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REVIEW ESSAYS

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The Role of International and Local NGOs in the Transformation of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict[1]

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Introduction

The concept of conflict transformation is still relatively new and poorly defined, having gone through a series of stages since the beginning of its regular usage (Lederach 1999; Miall 2003; Reimann 2003; Rupesinghe 1995; Värynen 1991). However, it is clear that most current proponents of transformation attempt to set themselves apart from those of more established concepts such as regulation, management, and resolution by adopting a more holistic approach to addressing any given conflict. Conflict transformation is supposed to encompass all levels of society and includes at least two types of change. First, changes are supposed to be made in the society or societies in which the conflict is occurring in order to provide the possibility for (second) transforming the conflict into a productive phenomenon rather than attempting to eliminate or 'resolve' it. Implicit in this approach is a more positive definition of conflict than those that have often characterized the literature on ethnic and international conflict to date, one that tends to emphasize the potentially useful functions of conflict à la Dahrendorf (1965).

The idea of conflict transformation in the sense described above underlies the 'Lederach pyramid' (Lederach 1997: 39), as well as new approaches which suggest adding to track I and track II a track III level of diplomacy (e.g., Reimann 2003). The pyramid divides relevant conflict transformation actors into three groups: top-level, middle-range and grassroots. Each level has specific tasks in the achievement of the conflict transformation goals outlined above. However, the middle-range actors are deemed particularly important in reaching these aims, as they are assumed to have good contacts both upwards and downwards within the pyramid and therefore to be especially effective as transmitters of conflict transformation approaches. Cordula Reimann follows this approach in the sense of adding a Track III level to the usual Track I and II categories that have already established themselves in the conflict management literature (see, among others, Volkan et al. 1991). However, her emphasis is on grassroots capacity rather than middle-level intervention.

It has long been standard to look at the top level of negotiations in international and separatist conflicts, and the actors are often relatively clear, at least those who take part in the negotiations themselves.[2] However, addressing the middle and lower levels of the societies involved with the goal of altering conditions within them either to facilitate the acceptance of a settlement or even to put pressure on the top level is a more recent phenomenon. This study attempts to do this in the case of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict by looking at those INGOs and NGOs that focus on conflict transformation and peacebuilding. It argues that in the particular case of conflict management and peacebuilding, Georgian NGOs fall into the middle level according to Lederach's classification. The article will explore the difficulties encountered by Georgian NGOs as peacebuilders in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict and will investigate the reasons behind these challenges as well as future prospects for NGO development and impact on the conflict. After presenting a brief background of the conflict, we offer an analysis of the conditions under which NGOs must work in Georgia/Abkhazia (taking into consideration conclusions of other authors on development of civil society in the post-Soviet space), followed by the presentation of empirical data on four western organizations and their

[1] This research for this article was conducted in the context of a project on ethnonational conflicts in Eastern Europe funded by the German Science Foundation (DFG). The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

[2] However, even on this level the situation is usually more complex and less purely hierarchical than perceived by outside observers. See Lederach (1997: 38-41).

Georgian and Abkhazian NGO partners. Finally, we draw some conclusions from the empirical situation on the extent to which the (I)NGOs are contributing to a process of conflict transformation and point to some tentative theoretical implications.

The Role of (I)NGOs and Challenges for Their Development

The role of NGOs has been undertheorized in the conflict literature until very recently. Even now, most attempts at generalizing NGO functions and the factors that condition their roles in conflict situations have been analytical rather than theoretical. One of the most important representatives of the conflict transformation approach, John Paul Lederach, offers a 'comprehensive framework' for a peace process, 'which assumes an interdependence of levels that involve multiple tiers of leadership and participation within the affected population and that integrate simultaneous but pace-differentiated activities' (Lederach 1997: 46). This implies that while it is necessary to examine to an increasing extent the middle and grassroots levels in conflict situations, this alone is not adequate. Rather, the existing emphasis on the top leadership must be integrated into this approach, thus resulting in a more comprehensive analysis.[3] With regard to the middle level, Lederach specifically asserts that '…the middle range holds the potential for helping to establish a relationship- and skills-based infrastructure for sustaining the peacebuilding process' (Lederach 1997: 51). This is especially true because middle-range actors have contacts both upwards and downwards, whereas those on the grassroots level are better connected to the general populace and attuned to its needs. According to Lederach, typical middle-range actors are sectoral leaders, ethnic or religious leaders, academics and other intellectuals, and NGO leaders, although leaders of indigenous NGOs can also be located on the grassroots level. The main activities of the middle level revolve around problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution training, peace commissions and insider-partial mediation teams (Lederach 1997: 39).[4] The NGOs discussed below in the Georgian-Abkhazian case are deemed middle-level actors, and therefore their respective upward interactions with government institutions as well as their downward contacts to society at large will be assessed.

Most conceptual and analytical reflections on the role and functions of conflict-related NGOs have occurred in the context of empirical studies. One dominant pattern in both academic and praxis-oriented contributions has been to contrast a description of the ideal role of an NGO with empirical reality (e.g., MacFarlane 1998). This contrast is well exemplified by Neil MacFarlane's work, which has the further advantage for this study of focusing on NGOs in Georgia. MacFarlane stresses both the larger phenomenon of the creation of NGOs as a means of strengthening democracy as well as the concrete advantages they possess over governments or international organizations for the performance of certain types of tasks. According to MacFarlane, 'the proliferation of NGOs is part and parcel of the pluralist conception of the rooting of democratic governance within a society. To the extent that citizens aggregate on the basis of common interests into effective organizations for the promotion of the latter, this limits the power and flexibility of government' (MacFarlane 1998: 245). He sees the role of NGOs as similar to those found on Lederach's middle level: 'In addition to their direct effect on public policy, NGOs have an important indirect effect in increasing the awareness of the public at large of the nature and significance of policy issues before government' (MacFarlane 1998: 245). The advantages of NGOs in conflict prevention are that they 'do not carry the baggage of government status', are closer to and better

[3] While this cannot be done within the framework of this article, which focuses primarily on certain middle-level actors, previous work has been done on top-level attempts in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, allowing for a more complete approach when taken in conjunction with the present study (see MacFarlane 1999; Stewart 2003).

[4] An 'insider-partial team' is part of an approach which 'involves intermediaries from within the conflict setting who as individuals enjoy the trust and confidence of one side in the conflict but who as a team provide balance and equity in their mediating work' (Lederach 1997: 50).

informed about developments within the community, are 'often made up of people of stature within communities' and promote functional concerns and therefore can transcend ethnic boundaries (MacFarlane 1996: 246).

In transitional societies, such as those in the former Soviet Union, NGO potential is conditioned in large part by the relationship between local NGOs and their international partners, who are responsible to some extent for setting the agenda, wholly for obtaining funding, and in large part for evaluating project work. International NGOs also have a specific role to play, with certain advantages over local organizations under particular conditions: 'where local organizations are weak and vulnerable to government interference…international groups may fill the gap in non-governmental activity' (MacFarlane 1998: 246). Further, INGOs usually have more prestige and better access to information, can do capacity-building via training, financial support, provision of equipment, etc., can operate across lines of conflict, and can serve an early warning function for international intergovernmental organizations or for their home governments (MacFarlane 1998: 246-247).

Other studies have placed less emphasis on the ideal type of NGO and more on the actual role NGOs can play in the conditions in which they find themselves (Hudock 1999; Mendelson and Glenn 2002). Ann Hudock points out the difficulties of cooperation between northern and southern NGOs, stressing especially the southern perspective that dependence on northern funding and agendas often prevents local organizations from carrying out useful projects. She criticizes the tendency of some scholarship to idealize NGO activists' goals: 'One of the most fundamental weaknesses of the NGO literature is its suggestion that NGOs possess a value base that drives them to act on 'altruistic' motives. This absolutely contradicts one of the key tenets of organizational analysis; namely, that organizational survival is every organization's goal and that, to survive, an organization must place its own interests before those of others, especially those which are potential competitors' (Hudock 1999: 20-21). This observation points to a problem present in the Georgian-Abkhazian situation, where 'civic values' cannot be taken for granted among NGO employees, and where competition for association with western partners and access to hard currency is stiff, leading to a harsh struggle for survival by any given organization.

The empirical findings presented in a collection edited by Sarah E. Mendelson and John K. Glenn (2002) also contrasts starkly with the ideal-type NGO attributes presented by MacFarlane and others. In just one instance of this, Mendelson concludes that 'the efforts to link local groups to Western networks has [sic] come at the cost of ties *between* like-minded groups and has diverted local groups' attention from pressing local needs' (Mendelson and Glenn 2002: 234, emphasis in original). This is just one of many criticisms which apply to the Georgian case, where the close association between a given INGO and one or two local partner NGOs initially led to compartmentalization of the field and resulted in a lack of communication among both local groups with similar goals as well as among INGOs. Once entrenched, this compartmentalized pattern is difficult to overcome, although there has been some success in this direction in the Georgian-Abkhazian case.

This study takes the Lederach pyramid as a starting point and focuses on the middle section as applied to the Georgian and to some extent the Abkhaz society, specifically on the group of NGOs within the conflict and peacebuilding sphere which can be supposed to possess or be developing contacts both upward to relevant politicians and government institutions and downward to the society at large. It draws further on other studies of (I)NGOs active in developing countries and/or in the former Soviet Union to pinpoint the factors that condition the pursuit of such contacts. Finally, it places the thus

contextualized work of NGOs in a conflict transformation framework in order to assess their role in the situation in contemporary Georgia and Abkhazia.[5]

History and Background of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict

Although we do not have the opportunity here to go into detail about the history of Abkhazia and its changing relationship to Georgia, one point should be emphasized. The Abkhazians and the Georgians refer to quite different historical phases to buttress their arguments for this or that status for Abkhazia. While the Georgians stress certain periods during the pre-Soviet era, in which Abkhazia was frequently integrated with parts of contemporary Georgia, the Abkhazians mention primarily the Soviet period, during which Abkhazia possessed the status of an autonomous republic, with its own governing structures and special quotas to ensure the participation of ethnic Abkhaz in the political system to an extent greater than that implied by their percentage in the population.[6] Thus, both sides manipulate history for their own purposes, and arguments can be found for a variety of arrangements by making reference to different historical phases.

Changing demographics have also played a role both historically and in the contemporary situation. While the Abkhaz made up only around 17% of the population of 'their' autonomous republic, they argue that this situation is due to a number of historical injustices, not least the Georgianization carried out under Stalin.[7] For this and other reasons, they insist on greater than proportional representation in political and cultural life. Even after the exodus of approximately 250,000 refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs—mostly ethnic Georgians) it is still disputable whether the ethnic Abkhaz now comprise the majority in the republic. This demographic weakness is one principal reason for persistent Abkhaz opposition to the return of IDPs in significant numbers.

The focus of this brief history is on the Soviet era and the initial years of Georgian independence. The beginning of the Soviet period was characterized by political and social turmoil. From March to December 1921, Abkhazia was an independent Soviet Socialist Republic. At the end of 1921, the Abkhazian SSR united with the Georgian SSR under a Treaty of Union, which lasted for ten years. In 1931, Abkhazia's status was reduced to that of an autonomous republic within the Georgian SSR. Thus, by 1931, the situation had stabilized around the constellation which lasted until the end of the USSR in 1991. The degree to which pressure was exerted on Abkhazia to accede to the final change in status remains controversial to this day. What is certain is that throughout the Soviet period cultural and political figures in Abkhazia consistently raised the question of granting the republic a higher status. This generally came to the forefront at times of change within the former Soviet Union, such as the introduction of a new constitution, or during periods of relative political openness.

Thus in 1956,[8] 1967 and 1978 Abkhaz party officials, supported by intellectuals in the republic, petitioned Moscow for a separation of Abkhazia from Georgia in exchange for incorporation within the Russian SFSR[9] (Zverev 1996: 39). Although unsuccessful in their

[5] As the author had better access to material on the work of Georgian NGOs, this study is not able to present a balanced portrait of work in Abkhazia and in Georgia proper, but is necessarily more Georgia-oriented.
[6] For a brief, relatively pro-Abkhaz account of the history of Abkhazia see Otyrba (1994).
[7] As of 1 January 1990, out of 537,000 inhabitants of Abkhazia, 44% were Georgian, 17% Abkhaz, 16% Russian and 15% Armenian. See Zverev (1996: 37).
[8] In 1956, three years after Stalin's death, his repressive policies were partially condemned by his successor Nikita Khrushchev at a CPSU Congress. This initiated a period of relative openness which was particularly cathartic for the Abkhaz, as they widely believed that Stalin and his henchman Lavrentii Beria, both ethnic Georgians, had supported pro-Georgian policies to the detriment of ethnic minorities within Georgia. On the ambivalent relationship of Georgians to Stalin and the Stalin period see Hanf and Nodia (2000: 23-25).
[9] The request for affiliation with the Russian Republic may have been tactical, seen as the only option to which the center might agree. On the other hand, it may have reflected a genuine sense of association with Russia,

primary aim, these efforts did result in a series of concessions concerning culture and personnel (ibid.) Thus, there is a recent tradition in Abkhazia of protesting for a higher territorial status and more participation in political and cultural affairs. During the Soviet period, these protests were naturally directed toward Moscow, which had ultimate authority over Georgian party leaders. This constellation contributed to a perception within Abkhazia (and other autonomous republics as well) of Moscow as a potential champion, while the Georgian authorities were viewed as (a) relatively weak and (b) unwilling to grant Abkhaz demands. To a large extent these perceptions have carried over and even been reinforced in the post-Soviet period.

The Abkhaz protests intensified in the late 1980s under Mikhail Gorbachev. In 1988, 60 leading Abkhazians sent a request to Gorbachev to consider the return of Abkhazia to its status as a Soviet Socialist Republic with treaty ties to Georgia. In March of the following year, a mass meeting of Abkhaz activists in the town of Lykhnyi reiterated the call for a restoration of Abkhazia's pre-1931 status. Then, in July 1989, clashes involving Abkhaz educational rights in Sukhum/i left 14 dead and over 500 wounded (Jones 1997: 513). In December 1990, the historian Vladislav Ardzinba was chosen to chair the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet, and he has remained at the head of the political structure of Abkhazia to this day, although his influence is waning due to his failing health. By 1991, the cleft between the Georgians and the Abkhaz had widened, so that when the Georgians decided to boycott a referendum on the future structure of the former Soviet Union, the Abkhaz authorities insisted on participating. Thus on 17 March 1991, with 52.3% voter turnout, 98.6% of those coming to the polls in Abkhazia supported remaining within a union of sovereign republics. This behaviour led to threats by the Georgian government to dissolve the Abkhaz parliament (Shubladze 1998: 171).

Parallel developments were occurring in Georgian political society during this period. Encouraged by the relative freedom of speech allowed under Gorbachev's new policy of *glasnost*, national movements rapidly developed in many Soviet republics, and Georgia was no exception. More unusual was that the extreme nationalist element with Zviad Gamsakhurdia at its head eventually prevailed, which as Ghia Nodia points out, was a situation unique to Georgia, 'the only place among these republics where the pro-independence movement was dominated by its radical factions' (Nodia 1998: 8). Gamsakhurdia initially commanded a great deal of respect in Georgian society as a former dissident and the son of a well-known author. He was elected president in May 1991 with an overwhelming 86% of the vote (Coppieters 2000: 21). Although the nationalist line he adopted did not bode well for relations between Georgians and ethnic minorities, Gamsakhurdia at first reached an agreement with Abkhaz officials on a quota system for the Abkhazian legislature.[10] However, this arrangement came about mainly because the government and the Gamsakhurdia-controlled parliament had failed to avert (and even contributed to the outbreak of) war in the autonomous region of South Ossetia and wanted to avoid a similar situation in Abkhazia. The difficulty with the new quota system was that it allowed for either of the two main voting blocs to stall parliamentary action, which the Georgian deputies soon did. The Abkhaz deputies, together with some others, continued to issue legislation, which led the Georgian faction to form a parallel parliament for which they claimed full legitimacy.

Gamsakhurdia quickly demonstrated his incompetence at preserving the loyalty of influential officials and angered many due to his response to the Moscow putsch, when he

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and at any rate created a precedent for the close relationship between Abkhazia and certain forces within the Russian Federation today.

[10] Under this arrangement ethnic Abkhaz were guaranteed 28 of the 65 seats, Georgians 26 and the other groups combined 11. Furthermore, constitutional amendments would require a two-thirds majority, i.e. consensus between the Abkhaz and the Georgians was necessary. See Hanf and Nodia (2000: 31).

failed to condemn the Communist hardliners unambiguously. Although he still had great support among the populace, his position among the political elite became increasingly tenuous, and he was eventually ousted by a military coup led by the National Guard under Tengiz Kitovani with the support of Jaba Ioseliani and his paramilitary squadron, Mkhedrioni, in January 1992. Unsure how to respond to their newfound power, the putschists invited the former USSR Foreign Minister and Georgian party boss Eduard Shevardnadze to take the reins. The choice of Shevardnadze appeared to promise increased stability and reliable contacts with the west, which could help put Georgia on its feet politically and economically. Shevardnadze was still in the process of dealing with a variety of hostile Georgian warlords when the situation in Abkhazia became acute. In July 1992, just as a ceasefire agreement in South Ossetia had been brokered due to the mediation efforts of Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin, the Abkhazian legislature restored the draft Abkhazian constitution of 1925, which did not consider Abkhazia a part of Georgia.[11] The following month Georgian troops entered Abkhazia on the pretext of protecting the rail lines and highways in light of pro-Gamsakhurdia ('Zviadist') insurrection in Abkhazia and bordering regions, and encountered resistance by the Abkhazian militia. This constituted the beginning of a war which was to last more than a year.

The consequences of the war for both Georgia and the Caucasus were multiple. First, the loss of de facto control over Abkhaz territory increased the Georgian government's difficulties in building a functioning state. Despite Georgia's entry into the United Nations in 1992, the question of the separatist regions was avoided in the current Georgian constitution and the issue of territorial integrity remains unresolved to this day. This has recently been starkly highlighted by the dispute between the central Georgian government and the region of Ajaria over the degree of the latter's autonomy.[12] Georgia's lack of capacity to deal with the situation in Abkhazia is furthermore a symptom of its larger difficulties in the democratization sphere, which have not been overcome with the appearance of a new, popularly supported president. On a material level, the infrastructure within Abkhazia has largely been destroyed, and Abkhazia is an isolated region except for its increasing ties to the Russian Federation (see below).

Second, Abkhazia is not alone but rather one in a series of similar conflicts over separatist regions, including another in Georgia (South Ossetia) as well as Chechnya in the Russian Federation and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. Thus, in addition to posing a problem of territorial integrity for Georgia, Abkhazia is symptomatic of a general instability in the region, which has had myriad consequences for the development of emerging statehood in each affected country as well as for the relations among the countries. So far, attempts at international mediation have failed to do more than 'freeze' the conflicts, which have undergone various stages. Natalie Sabanadze suggests that these conflicts so far tend to follow a similar pattern of three relatively distinct stages: 1) Russian involvement and international neglect, 2) increasing activity by international organizations, and 3) an attempt to counterbalance Russian influence by increasing US involvement (Sabanadze 2002).

Third, the war and its outcome have geopolitical implications due not least to significant Russian Federation support for the Abkhaz both during and after the war, which has increased Georgian dependence on Russia and at the same time impelled Georgian government to attempt to employ the UN and especially the USA as a counterweight to Russian influence in the region. Particularly the Russian military establishment has been supportive of the Abkhaz, while the presidential administration and the foreign policy

[11] For a more detailed account of this period than we can present here see Hanf and Nodia (2000: 34ff).
[12] For information and commentary on this dispute see the 2004 issues of the RFE/RL Caucasus Report under www.rferl.org/caucasusreport/.

establishment have been more balanced in their pronouncements and actions. In addition, the border with the Russian Federation is quite porous and a large number of Abkhaz possess Russian passports.[13] New Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili's tactics regarding the geopolitical aspect of the Abkhazia conflict have been to make friends with all involved international parties, obtain material (and where possible military) help from the US and the EU, and reach compromises with Russia in order to reduce its support for separatist regions. However, Saakashvili's apparent plan to woo back the separatist regions by orchestrating an economic boom in Georgia seems quite implausible. Furthermore, Saakashvili has raised concerns among the leaders in the relevant regions by some of his statements, which can be interpreted as a willingness to resort to violence for the sake of restoring Georgia's territorial integrity, as well as a recent build-up of military equipment and personnel on the Ajarian border (Fuller 2004). This lends credence to the idea that he covertly supports violence as a method, and can easily raise Abkhaz fears that they are next on the list.

Conditions for NGO Development in Georgia and Abkhazia

Without pretending to offer an exhaustive list, we will present here several factors that have conditioned the development of the NGO sphere in Georgia and Abkhazia over the period since the collapse of the Soviet Union. While many of these aspects are valid for most post-Soviet situations, some are specific to cases in which war has occurred.

First, there are those factors associated with the legacy of the Soviet era, during which a civil society in the western sense was almost completely absent. All social institutions, including religious ones, were almost completely under government control. This phenomenon has been described in much greater detail elsewhere,[14] but for our purposes it has meant that Soviet citizens were not able to gain experience in creating civil society organizations, nor did they possess an awareness of the functions of such organizations and the methods of their work. Furthermore, there was no consciousness in the broader society of the need for and usefulness of civil society institutions. The lack of such consciousness led to initial suspicion of their employees and their motives, which implied a widespread lack of support in the broader society. Thus, in the beginning phases NGOs had to fight not only for their existence but also for recognition within most segments of society, rather than being able to count on a certain amount of passive social support as similar organizations could in the west. The same suspicion and lack of recognition was usually present among government officials, particularly those who had held their posts during the Soviet era as well. Such officials often perceived attempts to criticize government actions as a threat to the system, and they could count on some understanding of this attitude within society as a whole. For these and other reasons John K. Glenn concludes that the initial thrust of civil society development did not centre around the creation of NGOs, but rather focused on democratic movements, which eventually metamorphosed into fledgling party systems (Glenn 2001).

Second, and also partly related to the Soviet legacy, is a hesitancy on the part of large segments of the population to become involved in any even remotely political activity. Due to the primarily negative associations with government organs instilled during the Communist period, many people desired to be left alone to live their lives without any connection to politics. Although perhaps a majority sought an alternative to communism, democracy also eventually acquired a bad reputation because it was linked with economic

[13] According to one report, 120,000 of the estimated 320,000 current inhabitants of Abkhazia have Russian Federation passports. See 'Visiting Moscow, Abkhazia Chief Underlines Importance of Peace with Georgia', Rosbalt, 1 December 2003, eng.globalisation.ru/live/news.asp?id=4683).

[14] See among others Howard (2003: 20-26) who presents an excellent analysis of the reasons for the weakness of civil society in post-communist Europe, building upon and expanding on the 'legacies approach' to evaluating the post-Soviet space.

difficulties and interference from outside (e.g., international organizations such as the IMF) which led to domestic hardship, as well as with politicians who proclaimed democratic ideals but largely failed to put them into practice. In addition, western countries and institutions, which loudly promoted democratic principles, came to be seen in an increasingly ambivalent light due to an increase in available information and also to the ambiguous role western actors played (and continue to play) in the development of formerly communist states. While viewed as important political and economic partners, western institutions were often believed to be employing a double standard (one for the west, one for the east, or one for Russia, another for smaller post-Soviet states), and this not unfounded perception jeopardized positive associations with the idea of a democratic system.

A third factor conditioning the development of the NGO community in post-Soviet societies is a widespread lack of resources. These can be human in nature (see the discussion on attitudes to civil society institutions above), as well as material and financial. This latter dearth has necessarily led to a search for outside training, equipment and funding. Such a search has a variety of consequences. On the one hand, it can introduce a potentially positive element of competition into the emerging NGO realm, forcing organizations to attempt to generate high-quality proposals. However, all too often this initial phase encourages a certain amount of parroting of supposed western civic values in order to obtain grant monies, rather than to the actual internalization of such values by locals, which is a slow process depending *inter alia* on conditions outside the NGO community. Thus, an overly rapid and uncritical adoption of western funding organizations' agendas took place, with little sense of the need and/or available capacity to reflect on significant differences between western and post-Soviet societies and to modify approaches accordingly. This deficiency worked in two directions: just as many post-Soviet activists were overly willing to accept superficially the opinion of western civil society experts, so were these experts too inclined to present their ideas without being aware of the modifications necessary in the context of societies shaped by communist institutions.

Another possible factor that influences the development of civil society has so far been explored only in a different context, that of protest or the lack thereof over wage arrears in Russia (Javeline 2003). Javeline's argument is that there is little desire for citizens to become engaged politically in civic initiatives, such as protest groups, because it is extremely difficult to pinpoint who is to blame for the various ills that befall post-Soviet societies. Applied to Georgia/Abkhazia, this argument would mean that people become mired in a range of questions over who is to blame for the conflict (the Abkhazian government, the Georgian government, the Russian government, the Russian military, or North Caucasus mercenaries?) and cannot find their way out of this maze to take concrete action. This argument counters the all-too-frequent assumption of passivity among post-Soviet populations as an adequate explanation for a variety of societal phenomena.

Factors that were introduced or reinforced by the months of war include especially a deteriorated or absent trust in members of the other ethnic group on the emotional level, and a lack of infrastructure on the physical level. Furthermore, the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the war allowed a small elite group to come to power in Abkhazia which was able to establish tight control over society, so that Abkhazian NGOs must work within more strict parameters than Georgian ones and are more often accused of collaborating with the government.

However, over the past year or two the power of the small elite under Ardzinba has been eroding, with a government reshuffle in the spring of 2003 and the emergence of a

supposedly influential new opposition movement, 'United Abkhazia', this year. (Abkhazia's Leadership Struggle, 11 April 2004, available online at www.kafkas.org.tr/absoluten/showarticle.php?articleID=353). While it is unlikely that its leaders will be able to agree upon a single opposition presidential candidate for the elections scheduled for 28 October 2004, the status of the current Prime Minister Raul Khadjimba appears increasingly jeopardized. These developments have been overshadowed by more dramatic ones in Georgia proper, where Eduard Shevardnadze was ousted from the presidency in November 2003 and replaced by the leader of the protest movement that forced the ouster, the charismatic former Justice Minister Mikhail Saakashvili. After being elected President in January 2004 with over 96% of the vote, Saakashvili's party also managed to gain 76% of those parliamentary seats up for grabs in a March 2004 re-run of the tainted October 2003 elections, the overtly corrupt nature of which served as the impulse for Shevardnadze's expulsion.

In response to the radically altered political situation in Tbilisi, representatives of all three potential breakaway regions of Georgia—Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Ajaria—took part in a sort of informal 'summit' in Moscow to sound out various Russian officials on the extent of their support. However, an apparent refusal by the Russian authorities to pledge significant assistance led in the Abkhaz case to caution. The Abkhaz Foreign Minister released a statement about the need for a peaceful relationship with Tbilisi (see 'Visiting Moscow, Abkhazia Chief Underlines Importance of Peace with Georgia', 1 December 2003, Rosbalt, eng.globalisation.ru/live/news.asp?id=4683). Saakashvili for his part immediately tried to convince the UN to exert pressure on the Abkhaz side. Using strong language to describe contemporary Abkhazia, he deemed it 'a classical situation of ethnic cleansing, a situation that is totally against every principle of humanity' (McMahon 2004). However, the UN has failed to use the change of power as an opportunity for a fresh start at negotiations.[15] Thus, despite a new constellation in Tbilisi, internal politicking and Russian reluctance in Abkhazia, as well as the disinclination of the UN to seize the moment, have led to a holding pattern in the conflict.

Goals and Activities of INGOs in the Georgia-Abkhazia Conflict

This article focuses on four international NGOs and their Georgian partners.[16] These organizations are embedded in a larger context of (I)NGOs working on different aspects of the ongoing conflict and its consequences. Much of this work is in the more traditional areas of humanitarian aid, such as health, nutrition, and income generation.[17] While working alongside other NGO actors and international organizations, there is not much significant networking between the types of organizations examined here and those doing more conventional humanitarian work, which means that the peacebuilding and conflict transformation attempts become 'pigeonholed' rather than spreading throughout the NGO community. Only recently, has there been a successful effort to network more within the conflict transformation arena, which may be the precursor to more effective contacts with other spheres.

The organizations selected are those which have been concerned the longest and most intensively with the conflict, and are therefore deemed the most likely to have achieved results in their attempts to reach the goals mentioned above. Furthermore, all four have a reputation in Georgia/Abkhazia and elsewhere for serious work in the conflict

[15] For an analysis of the UN strategy in the conflict up to November 2003 (and most likely beyond) see Stewart (2003).
[16] Unfortunately the Abkhazian partners cannot be considered here more than superficially due to lack of material.
[17] For a consistently updated overview of the humanitarian assistance situation in Abkhazia, including the activities of conflict transformation and peacebuilding INGOs, see the briefing notes of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) at www.reliefweb.int.

management and peacebuilding sphere. In most cases, the INGOs chosen had established ongoing contact with Georgian or Abkhaz groups prior to starting their projects, and therefore brought a previous knowledge of the societies and the perspectives involved to the table. The INGOs are:

International Alert
Conciliation Resources
Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management
University of California at Irvine (Paula Garb project)[18]

Since most of the efforts of the Berghof Center, and in particular those investigated below, have been undertaken together with Conciliation Resources, the activities of these two organizations will be examined together. The aim of this section is not merely to describe the work of the selected organizations, but further to evaluate how their goals fit into the diagram suggested by Lederach, in which middle-level actors are supposed to facilitate transformation in both upward and downward directions.

International Alert

A well-known NGO operating from London, International Alert (IA) is currently carrying out three initiatives in the Caucasus, all in the realm of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. All of these fall under the umbrella of the Eurasia Programme, the declared aim of which is: 'to contribute to the peacebuilding efforts of civil society organisations, and others, in the Caucasus and the former Soviet Union spaces. The programme sees an opportunity to develop targeted initiatives for bridging the gaps between NGO and grassroots peacebuilding, and official governmental peace processes' (Strategic Plan 2001-2004: 19). The three initiatives are:

a) Georgian regions project: a conflict prevention initiative dedicated to improving the relationship between Tbilisi and the governing structures of Georgia's regions;
b) Caucasus NGO Forum: a Caucasian-wide network of civil society leaders and NGOs focusing on peacebuilding;
c) Georgia-Abkhazia project: by focusing on various groups, such as youth, women and ex-combatants, writers, and the disabled, attempts to organize and involve them in peacebuilding activities.

The emphasis here will understandably be on number three. However, to some extent the third initiative emerged from and continues to be linked to number two, as it was initially only in the context of a larger Caucasus-wide initiative that Georgians and Abkhazians could engage in a productive dialogue. IA claims that it 'has contributed through facilitation (along with other international partners) to breakthroughs at the non-governmental and civil society level. One of the main expressions of these breakthroughs is the establishment of a network (with the initiative of Paula Garb) which demonstrates some capacity for co-ordination and co-operation between local, international, bi- and multi-lateral peacebuilding activities' (Strategic Plan 2001-2004: 19).

The objective of the Georgia-Abkhazia project is 'to strengthen the ability of civil society structures in order to enable them to increase their influence on the official and diplomatic negotiation processes' (Strategic Plan 2001-2004: 21). Mechanisms for doing this include holding workshops for leaders in each of three (later more) fields for the purpose of enhancing their capacity for peacebuilding. For organizational purposes Georgian and Abkhazian co-ordinating councils were created which are also supposed to help in 'translating those experiences into influence with governmental peace processes' (Strategic Plan 2001-2004: 21). The outcomes are to include peacebuilding projects,

[18] Although not technically an INGO, this academic undertaking has many aspects of a typical INGO project, as it possesses not only theoretical but also eminently practical goals.

improved networks, and better relationships between governmental structures and emerging peace constituencies. Thus IA clearly places a definite emphasis on contacts upward to government officials and even to those involved in the international negotiation process. While some impact on the broader society is to be assumed from the planned and implemented peacebuilding projects, this appears to play a secondary role compared to the influence intended to be exerted on the respective governments. However, clear importance is attached to work which strengthens the support of middle-range actors for a peaceful transformation of the conflict.

Conciliation Resources and the Berghof Center

Two staff members of Conciliation Resources (CR) have been involved in the region since the early 1990s, although official activities in the Caucasus started in 1997. The focus is on the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict and therefore narrower than that of IA. In conjunction with local partners in Sukhum/i and Tbilisi from the NGO sphere, research institutes, and the media, CR pursues the following goals: civil society capacity building, media and public awareness raising in Abkhazia and Georgia, and the initiation and enhancement of dialogue processes. Thus there is more emphasis on influencing governmental behaviour regarding the conflict than in the IA case, and a greater focus on links downward to the broader society (or among middle-range actors), although within the work on dialogue processes the focus has shifted partly toward the inclusion of government officials.

Since 2000, CR's work within the context of the project has been clearly structured in three mutually reinforcing areas: capacity building, public awareness and the media, and informal dialogue. Capacity building has consisted of many aspects, including information sharing, training for journalists and NGO representatives, as well as training in international relations and democratic institutions for students, civil society activists and officials from parliament and the foreign affairs ministry and the administration of a grant program for NGOs in all regions of Abkhazia. Work with the media has involved meetings with journalists, which have led to collaboration between a Georgian and an Abkhaz journalist both working for the BBC. There have also been support and training of IDP journalists, as well as various publications and participation in TV and radio programs.

The dialogue process has been carried out together with the Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management in Berlin and has consisted of a series of meetings where small numbers of Georgian and Abkhaz participants have been able to reflect on their own and other conflicts. The participants have come partly from the NGO community but also include middle-level government officials. These meetings have been confidential, with some participants belonging to a sort of 'core group' which consistently takes part and others being involved on a rotating basis. According to the Berghof Center, the dialogue 'is based on a six-stage process: 1) establishing contact; 2) fostering mutual understanding; 3) joint analysis of conflict issues; 4) exploratory problem-solving; 5) shared activities; and 6) seeking inspiration for negotiations' (www.berghof-center.org/english/projects/georgia.htm). Thus the culmination of the process is intended to be influence on the top-level negotiation processes. The results, however, have so far been located more in the realm of developing contacts to the broader society: 'The seminars have already made it possible to agree to a range of confidence-building measures in the field of media cooperation, as well as a strategy for parallel NGO projects' (ibid.).

Conciliation Resources also emphasizes some limited results: 'Perhaps the most striking outcome of engagement to date has been the personal evolutions taking place in the individuals involved in the different aspects of CR's work. The sense of solidarity, commitment and mutual enlightenment that the Abkhaz, Georgian and international partners get from working with one another is an important starting point on the long

road to reconstituting the social trust that is essential for peacebuilding' (www.c-r.org). Nonetheless, CR recognizes the challenge of achieving measurable outcomes: 'In all its work in the Caucasus, CR recognises the difficulties involved in assessing a project's impact on broad social and political processes. Nevertheless, we work with our regional and international partners in the belief that well-designed initiatives from a range of actors can cumulatively contribute to influencing the nature of the dialogue across communal divides, as well as the way in which peace processes are conducted and who has a voice in their implementation' (www.c-r.org). This belief in the eventual effectiveness of a series of small steps is typical of the (I)NGOs working in the area of peacebuilding. CR expresses more explicitly than the other organizations its commitment to a conflict transformation perspective going beyond individual projects: 'Thus one of the tasks for international NGOs supporting local partners is to advocate the need not just for a peaceful solution to the conflict in question but for changes in the societies themselves. Among the issues to be addressed are the relationships between state and civil society, governance, accountability, cultural diversity and political pluralism' (Annual Report 2000, www.c-r.org).

Despite the long-term nature of its work, CR believes that some results have already been achieved beyond the small circle of participating Georgians and Abkhazians, claiming that 'some groups are articulating more nuanced approaches to the conflict resolution process and gaining a greater public voice. This is reflected in positive responses to the aforementioned TV and radio programmes, magazine articles, and seminars with officials, politicians and public activists. Charting this in societies where public opinion is fragmented is difficult. However, an example of how people try to find their voice occurred in October 2001 when tensions between the conflicting parties were reminiscent of the build-up to war in 1992. Back then, there were few, if any, moderate voices. In 2001, several CR partners in Tbilisi and Sukhum/i released public statements cautioning against intemperate and antagonistic approaches' (www.c-r.org). Such developments are also geared more toward influencing the wider society than to having an impact on the behaviour of government circles, although even mild criticism in a small and tightly controlled environment such as Abkhazia can potentially attract the attention of certain government organs.

