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Institutionalizing Ethnicity in Former Yugoslavia: Domestic vs. Internationally Driven Processes of Institutional (Re-)Design¹

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Introduction

The past decade has seen a degree of international intervention into Southeastern Europe exceeding any outside intervention by major powers and international organizations in Europe since the end of World War II. The degree of involvement has mobilized its critics, both within former Yugoslavia, as well as internationally. Some critics emphasize the belated, uncoordinated and insufficient action of the international community, while others condemn the degree of interventionism by 'great powers'. Some analysts in fact see international intervention as the reason for explain not only the disintegration of Yugoslavia, but also for most of the subsequent conflicts in the region, as well as for the region's political and economic position on the European periphery.

Rather than providing a normative assessment of international intervention or establishing lines of historical continuity, the starting point of this article is the observation that international intervention in the wars of former Yugoslavia has not only been quantitatively, but also qualitatively different from most earlier types of intervention in Europe and elsewhere. Instead of discussing international intervention in its various forms (military intervention; economic sanctions; mediation; negotiation), the focus is on agreements which either seek to end conflict or (less commonly) prevent violent conflict in former Yugoslavia. Before turning to such agreements, I shall trace the nature of international intervention and the development of externally driven agreements in recent decades.

Historically most internationally mediated agreements have focused on achieving either a cessation of hostilities (e.g., ceasefire) or a long-term strategy for the prevention of the re-occurrence of conflict (e.g., demarcation of internationally recognized borders between the conflict parties). Depending on the balance of power between the object of intervention and those intervening, as well as the principles which have guided the intervention—oscillating between self-interest and the promotion of universal values—the agreements either recognized the military/political status quo or they sought to establish a new reality, for example by rewarding countries with new territories at the expense of their neighbors (or colonial rivals).

With some exceptions, such as the Minority Treaties and the peace treaties signed with the losers after World War I (Claude 1955: 16-30), internationally mediated or imposed peace agreements have rarely been concerned with establishing rules for internal governance in the countries in question. This has been even more the case in regard to ethnicity (Owen 2002: 375-410). In recent years, however, most peace treaties have dealt with the post-war governance of the respective countries (Drews 2001). This change has been the result of three different, but related trends in recent decades:

1. The nature of conflict has changed over the past decades. With the revival of regional nationalism in Western Europe in the 1960s and the subsequent rise of nationalism in the developing world, and in the 1980s (Gurr 1993: 89-122)² also in Eastern Europe, the prime threat to international stability have been ethnic and internal conflicts rather than inter-state wars.

¹ Funding for research for this article was provided by the International Policy Fellowship of the Open Society Institute, Budapest.

² Most would argue that the nationalist wave started in Eastern Europe in 1989. In Yugoslavia, as well as elsewhere, one can identify an increase of nationalism already earlier in the 1980s.

2. The international community has moved away from viewing human rights as the sole guarantee to prevent internal instability, but has recognized the need for group-based minority rights, as well as political representation of non-dominant groups (Pejic 1997: 666-685).
3. The 'international community' has been less reluctant in recent years to intervene in 'internal conflicts', which were previously largely shielded from outside involvement by the primacy of sovereignty. While there has been no out-right dismissal of the concept of national sovereignty, it has been seriously challenged and did not prevent NATO intervention in Kosovo (Thornberry 2001: 43-58).

The intervention in the conflict in former Yugoslavia particularly saw the advent of long-term, often reluctant, international intervention. The peace settlements included, in addition to the aforementioned classical components of a cease-fire and the establishment (or confirmation) of borders, (a) provisions for constitutional reform to accommodate the groups in questions, at times including a whole new constitution; (b) mechanisms for the return of refugees; (c) institutions for the protection of human and minority rights. The agreements proposed by the international community in former Yugoslavia stand out particularly for their insistence on establishing group rights and/or group autonomy. Remarkable is also the fact that international organizations and groups of (mostly) Western countries have less focused on the re-drawing of borders, but rather on the re-design of institutional systems within the countries, including whole new constitutions (de Varennes 2002: 53-59).

In order to determine effect and possible success of this type of intervention, I examine two aspects. First, I categorize different types of international intervention, as witnessed in former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 2001. Second, I turn to difficulties associated with the successful functioning of these institutions. In conclusion, I briefly explore the need for re-designing or 'domesticating' internationally designed institutions in the countries of the former Yugoslavia. The aim of this article is to offer some thoughts on both forming a critical approach to future internationally driven institutional design in post-conflict areas, as well as arriving at some tentative conclusions for changes in the institutional set-up of the countries and areas in question, namely Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia.

Types of International Intervention

International intervention into ethnic conflicts has been a topic of increasing academic interest in recent years, especially in light of the wars in Bosnia, Rwanda and Kosovo (Crocker 1999). A first distinction made in the resulting body of literature is between *unilateral intervention* by one country or a group of countries into a conflict, primarily for deriving benefits for themselves, and *multi-lateral intervention* by international organizations or a group of countries (Walker 1993: 165-180; Cooper and Berdal 1993: 181-206). While the latter might also bring some benefits for the countries participating in the intervention,³ the action is primarily motivated by two principles: stability and preventing the abuse of human rights. While these principles are complimentary, it is important to recognize that the abuse of human rights has been tolerated at times in order to achieve stability (and possibly vice versa). Despite alternative interpretations of international intervention into the wars in former Yugoslavia, this article contends that intervention was primarily motivated by these principles rather than by self-interest. While especially the United States has led intervention at different times, there has been a consistently high degree of involvement of a number of other countries and organizations in the former Yugoslavia. During the early stages of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the European Union had been the key player in advancing proposals for a

³ Such as preventing the flow of refugees into the intervening countries or economic opportunities in the target countries.



reconstruction of, first, Yugoslavia and later Croatia and Bosnia. During this process, the United Nations also had a role in the negotiations. Later on, the so-called 'Contact-Group', comprising France, Italy, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, became the primary broker. It was this group of countries which, under the leadership of the United States, was instrumental in securing the Dayton Peace Accords and making the Rambouillet negotiations possible. In terms of institutional design, the United Nations regained a role in Kosovo through the Special Representative of the Secretary General, while the European Union was the key negotiator in Macedonia in 2001 and with regard to the future of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2001 and 2002.

For the purposes of this article, the cases under consideration can be defined by two criteria:

1. International intervention has to be multilateral and not primarily motivated by the wish to dominate the country in question politically, militarily or economically. For example, the support provided by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Bosnian Serb leadership would not qualify, nor would the support given by some Islamic countries to the Bosnian government.
2. The intervention proposes and/or negotiates a fundamental transformation of the institutional system of the country in question. This might occur through a new constitution or a package of constitutional and legal reform. A number of the proposed plans did not formulate a specific constitution or reform package, but were abandoned at the stage of formulating general principles for institutional change.

Altogether, one can list 14 proposals and agreements (see Appendix), some of which remained general and without great detail (e.g., the Cutilheiro Plan), while others were imposed by the international community without negotiations (e.g., the Constitutional Framework for Kosovo). While most institutional changes were part of the peace agreements themselves, others, most notably the Constitutional Framework for Kosovo and the amendments to the entity constitutions in Bosnia were imposed in the post-conflict phase.⁴

In addition to international intervention in the process of institutional change, it is worth noting that in a large number of cases international organizations were also accorded a role in the implementation process of the agreement. The massive presence of international organizations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, as well as to a lesser degree in Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro provides ample evidence for this. The focus here is less on the military and humanitarian presence which is not concerned with institutional reform or the supervision thereof,⁵ but rather on international organizations which supervise newly created institutions or organizations and individuals who form an integral part of these structures. Here one can distinguish between three different types of involvement of the international organizations in question in terms of intensity:

1. The least formal role international organization have held when charged with supervising the implementation of the respective accords and reporting on its progress, rather than intervening themselves directly in the implementation. Usually their role was tied to (prospective) membership of the countries in

⁴ Most Agreements are reprinted in Trifunovska 1994; Trifunovska 1999. The Dayton Agreement is available at www.ohr.int, the Ohrid Agreement at: www.president.gov.mk/eng/info/dogovor.htm, the Serbia-Montenegro Agreement can be found at: www.ssinf.sv.gov.yu/.

⁵ The military presence has been, however, preoccupied with military reform in Bosnia, which has had some impact on the institutional set-up of the country and its entities.

question in these organizations, such as the Council of Europe or the OSCE. An enhanced role has been played by some international organizations when they were assigned a specific monitoring role by the peace agreements and were granted limited power to influence the implementation process directly. One such example is the OSCE Democratization and Human Rights Departments in Bosnia and Kosovo.

2. A higher degree of involvement expresses itself in the possibility of the organizations to engage actively in the implementation process. This prerogative manifests itself in two ways. Some organizations, such as the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia, have been able to act as an executive and a legislative organ by being granted the power to pass laws, take decisions and dismiss elected and appointed officials. Here the organizations become active if existing domestic institutions are unable (e.g., due to vetoes) or unwilling (e.g., due to obstructionist politicians) to take decisions or take decisions which are in violation of the agreement. This particular type of involvement means that international agencies take part in the country's or entity's governance in the absence of domestic institutions. Before the parliamentary elections in November 2001 and the subsequent establishment of a government in Kosovo in March 2002, the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations (SRSG) exercised this function, as did the election department of the OSCE in Bosnia with regard to the organization of the elections prior to the passing of the election law in August 2001.
3. Finally, international intervention has expressed itself by International Organizations being given a role in nominating positions in domestic (and constitutionally defined) institutions. Here, the distinction between international and domestic agencies has been particularly blurred. Especially in Bosnia, a number of domestic institutions—such as the Constitutional Court, the Central Bank, or the Human Rights Ombudsman—are staffed by international officials, nominated by key international organizations, including the Council of Europe, the World Bank and the OSCE. It could be argued that through these appointments international intervention is less profound than by exercising power through international organizations with far-reaching powers, such as the OHR, as the international appointees are part of the domestic institutional infrastructure and usually can only take decisions in cooperation with some of the local members of these institutions. At the same time, these offices form an integral part of the institutional set-up and do not constitute the super-structure of international organizations which is much more vulnerable to considerations of an 'exit strategy'.

The issue of the 'exit strategy' extends the discussion to the dimension of time. All international involvement and intervention is considered to be temporary, either explicitly, by giving concrete deadlines—which are more often than not broken—or by setting a particular agenda including an eventual 'hand-over' to local actors and institutions, or implicitly by creating a parallel domestic institutional infrastructure which is intended to take over from the international agencies. The transitory nature of international intervention placed limitations on the effectiveness of international organizations. For the organizations themselves the temporary nature of their presence delayed the creation of firm local structures and subjected strategic planning to 'exit strategy'. For some of the local political elites the limited timeframe for intervention encouraged the hope that it would be possible to 'wait out' the international presence to return to pre-intervention ethnic mobilization.

It is important to note here that one International Organization might not only fulfill a different function in the different countries under consideration here, but also within one country they might be tasked with a number of responsibilities which vary with regard to



intervention. The OSCE in Kosovo and Bosnia has, for example, been both a monitoring organization, as well as an implementing agency, especially with regard to elections.

Before examining the origins of the agreements, it is necessary to distinguish between different degrees of intervention in the institutional set-up. The weakest case of international intervention in the case of former Yugoslavia has been international agencies acting as mediators, attempting to bridge conflictual positions. However, even with this relatively limited degree of intervention, punishments and rewards were offered to participants for either participation in the process or for the willingness to find a compromise (Touval and Zartman 2001: 427-444). More frequently in the case of the 14 cases of intervention in former Yugoslavia, international organizations proposed a particular solution to the conflict, albeit based on the proposals and demands of the parties, and sought to secure support from the different parties for that solution. Although the suggested outcome might have been located somewhere between the different opposing positions, it rarely constituted a *compromise* borne out of the genuine will of the parties to seek a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The fact that over half of the major international initiatives under discussion here failed is evidence for the difficulties with ending ethnic conflict (Sisk 2001: 9-19). The fact that reaching an agreement even with international mediation and pressure was often evasive highlights the fact that a domestically negotiated settlement was beyond the reach of the parties to the conflict.

The Origins of Institutions

The ongoing intervention of international organizations requires drawing a more pronounced distinction with respect to the origins of former Yugoslavia's post-conflict institutions. As mentioned earlier, the presence of international actors in the countries and their formal and informal intervention into different institutional set-ups necessitated additional adjustments of the original internationally mediated or imposed institutional arrangements. In the case of Bosnia, the intervention, especially the constitutional amendments passed by the OHR in April 2002, were primarily concerned with the institutional arrangements in the entities, whereas in Kosovo the entire constitutional framework was imposed nearly two years after the beginning of international intervention in May 2001. In general, one can thus distinguish between institutions, which have been designed as part of the peace agreement, most notably in Dayton for Bosnia, and institutions, which are created or reformed during the implementation process, such as the two just mentioned. It would be a mistake, however, to establish a rigid dichotomy between these two types of origins of institutions. Rather, they mark the end points of a wider spectrum of interventions into institutional reform. Both the Ohrid Accords and the Belgrade Agreement on the future relationship of Serbia and Montenegro, for example, seek to end a conflict (one military, one political) through more or less detailed principles of constitutional and institutional reform. The reforms themselves, however, took place in the post-conflict phase—at least in the case of Macedonia⁶—and the institutions resulting from these changes are both an aspect of ending the conflict itself and a component of post-conflict institutional development. Thus, based on the cases under consideration here, it is more useful to draw a distinction between institutions that were brought about as part of an *intervention to end conflict* or as an aspect of *peace building* after the end of the conflict itself. An intermediary model, outlined above, features general framework for institutional arrangements as an aspect of conflict resolution (or transformation), while the details of these institutions are negotiated during the peace building phase.

⁶ The nature of the political conflict between Serbia and Montenegro was not transformed through the Belgrade agreement, but rather reframed. In fact, as political conflict, it is unlikely to be 'resolved' due to the firmness of the different positions, but it can be 'managed' and prevented from affecting other areas of policymaking.

It is not possible to dismiss any of the three approaches—institutional design as part of a peace-agreement, institutional development in post-conflict phase and the intermediary model—outright, as all have their merits, and, more importantly, lack alternatives. All three carry certain limitations, which need be considered. The design of a complete package of institutional reform including a constitution, as in the Dayton Accords, has the distinct advantage that once accepted, the institutional set-up of the country is no longer contentious, allowing, at least theoretically a shift to more issue-oriented politics. The Bosnian peace agreement does, however, provide evidence for a critique of this hypothetical outcome. The consent of the parties to the conflict at the end of the war cannot be translated into automatic support during the post-conflict phase. In fact, the post-war period in Bosnia has seen various groups, from nationalists of all three major groups to moderate politicians, criticizing the arrangement (Bieber 2002: 205-218). It could be argued that the insistence of the international community at not altering the Dayton Accords removed potentially divisive constitutional and institutional debates from public discussion. On the other hand, complete institution-building packages, such as the Dayton Accords or the failed Rambouillet Agreement, contain a number of inherent problems:

1. The need to secure support from the parties to the conflict, rather than the political parties in a post-conflict settings which might require considerably more limitations to the quality of the arrangement than at some later stage. As the president of the Jewish community in Bosnia, Jakob Finci, has pointed out, the three-member presidency—limited by ethnicity and geographical origins (Serb member from the Serb Republic and Croat and Bosniak member from the Federation)—was one of the first constitutional provisions which was agreed upon by the representatives at the peace talks in Dayton (Finci 2001).
2. Institutional arrangements negotiated to end a war are probably more difficult to adjust and change than subsequent institutional reforms, as they are closely tied to the end of the war itself and have been arrived at in a non-constitutional process.
3. The point in time at which new constitutional/institutional arrangements are concluded often lies before the actual post-war dynamics of ethnic relations emerge, and as such they can prove inadequate for managing ethnic relations under these new circumstances.

Institutions that are set-up during the peace-building phase address these three points of critique. They are able to be more process-oriented and can reflect the needs of the society more adequately. However, the record of former Yugoslavia suggests that they are more difficult to achieve than other forms of constitutional re-arrangements. Both the amendments to the entity constitutions and the Constitutional Framework for Kosovo were imposed, rather than negotiated. While this derives in part from the extraordinary powers of the international organizations tasked with overseeing the civilian aspects of the reconstruction process, there is evidence in both cases that consensual institution-building or reforms negotiated between the different communities in question would not have been possible. In the case of Bosnia, Wolfgang Petritsch, the High Representative at the time insisted that the reform ‘... is not an outright imposition as used to be the case previously. This is clearly a new approach, I would say, this is a partnership’ (Reuters 2002). While this assertion is correct insofar as there was a multi-party agreement, which only narrowly failed (Agreement 2002), the process of arriving at these constitutional changes necessitated by a constitutional court decision nearly two years prior to the amendments suggests heavy-handed international intervention (Perry 2002). In the case of the Constitutional Framework for Kosovo, local actors were merely consulted and the general response by both Serb and Albanian political representatives suggested a high degree of scepticism (Bieber 2003). While imposed institutional change



might thus be possible, the need for *imposition* implies the failure or impossibility *negotiating* institutional reforms in a post-conflict setting.

The challenges arising from both types of achieving institutional change would suggest an intermediary model as a possible means of addressing the above-mentioned difficulties. The mixed-type of drafting constitutional reform principles to end the conflict and allowing for negotiations on the details later has the inherent advantage of addressing the need for institutional change to end conflict, while encouraging a process leading to reform that might include more groups than peace negotiations typically would. As the protracted negotiations in Macedonia (Brunnbauer 2002) and between Serbia and Montenegro (ICG 2002) after the conclusion of the respective agreements show, some of the most contentious issues, which lead to the conflict, are not, or only insufficiently, addressed in more general principles of reform. Furthermore, the generally wide margin of interpretations might result in a drawn-out period of institutional uncertainty in which ethnic entrepreneurs can easily mobilize communities against the process or against other groups. As such, this intermediary path might be more viable in conflicts where violence is either entirely absent, as in the case of Montenegro, or rather limited, as was the case with Macedonia.

As a brief survey of the different origins of institutional reforms and transformations suggests, there is no single path which would be inherently more effective in achieving functional and legitimate institutions. The three models outlined above draw attention to the fact that the timing of institutional reform is of critical importance and that the quality, longevity and effectiveness of these reforms depends to a considerable degree upon the exact point in time at which they are decided.

Success and Failure of Institutions

When assessing the performance of the institutions established or transformed by the aforementioned agreements one is confronted with a difficulty deriving from their very nature. Ulrich Schneckener has pointed out in a comparative study of power-sharing arrangements that a key factor for their success is that they are perceived as domestic agreements rather than as externally imposed agreements (Schneckener 2000: 16). There are a number of reasons why agreements, which are driven by international rather than domestic actors, are less likely to succeed.

The first group of factors is linked to the political elites charged with the implementation process. Secondly, one has to examine the acceptance of the agreement with the larger population and members of the antagonistic communities.

The international community has faced numerous difficulties in negotiating agreements in former Yugoslavia. Some of the 'leaders' of the respective communities were discredited and indicted for war crimes by the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) at the time of the negotiations (Radovan Karadžic and Ratko Mladic in 1994/5, and Slobodan Miloševic in 1999), which limited the ability of international negotiators to engage them in the negotiation process. In addition, in a number of cases in the former Yugoslavia, as well as in other civil wars, there was an absence of a unified and legitimate leadership, which represents both the respective population and the centers of political and military power. As a result, there was often no single partner who could negotiate on behalf of one group, as exemplified by the difficulties surrounding the Albanian delegation for the Rambouillet Peace talks in 1999 (Weller 1999: 227). As a result, some peace agreements did not include some key leaders: the Dayton Peace Accords were not negotiated with either Bosnian Croat or Bosnian Serb political leaders; the Ohrid Agreement for Macedonia did not include the leadership of the UÇK. Whereas

indirect control mechanisms⁷ were in place to assure support for, or more frequently toleration of, the agreement, direct channels of communication were limited, allowing for obstruction of these agreements by those excluded.

Even if the elites involved in the negotiations are the main stakeholders in the implementation process, there has been little assurance of their commitment to it. The support by these elites was in most cases primarily motivated by their attempt to avoid penalization by international organizations rather than by support for the actual agreement. This points to a particular problem associated with the nature of the agreements. All but two of the agreements or impositions under consideration—Serbia-Montenegro and the Constitutional Framework for Kosovo—were tools to end armed conflict. As mentioned earlier, these agreements differ from conventional accords seeking to end wars, such as an armistice or a cease-fire. Generally, all the agreements in former Yugoslavia also contained a cease-fire component, which was generally met with much less resistance, either during the negotiations (when the agreements failed) or during the implementation (if they were agreed upon). Military disengagement has been generally more easily achieved due to the parties on the ground⁸ and the means at the disposal to Western policy makers. The main difficulties arose from the non-military, institutional components of the agreements. International organizations generally lacked the tools or experience to adequately enforce institutional reforms/designs stipulated by the agreements. Without venturing into an exploration of the reasons for the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, it is important to note that the political and intellectual elites played a pivotal role in mobilizing ethnic identities, which had not been of primary significance in large parts of former Yugoslavia for most of the decades before 1991. The same elites continued to govern the territories now administered by internationally devised institutional arrangements. While there is a general question regarding the ability of wartime elites to govern ethnically divided societies in the post-conflict era, this applies particularly when these elites mobilized the identities to trigger war and derived their legitimacy from it. Here only the conflict in Macedonia might be a possible exception where political elites were more reluctantly drawn into the conflict as elsewhere.

In addition to the general difficulties associated with empowering new generations of leaders who can re-build some degree of inter-communal trust, the political arrangements stipulated by the agreement largely amplified this difficulty. As all agreements foresee varying degrees of ethnicity-based autonomy, they do not only reward the ethnic entrepreneurs during the conflict, but they also provide these elites with fiefdoms, i.e., autonomies, where in the name of ethnicity, elites are provided with considerable powers and resources. The policy of international organizations towards this dilemma has been two-fold: Recognizing the need for institutions that do not only safeguard minority rights, but also promote group-based representation, while on the other hand attempting to marginalize elites which derived their legitimacy from representing exclusivist ethnic interest. Various strategies were pursued to weaken these groups, including:

1. openly or indirectly endorsing 'moderate' political parties;
2. holding frequent elections;
3. excluding parties and individuals from political offices on the basis of their program or performance;

⁷ In the case of Bosnia, both the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević were signatories to the agreement and exercised some control over the Croats and Serbs in Bosnia, respectively. In Macedonia, some communication between Albanian parties and the UÇK is likely to exist, as well as some informal communication between the organization and some international actors.

⁸ Parties often complied because they either managed to continue their hold on territory (as in Bosnia), or because the disarmament process was mostly symbolic and allowed the parties to continue to play an important military and/or political role (as in Kosovo and Macedonia).



4. setting conditions for political and economic support related to the policies pursued by, and the composition of, governments;
5. setting electoral rules which would favor moderate parties.

The problems of such policies for democratic governance have been discussed elsewhere (Chandler 1999; Pula 2003). Additionally, these policies have largely not been very successful (ESI 2001). While some individuals have been politically marginalized, ethnicity has not only remained the prime divider in the political spectrum, major political parties continue to endorse extremist goals and do not seek co-existence with other ethnic groups (Papic 2001: 33). The only—rather weak—achievements have been a tuning down of nationalist rhetoric through the threat of sanctions against parties and politicians by international organizations and the ability to engineer a moderate coalition in Bosnia, which succeeded in taking power by a narrow margin in early 2001, lasting for barely two years until the elections in October 2002.

In addition to the limits of internationally driven institutional (re-) arrangements at the elite level, one has to note difficulties with regard to their acceptance by the population at large. Whether agreements are signed in post- or pre-conflict settings, their conclusion is based on the need for institutional change. Previous institutions did not properly manage ethnic relations and lacked legitimacy with one or more of the key groups in the society in question. Without these two factors, and the inability to carry out successful 'domestic' reforms of failing or failed institutions, internationally driven processes of institutional design would not have been required. As such, the new institutions should not only end the conflict, but also address its causes, i.e., the lack of functionality and legitimacy, which led to the breakdown of the previous system.

