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REVIEWS

Global Lies? Propaganda, the UN and World Order
Mark D. Alleyne
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003
Hbk: ISBN: 033392004X £50.00
Pbk: ISBN: 1403921008 £15.99
pp. 262 (including: appendices, footnotes, bibliography and index)

The photograph on the front cover of this book shows former UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim surrounded by a group of children from the United Nations International School. That an organisation ostensibly devoted to international peace and cooperation was led for a decade by a Nazi war criminal nicely illustrates the problems and contradictions which Mark D. Alleyne explores in his fascinating and informative study of the UN's Department of Public Information (DPI). Established in 1946 to publicise the aims and activities of the UN, the DPI itself is founded on a contradiction: it is the means by which the UN, while outlawing propaganda, engages in its own propaganda activity. The DPI has always argued that its work is not propagandistic, on the grounds either that it merely provides objective, value-neutral information, or that it only promotes 'universally approved causes and movements' such as human rights or environmentalism. Alleyne argues convincingly that such claims cannot be taken at face value. The UN's human rights campaigning, for example, 'originated in the power politics that founded the UN and is still a reflection of that power dynamic' (p. 110).

Yet, as the question mark in the title indicates, Alleyne is not against the idea that the UN should seek to ban 'bad propaganda' and promote 'good propaganda'. He just wishes it would be less mealy-mouthed about doing so. This defensiveness, he argues, has hampered efforts to improve the UN's image and has made some initiatives – such as funding special newspaper supplements, not always labelled as paid advertising – seem dishonest. However, since the appointment of Kofi Annan as Secretary General in 1997 the DPI has increased in importance, with greater attention than ever being paid to public relations. Alleyne suggests this is a response to the nature of the age, which he characterises in terms of 'the preponderance of international mass media, the phenomena of international spectacles, the Internet and the rise of public diplomacy' (p. 172—173). This dovetails with the meta-argument which Alleyne makes about the discipline of International Relations: that the field should take account of cultural matters (such as how the public image of the UN is constructed in media reports and film narratives) and embrace postmodernist and constructivist approaches. In the information age, he suggests, the UN is bound to put more emphasis on image and spectacle, and scholars have to examine such efforts. The proposition is not as radical a departure as Alleyne seems to think, and it makes a rather weak conclusion to the book.

Strikingly, Connor Cruise O'Brien argued as long ago as 1968 that the UN was all about drama and symbolism rather than substance and policy. This perspective, Alleyne suggests, was rediscovered 30 years later by writers such as Francois Debrix, analysing the organisation in terms of its 'signifying mission' (p. 26). Yet while O'Brien's view reflected the UN's relatively marginal position during the Cold War, the postmodernist position expresses the scepticism toward grand narratives typical of the post-Cold War era. A particular target of scepticism is any narrative which promises an alternative to Western hegemony. It is the shift to a unipolar world after 1989, in which yesterday's non-aligned states and nationalist movements have become potential targets of international intervention as today's rogue states and ethnic cleansers, that explains the current state of UN propaganda, rather than notions of the post-modern condition or the information age.

One of Annan's first actions on assuming office was to overhaul the DPI. His Task Force on the Reorientation of United Nations Public Information Activities recommended in 1997 that public information should be at 'the heart of the strategic management' of the UN. Arguing that the DPI should 'become a real player in changing the character of international relations', using 'strategic communication' and 'public diplomacy', effectively meant urging the UN to act more like a state (p. 54—55). This has been possible only to the extent that the sovereignty of some actual states has been weakened. In the 1950s, the DPI's adoption of the then fashionable 'two-step flow' model of communication may, as Alleyne argues, have indicated a fuzzy understanding of who constituted its target audience, but it perhaps also reflected the UN's caution about addressing populations over the heads of their governments and national institutions. In contrast, some of the Department's more recent activities, such as its use of the Internet, are 'circumventing the authority of governments' (p. 133).

In the early 1990s, launching more peacekeeping missions than ever before, the UN enjoyed renewed international prestige as the focus of hopes for a new, morally principled international dispensation. Yet while ethical interventionism has prospered, the UN itself has been seen to fail, criticised by many for its adherence to an old-fashioned, state-centric model of world order. The more the UN has sought to accommodate the new realities of power, the more it has abrogated its own principles of non-intervention and sovereign equality. Apologising for the UN's failures in the 1990s, Annan has presided over a decisive shift in favour of the idea that human rights trump sovereignty. Awarding him the Peace Prize in 2001, the Nobel committee inadvertently praised the Secretary General for having undermined the principles on which his organisation rested. Annan, they said, had won the prize for making it clear 'that sovereignty cannot be a shield behind which member states conceal their violations' (p. 74). It is by the same logic that interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have either ignored the UN or proceeded regardless of its disapproval. As coalitions of the willing are able to bomb, invade and occupy 'failing' or 'rogue' states without the sanction of the UN, the organisation remains 'relevant' only insofar as it provides a cover for Anglo-American intervention. In such circumstances the UN does indeed lack substance, and, as Alleyne shows, it has never been particularly stylish.

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Differing Diversities: Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity
Tony Bennett (ed)
Council of Europe, 2000
PBK: ISBN: 9287146497 $29.00 €19.00
pp. 202 (including: chapter references & appendix)

The first section of this volume is a traversal study on the theme of cultural policy and cultural diversity by Tony Bennett and the work forms part of a programme developed by the Cultural Policy and Action Development of the Council of Europe's Directorate of Culture and Cultural and Natural Heritage. The methodology for the programme had two distinct phases. A series of descriptive national reports was drawn up initially by a number of national co-ordinators for each of the participating European states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Representatives from Canada also participated in the project. In phase two, members of the project team visited each of these states and a series of research papers on selected transversal topics was commissioned, before the final report was compiled. The research position papers are published in part two of this book.

One of the key points of the introductory report is the irreducible specificity of the terms in which issues of cultural diversity arise in different contexts. As no two situations are entirely alike, one should be wary of generalising all forms of cultural differences. Bennett's report points to the inadequacy of the universal concept of 'cultural diversity' as a solution to particular situations of post-war migration or forms of cultural identity that have stubbornly resisted the process of assimilation in specific places.

Although we live in an increasingly de-territorialized and globalized world, there is still the tendency to essentialise culture and locate it in a specific time-space context. The construction of the nation-states has involved mapping specific peoples with particular narratives of identity within precise geographical boundaries, and nation-states have commonly endeavoured to homogenise, assimilate or suppress other cultures, which did not conform to the national norm. Bennett's paper reviews the national reports of the participating countries and offers a useful overview of the different approaches to diversity within the boundaries of the relevant member states.

This association of culture with territory is also reflected in some key international documents on cultural issues. For example, the languages of migrants do not come under the remit of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; the Charter only applies to speakers of languages which have traditionally been used in a particular location. In a useful discussion of terms such as 'autochthonous' and 'indigenous', Bennett draws the reader's attention to the association of the geographical concept of Europe and European cultural policy with the emergence of Christian and classical traditions in European regions. In consequence, much of the impetus towards the development of European cultural policy excludes those who are assumed to be non-European.

Several interesting position papers reinforce this point. In a contribution on the consequences of European media policies and organisational structures for cultural diversity, Denis McQuail calls for a detailed enquiry into the complexities of many issues that have been widely identified under the heading of cultural diversity. The internal cultural diversity of Europe is in a rapid state of flux and many countries have new as well as older identifications including categories of refugees, ex-colonial citizens, migrant workers etc. which are hardly included in many cultural policies.

Cris Shore reinforces this position in a wide-ranging essay examining cultural policies of the European Union. His argument is that European Union cultural policy is motivated by the assumption that culture is necessarily an integrative mechanism, which engenders social cohesion among the citizens of Europe. Yet the Eurocentrism inherent in its conception of culture of necessity excludes categories of 'non-European' culture, including Africans, Asians and the so-called 'cultures of hybridity' such as Turkish-Germans, Afro-Caribbean-Britons, and Italian-Mollucans.

The concept of recognition also features in Lia Ghilardi's highly interesting contribution on cultural planning and cultural diversity. She stresses the significance of an anthropological approach to culture; defining it as a way of life. While cultural policies tend to have a sectoral focus, cultural planning is directed towards the territorial unit. Consequently it is important to note that cultural planning does not involve the planning of some ephemeral notion of culture. Instead it necessitates a cultural (anthropological) approach to urban planning and policy. In a thesis compatible with the Gaia theory, Ghilardi proposes the notion of territory as a 'living ecosystem' which needs to the explored fully and acknowledged before policy can intervene.