More recently CR organized a series of dialogue seminars for Georgian and Abkhazian participants which took place in Great Britain and Ireland and were centred around the Northern Ireland conflict. These seminars involved various groups, including economists, politicians and NGO leaders. Each focused on a different aspect of the conflict. In part high-ranking political figures such as ministers or their deputies from both sides participated in the meetings. These seminars thus qualify as a so-called track 1½ measure toward transforming the conflict by offering a different but actual framework in which it can be addressed. They constitute both a continuation of CR's work with civil society leaders and an expansion of their cooperation with government officials to include those at the top level. Thus there appears to be a parallel strategy in line with Lederach: while continuing to pursue developments on the larger societal level, the organization is intensifying its efforts to reach those involved in official negotiation processes.

University of California at Irvine

The projects undertaken by the University of California at Irvine (UCI) under the leadership of Paula Garb differ from CR's dialogue seminars in that they belong exclusively to the track II arena. Since March 1999, a variety of seminars and other activities have resulted in 9 publications in both English (abstracts) and Russian (full texts). The objectives are also somewhat different in that they include academic goals: '(1) Promote constructive dialogue and interaction between citizens on both sides of the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict (2) Contribute to theory on conflict transformation by

enhancing methodologies for tracking how unofficial diplomacy impacts the stakeholders in this conflict; (3) Disseminate the results in the region and the international conflict resolution community' (Garb 1999).

The third objective is further specified elsewhere: 'By disseminating research findings, the UCI project aims to engage larger portions of the Georgian and Abkhaz populations—as well as the local media—in community discussions on the peace process, help the parties find ways to overcome the impasse, and support efforts, at least indirectly, in other conflicts where similar contradictions are at the heart of the disputes' (www.isar.org/isar/archive/GT/GT7garb.html). Thus there is an emphasis on contacts with the broader society rather than the development of connections to government officials or international organizations.

Initial conclusions following two years of work were similar to those reached by other organizations, although perhaps more bluntly stated: 'The results of these first studies indicate that unofficial diplomacy has had a major impact on all those who have participated, causing significant personal transformation and changes in perceptions about the conflict, but has not yet influenced public opinion in any tangible way. Most people questioned about these initiatives are either unaware of the activities or have a confused understanding of their value. One main reason for this limited public knowledge is that until now, participants have felt safe sharing their experiences only within a small circle of close relatives and friends. They tend not to look for media coverage of the events, and when they do, reporters rarely respond. If articles or television interviews do appear, they usually go unnoticed' (Paula Garb, 'Small Steps toward Peace in Abkhazia', www.isar.org/isar/archive/GT/GT7garb.html). According to Georgian participants, this lack of interest on the part of the media has mutated over time into a greater familiarity with the project and a willingness to devote some media time to its activities and their consequences.

Garb does, however, claim that in December 1999 the high level of trust achieved by the UCI seminar participants led to a 'major breakthrough in the citizen peace process' (ibid.). At that time, three Georgians (Ghia Nodia, Ghia Anchabadze, and Marina Elbakidze) had the opportunity to speak to and engage in discussions with Abkhaz participants in public forums in Sukhum/i. This was the first time such an exchange between Georgians and Abkhaz had been possible since the war. Since then there have also been numerous visits of Abkhaz peacebuilders to Tbilisi, e.g., two discussions hosted by an independent TV studio (see below) as well as a longer one at the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development. These discussions as well as those in December 1999 in Sukhum/i have been recorded in the project's publication series.[19]

In spite of only tentative and limited results, Garb believes it is worth continuing her work based on two assumptions: 'UCI will continue its work based on the shared conviction that the success of future citizen diplomacy hinges on two factors: first, the degree to which the nongovernmental sector grows in each society; and second, the degree to which representatives of the nongovernmental sector are able to free themselves and the public from dominant ideologies and promote democracy and civil society' (Ibid.). Here NGOs are seen not as representatives of significant trends within the population but rather as an *avant-garde* which is supposed to spread new ways of thinking and acting, in this case with regard to conflict situations. This view of the situation appears to have broader relevance for the entire post-Soviet space, in which NGOs are in many ways playing a pioneering role, as pointed out in a previous section.

[19] For the text of the publications see hypatia.ss.uci.edu/istudies/peace/progs/projpubs.htm.

Implementation of Projects with Local NGO Partners

The information for this and the following sections was derived primarily from the results of semi-standardized interviews conducted with leading figures in the various partner NGOs of the INGOs outlined above (see interview list).

International Alert

As already mentioned, the IA project on Georgia-Abkhazia focuses on a number of groups, such as women, writers, and young people. Each group has a coordinator which oversees and guides its activities in conjunction with other activists. A coordinating council keeps track of the overall process on the Georgian side.

The process of formation of the League of Women of the Caucasus, which has been encouraged and financially supported by IA, demonstrates on the one hand the somewhat artificial manner in which civil society institutions are being created and on the other an example of a successful synthesis of international and local agendas, with the desire of international organizations to foster the development of civil society coinciding with that of women's groups to form cross-border contacts. Marina Pagava, currently the executive secretary of the League of Women of the Caucasus and closely involved with IA's women's projects, talks about various meetings which took place both before and after the founding of the League. Five years have passed since the initial meetings were held, but this is a relatively short time frame with respect to the development of civil society. Only very recently have the women started to formulate concrete directions of work and projects within these different directions. Thus IA's approach has allowed time for guided but partially organic growth without insisting on specific results within the first years. Although the League is composed of women leaders from throughout the Caucasus, the depth of its contacts to a broader social base is unclear. As for upward connections to the political sphere, initial overtures appear to have been successful, but there has been little substantive interaction as yet due to the low level of preparedness of the League to function as an efficient lobbying organization.

Other foci appear to be further along than the women's group in terms of developing complete projects, which appears to be due partially to the fact that the other directions have spent less time on pan-Caucasian organizing. These foci include young adults (18-30 years), ex-combatants, writers, and the disabled. Guram Odisharia, head of the writers' project, points out the relative successes of all foci except that on the ex-combatants, which has encountered opposition to joint meetings, especially from the Abkhaz side. The writers' project has resulted in certain trips and publications with a peacebuilding purpose, although Odisharia does not see the political aspect of the conflict as being particularly meaningful to writers, whose focus he sees on the individual rather than the collective level. Instead of emphasizing the political, he believes it is more essential to raise awareness about the fact that there are five Caucasian literatures which all exist in relative isolation due to the absence of translations from one into another. Clearly some contact to the broader society is achieved by means of publications; the impact of these is difficult to assess but appears to be growing. Upward contacts to officials are often informal and spontaneous rather than organized, although there are occasional presentations to which government officials are invited and do actually attend. Thus there appears to be genuine potential for expanding contacts in an upward direction. However, the writers' projects in particular seem to be geared more toward raising public awareness about conflict situations and how to deal with them. The problem in the case of the IA group and elsewhere is that most forums which publish on such issues are newsletters or journals with extremely small print runs. Most of these are close to or fall within the NGO sphere, so it is often a case of 'preaching to the converted'. Any information which reaches the mass media is necessarily much briefer in content and at times presented in a distorted fashion.

The young adults focus has initially been on young journalists, offering training, seminars, joint meetings, etc., for about two years. There have been some results in the form of journalists from each side writing about the other, so that relatively reliable information has been spread to a limited extent. However, the current intention is to shift the focus gradually to young lawyers, on the theory that they are the future defenders of human rights specifically and of justice in general. In terms of the disabled and the ex-combatants, it is still too soon to speak about concrete results. The work with disabled people is a relatively new direction, which has so far consisted of separate Georgian and Abkhaz meetings and of attempts to assist in finding funding for medical needs. A joint meeting of both Georgian and Abkhaz disabled was in the planning stages in spring 2003. The work with ex-combatants is believed to be crucial since former soldiers carry quite a bit of clout in their respective societies, but it has been difficult as the two sides have differing needs and the willingness of the Abkhaz side to agree to a joint meeting has been largely absent. Nonetheless, both the disabled and ex-combatant projects appear promising in terms of their capacity to reach members of society beyond the NGO leaders and other intellectuals.

Conciliation Resources

The heart of CR's work on the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict are the dialogue seminars which make up the so-called 'Schlaining process', thus named because some of the discussions were held at Stadtschlaining near Vienna, a renowned centre of peace research. These have been carried out together with the Berghof Center. According to Paata Zakareishvili, a well-known Georgian NGO and human rights activist, the idea for the Schlaining talks emerged from reflections on the Paula Garb project (see below), which he also helps coordinate. The conclusion was that since joint talks are functioning on the level of NGO leaders, then an attempt should be made to include politicians in a similar process. Some modifications had to be made to accommodate the more sensitive situation. A confidentiality rule was introduced, under which it was allowed to state what had been said at the meetings, but not to attribute the comments to a particular person. Furthermore, the participants were understood to be acting in their individual rather than their professional capacities. Zakareishvili admits that while the project has brought certain successes, the overall result has not been as impressive as originally expected. While the politicians appear to have changed their thinking on a personal level, this has so far had little or no impact on their politics. Nonetheless, there has been an increased awareness of the potential of NGOs among government officials, at least on the Georgian side, and the beginnings of some cooperation between particular NGOs and certain politicians or groupings in the form of recommendations or documents being requested on specific issues. This latter point was confirmed in a broader context at a workshop on issues relating to the effectiveness of Georgian NGOs in December 2001, at which various examples of NGO cooperation with government bodies for the purposes of generating draft documents were given (Nodia 2001).

As a sort of continuation and expansion of the Schlaining process, CR has organized a Northern Ireland project.[20] Based on the principle that it would be useful for Georgians and Abkhaz to obtain fresh ideas for conflict management by looking at another, to some degree similar conflict situation, the project chose to focus on Northern Ireland as a case where some political results have been achieved. Five separate meetings were held for different target groups, e.g., economists, politicians, and NGO activists, all of whom were acquainted with various aspects of the Northern Ireland situation, and a follow-up meeting to discuss lessons learned was scheduled for spring 2003. While Zakareishvili was pleased with the opportunities presented to the groups during their visits in Northern Ireland and England, he was less optimistic about the impressions received by the

[20] This project was carried out by CR alone, without the participation of the Berghof Center.

Georgian participants. His assessment was that the lessons of the conflict had not really sunk in to the extent that they could be applied by the participants to the Georgia-Abkhazia situation. Thus while the Schlaining seminars and the Northern Ireland project have successfully involved middle- and even high-ranking politicians from both sides in discussions on Abkhazia and similar conflict situations, their tangible impact on the political situation has been extremely low. However, the seminars have led to a greater awareness of NGO potential in certain government circles, thereby improving the lobbying chances of those NGOs involved in the process.

Another line of work pursued by CR in connection with the conflict over Abkhazia has been its support of various media outlets, including Panorama, a paper published in Tbilisi and Sukhum/i since March 2003 (see OCHA Georgia 2004). Longer cooperation exists with Studio Re, an independent TV studio which characterizes itself as an NGO in the media sector. While the studio receives funding from a variety of institutions, CR is termed its 'European partner' and has financed the bulk of the work on Abkhazia. According to one of the directors of the studio, Mamuka Kuparadze, members of Studio Re have been participating in meetings of NGO activists since 1996, and as a result several joint projects have been carried out, in particular with Svetlana Korsaia of Abkhaz state television. In addition there have been various film productions. The first portrayed the situation in the Gal/i region, the southernmost area of Abkhazia in which primarily ethnic Georgians reside. Many of them became internally displaced persons within Georgia proper as a result of the war, although some have since returned to Gal/i. The film was shown to a limited extent in Georgia but the Abkhaz government refused to allow it to be screened in Abkhazia, although they did permit Studio Re to do further work on the territory of the region. Another film covered the series of meetings organized by CR in Northern Ireland (see above). Furthermore, the studio has organized nine TV discussions on Abkhazia, two of which involved participants who travelled from Abkhazia to take part.

Clearly, the focus of the studio is to reach as large an audience as possible within the broader society. There may have been some limited impact on the governmental level, particularly among Abkhaz government officials who screened the Gal/i film, but the primary orientation of Studio Re is toward the mass societal level. Kuparadze discusses the difficulties involved in reaching Georgian society and in modifying entrenched opinions. He claims that the Georgian mass media and society are distanced from the process which is occurring between Georgian and Abkhaz NGO activists and that there is little understanding of such meetings, particularly since they do not appear to deliver tangible results. These attitudes are compounded by the phenomenon of negative journalism on each side. The Georgian media do not present any positive information about Abkhazia, nor do the Abkhaz do this with regard to Georgia, according to Kuparadze. Instead, negative stereotypes which emerged or were strengthened during the war are reinforced by the media. This is due to the attitudes of the journalists and directors themselves, as well as to the unpopularity of balanced programming. Television stations can more easily ensure high viewing rates by sensationalizing a topic and playing to society's prejudices. Kuparadze points out that while Studio Re is able to realize its goals regarding production thanks to foreign funding, obtaining media time is a much more difficult challenge, although not impossible. The main way in which Studio Re attempts to reach larger audiences is by organizing seminars and discussions on its films or by giving them to others to do so. Thus, the impact of the studio's work is limited, but definitely goes beyond the tiny circle of NGO activists involved in dialogue seminars and similar activities.

University of California at Irvine

The Paula Garb project, run under the auspices of the University of California at Irvine, is characterized primarily by a series of dialogue seminars. (The tenth was held in Moscow in July 2003.) These differ from the ones offered by Conciliation Resources and the Berghof Center in three ways. First, they do not include politicians, but are exclusively 'track II' meetings, involving a wide variety of civil society activists. Second, there are no meetings involving members of only one society. Instead, all of the seminars have been of a joint nature, including both Georgian and Abkhaz participants. This differs also from the work of International Alert, which often focuses on parallel projects in the two societies before attempting joint undertakings. Third, the results of the meetings are published (9 volumes in all) in English (in part) and Russian (fully), so that they are accessible to virtually all members of both the Georgian and Abkhaz societies. While the original publications included only more or less formal speeches, the later ones also contain the informal discussions which follow, allowing the reader to gain a sense of the priorities and attitudes of the individuals and groups involved.

There appears to have been a significant evolution in the impact of the project within the five years of its existence. According to Paata Zakareishvili, the coordinator on the Georgian side, the books were not popular at first, but now the demand is greater than the supply and some are going into a second printing. He further believes that the project is now relatively well-known in Georgian society and has its own individual profile which sets it apart from others. While at an early stage of the project one participant complained that: 'Until NGOs embrace the principles of a civil society and become a force that has to be reckoned with, they cannot have a tangible influence on transforming the conflict', this now seems to have happened to some degree (Paula Garb, Small Steps toward Peace in Abkhazia, www.isar.org/isar/archive/GT/GT7garb.html). According to Zakareishvili, groups such as the so-called 'Abkhaz government-in-exile' have begun to take the role of NGOs in the development of the conflict seriously and have realized that some Georgian NGOs have established a direct connection to certain segments of Abkhaz society. He further points out that media interest has grown and claims that it is now significant as a means of reaching wider audiences.

Nonetheless, even Zakareishvili admits that the larger societies are being reached only inadequately. While the Georgian and Abkhaz participants are becoming closer in their approaches, and have been able to convince many in the NGO sector and some in the political realm of them, nonetheless the broader society is not influenced by the publications and the project as a whole. He suggests this is in part due to the difficulty of instilling civic values in people in more than a superficial way over the short term. Nevertheless, he believes it is important to keep pursuing the process in a fair and transparent way, as this is a path toward the establishment of a genuine civil society in both Georgia and Abkhazia. However, in order to keep up the project's momentum, a new phase should be introduced in which Abkhaz dialogue seminar participants come to Georgia to interact with the media and thereby with society, while Georgians go to Abkhazia for the same purpose. In this way a larger audience could be reached. But the Abkhaz side is not ready for such a step, which points to a series of differences in civil society development in the two societies. While the Georgians are dealing with a climate which is relatively tolerant of NGO activity, the Abkhaz groups are still under tight control by their government. Second, the opinions of the Abkhaz NGO leaders have remained within a narrower circle of activists than has been the case in Georgia. Third, while both societies are characterized by a high level of mistrust of NGO motives and activities, there appears to be a more open atmosphere for discussion of these in the Georgian environment. These differences are in part explainable by the fact that Abkhaz society is

constantly living with the consequences of the 1992-93 war (particularly international isolation) to a much greater extent than its Georgian counterpart.

Conclusions

Clearly, this case study confirms that it is exceedingly difficult to create civil society in the post-Soviet space. This is due in part to the Soviet legacy, which discouraged or prevented the development of social initiatives that were not controlled by the state. This, along with the western belief that a functioning civil society is an important pillar of democratic regimes, has resulted in a certain artificiality of the development of civil society institutions, such as NGOs in the post-Soviet Georgian context. Thus, the organizations have often not emerged from a perceived need within the larger society and therefore do not possess a broad social base. Rather, they are marginal groups supported by western funding which are intended to promote the injection of civic values into larger segments of society as well as to lobby the Georgian government for more peaceful policies regarding Abkhazia. Although contacts to politicians are partially in place and have to some extent been further developed by the NGOs and their international partners, these contacts are often based more on existing personal relationships than on the concept of a political culture in which functional lobbying plays a legitimate role. Still, there has been some progress in this matter, so contacts upward to politicians have had limited success and possess the potential for added development. However, downward contacts to the broader society are still largely absent, as media coverage of the NGO perspectives and activities has been minimal, except in those forums oriented toward a small audience already engaged in civil society initiatives. Thus at least the most significant (I)NGOs in the conflict transformation and peacebuilding sphere in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict are not able to fulfil both functions of middle-range actors as elaborated by John Paul Lederach.

What do these results imply in terms of the conflict situation? Since local NGOs together with their international counterparts have so far had only a miniscule impact as lobbyists, there has been very little if any influence exercised by NGOs on the negotiations on Abkhazia. Nor have they been able to act as legitimate representatives of the larger society, as they still represent a marginal view on the conflict and options for its resolution. INGOs have been able to involve a certain number of middle and even higher level politicians, but this has not led to policy changes thus far. Nor have attitudes within Georgian society in general toward the Abkhaz and Abkhazia changed significantly as a result of the activity of NGOs and INGOs.

Nonetheless, the developments are not all negative. While reaching few people, the projects have changed the opinions of some, at least privately. These alternative opinions are slowly beginning to reach a broader audience via interviews of some of the better known NGO activists, and cooperation between them and specialized government bodies is increasing. Opposition voices in cases of violence in conjunction with Abkhazia are growing, leading to a less monolithic perception of Abkhaz as the enemy. Activities with young people may be able to instil different values in the upcoming generation. Any conclusions must be tentative, but at least the principle of 'do no harm' is being adhered to, and for relatively small budgets the Georgian NGOs and their Abkhazian and international partners are doing commendable work, although its impact is still tiny. The hope and belief is that these groups are laying the groundwork for a more peaceful approach to conflict management and ultimately perhaps a productive transformation of the conflict. One possibility for overcoming the inadequate links with the wider society would be to create stronger ties between existing peacebuilding NGOs and their counterparts doing humanitarian work on the grassroots level, e.g., by introducing peacebuilding components into this work. This could help expand contacts with a broader

societal base for the middle level NGOs and could spread more pacific attitudes within the larger society.

Returning to the conflict transformation concept, it is appropriate to recall here that its goals were to encompass all levels of society in the process and to engender two types of change: in the societies, and in the function of the conflict. With regard to the former goal, some success has been achieved in involving middle-level actors, but the grassroots level has largely been neglected.[21] As for the second goal, societal change has been negligible, and a shift in the function of the conflict has not yet occurred to any significant extent, although it appears that the approaches of the NGOs analysed have started a process of perceiving the conflict differently in certain circles, which could be the beginning of an alteration of its function within the societies involved.

The limited success achieved in reaching the grassroots level runs contrary to some of the existing theory on conflict management and transformation, which assumes that NGOs are well connected at the mass societal level. Thus, in terms of theoretical approaches a rethinking of the potential role of NGOs is necessary. Their function and capacities depend heavily on the process by which the organizations came into existence. A rapid and artificial process of creation can eventually lead to the development of civic values among larger population segments, but this cannot be taken for granted in the initial stages, as is perhaps the case when a slower, more organic growth and evolution of NGOs has been possible. Future theoretical reflections on the functions of NGOs within a civil society framework should therefore take into account the conditions surrounding the emergence and development of the specific NGO context under investigation. In other words, a greater contextualization of NGO activity is required for theoretical constructs to achieve validity when tested against a variety of empirical cases.

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[21] For a detailed analysis of the top-level negotiations, focusing on the role of the UN, see Stewart (2003).

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Baltic Protest in the Gorbachev Era: Movement Content and Dynamics[1]

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Introduction

In August 1984, a Soviet court sentenced 16-year-old Latvian schoolboy Janis Lauska to five years in a labor camp for his purported membership in an underground nationalist youth group.[2] In August 1989, as many as 2 million residents of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia took part in the Baltic Way, forming a human chain that stretched unbroken across hundreds of kilometers and passed through the three republics' capital cities as a demonstration of support for Baltic independence.

In the five years that Lauska was sentenced to serve in hard labor, demands for Baltic independence had transformed from a criminal act into the publicly demonstrated aspiration of hundreds of thousands of the region's residents. After the failure of a reactionary coup in Moscow in August 1991, that aspiration was realized. Five decades after the Red Army ended their 25-year run of independence, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were recognized again as sovereign states.

This article examines the nature and dynamics of the mass movements that swept the Baltic republics in the Gorbachev era and, ultimately, helped to bring about the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Drawing on theoretical foundations established by Tarrow, Tilly, McAdam, and others, I examine the timing and sequence of the Baltic movements through a framework that understands waves of protest as collective political behavior. This 'political process' approach, as McAdam (1982: 36) labels it, emphasizes actors' changing perceptions of opportunities for protest in response to changes in state politics and institutions, as well as shifts in actor interests, organization, and resources.

Two questions in particular are addressed in this article: What motivated the Baltic protest waves, and what forces shaped the timing of the protest events that comprised them? To answer these questions, I apply exploratory event-history techniques to a data set that describes 440 collective events occurring in the region from 1986 to 1991.

Based on that analysis, I conclude that the Baltic waves are best understood as ethno-nationalist mobilization—that is, mobilization by communities linking the ideas of state and homeland to ethnic identity and thus pursuing control over public authority within a particular territory on behalf of members of their ethnic group. On the protest events' timing and sequence, I conclude that changes in the structure of political opportunities played a powerful role in shaping the dynamics of the Baltic waves. Taken together, these findings further confirm the view that ethno-nationalist protest waves follow trajectories similar to other kinds of contentious collective action more commonly understood as 'rational' or strategic.[3]

This analysis is eminently subjective; exploratory event-history techniques can identify patterns in data, but they do not offer a rigorous test of arguments about the origins of those patterns. Neither do I pretend that this analysis represents a full accounting of the social and political events of this period, a task that other scholars have undertaken with

[1] This research was supported by funding from the MacArthur Consortium and the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. I am grateful to Susan Olzak and David Holloway for comments on versions of this work. All errors are my own.
[2] *Human Rights Brief: USSR* 13/14 (31 July 1986): p. 4.
[3] See McAdam et al. (2001) and Beissinger (2002) for other efforts to link the analysis of nationalism to larger theories of protest mobilization and contentious politics.

great success.[4] Instead, events are discussed selectively, as they appear to relate to patterns that emerge from the event data.

The Dataset: Observing Baltic Protest, 1986–1991

The research presented here is based on a dataset describing 440 ethnic or nationalist collective events that occurred in the Baltic republics between January 1, 1986 and August 19, 1991. Following Tilly (1978) and Olzak (1992), I defined a collective event as a non-routine, public action involving a group of individuals making a claim which, if realized would affect the interests of a specific community beyond those participating in the event.[5]

Information permitting, the collective events in this data set were characterized along five dimensions: (1) spatial—the event's location; (2) temporal—the timing and duration of the event; (3) human—the number and identity of participants; (4) tactical—the actions of the participants and the nature of the response, if any, from security forces; and (5) political—the content of the participants' claims.

This research was motivated by an interest in ethnic and nationalist mobilization, so a crucial question in the construction of this data set was how to distinguish between ethnic and nationalist claims. Based on theoretical considerations discussed in the next section of this article, I arrived at the following guidelines: *nationalist* claims are aimed at defining or redefining the territorial boundaries of the polity, while *ethnic* claims are aimed at defining or redefining the social boundaries of the polity. Although both types of claims center on reshaping boundaries, the two are distinguished by the nature of the markers on which the 'ideal' boundaries are based. Nationalist claims emphasize geographic space, while ethnic claims emphasize social and political processES in relation to criteria such as language, religion or phenotype.[6] Thus, for example, shouts of 'Freedom for Latvia!' were coded as a nationalist claim, while cries of 'Russians, go home!' and 'Latvia for Latvians!' were coded as ethnic claims.

These narrative reports from which these data were coded came from seven print sources. Three of them were the republics' major 'official' Russian-language daily newspapers: *Sovietskaia Litva*, *Sovietskaia Latvia* and *Sovietskaia Estonia*. Two were foreign sources: the U.S. Information Agency's *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Soviet Union* (and later *Central Eurasia*), and *The Times* of London. And two were 'unofficial' publications from the region: *Human Rights Brief: USSR*, a bi-weekly *samizdat*[7] newsletter, and *Baltiiskoe Vremya*, a Russian-language daily published by the Latvian Popular Front.

As the abundance of sources suggests, this data set was assembled using a limited version of a so-called 'blanketing' strategy—drawing on multiple sources and multiple types of information, wherever they are available. Beissinger (2002) advocates a blanketing strategy for the study of transitional societies in particular, arguing that this approach helps to overcome sampling problems caused by the relationship between

[4] See especially Lieven (1994) for an excellent political and social history of this period in the region. On Latvia, see Muiznieks (1993) and Dreifelds (1996). On Lithuania, see Senn (1990) for a first-hand account of events there. On Estonia, Taagepera (1993) provides an outstanding history of this period.

[5] 'Non-routine' is intended to exclude regular or formalized actions, such as political party meetings, conferences or traditional holiday commemorations. 'Public' is intended to exclude meetings held behind closed doors, or by invitation only.

[6] The specific markers emphasized in protesters' claims will depend on the structure of ethnic boundaries in a given temporal and geographic context. In Northern Ireland, for example, religion is the central marker, whereas differences (real and imagined) in skin color are the key marker in the United States.

[7] *Samizdat* means self-published; it is the Russian term applied to Soviet-era dissident publications, which typically were typed and then hand-cranked through a small mimeograph machine.

patterns of mobilization and changes in the news media. The seven sources used here represent a compromise between what Beissinger (1995: 7) refers to as the need 'to simulate thoroughness' and the resource constraints facing a lone researcher attempting content analysis.[8]

Of course, even a blanketing strategy will not capture all collective events. Clues in the publications examined for this study suggest that routinized protests (for example, daily picketing of the Supreme Soviet[9] during legislative sessions) and small events often were not reported. A case in point: During legislative sessions, *Sovietskaia Estonia* would often include a photograph of a small group of picketers outside the entrance to Toompea Hall, the building in which the Supreme Soviet met. These photographs often appeared next to a report on the day's events at the legislative session, but the newspaper would not include any story or even a caption about the picket itself. Any attempt to use these photographs alone as indicators of an event's occurrence for purposes of analysis would require the researcher to make multiple assumptions about the event with potentially problematic consequences for the resultant sample.

Other clues suggest that small events often were not reported either.[10] For example, in Vilnius on the night of August 9, 1988, a student wearing an armband bearing the name of Lithuania's independence-minded popular front, Sajudis, was called a 'fascist' and was stabbed by a group of three Russian-speaking youths. This event, which meets a minimal definition of collective action and is clearly a significant occurrence in the context of ethnic and nationalist mobilization, was not directly reported in any of the sources used in this study.[11]

In light of these issues, the data set used here only includes events involving 50 or more participants. In part, the use of 50 as a threshold reflects convention; other event-analysis researchers have often used this number for the same reasons. In the Baltic context, this number also helps to address the problem of ritualized events. Based on the aforementioned clues, it appears that these events usually involved fewer than 50 participants. In cases where more participants were involved, such events were more likely to garner coverage.

Some events undoubtedly are lost in this approach, but the underlying theory—and thus the validity of the analysis—is essentially the same. The higher threshold simply means that the study captures only those efforts at collective action that are strong enough to put more than 50 people in the street. This approach is analogous to using more coarsely grained film to capture a subject's image; though the finer details may be lost, the larger patterns should remain. Of course, it is vital that the researcher keep this omission in mind when interpreting the results of his or her analysis; at this level of resolution, one cannot conclude that the absence of data indicates a total lack of mobilization.

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[8] Most event-analysis projects employ a team of researchers to compile narrative reports of events and to code the characteristics of those events. These data were gathered and coded by a single individual. Though this arrangement was not by choice, the advantage to doing it by oneself is a thorough familiarity with each source, and with other events of the period. This familiarity helped me to develop some broader impressions about events in the three republics studied, and the Soviet Union in general.

[9] The Supreme Soviet is the republic's legislature. These bodies were elected, but the candidates were all picked by the Communist Party and often ran unopposed. During the Soviet era, real power lay in the hands of the Communist Party's leadership council, the Politburo. These structures existed in each of the USSR's 15 republics, and again at the federal level.

[10] Drawing on a broader set of sources for events across the Soviet Union, Beissinger (1995: 13) arrives at the same conclusion and decides to define small events as those involving fewer than 100 participants.

[11] I learned of this event from a story in *Sovietskaia Litva* ('Nastoyaschie i Mnimye Vinovniki', 13 August 1988, p. 3) about a meeting between Communist Party and government officials and members of the initiative group forming Sajudis.

Of the 440 events included in this data set, 231 (52 percent) occurred in Lithuania, 117 (27 percent) occurred in Latvia and 92 (21 percent) occurred in Estonia. The higher counts occurred in the larger republics. Lithuania was the biggest of the three, with a population of 2.5 million. Latvia was home to roughly 2 million people, while Estonia was the smallest, with only 1.5 million residents at the time. In all three cases, most of the protests recorded in this data set occurred in the republic's capital city: Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn, respectively.

The first event in this data set took place in Riga, Latvia, on December 26, 1986.[12] In the early morning hours after a rock concert, some 300 working-class Latvian youths gathered in Riga's Cathedral Square and marched down Lenin Avenue toward the Freedom Monument shouting, 'Soviet Russia out! Free Latvia!' Security forces confronted the marchers, and several police vehicles were overturned.

The final event in this sample occurred in Vilnius, Lithuania, on August 19, 1991. On that day, protesters gathered outside the city's KGB headquarters to demand the KGB's withdrawal from Lithuania. A scuffle broke out between the protesters and Soviet soldiers guarding the building when the soldiers used batons against a group of young men who attempted to affix an anti-KGB placard near one of the building's entrances. Ten days later, following the failure of a reactionary coup in Moscow, the banner headline in the republic's largest newspaper declared: 'Today Is the First Day of Genuine Freedom.' The remainder of this article analyzes the goals and dynamics of the wave of collective action that led to that historic declaration.

The Character of the Baltic Protest Waves

How should we characterize the waves of protest that swept the Baltic republics in the Gorbachev era? Put simply, what were the protests about? This section examines data on the frequency and timing of collective events categorized by participant claims, in conjunction with other contextual evidence, to assess the issues and identities around which mobilization occurred.

Observers of, and participants in contentious collective action in the Baltic states during the Gorbachev era have characterized the events of that period in very different ways. In many cases, these disagreements seem to reflect differences of politics rather than analysis. In the Baltic cases, actions that Russian-speakers saw as indicative of ethnic prejudice and discrimination were often cast by ethnic Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians as expressions of the right to national self-determination. Consequently, the character of these events represents a central concern for any analysis of the Baltic protest waves.

The fundamental aim of all three movements was abundantly clear: to restore the independence the Baltic republics lost when they were annexed by the Soviet Union during World War II.[13] This goal is perhaps best characterized as a *nationalist* agenda. As Chinn and Kaiser (1996: 23) argue, following Gellner (1983):

[12] This was not the first ethnic or nationalist protest event in Baltic history, of course. During the 1970s in particular, the Baltic republics experienced a handful of demonstrations against Soviet occupation and Russian immigration. For this research, I chose to focus on the period 1986-1991 in order to isolate the dynamics of protest during the Gorbachev era. See Beissinger (2002) for one attempt to track systematically collective events in the Baltic republics prior to the Gorbachev era.

[13] The Baltic republics became independent states for the first time after World War I. In a secret treaty signed on the eve of the Second World War that carved Eastern Europe into Soviet and German territories—the so-called Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact—Germany ceded control of the Baltic states to the USSR. During the war, the German and Soviet armies each occupied the republics at various times, and both armies received some collaboration from local officials and guerrillas. After the war, some guerrillas continued to fight against Soviet occupation until the early 1950s.

> The central issue of nationalism…is political control over geographic space. [In nationalism], the national membership's sense of spatial identity…is transformed into a sense of exclusiveness toward the homeland as the place where only members of the nation truly belong and as the only place in which the national destiny can be fulfilled.

In other words, nationalism involves the pursuit of power over public authority in a specific territory on behalf of members of the national community. Consequently, nationalist political claims center on efforts to redefine the territorial boundaries of the polity or to enhance the national group's control over an existing polity. Membership in the national community can be defined according to various criteria, such as ideology, language, and ethnicity, or even some combination thereof.[14] National communities may also be closed or open; that is, they may or may not provide opportunities for new members to join by choice. In all instances, however, nationalism revolves around the notion of a homeland, where political authority over a certain geographic space is linked to loyalty to a particular community.[15]

What is less clear from the fundamental goals of the Baltic movements is the extent to which they were also rooted in ethnicity. In contrast to nationality, which emphasizes territory, *ethnicity* is rooted in the concept of kinship, which may or may not involve the idea of a homeland. As with nationalism, ethnicity can also become more or less salient, and thus encourage mobilization along ethnic lines. Broadly speaking, ethnic mobilization may be understood as an effort to enhance the control that members of an ethnic group—bound by ties of purported kinship—have over their own lives. That control may or may not flow from power over public authority in a particular territory. Instead, ethnic mobilization often focuses on control over valued political and economic resources, such as housing and jobs. Anti-immigrant mobilization in the United States in the late 19th century and anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia in 1997 both represent instances of this phenomenon. Ethnic mobilization may also emphasize control over symbols linked to group identity, such as what group members are called and how they are portrayed to the broader public. Minority groups in the United States have frequently mobilized around these sorts of issues in recent decades.

Implicit in the concept of ethnicity is the idea of a social boundary separating members from non-members. As Barth (1969) and others have emphasized, in practice, these social boundaries take the form of rules governing interaction between members and non-members. These social boundaries may or may not reference political authority and geographic space; in fact, in less hierarchical arrangements, those boundaries may explicitly involve the idea of finding ways to share a physical space and the resources it contains. Viewed from this perspective, ethnic boundaries may be thought of as existing in social space and emerging from human interactions.

Of course, ethnic and national identities often coincide. When communities bonded by a spatial as well as an ethnic identity mobilize, they are likely to pursue exclusive control over public authority within a particular territory on behalf of members of their ethnic group. This amalgamated agenda is perhaps best labeled *ethno-nationalism*, representing the intersection of ethnic and nationalist mobilization rather than a sub-type of either. Because it draws on overlapping sources of identity and emphasizes control over fundamental resources, ethno-nationalism tends to cast more groups as rivals and demand costly concessions from them. Consequently, ethno-nationalism is particularly likely to engender significant political conflict. Ethno-nationalism may generate conflict over territorial control,

[14] The doctrine of Cambodia's Khmer Rouge may be viewed as an extreme expression of ideological nationalism. The emphasis in France on mastery of the French language as an informal criterion for membership in the national community represents a form of nationalism based on language.
[15] See Taras (2002) on nationalism and the concept of home.

over individual rights, over group rights, or all of the above, as authority groups and militaries in control of a given territory are likely to resist efforts to wrest that control from them, and residents of that territory who identify with existing states or other ethnic groups might resist efforts to subordinate or exclude them from the territory in question.