Functionality can be examined from two angles. The first one pertains to the ability to take and implement decisions. Thus this aspect is largely related to state strength and weakness. Functionality is limited by the absence of sufficient control of the central authorities over the country's territory. Currently, neither governments of Macedonia, Kosovo, Serbia, and Bosnia⁹ exerted control over all its territory. This absence of control is only partly the result of the post-conflict setting; it is equally the result of the weakness of many institutions and the conflictual nature between state and local authorities—under control of different ethnic groups. The functionality of institutions is furthermore constrained at the centre, where complex and cumbersome decision-making process—a result of elaborate veto rights and broad ethnic representation—further reduce the limited powers central governments have.

The second dimension of functionality is specific to Eastern Europe. As European Integration provides for the only viable long-term development path for all countries (and regions) under consideration here, functionality has to be viewed in the context of integration into the EU. Past agreements, including the Dayton Peace Agreement and the Belgrade Agreement on Serbia and Montenegro construct fractured sovereignty with insufficient power either at the level of the sub-state units (republics or entities) or at the central level for the countries to engage in Euroatlantic integration processes, including approximation to the EU and NATO.¹⁰ The institutional arrangements are thus not functional in their capacity to secure approach mainstream European integration.

⁹ Government control in Bosnia recently increased with the establishment of the state-level State Border Service which took control of the country's international borders. Nevertheless, the state institutions have only limited means available to influence municipalities, cantons or entities.

¹⁰ Bosnia has been required to establish a joint army command to join Partnership for Peace, whereas Serbia and Montenegro were required to establish an internal market and customs union to participate in the Stabilization and Association process, two aspects not part of the Belgrade Agreement (Dnevni Avaz 2002, Patten 2002).

Turning to the issue of legitimacy of these institutions. Even if legitimacy of the institutions has been secured in the eyes of the political elites, this does not translate into popular legitimacy. Some proponents of the 'elite-manipulation' approach would argue that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia originated with elites and their consent is more crucial than that of wider populations. They would furthermore point out the ability of elites to engineer support. One piece of evidence to support this interpretation has been the construction of support for the Vance-Owen peace plan in Serbia. Originally, Slobodan Milošević opposed this plan for Bosnia. Once Milošević endorsed the plan under international pressure and instructed RTS, the state television, to change its tone of reporting on the plan from negative to positive, opposition among the population turned to support. On 9 April 1993, before the change in strategy, 70% of Serbs in Yugoslavia opposed the plan. By early May 1993, 61.7% signaled their support for the same plan in opinion polls (Economist 1993: 35).¹¹ While the control over the media and state apparatus in former Yugoslavia allowed authoritarian nationalist political elites to mobilize support for agreements, governments that are more democratic do not have the same means at their disposal for mobilizing support. Support for recent agreements has been luke-warm at best, partly as a result of less-than enthusiastic support from political elites, partly due to the complexity of these agreements and in part also due to the prevalence of uncompromising nationalism. Especially the members of the dominant communities have been more reluctant to endorse the agreements and the junior partners.

There are two recent examples for this trend. The Ohrid Agreement was only supported by 43.7% of Macedonians in its immediate aftermath, while 50.7% opposed it. Only among Albanians, the support reached 78% (INET 2001; Finn 2001: A26). In the first post-agreement period, the opposition by Macedonians actually increased to 56% in October 2002 and 63% in May 2002 (Judah 2002). The fact that the moderate and pro-agreement Socialdemocratic Alliance won the September 2002 elections can be partly attributed to other political issues, namely corruption, and the fact that the nationalist VMRO, despite criticizing the Ohrid Accords, failed to offer an alternative (NDI 2002). The agreement of Serb-Montenegrin relations received similarly little support among the dominant community. In a survey in Serbia two weeks after the signing of the agreement 46.6% opposed it, while only approximately 35% supported it (Blic 2002). In Montenegro on the other hand, nearly 62% supported the Belgrade Agreement shortly after it was signed (CEDEM 2002).

In addition to the short-term acceptance of agreements, one has to consider the long-term legitimacy they seek to provide. Even short-term support engineered through media campaigns does not necessarily translate into the long-term legitimacy of institutions. In Bosnia five years after the signing of the peace accords, a majority of 60.8% among those surveyed in *Republika Srpska* supported either the entity as an independent state or its accession to the Federal Republic Yugoslavia. In majority Croat areas of the Federation, the support for joining Croatia stood at 4.4%, while 37.6% favored the creation of a separate territorial unit within or outside Bosnia (UNDP 2001b: 33). Confidence in the state institutions is even lower, with approximately 65% of Serbs and more than 80% of Croats having no confidence in state institutions (parliament, presidency, and council of ministers) (UNDP 2001b: 12). A considerable majority of its Bosnia's citizens have little confidence in its institutions, do not seek to preserve the state and lack any attachment to the state (Vukovic 2001).

¹¹ While such surveys tend to have high margins of error due to the volatile climate in which they are carried out, they point to a trend. The effects of such media engineering are probably generally limited. As the first post-war elections in Bosnia indicate, even though the widely-viewed Serbian television (RTS) promoted the National Alliance for Freedom and Peace, the Serb Democratic Party still won with a margin of more than 5:1.



The reasons for the lack of legitimacy of a significant share of the agreements for former Yugoslavia derives from four factors:

1. While *nationalist sentiment* has been clearly mobilized by political elites, it has proven to be difficult to demobilize it and to undermine the primacy of national identity over other political identities in multinational settings.
2. As international actors authored most agreements and play a significant role in the implementation of these agreements, there is a sense of a *lack of ownership* over the agreements and their implementation. This is in part deliberately mobilized by nationalist elites to undermine the agreements, especially in anticipation of the period following the departure of international implementation agencies (Solioz and Dizdarevic 2001).
3. The agreements are generally *complex* in their institutional substance, the layering of sovereignty and the implementation process. The location of competences has often lacked any degree of transparency, even to political analysts.
4. Finally their *performance* has not been as successful as hoped for by a large part of the population, especially in terms of economic improvements and re-Europeanization of the countries in question.

Conclusion: The Need for Institutional (Re-) Design

The performance and legitimacy of institutions are key to drawing lessons from the current institutional arrangements and defining an agenda for change. Debates about re-design in recent years were less informed by performance than by moral rights and wrongs underlying the original agreements.¹² A comprehensive assessment of the performance of these institutions, extending beyond the consideration offered here, will have to take into account an evaluation of the capacity of the institutions to take decisions. As such, it has to consider the use of veto rights and other mechanisms to delay or prevent decision-making. In addition to the decision-making capacity of institutions, the implementation capacity has to be examined, as the different layers of autonomies and governance established in all countries and territories under consideration here often do not share ethnic dominance with the rule-making bodies and/or have different interests. Extending beyond the functional performance, the quality of the institutions has to be scrutinized. As critics of power-sharing arrangements have pointed out in other cases, power-sharing institutions run the risk of diminishing the quality of democracy, resulting from their complexity and primacy of ethnicity over the equal representation of all citizens (Bieber 1999: 79-94; Sisk 1996: 38-40). This qualitative consideration can be transferred to most other types of institutionalized ethnicity and is exacerbated in the former Yugoslavia by the substantial role played by non-domestic actors in the implementation and the governance of these institutions.

As has been highlighted in this article, there is a need to assess the performance and structure of institutions, which have emerged in former Yugoslavia as an integral part of peace agreements. The non-domestic origins of many of the institutional reforms in the former Yugoslavia have created a series of particular problems and need to be assessed in a differentiated manner. The attempt to manage diversity and to reject both disintegration and parallel trends of homogenization, as well as denying states full sovereignty when it comes to suppressing non-dominant ethnic groups, has to be welcomed. As such internationally driven institutional reform has been a constructive development of conflict management. Despite the flaws of these agreements, one has to

¹² The debates about constitutional change in Bosnia following the constitutional court decision give only little room to actual functionality of deeply entrenched power-sharing combined with ethnic federalism, but focused more on undoing some of the injustices incorporated in the institutional set-up of the two entities, especially in the Republika Srpska (Perry 2002).

note the frequent lack of alternatives, especially of 'homegrown' ones. However, it would be misleading to establish a dichotomy between exclusivist domestic institutional change and inclusive internationally driven processes of institutional reform. Institutional change in former Yugoslavia, both domestically and internationally generated, has been moving towards the primacy of ethnicity. Some systems have been mono-national, other agreements established bi- or tri-national states. Only in Macedonia, some aspects of the Ohrid Agreement constitute a move away from institutionalized ethnicity. Even here this move away is at the symbolic level (in the preamble of the constitution), while the institutions of the state are given strong ethnic qualifiers.

In order to overcome two problems associated with a number of these institutional arrangements—lack of legitimacy and functionality—a process of institutional re-design and/or change needs to be initiated. This process can only be successful, if these institutions become more domestic in both their origins and their identification and if they manage to perform better. Both will be a source of legitimacy, which is a prerequisite for these mechanisms of conflict management to become sustainable beyond the end of an international presence in the region.

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Appendix : International Intervention in the Institutional Set-up of the Former Yugoslavia (1991-2002)¹³

Country	Proposals/ Agreement	Year	Status	International Organization	Degree of Intervention	Type of Arrangement							
						Territorial					Non-territorial		
						Local Self- government	Regional Autonomy	Cantonization	Federation	Confederation	Cultural Autonomy	Power-sharing without Veto	Power-sharing
Yugoslavia	Haag Conference/ Carrington Plan	1991	R	EU	International Treaty					X			
Bosnia	Cutilheiro Plan	1992	R	EU	Constitution			X					
Bosnia	Vance -Owen Plan	1993	R	EU/UN	Constitution			X	X				
Bosnia	Owen -Stoltenberg Plan	1993/4	R	EU/UN	Constitution				X				
Bosnia	Contact Group Plan	1994	R	Contact Group	Constitution					X			
Bosnia/ Federation	Washington Agreement	1994	I	USA	Constitution			X	X				X
Croatia	Z 4 Plan	1995	R	Contact Group	Constitutional Reform	X	X					X	
Bosnia	Dayton Peace Accord	1995	PI	Contact Group/USA	Constitution				X	X			X
Yugoslavia/ Kosovo	Rambouillet	1999	R	Contact Group/USA	Constitution		X						X
Yugoslavia/ Kosovo	UN Sec. Council Res. 1244	1999	PI	UN	International Status		X						
Kosovo	Constitutional Framework	2001	I	UN (SRSG)	Constitution						X	X	
Macedonia	Ohrid Accord	2001	PI	EU	Constitutional reform	X						X	
Montenegro & Serbia	Belgrade Agreement	2002	n/a	EU	Constitution framework				X	X			X
Bosnia (Federation & RS)	Constitutional Amendments	2002	I	OHR	Amendments to Entity Constitutions								X

¹³ In some cases, the agreements are to be located between different types of arrangements (i.e., between confederation and federation). Some reforms that were instituted under international pressure are not included here, such as the Croat law on cultural autonomy for Serbs in 1991. Furthermore, some international processes have been excluded (such as the Hill process for Kosovo) and other more tentative initiatives. The Erdut agreement for the reintegration of Eastern Slavonia into Croatia, concluded in 1995, is also not included here as it did translate into a permanent autonomy or change of the Croatian constitutional arrangement. R= Rejected, I=Implemented, PI=Partly Implemented.



The Irish and their Nation: A Survey of Recent Attitudes

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Introduction

In a series of essays published in the months preceding the Easter Rising of 1916, Pádraic Pearse expressed his thoughts about the Irish people and their nation. Echoing a sentiment that many in his day embraced, he wrote, 'Irish rationality is an ancient spiritual tradition, and the Irish nation could not die as long as that tradition lived in the heart of one faithful man or woman' (1924: 304). As in previous armed rebellions, the 1916 Easter Rising failed to force the British from Ireland, and Pearse, who had proclaimed himself president of the provisional Irish government during the five-day insurrection, was ultimately executed along with fifteen other rebel leaders. Despite its lack of immediate success, the Easter Rising is now viewed as the event marking the beginning of the end of British rule, and Pearse has since taken his place in the pantheon of Irish heroes alongside such figures as Wolfe Tone, Robert Emmet, Daniel O'Connell, Thomas Davis, and Brian Boru, the first High King of Ireland. Pearse's reflections on the nation are important not only for their historical significance within Ireland, but because they also reflect the sentiment associated with national identity everywhere: self-sacrifice, pride, community, history, rebirth, and popular participation. Throughout the world, nations remain objects of affiliation, and, as this study reveals, the Irish people continue to display a strong attachment to their nation, much as Pearse foretold in his early twentieth-century essay.

The concept of the modern nation has generated extensive and lively discussions among scholars at least since the publication of Ernest Renan's influential 1882 essay (1990). One current area of debate concerns the way in which key terms such as the nation, national identity, and nationalism are to be defined (Isijiw 1974; Richmond 1987; LeVine 1997; Tilley 1997). There are now countless and often contradictory definitions of these basic concepts, leading some to conclude that there may be as many definitions as there are those who study the phenomena (Sugar 1981: 67). Connor (1978, 1987, and 1993) has been the most persistent in highlighting this 'terminological chaos', insisting that clear definitions be adopted which distinguish 'the nation' and its affiliated concepts from other phenomena. Smith's (1991) definitions of the basic terms are helpful for this study because they are comprehensive, widely-cited, and largely absent the ideological bias associated with so many other conceptualizations (Billig 1995). National identity is conceived of as a collective identity characterized by a historic territory, common myths and memories, common mass public culture, common legal rights, and common economy and territorial mobility. A nation is a human population sharing that collective identity, while nationalism is 'an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation' (pp. 14, 73).

Aside from the terminological debate, the most enduring discussions, and arguably the most influential, have centered on the origin and fundamental essence of the nation. The 'existence' of nations has been linked to such diverse phenomena as naturally occurring biological, psychological, and sociological human needs (Shils 1957; Rothschild 1981; Van den Berghe 1981), various social, economic, or political processes (Geertz 1963; Haas, 1964; Deutsch 1966; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Smith 1994), social construction and imagination (Anderson 1991; Brass 1991; Chatterjee 1993), and economic cleavages (Hechter 1975; Nairn 1977). Similarly, another debate has concerned attempts to categorize nationalism based upon its internal characteristics and/or ideology. The most commonly embraced typology, found in such classic works by Hayes (1931), Kohn (1967), and Smith (1983), is that which distinguishes between a rational/civic/French/Western form of nationalism and an emotional/ethnic/German/

Eastern type. Typically, value labels are associated with this dichotomy whereby the rational/civic type becomes viewed as the 'good' nationalism and the emotional/ethnic type as the 'bad' nationalism (Brown 1999).

The aforementioned debates have been productive, but whatever the fundamental nature of nationalism or the nation may be, it is clear that individuals manifest an attachment to the national collective rivalling the salience of any other individual-group bond. As a result, there is a continuing need to focus on other issues such as the essence, depth, and attraction of the bond between the individual and the nation (Stern 1995). This area of inquiry is especially important because as Druckman (1994: 44) notes, 'the feelings of attachment that comprise loyalty for many are not whimsical but are generally basic to the individual's definitions of themselves. Loyalty to a group strengthens one's identity and sense of belonging.' The nation has proven to be such an important object of attachment that alone or in tandem with the state, it is treated as a political entity, political leaders regularly invoke its name, and people express a willingness to sacrifice their lives for it. While this study is not an attempt to explain how the nation emerged, how it endures, or whether national identity or nationalism is good, bad, rational, or irrational, it does endeavour to examine the nature of national attachment by exploring the salience of national identity in Ireland and the place that particular national characteristics have in conceptions of Irishness.

The Irish nation, like most others, has been the subject of extensive scholarly attention. Much of that effort has focused on the evolution of Irish nationalism, the historical development of the Irish nation, and the composition of Irish identity. Boyce (1995) and Kee (1972) provide perhaps the most comprehensive historical accounts of Irish nationalism from the time of the ancient Celts to the present conflict in Northern Ireland. Their research illustrates the integral role of nationalism in the long struggle for Irish independence, the influence of nationalism on Irish politics, and the evolution of Irish national identity. A similar work by Rumpf and Hepburn (1977) examines the interaction between nationalism and socialism in twentieth century Ireland, addressing the effect these two ideological movements have had on Irish politics.

Other studies have concentrated on the composition of Irish nationalism or the nature, traits, or symbols of both the past and present Irish nation. Alter (1974) explores a pivotal period in Irish history known as the Home Rule Movement (1870-1918) and identifies several national symbols of the time including the green flag, the harp, and national festivals. For Archer (1984), the Easter Rising is a major national symbol, and he contends that Irish nationalism has been shaped by distorted images the Irish have of themselves and of the English. Cronin (1983) outlines five nationalist currents in Irish history: traditionalist nationalism, constitutional nationalism, physical-force republicanism, radical republicanism, and cultural nationalism. Bromage (1968) suggests language, religion, and land are the central components of traditional Irish identity, while McCaffrey (1989) concurs and adds ethnic origin as an additional characteristic. Girvin (1986) too cites religion and the language as symbols of the Irish nation and national identity. White (1996) describes an historic Irish national identity shaped by mythical Gaelic origins, devout Catholicism, and agrarianism. Furthermore, White concludes that contemporary Irish identity is a product of socio-economic modernization, and thus a blend of the traditional identity with more secular, cosmopolitan, European, and materialistic ideas. Similarly, Hutchinson (1987) stresses that the character of the modern Irish state has been shaped by a cultural nationalism, which is agrarian, Catholic, and Gaelic in nature. Cullen (1980) describes Irish nationalism as 'narrow and inward looking' and a 'product of colonialism' (p. 104-105). O'Mahony and Delanty (1998) identify two strands to Irish national identity: it is backward looking, seeking a return to traditional, Catholic Ireland; it is also forward looking in the sense of adapting to ongoing social change. Finally, Garvin (1996) contends that Ireland is now in a post-nationalist



stage in which most of the fundamentalist rhetoric associated with early independence has been abandoned.

Rather than hypothesizing about the nature of Irish national identity or examining the influence of nationalism on political events in Ireland, this study utilizes public opinion survey data to explore the appeal, depth, and composition of Irish national identity. First, data from a 1995 International Social Survey Programme survey are examined to assess the salience of Irish national identity, levels of pride in various national characteristics, and the importance of certain criteria for being considered a member of the Irish nation. With data gathered from twenty-three countries, the attitudes found in Ireland are also compared to those from the other surveyed countries. Then, Eurobarometer public opinion data collected over the past two decades are analyzed to assess levels of national pride and collective self-identification in Ireland and how such attitudes compare with those found throughout other European Union countries. Public opinion data on the subject of national identity are limited, especially the cross-national variety, and thus these surveys provide a unique opportunity not only to examine Irish opinion, but also to place it within a comparative context. This twofold analysis, while not intended to prove or disprove any specific theory of national identity, adds to the wider body of knowledge by providing a greater understanding of the nature of Irish identity and the relevance of the nation within the Republic today.

ISSP Analysis

The International Social Survey Programme designs and coordinates annual cross-national surveys, each of which focuses on a single theme in the social sciences such as religion, family, work, or the environment. In 1995, ISSP developed a questionnaire dealing exclusively with national identity and its many facets including attachment to the nation, national pride, and national symbols and characteristics. The survey was administered that year to nearly 31,000 individuals in twenty-three countries throughout Europe, North America, and the western Pacific.¹⁴ Of particular interest in that survey were questions dealing with feelings of closeness to the nation, the importance of certain national traits, and feelings of pride in political, social, and economic components of the nation.

Among all of the questions included on the survey, perhaps the most fundamental for assessing levels of national attachment was:

*How close do you feel to Ireland?*¹⁵

Participants could choose from one of the following responses: *very close*, *close*, *not very close*, and *not close at all*. Clearly, the proportion of those who indicated that they felt *very close* to their nation provides a good indication of the depth of national identification. Among those surveyed in Ireland, over one-half of the respondents, 53.8%, expressed this strongest feeling of attachment to the nation. By comparison, only 45.5% of the entire ISSP survey population held that same view. Ireland's figure ranked ninth highest among the twenty-three countries with Hungary having the largest proportion at 79.6% and the Philippines the fewest at 21.9%. Further discussion of the general attachment to the Irish nation is found below in the analysis of the Eurobarometer data.

¹⁴ The survey was administered in Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United States. The sample size in each country varied from a low of 994 in Ireland to a high of 2,438 in Australia.

¹⁵ Each question examined will be presented as it appeared on the Irish questionnaire. On other questionnaires, the appropriate country/nationality label was used consistent with the survey location.

The ISSP survey is helpful in other respects because it provides an opportunity to examine what have been described earlier as features or symbols of the Irish nation. Within that body of literature, religion, land, and the Gaelic tradition emerge as the most commonly agreed upon characteristics of the Irish nation. Collectively, these represent what Smith (1991) described as the attributes of an ethnic nation as opposed to institutional or legal characteristics which would define a civic nation. A number of ISSP survey questions address these national components, thereby providing an opportunity to assess the importance of them to the Irish people. Before proceeding however, it must be noted that the following analysis is not an attempt to test whether these previously cited elements are fundamental to the conception of the Irish nation. The ISSP survey was not designed for that purpose, nor is a survey necessarily the best way to accomplish such a task. The examination of this data simply provides a contribution to the ongoing effort to understand the nature and appeal of the Irish nation.

The first characteristic of the Irish nation to be explored is religion. In the minds of many, a link between Catholicism and the Irish nationalist movement extends back at least to the early nineteenth century and the political movement led by Daniel O'Connell. Since then, religion has been cited by politicians, scholars, nationalists, and others as a core component of Irish national identity (Murphy 1988). John Dillon (1851-1927), a prominent Irish nationalist and member of the British Parliament, spoke of this connection in 1890:

The day is gone by and I thank God for it, when anyone can sow dissension between the religion of the Irish people and the nationality of the Irish people, which it has always been our proudest boast have been kept in harmony, bound together by links which no Government and no coercion can tear asunder. The religion and nationality of the Irish people are bound today by stronger bonds than ever, which no power, whether it be a Catholic bishop or a Coercion Government, will ever sunder. (Boyce 1995: 219-220)

Sentiment of this sort still prevails today, and it may be attributed to the historically active role of the Church in Irish politics, frequent references to Catholicism in nationalist discourse, a population which today is nearly 95% Catholic, and a church attendance rate which is the highest in Europe. In identifying Catholicism as a core component of the nation, the assumption is that the people themselves perceive being Catholic as a compatible with, if not altogether necessary for, being Irish. This proposition, along with the general relationship between religion and national identity, is explored through the following ISSP survey question:


To be truly Irish, how important do you think it is to be a Catholic?

Of the four possible responses to this question (*very important*, *fairly important*, *not very important*, and *not important at all*), nearly one-third of Irish respondents, 32.1%, indicated that they thought it was *very important* to be a Catholic in order to be truly Irish. Among all those surveyed by ISSP, the proportion of respondents who held that belonging to their nation's dominant religion or denomination was very important for nationality was only 19.7% (see Figure 1). Thus, the proportion of Irish embracing that view was over 60% higher than the corresponding figure for the entire survey population, and Ireland ranked third behind Bulgaria (45.5%) and the United States (38.6%) among countries having the largest proportion of respondents with such an opinion. The lowest figures were found in the Netherlands (3.3%), Sweden (7.5%), and Norway (9.7%). If the respondents who indicated that religion was *fairly important* are included with those who thought it is *very important*, the proportion of Irish who viewed Catholicism as being linked to Irishness was 54.4%, nearly 50% higher than the corresponding overall survey figure of 36.9%. This finding appears to support the



contention of those such as Bromage (1968), Girvin (1986), Hutchinson (1987), McCaffrey (1989), White (1996), and O'Mahony and Delanty (1998) who identify religion as a primary element in Irish national identity. The data also seem compatible with Smith's (1991) contention that a common mass public culture, of which religion is a part, is a fundamental element of national identity in general.

Figure 1 percentage of respondents viewing selected criteria as very important for nationality, 1995.