Any review of cultural and media policy should be directed towards the wide variety of cultures and ethnicities in a particular location. Annabelle Sreberny focuses particularly on the notion of 'diasporic communities'; a term increasingly preferred to describe 'ethnic minorities' or 'immigrants'. New media have ensured that such communities can circumvent traditional territorial restrictions. Appadurai has used the term 'ethnoscape' to acknowledge the sense of diaspora that may be spread across several nations or continents but is connected together through sophisticated media.

Although it is commonly assumed that the globalization of culture in the new media will ultimately homogenise or even 'Americanise' minority and national cultures, Rosemary Coombe draws attention to the re-affirmation of cultural traditions in Canada's Northwest Territories though the use of the Internet. As the Internet offers the opportunity for communication in space rather than in place, it may ultimately prevent the further erosion of traditional languages and lesson the isolation of many indigenous communities.

Themes of culture, diaspora and place feature strongly in many of the research position papers. Other interesting contributions include a focus on the implications of international copyright law by Mira Sundara Rajan and the implementation of cultural diversity policies by Arnold Love. Ideally, this book would have had a brief concluding review by the editor drawing together the themes interweaving the different conclusions. This, however, is a minor point and the book is recommended to policy makers and academics alike.

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Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs
Henry F. Carey and Oliver P. Richmond (eds)
Frank Cass, 2003
HBK: ISBN: 0714654302 £42.50 $79.95
PBK: ISBN: 0714684066 £17.50 $26.95
pp. 191 (including: Acronyms and Abbreviations, Abstracts, Notes on Contributors and Index)

This book can be read on two levels. On one level it is a broad-ranging analysis of the problems and issues raised by NGO engagement in conflict prevention and peace-building. Divided into sections on thematic issues (six chapters) and case studies (four chapters) the key questions of NGO independence from donors and governments, problems of the manipulation of aid and capacity for long-term planning, and problems of politicisation under the human rights agenda are raised and addressed with a variety of different nuances.

Many chapters stand out as being of particular interest. For example, Michael Schloms' chapter on the contradictions and problems of NGOs pursuing a humanitarian or a human rights agenda handles the debate with care and balance, highlighting the limited role humanitarian aid can play in peacebuilding. Charlotte Ku and Joaquín Cáceres Brun highlight the reasons for the International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC) stance on neutrality in the face of pressure to go down a more partisan and politicised path. Frances T. Pilch contributes a fascinating chapter on the struggle of Western legal NGOs, through elite advocacy and the provision of *amicus curiae* briefs, to 'engender' war crimes prosecutions and extend international law in relation to sexual violence. This book would therefore makes a good introduction to the questions of NGO engagement in peace

processes and one that I would recommend for undergraduate and MA teaching purposes.

On another level, the chapters and the introduction and conclusion offer very little that would be new or of interest to readers more familiar with the debates. In fact, the underlying impression is one of setting up a straw man which is then only criticised in a fairly circumstantial way. The problem is that the starting assumption for the editors and contributors is that NGOs have a vital role to play in peace processes. As Oliver Richmond states in his Introduction: 'NGOs are relatively unencumbered by sovereign concerns and are themselves relatively free from claims to sovereignty, which enables them to work in normative frameworks untainted by official, state and systemic interests.' (p. 5) From this rather naïve and idealistic perspective, problems, issues and contradictions raised by the contributors are then of interest only in so far as they raise the need for 'further investigation in order to develop more effective and multidimensional responses to conflict in the field on the part of NGOs and the many actors they are associated with' (p. 10). The bland assumptions and anodyne conclusions, set up a highly restrictive research framework. This restrictive approach taints every contribution to the collection and establishes a framework for the book which tends to weaken and truncate the very useful points raised.

Some of the weaker chapters focus on prescriptive rather than analytical concerns, for example, Francis Kofi Abiew writes that NGO-Military relations need better understanding and coordination, Felice D. Gaer uncritically charts the mainstreaming of human rights concerns in UN bodies and urges further progress on this. The uncritical and narrow starting assumptions hugely exaggerate the role that NGOs can play. Wafula Okumu, in his chapter on humanitarian NGOs in Africa, for example, argues that NGOs are 'mitigating the social and economic consequences of collapsing states…implementing peace accords, promoting democratic and economic reforms, protecting human rights, and encouraging the settlement of conflicts' (p. 120) before laying out his own prescriptive solutions. It is as if states and governments, markets and major powers do not really play a significant role in the outcome of peace processes and that NGOs operate in some parallel universe where normative values are enough to turn wishes into reality.

The lack of any broader consideration of how NGOs, new security approaches and new normative frameworks fit into the increasingly unregulated, and increasingly hierarchical, framework of international relations is a frustrating lacunae. The questions raised about third party interference, ethics, coordination and long-term processes of external regulation are broader ones, concerning Western policy making and the breakdown of the Cold War framework of international regulation. Looking at these questions in technical terms of NGO practice and experience makes them less open to investigation or clarification.

In fact, the real question is why there is such a focus on NGOs when conflict resolution and peace-building processes are, if anything, affairs of states. Establishing the importance of NGOs for policy-making is one thing, especially when it comes to the influence of Western elite advocates, such as high profile individuals or lawyers' groups; however, establishing the importance of NGOs for conflict resolution and peacebuilding in non-Western states is another. James Larry Taulbee and Marion V. Creekmore, Jr's chapter on the role of the Carter Centre highlights the dependency of Carter's 'Track 1½' diplomacy on US government advice and permission. Bronwyn Evans-Kent and Roland Bleiker in their chapter on NGOs in Bosnia highlight the token contribution of domestic NGOs, limited to multi-cultural drama groups and lecturing demobilised soldiers on the dangers of alcoholism. Mahmood Monshipouri's chapter on NGOs and peacebuilding in

Afghanistan makes clear that, when the government's writ does not run outside the capital Kabul, the potential for NGOs to promote gender equality, long-term development, community participation or refugee return is somewhat limited. Not only is peace-building dependent on states and governing structures in the region, the success of conflict resolution is often dependent on states outside the region as well.

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Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security

Mark Duffield
Zed Books, 2001
HBK: ISBN: 1856497488 £49.95 $75.00
PBK: ISBN: 1856497496 £16.95 $29.95
pp. 304 (including: bibliography & index)

Global Governance and the New Wars presents an innovative and provocative approach to regional security complexes and socio-economic development. The book is very rich in information and ideas, and it is of direct interest to both students of world politics and practitioners in the field of conflict resolution. The book suggests many new research questions; of particular interest is how the study of the 'shadow economies' may point out some of the insufficiencies and misunderstandings of the current notions of global governance. This book seeks to explain why the early hopes that the end of the Cold War would bring about an era of peace and stability were not borne out.

The subtitle (the merging of development and security) provides some clues to Duffield's argument. He points out that during the Cold War international security hinged on maintaining a balance of power between sovereign states. The superpowers sought alliances with the nation-states of the 'Third World'. The end of the Cold War has changed all of this. These alliances have lost their political significance and consequently the sovereignty of nation-states of what was formerly the Third World (now renamed the 'South') is no longer of strategic importance. The 'new wars' of the post-Cold War world are primarily internal to the nation-states of the South and the former Soviet bloc. The threat of instability in the world system has shifted from one *between* the superpowers to one *within* the South and the former Soviet bloc. Underdevelopment is understood to be the source of this instability and the cure is the development and reorganization of the countries of the South. Aid, humanitarian assistance and social reconstruction (the core of traditional development activity) have thus become reconceptualised as tools for creating security and preventing future conflict.

The end of the Cold War marks a watershed in international affairs. Duffield points out, however, that the dramatic political changes it has wrought obscure a longer-term fundamental shift from a capitalist system that was expansive and inclusive to what he calls a 'liberal' world system. 'Since the 1970s, formal trade, productive, financial and technological networks have been concentrating within and between the North American, Western European and East Asian regional systems at the expense of outlying areas' (p. 2). Economically the South has become decoupled from the North. Politically the South is now the object of selective interventions 'preferably through cooperative partnership arrangements, to change whole societies and the behaviour and attitudes of the people within them' (p. 42). Unlike the colonial relationship which characterized North-South relations in the past, these interventions are not carried out by individual governments but by multi-level and increasingly non-territorial decision making networks that bring

'together governments, NGOs, military establishments and private companies in new ways' (p. 2). These decision-making networks are the actors and institutions of global governance.