To what extent was Baltic mobilization based on ethnic as well as nationalist identities? We can try first to answer this question by examining protesters' claims. As Figure 1 illustrates, participants voiced explicitly ethnic claims—that is, claims aimed at defining or redefining the social boundaries of the polity—at relatively few collective events in the Baltic republics during the Gorbachev era. In all three republics, the vast majority of collective events emphasized demands related to political control over territory.

The intersection of ethnic and nationalist objectives is evident in the agendas of the Popular Fronts and Sajudis, the region's major social movement organizations and the chief sponsors of native-group collective action. These organizations pursued agendas that explicitly linked the goals of political independence and popular sovereignty to ethnic identity. The Latvian Popular Front (PFL), for example, declared in its October 1988 Program that:

> The [PFL] proceeds upon the basis that the Latvian people has in this republic the status of an indigenous nation, for Latvia is the historical territory of the Latvian people, the only place on earth where the Latvian nation, Latvian language, and Latvian culture can be maintained and developed. Therefore, the [PFL] deems it necessary, as a guarantee of the Latvian people's national self-determination, to include in the legislation on the soviets [or councils] and the elections to the soviets a principle according to which the soviets of this republic at any level must provide for a permanent and irreversible majority of mandated positions which under any demographic situation will be retained for the representatives of the Latvian nationality.[16]

This statement draws an explicit connection between cultural and spatial identity and political power. The declaration that ethnic Latvians *must* form a majority of the representatives on local as well as national governing councils 'under any demographic situation' seems particularly bold in light of the fact that Latvians did not form a majority of the population in most of the republic's major cities.[17]

The Estonian Popular Front, in its founding program, also drew a strong link between the native ethnic group and the exercise political power in the republic. Its statement on the means to an ethno-nationalist end is somewhat less radical than that of its Latvian counterpart, however. Specifically, the Estonian Popular Front's platform states that:

> To the native ethnic group in a union republic, the national problem is one of historical destiny. To a member of another ethnic group who lives in a union republic, the national problems are a matter of his personal destiny. The Estonian SSR is a national republic. Acting above all as a defender of the interests of the

[16] 'National Front Publishes Program', *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: USSR*, 6 December 1988, p. 88.
[17] The ethno-demography of Latvia changed dramatically under Soviet rule, largely because of the immigration of ethnic Russians encouraged by the Soviet government. By 1989, ethnic Russians comprised at least one-third of the population in each of the republic's seven major cities and in three of the 26 mixed urban/rural districts. Moreover, ethnic Russians outnumbered ethnic Latvians in four of those cities, including the capital, Riga. Estonia underwent a numerically similar shift, but most ethnic Russian immigrants settled in that republic's northeastern coastal strip. Lithuania experienced the least immigration of the three.

> Estonian nation, it will be able to ensure the defense of the interests of all other ethnic groups which live here.[18]

Figure 1: Count of Protest Events by Claim, 1986–1991



[18] 'Estonian 'Popular Front' Drafts Expanded Program', *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: USSR*, 27 September 1988, p. 52.



Here the ethnic, territorial, and political are linked in the vision of the republic as the defender of the interests of the titular ethnic group. Despite the democratic intentions of this statement, it is not at all clear how state actions in defense of one ethnic group's interests simultaneously ensure the defense of the interests of all other ethnic groups residing on that territory.

These sentiments are echoed in the draft program of Lithuania's Sajudis/Movement for Perestroika, also published in 1988. Like the others, this program expresses a commitment to pluralist democracy and to the equal rights of all ethnic groups residing in the republic. Also like the others, it simultaneously links the 'popular' part of popular sovereignty to the native ethnic group. Sajudis' draft platform states that:

> The Movement believes that national equality may be achieved only on the condition that representatives of all nations recognize the right of the Lithuanian people to self-determination, the sovereignty of the Lithuanian SSR and its territorial integrity, that Lithuanian history, culture, and language are known, and that they are respected. The right of the Lithuanian people, as with any other community, to concern themselves with their self-preservation, with their own economy, with nature, and with preservation and development of language and culture on territory inherited from their forefathers must be recognized.[19]

Although less assertive about the relationship between public authority and the native ethnic group, this statement nonetheless emphasizes an ethno-nationalist vision of social and political change in Lithuania. The republic's territory is seen as the domain of

[19] 'Lithuanian Restructuring Movement Draft Program', *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: USSR*, 4 November 1988, p. 47.

Lithuanians, and political reform is linked to the self-determination of the Lithuanian people, understood primarily in ethnic terms.

Thus all three of the region's major social movement organizations establish ethno-nationalist agendas in their initial platforms, linking the enhancement of republican autonomy to the interests of the native ethnic group. These organizations grew explosively in the first months of their existence and promptly became the primary sponsors of collective protests in the region. While many of these protests and demonstrations centered on nationalist claims, the movements' platforms clearly indicate that republican sovereignty was seen not only as an end in and of itself, but also as a means to ensure the survival and advance the interests of the region's native ethnic groups. Support for republican sovereignty and independence often went hand-in-hand with the expectation that such changes would restore the titular ethnic group to power and revive its language and culture.

It is also relevant that the nationalist movements acted against a background of swelling cultural activity among all ethnic groups in the region. During this period, annual folk song festivals attracted hundreds of thousands of participants in each republic, leading some observers to dub the Baltic transformation the 'Singing Revolution.' While many of the events that marked the growing emphasis on cultural ties do not meet this study's definition of collective action, they do suggest the development of ethnic solidarity and importance of ethnic identity in the mobilization that was occurring.

The ethnic and nationalist strains of Baltic mobilization sometimes came into conflict. In the first years of the popular fronts' existence and particularly in Latvia and Estonia, advocates of ethnic exclusion and proponents of civic nationalism competed for dominance within those organizations. At times, this competition led to the pursuit of apparently conflicting policies. For example, at the same time that the Latvian Popular Front was advocating rules to ensure an ethnic Latvian majority in all state bodies, it was also supporting the development of non-Latvian cultural associations to promote the language and culture of other ethnic groups within the republic (Muiznieks 1989: 20).

The weight of ethnicity was also apparent in the emergence of the Estonian and Latvian Citizens' Committees, whose agendas centered more explicitly on ethnic objectives.[20] The Citizens' Committees were founded in 1989, first in Estonia and later in Latvia. They were rooted in the idea that the Baltic republics had never lost their independence, at least not in a legal sense. In light of that interpretation of history and international law—one officially shared by numerous foreign governments, including the United States—these groups sought to register residents of interwar Latvia and Estonia and their descendants as the only rightful citizens who could elect national congresses to consider the republics' future. Nearly all of those 'rightful' citizens were, of course, ethnic Latvians and Estonians.

The efforts of the Citizens Committees were extremely successful; by the time elections to the Citizens' Congresses were held in early 1990, the Estonian and Latvian Committees had reportedly registered over 600,000 and 900,000 individuals, respectively (Kionka 1990b: 31; Muiznieks 1990: 29). Because of their massive popular base and moral authority, these congresses were able to exert a powerful influence over the republican legislatures on changes in citizenship policy.

The nature of the Citizens' Committees and their role as a source of pressure over the popular fronts helps explain the relative absence of native ethnic events in a wave of ethno-nationalist mobilization. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of the committees' registrants were ethnic Estonians and Latvians. As Muiznieks (1990: 28) observes, the appeal of the

[20] For a more thorough discussion of these organizations, their origins, and their evolution, see Kionka (1990a) and Muiznieks (1990).

committee concept to Latvian activists rested, in large part, on the fear that if non-native immigrants were eligible to vote, they might oppose independence in an open referendum. It is important to note that no analogous organization emerged in Lithuania, the republic that experienced the least intensive immigration under Soviet rule. Given the aims and consequences of their actions, these committees can be understood as a form of ethnic mobilization aimed at excluding non-native rivals from the political process as the new 'rules of the game' were being drawn up. Rather than taking to the streets, the Citizens' Committees sough to accomplish ethnic exclusion by co-opting state institutions. Even as Latvians and Estonians marched for independence, they were working to accomplish ethnic exclusion through another form of activism.

The timing of political reforms in response to ethnic claims also helps explain the limited number of native-group ethnic collective events. When confronted with early mass demonstrations, republican elites initially responded to what they perhaps perceived as the symbolic rather than substantive elements of the demonstrators' demands, namely, issues of language, education, migration, and state emblems. By mid-1989, all three republics had adopted new language laws establishing the native group's language as the official state language and requiring its use in various arenas. The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet had adopted a law on education intended to enhance the use of Lithuanian and undo efforts toward Russification. The Latvian legislature had enacted restrictions on migration aimed at stopping the flow of non-native workers into the republic. These victories indicated that the movements' chief opponent resided not in their republican capitals, but in Moscow.

From a strategic perspective, then, it seems sensible that these movements decided to concentrate their efforts on breaking free from the Soviet state, as the predominance of nationalist claims suggests. After an early burst of protest activity won results on key ethnic claims, the Baltic movements appear to have used collective protest primarily to apply pressure on the nationalist issues where change was less forthcoming, namely, republican sovereignty and independence.

The Dynamics of Baltic Mobilization

That final piece of evidence begins to address the second question posed at the start of this article: What forces shaped the timing of protest in the Baltic republics? The remainder of this article explores the applicability to ethnic and nationalist collective action of Tarrow's (1988: 422) claim that, 'The dynamics of collective action—even in its most 'expressive' and anti-political forms—are best understood in relation to the political process.' Research by McAdam (1982) on mobilization among African-Americans suggests that erosion of the political establishment, brought by the gradual accumulation of broad social processes, contributed to the rise of a black insurgency in the United States. The research presented here focuses more narrowly on the impact on ethnic and nationalist collective action of certain formal and informal changes in state institutions and practices.

Tarrow (1994: 85) argues that social movements arise primarily in response to changes in the structure of political opportunities, which he defines as 'consistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent—dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure.' This section explores four hypotheses about the relationship between movement dynamics and change in the political opportunity structure.

First is the possibility that *change in the openness of the polity* encourages collective action. More specifically, as Eisinger (1973) argues, increasing access to political power encourages collective action in systems characterized by a mix of open and closed institutions or channels. When the state becomes more responsive to popular preference

but fails to provide regular channels for its expression, social groups are more likely to undertake collective action in an effort to influence state power.

Second, now following Tarrow (1994), is the possibility that *instability in elite alignments* encourages collective action by generating uncertainty, encouraging challengers to attempt to exercise marginal power, and inducing elites to seek new sources of support. This instability might take the form of splits among elites, including but not limited to divisions between so-called 'hard-liners' and 'soft-liners.' It might also come about through the emergence of influential allies within the government (Tarrow 1994: 86-88).

Third, as posited by Tilly (1978) and Tarrow (1994), among others, *change in the levels of state repression and facilitation* can encourage collective action. The level of state repression is understood here as expectations about how security forces will respond to protest; those expectations, of course, are often based on recent experience. State facilitation is understood as the resources and procedures available to organizers of collective events.

Finally, as Tarrow (1994: 24-25) and Beissinger (2002: 16–18) argue, once collective action emerges, actors begin to create their own opportunities and expand opportunities for others by demonstrating authorities' weaknesses and challengers' strengths, increasing uncertainty, and providing elites with potential social allies. In Beissinger's (2002: 17) words, 'A reproducing chain of events can grow to the point that the initial structural influences that played a prominent role in unleashing the series seems buried in the distant past and relatively impotent within the ongoing production of events.' Thus early opportunities for collective action are transformed into *cycles of protest* that reflect not only exogenous features of the political environment but also endogenous dynamics of learning, resource mobilization, and organizational competition.

Figure 2 presents monthly counts of collective events by ethnic natives and Russian-speakers in each republic. These figures portray changes in the rate of ethnic and nationalist protest in the Baltic republics from 1986 to 1991. It is important to recall that these figures show only the number of collective events with 50 or more participants, indicating nothing about the size or duration of those events. Even so, these figures do indicate change in the rate of collective action over time. By taking advantage of information about the event's participants, they also illustrate some of the dynamics of mobilization and counter-mobilization between native ethnic groups and Russian-speakers.

Perhaps the most striking feature of these figures is the similarity across the three cases in the timing of the beginnings, major peak, and decline of collective action, particularly among the region's three native ethnic groups. This similarity suggests that the Baltic movements do indeed represent 'waves' of protest, and that these waves were shaped by common factors.

In all three cases, mobilization began hesitantly in 1987, with the first round of so-called 'calendar' demonstrations commemorating significant days in the interwar history of the Baltic states. Also in all three cases, these early events typically were organized by dissident groups founded prior to Gorbachev's rise to power. The main contrast across the three—the number of participants—does not appear in the monthly count charts but does appear in the larger data set. While these early demonstrations typically attracted no more than a few hundred participants in Lithuania and Estonia, the Latvian events drew crowds numbering in the thousands.

Despite the relatively small number of participants, these events clearly helped to spark a transformation of political perceptions in the region. What Taagepera (1993: 125–126) says of Estonia was undoubtedly true in all three Baltic republics:

> From February to August 1987, the atmosphere...changed more than it had during the previous thirty years. Repression of freedom to organize and express opinions faded. Public opinion and public action were born. History had indeed started to move.

The beginnings of ethnic and nationalist collective action in the Baltic republics conform to Tarrow's (1994) roadmap of the first phase of a protest cycle. In each republic, 'early risers' began sporadically in 1987 to test the sincerity and depth of Gorbachev's calls for economic and social reforms. These early demonstrations in 1987 were occurring in the wake of the disaster at the Chernobyl Atomic Energy Station in April 1986, which encouraged officially sanctioned creative unions across the USSR to become more vociferous about their environmental and cultural concerns (Nahaylo and Swoboda 1990).[21]

From a strategic perspective, these calls signaled instability in elite alignments following Gorbachev's accession to power and his announcement of an agenda for social and economic reform (later known as *perestroika*). The assertive tone adopted by the prominent writers and artists who comprised the creative unions highlighted the presence of potential allies within the Communist Party. Meanwhile, the success of Baltic environmental campaigns supported by these unions suggested an increase in the state's responsiveness to popular concerns. An implicit (and sometimes explicit) link in these campaigns between environmentalism, on the one hand, and ethnicity and nationalism, on the other, encouraged ethnic and nationalist activists to take the next step and openly voice their demands. [22]

Yet despite the responsiveness to grass-roots environmentalist activism in this period, the Soviet system still lacked formal channels for communicating interests from the bottom up. This state of affairs conforms to Eisinger's (1973) notion of a change in the openness of the polity resulting in 'mixed' institutions. In this context, would-be activists undoubtedly recognized that further efforts to influence official decision-making would require public protest.

Taken together, these changes—elite instability, the rising visibility of potential allies in the Party, and increased responsiveness to popular pressure within a formally closed system—represent a significant transformation of the structure of political opportunities in the early years of Gorbachev's tenure. The early Baltic protests exploded into mass mobilization when they highlighted and exacerbated splits within and across republican leaderships, thereby emboldening Baltic residents and encouraging some native elites to adopt the role of 'tribune of the people' (Tarrow 1994: 88). As Beissinger (2002: 72–79) demonstrates, similar processes were occurring at the same not only in all three Baltic republics but also in other parts of the Soviet Union, creating interactive effects that contributed to the acceleration of these movements.

[21] In all three republics, the major environmental campaigns of this period involved opposition to new industrial development, which often included plans to import more Russian-speaking laborers. In Lithuania, plans to build a fourth reactor at the Ignalina nuclear power plant were also a key issue.
[22] For more on the links between environmentalism and nationalism in the USSR under Gorbachev, see Dawson (1996).

Figure 2: Monthly Count of Protest Events by Primary Participating Group, 1986–1991





The divisions among elites were vividly apparent in security forces' ambivalent response to these early risers. While police prevented or broke up many early protest events, they allowed others, sometimes even on the same day and around the same issue as those in which they intervened. This mixed response revealed divisions within republican Party leaderships over the appropriate role of and reaction to nationalist activists in a time of economic crisis and political reform in the USSR.

Elite instability was further highlighted by the shuffling of top Party officials in each of the Baltic republics. In December 1987, Ringaudas Songaila became Lithuania's new First Secretary following the death of his predecessor. Songaila was replaced less than a year later by Algirdas Brazauskas, who supported a conservatively interpreted Sajudis agenda. Meanwhile, Estonia's leadership took a turn towards reform when Vaino Väljas, the former Soviet ambassador to Nicaragua, was chosen to replace the highly unpopular Karl Vaino as the Estonian Communist Party's First Secretary in June 1988. Upon arriving to take his post, Väljas promptly dumped the requirement that Estonian Party meetings be conducted in Russian (Taagepera 1993: 136-138). Latvia finally followed suit in October 1988, when Jãnis Vagris rose to that republic's top post in place of the hard-line Russian Boris Pugo, who had been moved to the USSR's Interior Ministry.

The rise of reform-minded Communists to power in the Baltic republics was, in part, a tactical response to early activism. Various factions within the Baltic and Soviet Communist Parties supported these leadership changes as a means to control or to capitalize on rising ethnic and nationalist solidarity. The Gorbachev team seemed to have learned a lesson in Kazakhstan in December 1986, when the replacement of that republic's First Secretary with an ethnic Russian from outside the republic resulted in mass demonstrations and rioting. Centrist Communists had apparently come to believe that ethnic and nationalist sentiments could not be ignored (as they were in Kazakhstan), so perhaps they could be harnessed in the service of *perestroika*. At the same time, the more liberal native cadres saw an opportunity finally to pursue the kinds of changes they had been attempting to implement since at least the late 1950s.[23]

[23] The years 1957-1959 saw the rise of a political movement within the Latvian Communist Party characterized by Nils Muizneks (1994) as 'National Communism.' Led by Eduards Berklavs, Latvia's political leadership

In what must be regarded as one of Gorbachev's most profound miscalculations, these leadership changes only encouraged elites and non-elites alike to push even harder. The monthly protest counts show that the rate of collective action increased significantly in 1988 as the Baltic populations became emboldened by the presence of potential allies in the top ranks of their governments. What these figures do not show is that the magnitude of these events (measured in terms of the number of participants) was increasing as well, often dramatically.

The surge in collective protest is also reflected the increasingly progressive actions of the republics' creative unions, which in early 1988 offered sharp criticism of the USSR's brand of federalism and its nationalities policies. These actions culminated in the foundings of the mass organizations that would come to dominate the Baltic protest waves—the Popular Fronts of Estonia and Latvia and Sajudis/Movement for Perestroika in Lithuania.

In 1988, local Communist elites began responding to the growing calls for change embodied in the collective protests. By the end of that year, each of the Baltic republics had a new First Secretary of the Communist Party, the top political job in the Soviet system. The governments of the Baltic states also began to enact real policy changes. In all three, government bodies took the symbolic steps of recognizing nationalist symbols (the flags and anthems of the independent Baltic states) and declaring the native group's language the official tongue of each republic. In November 1988, Estonia's legislative body, the Supreme Soviet, took the more dramatic step of adopting a declaration 'On Sovereignty', which asserted the republic's right to greater self-governance and economic autonomy. The Latvian and Lithuanian Supreme Soviets did not follow suit on this score until the summer of 1989 (in June and May, respectively).

The peaks in the rate of ethnic and nationalist collective action in 1989 imply that the republican leadership's responsiveness to protesters' demands further emboldened Baltic residents. Supplemental data indicate that participation in collective events also increased substantially in 1989 compared with 1988, especially in Latvia and Lithuania.[24] At this time, the axis of political conflict was shifting from 'state vs. society' to 'republics vs. center' as republican elites scrambled to keep up with the increasingly radical demands of the nationalist organizations and their supporters. As Tarrow's (1994: 88) framework suggests, this public split between republican and Soviet elites (and between hard- and soft-liners at both levels) signaled deeper change in the structure of political opportunities that further emboldened activists.

Moscow's accession to one of the nationalists' key demands further catalyzed Baltic protest. In the summer of 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR admitted to the existence of secret protocols in the Hitler-Stalin pact ceding the Baltic states to Soviet control, and to their illegitimacy. As Lieven (1994: 222) notes, the Supreme Soviet 'had in effect admitted the illegitimacy of Soviet rule; any subsequent Soviet political activity in the region could now be only a rearguard action or an attempt at the re-imposition of military rule, without any democratic legal justification.'[25]

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undertook efforts to slow the influx of immigrants, to promote ethnic Latvian cadres, to expand the use of the Latvian language in the republic, and to increase Latvia's economic autonomy. This movement came to an abrupt end in the summer of 1959 when some 2,000 local officials were purged as part of a broader 'anti-nationalism' campaign conducted across the Soviet Union.

[24] Measured by event counts, Beissinger's data show a surge in 1989 in mobilization in Lithuania but not Latvia and Estonia. Measured by participants, Beissinger's data show substantial spikes in all three republics in 1989.

[25] It should be noted that, even acknowledging the existence and illegitimacy of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, not all observers immediately admitted the annexation of the Baltic republics was illegal. Many interested parties, including Gorbachev, continued for some time to espouse the traditional party line that the Baltic

Not coincidentally, the Baltic cycles of protest peaked shortly thereafter in the incredible Baltic Way demonstration of 23 August, 1989, the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. On that day, as many as 2 million Baltic residents joined hands in a human chain stretching from Tallinn to Vilnius as an expression of Baltic solidarity in opposition to Soviet occupation and annexation. Approximately one third of the entire population of the *region* participated in that single event, the apex of mobilization in the Gorbachev era and probably one of the largest collective events of all time.

Interestingly, however, apart from the Baltic Way, the rate of collective action among Estonians in particular never returned to the peak levels of 1988, according to my data.[26] As Figure 2 shows, a rise in the rate of collective action among Russian-speakers accounts most of the events in that republic from 1989 to 1991. Estonian ethnic and nationalist collective action appears to have peaked in June, August, and November of 1988.

The explanation for this pattern probably lies in the relatively progressive position the Estonian government adopted during this phase of the transition. Although Latvians mobilized earlier and faster than their neighbors did, republican Party elites responded more quickly and more radically in Estonia. The Estonians were the first to adopt a declaration on sovereignty, the first to adopt a new law on language, and they stood at the front of efforts to enhance republican economic autonomy (see Table 1). The timing and radical nature of these actions reduced the rate of protest in the years that followed by taking those demands off the table—much to the protesters' satisfaction. Interestingly, these events also contributed to the intensification of mobilization in Latvia and Lithuania, as activists in those republics were acutely aware of Estonia's progressive position and began to press their governments to 'catch up' with their neighbor.

The Baltic movements took a crucial step towards consolidating their gains in early 1990, when the Popular Fronts and Sajudis won decisive victories in relatively competitive elections to the republican legislatures. Taking seriously their mandate for radical change, these bodies promptly moved beyond demands for greater sovereignty to embrace the call for full independence. While the Latvian and Estonian legislatures declared only the beginning of a transition to independence, however, the Lithuanian legislature took the decisive step of declaring that republic independent. Moscow responded with an economic blockade, and Gorbachev demanded that all republics—including Lithuania—participate in the development of a new federal treaty. The Lithuanian leadership stepped back but it did not fold, adopting in June a 100-day 'moratorium' on the declaration of independence. In fact, Gorbachev's call for the negotiation of a new federal treaty was itself a kind of concession, and it seemed apparent that Moscow's political leverage over the Baltic governments had all but vanished.

republics had nevertheless acceded voluntarily to Soviet power in a 'popular revolution' and were therefore obliged to negotiate any changes in their relationship with the USSR under the terms of Soviet law.

[26] In contrast to my data, Beissinger (2002) observes similar event counts and rates of participation among Estonians in 1988 and 1989. In accord with my data, Beissinger observes the same drop-off in Estonian mobilization after 1989, compared with sustained mobilization among Latvians and Lithuanians.

Table 1: The Timing of Key Political Events in the Baltic Republics, 1986-1991

	ESTONIA	LITHUANIA	LATVIA
STATE ACTIONS			
Legalization of national flag	Jun 1988	Oct 1988	Oct 1988
Native-group lang. declared state lang.	Jun 1988	Nov 1988	6 Oct 1988
Declaration on republican sovereignty	16 Nov 1988	18 May 1989	28 Jul 1989
Law on language adopted	18 Jan 1989	25 Jan 1989	5 May 1989
Limits on immigration adopted	Jun 1990	N/A	Feb 1989
Law on citizenship adopted		Nov 1989	
Soviet annexation declared illegal	12 Nov 1989	Sep 1989	N/A
Competitive elections to legislature	18 Mar 1990	Feb 1990	18 Mar 1990
Declaration on independence	30 Mar 1990	11 Mar 1990	4 May 1990
Number of 'firsts':	4	3	1
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION			
Founding of popular front	Apr 1988	May 1988	Jun 1988
Founding of Russian-speakers movement	Jul 1988	Nov 1988	Oct 1988
Removal of 'old guard' CP leader	Jun 1988	19 Oct 1988	4 Oct 1988
Formal end to CP's 'leading role'	Feb 1990	7 Dec 1989	28 Dec 1989
Formal split in republican CP	Mar 1990	Dec 1989	Apr 1990
Number of 'firsts':	3	2	0

[Underlining indicates first action on a particular issue or area.]

Sources: Taagepera (1989: 24); Mastro (n.d.); Lieven (1994); *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*; *RFE/RL Research Report: USSR*

In each of the Baltic republics, ethnic and nationalist protest spiked around the time when the republican Supreme Soviet took these major steps toward independence. Two of the five highest monthly counts in Estonia correspond to the declarations on sovereignty and independence in November 1988 and March 1990. The rate of collective action in Latvia jumped around the initial declaration on sovereignty in June 1989 and even more sharply in May 1990 around the beginning of the transition to independence. In Lithuania, spikes in June 1989 and April 1990 follow closely behind the declarations on sovereignty in May 1989 and of independence in March 1990. Once again, the protesters evidently were emboldened by—and emboldening to—the increasingly radical republican leadership.

In contrast to Estonia, which remained relatively quiescent after 1988, Latvia and Lithuania experienced a resurgence of protest in January 1991. These events were a courageous response to the USSR's strongest and most desperate attempts to repress the Baltic drive toward independence. In late 1990, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze resigned his post and warned of an impending reactionary coup. Early the next year, Gorbachev warned the Baltic republics that their efforts to withdraw unilaterally from the USSR would not be tolerated. Residents of all three republics responded to the imminent threat of action from Moscow by constructing and manning barricades to defend the houses of government day and night. In Vilnius, in the early morning of 13 January 1991, Soviet soldiers killed 15 civilians as they occupied that city's television tower and other sites they considered strategic. In Riga one week later, Interior Ministry forces (known as 'Black Berets') attempted to occupy the press ministry

building; their actions resulted in the deaths of six persons, including a respected journalist who was covering the event.

Baltic citizens responded to the crackdown with a host of demonstrations affirming their commitment to full independence. The fact that this higher rate of action was sustained throughout 1991 in Lithuania but not in Latvia reflects the Soviet forces' prolonged efforts to destabilize the former. Virtually all of the ethnic Lithuanian events that occurred in the spring and summer of 1991 were explicitly devoted to resisting the continued occupation of sites in Vilnius, or to protesting the murders of several Lithuanian customs agents at newly established border posts.
So far, the discussion has focused on mobilization among ethnic Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians. The data examined here also offer some clues about the goals and dynamics of mobilization among ethnic Russians in the region. As shown in Figure 2, ethnic Russians appear to have mobilized in response to the successes of the republican nationalists. Ethnic Russians in Estonia began to take to the streets in the summer of 1998, shortly after the Supreme Soviet declared Estonian to be the republic's official language. Their counterparts in Latvia and Lithuania followed suit a few months later as the Supreme Soviets in those republics passed similar declarations. In all three cases, the start of street protests by ethnic Russians corresponded with the founding of the major organizations claiming to represent those communities—Yedinstvo (Unity) in Lithuania, Intermovement in Estonia, and Interfront in Latvia. These organizations explicitly presented themselves as a 'counterweight' to the Popular Fronts and Sajudis.[27]

Latvia experienced something of a wave of ethnic-Russian protest in 1989, surging in February and March and again in May. In that four-month window, large groups of ethnic Russians took to the streets ten times. Those spikes correspond to the passage of laws aimed at restricting immigration and promoting the use of the Latvian language across a broad range of activities. Meanwhile, the Latvian declaration on republican sovereignty, adopted in July 1989, appears to have provoked a less aggressive response; ethnic Russians held just one large protest in July and only four more in August and September.

This pattern suggests that ethnic Russians were primarily motivated to mobilize by fears of ethnic exclusion. Declarations and laws linked to a crucial ethnic marker—proficiency in the Baltic languages—were apparently perceived as more threatening than the declarations of sovereignty that represented the core of the Baltic movements' nationalist agenda. By no means were those nationalist goals irrelevant, however. Two of the largest spikes in Russian protest—March 1990 in Estonia and May 1990 in Latvia—correspond directly to the passage of those republics' declarations of independence, suggesting that some ethnic Russians also were directly concerned about the prospect of their separation from the Soviet Union.

In 1991, the more reactionary elements of the Russian-speakers' movements rallied in support of the crackdown by Soviet forces in the region. In Estonia, Russian speakers in the mostly ethnic Russian northeast began demonstrating in support of economic autonomy for that corner of the country, suggesting that they already considered independence a 'done deal.' Many of the demonstrations Russian-speakers organized during this period occurred on dates that were officially commemorated on the Soviet calendar: Soviet Army Day, Victory Day, and May Day in particular. These are, in effect, expression of Soviet nationalism, and for the most part they account for the final peaks in collective action prior to full independence.[28] In the wake of the failure of the reactionary coup in Moscow in

[27] For a contemporary sketch of one of these organizations, see Ilves (1991: 71–83).
[28] Lieven (1994: 197) provides a colorful description of these events: 'Most [pro-Soviet] demonstrations were not merely small, but also attended largely by the elderly. The sight of badly dressed, misshapen Russian women shrieking hysterically at these meetings was one with which every observer became familiar. It is not the stuff of which successful counter-revolutions are made.'

August 1991, all three republics declared the leading Russian-speakers organizations illegal on the basis of their vocal support for the putschists.

Conclusions

This analysis shows how the goals and dynamics of the protest movements that swept the Baltic republics during the Gorbachev era related to specific changes in the structure of political opportunities they faced. More generally, this analysis suggests that ethnic and nationalist protest are shaped, at least in part, by the forces that influence other kinds of social movements more commonly viewed as 'rational' or strategic. The fact that the Baltic movements responded to increasing access to state power, unstable elite alignments, and decreased state repression implies that participants in these events carefully evaluated their political environment before acting. In contrast to the emphasis on a cultural and symbolic agenda one might expect from an identity-oriented interpretation, these movements intended explicitly to transform state power. Their fundamental goals were to redefine the geographic boundaries of state authority and to put power over public authority in the hands of particular ethnic groups. As they accomplished these goals, they motivated potential losers—primarily ethnic Russians residing in the region—to counter-mobilize. Both sides found allies among local and federal elites, producing a tense face-off in 1991 as the USSR spiraled toward break-up.

One important question this article has not attempted to address is how or why the Baltic movements remained non-violent. The most violent incidents in the region occurred in early 1991, when security forces sought to occupy key sites in Riga and Vilnius, and even those confrontations resulted in just 21 deaths. That number is by no means insignificant, but it does seem small considering the central role the Baltic revolutions were playing in the destruction of one of the world's most powerful and traditionally repressive states.

In fact, that very power hints at one of the strongest explanations for why the Baltic revolutions remained peaceful. Given the coercive power of Soviet security forces, Baltic protesters surely recognized that any attempt to enact their agendas by force would fail badly. As it happened, the Baltic movements did a skillful job in 1987 and 1988 of probing the limits of official tolerance, and then moving those limits through repetition of the claims and tactics that lay right up against the boundaries they had identified. By the summer of 1989, fear of a massive military crackdown was greatly diminished following the emergence of the so-called Gorbachev Doctrine, under which Communist regimes in Eastern Europe were allowed to fall without Soviet intervention. Only the following year did the Baltic movements dare to take the ultimate step of declaring their independence from the USSR—and then backing slightly away from those declarations in response to Moscow's threats.

This tactical interpretation differs from the sociological explanation offered by Petersen (2001), who views non-violent mobilization and armed rebellion as sequential stages of resistance and argues that the transition from one to the other depends on the strength and structure of local communities. Comparing armed Lithuanian resistance to Soviet occupation in the 1940s and 1950s with non-violent Lithuanian protest against Soviet rule in the 1980s, Petersen argues that the emphasis in the 1980s on passive resistance reflected the weakening of Lithuanian communities through modernization and Communist rule.

Without disputing the notion that community structure shapes the likelihood and character of collective action, I believe we may more fruitfully view mobilization for violence and mobilization for protest as at least partially distinct processes that respond to different incentive structures and usually draw on different sets of individuals, even within a single community. Put another way, I do not see ethno-nationalist violence as a later or higher stage of resistance so much as an alternative—though sometimes

overlapping—mobilizational path. This distinction often becomes evident in particular mobilizational waves through clashes between 'radical' or 'hard-line' organizations that endorse the use of violence and 'moderate' or 'soft-line' organizations that emphasize non-violent forms of contention. Which mobilizational stream gains ascendancy in any given situation depends on host of contextual factors and event-driven contingencies, not the least of which is the military might of the power they are confronting.

In the Soviet Union, actors seeking a change in status vis-à-vis Moscow were virtually assured of destruction if they chose to use violence, even in the Gorbachev era, as evidenced by the violent suppression of the Azerbaijani revolution in 1990. By contrast, the response to non-violent protest was far more ambivalent from the start, in part because the Communist Party relied on the pretense of mass mobilization and public demonstrations to legitimate its rule. For groups seeking to challenge Soviet authority, this incentive structure almost over-determined a tactical emphasis on non-violent contention.[29] Following the reactionary putsch of August 1991, the Soviet regime finally crumbled, and the Baltic protesters never had to fire a single shot. In the context of Gorbachev's reforms, their strategy had been impeccable: the Soviet Union had been held together by force, so they finally defeated the Soviet enemy by peacefully turning its own institutions against it.

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[29] As Beissinger (2002: 271–319) shows, the incentives were very different for groups threatened by the shift of political authority from Moscow to the republics, and most of the violent ethno-nationalist mobilization that occurred during this period involved clashes between republican groups over borders or between groups within Soviet federal units.

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Back to Basics? International Engagement and Recurring Conflict in Southeastern Europe

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With the Ottoman and Habsburg empires caught up in a process of disintegration, the newly independent states of Southeastern Europe embarked on an uphill battle to solidify their territorial integrity, to forge robust political institutions and enhance the cohesiveness of society at large. In the late 19th century and especially the early 20th, problems associated with state building were aggravated by the fact that governments of independent Southeast European countries began perceiving their national projects as competitive to those of their neighbors. The powerful dynamic of relationships between majority and minority populations, within and across state borders, was another factor that prolonged the process of creating viable and sovereign states.

The legacy of international engagement on the Balkan peninsula over the past two hundred years is fraught with as much complexity as are intra-regional ties. Neighboring countries and especially Great Powers have at times exerted direct influence, or projected power from afar, over the political and social mosaic of Southeastern Europe. The motives and modalities of such meddling have varied considerably. But a long-standing interest of most foreign powers has been to thwart or contain conflicts that could otherwise unsettle the region, and affect the continent as a whole. From time to time Great Powers and other international actors have acted in concert to advance this latter aim.

This article will begin by briefly analyzing international engagement with the Balkan states over the past two centuries. By *international* engagement I mean that states, directly or indirectly referring to multilateral agreements or organizations, made commitments to local actors, employed significant resources, and developed policies with intrusive aspects. I argue that, in terms of motives and means behind conflict-related political intervention, three eras of international engagement stand out as distinctive. The same is true when turning to conceptions of post-conflict interference, in the form of administration of portions of Southeastern Europe. In the latter context, I will distinguish between practices linked to interim administration and those associated with the (hypothetical) end state of affairs.

The historical overview will then inform a discussion of contemporary international engagement on the Balkan peninsula. My overall concern is with the effectiveness and legitimacy of international engagement, both in terms of political intervention and in the form of administration of territories, peoples and resources. For all of these purposes, the article will draw on the contemporary literature on related issues in the academic field of international relations, as well as on a growing body of policy-relevant work discussing the problems of conflict-related political intervention and administration in Southeastern Europe at the turn of the 21st century.