Source: *International Social Science Programme*

Turning next to land as a national characteristic, as noted previously some have suggested that the Irish nation has long been associated with agrarian and rural qualities. This emphasis would seem appropriate given the historically rural nature of Irish society and the central role that farmers and peasants played in uprisings against British rule. More generally though, the essential point is the notion of land itself being integral to the conception of the nation, whereby territory becomes the 'homeland' and individuals associate their national belonging with being born and/or residing for extended periods within those boundaries. The strength of such a bond cannot be overestimated; within nearly all nations, substantial emphasis is placed on the territorial boundaries demarcating one's nation from others. Such a view is often accompanied by some historical claim to that land and a distinction between those who are tied to it and those who are not. Eamon de Valera (1882-1975), the most important twentieth-century Irish political leader, reflected this sentiment when he stated:

We were originally Celts here with an ancient civilization and systems of laws. The Norsemen and the Normen [sic] were invaders. They secured the supreme political power but, underneath, the overwhelming majority of our own people – the great body of the nation – adhered to their own way of thought and preserved their original Celticity. (Bromage 1968: 25)

His contention that 'we' (the Irish) were 'here' (in the territory) before the 'invaders' (them) illustrates the way in which territory and the possession of it becomes imbedded in conceptions of nationhood.

The ISSP survey focuses on this relationship between land and national identity with two survey questions. The first looks at the significance of birthplace and its connection to perceptions of national belonging.

To be truly Irish, how important do you think it is to have been born in Ireland?

Available responses to this question were identical to those associated with the previous question on religion, and thus those who thought it was a *very important* criterion for nationality is again of most interest. The proportion of respondents who indicated that being born in Ireland was very important for being considered Irish was 58.1%. In contrast, the proportion of all those surveyed who viewed birth location as very important for nationality was 38.7% (see Figure 1). As with the preceding question on religion, the percentage of Irish attaching great importance to this characteristic was higher than the overall survey figure by more than 50%. Among all countries in the ISSP survey, the largest proportions of respondents expressing this strong view regarding birth and nationality were found in the Philippines (70.9%), followed by Bulgaria (58.6%) and then Ireland. The Netherlands (23.4%), Canada (24.7%), and Sweden (27.3%) had the lowest figures.

The second survey question addressing land as a component of national identity involves the importance placed on living within the national boundaries.

To be truly Irish, how important do you think it is to have lived in Ireland for most of one's life?

Among the Irish, 49.3% indicated that they believed to be truly Irish it was *very important* to have lived in Ireland most of one's life. This figure was considerably greater than the level of 36.4% found for the entire survey population (see Figure 1). When compared to all twenty-three countries in the survey, Ireland ranked fourth behind the Philippines (57.6%), Bulgaria (50.5%), and Austria (49.9%) in having the largest proportion of respondents holding this view. The lowest levels were found in the Netherlands (21%), Canada (23.3%), and Australia (26.7%). It is intriguing that such significant numbers of Irish would hold these opinions considering the nation's long and well documented history of emigration. One might have hypothesized that the Irish would be less concerned about linking birth or residence with nationality since millions of Irish over the last century and a half were compelled to live abroad, in many cases permanently, because of poor economic conditions in the country. Overall though, these responses reflect, as Bromage (1968), Hutchinson (1987), McCaffrey (1989), and White (1996) noted, the integral role of territory in forming the bond between individual and the Irish nation, as well as Smith's (1991) assertion that an historic territory is one of the core components of national identity.

The final characteristic of the Irish nation often mentioned by scholars might be broadly described as the Gaelic tradition. It is comprised of at least three components – language, history, and culture – and is that aspect of nationality which, in the minds of many, truly distinguishes the Irish from all other nations. As Douglas Hyde (1860-1949), later to become the first president of the Irish Republic, asserted in 1897, 'I believe it is our Gaelic past which, though the Irish race does not recognize it just at present, is really at the bottom of the Irish heart, and prevents us becoming citizens of the empire' (O'Donoghue 1999: 139).

The first element of the Gaelic tradition, the Irish language, is perhaps the most commonly mentioned attribute of the Irish nation. It was spoken by the majority of the



population well into the nineteenth century, but beginning around the 1840s, the number of Irish speakers began a rapid and steady decline due to the establishment of national schools, in which instruction was primarily in English, and mass emigration during the Famine (Comerford 1989; Johnson 1993). Since independence, there has been an ongoing effort to preserve and expand Irish language use, and according to the most recent census figures, 43% of the population claim to be able to speak Irish and approximately 10% of the population indicate that they speak it on a daily basis. However, these figures are self-reported and it is generally assumed that the actual number of native Irish speakers is lower. In the ISSP survey, the following question addresses the place of language in the conception of nationality:

To be truly Irish, how important do you think it is to be able to speak Irish?

Among those surveyed in all twenty-three countries, 59.6% felt that it was *very important* to be able to speak their language to be considered a member of their nation. The highest proportions were found in Hungary (79%), the Czech Republic (74.4%), and Norway (73.7%). By contrast, only 14.5% of Irish respondents indicated that they felt that it was *very important* to be able to speak Irish in order to be considered Irish (see Figure 1). Not only was the proportion of Irish with that attitude less than one-fourth of that for the overall survey population, it was by far the lowest among all countries. Spain, which had the second lowest proportion of respondents attaching great significance to the language, had a figure, 32.4%, which was still double that found in Ireland. On this national characteristic, Irish attitudes were dramatically different from those in any other surveyed country.

In literature, song, and political discourse, the Irish language is framed as an integral component of the nation. Arthur Griffith (1871-1922), recognized as one of the founders of the Irish Republic, remarked that without the Irish language 'there will never be seen again, on this planet, an independent Irish nation, or indeed an Irish nation of any kind' (Boyce 1995: 296). Despite sentiment such as this, the response level associated with the previous survey question highlights a paradox associated with the link between language and nationality, something which has long been recognized by even the most ardent nationalists. The Irish may embrace the general premise that their language is a primary national characteristic, yet the vast majority of them can't speak it fluently or don't speak it on a regular basis. Thus when pressed about its connection to nationality, as in the above question, the majority of people simply cannot require mastery of the Irish language as a necessary criterion for belonging to the nation. If they did, there would be far fewer individuals who could be considered truly Irish. These findings though do not necessarily contradict the position of those who specifically identify language as a vital component of Irishness (Bromage 1968; Girvin 1986; McCaffrey 1989). It appears as if the Irish language can be a characteristic of both the nation and national identity, so long as it is embraced as a 'symbolic' rather than a 'functional' element.

The second part of the Gaelic tradition is history. For all nations, history entails the perception that the community is hundreds or thousands of years old, or even so ancient that its origin has been lost in the mist of time. Such a collective is comprised of members bound together by common memories and a shared historical experience which differentiates their nation from all others. It matters little whether this history is grounded in fact or myth or some mixture of the two. The important point of history is that this shared memory and experience generates a sense of legitimacy, continuity, and permanence to the nation, thereby providing the basis for the claim that the nation exists and will exist because it has always existed.

The ISSP survey addresses both history and the final component of the Gaelic tradition, culture, through a series of questions probing levels of pride in those national

characteristics. While national pride is not necessarily synonymous with national identity or nationalism, it reflects individual sentiments toward the nation in much the same way. As evident from Smith's (1991) definitions of national identity and nationalism noted above, the link between all three of these concepts rests with the bond between individual and nation, and national pride has rightly been treated as manifestation of national attachment (Terhune 1964; Rose 1985; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Larsen, et al. 1992; Dogan 1994; Kowalski and Wolfe 1994; Mummendey, Klink, and Brown 2001). Moreover, previous research on the same ISSP national pride questions considered below revealed that national pride could be grouped into two categories approximating Smith's (1991) distinction between civic and ethnic national identity. Furthermore, that research also indicated that each type of pride and its national identity counterpart were associated with similar levels of xenophobia (Hjerm 1998). Thus, these studies confirm the reliability of national pride as an indicator of national identity.

Returning to the analysis of the ISSP data, the survey provides insight into the place of history as a part of the Gaelic tradition with the question:


How proud are you of Ireland's history?

With available responses ranging from *very proud* to *not proud at all*, those who indicated that they were *very proud* of their history represent the strongest bond between individual and nation. The proportion of Irish with such an attitude was 53.2%, while just 33.5% of the entire survey population held that same view. Thus, the proportion of Irish expressing this highest level of pride in their nation's history was nearly 60% above the corresponding figure for the survey population (see Figure 2). Bulgaria (64.6%) had the highest proportion of respondents with that opinion and Ireland was second followed by the Czech Republic (50.1%). The lowest levels were found in Germany (8.7%), Sweden (17.3%), and the Netherlands (19.5%). Thus, the data support the claim that history is an element of Irishness (Archer 1984; White 1996), and they reflect Smith's (1991) proposition that common myths and memories are fundamental to the composition of national identity.

The final component of the Gaelic tradition is culture, which includes elements such as the arts, literature, and sports. While arts and literature are rather straightforward in their relationship to culture, uniquely Irish sports such as hurling and Gaelic football are also part of the Irish tradition. Such games are widely played and followed throughout Ireland today, and they have long been part of the Irish experience; Gaelic football dates to at least the seventeenth century and hurling has been played in one form or another for over one thousand years. The Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA), which is responsible for promoting and regulating these games, illustrates this link between sports and national identity. Beyond its sporting responsibilities, the GAA has deliberately cast itself as a defender of the Gaelic tradition and maintained close ties to various nationalist political movements since its founding in 1884 (Mandle 1987; Cronin 1999). Sean McCague, the president of the Gaelic Athletic Association, celebrated the importance of culture when remarking, 'There is unity of mind in being Irish. Our games, our heritage, our music, dance and our built and green heritage are all part of what we are' (Logue 2000: 137).



Figure 2: Percentage of respondents who are very proud of selected national characteristics, 1995



Source: *International Social Science Programme*

The relevance of games for conceptions of Irishness is evident from the response to the ISSP question:

How proud are you of Ireland's achievements in sports?

Among the Irish, 69.1% indicated that they were *very proud* of their nation's achievements, a figure which was double the response of 34.4% for the entire survey population and the highest of all the twenty-three countries surveyed (see Figure 2). Other high levels of pride were found in New Zealand (66.4%) and Bulgaria (65.9%), while Poland (8.0%), Slovakia (19.0%), and the Czech Republic (19.2%) had the lowest levels.

The other element of culture, the arts and literature, was addressed with the following survey question:

How proud are you of Ireland's achievements in the arts and literature?

Among the Irish, 58.9% indicated that they were *very proud* of achievements in this area, while only 29.1% of the total number of respondents held that opinion (see Figure 2). As with pride in sports, the proportion of Irish respondents expressing this strongest level of pride in arts and literature was double the figure for the entire survey population and the highest among all countries. Italy (47.4%) and Bulgaria (46.7%) ranked just behind Ireland. The Netherlands (12.4%), Poland (14.1%), and Sweden (15.6%) had the smallest proportion of respondents with that view. Overall, these attitudes toward sports, arts, and literature in Ireland are compatible with the claim that Gaelic culture is a vital ingredient in the conceptualization of the Irish nation (Bromage 1968; Archer 1984; Hutchinson 1987; McCaffrey 1989; White 1996; and O'Mahony and Delanty 1998). These results also seem to support Smith's (1991) identification of a common mass public culture as a basic element of national identity.

The ISSP data examined above reveal that strong levels of national affiliation, including feelings of closeness to the nation and pride in national history, arts and literature, and sports, were consistently greater in Ireland than for the survey population as a whole. Additionally, certain national characteristics such as birth, residence, and religion were deemed more essential by the Irish for their conception of nationality than was the case for the overall survey population. Overall, these findings demonstrate that a considerable bond exists in Ireland between the individual and nation, and that most of the commonly described national characteristics are indeed part of the foundation of Irish national identity.

Eurobarometer Analysis

Additional insight into Irish national identity is also possible through an analysis of data from a biannual survey, Eurobarometer, administered by the European Union in all member states.¹⁶ While its primary purpose is to measure attitudes regarding European integration and EU institutions and policies, this survey provides a wealth of data on a wide range of political, social, and economic issues. Two questions in particular address national identity and offer an opportunity to evaluate Irish attitudes and compare them to opinion found in the other member states. Moreover, these questions have been included in most of the surveys over the two decades, thereby permitting an examination of the evolution of national identity in Ireland and the rest of the EU. The first of these questions, appearing for the first time in 1982, probes national pride and provides a good indication of the degree to which the Irish are attached to their nation.

*Would you say that you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, or not at all proud to be Irish?*¹⁷


Consistent with the approach taken in the earlier analysis of the ISSP national pride questions, those who indicated that they were *very proud* to be Irish is of most interest. This type of sentiment suggests a strong attachment to the nation and provides a means for understanding the depth of Irish identity. The question appeared with some consistency between 1982 and 1988 and again between 1994 and 2001, but was not included between 1989 and 1993. Consequently, it is perhaps most useful to consider the data in these two time frames, 1982-1988 and 1994-2001.

The data from the period between 1982 and 1988 reveal that on every occasion, except 1984 and 1987 when the question was not included on the survey, a majority of Irish respondents expressed the strongest level of affinity for their nation. Those indicating that they were *very proud* to be Irish ranged from a low of 53.4% in 1985 to a high of 58.2% in 1982. In comparison, the proportion of all survey respondents with that opinion ranged from a low of 41.2% in 1988 to a high of 46.5% in 1985 (see Figure 3). Thus from 1982 to 1988, the Irish expressed a level of national pride consistently above that found throughout the European Union overall.

Figure 3: Percentage of respondents indicating they are very proud to be Irish (or appropriate nationality in other EU countries)

¹⁶ The regular Eurobarometer survey sample size is approximately 1,000 individuals in each country with the exception of Luxembourg (600 respondents), the United Kingdom (1,000 respondents in Great Britain and 300 respondents in Northern Ireland), and Germany (1,000 respondents in the former East Germany and 1,000 respondents in the former West Germany).

¹⁷ In each European Union country, the appropriate nationality is used in place of the word 'Irish'. All Eurobarometer questions examined in this study are similarly treated.



Source: Eurobarometer

The differences between attitudes in Ireland and those for the entire survey population become even more pronounced between 1994 and 2001. Among all surveyed countries in 1994, 1997, and 1999, Ireland had the greatest proportion of individuals indicating that they were very proud of their nationality, and in 2000 and 2001 only Greece had a larger proportion. Given that this question was not included on surveys conducted in 1995, 1996, and 1998, Ireland between 1994 and 2001 ranked either first or second among all European Union countries each surveyed year. Those in Ireland responding that they were very proud of their nationality ranged from a low of 69.5% in 1994 to a high of 78% in 1999 and 2000. These figures represent a substantial increase from the levels found between 1982 and 1988. Moreover, in each survey the proportion of 'very proud' respondents among the entire survey population was well below that for Ireland, ranging from a low of 35.1% in 1994 to a high of 39% in 2000 (see Figure 3). When compared to the European Union overall, Irish respondents were twice as likely to be very proud of their nationality, and Great Britain and Finland, the two countries with the next highest proportion of 'very proud' respondents during this time, were generally some fifteen to twenty percentage points behind Ireland and Greece. Quite simply, Irish and Greek respondents expressed levels of national pride which were substantially above that found for any other European Union country.

The second Eurobarometer survey question addresses respondent self-identification rather than national pride, but it too provides insight into the salience of Irish identity. The question used between 1983 and 1992 was:
Do you ever think of yourself as not only Irish, but also European?

Following a change in wording in 1992, the question became:
In the near future do you see yourself as Irish only, Irish and European, European and Irish, or European only?

Despite that shift in emphasis from present to future self-identification, both versions of the question deal with the same underlying sentiment of primary collective attachment and the balance between national identity and European identity.

The question used from 1983 to 1992 inquired whether people ever perceived themselves to be European in addition to their own nationality. Among the three available responses, *often*, *sometimes*, and *never*, those who never thought of themselves as European, but only as Irish, is of most interest as it represents the strongest level of national attachment. In the reworded version used since 1992, the focus turns to future identity with specific national and supranational identification response options provided within the question. Here, the response of *Irish only* reflects that same strong expression of affinity for the nation.

With the development of the European Union over the past few decades, it may be hypothesized that the responses to these questions are shaped largely by opinion toward EU political institutions and the process of European integration. Indeed, many facets of public opinion, including some where a connection to EU policy or activity is not directly apparent, have been affected by attitudes regarding this international institution. Nevertheless, negative attitudes toward the EU are not necessarily accompanied by high levels of national pride or a propensity toward national self-identification. In the case of Ireland, it may be helpful to note that strong support for the EU coexists with the high levels of national pride identified above. For instance, a 1998 Eurobarometer survey revealed that 82% of Irish believed that it was good for their country to be a member of the European Union, while the corresponding figure for the entire survey population was just 51%. Among all fifteen European Union countries, Ireland had the largest proportion of respondents expressing this favourable attitude toward the organization with Luxembourg (81%) and the Netherlands (71%) ranked second and third. The United Kingdom (29%), Sweden (37%), and Austria (42%) had the lowest figures in the European Union. Additionally, 88% of Irish respondents indicated that their country had benefited from membership in the European Union, while only 46% of all those surveyed held that same view. Here again, Ireland had the highest figure among all countries with Portugal (77%) and Luxembourg (72%) ranking second and third. The United Kingdom (29%), Sweden (29%), and Denmark (37%) had the smallest proportion of people indicating that their country was better off because of EU membership (European Commission 2001c: 20-23). A more detailed examination of the relationship between national identity and support for international institutions is beyond the scope of this study, yet the data illustrate that insight into the salience of Irish identity can be gained from questions probing national versus supranational self-identification.


In the case of responses to the Eurobarometer question as used from 1983 to 1992, it becomes clear that the pattern of above average Irish national affinity associated with the national pride question is present again. Among the entire survey population, the proportion of respondents who indicated they thought of themselves only in terms of their own nationality, never as European, ranged from a low of 43.9% in 1986 to a high of 53% in 1990. In comparison, the proportion of Irish who held that same view ranged from low of 58.5% in 1988 to a high of 70.5% in 1983 (see Figure 4). In every surveyed year, the Irish were ten to twenty percentage points above the survey population in rejecting the label 'European' for themselves and embracing instead an attachment only to the national collective. Throughout this ten-year period, Ireland generally was second only to the United Kingdom in having the largest proportion of respondents with this view, except in 1987 and 1989 when Ireland ranked third behind the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

The responses following modification of the question in 1992 are similar in that the data reveal levels of national attachment among the Irish again to be above the overall Eurobarometer survey figures. Between 1992 and 2001, the proportion of Irish who



indicated that in the near future they would consider themselves only Irish, not as European or some combination of Irish and European, fluctuated between a low of 38.5% in 1994 and a high of 56% in 2000.¹⁸ Among the entire survey population, the proportion of respondents indicating that they would identify themselves exclusively by their own nationality ranged from a low of 33% in 1994 to a high of 46% in 1998 (see Figure 5). Thus from 1992 to 2001, the proportion of Irish defining themselves solely by their nationality was consistently five to ten percentage points higher than corresponding figure for the survey population. During this period, Ireland ranked between third and sixth among European Union countries in having the largest proportion of respondents who would define themselves solely by their nationality.


Figure 4: Percentage of respondents who never view themselves as European



Source: Eurobarometer

¹⁸ It should be noted that the figure of 38.5% in 1994 appears unusually low given that in the other survey years the proportion never fell below 48%. For the entire survey population, the response of *nationality only* given in 1994 was also dramatically below that for any other year. Consequently, the data associated with the 1994 survey question are perhaps best viewed with a degree of caution.

Figure 5: Percentage of respondents who, in the near future, only see themselves as Irish (or appropriate nationality in other EU countries)



Source: Eurobarometer

The data associated with both versions of this Eurobarometer question on national/supranational identity reveal a few interesting trends. Obviously, the differences between Irish opinion and overall European Union opinion were generally greater between 1982 and 1992, after which the gap between Irish opinion and overall EU survey opinion narrowed in response to the reworded question. A more careful analysis however reveals that the proportion of individuals defining themselves solely by their nationality in Ireland, and likewise among the survey population as a whole, reached their lowest levels between 1993 and 1995. Since then, the proportion of Irish defining themselves by their nationality has followed an upward trend, rising from 38.5% in 1994 to 55% in 2001. During that period, the proportion of all those surveyed in the EU who expressed this 'nationality only' self-definition also rose between 1994 and 1996, but has since remained relatively steady at approximately 45%. Whereas Irish figures were some four to nine percentage points higher than the corresponding survey figures between 1993 and 1999, the disparity between Irish and overall attitudes has increased since 1999. In 2000 and 2001, the proportion of Irish expressing this exclusively national self-definition was between ten and fifteen percentage points above the proportion of all those surveyed; a pattern similar to that found between 1982 and 1992. Irish attitudes on this issue are not only different from overall European Union opinion, but the differences between Ireland and the larger EU population have been increasing.

Several conclusions can be drawn from these data. First, identification with the nation is comparatively stronger in Ireland than in the European Union as a whole, particularly with regard to levels of national pride which rank among the highest anywhere in the EU. Second, an increasing proportion of the Irish population is identifying with the nation. Levels of national pride and national self-identification have been rising in Ireland since the mid-1990s. And finally, the differences between Irish opinion and overall EU opinion in the area of national identity are widening. The percentage of respondents throughout the EU who define themselves solely by their nationality has remained relatively stable



since the mid-1990s while the proportion of Irish with that view has been increasing. Generally, these conclusions parallel those found from the ISSP survey data discussed previously, reaffirming the existence of a salient and relatively strong bond between the individual and the Irish nation.

Conclusion

For many, the use of the words 'nationalism' and 'Ireland' together tend to be associated with the troubles in Northern Ireland; an understandable tendency given the visibility of that ongoing conflict. However, as this study confirms, the nation is also a relevant concept south of the border in the Republic of Ireland. The data explored here indicate that the Irish exhibited among the highest level of national pride throughout the European Union and were less likely to identify themselves as European and more likely to define themselves solely by reference to their nationality. Additionally, the depth and scope of that attachment extended to national characteristics to a degree not present in most other surveyed countries. The Irish placed a greater emphasis on the importance of religion, birthplace, and residence for their conception of nationality, and they expressed among the highest levels of pride in their nation's history, arts and literature, and sports.

Both the salience and composition of that identity raise questions about the impact this national attachment may have on major political issues in Ireland such as European Union membership and the conflict in Northern Ireland. As noted earlier, Irish attitudes toward the European Union are overwhelmingly favourable. Some might find it difficult to reconcile strong levels of national attachment with widespread support for this international institution, yet as Laffan (2002) notes regarding Ireland's entry into the European Union, 'The renewed link with continental Europe resonated with Catholic Ireland. EU membership implied a re-joining of Europe in an important sense' (p. 86). More importantly for many Irish, membership in the European Union provided the means by which the nation could alter its historical dependence upon Great Britain and establish itself as a strong and fully independent state. In this way, Laffan notes 'EU membership appealed to the old concern of Irish nationalism – "how to deal with Britain" and the new concern – how to make Ireland prosperous. The EU offered liberation not containment' (2002: 86).

In June 2001, it may have appeared as though this compatibility between Irish national identity and membership in the European Union had finally ended. The Treaty of Nice, which restructured the European Union to facilitate the admittance of future members from Central and Eastern Europe, was rejected in an Irish referendum by 54% of the voters. While this marked the first time Irish voters failed to approve a European Union treaty, those voting 'no' in EU referenda over the past three decades has steadily risen from the 16.9% in 1972 who opposed Ireland's joining the EU to the majority who opposed the Nice Treaty in 2001. These developments would seem to indicate a steady transformation in Irish attitudes toward the European Union. Yet as Sinnott (2001) notes, these figures are misleading due to substantial declines in voter turnout. In EU treaty referenda, voter turnout in Ireland fell from high of 71% in 1972 to a low of 35% in 2001. Thus when this decline is taken into account, the proportion of the entire Irish electorate actually voting 'no' in EU referenda has only increased from 12% in 1972 to a high of 21% in 1998. In the 2001 referendum on the Nice Treaty, the 'no' vote as a proportion of the entire electorate actually declined to 18.5%, but when combined with the low voter turnout, it was enough to defeat the measure.