According to Duffield, the key problem with the liberal 'new wars' perspective is that it conceptualizes creative indigenous responses to the decoupling of the South from the formal world economy as a problem. The expansion of non-formal 'shadow' economies, especially in war torn areas, such as in Africa, 'has come about not because of structural adjustment, market liberalization and the activities of aid agencies, but as an indirect, subversive and antagonistic response to these developments' (p. 159). He uses the example of the UNITA rebel movement in Angola, which spans the Cold War and post-Cold War, to illustrate the indigenous response to a changing economic and strategic context. In the process of shifting from reliance on superpower support UNITA has undertaken wide-ranging changes in its 'control of resources and populations, its mode of legitimation and organisation, and its relations with outside actors, international agencies and global networks' (p. 138). Development discourse, he says, ignores the complex process of social transformation and adaptation involved in such a shift and instead focuses on the often brutal and coercive methods through which it has been achieved.

Although Duffield should be commended for his innovative approach, his new theoretical perspective is not always entirely clear. For example, the author often appears to endorse arguments from the liberal perspective, while at other instances he gravitates toward concepts from dependency theory. Different theories have different implications, but the author never explicitly discusses the criterion for evaluating theories and their propositions. This problem becomes even clearer at the concluding chapter where the author states that the liberal peace argument suffers from severe limitations, yet the discussion does not clarify how future research may proceed to address these limitations. The link between theoretical propositions and policy implications is moreover not always clearly defined. For example, the author advocates 'reformation of institutions and networks of global governance to address complexity' instead of 'searching for better policy' (p. 264), but provides few answers as to how institutions could be reformed and towards what direction. The main argument of this book is somewhat tailored to fit the reality of the African continent, which sometimes comes at the expense of its broader applicability to other regions. In particular, to what extent would similar processes apply to the Eastern European countries in the fringes of the European Union? It is interesting to point out that the European Union followed a rather integrative policy bringing-in the former communist counties. Despite some problems with clarity, overall, Duffield presents a challenging argument that can potentially have a great impact in the field of humanitarian intervention and international governance.

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State Crime: Government, Violence and Corruption
Penny Green and Tony Ward
Pluto Press, 2004
HBK: ISBN: 0745317855 £45.00 $75.00
PBK: ISBN: 0745317847 £14.99 $24.95
pp. 256 (including: notes, references and index)

Penny Green and Tony Ward's book, *State Crime*, makes an important contribution to the field of criminology, defining the state as a possible perpetrator of crime. Using the already existing literature in international relations, the authors lead criminology beyond

the boundaries of the nation-state. Putting together a range of different resources from various disciplines, the book describes different ways through which states, or different agents with the complicity of the state, violate human rights and produce harm to individuals.

Following the international relations literature, essentially the authors argue that the state, from the more autocratic to the more liberal one, is capable of committing crimes and human rights violations. Their argument is based on the premise that there is a 'political economy of crime'. According to the authors, 'the relationship between forces of production and the state shapes patterns of criminal behavior in different kinds of states' (p. 185). A direct attack is carried out by western military intervention and institutions of global finance, which, through imposing political and economic conditions for good governance, create paradoxically the conditions for human rights violations (p. 192). Green and Ward argue that the promotion of universal values by institutions such as IMF and WTO are serving the interests of transnational capital and the economically powerful. In turn, this leads to an increase in authoritarianism, a lack of legitimacy and therefore further human rights violations. In this context, the role of civil society, 'the organized voice of ordinary working people' (p. 208), becomes vital, in order to label ruling elite's acts as criminal and create a different hegemony from the one purported by global institutions and powerful states.

Crimes committed by states range from corruption to genocide. Green and Ward devote a chapter to each of the most significant ones: corruption, state corporate crime, natural disaster, police crime, organized crime, terror, torture, war crimes, and genocide. In each chapter the reader will find a definition and a description of the different parameters used to evaluate the offence. Many different examples are used, highlighting complexities of the subject, which are taken from the analysis of other disciplines and from data collected by NGO's like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and State Watch, and finally an attempt to explain the whole through criminology theory.

The book opens with the definition of the state as criminal. The state is conceived in Marxist terms as 'public power equipped for the use of force' (p. 3) and it is represented as a unitary force pursuing its own goals to whose acts it is possible to adapt central concepts of criminology. The criminal state is a form of 'organizational deviance involving the violation of human rights' (p. 2). Despite being aware of the ambiguity of the human rights concept, which has been used to support military interventions, or to argue 'an extension of global processes of policing and punishment' (p. 10), the authors claim its usefulness to delineate and delimit the number of deviant acts for which the state should be responsible. The authors seem to suggest that human rights are those so labeled by civil society and not only the ones inscribed in international legal conventions.

According to Green and Ward, the essence of many state crimes stems from corruption: 'a form of clandestine exchange committed either in pursuit of the organizational goals of state agencies or tolerated for organizational reasons' (p. 11). Corruption is closely interrelated with clientelism and patrimonialism, other two forms of illicit exchange and abuse of power. These phenomena, which are supported by economic liberalism and global financial institutions, directly or indirectly violate human rights. Indeed clientelism and patrimonialism divert resources from people and obfuscate the political process damaging population's ability to participate.

Very interestingly, natural disasters are described as state crime. The argument is that states should be held responsible for potential disasters, whose scale of consequences is directly related to corrupt practices. The increasing pressure on the environment and natural resources makes population more vulnerable, being forced into displacement and

poverty. The argument compels us to pay attention to state responsibility for consequences usually considered of natural disaster, opening up the discourse to other unusual disciplines.

The inclusion of war crimes shows not only particular attention to the need for a criminology of war, but also to the actual political situation, leading the conclusion of the book to the analysis of the current war in Iraq. Criminology has never considered war as an appropriate object of knowledge, even though many have pointed out the gross victimization that war inevitably creates (Jamieson 1998). Green and Ward underline the western complicity in Saddam Hussein's most dreadful crimes during the war with Iran in the 1980s, while the dictator was largely abusing of his monopoly of force, torturing, terrorizing and committing genocide. On the contrary, these same western countries have used allegations against Saddam Hussein's regime to protect US oil interests and to create support for this action through the notion of 'justified punishment'.

In conclusion, Green and Ward's book accomplishes an important task: it articulates a discourse on the state as a possible source of crimes within the field of criminology. This sets up a foundation of a new paradigm of crime, not based on the legal definition, but on the concept of human rights violations. In so doing, criminology becomes independent from law, changing its own subject matter, which is defined by the labeling of civil society. This book is the extremely interesting result of the convergence of the literature in international relations and the one in criminology, underlying the interconnection among these disciplines. For criminologists, this book shows how important it is to focus on the wide range of crimes committed by the powerful and in particular by state organizations instead of the crimes committed by the poor. For international relations scholars, this work suggests the limits of relying on a strict legal definition of human rights violations, giving some understanding of how the individual and the organizational levels interplay in human rights violations.

Reference

Jamieson, R. (1998), 'Toward a Criminology of War in Europe', in Ruggiero, V., South, N. and Taylor, I., (eds) *The New European Criminology: Crime and Social Order in Europe*. London: Routledge

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Language Rights and Political Theory

Will Kymlicka and Alan Patten (eds.)
Oxford University Press, 2003
HBK: ISBN: 019926290X £50.00
PBK: ISBN: 0199262918 £18.99
pp. 349 (including index, notes, references and tables)

Will Kymlicka and Alan Patten themselves signal why their collection is important: it is the first book-length engagement with language rights from a normative-theoretical perspective. Language, the editors note, has received less systematic attention from normative theorists over the last decade than many other group allegiances, including race, ethnicity, nation, indigenous community, gender and religion—despite its centrality to numerous contemporary conflicts, and despite the peculiarly interesting challenge that language represents for liberal political theory.

It presents a special challenge because, as all the contributors recognize, the liberal ideal of state neutrality regarding citizens' lifestyles, identities and creeds is peculiarly inapplicable to the sphere of language. Since state personnel must communicate with citizens and each other, they necessarily adopt a medium of communication; and because their preferred medium will not be the mother tongue of all citizens, language is a matter on which even the most 'civic' of nationalisms, the most non-interventionist of liberal regimes, favour some citizens over others. Because language is a source of identity as well as a tool, the impossibility of language neutrality arguably jeopardizes the possibility of state cultural neutrality more generally.

Beyond agreeing that the state is ineluctably a linguistic interventionist, the contributors all appear to be liberals who reject the coercive suppression and promotion of languages. Their central disagreement is over whether the state should promote language uniformity or act to preserve declining minority languages. Contributors championing common (typically majority) language promotion cite the value of shared language to social cohesion, economic efficiency, democratic deliberation and individual social mobility. Those advocating bilingualism and/or language preservation wish to redress injustices suffered by minority-language communities, provide linguistic minorities with contexts of choice, affirm equality and secure the 'public good' of bio-lingual diversity.