The Record of International Engagement: Three Eras

Stephen Krasner's *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (1999) and the author's frequent use of examples from the Balkan peninsula in this influential study has sensitized many international relations scholars to the long history of Great Power entanglement in the region. It is quite clear that major Western powers of the 19th century, be it France, Austria-Hungary, Prussia, Russia or the British Empire, in a first era of international engagement brought their power to bear over important areas of policymaking in Southeastern Europe. Economic policy was crucial to such pressures. At the time, international borrowing was, in the absence of a modern financial system or global trade agreement, a matter handled between two sovereign states. As long as both countries

were roughly equal in size, power and resources, sovereign lending need not have been profoundly different from contemporary arrangements. But the lender was, as a rule, in a much stronger position than was the borrower. Krasner writes that the debtor country's autonomy through sovereign lending in fact could be compromised twice: first by signing a contract that provided the creditor government control over some domestic fiscal activities, such as collection of tax or levies. And second, if the debtor defaulted, the creditor government might be in a position to seize assets, direct control of custom houses or the like (Krasner 1999: 132).

Another common intrusive activity was related to the 'import' of predominantly German princes as monarchs and the establishment of constitutions in the turbulent wake of Habsburg or Ottoman rule (Krasner 1999: 155-175; Jelavich 1983: 235-299). Nowhere was political intervention more blatant than in the case of Greece. Following a series of meetings by local Greek revolutionaries in the 1820s, an intergovernmental convention signed by Britain, Russia and France set up a government and ensured it international recognition, and thereby effectively overruled all previous proceedings. The teenage son of Ludwig I of Bavaria, Otto of Wittelsbach, was picked as ruler. Bulgaria under Alexander of Battenberg, liberated from the Ottoman forces by Russia in 1878, suffered another setback. Having been acknowledged as the largest Balkan country—with outlets into the Aegean and Black Sea—at the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878, the Congress of Berlin of the same year ruled to relegate Bulgaria to a landlocked principality under the suzerainty of the Sublime Porte. Romania and Serbia, although better poised to mobilize local political resources by virtue of their more influential elites, did gain formal independence at the Berlin Congress. Still, international recognition was made contingent on those states accepting provisions that secured ethnic and religious equality in their constitutions. In Albania, finally, Italy and Austria-Hungary sponsored competing political factions with divergent lawmaking agendas both before and after the granting of autonomy in 1912 (Gawthorne-Hardy 1950: 90-92).

International interference followed this pattern well into the first decade of the 20th century. It was for the most part hardnosed, unilateralist and largely driven by what the respective capitals regarded as their overriding national interests. The so-called 'Concert of Europe' no doubt helped constrain desires toward engaging in the use of large-scale coercion or outright warfare (Clark 1990). Due to such constraints, in the Balkans most European Great Powers preferred playing subtler games than in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The principal mode of influencing the newly independent states can be described as a form of economic and political patronage. Though Serbia was virtually a Russian protectorate from 1830 to 1856 and Greece remained under heavy Russian, French and British influence as long as until 1923, direct administration of territories and populations was in fact uncommon (Jelavich 1983: 229-234). Since anything resembling occupation would have prompted suspicions of territorial expansion on the part of competing powers, the rare examples of outright administration were entrusted to the 'incumbent' Ottoman and Habsburg imperial regimes.

At the same time, the Paris (1856, 1858) and Berlin (1878) international conferences helped forge certain elements of a joint approach toward Southeastern Europe. This joint approach transpired from international deliberations combining the key components of the 'Concert of Europe' system, namely Great Power consent to any significant territorial changes on the continent, and a desire to forge relative stability through the establishment of viable states (Clark 1990: 112-130). It is nevertheless apparent in the outcome of those major conferences devoted to Balkan affairs that balance of power considerations remained the chief concern.

In the interwar period, international engagement in Southeastern Europe was directly geared toward the protection of ethnic and religious minorities. This second era of international engagement was strongly influenced by the notion of self-determination, as conceptualized by Woodrow Wilson. In light of the two Balkan wars and the First World War, foreign powers felt that they had little to gain from pressing Balkan governments into adopting certain economic policies or constitutional provisions. Perhaps more importantly, the 1914 events in Sarajevo and their repercussions had underscored the dangers of an unstable Southeastern Europe and the common interest of Great Powers to secure peace and prosperity in the region (Cobban 1969: 57-84).

Indeed, there was a longer history of the Great Powers' preoccupation with minority issues. Already the 1815 Vienna Congress had afforded protection to an ethnic group, as opposed to a religious community, in its explicit reference to the situation of Poles.[1] Further, the 1858 Treaty of Paris awarded religious and civil liberties to Jewish communities in the Balkan countries, and the 1878 Berlin Treaty prohibited 'exclusion or incapacity in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil and political rights, admission to public employments, functions and honors' (Krasner 1999: 86-87). Interestingly, the phrasing of this latter anti-discriminatory clause has a distinctly modern flavor. Overall, however, these minority rights provisions were not translated into political and administrative practices that corresponded to the spirit of treaty formulations. For instance, the treatment of Jews in Romania, of Muslims in Serbia, and of Turks in Bulgaria, left much to be desired.

Because of the perception that early 20th century warfare in Southeastern Europe largely stemmed from animosities between ethnic and religious groups, minority rights agreements were incorporated into most peace treaties signed with all Central and Eastern European states in the aftermath of World War I (Cobban 1969: 85-90). Similar provisions were in fact made for the protection of minority rights in the Free City of Danzig, the Åland Islands, Upper Silesia and other regions. As opposed to the treaties of the 19th century, the interwar agreements were quite detailed and often explicitly guaranteed minority protection as regards distinctions of language, birth, race, nationality and religion (Krasner 1999: 90-91). In turn, these minority arrangements were typically incorporated into national law with the additional condition that the League of Nations would need to approve of them being suspended or revoked.

It would appear that the policy recommendations proffered by European governments largely resonated with the famous fourteen points put before the U.S. Congress by President Wilson in 1918, including the notions of collective security and self-determination of peoples (Cobban 1969: 57-58). If wartime intervention had been characterized by motives related to military strategy, interwar engagement on the part of European Great Powers was internationalist and sometimes even multilateral in its implementation.[2] For example, the Minorities Section of the Secretariat of the League of Nations was charged with monitoring and enforcing of the minority rights protection system established through the Treaty of Versailles and a string of bilateral accords (Claude 1959: 43-61).

In terms of administration of post-conflict situations, the so-called inter-Allied Regime set up in Thrace represents an interesting episode. The short-lived inter-Allied Regime is a

[1] Article 12 expressly provided for 'institutions that assured to the Poles the preservation of their nationality' (Fouques-Duparc, quoted in Krasner 1999: 83). The treaties of Paris (1856 and 1858) and Berlin (1878) and other international agreements were to have similar ethnic safeguards built into them.
[2] Regarding multilateralism, I follow John Ruggie (1998: 112), who wrote: 'What distinguishes the multilateral form from other forms is that it coordinates behavior among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct'.

successful, albeit unusual interwar experiment by Great Power governments to introduce order, reduce conflict potential and help build effective political institutions in one area of Southeastern Europe (Cobban 1969: 299-300; Mitrany 1936: 254-263). It was set up in what today is northeastern Greece on 28 October 1919 through a decree issued by the Governor General, the French General Franchet d'Esperey. The decree established an autonomous province with a provisional government that was acting on behalf of the Allied Powers. The provisional government carried out a comprehensive demilitarization of the province while working to facilitate, rather than assume, the normal duties of local administrations.

Yet despite individual achievements in terms of peace-building and concerted efforts to convince governments to develop a more tolerant and inclusive policy towards minorities (thwarting a general trend toward increasing tensions between ethnic and religious communities on the peninsula), the positive legacy of several interwar experiments faded within a couple of years. Evidently, international actors never provided resources matching the ambitions and pledges initially made. The actual policies adopted by several Balkan governments revealed that their own commitment to self-determination, beyond the interests of the majority population, was shallow at best (Cobban 1969: 87-88). Following the Greek-Turkish wars of 1919-1922 and the ensuing population exchanges, few paid even lip-service to minority rights. As 400,000 Turks and Muslims left the Balkan peninsula and entered the newly proclaimed Turkish nation-state, some 1,100,000 Greeks and Orthodox Christians were evicted from Anatolia (Clogg 1992: 101).

By and large, the Second World War and the Cold War periods were characterized by one-sided power projection into the Balkans by individual Great Powers. In the latter period, needless to say, the United States and the Soviet Union dominated the scene entirely. What can be termed a third era of international engagement therefore only began with the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. In 1990 and 1991, Western states were standing by as hostilities erupted in Slovenia, Croatia and elsewhere. But over the next few years, the United States, the European Union and individual European countries became increasingly entangled with conflict management in the Balkan region.

The collapse of Yugoslavia presented a series of challenges to international actors in terms of intervention as well as post-conflict administration of territories, peoples and resources. There was an initial agreement to try and rely as much as possible on regional and multilateral institutions, such as the EU, the OSCE and the UN.[3] While the EU sought to produce a political framework for a reconstructed federal Yugoslavia, the OSCE was given an operational role in monitoring elections, building confidence and preventing the outbreak of hostilities. Several ceasefire agreements were negotiated between warring factions, but the conflict escalated amid EC/EU efforts to forge a settlement on the orderly breakup of Yugoslavia.

In the next stage, diplomatic activities were reorganized along classic Great Power lines, in the so-called Contact Group, initially encompassing the United States, Russia, France, Britain and Germany (Cohen 1995: 310-320). Faced with ongoing Bosnian Serb aggression against the civilian population of Sarajevo and elsewhere, U.S. and NATO policy hardened and became more favorable toward the Bosnian Muslim and Croat viewpoints. In February 1994, following the Sarajevo 'market massacre', NATO issued an ultimatum to Serb forces to withdraw beyond shelling distance of that city. A few months later Washington gave its blessing to Croatian troops moving in to capture the Serb-held

[3] The EU and OSCE, formerly the EC and the CSCE, were renamed in the mid-1990s.

Krajina region. Whereas the defeat of Serb forces in that pivotal region between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina dealt a major blow to Belgrade's strategy for a Greater Serbia, it inevitably prompted the biggest single exodus of war refugees during the post-Yugoslav wars, with hundreds of thousands of Serbs evicted from their longtime homelands.

NATO was also the tool of military intervention in the spring of 1999, as the Western alliance tried to put an end to the low-intensity warfare between Albanian insurgents and heavily armed Serb police forces in the province of Kosovo (Schnabel and Thakur 2000). NATO's campaign appears to have been badly prepared in many respects, but the grip was tightened after the first weeks of limited success. Slobodan Milosevic did much to strengthen the resolve of NATO, which was getting ready to celebrate its 50th anniversary, by escalating his policy of expelling Kosovar Albanians (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000: 19). Cornered by NATO, the EU and Russia, Milosevic eventually accepted the broad terms of a peace agreement on 2 June 1999, with military details hammered out over the next few days. On 10 June, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana, on part of the alliance, declared the end of the air campaign.

International intervention in the Republic of Macedonia, as conducted in the spring of 2001, was less heavily reliant on a military component. UN, NATO and OSCE missions had been stationed in the country for nearly a decade, aiming to reduce the level of tension between majority ethnic Macedonians and the sizable minority of ethnic Albanians. The situation turned into an acute crisis in the aftermath of the Kosovo campaign, as the number of incursions of armed Kosovar Albanians increased. In February and March 2001 the city of Tetovo became the scene of armed struggle between Albanian guerillas and Macedonian police forces. With civil war lurking as a real prospect, a number of Western governments and international institutions acted swiftly.

At this point, the United States and the EU devised a joint strategy with three components. One component was the offer of a small-scale military contingent that would monitor the conflict, oversee the dismantling of irregular (ethnic) Albanian forces on Macedonian territory, and guarantee the safety of minority communities in disputed areas of the country. A second component was the diplomatic input into the complex negotiations between the Macedonian cabinet, parliamentary representatives of the Albanian minority, and interlocutors of the armed insurgents. The core controversies related to the status of the Albanian community in the constitution, access to public office, and decentralization of government to the municipality level—paving the way for partial autonomy for Albanian-dominated areas. A third component consisted of a package of aid, credits and pledges to help the country move in the direction of EU accession.

Although the incentives provided by the EU were significant, the strict conditionality approach outlined by U.S. envoy James Pardew and EU's High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, left little room to maneuver for the Macedonian cabinet or for their ethnic Albanian counterparts. The Ohrid agreement signed in the summer of 2001 led to the disbandment of ethnic Albanian guerilla forces in Macedonia and to a series of concessions by the government in terms of constitutional amendments and decentralization of power to municipalities.

So if Great Powers seem to dominate the political intervention phase in the third era of international engagement, the multilateral component remains crucial to post-conflict administration. A High Representative was charged with organizing international administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina as soon as the Dayton peace accord was finalized in November 1995, and a Special Representative of the Secretary-General

(SRSG) to Kosovo was similarly appointed in 1999. Italy joined the Contact Group in shaping the main conditions of realizing the terms of the peace agreement. A so-called Peace Implementation Council was formed for the participation of dozens of other governments involved in the reconstruction of the country. In Kosovo, meanwhile, a Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) was created under the UN SRSG and the auspices of UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo). In turn, UNMIK-JIAS entails four pillars whose day-to-day operation in turn relies on the EU, the OSCE, and a variety of UN agencies.

Expanding Ambitions

To summarize the preceding section, three distinct eras of international engagement in Southeastern Europe can be identified. In the 19th century foreign powers interfered frequently into the affairs of Balkan states on the basis of Concert of Europe norms, though primarily using unilateral means. A second era of international engagement was characterized by efforts to bolster minority rights and by internationalist motives. International peace treaties and the League of Nations were considered the main building blocks of that arrangement, even if enforcement capacity was weak, success modest and in many instances unsustainable. A third, post-Cold War era focuses on human rights and relies on the political and military intervention of Great Powers acting in concert, while post-conflict administration is largely left to global and regional multilateral institutions.

In other words, the developmental pattern of the past two hundred years demonstrates significant complexity. For instance, it is unclear how the practice of international engagement in Southeastern Europe relates to Kalevi Holsti's (grand theory) observations of 'a slow decline in the appeal of bellicosity' since the Napoleonic Wars (Holsti 1991: 326).[4] But the pattern is unilinear in at least one key respect, namely in respect of its expanding ambitions to organize post-conflict administration in Southeastern Europe. The example of the inter-Allied Regime in northern Greece was alluded to above, and the jurisprudence of the League of Nations and the International Court in The Hague likewise serve to underscore that point (Claude 1959: 28-61). In the post-Cold War environment, this process has evolved much further. While 19th century monarchs and early 20th century politicians appear to have focused on stemming violence and bringing a measure of peace and stability to the region, contemporary decisionmakers and international organizations officials actively contribute to raising expectations associated with post-conflict administration.

The higher degree of intrusiveness characteristic of present-day post-conflict administration is evident in the Dayton agreement and the personal powers it accords to the High Representative. At a December 1997 Peace Implementation Council meeting in Bonn, these powers were further expanded to include the sacking of government officials, the right to declare elections invalid, etc. While perhaps above all Carl Bildt's reign was characterized by respect for the political integrity of officials from all sides, his successor Carlos Westendorp was vested with the so-called 'Bonn powers', enabling him to dismiss Serb Republic president Nikola Poplasen. Subsequent representatives have engaged in much more intrusive activities in order to further the goals of international actors. Wolfgang Petritsch more than once applied his wider mandate to undo the election results in the various entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as to introduce sweeping constitutional changes. Paddy Ashdown followed this approach in, among other things, amending the constitution of the Serb Republic (ICG 2003; Ourdan 2002).

[4] Overall, the Balkans were never regarded a major prize by the Great Powers in the 19th century. One might argue that the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits remained a significant prize until the mid-19th century (as the Crimean War would appear to confirm). The building of railroads across many parts of the region in the late 19th century clearly offset the role of the Straits, yet thereby tended to somewhat bolster the strategic relevance of other areas of the region.

These measures are all legal in that the High Representative's original mandate had, from the outset, been very broad in scope, before it was then extended even further through the 'Bonn powers.' An act of a legally more dubious kind was the 'information intervention' that took place in 1997. After continuous tension between the UN, NATO and the Bosnian Serb media, SFOR General Wesley Clark simply besieged and closed down the Pale TV station for 'persistent and blatant contravention' of the Dayton accord (Thompson and Price 2003: 183-202). Needless to say, such overt use of military force resembles the practices of occupying forces rather than of post-conflict administration sanctioned by the international community.

The paradoxes and inconsistencies that flow from the Dayton accord are today recognized among practitioners and outside observers alike (Knaus and Martin 2003; ICG 2003). Susan Woodward refers to Dayton as 'not a peace agreement but a 'deal'—a form of nonnegotiated elite pact drawn up by outside negotiators—between the heads of the three warring parties' (Woodward 1999: 284). The basic paradox Woodward sees is inherent in the relationship of Dayton to the international legal norm of sovereignty. In her view, the international community is 'defying the autonomy principle in order to create an autonomous state' (Woodward 1999: 253). The question she poses is whether the major exceptions to sovereignty and non-intervention implied in the Dayton agreement can contribute to genuine domestic sovereignty and autonomy being established in the next stage (Woodward 1999: 256).

Another troubling inconsistency is the role of national and ethnic communities in the Dayton universe of constitutional rules. While the U.S. administration long opposed the Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg plans for a reconstructed Bosnia and Herzegovina on the grounds that it tended to reward Bosnian Serb aggression and reinforce ethnopoliticization of the Balkans, the Dayton accord was no less flawed in this respect (Woodward 1999: 283). Aside from the political leaders who signed the accord, Dayton may even have had fewer prospects to be accepted by most inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By reinserting ethnic quotas and balances in the constitution, many observers believe that the ethnopolitical nature of decision-making and representation was further entrenched in the aftermath of the war.

But sovereignty is nonetheless a principle inherent to the Dayton agreement, posing certain limitations to post-conflict administration. The UN mission to Kosovo, UNMIK, has a much more far-reaching mandate based on Security Council Resolution 1244 of 1999. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo found that resolution 1244 had created 'a unique institutional hybrid, a UN protectorate with unlimited powers' (The Kosovo Report 2000: 9). In consequence, there is hardly any realm of government left untouched by the activities of international actors within the UNMIK-JIAS arrangement. More recently, regional and municipal authorities in Kosovo have been awarded certain competences and duties (Schwarz 2002). Their mandatory tasks include the basic operation of infrastructure, the economy, and the health system. In addition, the more active and innovative of regional and municipal officials may choose to attend to matters beyond the fundamental ones. Local administrators are in other words cautiously encouraged to try and cater for culture and arts, sports, tourism and youth matters (Schwarz 2002: 124-125).

The formal mandate notwithstanding, the expressed ambitions of international administrators in Kosovo also outstrip those of their peers in Sarajevo. The expansion of ambitions characterizing the third era of international engagement is vividly illustrated in the following statement by Andy Bearpark, Deputy UN SRSG to Kosovo. According to him, international donors

> require us to provide a stable and secure environment in which all the people of Kosovo can pursue normal lives, a democratic and accountable system of government, a sound market-oriented economic and financial framework within which Kosovo's people can prosper freely, a strategy to promote growth, and the conditions in which civil society can flourish (UNMIK 2000: 5)

In this understanding, the joint UNMIK-JIAS framework is supposed to fulfill each of the lofty ambitions listed. While UN police keep the peace and uphold law and order, a variety of other UN agencies are supposed to build a civil administration system. The OSCE is charged with election monitoring and democratization programs, the first concrete outcomes being the municipal and parliamentary elections held in 2001 and 2002. The EU, finally, is responsible for rebuilding the economy and the infrastructure, via the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development as well as an array of smaller projects and initiatives.

From a critical standpoint, Florian Bieber has distinguished three levels of ambition among international organizations active in post-conflict administration efforts in the Balkan peninsula today. The three levels of ambition can be expressed in terms of how international actors experience their own roles. Such actors perceive that they have a mandate from the international community to either (Bieber 2003: 5-6):

- monitor agreements entered by the parties,
- technically implement such agreements
- or act politically through the shaping and staffing of government agencies and/or nominating people for public office.

In fact, it would appear that the entire spectrum of post-conflict administration is present in parts of former Yugoslavia. The role of the international community in the Republic of Macedonia is largely that of monitoring agreements entered into by the parties.[5] In Bosnia and Herzegovina, by contrast, the international mission takes a much more active stance in technically implementing Dayton, as well as vetoing developments that are regarded as detrimental to the purposes of the peace agreement by applying the 'Bonn powers'. Kosovo, finally, is an example of a province that is being administered and politically molded at the same time. Belgrade has practically no say over what goes on in Kosovo, and so far the influence of local residents is also very limited.

Of course, the long-term perspective is that power will be handed back to local actors, to decision-makers and civil servants (Ducasse-Rogier 2001: 29). But what about the questions posed by Susan Woodward? Is it possible to create autonomy through procedures and actions that violate autonomy? Can democratic institutions emerge in a context where election results could be declared invalid as a result of citizens voting for a nationalist party? Is accountable government a realistic prospect when the top international officials are in a position to sack government officials and thus bypass regular chains of command and legal procedure?

In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, David Chandler has famously launched a major assault on what he calls 'the strategy of externally imposed democratization' (Chandler 1999: 193). Chandler may well have a point in that resistance against international efforts often stems from a wish to regain self-respect and dignity, as powerfully described by Frantz Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth* (Fanon 1966). On the whole, however, Chandler's charge that foreign meddling in the Balkans reinvigorates the image of colonialism and 'the White Man's burden' seems grossly overblown. First, Southeast

[5] In 2003, the EU Commission pledged to assist each of the Macedonian ministries to implement reforms that were agreed under the Ohrid agreement (Ernst 2003).

European societies have never been subjected to slavery and colonialism in the sense these terms deserve to be defined. Second, international organization officials serving in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo—and to a lesser extent in the Republic of Macedonia—have undoubtedly made *some* progress toward institutionalizing democracy and civil society (Manning and Antic 2003). And third, none of the Western powers or international organizations plan to stay long in Southeastern Europe or would deliberately miss an opportunity to find an appropriate 'exit strategy.' Ultimately, they wish to transfer power to local actors who will govern their communities responsibly, not least taking the views and interests of minorities into account.

More adequate than Chandler's blunt challenge is Sumantra Bose's pointed criticism of the mandate of the High Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina, accountable to 55 governments and organizations associated with the Peace Implementation Council, but not to the citizens of that country (Bose 2002: 275). But even Bose's comprehensive analysis seems to neglect the contradictions involved in the approach of the international community in the Balkans. Adding to Woodward's preoccupation with sovereignty and autonomy, Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin have recently investigated the interaction between the High Representative and local decisionmaking bodies, and concluded that there are few serious legal or political constraints to the authority wielded by the head of international activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Knaus and Martin 2003: 63-67).

Even fewer outside observers have tried to elicit general lessons regarding region-wide international engagement. One exception is Florian Bieber (2003), who has questioned the relationship between post-conflict administration and support from local political actors and the public at large. At the center of his concern is the role awarded to civil servants, political parties, and the citizenry in the interim phase (while not neglecting how this affects the hypothesized end state of affairs). In fact, Bieber perceives the key paradox in the fact that the deeper the involvement of international actors in Southeastern Europe, the more problematic the question of legitimacy is likely become. Incidentally, this paradox was succinctly summed up by High Representative Ashdown himself in a 'no-nonsense' message to the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 2002:

> The more you reform, the less I will have to do. The less you reform, the more I will have to do (quoted in Knaus and Martin 2003: 61).

According to Bieber (2003), there are at least two simple reasons why the performance of institutions run by international officials will tend not to be successful. One is that the running of day-to-day government affairs requires the continuous support, and not only tolerance, of local political elites. In essence, there is only so much one can do if key representatives of the citizenry, people who have acquired a certain standing in the community, refuse to lend a helping hand. The other reason is that a smoothly operating government requires the acceptance of the public at large. Again, laws and regulations will not be upheld, or key objectives attained, without some level of consent on the part of the citizenry. Alas, Ashdown's candid message is not necessarily the best way to wield support from either 'constituency.'

Piecemeal Success

So what has gone wrong in terms of international engagement in the Balkans over the past decade? Some problems of post-conflict administration are structural, even endemic, and will not be successfully overcome through any temporary initiative by outsiders. A basic problem in administering a province like Kosovo—one of the poorest regions with one of the weakest governance structures in all of Europe—is where to begin in the first place (UNMIK 2000: 9). To introduce even a thin veneer of order and security

for all inhabitants, requires substantial resources. The 40,000 troops that KFOR initially was made up of were evidently not enough to prevent further human rights violations after the withdrawal of Serb police and military.[6]

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, we know that several tactical errors were committed. Some decisions were influenced by over-optimism on the part of international actors, who believed that the electorate after several years of conflict would suffer from 'nationalist fatigue.' A crucial decision was to hold general elections as the starting-point for a process of democratization, soon after the cessation of violence. Instead of providing a stepping-stone toward democratic rule, the electorate voted for nationalist parties and thus entrenched the ethnopolitical dimension of political life (Manning and Antic 2003; Ducasse-Rogier 2001: 26).

Conversely, other decisions taken early in the process may have been overly pragmatic. Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to field what in fact are three armies organized along ethnic lines. The rationale behind the initial reluctance to disarm the troops lay in a fear of enhanced instability immediately after the Dayton accord was signed (Woodward 1999: 287). The small numbers of troops that SFOR consisted of at this delicate juncture made this fear a plausible one. Yet the short-sightedness (or naïveté) of allowing three separate armies to be sustained, in light of the objective of de-emphasizing ethnicity in future Bosnian politics, is nothing short of astonishing.

These tactical errors no doubt contributed to the 'Dayton syndrome' of reaffirming nationalist claims and reinforcing a trend toward virtual ethnic fiefdoms (Bieber 2003: 10). But more worrisome is that many of the later problems in effect were pre-programmed and, according to some analysts, wholly predictable. In many ways, the absurd complexity of Dayton Bosnia constitutes a mere extension of the peace accord. In this regard, the outrage of HR Paddy Ashdown expressed in May 2002, as he blasted the lawmakers of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the existence of 13 prime ministers, 180 cabinet members, and 760 parliamentarians, was entirely misdirected. More appropriate was Ashdown's sharp criticism of rampant corruption and nepotism facilitated by that constitutional complexity and lack of administrative and political accountability (Ourdan 2002).

Second, the mere fact that a government structure is transitory inevitably limits its effectiveness (Bieber 2003: 6). An obvious example is Kosovo, whose permanent status was deliberately left undetermined in order for a peace agreement to be signed at the end of NATO's military campaign in 1999. Resolution 1244 consequently strikes a compromise that neither side considers tenable in the long term, namely the institutionalization of Kosovo as a region with 'substantial autonomy' within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In fact, even the latter state has since the Kosovo war been reconfigured as a 'Union of Serbia and Montenegro.' While the details of the peace agreement may have been expedient for hostilities to end and a temporary arrangement to be established, UNMIK later acknowledged that the constitutional limbo established through the peace accord has undermined efforts to forge viable government structures (UNMIK 2000/45: 1:1). The 'standards before status' formula devised by the Contact Group countries, instead of mitigating the problems, threatens to augment them, as extremists on either side experience an opportunity and consequently ratchet up their rhetoric (Steiger 2003). Moreover, as any transitory arrangement involving several international organizations and/or foreign governments, the UNMIK-JIAS arrangement suffers severely from the need of constant 'inter-pillar' coordination.

[6] Few of the 200,000 Serbs driven away after the end of NATO's air campaign have returned since mid-1999 (Woker 2003).

Third and crucially, there is the question of legitimacy and support from local elites and citizenry, raised by Bieber and others. In the international law sense, post-conflict administration arrangements that were established as part of a peace deal are legitimate as long as the local political leadership has signed up. But to the extent that a peace accord simultaneously creates a long-term constitutional arrangement that is binding on all citizens, this is clearly unsatisfactory. Unless the agreement is formally ratified by an elected legislature or by the electorate at large through a referendum, a serious legitimacy deficit will eventually ensue.

The prospect that post-conflict administration in Southeastern Europe may drag on for many years to come serves to exacerbate the problematic. The threat of alienation from the post-conflict administration conducted in their name on the part of Balkan politicians, civil servants and the public is already looming large in some places. The ethnic violence erupting in several locations throughout Kosovo in March 2004 has reminded all parties of the high stakes involved, but there are also less dramatic signs of a growing legitimacy gap. For instance, in May 2003, the Kosovo legislature had passed a bill challenging the international community by declaring the 'war of independence' conducted by the KLA in 1998-1999 a justified one (DPA/AP 2003). Meanwhile, in Macedonia, key signatories to the 2001 Ohrid agreement were becoming increasingly reluctant to stand by their commitments, a process only halted by the tragic death of President Boris Trajkovski in an airplane crash in February 2004 (Ernst 2003; Ernst 2004). Evidently, many people in Macedonia, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina feel they have limited influence over their own futures as a result of how international engagement is organized.[7]

Back to Basics?

David Mitrany, a founding father of the study of international organization and of functionalist theorizing in political science, spent part of his academic career conducting research on his native region, the Balkans. One of Mitrany's first full-blown studies was devoted to international engagement in Southeastern Europe (Mitrany 1936). In his conclusion, this British political scientist of Romanian-Jewish origin noted the stereotypes inherent to much thinking about conflicts and their origins in Southeastern Europe:

> [t]oo often it has been said, and all too easily believed, that the antagonism between the Balkan nationalities is so deep that they must be segregated; and on the other hand, that the poverty of their countries is the consequence of foreign exploitation (Mitrany 1936: 262-263).

But the term 'exploitation' is, according to Mitrany, badly suited to describe certain multilateral experiments of the interwar period (as it is inapplicable to most instances of recent international engagement) in the Balkans. In fact, the experience of the inter-Allied administration of 'Western Thrace' between October 1919 and May 1920 in Mitrany's view demonstrated that the mixed populations of that region are altogether capable of a life of mutual tolerance and co-operation, as long as they are insulated against the nationalist incitements of political conflicts.[8] Mitrany also felt that the experiment proved that 'even in a poor province people can be given the advantage of a civilized material life, if their labor and resources be not absorbed in an extravagant political and military superstructure of the state' (Mitrany 1936: 263).

[7] According to Ivan Krastev (2002), this 'crisis of representation' exists in a milder form throughout the peninsula, and is linked to the conditionality principle applied by most international organizations, especially the EU and the International Monetary Fund.

[8] Greece subsequently took over the administration of Western Thrace. After the 1922-23 war with Turkey, a surge of Greek nationalism swept away the legacy of multiethnic coexistence, launching a period of what Anastasia Karakasidou (1997: 141-161) calls 'group formation and social closure' in present-day northern Greece.

The 'Western Thrace' experiment, as evaluated by Mitrany, consisted of a hotly disputed area between the Rhodopi mountain range in the north and the Agean Sea in the south, otherwise delimited by the Nestos (Mesta) and Maritsa rivers. The population was made up of some 73,000 Turks, 69,000 Bulgarians, 51,000 Greeks, and smaller numbers of Pomaks (Slav-speaking Muslims), Jewish, Armenian and Roma minorities (Mitrany 1936: 255). For this brief period, a Superior Administrative Council for Thrace was created, under Governor General d'Esperey and his deputy, General Charpy, to advise the regime. The composition of the Superior Council, in turn, reflected the various ethnic and religious backgrounds of the population.

The achievements of the inter-Allied regime in terms of reinvigorating institutions of public administration, education, health care and infrastructure were perhaps not altogether surprising, as the preceding wars had wreaked havoc in the region for several years and the mere discontinuation of hostilities helped restore basic services. More unexpected was the extraordinarily robust economic revival which resulted from the short-lived, military-led administration, apparently at least in part due to its vigorous support of an active economic policy. The main item on the expenditure side of the budget was represented by public works, providing jobs and a much-needed jolt to a variety of local businesses (Mitrany 1936: 259-261).

Apart from its positive economic results, the unexpected political success of the brief reign of the inter-Allied administration may seem puzzling to a contemporary observer, accustomed to the long-term projects of resourceful international organizations and their pervasive presence in regions of conflict. It appears that popular support was never presumed on the part of General d'Esperey's administration but gradually acquired through actual delivery on everyday matters that concerned the inhabitants of 'Western Thrace.' According to Mitrany himself, a heavy focus on rapid, hands-on results combined with a manifest respect for the customs and politics of the area—in contrast to most regimes briefly ruling the area in the early 20th century—paved the way for an excellent relationship between the interim government and the local population.

Today, more than eighty years have passed since the inter-Allied Regime was dismantled. The character of political conflicts—and prospects for their resolution—has changed profoundly, and so have the particular circumstances in Southeastern Europe. The mixed legacy of Yugoslavia, affecting all parts of the peninsula under scrutiny here, directly or indirectly shapes post-conflict administration in much of the region. And the structure of relationships between different actors on the world stage, between governments, international institutions and non-governmental organizations, constitute elements of such transformation.

Nevertheless, many of the lessons Mitrany extracted from the inter-Allied experiment of 1919-1920 seem compatible with contemporary observations. Not least Bieber's double focus on performance and legitimacy, flowing from his analysis of peace building efforts in ex-Yugoslavia, demonstrates considerable overlap. Bieber stresses that, while institutions promoted by international organizations or foreign governments must operate effectively and produce tangible results, they also need to be 'more domestic in both their origins and their identification' (Bieber 2003: 14). Similarly, Woodward regards the near total lack of indigenous support for the Dayton arrangement in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the source of many of its present deficiencies. The denial of sovereignty is extreme in Dayton, she asserts, as a result of the imposition of

> a design of international construction without any participation of the Bosnian people in its construction or amendation. Because the structure of guarantees for national rights built into the Dayton constitution leaves no

> space for democratic politics in its implementation and possible reform, moreover, there is no clear way to generate a popular source for Bosnia's international legal sovereignty (Woodward 1999: 289)

Recalling Mitrany's wider theorizing about politics and international relations, one is tempted to call this a functionalist lesson. High performance in the fields for which a post-conflict administration authority expressly assumes responsibility would be a fundamental, if not necessary precondition for success. A second prerequisite would be that the legitimacy derived from an international mandate is limited in scope as well as in time, since otherwise the integral role of—as well as support from—decisionmakers, bureaucrats, businesses, NGO's and the like, is likely to erode.

Beyond performance and legitimacy in this narrow focus, there may be broader reasons for reverting back to basic values in post-conflict administration. One is the general trend perceived by sociologists toward the increased centrality of questions related to legitimacy and democracy in world culture. The successful diffusion of the human rights agenda throughout the post-World War II period is widely supposed to be one expression of this trend. Another sign of the rising salience of legitimacy might be the heightened awareness of dependency relations between creditors and debtors, for instance in the stark asymmetry prevailing between developing countries and international financial institutions. There are good reasons to assume that Balkan societies are just as sensitized to such asymmetries as people in developing countries, which is why intervention and post-conflict administration would need to be precisely and narrowly defined (Krastev 2002: 49-53).

Conclusion

A co-inspirer of postwar international organization and European integration—by virtue of his theorizing of cross-border political processes—David Mitrany was predictably heartened by postwar developments in this respect. The entrenchment of international institutions in world politics, the evolution of global arrangements in matters of trade and finance, and the ever-widening scope of international organization, all seemed to be steps in the right direction. He was particularly struck by the extraordinary degree of collaboration that was taking place in Europe, albeit at the time still restricted to the western part of the continent (Mitrany 1975: 240-266). Presumably, had he still lived, Mitrany would have delighted in the post-1989 coming together of eastern and western Europe, politically and institutionally.

The same applies to his native Southeastern Europe. The Balkan peninsula 'lacks a natural center of its own', Mitrany wrote nearly seventy years ago (Mitrany 1936: 6). Although this is still fundamentally true, Southeastern Europe is no longer left to itself. Through the emergence of a resourceful and an increasingly committed EU, supplemented by organizations like the OSCE, NATO, the OECD and the Council of Europe, the European continent has been provided with a huge magnetic force. This magnetic force is proving itself capable, after some false starts in the early 1990s, of pulling the Balkan peninsula into its orbit. Slovenia entered the EU as full member in the spring of 2004, with Bulgaria and Romania hoping to join as early as 2007. In terms of economic policy, non-members are also parties to the wider processes. If international engagement in the interwar period helped establish efficient regulations concerning Danube shipping, the infrastructure projects presently promoted under the auspices of the EU-sponsored Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe should provide a major impetus

to economic growth.[9] In turn, these developments are destined to enhance intra-regional ties.