Sinnott's opinion survey found that a lack of information and lack of understanding of the issues surrounding the Nice Treaty were the most common explanations given by those who abstained, as well as by those who voted 'no'. The Irish government, embarrassed by the public's rejection of the Treaty, called for another vote and campaigned

aggressively to ensure passage. In the subsequent October 2002 referendum, voter turnout increased to nearly 50% and the Treaty was approved with 63% of the vote. There may be a growing complacency or indifference among the Irish electorate, but as discussed earlier, strong levels of national identification have not proven to be incompatible with what remain overwhelmingly favourable attitudes toward membership in the European Union.

Among all issues though, none has been more enduring or more closely linked with national identity than the partition of Ireland following the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. The resulting separation of the Irish people into a state (the Republic of Ireland) and a de-facto state (Northern Ireland), as well as the conflict between Republicans and Unionists in the North, figure prominently in the political dialogue, and have shaped public attitudes in the Republic. With respect to the unification of North and South, a majority of Irish between 1970 and 1991 indicated that a united Ireland was 'something to hope for'; the proportion ranged from a low of 61% in 1974 to a high of 82% in 1991 (Hayes and McAllister 1996: 78). Additionally, a survey conducted in 1983 revealed that 63% of respondents in the Republic believed that the Irish nation consisted of all 32 counties of Northern Ireland and the Republic (Cox 1985). These attitudes seem appropriate considering the nature of Irish national identity discussed above, yet other opinion stemming from the North-South division seems at odds with conventional wisdom. For instance, in that same 1983 survey, less than half of those in the Irish Republic, just 41%, viewed the people of Northern Ireland as Irish (Cox 1985). Another comprehensive survey of Irish attitudes, administered in the Republic in 1988 and 1989, also revealed less than overwhelming affiliation with those in Northern Ireland. While 49% of respondents agreed that Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic were two separate nations (an increase of ten percentage points from a 1972-1973 survey), only 42% disagreed with such an assertion (Mac Gréil 1996). One might be tempted to conclude that these attitudes are due to the fact that the majority of the population in Northern Ireland is Protestant and thus viewed as different by almost the exclusively Catholic population in the Republic. Most remarkably, however, in that same survey a plurality of those in the Republic, 45%, indicated that Catholics in Northern Ireland have more in common with Northern Protestants than they have with Catholics in the South.

Although large proportions in the Republic indicated that Irish unification was something to hope for, attitudes changed when it came to practical political solutions for Northern Ireland. For example, those in the Republic who believed Irish unity was a solution for the problems in Northern Ireland fell steadily from 72% in 1984 to 41% in 1991 (Hayes and McAllister 1996: 76). In a 1996 Irish Times survey administered less than one year after the ISSP survey discussed above, only 30% of respondents in the Republic wanted Northern Ireland to become part of a united Ireland; 29% wanted Northern Ireland to be linked to both the United Kingdom and Ireland; and 22% wanted Northern Ireland to become independent. This evidence highlights the divergence in opinion over the desire for Irish unification versus its utility in solving the dispute (Hayes and McAllister 1996: 77)

Attitudes within the Republic toward Northern Ireland have clearly evolved from the days when the border between North and South was viewed as a temporary and artificial boundary between all Irish people. A greater proportion of people are more likely to perceive differences between North and South and less likely to see a united Ireland as a solution to the Northern Ireland problem; views which surveys confirm are more prevalent among the young and those living in urban areas. Some have attributed these changing attitudes to the physical separation between North and South:

The state has become synonymous with popular feelings of nationhood, even if this is anathema in constitutional terms. The longevity of partition has led to a situation where



the vast majority in the South cannot remember Ireland united and have known nothing other than the twenty-six county state. (Cochrane 1994: 390).

Given Ireland's continued urbanization and a population which is the youngest in Europe, this attitudinal transformation, noted in Garvin's (1994) examination of Irish identity, will likely continue. Such an opinion shift was most dramatically emphasized in the referendum on the 1998 Good Friday Agreement where 94% of Irish voters approved amending the Irish Constitution to remove the Republic's territorial claim to Northern Ireland. This overwhelming level of support 'not only provided a popular mandate for the settlement but also symbolically revoked what fundamentalist republicans had regarded as the irrevocable decision of the Irish people in 1918 in favour of an independent, united Irish republic' (Coakley 1999: 49-50). Thus, while national unity has been prominent within twentieth-century Irish political discourse, the physical border created between the North and South has slowly been incorporated into conceptions of Irish national identity.

Future research involving a comprehensive statistical analysis of Irish data from the Eurobarometer and ISSP surveys will likely provide additional insight into the nature of Irish national identity, yet this study still contributes to the body of knowledge in a number of ways. First, it demonstrates that identification with the nation can be revealed, measured, and interpreted with survey data. Second, it builds upon past work on Irish national identity by analyzing the depth and composition of that attachment. And finally, the study confirms that the nation remains a prominent feature of the Irish political and social landscape. As Collins and Cradden (2001) assert:

For Ireland, nationalism is the dominant ideology. It binds diverse individuals into 'a people', acts as a motive for economic, cultural and sporting achievement, and provides a source of genuine pride and sympathy. The nation has become the highest affiliation and obligation of the individual, and through it a significant part of personal identity is formed. (p. 150)

Perhaps it should not come as a surprise to find that these findings reaffirm the prevalence and strength of the bond between the individual and the Irish nation. After all, the great events throughout Irish history including the Civil War (1922-23), the Easter Rising, the Home Rule movement, the Repeal movement (1829-1843), and the Rebellions of 1798 and 1641 were infused with national sentiment and propelled by an attachment to the nation. The manner in which the Irish nation is conceptualized has changed over the course of Irish history, and Ireland today is politically, socially, and economically different from the Ireland of just a generation ago. Yet even with the passage of time, the nation endures as an object of affiliation and remains a central force in Irish politics. Bertie Ahern, the current Taoiseach (prime minister of Ireland), touched upon this when he remarked, 'The one constant over many generations and centuries through all tribulations has been our pride in being Irish' (Logue 2000: 1). While it is often tempting to dismiss such a statement when it comes from a political leader, this study confirms that the Taoiseach's sentiment is shared by most others who, like him, are members of the Irish nation.

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IMPORTANT NOTICE

The Editors of the Global Review of Ethnopolitics would like to notify all readers of volume 11, issue 2 that an article that appeared in the original version published on 12 March 2003 was plagiarised to a significant extent. The article in question is Andrei Panici's contribution 'Romanian Nationalism in Moldova'. Upon learning of this case of plagiarism, we immediately removed the article and are currently considering further action. Our sincere apologies to all our readers and to the author whose work was plagiarised.



FORUM: INDIA

Critical Reflections on Celebrating Success: A Response to Maya Chadda

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Maya Chadda's article in *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics* (Chadda 2002) raises a number of issues that are worthy of serious discussion. It represents one current in the study of developing societies that argue that India has evolved into a form of federalism which has successfully contributed to the consolidation of democracy and relatively benign management of ethnic conflicts. This argument is normally presented with reference to India's farsighted constitutional design, its benevolent management by the Indian National Congress (INC) under Nehru, and the social pluralism of Indian society that underpins the political arrangements. There are, however, several problems with this approach some of which Chadda does not address or that she dismisses out of hand.

First, on reading the article we do not get a clear exposition of the analytical framework that explains the development of centre-state relations in India. The nearest we get is the idea of 'relational control and interlocking balance' (Chadda 2000: 49) and necessary conditions for its effective functioning (Chadda 2000: 50). These are merely descriptive categories, and one is at loss to fathom the meaning of 'layered order'. That a clear analytical framework exists has been highlighted by scholars like Brass (1991: Ch. 5). It is further evident in the constitutional discourses on India's distinctive 'civilisational' identity as a multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multicultural entity which foreclosed any debate about India as a multi-national state. This identity and how it has been managed has been determined by the political coalitions that have dominated Indian politics. Above all, it has been the political interests of these coalitions that have structured how Indian federalism has been reshaped.

In understanding the evolution of centre-state relations in India we need a framework that can give us a better handle on the relationship between India's external and internal boundaries, between India's conception of itself and its internal order. I have attempted to do this, and reached conclusions diametrically opposed to those of Chadda (Singh 2001). Rather than suggest that the 'creative' management of relations with enemies provided for an imaginative federal solution to India's borderlands, I argue that following partition India's conception of its national identity has created a sharp divide between the core and peripheral states. That is why the peripheral states have remained the sites of resilient ethno-national movements that have done so much to frustrate India's nation-building efforts (Singh 2000). That is why the rules used for reshaping the core of Indian federalism are inapplicable in the periphery. And that is why different modes of 'integration'—coercion and cooption – are used to retain control.

Second, Chadda dismisses the validity of an alternative reading of Indian history that was aborted by the partition, a history with constitutional designs that could have averted partition (Talbot and Singh 1999). It is no doubt difficult to conjecture whether such an alternative would have produced a state (or states) that would have been more or less democratic than today's India but, arguably, that would have been more attuned with the provincial realities of subcontinental India than the centralised Nehruvian state that subsequently emerged. Chadda has not satisfactorily explained why a subcontinent of the regions continues to have substantial appeal and why India as a nation-state remains a deeply contested fact. The recent mobilisation over Kashmir has demonstrated the heavy price India has had to pay for its nation-building efforts. It also illustrates that despite over 50 years of 'violent control', the Indian state in Kashmir has been unable to establish the kind of legitimacy one would expect of a consolidated nation state, even allowing for the devious machinations of India's enemies.



Third, there is considerable evidence to suggest that Mrs Gandhi, who destroyed the INC of Nehru, was the principal cause of the rise in populism, political decay and de-institutionalisation. She suspended the constitution between 1975 and 1977 by imposing a state of emergency during which opponents were jailed. She deliberately fostered the cult of personality. And as Brass (1991: Ch. 5) has so effectively demonstrated, she systematically reversed the guidelines for ethnic conflict management set by her father by encouraging militancy in Punjab only to put it to the sword later on in order to garner the Hindu vote. Without seeking to defend Kohli (1990), my understanding of the latter's work is precisely that the crisis of governability—and a resort to coercion—was the outcome of systematic deinstitutionalisation and decay of state institutions consciously subverted by Mrs. Gandhi for her own political ends. More than any other politician in post-independence India it was Mrs. Gandhi who undermined federal autonomy by regularly imposing President's rule (direct rule from New Delhi) and dismissing Congress and non-Congress chief ministers at whim. Chadda's arguments do not accord with the facts. Nor do they provide any insights into Mrs. Gandhi's period in office. At best they are an elaborate apologia for Mrs. Gandhi's statecraft which, in Chadda's own words, enfeebled the Indian state to its weakest condition since 1947.

Fourth, my argument that INC rule in post-1947 was hegemonically oppressive attempts to analyse how the INC used political, constitutional, ideological and coercive means to undermine the Sikh agitation for a Punjabi-speaking province. This argument is developed at length in *Ethnic Conflict in India* (Singh 2000). Part of that strategy was to encourage ethnic flooding by getting Punjabi Hindus, who were then a majority in the province, to declare Hindi – not Punjabi – as their official language, thereby undermining the case for a linguistic state based on Punjabi. Many Punjabi Hindus, the ideologues of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and ill-informed observers continue to propagate the idea that Sikhism is merely a Hindu sect. It is in this context that we should read Chadda's statement that 'The demand for a separate province of Punjabi Suba (Punjabi-speaking state) was based on religious separateness of Hindus and Sikhs' (Chadda 2000: 48). In fact, the Sikh tradition had begun to reform itself of accretions of Hinduism from the late nineteenth century onwards. The claim to separate statehood before 1947 was based not only on the pre-colonial legacy of a Sikh state but the recognition of a self-conscious community with distinct religious boundaries, history and political institutions. After failing to secure the constitutional guarantees of autonomy that they were promised prior to independence, the Sikh political leadership in a majority Hindu Punjab adopted the political infiltration of Congress as a tactic that would protect its interests (Nayer 1966). Minorities have adopted similar tactics elsewhere and in India (for example Kashmir's National Conference's alliance with the BJP), but it would be naïve to read into this an affirmation of INC's secularism or support for the BJP's political programme of *Hindutva* (Hinduness).

Sikh demands for autonomy, which led to the violent agitation in the 1980s and early 1990s, harked back to the pre-independence claim for an autonomous area for Sikhs. The Anandpur Sahib Resolution that became a charter of Sikh demands was very much modelled on Article 370 that gave Kashmir special status. The idea of a Sikh nation does not necessarily imply, as Chadda claims, a Sikh state. Only paranoia and fear, which has been the hallmark of India's centre in dealing with Sikh political leaders, would conflate the two.

Fifth, my argument for interpreting India as an ethnic democracy (Singh 2000: Ch. 3) seeks to interrogate the nature of Indian democracy by exploring the post-partition nation, its core and peripheral fault lines, the role of Hinduism—with its extreme diversity—as a 'meta ethnicity' and as a 'civic religion', outcomes from the political system, and the modularity of the majoritarian discourses of Nehruvian secularism and

current day *Hindutva*. It is an argument that certainly is worthy of *some* consideration, even if it is ultimately refuted. Given the banalisation of the distinction between Nehruvianism and *Hindutva* and the plight of minorities in today's India, where the Muslims of Gujarat have become the symbols of orchestrated violence against minorities, the onus is on the critics of this argument to provide convincing evidence to the contrary.

Against the dominant trend that celebrates India's democratic achievements, which are, indeed, considerable, there is also the need to question the *kind* of democracy India is (Singh 2002). Why is it that the nation-building project over the last two decades has cost over 100,000 lives in the peripheral states alone? Why is it that concentration camp-like conditions exist for over 100,000 Muslims in Gujarat whose safety cannot be guaranteed? Academics interested in understanding the management of ethnic conflicts in India since 1947 and more humane policy options to accomplish this should also consider alternatives to Maya Chadda's argument.

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Do the New States Tell a Story about Indian Federalism? Some Comments on Maya Chadda's 'Integration through Internal Reorganization: Containing Ethnic Conflict in India'

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Maya Chadda's article (Chadda 2002) seeks to explain the ability of the Central government in India to create new states. She argues that the model of governance adopted by India at independence was a combination of 'relational control' (pertaining to India's role in South Asia) and 'interlocking balances' (within the country). The first phase of federal reorganization (in the 1950s) on the basis of language breathed life into this model; the second phase, of reorganization in the north-east, protected the model by giving the new states a stake in India's territorial integrity; and the third and most recent phase of reorganization also, she argues, fits this model well. Ergo, in her view, this governance model still holds.

Even if we agree that the imperatives of territorial unity have generally prevailed over those of federal democracy in India, it is difficult to see what purchase this argument has in relation to the third phase of reorganization. It may explain the response of the Indian state to the Punjab and Assam issues in the 1980s, but in relation to the three newest states of the Indian Union, Chadda's argument is somewhat ambiguous and even



bewildering. She seeks to justify and even endorse the predisposition of the Indian Union towards territorial unity in fairly strong normative terms. She also suggests that when the demand (e.g., for separate statehood) is conceded, it is only because it is relatively uncontroversial. What, if anything, does this tell us about state capacity? It would seem to be logical to deduce, from this account, that the third phase of reorganization is relatively inconsequential from the point of view of the – normatively, constitutionally and empirically – strong Indian state. If so, then the analytical merit of focusing on the newly-created states is not very clear. And an empirical assertion of the strength of the Indian state is anyhow contestable.

The creation of new states is arguably only one dimension of the larger story of federalism in India. Indeed, the federal question in India is not only about ethnic conflict, and its containment by the state. It has many other significant aspects quite unrelated to ethnicity, including issues of greater autonomy for the states, the centre's power over the declaration of President's rule, state finances, and so forth. While it is a perfectly legitimate exercise to subject one dimension of the centre-state relationship to closer scrutiny, problems are wont to arise when the conclusions emanating from the study of the segment do not cohere with our broader understanding of centre-state relations, or lead us to misrecognize the larger picture. Chadda's argument about the big picture is straightforward. Whenever federal democracy is challenged, she says, considerations of territorial integrity take primacy. When, however, the grant of autonomy is less controversial, it is acceded to. This is not saying very much about the capacity of the state, which was the point of departure of the article. Should accommodation be interpreted as a sign of state strength or state weakness? It could, for instance, be argued that under the impact of factors such as the decline of the one-party dominant system, the regionalization of the party system and so on, the constitutionally strong position of the Centre has been considerably diluted in the recent past. Chadda herself mentions these factors, but they do not form a part of her account of state capacity.

That the model of governance evolved in the 1950s essentially holds, as Chadda suggests, is contestable. The comparison between this last phase of state-creation and the challenges faced by the Indian federation in the previous decade, is not very clear. Insurgency in the Punjab and Assam was surely a challenge to federal democracy, as in Kashmir and the North-East even today. The explanation for the difference in state response surely lies not just in the political circumstances, but also in that the nature of the claim in the latter was/is different in those cases from that in the newly-created states. In all the three newly-created states, the issue of identity (tribal identity in the case of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, and the distinctive identity of the hill people in the case of Uttarakhand) was almost inseparable from that of development and/or maldevelopment. The development deficit was critical in Jharkhand and the issue of sustainable development was central to the Uttarakhand agitation.

Chadda's account of the movements leading to state-creation is rather perfunctory. She forbears to mention, for example, the particular circumstances under which the demand for a separate state of Uttarakhand (using the self-description of the movement) was revived after the 1950s. Post-Mandal, it was the policy of 27% reservation in public employment for OBCs in the hill region (where their proportion in the population is barely 2%) that sparked off the agitation. The rape and killing of movement activists at Muzaffarnagar by Mulayam Singh Yadav's government was a blow that could not be forgotten or condoned. It was, however, only the proverbial match on a tinder-box waiting to explode. Developmental neglect, combined with the perception that the hill regions of Garhwal and Kumaon were rather low on the developmental priorities of the Uttar Pradesh state administration at Lucknow, was substantially responsible for fuelling the movement. No major party was willing to risk even the handful of parliamentary

seats from this region by decrying the movement: all sought to appropriate it. In Jharkhand, likewise, it was easy for the movement to muster support across party lines because the issue of development was foregrounded.

Ultimately, Chadda's explanation for the third phase of reorganization hinges on three points: first, that these were relatively uncontroversial demands; second, that they fitted well into the electoral calculations of political parties; and third, that a sea-change had occurred in Indian politics. What does this tell us about Indian federalism? Arguably little. What can we extrapolate from this account that can help us understand state capacity, in a way that simultaneously and coherently explains the Indian state's response to Punjab and Assam, the continuing troubles in Kashmir and the North-East, and the process of state-creation two years ago?

On the question of ethnicity *per se*, it can be argued that the Indian polity has witnessed a reinvention of ethnicity. Earlier episodes of ethnic assertion were expressed in the form of territorial claims. Today, this has changed. OBCs, who constitute 50% of India's population, found themselves considerably under-represented in governance structures. The implementation of the Mandal Commission's report, and the emergence of political parties such as the Samajwadi Party, have shown that the claims of ethnicity based on region have given way to an altogether new form that does not challenge the federal structure. Rather, it seeks to forge trans-state linkages and alliances based on caste (e.g., the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party) or religion (the Sangh Parivar). It is this, along with the fact that regional parties have burst the bounds of regions and become decisive in the matter of government-formation at the centre, that gives the Indian nation-state its apparently more 'settled' character. The only new candidate to offer itself for separate statehood in the last two years is 'Harit Pradesh', comprising the prosperous and productive western region of Uttar Pradesh, and – though it has thus far been treated rather dismissively—it is worth noting that this demand is grounded in a claim that is entirely unrelated to ethnicity.

Finally, Chadda laments that the debate on Indian federalism has been polarized between centralization and decentralization in a way that is entirely untenable. It can be argued that a measure of decentralization has taken place, both politically and constitutionally. In political terms, the emergence of strong regional parties which are decisive players in the national polity; in economic terms, the ability of Chief Ministers to invite foreign direct investment and multilateral funding, and to take economic reforms forward in their own states; and constitutionally, the enactment of the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments reviving the *panchayati raj* institutions of local governance, are irreversible trends for the foreseeable future. The Indian polity is surely moving in a more federal direction, even if by political accident rather than design. Even as we consider this to be a reassuring trend, we may continue to be less than sanguine about the ability of the Indian state to manage and contain ethnic conflict in particular regions.

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Multiple Identities, Dual Loyalties and the Stabilisation of Federalism in India: Observations on Maya Chadda's 'Integration through Internal Reorganization: Containing Ethnic Conflict in India'

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Maya Chadda's article (Chadda 2002) on the 'integrative capacity' of the Indian federation and its contribution to building an 'Indian nation' covers many issues. She seeks to explain the differences in the rationale behind the reorganisations of the 1950s, 1970s and in 2000. From a comparative federal perspective, the creation of the states of Jharkhand, Chattisgarh and Uttaranchal in September 2000 was a radical and innovative step. Yet, as Chadda identifies, on one level, these reorganisations continued a trend set since independence. The Indian state has continuously reorganised its internal political boundaries in order to manage the diversity within its borders.

As Chadda acknowledges, the Indian state has pursued different objectives in undertaking these reorganisations. The reorganisations of the 1950s and 1970s were the result of challenges to the centre. Although the Congress Party was dedicated to linguistic reorganisation before independence, its commitment to a majoritarian constitutional framework after independence was challenged by this obligation (Adeney 2002). After independence Congress backtracked on the promise to create linguistically homogeneous provinces despite conceding the legitimacy of regional languages for governmental use. The Congress eventually accepted the demands for reorganisation because of electoral considerations. It initially reaped the benefits of so doing.

Although Chadda accepts that linguistic reorganisation played a positive role in stabilising the Indian federation, promoting the growth of dual loyalties to centre and region, she does not directly address *how*. Linguistic reorganisation promoted security for territorially concentrated linguistic groups. However, it only did so in conjunction with linguistic multiculturalism at the centre. This multiculturalism concerned the provision to use regional languages at state level. It also included the right to sit government exams and communicate with the centre in any of the languages recognised in the Eighth Schedule of the constitution. Reorganisation on its own was not sufficient, these other provisions were also necessary to promote security for linguistic groups. This is because federations are often centralised, majoritarian governmental forms. There is no necessary equation with federal forms of government and ethnic accommodation as Chadda recognises (Chadda 2002: 56). However, her conflation of federal ethnic accommodation, or as she negatively describes it—containment—with decentralisation is confusing. Federations are not necessarily the most decentralised forms of government. They are defined by a division of sovereignty between two territorially defined levels of government rather than a specific division of sovereignty. Therefore, centralism and federalism can coexist.

Although Congress was the initial beneficiary of the reorganisations of the 1950s in electoral terms, regionally defined parties were the main beneficiaries a decade later. Yet the reorganisations did not just provide the conditions for regional parties to emerge – they permitted alternative identities such as caste to assert and mobilise themselves politically. As Horowitz (1985: 617) argues

When groups are territorially concentrated, devolution may have utility not because it provides 'self-determination', but because once power is devolved it becomes somewhat more difficult to determine who the self is.

That these alternative identities emerged was indicative of the fact that linguistic groups had received security. Therefore linguistic reorganisation in the 1950s provided the conditions under which dual loyalties were created, both to the region and to the Indian

nation. The creation of dual loyalties is essential to the success of a federation. The proliferation of regionally delimited political parties has not challenged the security of the Indian federation, although they have proved to be more of a challenge for governmental stability.

The reorganisations of the North East were omitted from the State Reorganisation Commission's recommendations partially because of the extreme heterogeneity of the region. Chadda argues that the Indian state undertook these reorganisations in order to promote India's governance and security. However, this argument poses more questions than it answers. Under Nehru, territorial recognition for non-Hindu groups was seen as antithetical to the security of the Indian state and its national identity. This was why the demand for a Punjabi speaking state was excluded from the initial reorganisations as it was perceived to be demanded along 'communal' lines. These later reorganisations were not as successful in creating the dual identities as the reorganisations in the 1950s were. The differential policies that the Indian state has adopted with regards to claims for recognition within the federal system have affected the ability of the state to accommodate these different identities. Chadda acknowledges this. However, she does not explicitly discuss the fact that the Indian state has adopted very different approaches to managing claims put by religious groups as opposed to those defined by language.