The debate that ensues is over more than the relative weight of these rival considerations. In two areas, contributors dispute basic factual premises. Where some attribute language decline to oppressions inflicted by nationalists and imperialists, others put it down mainly to the demands of a necessary and unstoppable modernity. (The very definition of oppression is contested: a number confine its meaning to overt suppression, while others consider the state's promotion of majority language itself oppressive.) And while several contributors hold that minority language education impedes learners' social mobility and majority-language proficiency, Stephen May cites empirical evidence that it does precisely the opposite.

Disagreements are not all *between* the language pluralists and the supporters of shared language. In the latter camp, Thomas Pogge pronounces historical injustices to be irrelevant to the calibration of present-day language rights, while Michael Blake endorses positive remedial action to assist historically oppressed language groups. Preservationists have their own dilemmas: should language rights follow citizens wherever they live in a state, or only apply in designated sub-territories? While Patten favours the former except under certain conditions, Denise Réaume advises that rights follow neither individuals nor territories but viable language communities.

Some differences are less sharp than they first appear. Predictably, language preservationists like May and Réaume emphasise the group interest of minority language communities in linguistic survival, while moral individualists (notably Pogge and Daniel Weinstock) fret over the illiberal consequences of prioritizing group over individual interests. Yet May claims liberal credentials and endorses the individual's right to exit groups, while Réaume would support only languages enjoying the day-to-day commitment of their speakers and supporters. Conversely, while an anti-preservationist current runs through many chapters, no contributor denies that the state should provide translators to foreign language speakers in courts and hospitals. In other words, even defenders of majority languages would accommodate minority languages, if only transitionally. And the boundary between accommodation and promotion can blur.

On the whole this collection works: by parading so wide a range of (liberal) positions and issues, and corralling key writers to present them, its designers have ensured that readers will come away with a pretty good overview of how normative theory has begun

to address language issues. They will also be persuaded, I think, that political theorists bring distinctive insights to a field hitherto mainly populated (as François Grin notes) by sociolinguists, anthropologists, ethnologists, educationists and lawyers. That indeed is the one definite message of a book that otherwise functions as a forum rather than manifesto.

The book's range does stretch it thin. Philippe van Parijs's discussion of rival formulae for subsidizing majority language acquisition engages none of his co-contributors. His and two more cursory discussions (by Rubio-Marín and David Laitin & Rob Reich) of the right to acquire the *majority* tongue seem stranded in a book mainly debating minority language preservation. More could have been said on another topic: the moral relevance of history. May rightly considers Pogge too dismissive of historical claims, but never himself adequately explains why past linguistic injustice should concern us. I would have also liked to see someone take up the challenge of Laitin and Reich's 'liberal democratic' approach, which seems to assume that where it is desirable to settle matters via political competition, philosophers and their principles should keep out. (Is normative theory required only to adjudicate pre-political constitutional rights, and not to influence political discussions about the choiceworthiness of substantive policy options? Does interest-driven politics not itself find expression in the sorts of public reasons that theorists can usefully scrutinize?)

Not unlike the book perhaps, a few individual contributions meander. It is not clear whether Rubio-Marín is offering a taxonomy of language rights or making a case for the primacy of instrumental rights. Though loosely united by a concern with diversity, Grin's chapter ambles across different topics. Idil Boran defends the biodiversity argument for language preservation against all comers in a lengthy and illuminating discussion, then proceeds to ambush it on different grounds.

Such occasional lapses of focus and structural coherence, whether in individual chapters or the book overall, do not seriously detract from the usefulness of Kymlicka and Patten's collection. The book is likely to become a key reference in both teaching and scholarly debate on the normative aspects of language policy.

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Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities
Ludger Mees
Palgrave, 2003
HBK: ISBN: 1403902658 £50.00 $69.95
pp. 288 (including: bibliography and index)

Nationalism, Violence and Democracy communicates a mixed message. Mees oscillates between trying to communicate a positive message about the conflict in the Basque Country and a more pessimistic view of the chances for resolving the conflict any time soon. The author argues that the growing unpopularity of the armed struggle of *Euskadi ta Askatasuma* (ETA), along with increased successes by Spanish security forces, has pushed ETA towards its ceasefire in 1998 and may in fact continue to push ETA in that direction.

The book essentially attempts to do three things. First, it analyzes the evolution of Basque nationalism as a political and social cross-class movement within a weak Spanish nation-state. Second, it attempts to explain the development of political violence. Third,

it examines the various opportunities available for the resolution of the conflict. The book also compares the Basque case with that of Northern Ireland, in particular the errors committed in the Basque conflict, the missed opportunities and the reasons for the return of violence.

The first three chapters of the book do not add anything new to the extensive literature already available on the origins of Basque identity and nationalism. Describing it as calculated ambiguity, the author argues that, compared to Catalan nationalism, Basque nationalism has always been a more defensive project from the beginning because it failed to formulate its own position in relation to the state. Nationalism, however, is by its very nature something ambiguous and in this respect, Catalan nationalism can arguably be described as just as ambiguous in the formulation of its own position vis-à-vis the Spanish state.

Mees also proposes four hypotheses which may explain why Basque nationalism, rather than Catalan or Galician nationalism, turned to violence. First, he argues that most of ETA's recruits have traditionally stemmed from the Basque lower classes (why this in itself is a reason for violence is never fully explained). Second, that the never-ending warfare, which characterized most of the nineteenth century, helped to foster a tradition of violence. A third reason put forth by the author is the weakness of Basque culture, particularly in relation to language. A final reason is that traditionally, radical answers were given to radical challenges such as the high levels of repression in the Basque country during the Franco regime or how weak traditional culture was affected by industrialisation and urbanisation. These reasons have been argued before and the author is not really contributing anything new to this argument.

The more interesting part of the book is its analysis of the Basque question since Spain's transition to democracy began with the death of General Franco in 1975. Mees discusses the 'Basque peculiarity' in the process of transition with Basque nationalists excluded from the parliamentary commission responsible for elaborating Spain's 1978 constitution. This, along with the fact that Basque nationalists actively campaigned either for abstention or against the Constitution, meant that over the years, ETA and other radical nationalists have used the results of the 1978 referendum to argue that Spain's model of decentralisation was imposed on the Basques against their will. (22 per cent of the Basque electorate voted against the draft constitution as opposed to a Spanish average of 8 percent). The author argues that the debate about Basque autonomy, particularly the passive rejection of the Constitution and the ensuing more enthusiastic support for the Basque Statute of Autonomy (90 per cent support), marked a watershed in Basque nationalist politics which became hopelessly divided from that moment.

In Chapter 6, the author goes on to explain the rise of Basque nationalism in the context of the institutionalisation of Spain's democracy. Because of its struggle against the Franco regime, Basque nationalism initially became a synonym for democracy. By the 1990s, however, the decline of radical nationalism, the military and political weakness of ETA and the pressure articulated by the Basque peace movement all helped to set the context within which ETA's 1998 ceasefire would be announced. The breakdown of the ceasefire in 1999 ushered in a new period of confusion, conflict and strategic re-alignment for Basque politics.

Although the author successfully manages to realize the study's three main objectives, mentioned above, at times it is difficult to follow his train of thought. There are long, sometimes unnecessary descriptions of Basque social movements such as *Gesto por la Paz* or *Elkarri*. Furthermore, the author's discussion of the extent to which the Basque language has permeated Basque society glosses over the fact that only one-fifth of the

population speak it, as opposed to over three-quarters of the population of Catalonia who speak Catalan. The book also attempts to be chronological in its analysis of Basque nationalism, but there is a tendency to articulate a more thematic approach with the result often being confusing. The discussion in Chapter 8 about the concept of a 'third space', a political and social area in which nationalists could work together in their attempts to secure Basque self-determination, has always been seen as something vague and the author's emphasis on its role in the peace process seems misled. On a minor note, there are also small editing mistakes here and there, e.g., Councillor Blanco was killed by ETA in 1997 not 1996 (p. 94).

In the final chapter, the author argues that the ceasefire required moderate nationalists to radically change their political strategy and that the *Basque Nationalist Party* (PNV) was a prisoner of an impossible double strategy, i.e., demonstrating to ETA supporters that it was committed to Basque nationalism by working with ETA but at the same time continuing to support Basque autonomy (and thereby avoiding the alienation of the business community and moderate nationalists). In the end, the ceasefire failed because ETA focused on 'governing nationalism' (p. 150) or accumulating nationalist power but did not attach any great importance to negotiations with the Spanish government. The fact that only one meeting took place between representatives of ETA and the Spanish government during the fourteen months of the ceasefire exemplifies the unwillingness of both parties to search for a negotiated settlement since neither has given up their objective of securing a complete military victory.