Notwithstanding these promising trends, Mitrany might not have been impressed by the continued absence—at the dawn of the 21st century—of agreed practices in the international community for handling conflict-related political intervention and administration. Much of what is going on in this field, not least in the Balkans, is characterized by *ad hoc* solutions to problems partly inherent to the present system of international relations. To a considerable degree, the solutions advanced appear more closely linked to the interests of influential governments, or those of individual international organizations, than to actual needs. In terms of post-conflict administration, moreover, the persisting 'trial-and-error' methodology does not appear to generate better solutions, but increasingly cumbersome modes of action.

Arguably, a Mitranian recipe to the contemporary problems of international engagement prescribes that we reflect seriously on the fundamental goals and means to be applied in regions of conflict. One key aspect is actual performance, which in a Mitranian understanding ought to mean that one pays special attention to the economic aspects of peace building, as well as to the functional differentiation between spheres of activity. A second major aspect, as Bieber and Woodward point out, is linked to legitimacy, in a formal as well as in a symbolic sense. In advancing the example of the inter-Allied Regime in Western Thrace, Mitrany indicated that post-conflict administration is helped by a clear delimitation of roles between international actors and local administration and possibly a fixed timeline, in order to avoid creating an artificial set of incentives for local actors. Considering the importance he attached to respect for the sensitivities of the local polity, finally, Mitrany is likely to have advocated that international actors are particularly careful not to undercut existing political and administrative authority and capacity, but rather that they act to bolster them. In a sobering comment expressed at the end of his long career as theorist of international organization, he cautioned that

> the long democratic effort for mutual tolerance and understanding citizenship has fallen into the raw percentages of opinion polls and the intemperate clamour on the highways as in the universities, our centres of enlightenment. And the long liberal effort to stop small peoples and nations being dominated by the stronger has so far merely split the misuse of power into more numerous hands. We have sown liberty and are merely reaping license, within our communities and in the world at large (Mitrany 1975: 266)

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[9] On the history of creating an international arrangement for Danube shipping, see Sherman 1923. On infrastructure projects, see the website of the Balkan Stability Pact at http://www.stabilitypact.org/infrastructure/default.asp.

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Kosovo's Fifth Anniversary—On the Road to Nowhere?[1]

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Kosovo Today

Five years have passed since NATO launched its first ever military operation in Europe to 'prevent atrocities and genocide' in Kosovo. The Bosnian debacle had certainly fostered the international community's resolve for robust military and diplomatic intervention. Dayton also provided the United Nation's Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) and KFOR with lessons learned for the challenges of modern post-conflict management, reaching far beyond mere peace keeping. In the case of Kosovo, the unresolved status issue exacerbated the challenges of outside state and nation building. Kosovo being the lynchpin of regional stability, in the aftermath of the war, a quick decision on independent statehood was considered a dangerous precedent for the 'powder keg' of Europe.

Under international law, Kosovo has remained part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, now Serbia and Montenegro, although its inner-Yugoslav status as autonomous province of Serbia is disputed. UNMIK and Kosovo's Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) jointly exercise all sovereign prerogatives in Kosovo. The international community has provisionally taken over from the Belgrade authorities in ruling and administrating Kosovo. Most Albanian refugees returned right after Milosevic's capitulation in June 1999. Serbs who had fled after the war have only trickled back in small numbers despite substantial international programs for returnees. Today, Serbs constitute a locally concentrated minority of about 7% in Kosovo, the Albanians an 88% majority.

Socio-economic development in the structurally weak region of Kosovo has fallen far short of local and international expectations. In terms of housing and infrastructure the repair of war damages has been completed meanwhile, revealing underlying structures and macro-economic trends that offer little ground for optimism: a continuous slowdown in economic growth; a corresponding increase in unemployment; and a huge disproportion between import and export. What remains is a region with no major assets for sustainable economic development, but crippling historical legacies and structural deficits. (Kosovo 2000; Serbia and Montenegro 2003: 26-34) The reform process of belated transition is seriously hampered by the local ethnic standoff between Albanians and Serbs as well as by the political standoff between UNMIK, the Belgrade authorities and the Kosovar leadership.

Human security improved significantly for the ethnic and religious minorities in Kosovo as soon as KFOR moved in to restore order after all state institutions had broken down at the height of the conflict. Interethnic violence became incidental, but revived long-established traditions of Serb-Albanian enmity and the frequency of brutal incidents have effectively disallowed a return to 'normality.' The recent outbursts of violence have demonstrated how dangerously thin the cover of coexistence and how explosive the underlying hatreds are. The Serbs continue to live in scattered, isolated enclaves, some under permanent KFOR protection and generally lacking the minimal preconditions for normal life. Consequently, the results of the increased international efforts to restore a 'multiethnic Kosovo' by facilitating the return of Serb refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) have been meagre, despite the abominable circumstances in refugee camps in Serbia proper. The number of potential returnees (230-240,000) canvassed by Belgrade is certainly way off the mark, but the number of actual returns (9,000 by early

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2004) is too low to be of any significance for the process (OSCE/UNHCR 2003; Ivanisevic 2004).

The domestic *political process* in Kosovo has been institutionalised in the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). 'State building' (i.e., institution building) intentionally preceded democratisation. Heeding a key lesson from Bosnia, the international community opted for a bottom-up approach of democratisation, moving from local (28 October 2000) to central elections (19 Nov. 2001). The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, signed by the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations (SRSG) Hans Haekkerup on 14 May 2001, prepared the ground for 'establishing and overseeing the development of provisional, democratic self-government institutions', as stipulated by UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 1999. Rather than to prove the Kosovars' ability and willingness to rule themselves, the political bickering after the November 2001 elections produced a stalemate that only the new SRSG Steiner could resolve in March 2002. The net outcome was Ibrahim Rugova holding the Presidency and a coalition government of the main Albanian parties under Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi. The electoral law granted the Serb minority and its Povratak coalition a substantial 'overrepresentation' in the Assembly (22 out of 120 seats). Yet, the elected assembly has in general refused to take into account legitimate minority concerns in the legislative process and has occasionally over-stepped its competencies. The 'reserved powers' of UNMIK - budget, monetary policy, minority protection, external relations, security (and the respecting of Resolution 1244) - are those that really constitute state sovereignty. On 7 March 2003, the Transfer Council of UNMIK and PISG was installed to manage the gradual transfer of competencies and responsibilities. Legally, the transfer to the PISG does not prejudice the final status as it could lead to both substantial autonomy in a post-Yugoslav state and to independent statehood.

It has often been stated that much, if not everything, in Kosovo depends on the status question. As a return to the *status quo ante* in terms of sovereignty was considered unrealistic and as the international community rejected a territorial partition along ethnic lines, the ensuing stalemate of non-status was redefined as 'gaining time.' Due to timetables in Kosovo and Serbia and Montenegro, the status issue cannot be postponed much longer. The quasi-moratorium on the status issue has contributed substantially to stabilisation and normalisation in the region, but the productive phase of temporising is coming to an end. Conditionalities, incentives and international pressure will only go so far in turning a weak state-like entity into a functioning state. The achievements of a virtuous circle of 'standards before status' may easily be jeopardised by a subsequent vicious circle of politicking for final status – timing is of the essence.

A regional framework of democratic states and basic stability has emerged, whereas the status issue sticks out more and more prominently as a factor hampering economic and political progress as well as Euro-Atlantic integration for Kosovo and the Western Balkans. The domestic, regional and international context today may be far from ideal for a final settlement to the Kosovo question, but it is equally hard to project short or medium-term changes that would make the circumstances really conducive for a negotiated arrangement.

The past half-decade has underscored that the time horizons of international politics and the eager anticipation of the local communities tend to be incompatible with the elongated processes of nation and state building. It remains to be seen, however, whether shortcuts in these processes – if available – provide *real* answers to the many fundamental challenges Kosovo faces, e.g., economic restructuring, societal reconciliation and European integration.

Roadmaps and Roadblocks

The status of Kosovo under international law is defined by UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244 (and can thus be changed by another UNSC resolution only). Reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the resolution authorises an international (military and civilian) interim administration to provide for Kosovo's 'substantial autonomy within the FRY.' Thus, both Yugoslav sovereignty and international transitional administration depend in duration on Res. 1244. Although the 1991-1992 Badinter Commission did not consider the option of independence for Kosovo, its criteria might be interpreted to condone statehood for Kosovo, but not for the Republika Srpska and certainly not for Northern Kosovo or Southern Serbia. Under the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, Kosovo was given the right to establish its own constitution, legislative power, and financial autonomy. The bodies of executive, legislative, and judicial powers (including constitutional courts) had the same status as those in the republics. Moreover, as far as the political and legislative process on the level of the federation was concerned, Kosovo was equal to the six republics and directly represented in the federal parliament, constitutional court, and presidency. Independence for Kosovo would *upgrade* the province's borders to state borders, not *change* borders (as it would in the case of secession by the Republika Srpska from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Mitrovica region from Kosovo or the Tetovo region from Macedonia). Typically, however, Resolution 1244 does not refer to past Serbian models of autonomy for Kosovo, be it before and under the 1974 Constitution or after Milosevic's revoking of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989. Thus, the argument of Resolution 1244 was not based on the constitutional order of Yugoslavia (and its restoration), but rather on the legitimacy of Kosovo's claim to substantial autonomy.

In the current situation, however, the international community is treading a thin line between respecting *de jure* Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo and *de facto* administrating the protectorate, with both Prishtina and Belgrade keeping a jealous and vigilant watch. Recently, for instance, the former Prishtina court now acting out of Nis indicted the commander of the Kosovo Protection Corps citing a Serbian Interpol warrant. UNMIK rejected the arrest of the KPC commander with the argument that the Nis court acted as a Serb parallel institution for Kosovo and had no jurisdiction. On at least three other occasions, Belgrade's 'virtual sovereignty' over Kosovo has already ignited major political controversies, with more sure to come (RFE/RL Newsline vol. 8, No. 41, Part II, 3 March 2004) .

Firstly, the fact that Res. 1244 referred to Kosovo as *part of the FRY*, but not as the autonomous province of Serbia it actually was, has added to the confusion. Some have argued that the fact that the FRY ceased to exist with the creation of Serbia and Montenegro has made Res. 1244 irrelevant and thus Kosovo independent by default. Another line of argument – even for those who reject that Kosovo is part of Serbia and Montenegro as the successor state of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – claims that Res. 1244 precludes a return to a *status quo ante* as constituent part of the Republic of Serbia. The Belgrade Agreement for the Restructuring of Relations between Serbia and Montenegro (14 March 2002) included an explicit precaution for a possible disintegration after three years: 'If Montenegro withdraws from the state union, international documents related to the FRY, the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 in particular, shall relate to and fully apply on Serbia as its successor.' (Accord 2002) The suggestion that this provision violates the UNSC resolution by *re*-introducing Serb sovereignty over Kosovo seems far-fetched: The UNSC, respecting Yugoslav sovereignty, could not deny Kosovo being an autonomous part of Serbia under (any) Yugoslav constitution and theoretically Serbia might uphold the defunct 'shell' of the state union even after Montenegro's secession, if only because of Kosovo.

Secondly, for Kosovar leaders it is a must to protest any appearance of Serbian, Yugoslav or Serbia and Montenegro's *sovereignty over Kosovo*. The bilateral treaty on the rectification of the state border between FYROM and Yugoslavia was signed in February 2001. The clarification of the border delineation served the improvement of border patrolling on both sides (and thus may have contributed to the outbreak of violence in Macedonia by cracking down on grey zones). The Albanian leaders in Prishtina found it hard to stomach that the Belgrade authorities could rectify the border and thereby 'give away' some 2,500 hectares of 'their' territory. Formal respect of Yugoslav sovereignty and pragmatic reasons of border security made the UN and NATO accept the agreement.

Thirdly, similar protests were provoked by the explicit *reference to Kosovo* as a province of Serbia in the preamble of the Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (6 February 2003): 'the state of Serbia which includes the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, the latter currently under international administration in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1244' (Constitutional Charter 2003). The upcoming new Serbian Constitution is bound to trigger a similar bout of protest. Neither party to the conflict will allow the tension to subside or the political hype of status to whither away. Second-track simulations and non-status negotiations certainly have their merits, but they will not scratch the surface of the status issue, even without the existing time constraints

In hindsight, it is often argued that a window of opportunity for an 'imposed' final status arrangement (i.e., independence) actually existed when Milosevic was still in power. Whether the Serbs would have accepted the loss of Kosovo as punishment for the regime's crimes or whether Milosevic could have blamed it on the 'unpatriotic' opposition remains a matter of speculation. Irrespective of self-serving Russian and Chinese opposition to Kosovo independence in the UNSC, the idea of Kosovo's reintegration in a post-Yugoslav state gained some credence with the end of the Milosevic regime and the coming to power of the democratic and reform-oriented Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition in Belgrade. Additionally, it was argued that international pressure on the new democratic regime to settle the Kosovo issue might backfire and erode its popular backing in Serbia. For any Kosovar Albanian leader yielding one inch from the claim to full independence would be political suicide, as the status issue is not subjected to a cost-benefit analysis. Although many reform politicians in the Democratic Party and G-17 are more than willing to give up on Kosovo in order to boost economic reforms and European integration, they will say so only behind closed doors. The landslide victory of nationalist parties (ranging from Kostunica's DSS to Seselj's SRS) only adds to this political taboo.

The Future Status of Kosovo

Hypothetically, at least five main options for a future status of Kosovo are currently under discussion (see Table 1, cf. Calic 2004; Kosovo Final Status 2002; Altmann 2001) At the end of the day, however, all options fall into three distinct categories; those that grant Belgrade any sovereign rights over Kosovo (autonomy, reintegration), those that do not (independence) and those that leave this question unanswered (permanent protectorate, EU integration). As national sovereignty is indivisible from an Albanian-Kosovar perspective and as Belgrade is ready to consider any option *but* independence, room for compromise seem to be non-existent. The underlying logic of each option and the overall objectives of the international community are therefore key in deciding on the way forward. The international community's principles may be summarised as:

1. *Functional*: the prioritisation of a functioning state over a nation-state
2. *Final*: a finality of Balkan state disintegration
3. *Fair*: a fair arrangement respecting the rights of minorities *without*, however, thwarting the first two principles

Table 1: Options for the Future Status of Kosovo

Independent statehood	**Autonomy *within***	***Reintegration***	**Permanent international *protectorate***	***EU integration***
conditional	Serbia	As third constituent part of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro		
unconditional	Serbia and Montenegro			

The *Kosovar* position claims that international conditionalities concerning human and minority rights as well as a fully functional state will be fulfilled once Kosovar self-determination has run its course all the way to independent statehood. The logic of the Kosovar position is that it would be unjust to have a Serbian or South-Slavic state/federation rule over Albanian Kosovo. The arguments range from ethno-demographic (national self-determination) to legal (Kosovo's status under the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) constitution or the disintegration of the federation) to moral (Belgrade forfeiting its sovereign rights because of the atrocities committed by the Milosevic regime). Theoretically, independent statehood would not preclude a state restructuring within Kosovo through federalisation or cantonisation.

The *Serbian* position of a restoration of sovereignty over Kosovo could theoretically involve a range of options. Irrespective of the fact that a restoration is unlikely and that Belgrade has not even begun to contemplate the practical consequences, Belgrade's sovereignty could be implemented as an autonomous province of Kosovo either within the Republic of Serbia or within the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The exercise of constructing an autonomous status for Kosovo under the State Union and the Constitutional Charter is quite academic as any effort in that direction would reach beyond the projected life span of the State Union. Even if such an arrangement could be implemented at short notice, the dissolution of the State Union would again leave Kosovo behind with an undefined status under international law. The same basic argument of time constraints applies to the concept of a tripartite State Union. Harmonising *three* instead of two economic and legal systems into a State Union compatible with the EU Stabilisation and Association Process would be a mission impossible even without time pressure. Zoran Djindjic's suggestion of a status for Kosovo in-between autonomy and third constituent of the state union was equally fuzzy. Thus, disregarding the current Kosovar position and assuming the velvet dissolution of the State Union by 2006, autonomy within Serbia is the only 'real' option from the perspective of the current Serbian position.

Serbia with Kosovo

A prospective independent Serbia including an autonomous Kosovo would face serious new constitutional, demographic and ethnopolitical challenges (see Table 2). The quality of Kosovo's autonomy would set a precedent for Vojvodina; and with the expected increasing vigour of the autonomy movement in that region, only equal status to Kosovo would be acceptable. The fact that Kosovo's autonomy under the 1974 constitution was linked as much to the SFRY as to the Republic of Serbia precludes a return to a *status quo ante*, but any new autonomy arrangement within Serbia for Kosovo, Vojvodina (and Sandzak?) would leave Belgrade with minimal, largely nominal sovereignty over these regions. The burden of transfers to Kosovo for economic development and security would easily top Tito's system of compensations. With one-third of the territory under autonomous rule and almost one-third of non-Serb population overall, the ethno-demographic composition and constitutional set-up of the 'new' state so desired by Serbian nationalists would destroy any illusions of a homogeneous, centralised nation-

state. More likely, in controlling and administrating Kosovo, Belgrade would have a state of war on its hands.

Table 2: Basic Demographic and Geographic Data of the Republic of Serbia and Related Entities

ENTITY	Population		NATIONALITY	Members		ENTITY	Size	
	in thousand	in %		in thousand	in %		in sq km	in %
Rep. of Serbia	9,397		Serbs	6,495	69.1%	Rep. of Serbia	88,361	100,0%
Vojvodina	2,031	21.6%	Albanians	1,734	18.4%	Vojvodina	21,506	24.3%
Kosovo	1,900	20.2%	Hungarians	293	3.1%	Kosovo	10,887	12.3%
Serbia proper	5,466	58.2%	Bosniaks	211	2.2%	Serbia proper	55,968	63.3%
			Others	666	7.1%			
			Total	9,398	100,0%			

Source: Republic Statistical Office of Serbia (2002 census); Statistical Office of Kosovo (estimate)

The key distinction between the current process of 'standards before status' and the often-propagated alternative solution of 'conditional independence' is the *ex ante* determination of independence as the final status. The process leading from the *definition* of final status to the actual *awarding* of independence would then be the same; an (incremental) transfer of sovereign competencies under substantial international supervision and guarantees. In terms of sequencing transfer and standards, 'conditional independence' is frontloaded compared to the backloaded 'standards before status.' Logically, independence once awarded cannot be revoked and sovereign rights once transferred cannot be withdrawn. Thus, 'conditional independence' in its practical implementation would be similar to the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina with an Office of the High Representative (OHR) to uphold international standards and to move local politicking away from zero-sum games step-by-step.

The two 'international' options of a permanent protectorate and European integration deserve closer scrutiny. The *protectorate* is hardly a long-term option in and by itself. On the one hand, both 'standards before status' and 'conditional independence' or even autonomy under Serbian sovereignty would imply an extended international (civilian and/or military) presence as guarantor in Kosovo. The well-known 'unintended consequences' of protectorate arrangements such as the so-called 'inflexibility trap' resulting in 'frustrated societies, weak states and a crisis of democracy' are a stark argument against an unlimited continuation of this mode of governance (Krastev 2002).

The 1999 promise of a 'European perspective' for the Western Balkans evidently includes Kosovo. Nevertheless, the idea of a European short cut for Kosovo is largely utopian. Some have argued that the transfer of sovereign rights in the process of *EU integration* might make the sorting-out of sovereignty over Kosovo between Belgrade and Prishtina a superfluous exercise or at least one that could be cut short by integrating Kosovo into the EU as it is. This shortcut has three drawbacks. Firstly, taking Kosovo's inability to meet basic criteria as an excuse to reduce or forfeit conditionalities would undo the fundamental logic of EU integration strategies. Secondly, apart from the fact that sovereignty is generally seen as indivisible in the Balkans, the sovereign rights relegated to Brussels in the process of European integration are not those disputed between Prishtina and Belgrade. Thirdly, the EU can only negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with a fully sovereign and functional state. In order to circumvent this dilemma and not to complicate the SAA preparations with the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro further, the EU has set up a Stabilisation and Association Process Tracking

Mechanism (STM) for Kosovo. This joint technical working group of UNMIK, the PISG and the European Commission simulates the benefits of SAA preparations for the countries of the region in terms of norm-setting and policy guidance for EU-compatible structural reforms. The outcome for Kosovo, however, cannot be the signing of an SAA. The government in Belgrade cannot be held responsible for the fulfilment of SAA criteria in Kosovo, nor can - to a large extent - the government in Prishtina. Judging by the track record of the other Balkan countries in the Stabilisation and Association Process so far, even an independent but weak Kosovar state would be an unlikely candidate for a fast track to EU membership. Conversely, the signing of an SAA with Serbia and Montenegro or, more likely, Serbia *and* Montenegro in the medium term - a feasibility report for Serbia and Montenegro is being prepared, but a ratified SAA before 2007 is unlikely - would have consequences for Kosovo too. Far-reaching autonomy within Serbia would create SAA problems similar to Bosnia and Herzegovina's and conditional independence would imply a separate SAA for Kosovo. Reform politicians in Belgrade therefore argue that progress on EU integration as well as on political and economic reforms would be much quicker without Kosovo (and without Montenegro).

Options involving an exchange of population or territory would fly in the face of the most basic European principles and would certainly trigger an avalanche of similar claims in the region and beyond. These options may be (and are) used as threatening gestures, but are non-starters in an orderly final-status process. The same applies to possible 'solutions' involving a partitioning of Kosovo along the (main) ethnic lines, with the Serb part joining Serbia and the Albanian part gaining independent statehood or revisiting visions of a Greater Albania. Accepting such a redrawing of borders would foster and legitimise similar ideas in Bosnia, Preshevo Valley and Macedonia – a slippery slope towards further ethnic cleansing. More importantly, such a decision would condone the concept of Kosovo as a second, mono-ethnic nation-state of the Albanians where minorities can at best be tolerated. Euphoric international promises to 'restore' multicultural and multiethnic communities have subsided and the international community has come to accept pragmatic solutions in refugee return and related property issues. Yet, countering creeping endeavours to turn states and state-like entities into mono-ethnic constituencies by violent or other means remains a prime objective.

Restructuring of Kosovo could be an option to accommodate ethnic minorities (i.e., the Serb population), both in a framework of conditional independence and as an autonomous province of Serbia. *Federalisation* would create two ethnically defined constituent entities within an independent Kosovo (similar to the Federation and the Republika Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina). A federalisation of Kosovo as a province of Serbia would be food for thought for experts in international and constitutional law. With the haphazard distribution of pockets of Serb population over Kosovo the territorial shape of the two entities would surpass the worst versions of the Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia. As the lessons of Dayton indicate, in either case the net result would probably be a political system deadlocked by ethnic loyalties, a plethora of practical problems and a multiplication of public institutions without corresponding increase in the functioning and output legitimacy of the 'state.'

Cantonisation originally refers to the classic and unique Swiss example of plural constituent parts of the state that are not ethnically defined. Since Dayton, cantonisation refers to a state arrangement consisting of multiple ethnically defined territorial units. The distribution of the Serb population in Kosovo would seem to favour such a way out over federalisation. The price to pay would be the same: an uncontrolled multiplication of institutions and politics to the detriment of socio-economic realities – again a lesson learned from Bosnia.

Typically, the workability of sub-state arrangements to accommodate minority communities requires a strong and prosperous state as well as a historical tradition. Otherwise, the outcome tends to be a weak, dysfunctional and de-legitimised state. The argumentative fallacy of both cantonisation and federalisation concerns the principle of *reciprocity*. The Albanian Kosovars argue that, because of their right to national self-determination or wartime atrocities, they cannot be part of or be ruled by a Serb-dominated state. Reciprocally (albeit on a smaller scale), Serbs in Kosovo argue that, because of *their* right to national self-determination or post-war atrocities, they cannot be part of or be ruled by an Albanian-dominated state. Consequently, all state politics is ethnic politics. Cooperation between Serbs and Albanians is relegated either to the individual level or to the inter-state and the European level. In an independent Kosovo it would be hard to argue why the Serbs in Mitrovica should not have a claim to maximum autonomy. In a re-integrated Serbia it would be equally hard to argue why the province of Kosovo should be partitioned ethnically with federal autonomy for the Serbs, whereas statehood should be refused to the Kosovo Albanians.

Assuming that the status process were to result in acceptance of either conditional independence or autonomy within Serbia by the negotiating parties, then it would be up to the international community to apply the three fundamental principles of functionality, finality and fairness mentioned above. *Functionality* of Kosovo as a state or autonomous entity would be highly problematic in any constellation, if only because of obstructionism by the Albanian Kosovars in the first or the Serb minority of Kosovo in the second case. Territorial solutions would create too many non-cooperative and rivalling levels of government, e.g., a Serb autonomous province within a Kosovo autonomous entity within the state of Serbia (itself a constituent republic of a State Union). The criterion of *finality* does not refer to the sustainability of such an arrangement, but rather to potential precedents for the region. A federalisation or cantonisation of Kosovo would be a precedent for Albanians in Macedonia. Independence would be a wake-up call for Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Eventually, 'precedent' in this context is not a legal category, but rather the readiness of one or more parties to instrumentalise a specific case for their own ends. As a consequence, precedents can always be construed – the issue is rather how credible they are as a factor of public mobilisation and indignation. Conversely, the international community has to be able to make the case for the consistency and righteousness of its approach to various cases of nation and state building in the region. Lastly, although no binding legal norms and uniform practices exist for minority regimes in Europe, the criteria of state functionality and a finality to state fragmentation imply a certain correlation between distribution, relative and absolute size of a minority, on the one hand, and the extent of minority arrangements, on the other hand.

Functional statehood hardly figures in the Belgrade and Prishtina visions of the future of Kosovo. It is either considered to be of secondary importance or an automatic consequence of restored statehood or national statehood. Whereas a reintegration of Kosovo in whatever form would certainly unhinge the fragile political structures in Belgrade, Kosovars are inclined to show off their parallel underground institutions of the 1990s as a basis of statehood. In order to ground the extremely emotional and zero-sum debates in political reality, it would be advisable to challenge both parties to produce a concrete platform for future status - much along the lines of the initial negotiations between Belgrade and Podgorica (van Meurs 2002). Platforms specifying constitutional arrangement for Kosovo autonomy in Serbia or minority protection regimes for Serbs in Kosovo respectively might have a sobering effect.

All in all, the various options championed by Albanian and Serbian politicians are fatally reminiscent of the famous one-liner, 'Why should I be a minority in *your* country, if you could be a minority in *mine*?' (cited in Woodward 1995: 108)

Negotiating Kosovo

As the endogenous capabilities in Belgrade and Prishtina to initiate a constructive process aimed at a mutually acceptable compromise arrangement for the final status of Kosovo are strictly limited, much if not everything depends on the 'international community.' Although Russia and China also factor in as potential veto powers in a UNSC authorisation of a final status for Kosovo, constructive engagement mainly concerns the USA and the EU (or key EU members). With the international community equally deadlocked and largely unwilling to tackle the thorny Kosovo issue head-on, a breakthrough will likely depend on shifts in EU and/or US interests outside the Balkan conundrum. The recent shaping-up of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and its increased willingness and improved capabilities to handle military and policing operations has consequences for the Balkans and the transatlantic division of labour, but hardly impinges on the deadlocked status issue.

Resolution 1244 assigns UNMIK and the SRSG the task of 'facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet Accords.' (Rambouillet Accords 1999) The ambiguity of the accords' text, however, is unsurpassed: 'Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act.' This one sentence raises a plethora of questions: What if the will of the people and the opinions of the relevant authorities turn out to be irreconcilable? Is the reference to the Helsinki Final Act a reminder that state borders are inviolable or does it make any solution conditional on a larger set of standards concerning human and minority rights, democracy and the rule of law?

Even though Res. 1244 highlighted Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo and failed to mention the timeframe, Michael Steiner's 'standards before status' speech at the UN in April 2002 marked the end of this three-year time-out. His proposal was generally considered the best possible option given the circumstances, defining eight standards or benchmarks: (Address 2002)

1. functional state institutions;
2. enforcement of the rule of law;
3. freedom of movement;
4. right of return for all Kosovars;
5. market economic development;
6. clarity of property title;
7. normalised dialogue with Belgrade; and
8. reduction and transformation of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC).

Most of these benchmarks are related to state functionality and have to be addressed by the PISG. From a Kosovar perspective, making the opening of status negotiations conditional on fulfilling certain standards is an incentive only if independence is the guaranteed or prejudiced outcome of the negotiations. Conversely, from a Serb perspective the 'standards before status' formula provides no incentive for cooperation whatsoever and might even be understood as an invitation to obstruct and thwart progress on issues such as the Prishtina-Belgrade dialogue or refugee return and freedom of movement. Thus, the fundamental flaw of 'standards before status' is that it can unfold its incentive function for one party *only* and *only* if it prejudices the final status outcome. Although local Serb communities would certainly profit from full implementation of the 'standards', they are not the addressees of the 'standards before status' conditionality. There even is a 'moral hazard here: In the competition of two

mutually exclusive status options, any obvious and/or provoked failure on the part of the Albanians to meet the standards might be seen as boosting the Serbian option for the status of Kosovo.

'Standards before status' opened the prospect of a mediated bilateral dialogue on non-status issues and UNMIK finally took its courage in both hands and sought to cut through the legal complexities of ownership and sovereignty. In June 2002, the Kosovo Trust Agency was established to administer publicly-owned firms and begin the privatisation process on the basis of laws approved one month earlier. The fact that UNMIK no longer shuns status-related questions and since November 2003 even envisages a corresponding political process also reinvigorated political activity in Belgrade and Prishtina. Albanian politicians reiterated their position that Kosovo is independent and only awaits international recognition. They criticized that Steiner's formula did not contain a roadmap and a timetable for independence. In Belgrade the Kosovo issue had been handled by Deputy Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic, who heads the government's Coordination Centre for Kosovo (CCK). In January 2003, it was publicly announced that status negotiations should no longer be postponed, as further delays would only consolidate Kosovo's *de facto* statehood, a trend unacceptable to Serbia. To underline his claim, Djindjic demanded the stationing of Serbian security forces in Kosovo and proposed the ethnic federalisation of Kosovo under Serbian sovereignty (Beta News 27 February 2003).

The ceremonial opening of 'technical' negotiations between Prishtina and Belgrade in Vienna on 14 October 2003 constituted a belated satisfaction for Michael Steiner, who had left Kosovo in the summer of that year. His political mantra of 'standards before status' had brought Kosovars and Serbs to the Austrian capital. At the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki in June 2003 the mutual readiness to open negotiations had been celebrated. Irrespective of the question, whether Kosovo becomes an independent state in the medium terms or not, numerous *practical* questions thus far remained unanswered between the two neighbours, ranging from transport and license plates to energy supplies and telecommunication. In the harsh political realities of today, however, each and every protocolary decision and technical issue appears as the status question in disguise. In the UN mediated negotiations, each party to the conflict watches its opponent with eagle eyes to prevent the other from prejudicing the final status of Kosovo in his favour, while striving to do just that himself. The number of pitfalls awaiting the UN negotiators is plenty.

In the run-up to the negotiations, both parties – as was to be expected – brought out their big guns. In spring, the Kosovar Parliament threatened to declare independence and the Serb communities in northern Kosovo countered with the options of unification with Serbia or the creation of their own 'Republika Srpska' within Kosovo. The Serbian parliament and government in Belgrade declared on 27 August that the only acceptable future status for Kosovo would be that of a province of Serbia, adding the return of Serb refugees and the Serbian army as conditions. In order not to negate the emotional next to the legal dimension, the Orthodox Church in Belgrade simultaneously epithetised Kosovo as 'Serbia's Jerusalem.' The parliament in Prishtina refused to debate the substance of the Vienna negotiations, to give the Rexhepi government a mandate and thereby assume responsibility for the upcoming bilateral talks.

The breakthrough of sorts concerned the readiness of the Kosovar leadership and Belgrade to accept each other as negotiating parties. For Belgrade negotiations with Prishtina undermined the alleged status of Kosovo as merely a province of Serbia, whereas it had symbolic importance for Prishtina whether representatives of Serbia or Serbia and Montenegro were sitting on the opposite side of the table. Thus, on 14

October 2003, the delegations met under the vigilant eye of the revived Contact Group and representatives of NATO, the EU and the OSCE. Zoran Zivkovic, Prime Minister of Serbia, and Nebojsa Covic, his Deputy and President of the Coordination Centre for Kosovo and Metohija, represented Serbia and Montenegro. The last-minute withdrawal of Kosovar Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi was a major setback. Only President Ibrahim Rugova and Nedzad Daci, Chairman of the Assembly, arrived in Vienna. After a short meeting with high media coverage it was formally decided to install four working groups that were to meet alternately in Prishtina and Belgrade, starting in November, to deal with (1) electricity supply for Kosovo; (2) transport and telecommunications; (3) refugee return; and (4) missing persons. Meanwhile, the representatives of the Belgrade and Prishtina working groups have held their first meetings under international chairmanship. The first meeting of experts on 4 March 2004 in Prishtina dealt with the least politicised issue – energy supply and environmental protection. The working groups for missing persons met on 9 March 2004 in Prishtina with the Kosovar delegation including both Milorad Todorovic as the responsible minister and UNMIK staff. The working groups on transport and telecommunications as well as the most controversial issue of the return of displaced persons are yet to hold their first meeting.

After the meeting, Rugova underlined that Kosovo's mind was firmly set on joining the EU and NATO as an independent country. In return, Covic noted that the past meeting had brought together representatives of the Republic of Serbia and the province of Kosovo. The uneasy mediating role of UNMIK is not only due to the single-mindedness with which the rivals had dug their heels in even before the 'negotiations on issues of joint interest' had actually started. Paradoxically, the opening of technical negotiations as such not only constitutes a victory for the 'standards before status' approach, but also its demise: In order to avoid the absurd situation of Kosovars and Serbs fighting at the negotiation table about issues that actually belong to the prerogatives of the third quasi-neutral party of UNMIK, Steiner had to transfer some more competencies to the institutions of provisional self-government. This transfer collided with the 'standards before status' logic, even though the opening of negotiations was one of the eight standards.

In order to further complicate the pre-negotiations for the Vienna meeting, additional 'parties' demanded access. The Serb minority in Kosovo insisted on having its own representative at the table. Following the same ethnic (versus state) logic, the Albanian minority in the Preshevo Valley reciprocally insisted on having its own representative present. In the Kosovo delegation the Serb Milorad Todorovic officially did not represent the ethnic minority, but was invited *ex officio* as minister. With Rexhepi's withdrawal, Harri Holkeri felt compelled to disinvite Todorovic as well (Meurs 2003).

The conclusion from the Vienna meeting is that the political leaders in Belgrade actually had no master plan for a sustainable and domestically acceptable solution for Kosovo. Nor had their interlocutors from Prishtina a concept for the Serb minority in the envisaged independent Kosovo. The fact that the international community seems equally helpless in dealing with the status question, however, is more worrisome. A resounding victory for G17 and other reformers unwilling to let the status question block Serbia's road to Europe in the December 2003 elections might have been helpful to unravel the Gordian knot. The victory of the nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS) has tied the hands of even the most liberal politicians in Belgrade. To top it all, voices linking a possible loss of Kosovo to the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina have already been heard from Banja Luka and Belgrade. Albanians from Preshevo Valley or the Tetovo region might be tempted to use violence to state their claim in the negotiation process or to stop the talks altogether. Recent unrest in Southern Serbia and Macedonia and violent

clashes in Kosovo seem to indicate that the opening of a negotiation process more readily invokes the forces of the past than peaceable visionaries.

As political constraints dictate and as several international simulations have proven, neither Serbs nor Albanians have any motivation to cooperate and initiate compromises. No incentives (economic assistance or even EU integration) and arm-twisting is likely to reach beyond bringing them to the negotiation table. Both sides will drive the internationals up the wall by quarrelling over procedures and modalities and stonewalling any talks on substantive, status-related issues. Even if, in an unthinking moment, the two parties were to agree – their 'solutions' involving partitionings and land-swaps would be blatantly unacceptable for the international community. By all appearances, with acknowledging the loss of Kosovo a political taboo in Belgrade, reformers tend to favour partitioning or federalisation and thus give up all but formal sovereignty over the rest of Kosovo. Conversely, nationalists talk of cantonisation, which implies an ambition to control all of Kosovo in one way or another. Overall, the Belgrade argument seem to have shifted from a historical claim to the protection of the Serb minority, pointing an accusing finger at the track record of the PISG, UNMIK and KFOR in minority protection and insisting on full implementation of Resolution 1244 (The Independent 24 March 2004: 1).