Although Nehru was reluctant to allow linguistic groups recognition within decision-making institutions he was even more reticent when these identities were religious. As all the states of the Indian Union had a Hindu majority with the exception of Jammu and Kashmir, this was a latent challenge to the 'neutrality' of Indian secularism. It is significant that it is only after the death of Nehru that states with a non-Hindu majority were created. Yet these states were not created on religious criteria. The creation of these states did not promote security for the groups within them. This was partially because many of these states remained heterogeneous on either linguistic or religious criteria. But the centre's attitude to legitimate demands for autonomy from these regions—e.g., the 1973 Anandpur Sahib Resolution proposed by the Akali Dal—created a self-fulfilling prophecy. Chadda argues that for federalism to be successful the centre needs to be perceived as a neutral arbiter (Chadda 2002: 49). Tensions within the Indian federation have been exacerbated precisely where the central government has *not* acted impartially and this partiality is perceived to be related to ethnic discrimination – in this case along religious or tribal lines.

The belated recognition of a Punjabi state and the attitude adopted in regard to autonomy in the Punjab, North East and Kashmir have affected the stability of the federation precisely because these policies have undermined the creation of dual identities. Chadda has been concerned in the article to elucidate the linkages between federal design and democracy. She has concentrated on a one-way process – whether federal reform has improved democracy. Yet this perspective ignores the relationship in the other direction—the manner in which central policies have undermined democracy and therefore caused federal destabilisation. The Indian centre has dismissed state governments in all parts of India. The non-Hindu regions are not unique in this regard. Yet Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir have been subject to President's Rule for longer than any other state. It was the massive rigging and 'strong army tactics' adopted by the Indian state in Jammu and Kashmir during the 1987 state election which violently escalated the conflict (Bose 1997: 45-9). Additionally, democracy can be more or less majoritarian or consociational (as can federations). The form that democracy takes is crucial in an ethnically divided society. Chadda does not address this point. A majoritarian federation and a majoritarian democracy do not contribute to federal stabilisation in an ethnically divided society. She correctly identifies that with the advent of coalition politics the Indian federation is likely to become less centralised, although



economic liberalisation also prompted moves in this direction. The Bommai judgement of 1994 and the willingness of the previous president, Naryanan, to uphold its stipulations will influence the future direction of the federation.¹⁹ Even though these precedents will act as a check on politically motivated dismissals of state governments, they are less important in accounting for the ability of the federation to regulate ethnic conflict.

Federations are not an automatic institutional panacea for ethnic conflict as Chadda acknowledges. This is because they can be majoritarian structures of government. Autonomy is meaningless without inclusion within the wider federation, which the current era of coalition politics promotes. The creation of dual identities within a federation requires at the very least, the *security* of a group. Central government policies and other mechanisms of inclusion are vitally important in explaining the 'integrative' potential of the federation. One way of increasing the security of groups within a federation is to create homogeneous provinces in which security of culture is assured. However, without inclusion within the wider federal system, e.g., in representation in the decision making institutions and proportionality in government appointments, federal autonomy and redrawing of boundaries will be insufficient to manage ethnic diversity. Chadda's article acknowledges that central policies are important. However, she downplays the different attitude the centre has adopted with regard to demands made by religious groups compared to those defined by language. These policies have been to the detriment of federal stabilisation and its 'integrative' potential.

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India: An Ethnocracy, Theocracy or Democracy? A Reply to Singh, Jayal and Adeney

Maya Chadda

My article 'Integration through Internal Reorganization: Containing Ethnic Conflict in India' in the last issue of *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics* (Chadda 2002) has sparked a considerable debate among scholars with an expertise in India. It emphasises both the continued interest in political developments on the sub-continent, as well as the wider significance of any lessons learned from the way in which ethnic conflict in the world's largest democracy has been partly prevented and partly managed over the past half-century.

In the following, I will respond to the various criticisms that my three colleagues have made in this forum discussion on India. In taking their points one by one, my aim is not

¹⁹ The Bommai judgement of the Supreme Court restricted the ability of the centre to unilaterally dismiss state governments without following procedures such as giving the state government a chance to prove its majority on the floor of its Legislative Assembly.

to dismiss the objections that they raise, but rather to clarify and elaborate further the arguments I made in the original article, as only through constructive debate, focussing on issues rather than people, will we be able to advance the state of our scholarship.

To begin with, Gurharpal Singh's objection that my article lacks a clear analytical framework can be dealt with most easily. In my book *Ethnicity, Security and Separatism in India* (Chadda 1996), I discussed extensively both the theory and practice of what I called *interlocking balances and relational control*. I did not reiterate the way these have shaped Indian federalism at length only because it had been done so extensively elsewhere.

The more serious point that Gurharpal Singh makes is that 'following partition, India's conception of its national identity created a sharp divide between the core and peripheral states... The rules used for reshaping the core of Indian federalism are inapplicable to the periphery... that is why different modes of "integration" – coercion and cooption (sic) – are used to retain control.' In sum, while the central state in India used accommodation to maintain unity within the core states, it used coercion against the peripheral states. This thesis has the merit of being elegantly simple. But, like a vastly enlarged photograph, the clean lines that are visible from a distance disintegrate as one goes closer to it. In response, I contend that Singh's objections to my article arise from his insistence on using an analytical framework that looks at India and its federal politics along the all too familiar religious divide. In addition, how does one distinguish between core and peripheral states? In Singh's comments, one possible fault line between the two seems to be that the peripheral states remain the sites of 'resilient ethnonational movements'. By this yardstick, should Tamil Nadu, which has a political party, the Dravida Kazhagam, which is overtly separatist, not be categorized as a peripheral state? If so, then why was coercion not used to bring it to heel? A similar question can be asked about Andhra Pradesh, where the Telugu Desam captured power in 1983 within 10 months of its formation, almost entirely because it was able to tap into the then latent ethnonationalism of the Telugus. Ethnonational sentiment is also strong in West Bengal, which has a rich and distinctive culture and a highly developed language of its own. Are Andhra and West Bengal peripheral states? Or are they core states simply because their ethnonationalism has never turned either violent or separatist? To me, this seems to stem from a conflation of geography and conflict, and the use of the presence of the latter as an explanation for India's federal politics.

Following this argument through to the end would imply two important things: first, peripheral states, in Gurharpal Singh's sense of the word, define themselves. They do so by rejecting accommodation. That leaves the Indian State only two options – to permit them to secede or to enforce unity. Second, the distinction between core and periphery, far from being sharp and immutable, as Singh suggests, is a shifting one. Virtually any state in India (perhaps excluding the four Hindi speaking states of the north) can become a part of the periphery by becoming the site of a secessionist movement. It can return to the core when the separatism is contained. The possibility of such shifts deprives the distinction between core and periphery of its analytical value. What distinguishes one from the other are the implication each carries for the security and territorial integrity of the Indian Union. To recognize this is not to endorse the government's policy, which I do not do. But to ignore it is equally problematic. Are we to understand that New Delhi was never really worried about the security implications of Sikh, Kashmiri, Assamese and Naga and Tamil nationalism?

Is there any other way in which Gurharpal Singh's distinction can be rescued from this fate? The only one that remains is to define core states as Hindu states and the periphery as non-Hindu. Such a fault line would neatly put all the states where there is, or has



been, some insurgent activity – Punjab, Kashmir and the Northeast—on one side while putting the rest of India on the other. But on closer examination, this too does not work. First, it assumes that there will never be a separatist movement in a Hindu state. Second, it does not even explain all the insurgent activity going on in the country today. Where do we put the DK and the still very small Tamil National Renewal Army in Tamil Nadu, and the ULFA in Assam? Second, how does this explain the fact that in Punjab, only a small fraction of the Sikhs supported the insurgency even when it was at its height, which manifested itself in the fact that between 1983 and 1993, 61% of all the civilians whom the militants killed were Sikhs. In fact, the insurgency in Punjab died down when Sikh villagers not only turned against the insurgents, but took up arms against them. The neat fault line also breaks down in Kashmir. In the recent state election, Kashmiris rejected the National Conference and voted for many independent candidates. In a MORI opinion poll, conducted in Jammu and Kashmir in April 2002, which had foreshadowed these results, a quarter to a third of the Muslim residents of Kashmir valley said that they preferred to stay with India rather than merge with Pakistan (MORI 2002).

Niraja Gopal Jayal's point that I have emphasized territorial imperatives over those of building a federal democracy in my analysis do not reflect either my intention when writing the article or my assessment after re-reading it. The point of my analysis was to show that while the second reorganization, for instance the demands for an autonomous Sikh state during the Nehru period, raised concerns over territorial unity, the third reorganization and the creation of the three new states of Chattisgarh, Uttarkhand and Jharkhand was based on a very different calculus. Political and electoral considerations were paramount in this third wave of reorganization. These considerations were certainly not absent in the earlier reorganizations, but the Coalition era of the 1990s had brought a dynamic to the forefront that was altogether different from that in the era dominated by the Congress party. The decision to carve out three new states, its timing and the lack of controversy over it, cannot be understood without taking into account the new correlation of domestic forces characterized by the demise of Congress's dominance, the rise of the BJP, the strengthening of local and regional political parties and its inevitable consequence, namely coalition governments.

Second, Jayal notes that in my analysis I do not account for the level of state capacity—whether it was weaker or stronger in ceding internal reorganization—since I argue that separate statehood is granted when it is uncontroversial. It is true that I have not tackled the question of state capacity, but that is because I had not meant to address it in the article. The focus of the article was to expose—through events and policy analysis—the patterns in government responses to demands for ethnically based state-provinces. Was there an implicit grand design in the three waves of reorganization? This was the main question I sought to answer. I show that the design apparent in the first reorganization—which must be considered in conjunction with the constitutional article governing the provisions for the creation of new states—sought to establish a balance between territorial imperatives and federal democracy. Both were important to the process of nation-state formation. But this was a shifting balance and the constitution had wisely provided room for maneuver by leaving the decision to the representative body of the people. It was the parliament that had to decide the appropriate basis for altering internal boundaries and creating new province states. What was at stake then was not only unity but also democracy. And in this balancing act, the Indian state performed rather poorly. The third reorganization did not, however, call into question territorial unity. This is why the decision to create the three new states was guided by the imperatives of domestic politics, at least largely so. And it did not become particularly controversial mainly because of the sea change in post-1989 Indian politics. The lack of

controversy is meant to tell us the extent to which center-state relations had changed and brought regional parties the power to veto the central government's policies.

This is not to deny that questions about state capacity are certainly important, but they could not be addressed comprehensively within the scope of a single article. That is why I suggested only in passing that state capacity—or the quantum of state power—depends on state's institutionalized ability to defuse conflict (Chadda 2002: 52). This requires considerable political capital. So we need to account for not only the 'development deficit' that Jayal so rightly underscores but also for the 'democratic deficit' evident in the concentration of decision-making powers at the apex under Indira Gandhi. The dissipation of political capital did not occur because Indira Gandhi was turning India into a Hindu Rashtra—(that honor had to be left to the BJP and the Sangh Parivar although she was not above using the Hindu card occasionally for electoral purposes), but because she was seeking legislative majorities at all costs, including those that eventually destroyed her party and undermined the independence and integrity of state institutions. Her authoritarian tendencies hid the decay of Congress and its weakening hold over the Indian electorate. The result was the unraveling of the Nehruvian design that had balanced the two principles of unification and diversity through accommodation. The failure led to ethnic violence and insurgencies in Assam, Punjab and Kashmir.

Third, Jayal points out that economic factors were critical in forging the demand for the creation of Uttarkhand. The 'development deficit' she underlines did indeed spur the movement to its conclusion. My analysis should have included some observations about the economic neglect and lack of development, and I accept her comments on this score. I was less concerned with the causes that brought the movement about, but more with the government's response to it. This is why the focus is on the political dynamics that provided the background against which the decision to carve out a separate state was taken. Indeed, Jayal herself admits that while 'deeper causes' for the demand could be traced to the sense of economic discrimination, the trigger factors were largely political. 'Identity politics' is always a mix of many factors that frequently includes desire for equal status and economic grievances, as well as for an equal share of political power and office. Different grievances come to the fore at different times in the life of a movement. Punjab is a good case in point. The Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973 had a mix of religious, political and economic demands. The latter were even specified: guaranteed procurement prices for agricultural crops and investments in industry. But fulfilling the economic part of the demand alone would not have ended the insurgency in Punjab.

Finally, what are the component elements of ethnicity? As it would be far beyond the scope of my short reply, I do not wish to engage in the 'definitional' controversy and gladly concede Jayal's point that definitions shift according to who is doing the defining and for what purpose. So, caste groups or regional and caste associations that cross over more than one ethnically-based state, fall within the broad kind of definition of ethnicity that I implicitly based my argument on. More to the point, as I was interested in the strategies employed by the government and reasons for its choice, I found that these could be understood better if we were to construct a comparative frame of government response, beginning with spelling out the grand logic (which was explained briefly in the discussion of *relational control and interlocking balancin'* with citations for more elaborate discussion) of the 'original compact' between India and her federal parts. The extent to which governments strayed or adhered to the commitments in the original compact (implicit in the reorganization of 1956) provided clues for understanding at least two things: politics of center-state relations and the balance of political forces at large. One could infer something about the strengthening or weakening of the state from these, although, I hasten to add, that was not the focus of my article. In any event, the compact could accommodate a strong central state and a politically autonomous



province-state. Again, the relationship between Tamil nationalism and Indian nationalism, the DMK and the Congress or the BJP comes to mind, which, by and large, have been compatible. This is why the debates about centralization vs. decentralization that have so preoccupied scholars over the past decades are misleading. Decentralization is not the panacea it is made out to be and centralization is not the only problem Indian federalism needs to resolve. Many South Asia scholars have, however, invested too much passion in these arguments to acknowledge that the only way the Indian model can work is to do both within a frame of political negotiations with the disputants.

Katharine Adeney has two main objections to my article. First, that I do not distinguish between the government's treatment of Hindu as opposed to non-Hindu groups and their demand for autonomy. Second, that the particular form a democracy might take is crucial to understanding conflict in an ethnically divided society. For instance, a majoritarian democracy is bound to create a whole host of conflicts in a society as diverse as India. Adeney cites Nehru's rejection of the demand for Sikhistan because it was made by Sikhs. Indeed, Nehru distinguished between religion-based and language-based demands for the creation of separate province-states and remained stubbornly opposed to dividing India again on a religious basis. There is, however, a major difference between treating religious groups—who were granted total cultural autonomy—and ceding to their territorial demands. Punjabi Subha was created when Sant Fateh Singh replaced Master Tara Singh and articulated Sikh demands in terms of language rather than religion. Nehru took a principled position on this issue. Nehru's speeches and statements also reveal ample references to Punjab's location on the border with Pakistan. This shows that while principles of internal division were being debated, the government was worrying about ceding autonomy and creating a Sikh province on that border. Does that mean Sikhs were distrusted? The weight of evidence cited in scholarly literature about this period does not support such an interpretation of Nehru's motives. In any event, the majority of Sikhs in Punjab did not want a separate Sikhistan; only a small fraction had supported the demand for separate statehood. The politics of Punjab in the 1950s and 1960 was far more complex and cannot be reduced to a simple divide between Sikh and Hindus. Indeed, in subsequent elections, the majority of the Sikhs voted for the Congress rather than the Akali Dal which claimed to represent the Sikhs. And Master Tara Singh, the main advocate of Sikhistan was consigned to political oblivion.

In response to the second comment, I would like to point out that in the article and in my two books (Chadda 1997 and 2000) I have discussed extensively the disastrous consequences of Congress's quest for legislative dominance and centralized decision-making. I have argued that these quests eventually contributed to disaffection and violence in several parts of India. Indira Gandhi was violating the 'grand logic' that was meant to consolidate India's federal democracy and forging a more integrated union. That logic—evident in the constitutional design in combination with the rearrangements forged by the first federal reorganization—rested on strategies of accommodation to balance the interlocking interests within three arenas of conflict: between proximate ethnic communities (i.e., Hindus and Sikhs in Punjab) between the state and the central government (Punjab vs. government at the center) and India (with its indeterminate borders) and the neighboring states. The failure to balance and accommodate led to ethnic conflicts. Katherine Adeney and I are not in disagreement on this point.

In closing, I would like to thank all three respondents for their comments and for making me think harder about my arguments and conclusions and the logic by which I arrived at them. Although I disagree with Gurharpal Singh in his characterization of center-state relations, his arguments rightly warn us of the dangers we face now, should the resistance to 'Hindutva' crumble, which is all too real given the relentless march of the

VHP since the January 2003 elections in Gujarat. Jayal's learned comments point to the difficulty one must face in taking a 'small cut' from the seamless connectedness of politics and economics. Adeney's comments in fact reinforce many arguments I have made, although we differ on the significance of the Hindu—non-Hindu fault line in ethnic relations. Many of these and other more general points raised in the insightful comments on my article might become more applicable as we speak and deserve further rigorous examination by South Asia scholars. Yet, my aim was more modest, namely to offer an explanation for the three waves of internal reorganization in India that I discussed in my article.

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RESEARCH NOTE

Justice for a Genocide?

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In Rwanda today it is considered poor manners to cry at funerals. Public grieving for the death of a single person is thought to minimize the grief people felt after the genocide when many people lost entire families. That genocide was eight years ago and to date little has been done to bring the perpetrators to justice. The newly established gacaca courts are meant to rectify this situation and assess the guilt or innocence of some of the tens of thousands of people now held in Rwandan jails.

Gacaca, appropriately means grass, as the courts are held outside on the grass under shelters that in the past would have been constructed from banana leaves to shade people from the sun, but are now made out of UNHCR tarps. The logistics of bringing people to trial in this context are complex. First, it is necessary to compile a list of all the people present in an area before the genocide, then a list of all those who were killed, and finally a list of the accused. Draft lists are read out to groups of at least 100 people who correct them according to their memories. Trials of the accused will begin in March of next year.

As a method of getting a backlog of cases to trial, the gacaca courts are Rwanda's best option to date. Partially because of the genocide, which left Rwanda with a total of judges and lawyers that could be counted on one hand, the Rwandan national courts have been extremely slow in processing the accused. More reprehensibly, the International Criminal Tribunal in Arusha, established to try the organizers of the genocide, has brought less than ten accused to trial. In the meantime, many of those who organized the genocide still go free in the countries surrounding Rwanda, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The gacaca courts were designed to be more efficient by enlisting the support and participation of local communities. It is thought that this will not only bring justice but will also aid the communities in working through the trauma and the grief that resulted from the genocide. Indeed, at the beginning of each gacaca session the community is reminded by the presiding official of the benefits of the courts for both the victimized families and for the perpetrators of the violence. Participants in the genocide are urged to come forward and confess their crimes before March 15 of next year so that their sentences can be reduced.

It remains to be seen whether all of these benefits will be realized. Many fear that the gacaca will only serve to open old wounds and retraumatize those who have already suffered terribly. For example, one Tutsi young woman has been heavily pressured by her community to bring an accusation against a Hutu man. This young woman witnessed the man murdering her mother and grandmother with a machete. Yet, she was unwilling to raise an accusation against him because he was being beaten by others in order to make him kill. While she watched, he hacked her mother and grandmother to death sobbing 'I am killing you, I am killing you' all the while. The young woman does not want to see this man convicted, yet the pressure she is under from her community is intense. For her and for others, the gacaca process brings back terrible memories. This case illustrates the problems of adjudicating disputes from the genocide.

There are many levels of guilt: from those who stole things from people who had been killed to those who orchestrated the violence. The gacaca courts are designed to deal only with what are called 'active' and 'passive' participants, in other words people who

killed and people who allowed others to kill or perhaps gave them the information they needed to find Tutsis. The courts will likely be successful in moving people out of prison, as is their goal. But it is too much to expect from a judicial process that the gacaca courts will heal communities torn apart by the genocide.

The gacaca courts will bring the accused to trial in an unusual setting and there are few protections for the accused. Rules for the submission of evidence and legal processes designed to protect the innocent will not be present. Instead, testimony alone will determine the guilt or innocence of those on trial. Though this is not unusual in court settings in sub-Saharan Africa, in this case it could create problems far into the future. If there is any question of unfair procedure in the gacaca courts there is a potential that the courts will be perceived as a tool of revenge against the Hutu by the Tutsi-dominated government.

The gacaca are unlikely to bring any sort of resolution or reconciliation to ethnic conflict. The courts may bring some semblance of justice to a country that has seen little, but it is equally probable that they will exacerbate the underlying tensions that exist. Rwanda needs unifying measures at the moment, not institutional processes that emphasize ethnic divisions. Yet, it also needs justice. This presents a dilemma. The gacaca process illustrates only too well the thin line that exists between justice and revenge.

The courts are explicitly designed to try perpetrators of the genocide alone and not try war crimes associated with the RPF invasion and takeover. By all accounts, the RPF soldiers perpetrated relatively few violations of human rights -at least as African armed insurgency movements go. However, the explicit restriction of the gacaca courts means that the defendants will be almost entirely Hutu. Perhaps the government ought to reconsider this policy and allow all crimes committed during those long and terrible months of 1994 to be tried. If they do so, the gacaca will look far less ethnically biased and only a few RPF soldiers will be tried. If they continue to hold to the restriction then the courts appear to be merely a tool of revenge for the Tutsi against the Hutu. Certainly some sort of trial and punishment of genocide perpetrators is in order, but the government would lose little and gain much by allowing all the crimes perpetrated in 1994 whether related to the war or the genocide to be included. This would be a small, but important step down the road to ethnic reconciliation.

Right now in Rwanda, reconciliation does not seem to be a part of the national agenda. The government has not only started this new and potentially divisive court system, but also promulgated a new flag and a new national anthem for the country to eliminate what were seen previously as symbols of Hutu domination. But will these new symbols be seen as something other than Tutsi domination?

Little seems to have happened since the genocide to bring about an end to the underlying ethnic tensions in Rwanda. If this remains the case then the gacaca may be viewed as just another wave of the cycle of ethnic violence that has been going on in Rwanda for decades – this time institutionalized. Right now the predominantly Tutsi government has the upper hand, but the Tutsi are a minority and they will not always be in this position of power. Long –term stability and peace in Rwanda depends on the ability of all the courts to provide justice in a country where there are only two kinds of people: killers and judges.



PRACTITIONERS' CORNER

Political Travel through the Holy Land

Heribert Adam, Simon Fraser University, and Kogila Moodley, University of British Columbia

I

We have studied ethnic conflicts in many countries as insiders and outsiders over the past thirty years. Seldom have we felt so constrained to write as about our experience in Israel. That one of us is of German origin and the other lived through Apartheid victimisation evokes special sensitivities. It is the heavy burden of an atrocious anti-Semitic history that cautions against judging the descendants of century-long persecution, culminating in the horrendous Holocaust. Vulnerable, traumatised people long for security and protection at any cost, even at the price of expansionism. With Arab resistance to new Jewish settlers, the historically displaced inevitably engaged in displacement themselves. After four wars since 1948, the mythology of a promised land resulted in the Jewish domination of its Arab population. However, can the recent American settlers on the West Bank and Gaza still claim victimhood? With state subsidies and army protection, they confiscate more Arab land and use five times the scarce water per capita than the Palestinians are allocated.

Why concern yourself with Israel at all when there are so many worse human rights violations among Israel's Arab critics, some of our Jewish friends wanted to know? Why does the world pick on the only democracy in the Middle East – if not for its latent anti-Semitism? The suspicion runs deep and may even be partly justified, but at the same time it serves as convenient armour to silence any criticism of the Jewish state. Indeed, Israel should not be held more accountable than others. Israel receives disproportionate attention in global forums for a variety of reasons. First, it is precisely because Israel is a Western democracy, that it is judged by these standards. Western commentators feel a greater affinity to a like-minded polity than an autocratic Third World state. Second, the Jewish state enjoys a sophisticated diaspora for which it claims to be the spiritual home and sanctuary. Third, as a Western outpost in a strategic environment, the country is heavily bankrolled by the US taxpayer and donors and therefore linked to its outside supporters. Fourth, Israeli policies are used as a mobiliser for Islamist anti-Western sentiment. Above all, as former collective victims, survivors and descendants are expected to be particularly sensitive not to repeat ethnic discrimination. In short, concerns with Israeli policy for many reasons have to be distinguished from anti-Semitism. Criticism of its government does not question the legitimacy of the state of Israel, let alone should it be construed as an attack on Jewishness.