The main thrust of the book is that, despite the failure of the peace process, important changes took place in Basque society and politics during the 1990s which could sow the seeds for future attempts to secure a settlement. Despite the fact that ETA used the ceasefire to completely reorganise and integrate new members and that the *Partido Popular* government's anti-nationalist toughness has generated political support across Spain, throughout the book the author seems hopeful that a solution will be found. This optimistic message is sharply contradicted in the epilogue in which the author calls the banning of ETA's political wing, *Herri Batasuna*, in 2003, as one of the most serious political errors to have been committed in post-transition Spain. Whatever the author's feelings on this issue, the thoughtful analysis provided in this book serves as a key reference point for future debates on the resolution of the conflict.

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Against Their Will: The History and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR
Pavel Polian
Central European University Press, 2003
HBK: ISBN: 9639241687 £34.95 $54.95 €54.95
PBK: ISBN: 9639241733 £16.95 $25.95 €25.95
pp. XII + 425 (including: bibliography, index, figures, tables and maps)

This book offers a systematic survey of existing knowledge about the Soviet regime's forcible deportations of ethnic and social groups from the revolution to the death of Stalin in 1953. As such, it represents a valuable addition to the literature on Soviet population displacements and mass repressions. Professor Polian, a geographer by training, is an indefatigable researcher and prolific chronicler of coerced migrations under modern European dictatorships. He is best-known to date for his comprehensive and profound investigations of the fate of the 'Ostarbeiter', Soviet citizens transported to Germany during the Second World War to work for the Nazi economy and then invariably

consigned to the Stalinist Gulag upon their repatriation. His recent monograph on this theme, published both in Russian (Zhertvy dvukh diktatur. Zhizn', trud, unizhenie i smert' sovetskikh voennoplennykh i Ostarbeiterov na chuzhbine i na rodine, 2nd edition, Moscow, Rosspen, 2002), and in German (Deportiert nach Hause. Sowjetische Kriegsgefangene im 'Dritten Reich' und ihre Repatriierung, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, München, Wien, 2001), has already won many scholarly and political plaudits in both countries.

The work reviewed here focuses solely on Soviet deportations and spans a longer chronology. It is concerned above all to demonstrate that the use of forced deportations as a mechanism of mass repression was not an innovation of Stalin's regime in the 1930s, but can be traced back to the earliest days of Bolshevik post-revolutionary state-building. The first major operation was in fact carried out against the Terek Cossacks in April 1920, on the basis of a Central Committee directive (signed by Lenin) of January 1919 on 'de-cossackization'. Approximately forty-five thousand individuals, considered to be hostile to the regime solely by virtue of their ethno-social origin, were transported under this measure to Ukraine and to Arctic Russia. Large-scale coercive evacuations of populations recommenced at the end of the first decade of Soviet rule, as the regime undertook to 'cleanse' its western state border of ethnic and social 'elements' of population deemed to be politically unreliable. From the early 1930s, the regime launched its policy of comprehensively eradicating the purportedly wealthier, exploitative peasantry, which involved the brutal deportation over three years of nearly two and a half million people, mainly from the western and central regions of the Soviet Union to the state's Arctic, Siberian and Central Asian territories. Subsequent deportations affected not only social groups, but increasingly targeted populations by ethnic origin, starting with the Ingrian Finns of the north-western border (as early as 1930) and later embracing Kurds, Germans, Koreans, Poles, the Baltic nationalities, Iranians, Kalmyks, Chechens and Ingush, Crimean Tatars and many others. Of especial interest is Polian's documentation of the continuing deportations of many contingents (many now exiled for the second time) in the early post-war era.

In all, this work defines and describes forty-five discrete deportation 'campaigns', extending from 1920 to May 1952. Polian has also compiled a comprehensive list of the party directives and government acts which lent these repressions the gloss of legitimacy. He has gleaned much of the information about the deportations from the pre-existing secondary literature (most of which, however, exists only in Russian), as well as from his own archival investigations. He also offers a survey of the legislation which rehabilitated the victims of the deportations, promulgated during Gorbachev's policy of 'openness' (glasnost) during the late 1980s and during the first years of Russia's post-Soviet government. Indeed, the work under review – which was first published in Russian in 2001 and is currently being prepared for publication in German in 2004 - is in the very best tradition of glasnost scholarship, motivated by and imbued with a vigorous sense of humanity and compassion, and concerned first and foremost to bring a long-hidden history to light and to the attention of the widest possible circle of readers in the most accessible and systematic manner. The author's evidently conscious eschewal of interpretation for the sake of concentrating on identifying, itemising, classifying and describing these brutal acts of mass terror, only renders more shocking its impact as an indictment of the Soviet regime and its means of rule.

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The Politics of Social Science Research: 'Race', Ethnicity and Social Change
Peter Ratcliffe (ed)
Palgrave, 2001
HBK: ISBN: 0333722477 £55.00 $75.00
pp. 252, (including: preface, notes on contributors and index)

The review at hand is penned at a time when the postmodern and cultural turns of the social sciences are being supplemented by a 'methodological turn', of which the book reviewed is an excellent exponent. The methodological turn is, in itself, of course no novelty: it has been pre-intuited and indirectly invoked already by Karl Popper (1989), Michael Polanyi (1958) and Thomas Kuhn (1970), among others. The latter's work is especially relevant in this regard in its analysis of the relativity of seemingly solid research paradigms. In fact, as the methodological concerns of the scholars referred above were expressed in a predominantly philosophical key, *The Politics of Social Science Research* represents an effective percolation of their insights into sociological practice. It is, however, highly significant in that it represents the beginning of change in a discipline that holds great potential for improving the governance of modern society.

The book itself is a result of a 10-year project conceived by the editor at an ethics workshop of the World Congress of Sociology 1990. It brings together treatments of a number of ethical and theoretico-methodological aspects of the discipline, set in a variety of social and institutional contexts. However, it is far from being yet another collection of detached musings: Dr Ratcliffe's aim has been to relate the implications of the theoretical insights to the immediate material reality of research in settings and matters where carelessly formulated or ascriptive identity-related interpretations of data may lead to real oppression and inequality.

The volume starts with Part I intended to set out the central theoretical considerations (Chapter 1 by Peter Ratcliffe) that inform the subsequent contributions. The most important of these is, naturally, that of the possibility of the (apparent) detachment of the researcher. It may easily be agreed that the only sound method in science is to lay bare the roots of one's assertions when making them, everything else being likely to lead to varying degrees of mutual misapprehension. However, it is far from easy to uncover the roots in question, for researchers are ultimately only human, situated in their particular identity contexts that are fraught with their own particular expectations and predispositions. Hence it may not occur to us to even consider our visceral dislike of some trait in our subjects a (false) root in this sense. The value-neutrality and impartial observation principles of science must, in such contexts, retreat and give way to an express statement of values enabling the reader to assess the resulting research product against the background of the researcher's convictions. (Of course, this will only be tenable in a situation where the general integrity and objectivity of research presentation are a given.)

Eventually this is bound to invoke a (grossly) simplified parallel to Buddhist epistemology: everything we know is inexorably a function of the means through which we know it and hence needs to be assessed in relation to it (see Wallace 1999:175-177 for a brief account). In the particular context of race and ethnicity research this means that the way we gather information (and often also what information we can gather) is conditioned by our own standing as a subject with a particular identity configuration.

The first part of the book also includes Chapter 2 (by Dipannita Basu) on the colour line in American sociology. It analyses the institutionalisation of inequality patterns in US academia—which would perhaps have been better placed in Part II.

The rest of the volume falls into Parts II-IV, dealing respectively with non-European, Western-European and Eastern-European societies. The second part includes contributions from Australian, South African and US scholars examining the legacy of racism and colonialism in the particular contexts of their societies. The chief issue in the case of the US (Chapter 3 by Walter R. Allen) is the incomplete dismantling of the racial divide that has haunted the nation since slavery. Notably, the official family policy of the US appears to be blithely geared to the white family model, ignoring or disparaging all evidence of the possibility of different ones. South Africa (Chapter 4 by Rupert Taylor and Mark Orkin) has apparently been academically blind to any possibility of race not being the essentialised central determinant of the social structure of the country. Australia (Chapter 5 by Christine Inglis) had a well-functioning immigration-related research scheme working from 1989-1996, informing the public and policy-makers of the realities on the ground; it was then summarily shut down when a hostile administration took office.