In sum, with 'standards before status' and the opening of a negotiation process the status issue is back on the agenda (assuming it ever was 'off the agenda'—see Table 3) and here to stay. The classic post-conflict approach of holding off on controversial issues while re-establishing normal relations has run its course. If the logic of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was at least partly linked to Kosovo, the end of the moratorium by early 2006 and the likely dissolution of the Union set a firm time limit for the status of Kosovo. In the meantime, the various entries in the regional timetable (e.g., the upcoming elections in Serbia, Kosovo and Serbia and Montenegro) will keep the status issue in the newspapers.

Table 3: The Political Calendar of Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, 1999-2006

June 1999	UNSC Res. 1244		December 2003	Parliamentary elections in Serbia
October 2000	Local elections in Kosovo		April 2003	Presidential elections in Serbia
November 2001	Central elections in Kosovo		October 2004	Parliamentary elections in Kosovo
March 2002	Belgrade Agreement between Serbia and Montenegro		Spring 2005	Elections for the parliament of Serbia and Montenegro
February 2003	Proclamation of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro		Mid-2005	Review of standards for Kosovo, opening of status negotiations
October 2003	Opening of UN-mediated negotiations between Belgrade and Prishtina in Vienna		February 2006	End of the 3-year moratorium on the Montenegro referendum
November 2003	Announcement of mid-2005 as the timetable for status negotiations by the Contact Group		???	UNSC Resolution on the final status of Kosovo

The benchmarks as specified by the current SRSG are a tall order if not a mission impossible for the Kosovar leaders with little more than a year to go. A public commitment and the implementation of corresponding policies for a multiethnic Kosovo by Albanians leaders in Prishtina feature high on the list of tasks. Some of the benchmarks are rather general, e.g., the promotion of civil society, but others are highly demanding, e.g., a legal framework for investment or conditions for safe returns. Predictably, the outcome of the review of mid-2005 will have to be positive despite serious shortcomings on most benchmarks, with the Kosovars pointing to their limited competencies and Serb obstructionism and the Serbs arguing that the UN assessment is biased in favour of Kosovo independence. Political expediency and timetables are strongly against a further postponement of final-status negotiations, even though the non-status dialogue will not have shifted either partisan position on the status issue one

inch. In seems a safe bet that no intense and 'robust mediation', no international package of incentives and pressure will bring the two parties closer to a consensual outcome for final status negotiations. In the end, the parties to the conflict can wait, the international community cannot. Most likely, at the end of the day, the UN and the Contact Group will have to define a final status single-handedly.

Final Status

Finding middle ground between Prishtina and Belgrade positions might involve 'independence without full sovereignty' or 'full sovereignty without independence.' Precedents for such constellations are rare, but some have proven quite stable. *Taiwan* acts as an independent state, but is not a member of the UN and *de jure* remains a province of mainland China. Taiwan largely refrains from pushing the issue of recognised independent statehood, whereas Chinese threats to reassert its sovereignty by force have also subsided. After more than 30 years, *northern Cyprus* continues to exist as a *de facto* state without international recognition. Fruitless negotiations kept the border between the two halves of the island closed for decades, although violence subsided. Only the immediate prospect of EU membership seems to have opened a window of opportunity for a rapprochement and new status talks. The *Ostpolitik* of West Germany vis-à-vis the GDR is another example of accepting overriding international realities and creating possibilities for mutually beneficial cooperation and pragmatic coexistence without prejudicing fundamentally incompatible positions on state sovereignty. The British *Commonwealth* stands for a minimum of symbolic integration without a real transfer of sovereignty. The more or less constructive and at least stabilising outcome in each of these cases depended primarily on the willingness of the protagonists to respect the opposing claim, to accept the impossibility to find a functioning compromise and to work with the ensuing constellation. Typically, in each case the protagonists were state (or state-like entities) without violent 'pressure groups', ethnic minorities or 'age-old' ethnic hatreds.

As the Kosovo status issue definitely does not fulfil any of these preconditions, the international community has to prepare a scenario for the likely case of deadlocked status negotiations on the basis of its own principles – functional, final and fair. Postponing either the deadline for the beginning of status negotiations or the one for their conclusion is not an option with so many actors interested in blocking the negotiation process. As vested interests ranging from nationalist politicians to organised crime thrive on fuzzy arrangements and fuzzy timetables, the new status of Kosovo would have to be clear and enforceable. 'Standards before status' has no incentive for Belgrade and as the issue of state functionality in Kosovo is unlikely ever to have an impact on the status debate in far-away Belgrade (but may one day in Prishtina and Mitrovica). The UN should fix an end date for status negotiations in advance and define an authoritative alternative: 'no' to the Belgrade agenda and 'no' to the Prishtina agenda.

Ideally, the issues of Belgrade's sovereignty over Kosovo and Prishtina's sovereign statehood should be separated. Currently, a triple deadlock exists. The international deadlock concerns the threat of a veto in the UNSC against national determination leading to secession and independence. The bilateral deadlock is Prishtina's and Belgrade's incapability and unwillingness to compromise on the status issue with no perspective whatsoever for the international community to sway leaders on either side. The local deadlock concerns the standoff between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. The Albanians insist on turning 'standards before status' upside down. The Serbs are well aware of the international deadlock, which reduces their already non-existent readiness to negotiate the status issue even further. Local Serbs are equally aware of Belgrade's unwavering support and pertinent position on the status issue, which reinforces their unwillingness to come to terms with Kosovo. As the bilateral deadlock cannot be broken,

the international deadlock is the key. As the case of Cyprus currently demonstrates, a third party may play a constructive role in the deadlocked local conflict if conflict resolution is linked to its own concrete interests (e.g. accession negotiations for Turkey). Conversely, if its position in the conflict is merely a chip in domestic politics without concrete implications or interests involved, the 'interested' third party is likely to support non-conciliate parties and perpetuate the deadlock.

The proposed alternative is the annulment of Res. 1244 and Belgrade's sovereignty to be replaced by a full UN trusteeship rather than conditional independence. The fake option or lever of a restoration of Belgrade's sovereignty over Kosovo should be scrapped. It nurtures political illusionism in Belgrade and provides Kosovar politicians with an excuse to dodge the real issues. The Contact Group ought to prepare the ground for new UN resolution annulling Res. 1244 and thereby ending Belgrade's sovereignty over Kosovo and transferring full sovereignty – not to Prishtina, but to the UN in New York. A UN trusteeship would eliminate the bilateral deadlock in status negotiations and create much better prospects for non-status negotiations. Similarly, once the Kosovo Serbs are in a situation similar to other Serb minorities (without parallel institutions or overriding loyalty to Belgrade), they will have to engage with Prishtina and might negotiate some for of autonomy within Kosovo. The 'reserved powers' of UNMIK and the SRSG would largely remain the same – international representation, minority protection and security. The normal political process and the functioning of the state would be put in the hands of a representative government under the oversight of a High Representative much like in Bosnia.

Such a UN trusteeship in Europe would have the advantage of clarifying (or at least simplifying) the issue of sovereignty and leave the negotiations on 'succession issues' with Belgrade to the UN. In Kosovo the trusteeship would create the basic preconditions for large-scale privatisation and economic development (but without the hollow promises of independence). The UN and its civilian and security institutions in Kosovo would have to provide and implement solid guarantees for the Serb minority and Belgrade would have every right to be particularly vigilant and demanding vis-à-vis the UN and UNMIK/KFOR in this respect. The Serb minority would have to engage with the PISG and abolish all parallel institutions. Belgrade's influence on Kosovo would be channelled via the UN, not back-channelled via Mitrovica. Undoubtedly, the new policy of aloofness on the part of Zagreb and Belgrade has contributed significantly to the improvement of the political relations between the three ethnic communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina in recent years. Back channels can be a constructive instrument in conflict resolution. Third parties rewarding and reinforcing parties to the local conflict for their uncompromising hard-line positions are bound to perpetuate the conflict, as the above cases of Cyprus or Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrate. The Albanian Kosovars would not gain independence, but they would lose the threat of 'Yugoslav' restoration. The trusteeship would be a demanding strategy for the international community and the UN in particular, but it might produce a functioning state; it would be final by not creating a precedent for further state disintegration; and it would allow for fair arrangements with the Serb minority without upturning functionality or finality.

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REVIEW ESSAY

Israel and Palestine: An Unbridgeable Chasm for Conflict Resolution?

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Palestine / Israel: Peace or Apartheid (second edition)
Marwan Bishara
Zed Books, 2002
PBK: ISBN: 1552660974
pp. xiii + 173 (including: index & bibliographical references)

Islam and the Myth of Confrontation
Fred Halliday
I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999 (reprinted 2003)
PBK: ISBN: 1850439591 £13.99
pp. vii + 255 (including: notes & index)

What Went Wrong?
Bernard Lewis
Oxford University Press, 2002
ISBN: 0195144201
pp. vii +180 (including: bibliographical references & notes)

The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror
Bernard Lewis
The Modern Library, 2003
HBK: ISBN: 0679642811 $19.95
pp. 224

Blaming the Victims
Edward W. Said, and Christopher Hitchens, editors
Verso, 2001
ISBN: 1-85984-340-9
pp. v + 296 (including: bibliography, index)

The future belongs to those who believe in the beauty of their dreams.
Eleanor Roosevelt

Past thinking and methods do not prevent world war. Future thinking must...
Albert Einstein

What Can Be Said or Done?

Paraphrasing God's promise to Abraham regarding the size of the intended Israelite population (Genesis 15.5), books on the Middle East, the relationship between the West and Islam, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are 'as numerous as the stars in the sky.' This essay seeks to review a current sampling of the literature on the Palestinian-Israeli relationship. Though prospects for peace between Israelis and Palestinians, and by implication for other aspects of the Middle East conflict as well, appear less than sanguine at this point, there should always remain at least some hope that the combatants will eventually work together, and, with outside assistance, arrive at a just settlement for both peoples. After a hiatus of almost four years there are again some promising signs

for peace including the recent Geneva protocol negotiated by Yossi Beilin, former Minister of Justice under Ehud Barak's Labor Government, and Yasir Abed Rabbo, former Information Minister for the Palestinian Authority. This protocol, similar in intent to the stillborn results of the Taba Conference in January of 2001, offers the potential for renewed beginnings of conflict resolution between Israelis and Palestinians. As with anything else in this troubled conflict, time will tell.

The plain fact is that past attempts at conflict resolution between Palestinians and Israelis have not worked, and it is incumbent upon the practitioner to understand why. Is it due to what some perceive as a brutal Israeli occupation or is it due to Palestinian intransigence when presented with politically realistic proposals from their Israeli interlocutors? Perhaps the truth lies somewhere in between, but the fact is that Palestinians and Israelis have arrived at a dynamic in their conflict resolution negotiations with each other that does not facilitate peace. This essay offers some suggestions based upon the books referenced above, and provides recommendations as to how the obstacles that entangle these two peoples might be made to disappear. The aforementioned books were chosen owing to timeliness and to establish a setting in the literature for this troubled relationship. These works are descriptive of the emotional context that exists between these two peoples, but they are not necessarily descriptive of a strategic approach to conflict resolution between Israelis and Palestinians, especially in light of the cultural and ethnic milieu that divides them.

Is There a Cognitive Disconnect between Israelis and Palestinians?

The disconnect between these two peoples exists because in addition to the obvious religious differences, there is and has been a breakdown in cross-cultural communications. In this instance the cognitive disconnect has both contributed to the conflict and hindered these peoples' ability to achieve peace. The first aspect of cognitive dissonance is reflected in their diverse language structures and communication styles. Using the work of Raymond Cohen as a model (Cohen 1997) the Palestinians can be described as a high-context people and the Israelis as low. According to Cohen, '[a] high context culture communicates allusively rather than directly.' Cohen goes on to note that, '[a]s important as the explicit content of a message are the context in which it occurs, surrounding nonverbal cues, and hinted-at nuances of meaning' (Cohen 1997 : 31). Low-context cultures such as the Israelis, described by Cohen, tend to display a more direct get-to-the-point communications style. The result is two different negotiating communication styles hindered by translations between at least three different languages (Arabic, Hebrew, and English).

The second cognitive disconnect between these two peoples, described in the work of Kirsten Schulze (1999), reflects the perception that their negotiating approaches are primarily maximalist with neither side being willing, except under extreme pressure from outside political actors, such as the United States and the European Union, to step back from the brink of absolute confrontation. She notes, '[t]he pattern that emerges is one of entrenched positions, dubious motives, poor timing, uninspired leadership and psychological obstacles' (Schulze 1999: 96).

Disconnect number three for these two peoples reflects the elite behavioral pattern that in times of crisis, the political control in both societies tends to become concentrated in the hands of the radicals whose primary modus operandi is to cease negotiations and create policies that seek to eradicate their opponents.

The fourth cognitive disconnect is how cultural differences affect the decision making process of these two peoples. Israelis and Palestinians are simply 'wired' differently with respect to their approach to decision making. According to the cultural identifier

methodology of Geert Hofstede, these differences are distinguished by the fact that the Israelis tend to be individualistic and make decisions using a generally flat decision making hierarchy. Conversely, the Palestinians reflect more of a collective society and exhibit a hierarchical decision making style (Hofstede 1997). Sadly, the cultural identifier that both side's share is an enhanced tendency for confrontation and conflict. Unfortunately this tendency has been reflected throughout the Twentieth and early Twenty-First centuries and has most recently been demonstrated in the revenged-based scenario characterized by the behavior of both sides in the Second Intifada, beginning in September of 2000.

The fifth cognitive disconnect is that the leadership of both societies have been poor managers of their individual 'street's' expectations. Whether this reflects an isolation of the elite on both sides or the fact that they are surrounded by numerous factions with powerful and competing interests, the sense is that except for condoning confrontation, no one appears to want to take the type of decision made by Anwar Sadat in making peace with Israel, and lead. This is further compounded by the fact that all the players on both sides know each other quite well and have broken bread with each other in their homes on numerous occasions.

Finally, the last disconnect is that despite strong tendencies towards hospitality in both societies, their nationalist historical narratives and historical justifications for their own existence at the expense of the other paradoxically confines them to the constraints of geography: they are basically two peoples with aspirations for the same land.

What Do the above Books Bring to Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Resolution Efforts?

There are several broad themes for conflict resolution between Israelis and Palestinians in the books reviewed. The first theme is the continuing impact of the concept of 'Orientalism' both on the literature and on attempts at reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis. One of the aspects of Orientalism is Edward Said's use of it to convey a strategy of alleged Western superiority, wherein it is used by scholars of the West to convey popular misrepresentations of the Arab World (Said 1979: 285), to distort cultural relations with the Arab and Muslim World, and the perceived simplicity of Islam with reference to Western religious practices. The sense of this throughout is that Orientals do not measure up to Occidentals. This has obvious overtones for both Palestinians and Israelis and their acceptance by the rest of the world. Bernard Lewis has attempted to address these perceived inequities, but his explanations may not be enough to mollify the disciples of the late Edward Said (Lewis 2002).

Lewis and Said have been waging a battle over Orientalism for over twenty years. Lewis views the struggle in light of the necessity for Westerners and others to seek to understand the Arab and/or Muslim historical setting. Said contends that though it may be appropriate for Westerners to 'understand' the Arabs and Islam, they often miss the point because their conclusions are based upon their own historical biases. Said's work will be discussed more fully in a moment, however, for the practitioner of ethnic conflict resolution, of these two, Lewis' work entitled the *Crisis of Islam* (Lewis 2003) offers compelling insights into both the concept of Islamism, and by implication with reference to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the influence of Hamas on Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution efforts. Since Lewis' conclusion may also be perceived by some as another example of cognitive disconnect between these approaches and therefore is subject to interpretation depending upon which side of the Orientalism issue you embrace. Both sides have merit. How would a conflict resolution facilitator utilize both sides of the Orientalism argument as portrayed by Said and Lewis? For example, the role of a facilitator of conflict resolution is to arrive at a conclusion based upon study and

experience regarding the approaches and goals of the opposing interlocutors to the conflict. In that way this type of individual can arrive at a reasoned judgment as to what it is that both sides want and then design a strategy to increase the chances of a mutually beneficial conclusion. However, based upon Edward Said's approach can this person who is not of the culture ever arrive at an approach that defines the culture?

Lewis cautions that Westerners, and by implication conflict resolution practitioners, must understand the reach of Islam in Muslim societies. This is further confirmed by his retelling of the saga of Sayyid Qutb, founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and a strong influence on Hamas movement in present day Palestine. He observes that, 'Muslims tend to see not a nation subdivided into religious groups but a religion subdivided into nations' (Lewis 2003: xx). This has broad implications for the community of Arab and indeed Muslim support for the Palestinian cause as is evidenced by various calls for *jihad* in its 'martial' interpretation. Lewis notes that jihad can be characterized both defensively as moral striving, and offensively as armed struggle (Lewis 2003: 30). Both interpretations carry relevance for conflict resolution. With respect to the idea of moral striving, jihad can be perceived as a moral striving with respect to the adherence to and use of Islamic religious goals to improve the ethics and morality of one's life. This is not necessarily an impediment to conflict resolution but rather serves as a guide to righteous living. The martial interpretation of jihad can have implications that deter conflict resolution efforts since its tendency is exclusive rather than inclusive, and does not necessarily seek reconciliation as either a tactic or a strategy.

The second broad theme for conflict resolution efforts as discussed in these works manifests itself in obstructionist behavior. Unfortunately, this conflict is typified by obstructionism on both sides. This approach, and its ideology, is represented in this review by the work of Marwan Bishara (2002), and Edward Said and Christopher Hitchens (2001). This is not to say that the writings herein are not heartfelt grievances and are well-meaning and well-intentioned. Neither society has a premium on those types of individuals whose behavior encourages radical polarization for whatever the reason either justified or not. Said (and Hitchens), as noted earlier, have for many years made significant contributions toward nurturing the Palestinian historical narrative. Their literary review encourages a sense of legitimacy in the Palestinian community and their supporters throughout the world. Obviously this is subject to interpretation by the supporters of Israel, and sadly reflects an argument that will never be resolved since both sides are so polarized. The key point here is that Said and Hitchens strongly argue for their point of view in support of Palestine. However, from the point of view of a conflict resolution practitioner their work is self-justifying and does little to help the 'peace constituencies' and innocent individuals in both societies.

Said and Hitchens' work is not only thought provoking but it also encourages new thinking as in Edward Said's compelling 'Canaanite's' response to Michael Walzer's *Exodus and Revolution*. Said contends that Walzer's 'Exodus Politics' sets a precedent for the sins of orientalism. He suggests that Walzer develops Moses as a popular leader on a mission to free his people from bondage and by implication to establish the ethical relationship of man/woman to God. Though he believes that there is merit in Walzer's approach, where he differs with Walzer and Jewish-Christian theology, is in the status of the peoples, primarily Canaanite (read Arab), who in his words were displaced by the Children of Israel performing their mission inspired by God. His interpretation rings poignantly for today's struggles between Israelis and Palestinians, but does not necessarily facilitate conflict resolution. (Said and Hitchens 2001: 161).

Marwan Bishara's work also fits into this category. Bishara has been inextricably linked to Israel, surviving in the nether world as an Israeli-Arab. His views are forged in the

crucible of resistance to what he perceives as Israeli 'apartheid.' He argues that the peace process during the 1990s was a failure since, '[t]he Oslo process must, first and foremost, be understood in its historic and geo-strategic contexts. It resulted only after a series of fruitless Israeli attempts to defuse the Palestinian question without resolving it' (Bishara 2002: 3). What he neglects to mention in this work that the failure had two fathers, both Israeli and Palestinian. This latter concept is ably demonstrated in the work of Charles Enderlin (2003) who, writing from the perspective of diplomatic history, discusses first how close the leaders of both sides are to each other personally, and secondly, that neither, for various political/personal reasons or otherwise, was able to consummate peace either at Camp David II in September of 2000, or at the Taba Conference in January of 2001.

Sadly, though both Said and Bishara are passionate and indeed persuasive from their points of view, neither offers substantively constructive suggestions for bridging the chasm between Israel's security and Palestine's legitimacy needs that Bishara presciently depicts as the gap between Israel's 'culture of impunity' and the suicide bombers (Bishara 2002: xxi).

Fred Halliday's work under review here represents the third broad theme; i.e., the middle path between Orientalism and obstructionism (Halliday 1999). In his work, we begin to see a glimmer of constructive insights for conflict resolution between these two peoples. Halliday uses a comparative approach and argues forcefully against the concept of Middle East particularism. His work serves as the middle ground between Lewis and Said. Though he believes that it is necessary to develop a thorough understanding of the issues that separate the combatants such as Israelis and Palestinians, he also contends that we should develop and implement approaches to conflict resolution that might have had some success in the resolution of ethnic disputes elsewhere. He suggests that the Arab-Israeli conflict is similar to others based upon the need to understand nationalist ideologies, and to perceive how either international issues such as globalism or the power of the Diaspora of both peoples can influence the local origins of a conflict. Issues of diversity, the effect of arbitrary national boundaries resulting from colonialism, and the tendency towards repressive rulers in the Arab world further complicate conflict resolution efforts.

Halliday also discusses what he views as the mythology of confrontation. This mythology has two sides. In the West:

> Myths of racist hatred may begin as lies invented by idle xenophobes, but once conveyed into the political realm and diffused inter-ethnic contexts, they acquire a force and a reality they previously lacked. A similar process is occurring with the 'myth of confrontation' pertaining to Islam; propagated against Muslims, such myths are also taken by Islamists to provide justification for their own causes (Halliday 1999: 7).

This is precisely the problem with the radical elements in both Israel and Palestine, and the situation is further compounded for the Palestinians by the paradox of their rejection and acceptance of the international system as exemplified by the West and by proxy, Israel. The paradox for the Palestinians, according to Halliday, is that, on the one hand, they accept, or at least acknowledge the West's reputed technological advances while they repelled by their perception of the West's moral and ethical values, on the other. The intent, whether stated specifically or not by Halliday, is that comparative analysis of other ethnic conflicts, such as South Africa, Northern Ireland or Sri Lanka can provide insights into some form of mutual accommodation between Israelis and Palestinians.

Suggestions and Conclusions

There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from the review of the works discussed here. The first concerns the crucial importance of nurturing the 'peace constituency' in both societies. Here those of an obstructionist tendency as represented by Said, Bishara, and Israeli groups such as the *Gush Emunim* cannot be permitted to overwhelm and occupy the constructive middle ground in both societies. Rejectionism as an intellectual exercise, though a tension reliever and self-justifier, does not help conflict resolution and adherence to its precepts is indicative of a desire not to find common ground with, but rather to destroy, one's opponent.

Second, efforts must be made, such as in the work of Ted Robert Gurr, to identify the predictors of protest and rebellion in ethnic conflicts at an earlier point in order to forestall conflict (Gurr 2000). Gurr has developed these predictors so that the causes that encourage rebellion and revolution can be hopefully addressed and resolved earlier in order to lessen the effects of conflict. For example, what if the issues that led to the Second Intifada in September of 2000 could have been identified at an earlier time?

Third, culturally appropriate negotiating styles must be crafted to mitigate the maximalist demands, as identified by Kirsten Schulze, and lead to the creation of an atmosphere of peaceful conflict resolution as described by Anthony Baird (1999) who argues that conventional methods of conflict resolution do not work in ethnic conflicts. Therefore, the emphasis must be placed on encouraging both peoples to see, experience and taste the benefits of peace by emphasizing their natural tendencies for hospitality (Baird 1999). This process requires an understanding of culture and history and is used by the conflict resolution facilitator to smooth over cultural negotiating styles so as to promote mutual benefits rather than the present day discords.

Fourth, Roger Fisher, under the auspices of the Harvard Negotiation Project, has developed excellent brainstorming strategies to further mutual understanding (Fisher, Kopelman, and Schneider 1996), and John Paul Lederach (1997) has presented constructive approaches based on creating a sustainable peace process after the conflict has ended. Fisher concentrates on increasing both sides' mutual knowledge of the pressures felt by their interlocutors, whereas Lederach sets up institutional strategies with established time lines to facilitate the implementation of peace.

Fifth, efforts must be made, based upon the suggestions of Raymond Cohen (1997) to decrease the level of dissonance in cross-cultural communications between these two peoples. The meaning and interpretation of communication must be attuned to both cultures and clearly understood by both interlocutors. Careful listening and using established methods of communications agreement to ensure that both sides both understand and respond in a mutually recognized manner to the other's messages could accomplish this.

Sixth, economic incentives for cooperation must be encouraged. There are already a number of people-to-people business initiatives that are in place, and incentives may also be provided by outside actors, such as the European Union or the United States, to encourage peaceful behavior.

Seventh, incitement and stereotyping by both sides must be resisted with all means necessary, especially in the education of children.

The eighth success criterion is that, owing to the so far intractable nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, progress must be facilitated in discrete chunks. This was the

intent of President Bush's 'Roadmap for Peace,' but one wonders whether the appropriate tactics were used to flesh out the overall strategy.

Finally, since both sides prize relationship building, the personal chemistry between individuals at all levels of both societies must be reinvigorated.

The resolution or at least diminution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a difficult goal, but, as Fred Halliday notes, it may not be impossible based upon the precedent set by the resolution of other conflicts of a similar nature.

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REVIEW ESSAY

Images of Yugoslavia: Past and Present

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Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918-1992
Dejan Djokic, ed.
C. Hurst&Co., 2003
Hbk: ISBN – 1-85065-662-2 £45.00
Pbk: ISBN – 1-85065-663-0 £16.95
pp. 356 (incl.: preface, maps, index)

Fools' Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions
Diana Johnstone
Pluto Press, 2002
Hbk: ISBN – 0-7453-1951-3 £45.00
Pbk: ISBN – 0-7453-1950-5 £16.99
pp. 317 (incl.: notes, index)

Ideology, Legitimacy and the New State: Yugoslavia, Serbia and Croatia
Siniša Maleševic
Frank Cass, 2002
Hbk: ISBN – 0-7146-5215-6 £42.50
pp. 338 (incl.: preface, notes, bibliography, index)

Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States
Vjekoslav Perica
Oxford University Press, 2002
Hbk: ISBN – 0-19-514856-8 £24.99
Pbk: ISBN – 0-19-517429-1
pp. 363 (incl.: preface, chronology, maps, notes, selected bibliography, index)

Intrastate ethnic warfare, the scourge of the post-Cold War decade, has been pushed to the background of world attention. As the threats posed by international terrorism and rogue states have captured public imagination, the horrors of ethnic conflict in places like the former Yugoslavia seem to be of a different era. But although the main characters in those dramas have passed from the scene and democratization has become a ubiquitous process in the region, the publication of works about that area has continued unabated. Former Yugoslavia remains on the academic map. Still, the almost frantic search for explanations has shifted toward more sober analyzing that tends to supplement, rather than explain, the existing literature.

At first sight, Siniša Maleševic's analysis of ideological legitimization of the second Yugoslavia and independent Serbia and Croatia falls outside this pattern. The three cases highlight a post-revolutionary situation, in which a new governing elite faces the need to legitimize its rule in the new state and replace the ideology of the ancien régime with its own. At the center of this 'ideology transition' (p. 316) is the charismatic revolutionary authority personified in the figure of a Great Leader. In order to sustain their rule, the new leader and his party combine the power of his charisma with traditional values, symbols and myths to introduce the new ideas of their ideology, while disguising their rule in the mantle of legal-rational authority. As the memory of the revolution subsides among the populace and the charisma wears out as the principal source of legitimacy, in

order to entrench its rule the new power elite promotes its ideology to dominance by emphasizing the aspects of that ideology that are most appealing to the masses. The shift from charismatic to value-rational authority, whereby the elite's values expressed in the new dominant ideology are perceived by the masses as congruent, if not identical, with their own, is termed here as the ideologization of charisma.

Maleševic assumes the universality of ideology; ideology as 'any politically motivated or action-oriented set of ideas and practices related to the conceptual organization of society' (p. 48) is present in every state as an essential discursive reality that provides the power elite with a fundamental source of legitimacy. Maleševic distinguishes between two levels of ideology. Normative or official ideology, the content of which he analyzes from the ruling party manifestos, defines the fundamental principles that determine the society's final developmental goals. It operates with a universalist, abstract language of reason and its content circulates mainly within the elite as a self-affirmation of its legitimacy. By contrast, as an 'institutionalized mechanism of "narrative control"' (p. 75), operative ideology's simpler, more particularistic terms are more familiar to the masses and appeal to their collective sentiments, emotions and interests. Disseminated through the mass media and education system, operative ideology uses traditional terminology and symbolism to deliver the message of the normative ideology. When Maleševic finds that normative ideology is, on the normative level, ultimately translated into a form of nationalism, he affirms the universality of nationalism as the principal legitimizing ideology of modern states.

In investigating the ideologization of charisma, Maleševic focuses on the form and content of ideology. He persuasively shows the nature of its two levels and the relationship between their contents. However, with the next step, the functioning of ideology as a source of elite legitimacy, his analysis flounders. The concept of legitimacy links elite rule to the popular recognition of that rule as legitimate. Yet there is little evidence in the text for the popular acceptance of the dominant ideology as an underpinning of elite rule. Instead, after Maleševic admits the methodological difficulty of verifying this acceptance and consequently disclaims to analyze ideology's legitimizing function, he takes that acceptance for granted. The ideological brainwashing, electoral manipulation and the policies of repression and intimidation, often used in the name of the state's survival against external threats, are on the whole overlooked. At the same time, he presupposes a certain irrational predisposition of the nations in question, based on their traditional social hierarchies, to accepting strong leaders at their helm. Overall, the assumption seems to be simply that since an ideology became dominant, it was also accepted. Although Maleševic's unwillingness to establish the acceptance of elite ideology among the masses takes him only halfway toward explaining ideological legitimization of new states, his excellent content-based analysis of the multiple layers of dominant ideologies is a theory-oriented step in the right direction.

In Maleševic's framework, the Yugoslavism of the second Yugoslavia is an example of operative ideology. While he analyzes its content in the initial stage of the second Yugoslavia's existence, Dejan Djokic's edited volume traces the evolution of the concept throughout its entire history. Therefore, rather than being an ideology legitimizing a ruling elite's ascent to power at any point in time, the meaning of the term is diluted into a 'fluid concept, understood differently at different times by different Yugoslav nations, leaders and social groups.' (p. 4) This seems to be a natural conclusion for a historiographic work such as this one. Yet to trace the fate of Yugoslavism, both an integrationist ideology meant to override exclusive nationalisms and an overarching ethnic identity meant to efface the existing ethnic ones, as it became co-opted and assimilated by them only to be finally scraped as a viable model for national coexistence, is to parallel the development of the state it engendered.

The book's twenty-one chapters are grouped into five parts. The first part on context deals with the Yugoslav idea from its birth among Croatian intellectuals in 1830s to the end of the First World War. Rusinow's is the only chapter dealing with Yugoslavism before Yugoslavia came into existence. The detailed discussion of how Yugoslavism became interwoven with the main national ideologies to give birth to their common state provides a background to the subsequent chapters. The preoccupation of the other two chapters with the First World War provides for overlap in their content. Part Two tackles the ethnic nationalisms present in the former Yugoslav territory, illuminating the relationship of the national ideologies to the common state. While providing useful summaries of the constituent nations' shifting attachments to the common state, the texts in this part miss the opportunity, outlined in the opening chapter, to contrast Yugoslavism with particularistic ethnic nationalisms. Yugoslavism as a counterpart of particularistic nationalisms is dealt with only marginally. In the next part, on leaders and institutions, Dejan Djokic ties into the first part by discussing Yugoslavism among South Slav elites in the interwar period. Dejan Jovic's lucid account of the struggle between Tito's and Kardelj's concepts of Yugoslavism shows how the anti-statism of the latter contributed to undermining of the Yugoslav idea and the rise of ethnic nationalism in the country's republics. The chapter succeeds mainly in connecting the history of Yugoslavism to that of Yugoslavia, as it comes closest to offering an explanation of Yugoslavia's failure on the basis of its ideological foundation. Mile Bjelajac's chapter on the role of Yugoslavism in the military then comes as a useful, if not too brief, overview, while the remaining chapters on economy and religion touch upon the book's central concept only tangentially.

Part Four reflects the emergence of Yugoslavism from the intellectual sphere by discussing its fate among the intellectuals. The focus on the first and last periods of Yugoslavia's existence, present throughout the book, stands out here as well. In her investigation of the relationship of South Slav intellectuals to Yugoslavism as the idea behind the creation of Yugoslavia, Ljubinka Trgovcevic highlights the Christian element inherent in the ideology; Andrew Wachtel parallels the fate of synthetic Yugoslavism with the careers of Ivan Meštrovic and Ivo Andric; and Aleksandar Pavkovic discusses three versions of Yugoslavism that circulated among Serbian intellectuals after Tito's death. The final part purports to present the alternatives to Yugoslavism. Desimir Tošic's and Branko Horvat's chapter consist largely of translated manifestos, respectively, of the Democratic Alternative and the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative. Similarly, Ramadan Marmullaku's personal essay on the Kosovo question and Aleksa Djilas's Yugonostalgic afterword provide for an interesting read but contribute little to the objective of the final part. The reader is thus left wondering whether there existed any alternatives to Yugoslavism apart from the ethnic nationalisms that defeated it.

The academic treatment of Yugoslavism has been, considering its centrality to the state legitimacy, surprisingly unsystematic and scattered. The book brings the loose ends together in a welcome synthesis, recording the historical transformation of Yugoslavism from a primarily ethnic concept to an ideological one, the shifts in its dominant interpretation as well as its competition with the national projects. These continual pressures facilitated Yugoslavism's failure to establish itself as an inclusive, civic ideology capable of defeating the exclusive ethnic nationalisms. The concept's structural flaws, its utilitarian artificiality, vagueness and ever-shifting meaning may therefore be in part responsible for the volume's lack of focus on Yugoslavism as a distinct analytical category. The chapters summarizing various aspects of Yugoslavia's history treat Yugoslavism only as an afterthought. Finally, reminiscent of Maleševic's analysis, Yugoslavism is presented as an elite matter. References to popular identification with Yugoslavism, or lack thereof, appear solely in a few footnotes as select census data. While the creation and modification of ideology is always an elite domain, the omission of

the mass element from the discussion of Yugoslavism suggests the principal reason for that ideology's ultimate downfall.

By contrast, in Vjekoslav Perica's *Balkan Ghosts*, Yugoslavism is revealed as the 'Yugoslav civil religion of brotherhood and unity' (p. 89). In a single chapter devoted to this issue, Perica demonstrates the manifestations of the Yugoslav regime's legitimacy more plausibly than Maleševic's and Djokic's volumes combined. Similar to Maleševic's analysis of operative ideologies, Perica puts an emphasis on the affective element of nationalism. However, in this 'first political history of religion' in Yugoslavia (p. ix), nationalism and religion appear as two sides of the same coin. Such a 'civil religion' reflects the similarity between and fusion of religious and secular national symbols, rituals and myths in a 'public patriotic worship' (p. 5) of the nation. This merging of national and religious identity defines the objective of Perica's monograph: rather than attempting to explain the dissolution of Yugoslavia by factors related to religion, the aim is to trace the influence of religious institutions on nation-formation and political legitimacy in Yugoslavia.

In a chronological account of the principal developments in Yugoslavia's churches, Perica documents their contribution to the construction of their respective ethnic nations and, consequently, to the destruction of interethnic harmony. In Perica's perspective, the congruence of ethnic, national and religious affiliations among Yugoslavia's constituent nations was the main factor of the country's instability. While this is not to suggest the existence of civilizational fault lines running across former Yugoslavia, religion is a crucial obstacle to successful state-building in multiethnic and multiconfessional states. More than instruments of political propaganda, the individual churches emerge as interest groups with their own agendas and objectives. Their aim is to attain state-wide 'religious monopoly' (p. 213), that is to become established as national churches in ethnically based national states. The religious hierarchy and the secular government legitimize each other, and their joint rule is claimed to ensure the survival of the ethnic nation. Reflecting the initial premise of his work, Perica's term for this phenomenon, ethnoclericalism, thus becomes an ideology that integrates both secular political and ecclesiastical elements. And while ethnoclericalism was strongest in the autocephalous Serbian Orthodox Church, it became a central, reactive feature of Croatian Catholicism and Bosnian Islam as well.

