relied on regionally-concentrated Amerindian support (Birnir 2004).

As these divergent examples suggest, political engineering and institutional design to encourage centripetal outcomes is an uncertain process fraught with unintended consequences. But despite this, measures which promote cross-ethnic politics and political aggregation – two key centripetal outcomes – appear to be growing in popularity, particularly in new democracies. The attractiveness of such reforms can be explained by several factors. Theoretically, centripetalism draws upon core political science ideas about the nature of social cleavages, particularly Seymour Martin
Lipset’s classic arguments about the virtues of cross-cutting cleavages for promoting stable democracy. Normatively, the virtues of political aggregation and centrisim are advocated (sometimes instinctively) by many policymakers, particularly those schooled in the Anglo-American tradition of two-party politics. Empirically, centripetal reforms are also more compatible with the development of two-party systems than alternatives such as consociationalism, and thus are attractive for political reformers looking to build more stable political systems – a frequently-expressed desire in many new democracies.

Critiques

Centripetalism has also attracted significant criticism on empirical and conceptual grounds. Empirically, critics point to the paucity of centripetal models in the real world; the limited application of cross-voting electoral systems, distribution requirements and other favoured devices; the difficulty in both forming and sustaining multi-ethnic political parties and coalitions in divided societies; and the ambiguous real-world experience of particular institutions such as the alternative vote. However, many of these critiques focus on the experience of a few high-profile cases such as Northern Ireland or (recently) Fiji, but tend to ignore other larger but less well-known examples of centripetalism in action such as Indonesia or Papua New Guinea. For instance, the re-introduction of AV laws in Papua New Guinea and the subsequent reduction in electoral conflicts at the 2007 national elections has yet to be incorporated into comparative discussions of centripetalism. Neither has the success of the peacemaking process in Bougainville, which includes a number of centripetal reforms such as cross-voting reserved seats for women, youth and ex-combatants as well as AV presidential elections.

As noted above, centripetalism is also criticized for being essentially majoritarian in nature. As the logic of centripetalism is focussed above all on the potential benefits of aggregation – of votes, of opinions, of parties – at one level, this is correct. G. Bingham Powell, for example, notes that political aggregation lies at the heart of what he calls the ‘majoritarian vision’ of democracy: “the majoritarian view favours much greater aggregation, while the proportional view emphasizes the importance of equitable reflection of all points of view into the legislature” (Powell 2000: 26). For this reason, critics of centripetalism have often identified the majoritarian nature of its institutional recommendations as a key weakness.

Centripetalists respond that they favour “a majoritarian democracy that will produce more fluid, shifting majorities that do not lock ascriptive minorities firmly out of power” (Horowitz 1991: 176). In other words, while centripetalism is indeed a majoritarian model, it is a majoritarianism of broad-based parties and inclusive coalitions – not a majoritarianism of
‘ins’ and ‘outs’, of ethnically-defined majorities and minorities. Centripetalists ideally favour an aggregative party system, in which ‘one or two broadly-based, centrist parties fight for the middle ground’ (Diamond 1996: 239), and therefore endorse the development of multiethnic parties or coalitions. In practice, this means that rather than stressing the importance of proportionality, as per the scholarly orthodoxy, centripetal approaches instead favour an aggregative majoritarianism, with more emphasis on the process by which different groups work together than strict fairness of outcomes.

Interestingly, the majoritarian themes of the centripetal approach and their emphasis on aggregative, ‘bridging’ political parties are echoed by and find support in a quite separate scholarly literature, on the political economy of development. Both literatures, for example, advocate aggregative political institutions, majoritarian electoral processes and broad-based ‘catch-all’ parties or coalitions. These same recommendations are also prominent in the ‘developmental state’ literature on the optimum political arrangements for economic development in new democracies. Thus, various works co-authored by Stephan Haggard have consistently argued that a system of two large parties or coalitions is the most propitious arrangement for democratic durability during periods of economic adjustment, while fragmented or polarized party systems represent a major barrier to achieving economic reform. Such recommendations suggest a growing convergence amongst different political science sub-disciplines on the benefits of aggregative and centripetal institutions for political development and stability.

Conclusion

In practice, the political engineering models of consociationalism, centripetalism and communalism should probably be seen more as ideal types rather than coherent, all-encompassing prescriptions. Indeed, many countries use combinations of each approach. Table 1 sets out the key recommendations of each approach.

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representing their own ethnic group multiethnic parties or party coalitions communal element of elections.

| Cabinets          | Grand coalition governments; minority veto on important issues | Multiethnic coalition governments. No minority vetoes | Formal powersharing arrangements based on vote or seat share |

Despite their differences, there is some agreement on some broader issues. For instance, there is a general consensus on the capacity of political institutions to change political outcomes, and hence on the utility of political engineering. Common ground is also found in the central role ascribed to political parties and electoral systems as key institutional variables influencing the reduction – or escalation – of communal tensions in ethnically diverse societies. A third area of agreement is the broad acceptance of the need in divided societies to deal with the political effects of ethnicity directly, rather than wishing them away. At a minimum, this means some type of government arrangement that gives all significant groups access to power, either directly or indirectly. For this reason, multiethnic coalitions are favoured by both consociationalists and centripetalists as a desirable form of powersharing for divided societies.

The contemporary experience of these different approaches has varied depending on the severity of the conflicts at stake. In deeply-divided post-war scenarios such as Bosnia, Northern Ireland and most recently Iraq, consociationalism remains the dominant approach. However, this trend is party driven by the United Nations’ standard model of post-conflict democratization, which favours the use of PR elections and power-sharing governments in the immediate aftermath of a conflict. Elsewhere, in less catastrophic cases, the trend in many regions has been away from the ethnically-based approach of consociationalism towards more fluid, centripetal models. Thus, there has been a marked shift away towards centripetalism in many parts of the developing world, particularly in Asia and the Pacific, in recent years.12

References


Bogaards, Matthijs (2008), ‘Comparative strategies of political party regulation’ in Benjamin Reilly and Per Nordlund (eds), Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Regulation, Engineering and Democratic Development, United Nations University Press, Tokyo.


1 See Lijphart, 1995. Similarly, consociationalists also favour ethnic federalism. As with political parties, a key presumption is that constituent units should be as ethnically homogeneous as possible in order to maximize each group’s control over their own interests and resources.

2 For surveys of these, see Horowitz 1985, 597-600.

3 See Reilly 2001, chaps 4-6.

4 For a recent example see Coakley and Fraenkel, 2009.

5 For an excellent analysis, see Salloukh 2006.

6 For a survey of these, see Reilly and Nordlund 2008.

7 For instance, at the April 2004 parliamentary elections, most of these major parties were able to attract a significant spread of votes across western, central and eastern Indonesia. While there were clear regional strongholds (the Islamic parties dominated in Sumatra, PDI did best in Java/Bali, while GOLKAR remained strong in eastern Indonesia), these were less pronounced than in 1999, prior to the new party laws.

8 For a discussion, see Lijphart, 1991; Reynolds, 1995; Fraenkel, 2001; Lijphart 2004; Fraenkel and Grofman, 2004.

9 For a partial exception, see, Reilly 2007.

10 See, for example, Lijphart 1995, 863-4; Reynolds 1999, 108-110.


12 For a book length discussion of this, see Reilly 2006.