The ex-colonial powers dealt with in Part III are the UK (Chapter 6 by Peter Ratcliffe), the Netherlands (Chapter 7 by Jan Rath) and Belgium (Chapter 8 by Marco Martiniello and Hassan Bousetta). Their issues are slightly different, the imperial legacy of the UK perhaps suggesting a stronger similarity to the US than the others. The connections forged between the metropolis and the colonies during colonialism proper acted like funnels propelling valuable goods from the colony to the imperial centre. However, these also turned out to be a natural immigration channel for colonials versed in the customs and the language, aspiring to upward mobility. The imperial nations have not been able to digest this aspect of their past imperial policy and often elect to forgo for lack of political will even those immigration policy actions predicated on sound scientific evidence.

Part IV looks at Eastern Europe, choosing the Yugoslav (Chapter 9 by Milena Davidovic) and the Russian (Chapter 10 by Vicki L. Hesli and Brian L. Kessel) cases as its subjects. The choice is an informed and complex one, alighting on territories in which social change had been held back for considerable time by the largest experiment ever to be perpetrated on a society. One of the functions of Communist repression was (in fact, by dint of its totalitarianism, had to be) forcing a damper on nationalist yearnings of any stripe. The repression could not leave academic methodologies untouched either. Thus, for decades, entire generations of researchers were reared to think in the Marxist mold which among other things downplayed the social significance of beliefs about ethnicity and race. Little surprise then that, when the pent-up frustrations were released, disintegration and secession ensued both in the general society and in academia. Against this context it is all the more important to underline again the complementary nature of the volume's 'rejection that 'races' exist in any real, scientific sense' (p. 8) and its exhortation to study the origins and causes of popular perceptions about them.

A small point of practical criticism that may be voiced with respect to the, at times, inadequate (translation and) language editing. Thus, among other small things, the notable Swedish sociologist's name is Myrdal (not Mydral, as Chapter 2 consistently has it) and the Latin transliterations of the Russian and other authors' and sources' Cyrillic names should have been cross-checked for uniformity (there are differing variants of the same names, cf 'Zdravomyslov' and 'Zdravomislov', 'Filosofii' and 'Filosofi', etc.) or correct spelling (Prasauskus pro Prasauskas, Msyl pro Mysl, Zhironovsky pro Zhirinovsky, etc.). It would also have been a good idea to keep the original Cyrillic forms of the Russian-language source names alongside Latinised versions. For readers not familiar with the Russian language and the sociological scene, it can be very hard to discern the original form of the source's name.

On the whole, however, these errors and inconsistencies in no way impinges on the book's substance. The volume remains an important step on the road to an improved research paradigm in practical sociology seeking to facilitate meaningful social change.

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Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa: Methods of Conflict Prevention
Robert I. Rotberg (ed)
Brookings Institution, 2001
HBK: ISBN: 0815775768 £30.95 $42.95
pp. 240 (including: index, bibliography)

The overriding theme of *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa* is that conflicts in Africa have reached a crisis level and that previous responses have not only been unsuccessful but were also undertaken with little consideration of the major obstacles to conflict resolution or management in the region. Given the unreflective nature of interventions to date, it is little wonder that peace efforts in Africa have enjoyed little success. The seven chapters in the book try to suggest alternatives that can be explored to change the situation, and here opinions vary.

Chapters one and six are not only interlinked in argument but are also written by the same author, Robert Rotberg. In Chapter 1, Rotberg argues that failure of peace keeping in Africa in the past was caused by the approach that was taken by the United Nations (UN). The UN's approach to peacekeeping, he argues, suffers from two weaknesses. Firstly, at the conceptual level, their approach implicitly suggests that there is a general approach to peacekeeping that is applicable to all situations. Secondly, at an operational level, interventions have operated with a very limited budget. The first step to successful peacekeeping in Africa he explains, is to define the nature of the conflicts, and then respond to each with due consideration for the specific nature of the conflict. He identifies four types of conflict and preferable responses. One of the conflicts he identifies, in Chapter 1, is that in which belligerents have agreed to a cease-fire and in which case an expanded monitoring force is required to ensure that the terms of the cease-fire are adhered to. The Ethiopia-Eritrea case is such a conflict. The second type of conflict, which he calls regime change conflicts, are those where combatants have fought to the realisation that the prevailing regime has to go, and thus what is needed is a force to facilitate the agreed change. Namibia and South Africa are relevant examples. The third type of conflicts are those in which belligerents are in a state of war and need peace enforcement rather than peacekeeping. The fourth type of 'conflict' is post-conflict reconstruction, i.e., situations in which violent conflict has been contained in some form, but in order to sustain the settlement the former conflict parties need international assistance for the reconstruction of the state.

In Chapter 6, Rotberg shares the view, expressed by the majority of the other contributors, that Africans need to take a lead role in peacekeeping in the continent. He cautions, however, that agreeing to an African response in the form of an African peacekeeping force, a view supported by the majority of chapters, is not enough in itself. He reckons that as much as such a force is desirable, the other important consideration to make is that such a force needs a leader, country or region with the responsibility of making decisions and mobilising it to respond when needed. This leader, country or region will also have to be acceptable as legitimate and non-partisan. He concludes that no such peace guardian presently exists in Africa.

In Chapter 2, Jeffrey Herbst explores the topic of African peacekeepers and state failure. Herbst argues that leaving peacekeeping to Africans will be like sub-contracting the responsibility of the international community, a view which sets him at odds with the other contributors. He advocates understanding the reasons that bring about state failure in Africa as a way forward, as opposed to abandoning the continent to its people. He points out the irony of the situation in Africa where the big countries, the potential hegemons traditionally expected to act as peacekeepers, are themselves involved in conflicts, leaving small countries as potential interveners. This situation of asymmetrical power relations places limits on African interventions. Herbst insists, however, that if Western intervention is to be successful it needs to be sensitive to the specifics of the African context. He concludes his chapter by stating that the 'United States and the European countries will have to deal with African interveners on African terms or realize that the West has become irrelevant' (p. 32).

The suspicion that African peacekeepers are likely to receive from African countries where they are deployed is a theme in the chapter by Christopher Clapham (Chapter 3). Clapham argues that unless the country or region that seeks to keep peace is seen as democratic by those whom it seeks to keep at peace, then it will not be accepted as a legitimate and impartial player. His article differs from Herbst's, because he supports African peace initiatives. In Chapter 4, Steven Metz evaluates the American strategy in African conflicts in the past. Writing from a realist point of view, he argues that the lukewarm treatment America has given African conflicts in the past is not accidental but rather a deliberate policy. He argues that in a globalised world America and the rest of the world have an interest in helping Africa help itself by supporting conflict resolution programmes. They can offer assistance in the form of enhancing conflict prevention, helping in professionally training African armies as well as helping consolidate regional co-operation in peacekeeping. He concludes by saying that the main responsibility, however, lies within African countries, who need to continue political, economic and policy reforms that can 'forestall future outbreaks of armed conflicts' (p. 74).

Chapter 5 follows up on Metz' ideas by showing that Africa can deal with its conflicts with assistance from the rest of the world. Banyongwe argues that Africa has the potential of constituting a force capable of monitoring a cease-fire or even a truce. Such a force can be constituted at sub-regional levels and then affiliated to the UN, and, with logistical support from countries in the Northern Hemisphere, it will be able to function. Chapter seven is a summary of discussions that were held at the World Peace Foundation meeting in Tanzania in 1999. Just like the articles in the book there are varied opinions as to what ought to be done to deal with conflicts in Africa.

As the subject of war is a complex one, so are the arguments that arise in Rotberg's book. The dominant view is that Africans need to take charge of the task of peacekeeping in Africa. However, there is little agreement on what to do, when and how the rest of the world should be involved, or whether it is appropriate for the UN to delegate its responsibility of peacekeeping in Africa to Africans. Despite, or perhaps because of, these

variations of opinion the book is a stimulating read. Anyone interested in understanding the efforts that have been undertaken in Africa by Africans and others to try and resolve the perennial problems afflicting the region will find it a worthwhile read. New challenges are identified and that may be a good starting point to advance the debate as to what can actually be done to reduce conflicts in Africa.