Through continual reinterpretation of history, the representatives of the church hierarchies ethnicized the religious and public discourse. Perica uses extensive evidence to trace the instruments of ecclesiastical mythmaking. Sermons, speeches, publications as well as the symbolism of shrines, saints, celebrations and rituals aimed to mold national identities by replacing history with mythical narratives. Perica convincingly details how the churches' manipulation of popular and official discourse in the exclusive ethnic direction took place throughout the entire history of Yugoslavia, and how, following their power objectives, the representatives of Yugoslavia's ethnic churches worked to undermine the legitimacy of the common state.

Subsequently, it was only when Yugoslavia ceased to exist that the churches emerged as the central elements of state legitimacy. In this respect, Perica's monograph serves as a complement to Maleševic's analysis. The operative ideology in Maleševic's Serbia and Croatia contained the affective elements adopted from the popular culture in order to attain the elite's legitimacy. Hence, the political establishment borrowed the traditional religious themes, and the religious institutions were only one of the instruments of disseminating the dominant ideology. By contrast, Perica suggests a much stronger influence of the churches on the new regimes. Church and state are intertwined to such a degree that they are almost indistinguishable: the state, the church and the nation cannot exist as separate entities. However, while the congruence of ethnic, national and

religious identity is a crucial element of post-Yugoslav nationalisms, ethnoclericalism sprang from the ethnic religious institutions pursuing their vested interests and did not become the dominant ideology. Governing political elites everywhere are always on guard against other actors impinging on their territory. Even if religion plays a major role in many types of contemporary nationalism, the establishment of legitimacy of modern states remains the domain of their governments.

Perica intermittently touches upon the role of external actors in the developments he follows. But while religious peacemaking contributed little to the international efforts to mitigate the Yugoslav conflicts of the 1990s, Diana Johnstone asserts that the international community's intervention was not only toothless in alleviating them but that it was their principal cause. International intervention in Yugoslavia was used by the United States in its pursuit of globalization as 'world economic domination by military means' (p. 268). Each chapter covers a broad issue, the discussion of which aims to support the main claims: responsibility for the Yugoslav wars, criminal justice, forms of nationalism in Yugoslavia, the role of Germany, the Kosovo case, and finally a chapter on the position of Yugoslav events in the global context. This technique makes Johnstone's a more dynamic and focused analysis than many chronological accounts. In each chapter, event by event, case by case, Johnstone sets out to debunk the collective fiction about the wars that was reinforced by the media and politicians to justify and promote the American hegemonic actions. Since her objective is to put the story in perspective by countering and remedying Western propaganda through an unorthodox interpretation of the events, her argumentation allows her to deconstruct each and every episode with supple background information.

Not surprisingly, however, it is Johnstone's method of selecting evidence that discredits her efforts to reveal the truth. Despite the undisputed merits of challenging the dominant discourse, Johnstone only uses sources, including Western ones, that fit her argument, presenting them as reality, while everything else is propaganda. And although Johnstone admits to the selectivity, reasoning that it is needed to balance the prevalent anti-Serb bias of Western media reports, she squanders the chance for presenting provocative and stimulating arguments with the resultant anti-Western and pro-Serb bias. The *j'accuse* tone Johnstone uses to reinterpret the previous decade in the former Yugoslavia results in the book reading like a well-researched ramble. Johnstone's fight against the twisting of reality by the Western media becomes the same twisting, only in the opposite direction. Thus, her criticism of the 'limitless demonization of Miloševic' (p. 42) turns into demonization of the West to the same degree.

With a paranoid, conspiratorial outlook presented in a pervasively conflictual tone, Johnstone easily identifies the culprits for all the evils that befell former Yugoslavia: the international community; the EU (and Germany in particular since its policies in the 1990s, it is alleged, were a continuation of imperial and Nazi Germany's); the media; politicians and their powerful aides; international and nongovernmental organizations (particularly those sponsored by Germany); diaspora lobbies and émigré circles (Israeli, Albanian, Croatian, Herzegovinan, Bosnian Muslim); public relations companies; ICTY; the Vatican; and even the Habsburgs (the probable future rulers of Croatia). They jointly comprise the 'Western imperial condominium' (p. 122) that served the global hegemonic interests of the United States. In the world, where battle lines are clearly drawn between the domineering West with its Yugoslav proteges, Croatians (Tudjman) and Bosnian Muslims (Izetbegovic), and the victimized Serbs, there is no need to provide convincing arguments.

The issue of international intervention remains a highly controversial one. Johnstone's book could have contributed a constructive voice from one of its opponents were its focus

not lost in the mire of biased accusations and reinterpretations. It is, indeed, difficult to present a cohesive argument, not to mention to demonstrate the existence of a vast hegemonic conspiracy, in the form of a rant. Johnstone's professed balancing act became a retaliatory barrage from the other side of the perceived barricade. There is every reason to be frustrated about the international community's (in)actions in the former Yugoslavia and the related media reporting. There is also ample, and seemingly increasing, evidence available for those who allege the U.S. hegemony. But Johnstone offers the same kind of rhetoric that fanned the flames of Yugoslav wars and that provided support to Miloševic's propaganda machine. The main benefit of her work thus remains its numerous, if only journalistic, snippets of alternative information that does not often find its way into literature.

Even with Johnstone's fiery contribution to the discourse on Southeastern Europe, the passions of the previous decade seem to have receded. As the former trouble spots of the Yugoslav space gradually converge to the Western democratic standards, and as the waves of democratization supposedly move further east, new issues arise on the academic agenda, and the need to explain former Yugoslavia subsides. But while the inevitable historicization of academic debate seems to be leaving scholars with plenty left to say and little to explain, the nostalgia that becomes stronger with the passage of time will, hopefully, not prevent the debate from fading.

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REVIEWS

Global Lies? Propaganda, the UN and World Order

Mark D. Alleyne
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003
Hbk: ISBN: 033392004X £50.00
Pbk: ISBN: 1403921008 £15.99
pp. 262 (including: appendices, footnotes, bibliography and index)

The photograph on the front cover of this book shows former UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim surrounded by a group of children from the United Nations International School. That an organisation ostensibly devoted to international peace and cooperation was led for a decade by a Nazi war criminal nicely illustrates the problems and contradictions which Mark D. Alleyne explores in his fascinating and informative study of the UN's Department of Public Information (DPI). Established in 1946 to publicise the aims and activities of the UN, the DPI itself is founded on a contradiction: it is the means by which the UN, while outlawing propaganda, engages in its own propaganda activity. The DPI has always argued that its work is not propagandistic, on the grounds either that it merely provides objective, value-neutral information, or that it only promotes 'universally approved causes and movements' such as human rights or environmentalism. Alleyne argues convincingly that such claims cannot be taken at face value. The UN's human rights campaigning, for example, 'originated in the power politics that founded the UN and is still a reflection of that power dynamic' (p. 110).

Yet, as the question mark in the title indicates, Alleyne is not against the idea that the UN should seek to ban 'bad propaganda' and promote 'good propaganda'. He just wishes it would be less mealy-mouthed about doing so. This defensiveness, he argues, has hampered efforts to improve the UN's image and has made some initiatives – such as funding special newspaper supplements, not always labelled as paid advertising – seem dishonest. However, since the appointment of Kofi Annan as Secretary General in 1997 the DPI has increased in importance, with greater attention than ever being paid to public relations. Alleyne suggests this is a response to the nature of the age, which he characterises in terms of 'the preponderance of international mass media, the phenomena of international spectacles, the Internet and the rise of public diplomacy' (p. 172—173). This dovetails with the meta-argument which Alleyne makes about the discipline of International Relations: that the field should take account of cultural matters (such as how the public image of the UN is constructed in media reports and film narratives) and embrace postmodernist and constructivist approaches. In the information age, he suggests, the UN is bound to put more emphasis on image and spectacle, and scholars have to examine such efforts. The proposition is not as radical a departure as Alleyne seems to think, and it makes a rather weak conclusion to the book.

Strikingly, Connor Cruise O'Brien argued as long ago as 1968 that the UN was all about drama and symbolism rather than substance and policy. This perspective, Alleyne suggests, was rediscovered 30 years later by writers such as Francois Debrix, analysing the organisation in terms of its 'signifying mission' (p. 26). Yet while O'Brien's view reflected the UN's relatively marginal position during the Cold War, the postmodernist position expresses the scepticism toward grand narratives typical of the post-Cold War era. A particular target of scepticism is any narrative which promises an alternative to Western hegemony. It is the shift to a unipolar world after 1989, in which yesterday's non-aligned states and nationalist movements have become potential targets of international intervention as today's rogue states and ethnic cleansers, that explains the

current state of UN propaganda, rather than notions of the post-modern condition or the information age.

One of Annan's first actions on assuming office was to overhaul the DPI. His Task Force on the Reorientation of United Nations Public Information Activities recommended in 1997 that public information should be at 'the heart of the strategic management' of the UN. Arguing that the DPI should 'become a real player in changing the character of international relations', using 'strategic communication' and 'public diplomacy', effectively meant urging the UN to act more like a state (p. 54—55). This has been possible only to the extent that the sovereignty of some actual states has been weakened. In the 1950s, the DPI's adoption of the then fashionable 'two-step flow' model of communication may, as Alleyne argues, have indicated a fuzzy understanding of who constituted its target audience, but it perhaps also reflected the UN's caution about addressing populations over the heads of their governments and national institutions. In contrast, some of the Department's more recent activities, such as its use of the Internet, are 'circumventing the authority of governments' (p. 133).

In the early 1990s, launching more peacekeeping missions than ever before, the UN enjoyed renewed international prestige as the focus of hopes for a new, morally principled international dispensation. Yet while ethical interventionism has prospered, the UN itself has been seen to fail, criticised by many for its adherence to an old-fashioned, state-centric model of world order. The more the UN has sought to accommodate the new realities of power, the more it has abrogated its own principles of non-intervention and sovereign equality. Apologising for the UN's failures in the 1990s, Annan has presided over a decisive shift in favour of the idea that human rights trump sovereignty. Awarding him the Peace Prize in 2001, the Nobel committee inadvertently praised the Secretary General for having undermined the principles on which his organisation rested. Annan, they said, had won the prize for making it clear 'that sovereignty cannot be a shield behind which member states conceal their violations' (p. 74). It is by the same logic that interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have either ignored the UN or proceeded regardless of its disapproval. As coalitions of the willing are able to bomb, invade and occupy 'failing' or 'rogue' states without the sanction of the UN, the organisation remains 'relevant' only insofar as it provides a cover for Anglo-American intervention. In such circumstances the UN does indeed lack substance, and, as Alleyne shows, it has never been particularly stylish.

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Differing Diversities: Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity
Tony Bennett (ed)
Council of Europe, 2000
PBK: ISBN: 9287146497 $29.00 €19.00
pp. 202 (including: chapter references & appendix)

The first section of this volume is a traversal study on the theme of cultural policy and cultural diversity by Tony Bennett and the work forms part of a programme developed by the Cultural Policy and Action Development of the Council of Europe's Directorate of Culture and Cultural and Natural Heritage. The methodology for the programme had two distinct phases. A series of descriptive national reports was drawn up initially by a number of national co-ordinators for each of the participating European states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Representatives from Canada also participated in the project. In phase two, members of the project team visited each of these states and a series of research papers on selected transversal topics

was commissioned, before the final report was compiled. The research position papers are published in part two of this book.
One of the key points of the introductory report is the irreducible specificity of the terms in which issues of cultural diversity arise in different contexts. As no two situations are entirely alike, one should be wary of generalising all forms of cultural differences. Bennett's report points to the inadequacy of the universal concept of 'cultural diversity' as a solution to particular situations of post-war migration or forms of cultural identity that have stubbornly resisted the process of assimilation in specific places.

Although we live in an increasingly de-territorialized and globalized world, there is still the tendency to essentialise culture and locate it in a specific time-space context. The construction of the nation-states has involved mapping specific peoples with particular narratives of identity within precise geographical boundaries, and nation-states have commonly endeavoured to homogenise, assimilate or suppress other cultures, which did not conform to the national norm. Bennett's paper reviews the national reports of the participating countries and offers a useful overview of the different approaches to diversity within the boundaries of the relevant member states.

This association of culture with territory is also reflected in some key international documents on cultural issues. For example, the languages of migrants do not come under the remit of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; the Charter only applies to speakers of languages which have traditionally been used in a particular location. In a useful discussion of terms such as 'autochthonous' and 'indigenous', Bennett draws the reader's attention to the association of the geographical concept of Europe and European cultural policy with the emergence of Christian and classical traditions in European regions. In consequence, much of the impetus towards the development of European cultural policy excludes those who are assumed to be non-European.

Several interesting position papers reinforce this point. In a contribution on the consequences of European media policies and organisational structures for cultural diversity, Denis McQuail calls for a detailed enquiry into the complexities of many issues that have been widely identified under the heading of cultural diversity. The internal cultural diversity of Europe is in a rapid state of flux and many countries have new as well as older identifications including categories of refugees, ex-colonial citizens, migrant workers etc. which are hardly included in many cultural policies.

Cris Shore reinforces this position in a wide-ranging essay examining cultural policies of the European Union. His argument is that European Union cultural policy is motivated by the assumption that culture is necessarily an integrative mechanism, which engenders social cohesion among the citizens of Europe. Yet the Eurocentrism inherent in its conception of culture of necessity excludes categories of 'non-European' culture, including Africans, Asians and the so-called 'cultures of hybridity' such as Turkish-Germans, Afro-Caribbean-Britons, and Italian-Mollucans.

The concept of recognition also features in Lia Ghilardi's highly interesting contribution on cultural planning and cultural diversity. She stresses the significance of an anthropological approach to culture; defining it as a way of life. While cultural policies tend to have a sectoral focus, cultural planning is directed towards the territorial unit. Consequently it is important to note that cultural planning does not involve the planning of some ephemeral notion of culture. Instead it necessitates a cultural (anthropological) approach to urban planning and policy. In a thesis compatible with the Gaia theory, Ghilardi proposes the notion of territory as a 'living ecosystem' which needs to the explored fully and acknowledged before policy can intervene.

Any review of cultural and media policy should be directed towards the wide variety of cultures and ethnicities in a particular location. Annabelle Sreberny focuses particularly on the notion of 'diasporic communities'; a term increasingly preferred to describe 'ethnic minorities' or 'immigrants'. New media have ensured that such communities can circumvent traditional territorial restrictions. Appadurai has used the term 'ethnoscape' to acknowledge the sense of diaspora that may be spread across several nations or continents but is connected together through sophisticated media.

Although it is commonly assumed that the globalization of culture in the new media will ultimately homogenise or even 'Americanise' minority and national cultures, Rosemary Coombe draws attention to the re-affirmation of cultural traditions in Canada's Northwest Territories though the use of the Internet. As the Internet offers the opportunity for communication in space rather than in place, it may ultimately prevent the further erosion of traditional languages and lesson the isolation of many indigenous communities.

Themes of culture, diaspora and place feature strongly in many of the research position papers. Other interesting contributions include a focus on the implications of international copyright law by Mira Sundara Rajan and the implementation of cultural diversity policies by Arnold Love. Ideally, this book would have had a brief concluding review by the editor drawing together the themes interweaving the different conclusions. This, however, is a minor point and the book is recommended to policy makers and academics alike.

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Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs
Henry F. Carey and Oliver P. Richmond (eds)
Frank Cass, 2003
HBK: ISBN: 0714654302 £42.50 $79.95
PBK: ISBN: 0714684066 £17.50 $26.95
pp. 191 (including: Acronyms and Abbreviations, Abstracts, Notes on Contributors and Index)

This book can be read on two levels. On one level it is a broad-ranging analysis of the problems and issues raised by NGO engagement in conflict prevention and peace-building. Divided into sections on thematic issues (six chapters) and case studies (four chapters) the key questions of NGO independence from donors and governments, problems of the manipulation of aid and capacity for long-term planning, and problems of politicisation under the human rights agenda are raised and addressed with a variety of different nuances.

Many chapters stand out as being of particular interest. For example, Michael Schloms' chapter on the contradictions and problems of NGOs pursuing a humanitarian or a human rights agenda handles the debate with care and balance, highlighting the limited role humanitarian aid can play in peacebuilding. Charlotte Ku and Joaquín Cáceres Brun highlight the reasons for the International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC) stance on neutrality in the face of pressure to go down a more partisan and politicised path. Frances T. Pilch contributes a fascinating chapter on the struggle of Western legal NGOs, through elite advocacy and the provision of *amicus curiae* briefs, to 'engender' war crimes prosecutions and extend international law in relation to sexual violence. This book would therefore makes a good introduction to the questions of NGO engagement in peace

processes and one that I would recommend for undergraduate and MA teaching purposes.

On another level, the chapters and the introduction and conclusion offer very little that would be new or of interest to readers more familiar with the debates. In fact, the underlying impression is one of setting up a straw man which is then only criticised in a fairly circumstantial way. The problem is that the starting assumption for the editors and contributors is that NGOs have a vital role to play in peace processes. As Oliver Richmond states in his Introduction: 'NGOs are relatively unencumbered by sovereign concerns and are themselves relatively free from claims to sovereignty, which enables them to work in normative frameworks untainted by official, state and systemic interests.' (p. 5) From this rather naïve and idealistic perspective, problems, issues and contradictions raised by the contributors are then of interest only in so far as they raise the need for 'further investigation in order to develop more effective and multidimensional responses to conflict in the field on the part of NGOs and the many actors they are associated with' (p. 10). The bland assumptions and anodyne conclusions, set up a highly restrictive research framework. This restrictive approach taints every contribution to the collection and establishes a framework for the book which tends to weaken and truncate the very useful points raised.

Some of the weaker chapters focus on prescriptive rather than analytical concerns, for example, Francis Kofi Abiew writes that NGO-Military relations need better understanding and coordination, Felice D. Gaer uncritically charts the mainstreaming of human rights concerns in UN bodies and urges further progress on this. The uncritical and narrow starting assumptions hugely exaggerate the role that NGOs can play. Wafula Okumu, in his chapter on humanitarian NGOs in Africa, for example, argues that NGOs are 'mitigating the social and economic consequences of collapsing states…implementing peace accords, promoting democratic and economic reforms, protecting human rights, and encouraging the settlement of conflicts' (p. 120) before laying out his own prescriptive solutions. It is as if states and governments, markets and major powers do not really play a significant role in the outcome of peace processes and that NGOs operate in some parallel universe where normative values are enough to turn wishes into reality.

The lack of any broader consideration of how NGOs, new security approaches and new normative frameworks fit into the increasingly unregulated, and increasingly hierarchical, framework of international relations is a frustrating lacunae. The questions raised about third party interference, ethics, coordination and long-term processes of external regulation are broader ones, concerning Western policy making and the breakdown of the Cold War framework of international regulation. Looking at these questions in technical terms of NGO practice and experience makes them less open to investigation or clarification.

In fact, the real question is why there is such a focus on NGOs when conflict resolution and peace-building processes are, if anything, affairs of states. Establishing the importance of NGOs for policy-making is one thing, especially when it comes to the influence of Western elite advocates, such as high profile individuals or lawyers' groups; however, establishing the importance of NGOs for conflict resolution and peacebuilding in non-Western states is another. James Larry Taulbee and Marion V. Creekmore, Jr's chapter on the role of the Carter Centre highlights the dependency of Carter's 'Track 1½' diplomacy on US government advice and permission. Bronwyn Evans-Kent and Roland Bleiker in their chapter on NGOs in Bosnia highlight the token contribution of domestic NGOs, limited to multi-cultural drama groups and lecturing demobilised soldiers on the dangers of alcoholism. Mahmood Monshipouri's chapter on NGOs and peacebuilding in

Afghanistan makes clear that, when the government's writ does not run outside the capital Kabul, the potential for NGOs to promote gender equality, long-term development, community participation or refugee return is somewhat limited. Not only is peace-building dependent on states and governing structures in the region, the success of conflict resolution is often dependent on states outside the region as well.

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Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security

Mark Duffield
Zed Books, 2001
HBK: ISBN: 1856497488 £49.95 $75.00
PBK: ISBN: 1856497496 £16.95 $29.95
pp. 304 (including: bibliography & index)

Global Governance and the New Wars presents an innovative and provocative approach to regional security complexes and socio-economic development. The book is very rich in information and ideas, and it is of direct interest to both students of world politics and practitioners in the field of conflict resolution. The book suggests many new research questions; of particular interest is how the study of the 'shadow economies' may point out some of the insufficiencies and misunderstandings of the current notions of global governance. This book seeks to explain why the early hopes that the end of the Cold War would bring about an era of peace and stability were not borne out.

The subtitle (the merging of development and security) provides some clues to Duffield's argument. He points out that during the Cold War international security hinged on maintaining a balance of power between sovereign states. The superpowers sought alliances with the nation-states of the 'Third World'. The end of the Cold War has changed all of this. These alliances have lost their political significance and consequently the sovereignty of nation-states of what was formerly the Third World (now renamed the 'South') is no longer of strategic importance. The 'new wars' of the post-Cold War world are primarily internal to the nation-states of the South and the former Soviet bloc. The threat of instability in the world system has shifted from one *between* the superpowers to one *within* the South and the former Soviet bloc. Underdevelopment is understood to be the source of this instability and the cure is the development and reorganization of the countries of the South. Aid, humanitarian assistance and social reconstruction (the core of traditional development activity) have thus become reconceptualised as tools for creating security and preventing future conflict.

The end of the Cold War marks a watershed in international affairs. Duffield points out, however, that the dramatic political changes it has wrought obscure a longer-term fundamental shift from a capitalist system that was expansive and inclusive to what he calls a 'liberal' world system. 'Since the 1970s, formal trade, productive, financial and technological networks have been concentrating within and between the North American, Western European and East Asian regional systems at the expense of outlying areas' (p. 2). Economically the South has become decoupled from the North. Politically the South is now the object of selective interventions 'preferably through cooperative partnership arrangements, to change whole societies and the behaviour and attitudes of the people within them' (p. 42). Unlike the colonial relationship which characterized North-South relations in the past, these interventions are not carried out by individual governments but by multi-level and increasingly non-territorial decision making networks that bring

'together governments, NGOs, military establishments and private companies in new ways' (p. 2). These decision-making networks are the actors and institutions of global governance.

According to Duffield, the key problem with the liberal 'new wars' perspective is that it conceptualizes creative indigenous responses to the decoupling of the South from the formal world economy as a problem. The expansion of non-formal 'shadow' economies, especially in war torn areas, such as in Africa, 'has come about not because of structural adjustment, market liberalization and the activities of aid agencies, but as an indirect, subversive and antagonistic response to these developments' (p. 159). He uses the example of the UNITA rebel movement in Angola, which spans the Cold War and post-Cold War, to illustrate the indigenous response to a changing economic and strategic context. In the process of shifting from reliance on superpower support UNITA has undertaken wide-ranging changes in its 'control of resources and populations, its mode of legitimation and organisation, and its relations with outside actors, international agencies and global networks' (p. 138). Development discourse, he says, ignores the complex process of social transformation and adaptation involved in such a shift and instead focuses on the often brutal and coercive methods through which it has been achieved.

Although Duffield should be commended for his innovative approach, his new theoretical perspective is not always entirely clear. For example, the author often appears to endorse arguments from the liberal perspective, while at other instances he gravitates toward concepts from dependency theory. Different theories have different implications, but the author never explicitly discusses the criterion for evaluating theories and their propositions. This problem becomes even clearer at the concluding chapter where the author states that the liberal peace argument suffers from severe limitations, yet the discussion does not clarify how future research may proceed to address these limitations. The link between theoretical propositions and policy implications is moreover not always clearly defined. For example, the author advocates 'reformation of institutions and networks of global governance to address complexity' instead of 'searching for better policy' (p. 264), but provides few answers as to how institutions could be reformed and towards what direction. The main argument of this book is somewhat tailored to fit the reality of the African continent, which sometimes comes at the expense of its broader applicability to other regions. In particular, to what extent would similar processes apply to the Eastern European countries in the fringes of the European Union? It is interesting to point out that the European Union followed a rather integrative policy bringing-in the former communist counties. Despite some problems with clarity, overall, Duffield presents a challenging argument that can potentially have a great impact in the field of humanitarian intervention and international governance.

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State Crime: Government, Violence and Corruption
Penny Green and Tony Ward
Pluto Press, 2004
HBK: ISBN: 0745317855 £45.00 $75.00
PBK: ISBN: 0745317847 £14.99 $24.95
pp. 256 (including: notes, references and index)

Penny Green and Tony Ward's book, *State Crime*, makes an important contribution to the field of criminology, defining the state as a possible perpetrator of crime. Using the already existing literature in international relations, the authors lead criminology beyond

the boundaries of the nation-state. Putting together a range of different resources from various disciplines, the book describes different ways through which states, or different agents with the complicity of the state, violate human rights and produce harm to individuals.

Following the international relations literature, essentially the authors argue that the state, from the more autocratic to the more liberal one, is capable of committing crimes and human rights violations. Their argument is based on the premise that there is a 'political economy of crime'. According to the authors, 'the relationship between forces of production and the state shapes patterns of criminal behavior in different kinds of states' (p. 185). A direct attack is carried out by western military intervention and institutions of global finance, which, through imposing political and economic conditions for good governance, create paradoxically the conditions for human rights violations (p. 192). Green and Ward argue that the promotion of universal values by institutions such as IMF and WTO are serving the interests of transnational capital and the economically powerful. In turn, this leads to an increase in authoritarianism, a lack of legitimacy and therefore further human rights violations. In this context, the role of civil society, 'the organized voice of ordinary working people' (p. 208), becomes vital, in order to label ruling elite's acts as criminal and create a different hegemony from the one purported by global institutions and powerful states.

Crimes committed by states range from corruption to genocide. Green and Ward devote a chapter to each of the most significant ones: corruption, state corporate crime, natural disaster, police crime, organized crime, terror, torture, war crimes, and genocide. In each chapter the reader will find a definition and a description of the different parameters used to evaluate the offence. Many different examples are used, highlighting complexities of the subject, which are taken from the analysis of other disciplines and from data collected by NGO's like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and State Watch, and finally an attempt to explain the whole through criminology theory.

The book opens with the definition of the state as criminal. The state is conceived in Marxist terms as 'public power equipped for the use of force' (p. 3) and it is represented as a unitary force pursuing its own goals to whose acts it is possible to adapt central concepts of criminology. The criminal state is a form of 'organizational deviance involving the violation of human rights' (p. 2). Despite being aware of the ambiguity of the human rights concept, which has been used to support military interventions, or to argue 'an extension of global processes of policing and punishment' (p. 10), the authors claim its usefulness to delineate and delimit the number of deviant acts for which the state should be responsible. The authors seem to suggest that human rights are those so labeled by civil society and not only the ones inscribed in international legal conventions.

According to Green and Ward, the essence of many state crimes stems from corruption: 'a form of clandestine exchange committed either in pursuit of the organizational goals of state agencies or tolerated for organizational reasons' (p. 11). Corruption is closely interrelated with clientelism and patrimonialism, other two forms of illicit exchange and abuse of power. These phenomena, which are supported by economic liberalism and global financial institutions, directly or indirectly violate human rights. Indeed clientelism and patrimonialism divert resources from people and obfuscate the political process damaging population's ability to participate.

Very interestingly, natural disasters are described as state crime. The argument is that states should be held responsible for potential disasters, whose scale of consequences is directly related to corrupt practices. The increasing pressure on the environment and natural resources makes population more vulnerable, being forced into displacement and

poverty. The argument compels us to pay attention to state responsibility for consequences usually considered of natural disaster, opening up the discourse to other unusual disciplines.

The inclusion of war crimes shows not only particular attention to the need for a criminology of war, but also to the actual political situation, leading the conclusion of the book to the analysis of the current war in Iraq. Criminology has never considered war as an appropriate object of knowledge, even though many have pointed out the gross victimization that war inevitably creates (Jamieson 1998). Green and Ward underline the western complicity in Saddam Hussein's most dreadful crimes during the war with Iran in the 1980s, while the dictator was largely abusing of his monopoly of force, torturing, terrorizing and committing genocide. On the contrary, these same western countries have used allegations against Saddam Hussein's regime to protect US oil interests and to create support for this action through the notion of 'justified punishment'.

In conclusion, Green and Ward's book accomplishes an important task: it articulates a discourse on the state as a possible source of crimes within the field of criminology. This sets up a foundation of a new paradigm of crime, not based on the legal definition, but on the concept of human rights violations. In so doing, criminology becomes independent from law, changing its own subject matter, which is defined by the labeling of civil society. This book is the extremely interesting result of the convergence of the literature in international relations and the one in criminology, underlying the interconnection among these disciplines. For criminologists, this book shows how important it is to focus on the wide range of crimes committed by the powerful and in particular by state organizations instead of the crimes committed by the poor. For international relations scholars, this work suggests the limits of relying on a strict legal definition of human rights violations, giving some understanding of how the individual and the organizational levels interplay in human rights violations.

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Language Rights and Political Theory

Will Kymlicka and Alan Patten (eds.)
Oxford University Press, 2003
HBK: ISBN: 019926290X £50.00
PBK: ISBN: 0199262918 £18.99
pp. 349 (including index, notes, references and tables)

Will Kymlicka and Alan Patten themselves signal why their collection is important: it is the first book-length engagement with language rights from a normative-theoretical perspective. Language, the editors note, has received less systematic attention from normative theorists over the last decade than many other group allegiances, including race, ethnicity, nation, indigenous community, gender and religion—despite its centrality to numerous contemporary conflicts, and despite the peculiarly interesting challenge that language represents for liberal political theory.

It presents a special challenge because, as all the contributors recognize, the liberal ideal of state neutrality regarding citizens' lifestyles, identities and creeds is peculiarly inapplicable to the sphere of language. Since state personnel must communicate with citizens and each other, they necessarily adopt a medium of communication; and because their preferred medium will not be the mother tongue of all citizens, language is a matter on which even the most 'civic' of nationalisms, the most non-interventionist of liberal regimes, favour some citizens over others. Because language is a source of identity as well as a tool, the impossibility of language neutrality arguably jeopardizes the possibility of state cultural neutrality more generally.

Beyond agreeing that the state is ineluctably a linguistic interventionist, the contributors all appear to be liberals who reject the coercive suppression and promotion of languages. Their central disagreement is over whether the state should promote language uniformity or act to preserve declining minority languages. Contributors championing common (typically majority) language promotion cite the value of shared language to social cohesion, economic efficiency, democratic deliberation and individual social mobility. Those advocating bilingualism and/or language preservation wish to redress injustices suffered by minority-language communities, provide linguistic minorities with contexts of choice, affirm equality and secure the 'public good' of bio-lingual diversity.

The debate that ensues is over more than the relative weight of these rival considerations. In two areas, contributors dispute basic factual premises. Where some attribute language decline to oppressions inflicted by nationalists and imperialists, others put it down mainly to the demands of a necessary and unstoppable modernity. (The very definition of oppression is contested: a number confine its meaning to overt suppression, while others consider the state's promotion of majority language itself oppressive.) And while several contributors hold that minority language education impedes learners' social mobility and majority-language proficiency, Stephen May cites empirical evidence that it does precisely the opposite.

Disagreements are not all *between* the language pluralists and the supporters of shared language. In the latter camp, Thomas Pogge pronounces historical injustices to be irrelevant to the calibration of present-day language rights, while Michael Blake endorses positive remedial action to assist historically oppressed language groups. Preservationists have their own dilemmas: should language rights follow citizens wherever they live in a state, or only apply in designated sub-territories? While Patten favours the former except under certain conditions, Denise Réaume advises that rights follow neither individuals nor territories but viable language communities.

Some differences are less sharp than they first appear. Predictably, language preservationists like May and Réaume emphasise the group interest of minority language communities in linguistic survival, while moral individualists (notably Pogge and Daniel Weinstock) fret over the illiberal consequences of prioritizing group over individual interests. Yet May claims liberal credentials and endorses the individual's right to exit groups, while Réaume would support only languages enjoying the day-to-day commitment of their speakers and supporters. Conversely, while an anti-preservationist current runs through many chapters, no contributor denies that the state should provide translators to foreign language speakers in courts and hospitals. In other words, even defenders of majority languages would accommodate minority languages, if only transitionally. And the boundary between accommodation and promotion can blur.

On the whole this collection works: by parading so wide a range of (liberal) positions and issues, and corralling key writers to present them, its designers have ensured that readers will come away with a pretty good overview of how normative theory has begun

to address language issues. They will also be persuaded, I think, that political theorists bring distinctive insights to a field hitherto mainly populated (as François Grin notes) by sociolinguists, anthropologists, ethnologists, educationists and lawyers. That indeed is the one definite message of a book that otherwise functions as a forum rather than manifesto.

The book's range does stretch it thin. Philippe van Parijs's discussion of rival formulae for subsidizing majority language acquisition engages none of his co-contributors. His and two more cursory discussions (by Rubio-Marín and David Laitin & Rob Reich) of the right to acquire the *majority* tongue seem stranded in a book mainly debating minority language preservation. More could have been said on another topic: the moral relevance of history. May rightly considers Pogge too dismissive of historical claims, but never himself adequately explains why past linguistic injustice should concern us. I would have also liked to see someone take up the challenge of Laitin and Reich's 'liberal democratic' approach, which seems to assume that where it is desirable to settle matters via political competition, philosophers and their principles should keep out. (Is normative theory required only to adjudicate pre-political constitutional rights, and not to influence political discussions about the choiceworthiness of substantive policy options? Does interest-driven politics not itself find expression in the sorts of public reasons that theorists can usefully scrutinize?)

Not unlike the book perhaps, a few individual contributions meander. It is not clear whether Rubio-Marín is offering a taxonomy of language rights or making a case for the primacy of instrumental rights. Though loosely united by a concern with diversity, Grin's chapter ambles across different topics. Idil Boran defends the biodiversity argument for language preservation against all comers in a lengthy and illuminating discussion, then proceeds to ambush it on different grounds.

Such occasional lapses of focus and structural coherence, whether in individual chapters or the book overall, do not seriously detract from the usefulness of Kymlicka and Patten's collection. The book is likely to become a key reference in both teaching and scholarly debate on the normative aspects of language policy.

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Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities
Ludger Mees
Palgrave, 2003
HBK: ISBN: 1403902658 £50.00 $69.95
pp. 288 (including: bibliography and index)

Nationalism, Violence and Democracy communicates a mixed message. Mees oscillates between trying to communicate a positive message about the conflict in the Basque Country and a more pessimistic view of the chances for resolving the conflict any time soon. The author argues that the growing unpopularity of the armed struggle of *Euskadi ta Askatasuma* (ETA), along with increased successes by Spanish security forces, has pushed ETA towards its ceasefire in 1998 and may in fact continue to push ETA in that direction.

The book essentially attempts to do three things. First, it analyzes the evolution of Basque nationalism as a political and social cross-class movement within a weak Spanish nation-state. Second, it attempts to explain the development of political violence. Third,

it examines the various opportunities available for the resolution of the conflict. The book also compares the Basque case with that of Northern Ireland, in particular the errors committed in the Basque conflict, the missed opportunities and the reasons for the return of violence.

The first three chapters of the book do not add anything new to the extensive literature already available on the origins of Basque identity and nationalism. Describing it as calculated ambiguity, the author argues that, compared to Catalan nationalism, Basque nationalism has always been a more defensive project from the beginning because it failed to formulate its own position in relation to the state. Nationalism, however, is by its very nature something ambiguous and in this respect, Catalan nationalism can arguably be described as just as ambiguous in the formulation of its own position vis-à-vis the Spanish state.

Mees also proposes four hypotheses which may explain why Basque nationalism, rather than Catalan or Galician nationalism, turned to violence. First, he argues that most of ETA's recruits have traditionally stemmed from the Basque lower classes (why this in itself is a reason for violence is never fully explained). Second, that the never-ending warfare, which characterized most of the nineteenth century, helped to foster a tradition of violence. A third reason put forth by the author is the weakness of Basque culture, particularly in relation to language. A final reason is that traditionally, radical answers were given to radical challenges such as the high levels of repression in the Basque country during the Franco regime or how weak traditional culture was affected by industrialisation and urbanisation. These reasons have been argued before and the author is not really contributing anything new to this argument.