Problematic ethnic solidarity may also be questioned. We know of many Jewish friends who are deeply troubled about Israeli policies. Yet these highly principled colleagues remain silent and will not criticise Israeli government policy publicly, particularly abroad. Elie Wiesel, who rightly assailed the initial silence of the world about the Holocaust, personifies this contradiction best: 'As a Jew I see my role as a defender of Israel. I defend even her mistakes. Yes, I feel that as a Jew who resides outside Israel I must identify with whatever Israel does – even with her errors. That is the least Jews in the Diaspora can do for Israel: either speak up in praise or keep silent.' Such uncritical solidarity elevates fallible policies into the realm of the sacred. Acquiescence in the face of injustice constitutes complicity. Learning from the holocaust implies concern for human rights everywhere. Why should breaking ranks on Israel amount to a betrayal of identity? On the contrary, it reaffirms a cherished Jewish tradition of rational argumentation that risks being lost by an unquestioning loyalty. The five hundred conscientious objectors who refuse military service in the occupied territories (but would

defend Israel proper) bravely uphold this tradition of autonomous reasoning. Yet they are ostracised as betraying fellow Jews.

While a Western majority blindly endorses or quietly tolerates any Israeli government policy, another vocal radical minority abroad calls for apartheid-like sanctions. Other human rights liberals highlight the plight of victims, but they seldom analyse what causes the suffering. Most university administrations in North America, from Concordia to Harvard, would like to declare the controversial issue a taboo and ban all discussions among agitated students and activist faculty. Such a position shirks rational, analytic debate where it should be encouraged. Do the calls to boycott Israel assist peace efforts in the Middle East? Progressive forces on both sides would be better served by concerned academics visiting and supporting them directly, if only to act in critical solidarity.

For professional sociologists, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict represents an additional challenge. Many of our friends at home declared us suicidal masochists, when we planned to revisit Israel/The Palestinian territories for field research. There we talked to dozens of colleagues, diplomats, NGO activists and ordinary people in both camps of a deeply divided society. From relaxed dinners in exceptionally hospitable Jewish and Palestinian homes through joyful *iftars* breaking the Ramadan fast, from a formal seminar at the Truman Institute of Hebrew University to a fascinating symposium with professionals at the Palestinian Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) in East Jerusalem, we oscillated in an intense immersion course of contrasting perceptions between Tel Aviv and Ramallah. Perhaps only innocent foreigners get away with raising the sensitive, controversial questions that underlie the seething resentment behind the self-evident 'truths' on both sides. Outsiders benefit from easy access as well as unsuspecting frankness. The support groups that visit the region hear only one side, want their own partisanship confirmed and return even more prejudiced.

We consciously avoided seeking out only people with similar political outlooks. We broke bread with an engaging leader of the now marginalised and dispirited Israeli peace movement as well as a valued colleague who proudly displayed a poster of Sharon on his wall. When we tried to gauge the mutual reaction to the opinion of these adversaries, they both shrugged: 'What else do you expect from such lunatics?' The sophisticated Sharon supporter revealed no doubts. He harshly dismissed even the outstanding Israeli daily Ha'aretz (published in English also as a supplement to the International Herald Tribune) as 'predictable leftist nonsense'. It brought home to us again that the internal political cleavages in Israeli society are at least as deep as the gulf to the Arab other. These were secularised individuals who probably both consider the 20% minority of ultra-orthodox Jews in their dark suits yet another separate element. To this division should be added the one million Russian 'Jews', who are first of all cultural Russians and mostly political hard-liners, and the 200,000 ideologically distinct settlers in Palestinian areas, in addition to the 200,000 residents in hilltop settlements of subsidised housing on conquered post-1967 Arab land around Jerusalem.

Similar deep internal ideological divisions exist among Palestinians. It was surprising that hardly any of the dozen or so politically aware Palestinians we spoke to at length displayed any enthusiasm for Arafat and his corrupt security service, let alone for the fundamentalists of Hamas and the smaller Jihad. Nobody dares to dispose of Arafat as the symbolic figurehead of Palestinian liberation, but everybody is aware of his limitations. Yet exiling him, as Netanyahu advocates, Palestinians unanimously consider as the prelude to their own expulsion. In national opinion polls, 46% of Israel's Jewish citizens favour 'transferring' Palestinians out of the territories, while 31% even support transferring the one million Israeli Arabs out of Israel proper. Referring to the demographic threat, a prominent academic told us: 'One Arab is too many!' A Palestinian academic referred to the ongoing 'soft transfer' of emigrating professionals as a major



problem. Intolerable conditions, from curfews to travel and business restrictions, motivate people with options to emigrate voluntarily. You do not have to terrorise a population in order to demoralise and drive out its elites.

II

The feared Kamikaze pilots of the imperial Japanese army crashed their planes into the US navy in heroic acts of self-sacrifice. Here at least the vicious fighting was confined to two militaries officially at war with each other. Suicide bombers in Israel and the Palestinian territories deliberately aim at killing Jews, regardless of whether they are civilians or soldiers, children or adults, left-wingers or right-wingers. Although it is not official policy, when the Israeli army pursues Palestinian militants, many more civilians than gunmen are regularly killed, regardless of whether they are apolitical pacifists or violent activists. In the undeclared war in the holy land, the innocents on both sides are the main victims. As usual, it is also the poor who live in refugee camps or wait at bus stations who are disproportionately at risk and suffer most.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict bears all the hallmarks of mutual ethnic targeting. You are singled out because you are a Jew. Property of Palestinians only is expropriated and only Arabs with different license plates are checked at numerous roadblocks and there are long roads for Jews only to the West Bank settlements. Randomly, indiscriminately and unpredictably, life chances are curtailed, just because one is born into a historical label. There is no escape from the bitter history as long as you continue to live in the embattled place. Two hostile people view each other as collective enemies, engage in collective revenge, suspect and demonise all members of the other group, regardless of the widely differing stances of individuals on both sides. This makes the necessary alliances of peace-seekers across ethnic lines so difficult. The two most educated and sophisticated people in the Middle East stereotype and blame each other in mutual resentment that exceeds anything experienced in other communal conflicts.

'How would you feel if requested to identify the bloodied pieces of your daughter because of some indoctrinated fanatic', asked our Jewish host in Jerusalem. Most likely, our unimaginable grief would also long for collective blame, if not revenge. 'Do you expect us to just stand around passively if their settlers confiscate more of our land, uproot more of our olive trees, shoot at us during their curfews and humiliate us in endless waits at their checkpoints', asked our Palestinian host ten kilometres away in Ramallah? 'They have all the weapons in the world – we have only our bodies and our will to resist their ongoing colonisation'. Both sides dwell on their legitimate grievances and nurture their respective victimhoods, each as poignantly felt as the other.

The cycle of mutual revenge has escalated after hopeful negotiation politics ceased in January 2001, and now the extremists shape events again. Apologists on both sides argue endlessly about cause and effect. Palestinians blame blatant settler expansionism on their land. Israelis invoke legitimate security concerns in light of unprecedented attacks on their normal way of life. Both 'righteous victims', in Benny Morris' famous book, brutalise each other. This undermines all prospects for future peaceful co-existence.

Can the impasse be broken? A similar despair and paralysis prevailed in the seemingly intractable ethno-racial conflict in South Africa during the mid-1980s. Until recently, few expected to see the communal strife in Northern Ireland, Cyprus or Sri Lanka ever to get settled. Yet in all these cases, visionary political leaders on both sides negotiated the non-negotiable. Can a similar historic compromise between two adversaries be achieved in the religiously charged Middle East atmosphere? What must happen before people get

tired of their brutalisation and exhausted from battle fatigue? Can outsiders help, facilitate, build bridges and restart negotiation politics as honest brokers?

The US administration, which has the most leverage on actors in the region, has conveniently washed its hands of it. Bush lets his hard-line Israeli allies determine the course of events. The Canadians, as eager impotent peacemakers everywhere, propose to inject peacekeepers into the volatile West Bank under an international trusteeship, even without a peace agreement. However, the extremists on both sides would most likely be gunning for the peacekeepers who would be as helpless as in Bosnia.

III

Outsiders are ill-positioned to give advice to insiders who struggle daily to live normally in a painful situation. Visitors should listen, learn and observe, but not lecture. Everybody knows a story of earnest consultants in developing countries who fly in from Washington or Ottawa and become instant experts overnight. But what if your hosts turn your questions around and press you for an answer to: What would you do in our situation? Feigning ignorance or escaping into evasive generalities shirks a moral obligation.

In this dilemma, the thrust of our response to our Palestinian audience was straightforward: recapture the moral high ground! Take a public stance against the counterproductive suicide bombings. Intentional killings of innocent civilians is immoral and a crime against humanity under international law. It marginalises the Israeli peace camp, a much-needed ally. Instead, adopt the Gandhian-style passive resistance, the non-violence of the first Intifada, rooted in the popular involvement and protest actions of shopkeepers and schoolchildren alike.

In contrast, the second Intifada consists of secretive, militarised attacks by autonomous rival militias in a fragile semi-state. With bombings and shootouts, opponents are challenged where they are strongest, rather than shamed with moral exposure of expansionism where Israel is weakest. Palestinians allow themselves to be branded as 'terrorists', besides triggering massive retaliation that has destroyed the social fabric of the emerging state. Preserve the few institutional gains of Palestinian statehood, rather than facilitate the Israeli right-wing to smash you into oblivion. The crushed ambulance on top of the pile of debris in Arafat's compound appeared to us as a reminder that this is warfare with few rules. After 9/11 at the latest, the militaristic strategy needed to be abandoned. Why unwittingly reinforcing Sharon's insistence that Palestinians are local Bin Ladens? Since you have nothing in common with the dogmatic anti-Americanism of Hezbollah leaders, why don't you say so publicly, as some of the Palestinian intellectuals have done internally? Disassociate yourself from al-Qaeda who want to piggyback on your cause for their own ends.

Our Palestinian audience received this pessimistic and critical vision with polite dismissal. Wishful thinking in place of realistic recognition of power differentials knows no bounds if you believe in the justice of your cause. Why did we use the insulting notion of 'suicide bombers' instead of the proper term 'martyr', one questioner wanted to know. Are we not aware that stone-throwing children did not persuade one settler to leave our land? But failure of non-violence does not logically mean that violence will succeed, we interjected. Besides, the protest of the first Intifada brought Palestinians some tangible gains, the Oslo accord, down the road a sovereign Palestinian state as well as global sympathy. But what kind of non-viable, non-contiguous Bantustan is created, insisted our interrogator? Another participant interjected, 'We would be the wardens of our own detention camps, completely at the mercy of Israel.' Indeed, Sharon seems to have something like this in mind when he talks about 'painful concessions': an eventual



Palestinian state on 40% of West Bank and Gaza territory under current official Palestinian Authority control, once the Israeli army withdraws.

A Palestinian lawyer questioned, 'After we have already conceded 78% of British-mandate Palestine to Israel and recognised their right to co-exist with us in the 1993 Oslo accord, how much more displacement and concessions must we tolerate? Colonial settlers are insatiable in their quest for our land and scarce water. While they enact a law of return for all Jews of the world, millions of Palestinian refugees, some still born on this soil, are barred from ever returning.' The return of refugees to their ancestral homes raises the most intractable issue of the conflict. Some Palestinians reject all compromises on this 'principal right', including compensation for lost land or symbolic return of limited numbers. For Jewish nationalists, from the right to the left, the demographic capture of the Jewish state means the end of their dream and the beginning of a nightmare. Apart from a few mavericks, like Meron Benvenisti or Jeff Halper, few political thinkers on the Jewish side envisage a bi-communal, federal and ethnically neutral common state of Jews and Arabs living together in relative multicultural harmony, like bilingual Canada or nominally 'non-racial' South Africa. Yet, Palestinian intellectuals increasingly rethink the goal of a separate state in light of the Israeli occupation. They now redefine their freedom as a civil rights struggle in a shared state, rather than national liberation in a separate state.

IV

Attempting to unravel these predicaments amounts to the impossible task of unscrambling history. Few other nationalist movements have succeeded in the way Zionism has established a modern ethnic state, despite the repeated military opposition of its Arab neighbours and local Palestinian population. The Jewish refugees from European anti-Semitism colonised the barren land not for economic reasons, but out of ideological commitment to the mythology of returning to a holy ancient home. Had there been no Russian pogroms in the 1890's and no Nazi holocaust, or had America welcomed the Jewish outcasts, Israel would not exist. The displaced Palestinians are the indirect victims of European crimes against a vulnerable minority that aimed at a safe haven. Just as other nationalisms invoked the right of self-determination, so did Jews, but clearly NOT in 'a land without people for a people without land', as the cliché asserts.

Our Palestinian colleagues largely agreed with our non-violent advocacy in private conversations. They wanted us to understand their own predicament as well as the context of the suicidal resistance. They felt uneasy denigrating the ultimate sacrifice of activists on their behalf. Under conformity pressure to honour the 'brave martyrs', they also could not publicly disavow them without marginalising themselves in Palestinian politics. Israeli Palestinians in Jaffa told us about a memorial service for the collateral Palestinian victims of a suicide bombing during which the grieving relatives did not utter any criticism of the bomber. Out of fear or support? We think Israel deceives itself when it takes for granted the loyalty of its 20% Arab citizens. These second-class citizens are increasingly alienated, as we sensed during our first day in a large Palestinian home in Jaffa. During a tour of dilapidated community facilities, the unequal allocation of public funds for identical taxpayers emerged as a major complaint. Just from a look at the potholes and sidewalks one knows whether one is in a Jewish or Arab quarter.

While emigration is on many people's minds, without outspoken moral leadership by the community's intellectuals, fragmented and irrational responses to the occupation continue. Palestinian society as well as Israel's security is increasingly threatened by autonomous militias outside the control of any political leaders. Among a militant youth with nothing to lose, the functionaries of the Palestinian Authority are discredited

because of their perceived personal enrichment and collaboration. Utter powerlessness and frequent personal humiliation produces an all-consuming rage that outsiders can hardly fathom. We had assumed that religious indoctrination motivates martyrdom, but were given quite different explanations.

A trusted Palestinian community leader conveyed the story of a well-adjusted high-school girl from a secularised liberal family who blew herself up in a supermarket. She told two women in traditional Palestinian dress 'to get out', before approaching a group of other female shoppers with children. They were all killed when she exploded. Why did she do this? 'Certainly not because she was a religious psychopath!' The teacher explained that he is not worried when one or two girls are missing from his class – but when ten are suddenly absent simultaneously he fears that they are competing for the 'honour' to be the next martyr. 'The girls save their own pocket money to buy the belt.' He also knows of families who rejected the money offered afterwards, because 'it is no substitute for our beloved child'. But who makes and abuses impressionable children as moving bombs?

We asked an attractive 23 year old Palestinian woman how she experiences 'the situation'. Her reply boiled down to one concept: humiliation. In her words, she feels symbolically 'raped' by the young men in green uniforms at the many checkpoints and she illustrated this with numerous stories of sheer harassment. We were told of boys, whose school bags were emptied and after they had picked up their books, the guard laughingly repeated the harassment.

When entering Israel a second time from Jordan at the Allenby crossing, we saw with our own eyes how Arabs in the queue were treated. An elderly dignified couple in their seventies were ordered around with finger-snapping gestures. Their meagre household goods in two overstuffed bags were thrown around with contempt. The body language of gun-totting youngsters, including hardened young women, expressed it all. We were travelling with two Canadian-based diplomats, always patient, calm and polite, who for the first time grew audibly incensed at the unfriendly hassle even they were subjected to at the hour-long procedure. If privileged visitors receive this treatment, how can Israel expect ordinary tourists to return?

In the eerily empty Novotel in the no-mans land between East and West Jerusalem, the receptionist wears a pistol in his belt and was prepared to drop his room rate to \$75 when we hesitated to book. Armed uniformed pensioners guard the university gates and check the garbage cans in the cafeteria continuously. At Tel Aviv University we saw a student with an Uzi casually slung over his shoulder. Israelis live on the edge and nerves are frayed. Generally, aggressive driving and horn blowing relieves the pervasive stress. The number of deserters and so-called 'problem soldiers' with post-traumatic stress disorder has risen substantially. These are the hidden, invisible costs of a siege society from which neither side is shielded. The unexpected boom of an air force jet breaking the sound barrier over Jerusalem caused panic below, because it sounded like a bomb blast. Restaurants frisk their rare customers at the entrance. Driving a bus or being employed as a security guard in a shopping mall ranks among the riskiest occupations.

Yet at the same time, life continues routinely as if calculating daily survival or forgetting about it is as normal as brushing your teeth in the morning. Our convivial Tel Aviv host showed us proudly his bomb shelter beside the kitchen and drove us to the supermarket a few blocks down to view the site where an explosion had killed people only two days ago. Fatalistically, both opponents carry on. One underestimates the resilience and generosity of spirit among a beleaguered people, that brings out the best and the worst.

Jewish security consciousness seems totally absent in the Arab quarter of Jerusalem where we stayed at the ill-named, but legendary 'American Colony Hotel'. Frequented



mostly by foreign journalists and voyeuristic TV crews, the stylish meeting place exudes relaxed calm. Most residents of West Jerusalem avoid this part of the city and are even reluctant to pick you up at the hotel although no hostile incidents have ever been reported here. When you walk as a visible stranger through the chaotic markets of a West Bank town or the narrow alleys of the Muslim quarter in the old city, you feel safe and welcome. Every desperate merchant explains that his prices have been lowered, because of 'the situation'. When you still resist the amassed religious kitsch and faked antiques, he even tries a guilt trip with the question, 'You don't like to buy from Arabs?'

The Palestinians – both the stateless former commuters in the territories and the residents of East Jerusalem with a special identity card – suffer most from the depressed Israeli economy and the understandable Jewish paranoia. It was a trusted Arab painter, employed for ten years by Hebrew University, who suddenly snapped and placed a remote controlled bomb in the crowded student cafeteria which he had painted only the day before. Citing alleged cost-cutting, the institution has just laid off most of its Arab cleaning staff to the protest of a few concerned faculty. Three hundred thousand migrants from the Balkans and Asia have replaced the collectively dismissed Palestinians. Israeli closure policies have increased unemployment in the West Bank and Gaza dramatically. Therein lies a major difference to apartheid. South African rulers wanted to *exploit* their subordinates; Israel's rulers want to *expel* Arabs. The very logic of Zionism implies an Arab-free state, or failing that, second-class status in an official Jewish state. Is heightened misery and inequality of a suspect minority the key to greater security of the dominant majority?

V

What does the future hold? More of the same and worse through a general shift to the right by the Israeli electorate and dwindling numbers of left-wingers who support the *Meretz* party. Could a strengthened Sharon, under US pressure, mutate into a de Klerk or a de Gaulle, who turns upon the settlers? De Gaulle abandoned a much stronger settler force in Algeria, who considered themselves a betrayed part of the motherland and relied on its protection.

Will the repositioned Labour Party swing the apolitical but scared voters in the ideological middle between a committed anti-Arab right and a dispirited peace camp? It was under the Labour Party's former leader, Ehud Barak, that settlements expanded the most. Few peace activists place much hope in Labour's new leader, Amram Mitzna, although the former general and mayor of Haifa has campaigned on a platform of full withdrawal from Gaza and, if possible, negotiated borders, or alternatively unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank.

If the Israeli electorate could only be convinced that the abolition of settlements and the establishment of a viable Palestinian state would bring peace, a majority would support disengagement. In the absence of a reliable negotiating partner among the fragmented Palestinians, many centre-left academics now support unilateral withdrawal. A long fence has been elevated to magical security. When iron curtains are falling elsewhere, many Israelis dream of walling themselves in. The settlers oppose the fence which cuts them off and looks like a final border with still more Palestinian land confiscated for 'security reasons'. However, as attractive as the 'two states for two peoples' sounds, it fails as long as fanatical settlers insist on living among the Palestinian population. What happens to the settlers who refuse to leave, we asked? 'They will just have to get out in the national interest', was the wishfully idealistic answer. Applying force and using the army, however, would amount to civil war in Israel. In their recent widely acclaimed book *The Global Political Economy of Israel*, Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler (2002: 356)

state, 'Since the Oslo 'peace' agreement of 1993, the various Israeli governments have removed *not a single* Jewish settlement in the Occupied Territories. On the contrary, they added more.' If the settlers cannot be forced out and the Palestinians cannot be 'transferred', then the logical outcome is to live together with equal citizenship in a single state.

It will take some time to convince both sides that co-existing in a bi-communal, common state may be the most economically sensible (though not yet politically feasible) solution. Even if the Palestinians eventually succeed in establishing a viable state of their own (as the negotiators agreed upon at Taba in January 2001, but which the now ruling Likud opposes), the sad truth is that this will not end the wider Islamist perception of a 'state of infidels' on sacred Muslim soil. There also has to be a recognition by the Muslim world of Israel's moral right to exist within pre-1967 borders. This was the essence of the Saudi proposal. It fell flat because of the unresolved right of return of refugees.

Indeed, the two-state-solution would certainly help to diffuse the militarised confrontation. However, a semi-sovereign, demilitarised Palestinian state in almost total economic dependency on Israel would most likely continue to give rise to new strife, especially if confined to Sharon's vision of a fragmented mini-state. Ironically, the very success of destroying the Palestinian Authority, reoccupying Palestinian areas and forging the entire British-mandate Palestine into one geopolitical entity, has fatally undermined the two-state solution, unless either expulsion or permanent Palestinian Bantustans are envisaged. Locked together by history, geography and economic interdependency, the two hostile people may well learn to live together equally, if not by choice then by necessity, just as whites and blacks learned to co-exist reluctantly in South Africa after centuries of antagonism.

One of the more cynical comments by a leading South African apartheid ideologue afterwards was, 'We had to try apartheid first in order to know that the system could not work!' Without repeating this crime, Israel can learn from South Africa that locking people into tribal reservations and restricting the rights of others in an ethnic state does not secure long-term peace. Nor does forced or induced 'transfer' abolish a people's sense of home and quest for return, apart from constituting a worse crime. A governing party, wavering between these two options of transfer or apartheid, and dominated mainly by military calculations, manifests its moral bankruptcy.

A sense of hope needs to be restored on both sides. People take risks when they have clear expectations of a better life and a stake in a promising future. Envisaged security, not increased insecurity, changes hardened attitudes. Since the partisan US is advocating more war and turmoil in the region, it falls on the European Union to hold out an alternative. An offer of EU membership for Israel/The Palestinian territories could perhaps provide a sufficient inducement for a negotiated settlement. If a divided Cyprus with a large Turkish Muslim population can become an EU member and the admission of Turkey itself is seriously considered for the future, a democratic Israel/Palestine with adherence to Western human rights standards would also qualify. Just as the European states have overcome their mutual enmity in common institutions, so the Israelis and Palestinians would be bound together in a supra-national arrangement to their mutual benefit.

Reference

Nitzan, Jonathan and Bichler, Shimshon, 2002, *The Global Political Economy of Israel*, London: Pluto Press.



REVIEW ESSAY

Peace and Conflict Studies Today

Stephen Ryan, University of Ulster

Peace and Conflict Studies (second edition)

David P. Barash and Charles P. Webel

Sage, 2002

HBK: ISBN: 0761925074 £50.00

pp. xiii + 571 (including: bibliographies & name and subject indexes)

Searching for Peace: The Road to TRANSCEND (second edition)

Johan Galtung, Carl G. Jacobson and Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobson

Pluto Press, 2002

HBK: ISBN: 0745319297 £50.00 US\$ 69.95

PBK: ISBN: 0745319289 £15.99 US\$ 24.95

pp. xxiii + 338 (including: notes & index)

Peace and Conflict Studies: An Introduction

Ho-Won Jeong

Ashgate, 2000

HBK: ISBN: 184014095X £59.00 US\$ 104.95

PBK: ISBN: 1840140984 £22.00 US\$ 34.95

pp. xvi+407 (including: bibliography & index)

[A]nybody who believes that there is a simple road to progress
in these areas has my sympathy' (Hoffmann, 1981, p. 140)

The Origins and Development of Peace and Conflict Studies

If we accept conventional genealogies of peace and conflict research, then this area of study is not yet fifty years old. Its origins have been traced back to many influences but its development as a relatively organised and coherent group of scholars began in Stanford and Michigan in the mid-1950s (Conflict Research) and then at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo a few years later (Peace Research). Of course this is an oversimplified account which omits certain anomalies such as the French Institut Français de Polemologie, established in Paris as early as 1945, and the Lancaster Peace Research Centre (later the Richardson Institute), which was created at the University of Lancaster in 1959.