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Researching Violently Divided Societies: Ethnical and Methodological Issues
Marie Smyth & Gillian Robinson (eds)
Pluto Press, 2001
HBK: ISBN: 0745318215 £45.00 $69.95
PBK: ISBN: 0745318207 £14.99
pp. 227 (including: table, map, chapter references & index)

What is research on violently divided societies for and who is best suited to carry it out? These are the two questions that lie at the heart of this thoughtful and insightful collection of essays on methodological and ethical issues confronting researchers of violently divided societies. They are addressed by contributors working in Central Asia, Africa, Cambodia, Bosnia, the Mddle East and Northern Ireland. Certainly a diverse selection of societies whose 'dividedness' (the editors reasonably suggest) rather than comparable levels or nature of violence make them suitable for collective consideration (p. 3). The most interesting theme of the collection concerns the particular issues facing 'insider' and 'outsider' researchers in conflict situations. In this regard, Albrecht Schnabel's analysis of flexible comparative studies of divided societies is the only one that focuses primarily on the 'outsider'. The 'external international expert' (suggests Schnabel) can compliment the work of the 'insider' by providing 'general' as well as 'particular' knowledge, insights and functions derived from their position 'above local attachments' (p. 203). In contrast, Anara Tabyshalieva argues that problems of researching the extensive violent divisions of post-Soviet Central Asia are exacerbated by 'insider'/'outsider' issues of access. On the one hand, global resource inequalities allow an ease of access for researchers from 'rich' countries to 'parachute' in to conduct research on problems they know little about (p. 135). At the same time, regional rivalries mean that various governments prevent researchers from other parts of Central Asia from carrying out work on their patch. Economic meltdown, a general decline in educational resources throughout the region, a growth of ethnic isolationism and Islamist reaction, and the barriers increasingly put in the way of women's participation in research, all lead Tabyshalieva to gloomy predictions on the future of ethnic conflict research in the region.

A certain pall also hangs over the contribution by Tamar Hermann, whose chapter is primarily based on her experience researching the role and impact of Israeli peace groups. This work formed part of a larger initiative that saw parallel studies of peace groups carried out within the Palestinian community and, internationally, in South Africa and Northern Ireland. While a significant degree of 'cross-community' collaboration was a key feature of the work conducted in the latter two divided societies, a truly 'joint' initiative proved depressingly impossible to achieve in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian research teams. This outcome certainly appears to have given Hermann much to think about. As she argues, few conflict researchers are 'pure' outsiders, the vast majority being either 'involved outsiders' or 'insiders'. As such they bring with them an often considerable amount of 'emotional baggage' that makes the research grails of either positivistic objectivity or hermeneutic self-reflexivity both virtually unattainable (p. 79).

Being an insider provides the real advantage of 'speaking the same language', metaphorically and literally (p. 84). But the disadvantage of insider 'first hand familiarity' is the inability to access and understand 'the other side' (p. 85). The answer to this dilemma? The very joint approach that was unobtainable in the case of Hermann's own work; a 'cross-community' strategy that lies at the heart of the recommendations later contained in the editors own conclusion.

The 'emotional baggage' of the 'insider' researcher is also the chief focus of Andrew Finlay's elegant discussion of reflexivity and ethnographic research in Northern Ireland. Finlay is particularly concerned to examine the 'insidious' impact of 'telling' on the research process; the series of inter-communicative signs and codes by which people in Northern Ireland ascribe a communal identity to one another. For Finlay, the impact of 'telling' on the interaction of researcher and interviewee has been greatly underestimated and under-theorised, particularly in terms of the 'feeling management' such encounters involve. Finlay is similarly critical of the 'benign introspection' he sees as typical of researchers responses to this problem. Rather, he suggests, there is a need to adopt a more substantive perspective and practice of 'constitutive reflexivity' (p. 66). There is much in this argument, not least in Finlay's suggestion that academics themselves often make assumptions about the work of their colleagues on the basis of perceived communal affiliation or origin. It is a lesson, though, that Finlay may have to consider himself (and I can speak with some authority here) when developing arguments based upon the incorrect ascription of a colleagues' identity. Getting 'telling' wrong can definitely be something of a problem for field workers in the North.

The selection of the case studies was also, in part, based on the under-representation of certain regions of the world in the literature on ethnic conflict studies. According to Eghosa Osaghae though, it was a deeply ingrained suspicion of the concept of ethnicity as a product of 'western social science' that accounted for the dearth of such studies in Africa prior to the 1990s. The result, a vacuum of knowledge about even the basic characteristics of the status, nature and numbers of Africa's ethnic groups. Post-cold war realities have, however, seen the rise of 'ethnocracies' amongst post-colonial African regimes and a welter of internal wars. It has similarly seen the emergence of a new wave of 'radical converts' to the study and 'championing' of ethnicity and ethnic rights, a group Osaghae somewhat begrudgingly criticises for their apparent intellectual tardiness (p. 27). When it comes to the reason why such research on ethnic conflict should be carried out, however, Osaghae's message is stark; the lack of such work in Africa contributed to the reduction of policy options to those of violent confrontation and state repression. Indeed, if doubts over why research on violently divided societies should be carried out (and by whom) led to the conclusion that the pursuit of such knowledge has little or no purpose, then Helen Jenks Clarke's excellent chapter is a most salutary antidote. Clarke discusses two Participatory Action Research (PAR) projects conducted in Cambodia that puts into perspective the dilemmas facing researchers in the field. Under the genocidal Khymer Rouge regime, social knowledge itself, and those who possessed it, were the explicit targets of annihilation. It is in that experience, a history of mass murder, that the divisions of the ethnically and religiously homogenous Cambodian society lie. It is similarly in the loss of knowledge of that history, and the need to re-establish the infrastructure of knowledge possession and production at such a basic level and on such a massive scale that the unequivocal purpose of research is to be found. As Clarke argues, the PAR research she was engaged in was designed to 'empower villagers to build their own models of society… [this] research helps to bring back, to re-establish such [social] knowledge' (p. 102). Reason enough for research.

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The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests and the Indivisibility of Territory
Monica Duffy Toft
Princeton University Press, 2003
HBK: ISBN: 0691113548 £24.95 $37.50
pp. ix + 266 (including: index, maps, bibliography)

The starting point for this stimulating, persuasive but ultimately frustrating book is the premise that territory is not solely a phenomenon of physical geography, which can be partitioned, circumscribed by borders, settled by populations and assigned various levels of autonomous or sovereign status, but that territory is also a subjective, emotive, non-material phenomenon, in which an ethnic group may vest its sense of identity, its aspirations and dreams, and as such is essentially 'indivisible'. The author terms this the 'dual nature of territory'. The aim of her study is to explain the role that territory plays in creating and fuelling ethnic conflict, and in particular to identify the territorial conditions under which ethnic disputes escalate into violence.

The author's focus is on conflicts which develop between states and ethnic minorities among their population. Why, she asks, do some ethnic disputes become violent, while others are settled by mutually acceptable compromise between states and sub-state actors? To answer this, she proposes a general 'theory of indivisible territory'. This theory posits that states and ethnic groups ascribe different meanings and values to territory. For a state, the territory over which it extends its authority is the defining element of its existence. Moreover, certain regions will have particular economic or security significance for the state's development or survival. States are most likely, however, to view territory as 'indivisible', and to mobilise military force to suppress secessionist aspirations, when to concede to the demands of one ethnic group would risk setting a precedent for others to follow. On the other hand, minority ethnic groups may view a particular segment of territory as their historic or spiritual homeland. In this case, they may refuse to submit to central state authority or to comply with arrangements for constitutional compromise or partition, and will demand greater autonomy or even sovereignty over the area in question. The likelihood of such a group resorting to violence to secure its control over territory depends on its settlement patterns. When the group is concentrated in the region under dispute, and constitutes the majority population in this area, it will possess a greater capability to act effectively and will feel it has greater legitimacy to do so, and therefore will be less willing to compromise over the solutions it seeks for this territory. Clearly it follows that in circumstances when both the state and the ethnic group consider a particular territory to be 'indivisible', there is a high likelihood of violence. When the ethnic group can be satisfied with an outcome short of sovereignty or the state does not fear setting a potentially self-destructive precedent, there is less chance of ethnic conflict turning to war.