The more interesting part of the book is its analysis of the Basque question since Spain's transition to democracy began with the death of General Franco in 1975. Mees discusses the 'Basque peculiarity' in the process of transition with Basque nationalists excluded from the parliamentary commission responsible for elaborating Spain's 1978 constitution. This, along with the fact that Basque nationalists actively campaigned either for abstention or against the Constitution, meant that over the years, ETA and other radical nationalists have used the results of the 1978 referendum to argue that Spain's model of decentralisation was imposed on the Basques against their will. (22 per cent of the Basque electorate voted against the draft constitution as opposed to a Spanish average of 8 percent). The author argues that the debate about Basque autonomy, particularly the passive rejection of the Constitution and the ensuing more enthusiastic support for the Basque Statute of Autonomy (90 per cent support), marked a watershed in Basque nationalist politics which became hopelessly divided from that moment.

In Chapter 6, the author goes on to explain the rise of Basque nationalism in the context of the institutionalisation of Spain's democracy. Because of its struggle against the Franco regime, Basque nationalism initially became a synonym for democracy. By the 1990s, however, the decline of radical nationalism, the military and political weakness of ETA and the pressure articulated by the Basque peace movement all helped to set the context within which ETA's 1998 ceasefire would be announced. The breakdown of the ceasefire in 1999 ushered in a new period of confusion, conflict and strategic re-alignment for Basque politics.

Although the author successfully manages to realize the study's three main objectives, mentioned above, at times it is difficult to follow his train of thought. There are long, sometimes unnecessary descriptions of Basque social movements such as *Gesto por la Paz* or *Elkarri*. Furthermore, the author's discussion of the extent to which the Basque language has permeated Basque society glosses over the fact that only one-fifth of the

population speak it, as opposed to over three-quarters of the population of Catalonia who speak Catalan. The book also attempts to be chronological in its analysis of Basque nationalism, but there is a tendency to articulate a more thematic approach with the result often being confusing. The discussion in Chapter 8 about the concept of a 'third space', a political and social area in which nationalists could work together in their attempts to secure Basque self-determination, has always been seen as something vague and the author's emphasis on its role in the peace process seems misled. On a minor note, there are also small editing mistakes here and there, e.g., Councillor Blanco was killed by ETA in 1997 not 1996 (p. 94).

In the final chapter, the author argues that the ceasefire required moderate nationalists to radically change their political strategy and that the *Basque Nationalist Party* (PNV) was a prisoner of an impossible double strategy, i.e., demonstrating to ETA supporters that it was committed to Basque nationalism by working with ETA but at the same time continuing to support Basque autonomy (and thereby avoiding the alienation of the business community and moderate nationalists). In the end, the ceasefire failed because ETA focused on 'governing nationalism' (p. 150) or accumulating nationalist power but did not attach any great importance to negotiations with the Spanish government. The fact that only one meeting took place between representatives of ETA and the Spanish government during the fourteen months of the ceasefire exemplifies the unwillingness of both parties to search for a negotiated settlement since neither has given up their objective of securing a complete military victory.

The main thrust of the book is that, despite the failure of the peace process, important changes took place in Basque society and politics during the 1990s which could sow the seeds for future attempts to secure a settlement. Despite the fact that ETA used the ceasefire to completely reorganise and integrate new members and that the *Partido Popular* government's anti-nationalist toughness has generated political support across Spain, throughout the book the author seems hopeful that a solution will be found. This optimistic message is sharply contradicted in the epilogue in which the author calls the banning of ETA's political wing, *Herri Batasuna*, in 2003, as one of the most serious political errors to have been committed in post-transition Spain. Whatever the author's feelings on this issue, the thoughtful analysis provided in this book serves as a key reference point for future debates on the resolution of the conflict.

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Against Their Will: The History and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR

Pavel Polian
Central European University Press, 2003
HBK: ISBN: 9639241687 £34.95 $54.95 €54.95
PBK: ISBN: 9639241733 £16.95 $25.95 €25.95
pp. XII + 425 (including: bibliography, index, figures, tables and maps)

This book offers a systematic survey of existing knowledge about the Soviet regime's forcible deportations of ethnic and social groups from the revolution to the death of Stalin in 1953. As such, it represents a valuable addition to the literature on Soviet population displacements and mass repressions. Professor Polian, a geographer by training, is an indefatigable researcher and prolific chronicler of coerced migrations under modern European dictatorships. He is best-known to date for his comprehensive and profound investigations of the fate of the 'Ostarbeiter', Soviet citizens transported to Germany during the Second World War to work for the Nazi economy and then invariably

consigned to the Stalinist Gulag upon their repatriation. His recent monograph on this theme, published both in Russian (Zhertvy dvukh diktatur. Zhizn', trud, unizhenie i smert' sovetskikh voennoplennykh i Ostarbeiterov na chuzhbine i na rodine, 2nd edition, Moscow, Rosspen, 2002), and in German (Deportiert nach Hause. Sowjetische Kriegsgefangene im 'Dritten Reich' und ihre Repatriierung, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, München, Wien, 2001), has already won many scholarly and political plaudits in both countries.

The work reviewed here focuses solely on Soviet deportations and spans a longer chronology. It is concerned above all to demonstrate that the use of forced deportations as a mechanism of mass repression was not an innovation of Stalin's regime in the 1930s, but can be traced back to the earliest days of Bolshevik post-revolutionary state-building. The first major operation was in fact carried out against the Terek Cossacks in April 1920, on the basis of a Central Committee directive (signed by Lenin) of January 1919 on 'de-cossackization'. Approximately forty-five thousand individuals, considered to be hostile to the regime solely by virtue of their ethno-social origin, were transported under this measure to Ukraine and to Arctic Russia. Large-scale coercive evacuations of populations recommenced at the end of the first decade of Soviet rule, as the regime undertook to 'cleanse' its western state border of ethnic and social 'elements' of population deemed to be politically unreliable. From the early 1930s, the regime launched its policy of comprehensively eradicating the purportedly wealthier, exploitative peasantry, which involved the brutal deportation over three years of nearly two and a half million people, mainly from the western and central regions of the Soviet Union to the state's Arctic, Siberian and Central Asian territories. Subsequent deportations affected not only social groups, but increasingly targeted populations by ethnic origin, starting with the Ingrian Finns of the north-western border (as early as 1930) and later embracing Kurds, Germans, Koreans, Poles, the Baltic nationalities, Iranians, Kalmyks, Chechens and Ingush, Crimean Tatars and many others. Of especial interest is Polian's documentation of the continuing deportations of many contingents (many now exiled for the second time) in the early post-war era.

In all, this work defines and describes forty-five discrete deportation 'campaigns', extending from 1920 to May 1952. Polian has also compiled a comprehensive list of the party directives and government acts which lent these repressions the gloss of legitimacy. He has gleaned much of the information about the deportations from the pre-existing secondary literature (most of which, however, exists only in Russian), as well as from his own archival investigations. He also offers a survey of the legislation which rehabilitated the victims of the deportations, promulgated during Gorbachev's policy of 'openness' (glasnost) during the late 1980s and during the first years of Russia's post-Soviet government. Indeed, the work under review – which was first published in Russian in 2001 and is currently being prepared for publication in German in 2004 - is in the very best tradition of glasnost scholarship, motivated by and imbued with a vigorous sense of humanity and compassion, and concerned first and foremost to bring a long-hidden history to light and to the attention of the widest possible circle of readers in the most accessible and systematic manner. The author's evidently conscious eschewal of interpretation for the sake of concentrating on identifying, itemising, classifying and describing these brutal acts of mass terror, only renders more shocking its impact as an indictment of the Soviet regime and its means of rule.

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The Global Review of Ethnopolitics
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The Politics of Social Science Research: 'Race', Ethnicity and Social Change

Peter Ratcliffe (ed)
Palgrave, 2001
HBK: ISBN: 0333722477 £55.00 $75.00
pp. 252, (including: preface, notes on contributors and index)

The review at hand is penned at a time when the postmodern and cultural turns of the social sciences are being supplemented by a 'methodological turn', of which the book reviewed is an excellent exponent. The methodological turn is, in itself, of course no novelty: it has been pre-intuited and indirectly invoked already by Karl Popper (1989), Michael Polanyi (1958) and Thomas Kuhn (1970), among others. The latter's work is especially relevant in this regard in its analysis of the relativity of seemingly solid research paradigms. In fact, as the methodological concerns of the scholars referred above were expressed in a predominantly philosophical key, *The Politics of Social Science Research* represents an effective percolation of their insights into sociological practice. It is, however, highly significant in that it represents the beginning of change in a discipline that holds great potential for improving the governance of modern society.

The book itself is a result of a 10-year project conceived by the editor at an ethics workshop of the World Congress of Sociology 1990. It brings together treatments of a number of ethical and theoretico-methodological aspects of the discipline, set in a variety of social and institutional contexts. However, it is far from being yet another collection of detached musings: Dr Ratcliffe's aim has been to relate the implications of the theoretical insights to the immediate material reality of research in settings and matters where carelessly formulated or ascriptive identity-related interpretations of data may lead to real oppression and inequality.

The volume starts with Part I intended to set out the central theoretical considerations (Chapter 1 by Peter Ratcliffe) that inform the subsequent contributions. The most important of these is, naturally, that of the possibility of the (apparent) detachment of the researcher. It may easily be agreed that the only sound method in science is to lay bare the roots of one's assertions when making them, everything else being likely to lead to varying degrees of mutual misapprehension. However, it is far from easy to uncover the roots in question, for researchers are ultimately only human, situated in their particular identity contexts that are fraught with their own particular expectations and predispositions. Hence it may not occur to us to even consider our visceral dislike of some trait in our subjects a (false) root in this sense. The value-neutrality and impartial observation principles of science must, in such contexts, retreat and give way to an express statement of values enabling the reader to assess the resulting research product against the background of the researcher's convictions. (Of course, this will only be tenable in a situation where the general integrity and objectivity of research presentation are a given.)

Eventually this is bound to invoke a (grossly) simplified parallel to Buddhist epistemology: everything we know is inexorably a function of the means through which we know it and hence needs to be assessed in relation to it (see Wallace 1999:175-177 for a brief account). In the particular context of race and ethnicity research this means that the way we gather information (and often also what information we can gather) is conditioned by our own standing as a subject with a particular identity configuration.

The first part of the book also includes Chapter 2 (by Dipannita Basu) on the colour line in American sociology. It analyses the institutionalisation of inequality patterns in US academia—which would perhaps have been better placed in Part II.

The rest of the volume falls into Parts II-IV, dealing respectively with non-European, Western-European and Eastern-European societies. The second part includes contributions from Australian, South African and US scholars examining the legacy of racism and colonialism in the particular contexts of their societies. The chief issue in the case of the US (Chapter 3 by Walter R. Allen) is the incomplete dismantling of the racial divide that has haunted the nation since slavery. Notably, the official family policy of the US appears to be blithely geared to the white family model, ignoring or disparaging all evidence of the possibility of different ones. South Africa (Chapter 4 by Rupert Taylor and Mark Orkin) has apparently been academically blind to any possibility of race not being the essentialised central determinant of the social structure of the country. Australia (Chapter 5 by Christine Inglis) had a well-functioning immigration-related research scheme working from 1989-1996, informing the public and policy-makers of the realities on the ground; it was then summarily shut down when a hostile administration took office.

The ex-colonial powers dealt with in Part III are the UK (Chapter 6 by Peter Ratcliffe), the Netherlands (Chapter 7 by Jan Rath) and Belgium (Chapter 8 by Marco Martiniello and Hassan Bousetta). Their issues are slightly different, the imperial legacy of the UK perhaps suggesting a stronger similarity to the US than the others. The connections forged between the metropolis and the colonies during colonialism proper acted like funnels propelling valuable goods from the colony to the imperial centre. However, these also turned out to be a natural immigration channel for colonials versed in the customs and the language, aspiring to upward mobility. The imperial nations have not been able to digest this aspect of their past imperial policy and often elect to forgo for lack of political will even those immigration policy actions predicated on sound scientific evidence.

Part IV looks at Eastern Europe, choosing the Yugoslav (Chapter 9 by Milena Davidovic) and the Russian (Chapter 10 by Vicki L. Hesli and Brian L. Kessel) cases as its subjects. The choice is an informed and complex one, alighting on territories in which social change had been held back for considerable time by the largest experiment ever to be perpetrated on a society. One of the functions of Communist repression was (in fact, by dint of its totalitarianism, had to be) forcing a damper on nationalist yearnings of any stripe. The repression could not leave academic methodologies untouched either. Thus, for decades, entire generations of researchers were reared to think in the Marxist mold which among other things downplayed the social significance of beliefs about ethnicity and race. Little surprise then that, when the pent-up frustrations were released, disintegration and secession ensued both in the general society and in academia. Against this context it is all the more important to underline again the complementary nature of the volume's 'rejection that 'races' exist in any real, scientific sense' (p. 8) and its exhortation to study the origins and causes of popular perceptions about them.

A small point of practical criticism that may be voiced with respect to the, at times, inadequate (translation and) language editing. Thus, among other small things, the notable Swedish sociologist's name is Myrdal (not Mydral, as Chapter 2 consistently has it) and the Latin transliterations of the Russian and other authors' and sources' Cyrillic names should have been cross-checked for uniformity (there are differing variants of the same names, cf 'Zdravomyslov' and 'Zdravomislov', 'Filosofii' and 'Filosofi', etc.) or correct spelling (Prasauskus pro Prasauskas, Msyl pro Mysl, Zhironovsky pro Zhirinovsky, etc.). It would also have been a good idea to keep the original Cyrillic forms of the Russian-language source names alongside Latinised versions. For readers not familiar with the Russian language and the sociological scene, it can be very hard to discern the original form of the source's name.

On the whole, however, these errors and inconsistencies in no way impinges on the book's substance. The volume remains an important step on the road to an improved research paradigm in practical sociology seeking to facilitate meaningful social change.

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Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa: Methods of Conflict Prevention
Robert I. Rotberg (ed)
Brookings Institution, 2001
HBK: ISBN: 0815775768 £30.95 $42.95
pp. 240 (including: index, bibliography)

The overriding theme of *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa* is that conflicts in Africa have reached a crisis level and that previous responses have not only been unsuccessful but were also undertaken with little consideration of the major obstacles to conflict resolution or management in the region. Given the unreflective nature of interventions to date, it is little wonder that peace efforts in Africa have enjoyed little success. The seven chapters in the book try to suggest alternatives that can be explored to change the situation, and here opinions vary.

Chapters one and six are not only interlinked in argument but are also written by the same author, Robert Rotberg. In Chapter 1, Rotberg argues that failure of peace keeping in Africa in the past was caused by the approach that was taken by the United Nations (UN). The UN's approach to peacekeeping, he argues, suffers from two weaknesses. Firstly, at the conceptual level, their approach implicitly suggests that there is a general approach to peacekeeping that is applicable to all situations. Secondly, at an operational level, interventions have operated with a very limited budget. The first step to successful peacekeeping in Africa he explains, is to define the nature of the conflicts, and then respond to each with due consideration for the specific nature of the conflict. He identifies four types of conflict and preferable responses. One of the conflicts he identifies, in Chapter 1, is that in which belligerents have agreed to a cease-fire and in which case an expanded monitoring force is required to ensure that the terms of the cease-fire are adhered to. The Ethiopia-Eritrea case is such a conflict. The second type of conflict, which he calls regime change conflicts, are those where combatants have fought to the realisation that the prevailing regime has to go, and thus what is needed is a force to facilitate the agreed change. Namibia and South Africa are relevant examples. The third type of conflicts are those in which belligerents are in a state of war and need peace enforcement rather than peacekeeping. The fourth type of 'conflict' is post-conflict reconstruction, i.e., situations in which violent conflict has been contained in some form, but in order to sustain the settlement the former conflict parties need international assistance for the reconstruction of the state.

In Chapter 6, Rotberg shares the view, expressed by the majority of the other contributors, that Africans need to take a lead role in peacekeeping in the continent. He cautions, however, that agreeing to an African response in the form of an African peacekeeping force, a view supported by the majority of chapters, is not enough in itself. He reckons that as much as such a force is desirable, the other important consideration to make is that such a force needs a leader, country or region with the responsibility of making decisions and mobilising it to respond when needed. This leader, country or region will also have to be acceptable as legitimate and non-partisan. He concludes that no such peace guardian presently exists in Africa.

In Chapter 2, Jeffrey Herbst explores the topic of African peacekeepers and state failure. Herbst argues that leaving peacekeeping to Africans will be like sub-contracting the responsibility of the international community, a view which sets him at odds with the other contributors. He advocates understanding the reasons that bring about state failure in Africa as a way forward, as opposed to abandoning the continent to its people. He points out the irony of the situation in Africa where the big countries, the potential hegemons traditionally expected to act as peacekeepers, are themselves involved in conflicts, leaving small countries as potential interveners. This situation of asymmetrical power relations places limits on African interventions. Herbst insists, however, that if Western intervention is to be successful it needs to be sensitive to the specifics of the African context. He concludes his chapter by stating that the 'United States and the European countries will have to deal with African interveners on African terms or realize that the West has become irrelevant' (p. 32).

The suspicion that African peacekeepers are likely to receive from African countries where they are deployed is a theme in the chapter by Christopher Clapham (Chapter 3). Clapham argues that unless the country or region that seeks to keep peace is seen as democratic by those whom it seeks to keep at peace, then it will not be accepted as a legitimate and impartial player. His article differs from Herbst's, because he supports African peace initiatives. In Chapter 4, Steven Metz evaluates the American strategy in African conflicts in the past. Writing from a realist point of view, he argues that the lukewarm treatment America has given African conflicts in the past is not accidental but rather a deliberate policy. He argues that in a globalised world America and the rest of the world have an interest in helping Africa help itself by supporting conflict resolution programmes. They can offer assistance in the form of enhancing conflict prevention, helping in professionally training African armies as well as helping consolidate regional co-operation in peacekeeping. He concludes by saying that the main responsibility, however, lies within African countries, who need to continue political, economic and policy reforms that can 'forestall future outbreaks of armed conflicts' (p. 74).

Chapter 5 follows up on Metz' ideas by showing that Africa can deal with its conflicts with assistance from the rest of the world. Banyongwe argues that Africa has the potential of constituting a force capable of monitoring a cease-fire or even a truce. Such a force can be constituted at sub-regional levels and then affiliated to the UN, and, with logistical support from countries in the Northern Hemisphere, it will be able to function. Chapter seven is a summary of discussions that were held at the World Peace Foundation meeting in Tanzania in 1999. Just like the articles in the book there are varied opinions as to what ought to be done to deal with conflicts in Africa.

As the subject of war is a complex one, so are the arguments that arise in Rotberg's book. The dominant view is that Africans need to take charge of the task of peacekeeping in Africa. However, there is little agreement on what to do, when and how the rest of the world should be involved, or whether it is appropriate for the UN to delegate its responsibility of peacekeeping in Africa to Africans. Despite, or perhaps because of, these

variations of opinion the book is a stimulating read. Anyone interested in understanding the efforts that have been undertaken in Africa by Africans and others to try and resolve the perennial problems afflicting the region will find it a worthwhile read. New challenges are identified and that may be a good starting point to advance the debate as to what can actually be done to reduce conflicts in Africa.

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Researching Violently Divided Societies: Ethnical and Methodological Issues

Marie Smyth & Gillian Robinson (eds)
Pluto Press, 2001
HBK: ISBN: 0745318215 £45.00 $69.95
PBK: ISBN: 0745318207 £14.99
pp. 227 (including: table, map, chapter references & index)

What is research on violently divided societies for and who is best suited to carry it out? These are the two questions that lie at the heart of this thoughtful and insightful collection of essays on methodological and ethical issues confronting researchers of violently divided societies. They are addressed by contributors working in Central Asia, Africa, Cambodia, Bosnia, the Middle East and Northern Ireland. Certainly a diverse selection of societies whose 'dividedness' (the editors reasonably suggest) rather than comparable levels or nature of violence make them suitable for collective consideration (p. 3). The most interesting theme of the collection concerns the particular issues facing 'insider' and 'outsider' researchers in conflict situations. In this regard, Albrecht Schnabel's analysis of flexible comparative studies of divided societies is the only one that focuses primarily on the 'outsider'. The 'external international expert' (suggests Schnabel) can compliment the work of the 'insider' by providing 'general' as well as 'particular' knowledge, insights and functions derived from their position 'above local attachments' (p. 203). In contrast, Anara Tabyshalieva argues that problems of researching the extensive violent divisions of post-Soviet Central Asia are exacerbated by 'insider'/'outsider' issues of access. On the one hand, global resource inequalities allow an ease of access for researchers from 'rich' countries to 'parachute' in to conduct research on problems they know little about (p. 135). At the same time, regional rivalries mean that various governments prevent researchers from other parts of Central Asia from carrying out work on their patch. Economic meltdown, a general decline in educational resources throughout the region, a growth of ethnic isolationism and Islamist reaction, and the barriers increasingly put in the way of women's participation in research, all lead Tabyshalieva to gloomy predictions on the future of ethnic conflict research in the region.

A certain pall also hangs over the contribution by Tamar Hermann, whose chapter is primarily based on her experience researching the role and impact of Israeli peace groups. This work formed part of a larger initiative that saw parallel studies of peace groups carried out within the Palestinian community and, internationally, in South Africa and Northern Ireland. While a significant degree of 'cross-community' collaboration was a key feature of the work conducted in the latter two divided societies, a truly 'joint' initiative proved depressingly impossible to achieve in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian research teams. This outcome certainly appears to have given Hermann much to think about. As she argues, few conflict researchers are 'pure' outsiders, the vast majority being either 'involved outsiders' or 'insiders'. As such they bring with them an often considerable amount of 'emotional baggage' that makes the research grails of either positivistic objectivity or hermeneutic self-reflexivity both virtually unattainable (p. 79).

Being an insider provides the real advantage of 'speaking the same language', metaphorically and literally (p. 84). But the disadvantage of insider 'first hand familiarity' is the inability to access and understand 'the other side' (p. 85). The answer to this dilemma? The very joint approach that was unobtainable in the case of Hermann's own work; a 'cross-community' strategy that lies at the heart of the recommendations later contained in the editors own conclusion.

The 'emotional baggage' of the 'insider' researcher is also the chief focus of Andrew Finlay's elegant discussion of reflexivity and ethnographic research in Northern Ireland. Finlay is particularly concerned to examine the 'insidious' impact of 'telling' on the research process; the series of inter-communicative signs and codes by which people in Northern Ireland ascribe a communal identity to one another. For Finlay, the impact of 'telling' on the interaction of researcher and interviewee has been greatly underestimated and under-theorised, particularly in terms of the 'feeling management' such encounters involve. Finlay is similarly critical of the 'benign introspection' he sees as typical of researchers responses to this problem. Rather, he suggests, there is a need to adopt a more substantive perspective and practice of 'constitutive reflexivity' (p. 66). There is much in this argument, not least in Finlay's suggestion that academics themselves often make assumptions about the work of their colleagues on the basis of perceived communal affiliation or origin. It is a lesson, though, that Finlay may have to consider himself (and I can speak with some authority here) when developing arguments based upon the incorrect ascription of a colleagues' identity. Getting 'telling' wrong can definitely be something of a problem for field workers in the North.

The selection of the case studies was also, in part, based on the under-representation of certain regions of the world in the literature on ethnic conflict studies. According to Eghosa Osaghae though, it was a deeply ingrained suspicion of the concept of ethnicity as a product of 'western social science' that accounted for the dearth of such studies in Africa prior to the 1990s. The result, a vacuum of knowledge about even the basic characteristics of the status, nature and numbers of Africa's ethnic groups. Post-cold war realities have, however, seen the rise of 'ethnocracies' amongst post-colonial African regimes and a welter of internal wars. It has similarly seen the emergence of a new wave of 'radical converts' to the study and 'championing' of ethnicity and ethnic rights, a group Osaghae somewhat begrudgingly criticises for their apparent intellectual tardiness (p. 27). When it comes to the reason why such research on ethnic conflict should be carried out, however, Osaghae's message is stark; the lack of such work in Africa contributed to the reduction of policy options to those of violent confrontation and state repression. Indeed, if doubts over why research on violently divided societies should be carried out (and by whom) led to the conclusion that the pursuit of such knowledge has little or no purpose, then Helen Jenks Clarke's excellent chapter is a most salutary antidote. Clarke discusses two Participatory Action Research (PAR) projects conducted in Cambodia that puts into perspective the dilemmas facing researchers in the field. Under the genocidal Khymer Rouge regime, social knowledge itself, and those who possessed it, were the explicit targets of annihilation. It is in that experience, a history of mass murder, that the divisions of the ethnically and religiously homogenous Cambodian society lie. It is similarly in the loss of knowledge of that history, and the need to re-establish the infrastructure of knowledge possession and production at such a basic level and on such a massive scale that the unequivocal purpose of research is to be found. As Clarke argues, the PAR research she was engaged in was designed to 'empower villagers to build their own models of society… [this] research helps to bring back, to re-establish such [social] knowledge' (p. 102). Reason enough for research.

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The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests and the Indivisibility of Territory

Monica Duffy Toft
Princeton University Press, 2003
HBK: ISBN: 0691113548 £24.95 $37.50
pp. ix + 266 (including: index, maps, bibliography)

The starting point for this stimulating, persuasive but ultimately frustrating book is the premise that territory is not solely a phenomenon of physical geography, which can be partitioned, circumscribed by borders, settled by populations and assigned various levels of autonomous or sovereign status, but that territory is also a subjective, emotive, non-material phenomenon, in which an ethnic group may vest its sense of identity, its aspirations and dreams, and as such is essentially 'indivisible'. The author terms this the 'dual nature of territory'. The aim of her study is to explain the role that territory plays in creating and fuelling ethnic conflict, and in particular to identify the territorial conditions under which ethnic disputes escalate into violence.

The author's focus is on conflicts which develop between states and ethnic minorities among their population. Why, she asks, do some ethnic disputes become violent, while others are settled by mutually acceptable compromise between states and sub-state actors? To answer this, she proposes a general 'theory of indivisible territory'. This theory posits that states and ethnic groups ascribe different meanings and values to territory. For a state, the territory over which it extends its authority is the defining element of its existence. Moreover, certain regions will have particular economic or security significance for the state's development or survival. States are most likely, however, to view territory as 'indivisible', and to mobilise military force to suppress secessionist aspirations, when to concede to the demands of one ethnic group would risk setting a precedent for others to follow. On the other hand, minority ethnic groups may view a particular segment of territory as their historic or spiritual homeland. In this case, they may refuse to submit to central state authority or to comply with arrangements for constitutional compromise or partition, and will demand greater autonomy or even sovereignty over the area in question. The likelihood of such a group resorting to violence to secure its control over territory depends on its settlement patterns. When the group is concentrated in the region under dispute, and constitutes the majority population in this area, it will possess a greater capability to act effectively and will feel it has greater legitimacy to do so, and therefore will be less willing to compromise over the solutions it seeks for this territory. Clearly it follows that in circumstances when both the state and the ethnic group consider a particular territory to be 'indivisible', there is a high likelihood of violence. When the ethnic group can be satisfied with an outcome short of sovereignty or the state does not fear setting a potentially self-destructive precedent, there is less chance of ethnic conflict turning to war.

The author develops her argument with meticulous attention to its theoretical inflections and empirical implications. In the first chapter, she examines alternative explanations advanced in recent scholarship for the outbreak of ethnic violence, which she divides into three categories: material, non-material and elite. While materialist explanations offer some insights, she believes, they oversimplify the motives of actors, neglecting to consider cultural or emotive factors disposing ethnic groups to risk great suffering for 'seemingly worthless territory' (p. 6). Nonmaterial explanations, specifically those which invoke either 'ancient hatreds' or the 'security dilemma' as impelling groups to resort to violence, posit an unwarranted inevitability in the descent of ethnic disputes into bloodshed, essentialise ethnic identity and naturalise the strivings of ethnic groups and

their leaders for sovereign statehood. The third approach, which focuses on the role of political elites in manipulating popular aspirations and perceptions of self-interest, overestimates the ability of individuals to influence events and fails to account for different outcomes in a range of cases where demagogues sought to incite a violent solution to ethnic disputes (as an example, the author cites Vladimir Meciar's unsuccessful attempt to instigate ethnic cleansing across the Slovakian-Hungarian border).

To test her hypotheses, Toft uses two methods. Firstly, she analyses the *Minorities at Risk* data set to identify meaningful relationships between a series of key variables derived from the 'theory of indivisible territory' and competing explanations (such as settlement patterns or the existence of material resources) and the likelihood of ethnic violence. Secondly, she examines the logic of her theory, and assesses how it measures up to alternative approaches, through detailed analysis of the historical and geographical preconditions, the sequence of events and the actors involved in four case studies of ethnic conflict. These are chosen, on the one hand, to represent cases when ethnic dispute descended into violent conflict (Russia/Chechnya and Georgia/Abkhazia) and, on the other, cases when confrontation was resolved and bloodshed averted (Russia/Tatarstan and Georgia/Ajaria). This combination of methods is successful: the use of statistical analysis obviates the risk of selection bias inherent in the case studies, the historical analyses permit us to examine in detail the complex circumstances of each case and to 'enter into the minds of the decision makers' (p. 11).

The evidence which Toft adduces in support of her 'theory of indivisible territory' is sufficient and persuasive. The statistical tests confirm, for example, that settlement patterns of a particular ethnic group on a given territory (which determine its 'capabilities' and 'legitimacy claims') are a better indicator of its propensity to resort to violence in pursuit of its objectives than the existence of natural resources in the region under dispute. Similarly, the cases studies demonstrate how a peaceful resolution may be achieved when an ethnic group has a relatively weak and dispersed presence in the disputed region and therefore accepts the 'divisibility' of this territory (as the Tatars did in the case of their ethnic homeland), whereas the existence of a concentrated ethnic majority in a homeland, especially when this group is passionately convinced of the historical legitimacy of its cause (as in the case of the Chechens), is much more likely to lead to violence. Although the Abkhaz were a minority in their region of north-western Georgia, and were therefore initially willing to compromise, the intervention of Russian forces gave them a greater sense of their own capability and encouraged them to view their territory as 'indivisible' and demand full secession. The Ajars in south-western Georgia, on the other hand, she states, consistently represented their interests as 'divisible' and successfully averted violence despite the Georgian state's consistent suspicion of all groups seeking any extension of autonomy.

Undoubtedly, this book is an extremely useful contribution to the literature on ethnic conflict and violence. However, it suffers from three flaws which mitigate its impact, though do nothing essentially to weaken the logic or persuasiveness of its argument. First, the presentation of a theory which is fundamentally about the importance of territory would have been greatly strengthened by the inclusion of detailed maps indicating historical and contemporary settlement patterns, disputed regional and state borders and other features which play a major role in the text. The three maps which are included are useless; the 'Location Map of Tatarstan' in particular is a cartographic catastrophe. Second, there is a tendency to reify and de-historicise certain categories such as 'ethnic group' or 'identity', which must themselves be interrogated and understood as constructions which have emerged in the process of historical and contemporary conflicts. Toft acknowledges this in the first chapter, but nevertheless fails

to heed her own admonition. When, for example, she presents the development of Tatar-Russian relations as an unproblematic narrative rather than an object embedded in controversy and subject to competing interpretations. Similarly, the settlement patterns themselves which the author places at the core of her explanation are, of course, not simply 'given' but historically determined. When such categories are tested as variables in statistical analysis, the diachronic dimension is necessarily bracketed out, and this can be done without undermining their explanatory validity. When they are described as elements of an historical interpretation, however, they demand greater sensitivity to their ontological status and conceptual construction. The third flaw of this book is the most irritating. Having outlined her theory in the first chapter, and developed it fully in the second, the author then proceeds to restate it throughout the book, at the start and conclusion of every chapter and in every sub-section of every chapter, so that most readers will soon tire of this relentless repetition.

The author writes lucidly and with conviction. Her theory is coherent, her hyptheses are stated clearly and her argument is developed cogently. Her methods are explained carefully and applied conscientiously. Her evidence is well-chosen and her conclusions are persuasive. There was simply no need to recapitulate it all so frequently. This reviewer is tempted to suggest that the ideas stated and continually restated in this book would have had a greater impact if they had been presented in a tightly written, incisively argued journal article, pared of all its repetition. As such, it would have been much more powerful exercise in social scientific explanation. As a book, it is to be hoped that its genuine originality and significance is not lost on frustrated readers.

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Potentials of Disorder
Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher (eds)
Manchester University Press, 2003
HBK: ISBN: 0719062411 £45.00 $74.95
pp. ix + 277 (including: index)

According to the editors' introduction, this volume seeks to examine the link between violence and institutions in two particularly conflict-prone, post-empire regions: the Caucasus and Yugoslavia. The specific questions that they seek to explore are which institutions foster violence, which provide for procedures in which conflicts can be addressed below the threshold of violence, which institutions lead to fragmentation and which can integrate society in the absence of a state (p. 1). This is a noble and worthwhile enterprise, and the editors and their contributors largely succeed in bringing it to fruition.

In their introduction, Koehler and Zürcher set the stage for the volume by outlining the complex dynamics at play between institutions and violence. They identify the importance of the Soviet and Yugoslav official and unofficial institutional legacies, point out the significance of risk-increasing factors for the actual likelihood of collective violence occurring and determine the functions of institutions in society and how these shape incentives, opportunities and constraints for political actors. The degree of emphasis placed on institutions at the expense of actors is somewhat unbalanced, however, and ignorant of the fact that after all, and despite institutional incentives, opportunities and constraints, actors' preferences may be shaped by them, but their decisions are eventually not determined by institutions but remain in the provenance of the actors themselves. Nevertheless, this introduction is a good example of how to clarify

key concepts for the reader and introduce him/her to the contributions of individual authors.

The first five chapters focus on the former Yugoslavia. Hannes Grandits and Carolin Leutloff examine how ethnic groups were mobilised for violence in the Krajina region of Croatia in 1990-1. Kristof Gosztonyi provides a study of the development of Croat-Bosnian relations in the emerging state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and offers a compelling analysis of local and external Croat efforts to facilitate the secession of the Republic of Herceg Bosna. In the probably most interesting essay in the collection, Xavier Raufer presents a quite disturbing picture of the influence and significance of Albanian organised crime networks in the Western Balkans and beyond. The next two chapters, by Christian Giordano on land reform and Norbert Mappes-Niediek conclude the case studies. Despite weaknesses in some chapters, overall a fairly well-rounded picture on the potentials for disorder in the Balkan region emerges.

The next five chapters provide the same analysis for the Caucasus. The opening chapter by Enver Kisriev is an excellent examination of the causes of peace and violence in Dagestan and Chechnya. Although perhaps under-theorised, it provides a wealth of useful empirical material to the non-specialist and makes a convincing case about how factors of structure and agency combined in Dagestan to prevent a scenario similar to that in Chechnya. The remaining four chapters in this section contribute two more case studies—on Georgia and Nagorno Karabakh—and two more regional perspectives on identity and state-society relations. Thus, similar to the section on the Balkans, the reader is presented with a combination of in-depth single case studies which are well-contextualised in broader analyses of regional dynamics. The fact that this is achieved despite the great number of authors involved is clearly to the credit of the two editors, whose own contribution on Nagorno Karabakh is another very strong contribution to the volume.

In a concluding section, comprising three chapters, John Borneman discusses the difficulties of reconciliation after ethnic cleansing and Georg Elwert examines different strategies of (international) intervention into (internal) conflict before Koehler and Zürcher present their own conclusion, drawing on the findings of individual chapters in this volume. This concluding chapter by the editors brings the reader full-circle and summarises the main lessons to be drawn from the case studies presented. Unsurprisingly, they conclude that institutions matter, but what constitutes the real value of this chapter (despite the rather oddly placed ‘word on methodology’ at the very end) is that Koehler and Zürcher manage to explain not just that they matter but also how and why. From this perspective, the volume is a useful contribution to the existing literature on conflict prevention, management and settlement in general, as well as to the vast amount of literature that already exists on the specific cases covered within it.

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