Peace and conflict research was a child of its time. It originated and developed in reaction to global politics and the way the latter was studied. The end of the First World War and the memories of Verdun and the Somme did induce disillusionment and a sense of gloom, but it also provoked a renewed commitment to making the world a more peaceful place. The strongest manifestation of this in the world of academic research was the establishment of the first chair in International Relations at Aberystwyth, followed by others around the world. For about twenty years international relations scholars engaged in what has come to be called utopian or idealistic research focused on issues such as strengthening international law, promoting disarmament and building a collective security system as an alternative to the discredited balance of power approach.

However, after the Second World War optimism was harder to come by. Albert Camus summed up the reasons very well in his acceptance speech at the banquet that followed the award of the Nobel Prize for Literature in Stockholm in December 1957. The author described himself as 'rich only in his doubts' and went on to describe the 'twenty years of an insane history' that his generation had lived through:

These men, who were born at the beginning of the First World War, who were twenty when Hitler came to power and the first revolutionary trials were beginning, who were then confronted as a completion of their education with the Spanish Civil War, the Second World War the world of concentration camps, a Europe of torture and prisons – these men must today rear their sons and create their works in a world threatened by nuclear destruction. Nobody, I think, can ask them to be optimists. (Camus 1957)

The strongest manifestation of this pessimism in the academic study of international politics was the tight grip that realist theories of inter-state behaviour placed on the analysis of world affairs. International politics was defined as power politics. The primary goal of statecraft was the promotion of the national interest. Progress was impossible and belief in a more peaceful world was a dangerous illusion. Indeed, for the hard-headed realist, peace thinking had actually contributed to the onset of the Second World War because it underpinned a misguided foreign policy known as appeasement and undermined the will of the people to take on Fascism in the only way it could be defeated – through armed resistance. After 1945 we therefore find time and again the use of the 'Munich Analogy' to attack peace initiatives and those who want to question the use of military force. Indeed, we see echoes of it today in the US government's attitude to the attempts by France and Germany to restrain the move to war with Iraq.

The failure to mobilise a strong peace movement immediately after 1945 illustrates an important lesson for the vitality of peace and conflict research. On the one hand there needs to be a strong sense of danger or concern about international developments, however there also needs to be a belief that something positive can be done about these dangers or concerns. In the ten years after the end of the Second World War there was a real sense of threat – the Cold War ensured that. However, there does not seem to have been the sense of optimism required to mobilize people to respond positively to it.

In the 1950s the sense of threat grew as the destructive power of nuclear weapons increased and the arms race accelerated. It was against this background that peace and conflict research emerged, coming from groups of people unhappy with the state of the world and the failure of academics to offer solutions or alternatives. But what were the grounds for optimism? In the 1950s, within the new peace and conflict research community, the basis for that optimism seemed to have been science, and in particular the behavioural revolution in the social sciences. The hope was that quantitative analysis of the causes of wars could provide information that could reduce large-scale violence.

Here we can cite a remarkable passage written by J. David Singer, one of the key figures in quantitative conflict analysis. He claimed that 'if the scientific study of world politics had taken root earlier in the century along with the "behavioural revolution" in psychology, sociology, and economics, it is not totally inconceivable that the First and Second World Wars might have been averted' (Singer 1991: 41). Faith in scientific analysis as an antidote to war was also a strong factor in the work of Kenneth Boulding, another of the founders of conflict research. He argued that:

The removal of conflict from the arena of folk knowledge to the area of scientific knowledge has a stabilizing, one is tempted to say a soothing, effect... If ideological struggles can be transformed even partially into conflicts of scientific theory, we have a much better chance for their resolution (Boulding 1982: 238).

In the 1950s, then, it was the 'hum of the calculator' that pointed the way forward. However, more recently the sources of optimism have tended to be less a belief in science and more a revival in normative theory. Here we should note (as do the Barash



and Jeong surveys) the important contributions from feminist peace and conflict research and green thinking. Marxist analysis also continues to adhere to a progressivist vision and has had its strongest input in this field in the debates on underdevelopment and the nature of the global capitalist economy. There has also been some interest in critical theory. A recent article by Heikki Patomäki (2001), for example, claims that peace research needs to be revitalised and calls for a redefinition of peace research in accordance with critical theories and Jeong invokes critical theory in his own analysis. But on the whole peace and conflict research seems to lag behind International Politics in this area, an uncomfortable thought for an area of study that has always regarded itself as the more radical. Perhaps the most significant normative input however has come from a revived liberal internationalism, especially the 'democratic peace' hypothesis.

Peace and Conflict Studies after the End of the Cold War

In some senses the end of the Cold War was a tuning point in the development of peace and conflict research. It presented both a danger and an opportunity. The danger was a perception of declining relevance. If the Cold War was over and the arms race had stopped why did we need peace and conflict research anymore? Violent conflicts still existed, of course, but they no longer threatened global annihilation. Indeed, several important research centres were closed as funding dried up. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War allowed for a rapid development of research in areas unrelated to nuclear weapons. These included: 'non-traditional conflicts' and 'new wars' especially ethnic conflict; broader definitions of security to include human security; and issues related to democratization. There was also a trend towards differentiation in peace and conflict research which meant a greater awareness of the impact on, and the role of, specific groups such as women, children and refugees.

The fear of destruction declined in those parts of the world lucky enough to escape violent conflict. However, there was also, at the start of the 1990s, a growing optimism about conflict resolution. The reasons for this optimism included the success of non-violence revolutions in central and eastern Europe, the spread of democracy, the end of apartheid in South Africa, and UN successes in Namibia and elsewhere which provoked the 1992 report by the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace*. The apparent move towards negotiated settlement in South Africa, Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, and several states in Central America stimulated interest in third party involvement in internal conflicts and acted as a catalyst for work on 'post-conflict peacebuilding'/ conflict transformation and conflict prevention, two of the major growth areas in terms of academic research in the 1990s.

The early 1990s therefore witnessed a flourishing of Peace and Conflict Studies as it moved into previously under-researched areas. This built on the consolidation of the area of study over the previous thirty years, which had seen the growth of professional bodies (IPRA, COPRED etc), the creation of over three hundred research institutes (e.g., US Institute of Peace, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Peace Research Institute Oslo, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Berghof Institute, the Institute on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity), the launch of respectable number of professional journals, and the development of courses in a wide range of universities. By the end of the century, Peter Wallensteen (2001: 21) was therefore able to claim that the number of courses had grown to an impressive size and that 'new teaching programmes [were] proliferating more quickly than research centres'.

The spread of taught courses in Peace and Conflict Studies has led to a demand for good quality texts. As someone who teaches both Peace and Conflict Studies and International Politics this reviewer has always been struck by the large number of good introductory texts for the later subject and the relatively poor range of materials for the former. The

books by Barash & Webel and by Jeong can be seen as attempts to remedy this state of affairs and to provide students with a solid introduction to this area of study. They should also help to answer the question of what peace and conflict research actually is? Given the diversity of the field simple definitions are difficult, and the growth in Peace and Conflict Research over the past decade has not helped. It is probably best to agree with Andrew Mack that 'attempts to derive a neat, all-inclusive definition of peace research seems unlikely to succeed... So rather than attempt what is probably impossible it may be more fruitful to conceive of peace research as a syndrome. By syndrome I mean a collection of attributes which tend to cluster together' (1985: 23). Mack wanted to identify the most important attributes as interdisciplinarity, optimism, broad definitions of peace and violence, policy-orientated research and a commitment to certain values.

This is close to a definition that appears in a recent review of the field by Paul Rogers and Oliver Ramsbotham. They argue that what distinguishes peace research from overlapping fields of study is 'its central concern with issues of peace and conflict, its multi-disciplinarity, its holistic approach combined with quantitative and empirical methodologies, and its normative commitment to the analysis of conditions for non-violent social and political change' (1999: 742). None of the three books examined here would seem to want to refute this description of the field.

The multi-disciplinarity and the willingness to study peace and conflict at all levels allowed academics in this field to avoid the state-centric focus of International Relations and to respond more effectively to the problems of more complex world of the 1990s. An interest in ethnic conflict, for example, emerged much more quickly here than at gatherings of International Relations scholars. Indeed, two of the leading figures in this field, Johan Galtung and John Burton, had been working with a frame of analysis based on human needs analysis which was hostile to the state-centric model and which led Burton to call for a paradigm shift in our approach to conflict analysis. Interestingly, both of these key figures have developed their ideas through action research that has seen them intervene in on-going conflicts. Galtung describes some of these interventions and the principles behind them in one of the books under review here, whilst Burton wrote the foreword for the Ho-Won Jeong's book and has had a strong influence on its approach to conflict resolution.

What none of the three books examine, however, is the tension between the desire for academic respectability and the importance of value commitment. It is not impossible to combine analysis and therapy, but it is a difficult balancing act. The normative commitment is at the core of peace and conflict research, for as Galtung has pointed out, without it Peace and Conflict Studies becomes social studies or world studies. This is reinforced by Barash & Webel, who point out that 'the field itself differs from most other human sciences in that it is value oriented, and unabashedly so' (p. x). But how do we stop the values contaminating the attempts at knowledge creation? The standard answer is to invoke the medical analogy. The claim is that peace researchers are like doctors who also combine scientific knowledge with a value commitment to make people better. Good medicine only works if it is based on a strong knowledge base. So the Galtung et al. book states that in working against violence 'we analyze its forms and causes, we predict in order to prevent, and we act preventively and curatively – all medical terms, since peace relates to violence much as health does to illness' (p. xiii).

However, this is an analogy that might flatter peace research, where the degree of knowledge about violence is surely nowhere as solid as the knowledge possessed by the medical profession. We should note the warning of Singer, who claimed that 'our knowledge base is much too slender to justify much confidence in one or another



theoretical position' (1991: 53). The suspicion, therefore, continues that peace work is more heavily impregnated by values than medicine.

Introducing and Defining Peace and Conflict Studies

So how, if at all, can the two introductory texts by Barash & Webel and Jeong help us with the problem of focus in peace and conflict research? In fact they are of enormous assistance because both are in close agreement on the broad outlines of what should be included in a Peace and Conflict Studies programme. There are core concepts, which include negative and positive peace, direct and structural violence, conflict resolution, conflict transformation and justice. Then there are core questions that have been at the heart of the subject area since its inception. Perhaps the most significant of these is the debate over the causes of violence. Given the optimistic tendencies of peace and conflict researchers most writers in this field are rather sceptical of nature theories of aggression and instead focus on avoidable causes. This is true of both the Barash & Webel and the Jeong studies, which warn against reductionism. Other core questions include how to resolve violent conflicts and how to promote good governance at the global level. Both are interested in the effectiveness of non-violent action. As well as peace, they also agree on what the other value commitments are: the promotion and protection of human rights, economic development and social justice, and the protection of the environment. Both also discuss peace movements, feminist peace research, and future directions.

That these topics might now be considered core to Peace and Conflict Studies receives support from the composition of the main professional body, the International Peace Research Association. This is subdivided into a number of study groups that mirror quite closely the chapter headings of these two books. They are: peace culture and communications; conflict resolution and peacebuilding; peace and ecology; global political economy; human rights; internal conflicts; non-violence; peace education; peace history; peace movements; peace theories; refugees; religion and peace; security and disarmament; gender and peace; reconciliation; art and peace; and indigenous peoples.

For all these similarities, there are still a number of differences between the two books. As we shall see the Jeong volume is more in tune with recent developments in the field. Barash & Webel are stronger on the debates about the 'reasons for wars', which takes up 150 pages whereas the Jeong volume deals with this in one short chapter. On the other hand, Jeong is stronger on conflict resolution. Indeed the Barash & Webel book does not even mention the work of the Burton School. Jeong is also much better on ethnic conflict.

The Barash & Webel book is a second edition of a book published in 1991 by Barash alone. Entitled *Introduction to Peace Studies*, it was an extremely useful book for any teacher of Peace and Conflict Studies, but went out of print quite quickly. I always hoped that it would be published again in a second edition, but have to confess to being disappointed that the revisions for the new edition are not as extensive as they could have been, given the growth of the literature over the past ten years. One indication of this are the works cited at the end of each chapter. The vast majority of these come from the 1960s to the 1980s. I could only find one from the 1990s (by Al Gore!). The implication, unintended I'm sure, is that nothing of significance was published in Peace and Conflict research in the past decade. This strikes me as unsustainable given the changes identified above. The text has been amended to take into account significant issues in the past ten years. So Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor are all mentioned. Some references and analysis have been deleted. Compared to the first edition there is much less here on the Cold War, central America, nuclear weapons and nuclear ethics, and radical perspectives. Yet the substance of the book remains basically the same and many of the changes are relatively superficial. Fortunately, although some literary references have been cut, many survive; and one of the strengths of the book is the variety and

scope of the literature used. There are fewer historical references in the second edition, but many remain to enliven the text. These factors combined with clarity of style and efficient organization probably make this a better introductory text than Jeong's book, despite its rather dated feel now.

Jeong on the other hand is more in tune with contemporary developments and is better as a more advanced text. It is not as user friendly or as rich as the Barash volume, nor is it as well presented (there is, for example, a repetition of a line of text on pages 63-64). The writing style may also be a little dense in places for first year undergraduates and the index could have been more extensive. However, the book is far more comprehensive when it comes to conflict resolution, so anyone interested in this topic might find it a more useful introduction.

Both books are effective guides through a complex area and it is interesting also to point out certain characteristics that the two volumes share that might tell us something about the present state of Peace and Conflict Studies. To begin with, each combines Peace and Conflict Studies under a single standard. This might indicate that the historic tensions between the two approaches have now lost their relevance. But it might also underestimate on-going disagreements about focus and methods. There are still some conflict researchers who do not want to be thought of as part of the 'imagined community' of peace studies.

Both books adopt what Kenneth Boulding called a broad approach to peace. The authors are comfortable with the concept of structural violence, and are happy to include a wide range of topics as being legitimate concerns of Peace and Conflict Studies. This does reflect existing practice. It is now hard to understand the vigorous debates that took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s over the desire of the narrow school to retain a focus on direct violence. One peace researcher even claimed that 'Galtung's theoretical conception of "structural violence"... had increasingly built into the heart of his theories... a standing invitation to indulge in the most grotesque excesses of seventies' radicalism' (Boasson 1991: 111). Linked to this is the acceptance in both studies that we should be working for positive peace as well as negative peace. In other words peace is conceptualised as not just an absence of direct violence, but also the presence of social justice, respect for human rights, and ecological balance.

The other interesting feature of the two studies is that neither embraces the 'scientific approach'. There is an awareness of the work of quantitative analysts such as Singer and Small, Gurr and Vasquez, but there is no attempt to engage with the advantages and disadvantages of 'scientific peace research'. The interest here is in their findings but not their methods. Jeong devotes less than a page to the scientific method, whilst Barash & Webel do not discuss it at all. The same is true of the Galtung, Jacobson and Brand-Jacobson study despite extensive use of the medical analogy. Whether this is indicative of a general decline in the scientific approach or whether this is just a reflection of the personal preferences of the authors is difficult to judge. A glance at the *Journal of Conflict Analysis* and the *Journal of Peace Research* (still the two leading journals in the field) suggest that quantitative analysis is alive and kicking, so it is hard to explain the lack of interest displayed here. Some explanation of the absence would have been useful, as one fear is that a gap could grow between peace research and peace education, with students unable to understand or to respond effectively to quantitative analysis.

Finally, one would have liked both volumes to have adopted a slightly more critical perspective towards the field of study. Important challenges, questions and debates seem to have been sidelined and interesting criticisms of Galtung (e.g., Lawler 1995) and



Burton (especially questions about the idea of basic needs) are not mentioned or are dismissed too easily.

The TRANSCEND Approach to Peace and Conflict Studies

We have already identified the marriage of theory and practice as an important feature of Peace and Conflict Studies. At the cutting edge of such initiatives is the work of Galtung and his colleagues at TRANSCEND. Here is a book full of originality and insight based on practical interventions in real world conflicts. The aim is not just to introduce us to the academic study of peace and conflict but also to tell us how these ideas can be operationalized. It emphasizes four pillars: action, education/training, dissemination and research and is keen to identify a number of areas including conflict transformation, peace pedagogy, peace zones, global governance, peace journalism, peace and the arts, peace business, and peacekeeping. It is claimed that TRANSCEND has held more than two hundred workshops for over four thousand participants in thirty-one states around the globe. It has also produced training manuals, courses and an Internet based Masters in Peace and Development.

If the second edition of the Barash & Webel book suffers from under-revision this is not a charge that can be laid at the book by Galtung, Jacobson and Brand-Jacobson. Even though the first edition only came out in 2000 the second edition is in some ways a very different volume. The three chapters in the original by Carl Jacobson (who died in 2001) devoted to Russia-China, the new-century Eurasian conflicts and East Asia and then South China Sea do not re-appear. And a chapter by Galtung on twenty-first century conflict formations has been dropped. They are replaced by new chapters by Galtung, on September 11 and on a bird's eye view of conflict, war and peace. Other chapters are reorganised. As a result the overall impact is a more coherent volume than the first edition. The number of conflicts subjected to the 'diagnosis, prognosis, and therapy' analysis, which makes up nearly half of the book, increases from forty to forty-five.

This book is really 'pure' peace studies and it is difficult to see how it could have been written in any other field of academic study. It does however provoke certain questions. Listing interventions is one thing, proving an impact is another. So how is the work of TRANSCEND evaluated and how do we know what impact it has had? What was the exact nature of the interventions in each case? How were local actors identified and engaged and how much local support is there for the individual therapies? Who funds this 'practical therapy' work? What criticisms have arisen about this work and how have these been responded to? And how realistic are some of these therapies, which seem to require major changes in the way the parties view their relationships? There is also a proselytising tone that sometimes seems to be making a call for dialogue in a rather monologic manner.

Galtung's answer to the pragmatists is 'do not be deterred by those who say ideas are too idealistic, or not realistic enough... When a conflict does not die down, it is because 'realistic' ideas are often not realistic (p. 177). However, at this point I am drawn back to Stanley Hoffmann's criticisms of the World Order Models Project initiative, strong in the 1970s and early 1980s, for which Galtung wrote the most impressive study, *The True Worlds*.

Hoffmann believed that this radical approach, based on the design of 'relevant utopias', was too impractical and instead he championed a more reformist and pragmatic approach that was both 'essential and elusive' (Hoffmann 1981: 194). This combined an 'ethics of compromise' with an 'ethics of wisdom'. The problem with utopian visions, he argued, was how to get from here to there and he went on to express envy for 'the writers of this school because they have a very easy task – when they meet an obstacle

they just describe it away'. The point Hoffmann is trying to make is that impractical therapies are not that useful.

Conclusion

The tension between a sound knowledge base and a commitment to values is one that cannot be avoided. Too firm a demand for academic rigour, however, can lead to the 'paralysed bystander' (Scherrer 2001: 15). Empirical evidence tells us that in some parts of the world life-expectancy is decreasing and one-fifth of the world's population will not live beyond their fortieth birthday. Every year HIV infects 800,000 children in Africa and nearly 11 million children die from common illnesses and malnutrition associated with poverty. Yet the world can spend about \$900 billion on defence and military hardware. The gap between the richest and poorest is growing and the wealth of the ten richest billionaires is greater than combined national income of the 48 poorest states. Violent conflicts have taken the lives of millions of people since the end of the Cold War, including two million children and have left many more physically and mentally damaged (e.g., Machel 1996).

The moral outrage that facts like these should provoke needs to be channelled into positive action. This, Camus knew, required more than academic knowledge. At the Nobel banquet he argued that individuals have to 'forge for themselves an art of living in times of catastrophe' where technology had gone mad and we are in the grip of worn out ideologies, debased intelligence and mediocre powers who 'can destroy all yet no longer know how to convince' (1957). This needed individual responsibility and the willingness of ordinary people to do extraordinary things in a spirit of tolerance and moderation. One of the strengths of Peace and Conflict Studies is that it is trying to work towards this. All three books provide guidance on how not to become a 'paralysed bystander' and they encourage optimism and a commitment to core values. They also provide an antidote to power politics and help to stimulate innovative approaches to deadly human problems.

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Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN)

Name of Site: Conflict Archive on the Internet
Author: Dr Martin Melaugh (Project Manager, CAIN Project)
URL: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/index.html>
Type of site: NGO, online archive and database
Housed at: University of Ulster
Status at 17th December 2002: live

The CAIN project began in 1996, and the website was first established in 1997, and was designed to provide an archive of material relating to the conflict in Northern Ireland since 1968. The project has been based at the University of Ulster Magee campus in Derry (specifically at the Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity [INCORE]). However, from 2000 the project has also been a constituent element of a wider effort to co-ordinate associated sites; the ARK website (Northern Ireland Social and Political Archive, <http://www.ark.ac.uk/>) brings together several sites linked to the University of Ulster and Queen's University in Belfast, including the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey into social attitudes, an Online Research bank focused on social policy, and a site devoted to Northern Ireland Elections.

CAIN is now well-established as a resource for researchers and analysts of the conflict, with over half a million total 'hits' recorded in the access statistics for October 2002 (23,000 Home page 'hits'), and a wide range of users from around the world (the site states that 'approximately one third of users are from Britain and Ireland; one third from the USA; and one third from Europe and the rest of the world'). This is clearly a website that caters for the needs of the academic community, but it will also be an invaluable future resource for other, non-professional users of the net. The politics of Northern Ireland has been the subject of a great deal of mystification over the years, and this kind of resource will certainly help to demystify aspects of the conflict, and provide a factual basis for argument and interpretation.

In terms of design, the site is admirably clear and easily navigable. There are three main sections, containing crucial information on the 'Background to the Conflict', 'Key Events' and 'Key Issues'. In addition to this subject content, the site map provides a useful summary of the services offered by the site: there is guidance on search facilities, 'frequently asked questions', a gateway to potentially complementary resources, links to bibliographies and databases, notes for prospective contributors, and information for any user wishing to provide suggestions and feedback. In one or two cases, work remains ongoing (e.g. a directory of researchers is planned), but generally these services are regularly updated and appear to be designed with the genuine interests of users in mind.

The content itself consists largely of three types of material: first, material written and edited by members of the project team; second, articles contributed specifically for CAIN by external sources; and, third, material that has been previously published elsewhere. This reviewer formed, the admittedly impressionistic, view that there was significantly more of the first and third type of material, and relatively fewer pieces that had been specifically contributed for the CAIN site. However, the quality of the contributions from the 'internal' project team seemed very high.

As far as the 'Background' section is concerned, this includes extensive bibliographical databases, an updated chronology of political events in Northern Ireland (where recent speeches and statements can be accessed), and a stimulating collection of visual and graphical material (including photographs, maps, posters, murals and symbols) generated by the conflict. As well as the obviously political content, there are several

interesting databases devoted to Northern Irish society, and also cultural production associated with the 'Troubles' (film, television documentary, fiction). Several of these databases have been donated from individual collections; for example, Eamon Melaugh's archive of photographs spanning thirty years, or Peter Heathwood's research into television documentaries analysing Northern Ireland. The range and breadth of the site is striking, and there will undoubtedly be new and thought-provoking material to be unearthed, even for the experienced specialist.