The author develops her argument with meticulous attention to its theoretical inflections and empirical implications. In the first chapter, she examines alternative explanations advanced in recent scholarship for the outbreak of ethnic violence, which she divides into three categories: material, non-material and elite. While materialist explanations offer some insights, she believes, they oversimplify the motives of actors, neglecting to consider cultural or emotive factors disposing ethnic groups to risk great suffering for 'seemingly worthless territory' (p. 6). Nonmaterial explanations, specifically those which invoke either 'ancient hatreds' or the 'security dilemma' as impelling groups to resort to violence, posit an unwarranted inevitability in the descent of ethnic disputes into bloodshed, essentialise ethnic identity and naturalise the strivings of ethnic groups and

their leaders for sovereign statehood. The third approach, which focuses on the role of political elites in manipulating popular aspirations and perceptions of self-interest, overestimates the ability of individuals to influence events and fails to account for different outcomes in a range of cases where demagogues sought to incite a violent solution to ethnic disputes (as an example, the author cites Vladimir Meciar's unsuccessful attempt to instigate ethnic cleansing across the Slovakian-Hungarian border).

To test her hypotheses, Toft uses two methods. Firstly, she analyses the *Minorities at Risk* data set to identify meaningful relationships between a series of key variables derived from the 'theory of indivisible territory' and competing explanations (such as settlement patterns or the existence of material resources) and the likelihood of ethnic violence. Secondly, she examines the logic of her theory, and assesses how it measures up to alternative approaches, through detailed analysis of the historical and geographical preconditions, the sequence of events and the actors involved in four case studies of ethnic conflict. These are chosen, on the one hand, to represent cases when ethnic dispute descended into violent conflict (Russia/Chechnya and Georgia/Abkhazia) and, on the other, cases when confrontation was resolved and bloodshed averted (Russia/Tatarstan and Georgia/Ajaria). This combination of methods is successful: the use of statistical analysis obviates the risk of selection bias inherent in the case studies, the historical analyses permit us to examine in detail the complex circumstances of each case and to 'enter into the minds of the decision makers' (p. 11).

The evidence which Toft adduces in support of her 'theory of indivisible territory' is sufficient and persuasive. The statistical tests confirm, for example, that settlement patterns of a particular ethnic group on a given territory (which determine its 'capabilities' and 'legitimacy claims') are a better indicator of its propensity to resort to violence in pursuit of its objectives than the existence of natural resources in the region under dispute. Similarly, the cases studies demonstrate how a peaceful resolution may be achieved when an ethnic group has a relatively weak and dispersed presence in the disputed region and therefore accepts the 'divisibility' of this territory (as the Tatars did in the case of their ethnic homeland), whereas the existence of a concentrated ethnic majority in a homeland, especially when this group is passionately convinced of the historical legitimacy of its cause (as in the case of the Chechens), is much more likely to lead to violence. Although the Abkhaz were a minority in their region of north-western Georgia, and were therefore initially willing to compromise, the intervention of Russian forces gave them a greater sense of their own capability and encouraged them to view their territory as 'indivisible' and demand full secession. The Ajars in south-western Georgia, on the other hand, she states, consistently represented their interests as 'divisible' and successfully averted violence despite the Georgian state's consistent suspicion of all groups seeking any extension of autonomy.

Undoubtedly, this book is an extremely useful contribution to the literature on ethnic conflict and violence. However, it suffers from three flaws which mitigate its impact, though do nothing essentially to weaken the logic or persuasiveness of its argument. First, the presentation of a theory which is fundamentally about the importance of territory would have been greatly strengthened by the inclusion of detailed maps indicating historical and contemporary settlement patterns, disputed regional and state borders and other features which play a major role in the text. The three maps which are included are useless; the 'Location Map of Tatarstan' in particular is a cartographic catastrophe. Second, there is a tendency to reify and de-historicise certain categories such as 'ethnic group' or 'identity', which must themselves be interrogated and understood as constructions which have emerged in the process of historical and contemporary conflicts. Toft acknowledges this in the first chapter, but nevertheless fails

to heed her own admonition. When, for example, she presents the development of Tatar-Russian relations as an unproblematic narrative rather than an object embedded in controversy and subject to competing interpretations. Similarly, the settlement patterns themselves which the author places at the core of her explanation are, of course, not simply 'given' but historically determined. When such categories are tested as variables in statistical analysis, the diachronic dimension is necessarily bracketed out, and this can be done without undermining their explanatory validity. When they are described as elements of an historical interpretation, however, they demand greater sensitivity to their ontological status and conceptual construction. The third flaw of this book is the most irritating. Having outlined her theory in the first chapter, and developed it fully in the second, the author then proceeds to restate it throughout the book, at the start and conclusion of every chapter and in every sub-section of every chapter, so that most readers will soon tire of this relentless repetition.

The author writes lucidly and with conviction. Her theory is coherent, her hyptheses are stated clearly and her argument is developed cogently. Her methods are explained carefully and applied conscientiously. Her evidence is well-chosen and her conclusions are persuasive. There was simply no need to recapitulate it all so frequently. This reviewer is tempted to suggest that the ideas stated and continually restated in this book would have had a greater impact if they had been presented in a tightly written, incisively argued journal article, pared of all its repetition. As such, it would have been much more powerful exercise in social scientific explanation. As a book, it is to be hoped that its genuine originality and significance is not lost on frustrated readers.

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Potentials of Disorder
Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher (eds)
Manchester University Press, 2003
HBK: ISBN: 0719062411 £45.00 $74.95
pp. ix + 277 (including: index)

According to the editors' introduction, this volume seeks to examine the link between violence and institutions in two particularly conflict-prone, post-empire regions: the Caucasus and Yugoslavia. The specific questions that they seek to explore are which institutions foster violence, which provide for procedures in which conflicts can be addressed below the threshold of violence, which institutions lead to fragmentation and which can integrate society in the absence of a state (p. 1). This is a noble and worthwhile enterprise, and the editors and their contributors largely succeed in bringing it to fruition.

In their introduction, Koehler and Zürcher set the stage for the volume by outlining the complex dynamics at play between institutions and violence. They identify the importance of the Soviet and Yugoslav official and unofficial institutional legacies, point out the significance of risk-increasing factors for the actual likelihood of collective violence occurring and determine the functions of institutions in society and how these shape incentives, opportunities and constraints for political actors. The degree of emphasis placed on institutions at the expense of actors is somewhat unbalanced, however, and ignorant of the fact that after all, and despite institutional incentives, opportunities and constraints, actors' preferences may be shaped by them, but their decisions are eventually not determined by institutions but remain in the provenance of the actors themselves. Nevertheless, this introduction is a good example of how to clarify

key concepts for the reader and introduce him/her to the contributions of individual authors.

The first five chapters focus on the former Yugoslavia. Hannes Grandits and Carolin Leutloff examine how ethnic groups were mobilised for violence in the Krajina region of Croatia in 1990-1. Kristof Gosztonyi provides a study of the development of Croat-Bosnian relations in the emerging state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and offers a compelling analysis of local and external Croat efforts to facilitate the secession of the Republic of Herceg Bosna. In the probably most interesting essay in the collection, Xavier Raufer presents a quite disturbing picture of the influence and significance of Albanian organised crime networks in the Western Balkans and beyond. The next two chapters, by Christian Giordano on land reform and Norbert Mappes-Niediek conclude the case studies. Despite weaknesses in some chapters, overall a fairly well-rounded picture on the potentials for disorder in the Balkan region emerges.

The next five chapters provide the same analysis for the Caucasus. The opening chapter by Enver Kisriev is an excellent examination of the causes of peace and violence in Dagestan and Chechnya. Although perhaps under-theorised, it provides a wealth of useful empirical material to the non-specialist and makes a convincing case about how factors of structure and agency combined in Dagestan to prevent a scenario similar to that in Chechnya. The remaining four chapters in this section contribute two more case studies—on Georgia and Nagorno Karabakh—and two more regional perspectives on identity and state-society relations. Thus, similar to the section on the Balkans, the reader is presented with a combination of in-depth single case studies which are well-contextualised in broader analyses of regional dynamics. The fact that this is achieved despite the great number of authors involved is clearly to the credit of the two editors, whose own contribution on Nagorno Karabakh is another very strong contribution to the volume.

In a concluding section, comprising three chapters, John Borneman discusses the difficulties of reconciliation after ethnic cleansing and Georg Elwert examines different strategies of (international) intervention into (internal) conflict before Koehler and Zürcher present their own conclusion, drawing on the findings of individual chapters in this volume. This concluding chapter by the editors brings the reader full-circle and summarises the main lessons to be drawn from the case studies presented. Unsurprisingly, they conclude that institutions matter, but what constitutes the real value of this chapter (despite the rather oddly placed ‘word on methodology’ at the very end) is that Koehler and Zürcher manage to explain not just that they matter but also how and why. From this perspective, the volume is a useful contribution to the existing literature on conflict prevention, management and settlement in general, as well as to the vast amount of literature that already exists on the specific cases covered within it.

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