The 'Key Events' section includes five areas that are considered critical (Civil Rights [1964-1972], Internment [1971-75], Ulster Workers' Council strike [1974], Hunger strikes [1980-81], and the evolving Peace Process [1988-present]), and a number of other events that are covered less extensively. The pages devoted to these 'key events' include summaries, a chronology, details of prominent organisations and key actors, as well as a specific bibliography and other resources. What is not entirely clear from the text is the precise rationale for choosing particular events as 'key', and also the decisions made with regard to periodisation. For instance, while no-one would dispute the significance of the Republican hunger strikes of 1980-81, it is certainly possible to argue that they could best be understood in terms of a cycle of prison protest that began in 1976, with the ending of special category status. Although this is apparent in the text, it would not be clear immediately. These 'key events' are described as 'turning-points' in the Troubles, but it is not always evident why other events could not also be described in similar fashion, and as of similar significance.

The 'Key Issues' refer to aspects of the political situation that have exercised politicians and general public throughout the course of the Troubles. Among those included are the administration of justice, children, discrimination, education, employment, housing, parades, policing, parties/elections and women. In several cases, these pages remain under construction, or the text is provided in draft form only, but nevertheless, this treatment of 'key issues' promises to be a valuable, if occasionally controversial, resource.

There is no doubt that the CAIN project represents one of the most influential web resources yet available for students of the politics of Northern Ireland, and it is likely to remain a vital teaching and research tool for many years to come.

Stephen Hopkins, University of Leicester, UK



REVIEWS

Women and the Politics of Military Confrontation: Palestinian and Israeli Gendered Narratives of Dislocation

Nahla Abdo and Ronit Lentin (eds.)

Berghahn Books, 2002

Hbk: ISBN: 1571814982 £50.00 \$75.00

Pbk: ISBN: 1571814590 £17.00 \$25.00

pp. 336 (including: bibliography & index)

Writing by feminists seeking to understand and analyse women's experiences of conflict and the terrible suffering which accompanies it has become relatively common over the last ten or twenty years. They represent an important and increasingly valuable thread in the study of ethnic violence by forcing activists, policymakers and academics to take account of its gendered components. This collection, whilst clearly in this tradition, is unusual and, for a number of reasons, disturbing.

The underlying idea, to examine the many forms of loss, suffering and 'dislocation' experienced by women from Palestinian and Israeli backgrounds through a series of personal narratives, is clearly set out in the introduction provided by the two editors. But the complex layers and sub-texts of this seemingly simple undertaking surface at once in these first pages. The two editors represent the two traditions and their joint introduction is in the form of a dialogue conducted between December 1999 and May 2001. Inevitably this struggles not only with the process of structuring and collating a book which draws on the common threads in the experiences of women from two traditions which frequently find dialogue almost impossible but also with the impact of the spiraling violence of the second, al-Aqsa, Intifada.

In a sense this dialogue lays all the problems bare and the life stories themselves serve to elaborate and personalise the key issues. However, this is not to minimise their impact since it is hard to read the whole set of narratives without experiencing a deep sense of despair. Many of stories are harrowing and the relentless catalogue of suffering in narrative after narrative is likely to leave the reader drained. Maybe this is one of the effects the writers were seeking to produce, perhaps we do need to be forcibly and repeatedly reminded just how awful some of the effects of conflict are for individuals, families and communities.

To pick out individual contributions seems almost inappropriate, as though it implied a hierarchy of suffering. At the same time there are clear and fascinating generational differences in the narratives. The accounts provided by the older Palestinian women in particular stand out with their spare, gaunt presentation. The recollection of horrific events in plain, almost detached and seemingly unemotional, style is deeply moving. Many of the younger women provide valuable details of context and explain the wider background against which individual events occurred but their accounts do not always have the force of those narrated by their mothers and grandmothers. Since many of these younger contributors are writers and academics it is not surprising that their political beliefs and theoretical understandings are interwoven with their personal accounts. This helps the reader to understand 'where the author is coming from', but just occasionally it also leaves a slight sense of the ideology dictating and shaping the story.

The most thought provoking aspect of the book, however, is linked to its basic structure. Although the editors go to considerable trouble to highlight the complexity of the relationship between the sufferings that women from Arab/Palestinian backgrounds have experienced since the establishment of the state of Israel and the suffering of those

women from Jewish/Israeli communities during and since the Holocaust, the structure inevitably invites comparison. But the reality of what has happened in Israel and the Occupied Territories since 1947-8, and what is happening now, makes this almost impossible. The current imbalance of power between the two communities and the fact that one group has physically displaced the other in many of the places they write about colours the whole narrative. On the one hand it makes it extremely difficult for the Arab/Palestinian women to empathise with Israeli concerns. On the other the Jewish/Israeli, women in spite of the fact that they hold liberal positions and express general distaste for aspects of current Israeli government policies, find it extremely disturbing to acknowledge the full force of what actually happened to many Palestinian communities. Perhaps one of the most telling accounts is Nira Yuval-Davis's painful recollection of the impact of discovering that the Palestinian she meets in London and begins a relationship with had, as a small child, been forced out of the fishing village which later became the idyllic location for her childhood family holidays. The problems which this imbalance creates could be cited as a weakness of the book but perhaps they are also part of a subtle sub-text through which the editors and authors invite us to look again at a seemingly intractable problem and consider what compromises and accommodations would have to be made to achieve any sort of stable future.

This is not an 'easy read' at any level but it is a book which should not be pigeonholed and perhaps ignored by many academics and policy makers with the argument that it is for women, feminists and liberals. It could be put on the required reading list for politicians and community leaders in divided societies everywhere. If they could really read with some semblance of an open mind it would not make their task simpler but it just might make a difference.

Valerie Morgan, University of Ulster, UK

Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention

Sumantra Bose

Hurst & Co., 2002

HBK: ISBN: 1850656452 £40.00

PBK: ISBN: 1850655855 £15.95

pp. 295 (including; maps, figure, bibliography and index)

Bosnia after Dayton deserves to be widely read. Sumantra Bose provides a balanced and insightful study of the complex internal and external relationships of Bosnian politics, something that is rare in books on the region. The book examines the dilemmas facing the international community in establishing a multinational Bosnian state in circumstances where two of the three national communities (Bosnian Serbs and Croats) would prefer partition. He highlights that the Dayton Agreement, which ended the Bosnian war in 1995, has necessitated an internationally-led state-building process involving 'political engineering on a remarkable scale' (p. 3). The book seeks to learn the lessons and limitations of this engineering process.

Bose essentially defends the Dayton settlement, which resulted in the formal recognition of ethnic division between two substantially autonomous entities, the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska and the internally-divided Muslim-Croat Federation. The domestic political framework closely mirrors the former communist practice under Tito of the 'ethnic-key' where political positions are allocated on the basis of ethnic representation— institutionalizing the importance of ethnicity and the bargaining power of nationalist elites. This framework of elite consociation is shaped and enforced by a broad range of international institutions overseeing the Dayton process, headed by the international



High Representative, currently Lord Paddy Ashdown, who has the power to sack obstructive elected politicians and to directly impose legislation.

Bose's book is a response to the problems and lack of progress by the international community over the last six years. Essentially the Bosnian polity is as divided as before, with the vast majority of voters voting along ethnic lines and little likelihood that Bosnia's pre-war ethnic mix can ever be reconstituted. The lack of progress has led international policy to be vociferously attacked from two sides, by those who argue for greater integration and those who argue for greater ethnic separation. Bose tackles both sides with equal good sense and clarity. The partitionist argument is more of a minority concern, expressed earlier by American isolationist scholars and more recently by increasingly marginalized Bosnian Croat nationalists. Bose articulately argues that partition, population exchanges and the establishment of ethnically homogeneous statelets would neither have been a more realistic or less violent option. It was, in fact, the internationally-led partition of former Yugoslavia that resulted in the break-down of inter-ethnic consensus and led to war in Bosnia to start with.

Bose's explanation of the limits of the liberal internationalist project in Bosnia is the fascinating heart of the book and produces insights which can be generalised to other cases of international engineering in post-conflict societies. He argues that the assumption of many international community representatives that corrupt and authoritarian nationalist elites are the chief obstacle to externally-imposed progress ignores the fact that nationalist parties have mass support in Bosnian society. This mass support could be ascribed to a Bosnian 'herd-mentality' and belief that Bosnians do not understand their 'real' interests, or, argues Bose, it poses a genuine puzzle which should encourage the critical examination of international strategy.

He argues that nationalist sentiment is more than understandable in Bosnia in the aftermath of a civil war—fought over competing views of the legitimacy of a Bosnian state—and in a regional context where the international community formally sanctioned the death of the Yugoslav state and Yugoslav 'idea' in favour of ethnically-based republics. Bose argues that Bosnia cannot be studied in isolation from the region and that, in the long-term, it is only through greater regional inter-connections that inter-ethnic divisions in Bosnia can be substantially ameliorated. Meanwhile, to argue that national identities within Bosnia are artificial or even illegitimate, as many commentators do, is both ignorant and absurd. To insist that Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats did not have a genuine case for opposing a centralised Bosnian state or that they do not have a case for desiring more autonomy today does not help establish a basis for co-existence and consensus. Greater autonomy is necessary in order to legitimise the Bosnian state in the eyes of its citizens.

Bose astutely notes that it is not just the 'ethnic-key' which makes the international regulatory regime in Bosnia resemble the earlier days of Tito-style communism. The lack of transparency in international decision-making and lack of accountability of international policy-makers to Bosnian people has replaced politics by paternalism where decisions are made 'behind the scenes' while the public is assured 'that whatever was being done was in their best interests' (p. 275). He is critical of international policies which have attempted to coerce integration through sacking politicians, banning political parties and closing down radio stations and newspapers, arguing that this has done little to assuage people's genuine concerns and insecurities. The political process has also been degraded by its instrumentalist manipulation by international managers who have regularly tinkered with electoral rules in the attempt to bureaucratically 'engineer' the dominance of pliant client elites lacking in popular support.

Instead of stultifying or by-passing the political process, Bose advises that the political sphere is necessary for 'state-building'—providing a mechanism through which political differences can be mediated, rather than merely suppressed or ignored. Putting forward a much needed creative and forward looking approach he advises that the international community should see the domestic political process as a vital mechanism for mediating conflicts and integrating society.

Bose defends the Dayton framework against its partitionist and integrationist critics. His defence, however, involves a fundamental critique of international institutional assumptions and practices that have, thus far, characterised the workings of the Dayton framework.

David Chandler, Brunel University, UK

The New Intifada: Resisting Israel's Apartheid

Roane Carey (ed.)

Introduction by Noam Chomsky

Verso, 2001

HBK: ISBN: 1859846343 £45.00 \$60.00

PBK: ISBN: 1859843778 £13.00 \$20.00

pp. 320 (including: index, notes, maps & web-guide)

Roane Carey's edited volume, published in the second half of 2001, is perhaps the first comprehensive attempt to analyse the current *Intifada* (Uprising). The book undoubtedly provides a much-needed introductory guide to understanding the current violence in Israel and the Palestinian (partly re-) Occupied Territories. This collection of articles by well known academics (Sarah Roy, Glenn Robinson) and careful observers of Palestinian life (Robert Fisk, Edward Said) is the first of its kind that tries to both explain the political roots of the current *Intifada* and act as a corrective to biased media representation of the conflict in the USA (hence the lengthy introduction by Noam Chomsky). Indeed, Roane Carey, of *The Nation* magazine (New York), introduces the book as a product of 'disgust at the mainstream media's consistent misrepresentation of the basic facts of this uprising' (p. 2). The book is nevertheless of general interest to understanding why the plight of Palestinians only grew worse during the 'peace process'.

Since the outbreak of violence in October 2000, academic work has, unsurprisingly, focused almost exclusively on the failure of Oslo to deliver peace. The authors argue, however, that the current crisis is not caused by the derailment of Oslo, it is the accords themselves that have caused the crisis. The book's central message is that the new *Intifada* was the predictable and logical outcome of Oslo.

So why, according to the contributors of this volume, was Oslo doomed to failure? Answers to this question are relayed in various different articles, each time from a number of different perspectives. Roy's study of economy, for example, offers three telling and irrefutable arguments. The first is the '[a]bandonment of international law in favour of bilateral negotiations between two parties of grossly unequal power' (p. 94). Palestinians agreed to renounce the mediation of existing international law instruments, such as the Geneva Conventions, and thus exposed themselves to domination through negotiations. Second, Oslo is characterized by a total economic dependency on the Palestinian side. This dependency is enforced through the mechanism of (unilaterally imposed) closure of borders and the distribution of privileges to some few co-opted Palestinians. Roy points out that the consequent:



economic losses to Palestinians during the post-Oslo period have been devastating. The average unemployment rate, for example, increased over nine fold between 1992 and 1996, rising from 3 percent to 28 percent, one of the highest unemployment rates among nearly 200 countries and political entities, according to the World Bank (pp. 91-2).

Third, essential issues (borders, East Jerusalem, settlements, water control and refugees) were postponed until final status talks. Thus, the transfer of Jewish civilian population into settlements inside the Territories (illegal under the Fourth Geneva Convention) steadily increased; the settler population almost doubled from 1993 until 2000 (from 100,000 to 170,000, without mentioning the almost 200,000 settlers living in expropriate lands in East Jerusalem). The continuous confiscation of Palestinian land and Oslo's depressing economic results were two key elements of a 'formula for conflict' (p. 71).

Thematically the book is divided into four uneven parts that deal with, respectively, repression and resistance (12 contributions), media war (2), refugees, remembrance and return (4) and activism awakened (2). Analytical articles (originally published in newspapers and magazines) appear alongside individually observed testimonies, some of which are rather unhappy (one often wonders why it always seems necessary to have foreigners recount their personal horror stories of an Uprising whose consequences three million Palestinians suffer daily). Although these accounts give the book a welcome groundedness in lived experience, the mode of narration leads at times to unnecessary dramatization.

The book will be received, of course, with all the predictable charges of pro-Palestinian partisanship given its list of contributors (Said, Chomsky and Bishara), unfair in the context of Edward Said's well known critical stance on Arafat and his cronies. A critical stance that is shared by many of the contributors to this volume.

The book perhaps fails to confront adequately the sad reality that factions of Palestinians have opted for violent confrontation. For a student seeking to grasp the current pattern of confrontation the book falls short in this respect. There is little doubt, moreover, that it suffers from its publication before the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Indeed, the type of violence it focuses on (low intensity conflict), is now arguably history, given that Israel has exploited the US-led 'war on terrorism' to step up its bids to establish military hegemony and reoccupying the Territories. The political parameters, too, have shifted. When helicopters launched rockets at the centre of Ramallah in October 2000, the international community expressed feelings of horror (as it did for the lynching of two Israeli soldiers). Now, month-long curfews, F-16 bombings in heavily populated civilian areas, and the systematic reoccupation of autonomous Palestinian zones scarcely raise an eyebrow. However, the analyses of Chomsky and Said on the semantics of violence demonstrate that the same rhetoric of terrorism and allegedly legitimate Israeli response was already in use during the first *Intifada* (1987-1993). Indeed the current dismissal of the Palestinian Authority as an invalid partner for peace is not time-specific, but part of a long-term Israeli phraseology, repeated hiding the illegal dimension of military occupation.

The book's subtitle (Resisting Israel's Apartheid) suggests that the conflict's ethnic dimensions cannot be understood without reference to the problem of racism. The reluctance of many authors to accept *Intifada Al-Aqsa* as a label to describe the current Uprising, since it endows the struggle with what they see as a misleading religious dimension suggests that a more relevant means to think the conflict is in terms of a *colonial* situation in which the two sides are not equally matched. Although controversial,

the apartheid analogy cannot be dismissed given that in the Occupied Territories a vast majority (three millions Palestinians) are systematically oppressed and discriminated against because of the presence of some 400,000 settlers.

The apartheid analogy is perhaps less appropriate for the Palestinian citizens of Israel (about 20% of the population), since it is a minority. Bishara's interview, however, does shed much light on the systematic discriminatory nature of the Israeli state by the Ashkenazi (Jewish of Western origin) leadership over both its Palestinian and Mizrahi (Jewish of Oriental and Arab origins) components. Oren Yiftachel (2000) has gone as far as to speak of a 'de-Arabization' project by the Ashkenazi historical leadership. One way of describing this would be to say that Israel is an *ethnocratic* state that operates a *neo-colonial* regime in the Palestinian Occupied Territories.

Despite a few shortcomings, then, the articles collected here provide an intelligent attempt to disentangle the more difficult issues as well as those that have received less coverage (such as the situation of the Palestinian citizens of Israel, or the thorny issue of the refugees return), as well as the more obvious controversies surrounding Oslo and the occupation. It is a welcome antidote to the mystifying media coverage it so successfully dismantles, exposing, thereby, the harsh ongoing realities of neo-colonial power in the contemporary epoch.

Reference

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Benoît Challand, European University Institute, Florence, Italy

The Politics of the New South Africa: Apartheid and After

Heather Deegan

Longman, 2001

PBK: ISBN: 0582382270 £22.99

pp. 272 (including: boxes, figures, tables, pictures, bibliography, appendices & index)

The 1994 official termination of the apartheid regime and peaceful inauguration of Nelson Mandela as the first president of the new, non-racial South Africa, have been both nationally and internationally recognized as examples of rare political virtue and savvy. Heather Deegan's *The Politics of the New South Africa* is one of several recent publications to have centred on the socio-political conditions that contributed to the making of what has been coined 'the South African miracle'. Within this wave of scholarship, Deegan's work does not contribute new theoretical or historical insights, but rather produces an introductory account of the history of apartheid and of the present-day South African nation.

The Politics of the New South Africa is particularly effective for a couple of reasons. For one thing Deegan assumes no previous knowledge of South African history from her reader, and thereby organizes her book into reader-friendly parts, chapters and sub-chapters that proceed in a linear chronological sequence from the 1910 establishment of the South African Union to the 1999 presidential elections. Deegan keeps from overwhelming her reader with details by dedicating no more than twenty pages to each section of her book and by giving only brief references to the pre-Union years. For example, she makes only a passing reference to the extended colonialist conflicts between the British and the Dutch, industrial developments, persecutions of the Khoikhoi, San, and African peoples and the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902. Despite their



brevity, Deegan's chapters cover all the essential aspects of the apartheid era. Readers will find material on the systematic persecution of political opposition, the forced removals of entire 'non-white' communities, the Sharpesville massacre and the Soweto uprising as well as material on the creation of the 'homelands' and their failure to appease African and international scorn. The creation of the 'Black Consciousness' movement with Steve Biko as its leader, the border wars, the international support and sanctions the official South African government of the apartheid era received, the violent exchanges among the 'non-white' ethnic and racial groups, are also covered.

Deegan also dedicates over half her book to contemplating the socio-political transformations of the most recent, democratic decade. This part of the book includes chapters dedicated to: the production of the first multiracial South African elections of 1994, the creation and dilemmas of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings that lasted from 1996-98, and the present day racial, ethnic, gender, and class tensions. Upon finishing *The Politics of the New South Africa* the novice student of modern South Africa will have a solid understanding of the nation's key historical events.

Moreover, even those who may have already read more extensive accounts of the South African past will find the book a useful source of reference material. Deegan takes extra care to footnote the extensive scholarly literature and cite it in her bibliography. Perhaps even more helpful is the wealth of material found in tables, boxes, figures and the appendices. These include historical maps, tables with detailed descriptions of political parties and their leaders, and interesting statistics accumulated throughout the second half of the twentieth century and pertaining to the beliefs, prejudices, likes and dislikes, hopes and fears of all South Africans.

The chapters that describe the series of political transitions that began in 1990 contain explanatory drawings for helping the reader understand the otherwise convoluted structures of administrative bodies that were put together to monitor and safeguard the fairness of the proceedings. The bodies she covers include: the Transitional Executive Council and sub-councils that negotiated the Interim Constitution and actual political transition, as well as the Independent Electoral Commission that was put in place to ensure the multiracial democratic elections in 1994. Boxed inserts interspersed throughout the book offer snippets from important historical texts such as the African National Congress' Freedom Charter written in 1956, and Mandela's speech given upon receipt of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission report. In addition to these boxes the book includes a wonderful appendix section filled with documents that any scholar interested in South Africa may wish to have in her possession: the 1989 Harare Declaration issued by the Organization of African Unity, F.W. de Klerk's parliamentary address on February 2, 1990, Mandela's speech after being released from the Robben Island prison, and the 1996 establishment of a Bill of Rights, among others. As an extra treat, Deegan also offers some provoking images that enhance the reader's appreciation of the South African experience. Such images include the famous picture of Hector Peterson's dead body being carried away during the Soweto riots of 1976, the long lines of South Africans waiting to vote for the first time in their lives in 1994, the human sculptures of Jane Alexander, political cartoons, and political campaign posters and voter educational materials from the 1999 elections.

A reader who is easily disoriented by the abundance of boxes, figures, tables, statistics, images, and excerpts from political documents and speeches, may find Deegan's book chaotic. Those who expect to learn the effects of the AIDS epidemic currently devastating Southern Africa at large and South Africa in particular, will find the book deficient. Deegan, who gives an extensive analysis of how unemployment and violence have affected South Africa since 1994, offers nothing more than a passing mention to the

topics of AIDS and other health concerns. Missing also are the political relations of South Africa in the current volatile international scene, the lawsuits pursued by victims of apartheid against multinationals and financial institutions that profited from the inequities of the previous regime, and other such discussions. These are disappointing omissions, explainable only if one accounts for the fact that a 2001 publication cannot help but fall short of keeping up with the continuous socio-political developments and concerns of a democracy as young as that of the new South Africa. With this in mind, I believe that Deegan's text is worth recommending as an introduction to the recent history of South Africa.

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Fragile Peace: State Failure, Violence and Development in Crisis Regions

Tobias Diebel with Alex Klein

Zed Books (in Association with The Development and Peace Foundation, Bonn), 2002

HBK: ISBN: 1842771701 £45.00 \$65.00

PBK: ISBN: 184277171X £14.95 \$22.50

pp. 265 (including: index)

Fragile Peace provides an interesting overview of the question of how, how long and under what circumstances peace may have a chance to prevail in crisis regions. Divided into three parts, each with a different focus on the problem of making or maintaining of peace, the book outlines a broad range of theoretical problems and empirical case studies.

The book is a valuable resource for the field of peace and conflict studies. Part one touches on three basic problems (in three articles), namely the possible contribution of external actors to the transformation of war-torn societies (Nicole Ball), the challenges for international law in cases of state failure and armed conflict (Hans-Joachim Heintze) and the question of decentralization, division of power and crisis prevention (Andreas Mehler). These contributions, in conjunction with the regional analyses, underline the fact 'that today it is no longer possible to confine conflicts to regional theatres in an era of globalization' (p. 212).

Why this is the case is illustrated in part two, which focuses on regional case studies. The Caucasus, Central America and the Horn of Africa are the regions of conflict examined in the book. The authors examine the state of 'peace' in war-torn societies which are in transition between war and a rather undefined state of being, not necessarily peace in a Western understanding. There are two chapters devoted to each region, one giving a general overview of the region, its conflict history and the current state of being and a second one examining in detail one aspect and country in that region. Each of the regions is identified with one special problem that seems paramount for the understanding of conflict and the possibility of making peace therein.

In the Caucasus, 'one of today's most explosive arenas of ethno-territorial conflicts' (p. 91) as Rainer Freitag-Wirringhaus describes it, the heart of the problem lies in the ethnic make up of the former Soviet republics and the latter's legacy of political elites and power structures. The region is also plagued by the problem of organised crime. Most of these states, formed during and after the demise of the Soviet Union are authoritarian states. State building in that sense becomes difficult and continuously contested, as the ethnic patterns of each state clash with the politics of the respective rulers. Irredentism, civil wars over territory and resources are the outcome of this and



peace seems to be difficult to establish with governments of that kind. The case study of Georgia, by David Darchiashvili, supports these arguments. In Georgia some of the greatest problems are an insufficient legal system, lack of democratic control of the law enforcement agencies and internal conflicts with minorities (p. 110).

In Central America, (Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Belize and Costa Rica), the obstacles for a lasting peace can be found in the massive involvement of external actors, namely the USA and the changing forms of violence, in the partly insufficiently handled decommissioning of weapons by various guerrilla movements. This leads Sabine Kurtenbach to say that it is not a pacification and a winding down of social conflict that can be witnessed, but rather a transformation of the form of violence encountered in some of these countries. Organised criminal groups are the only form of collective violence apparent, but most of the violence is individual and stems from the poverty and the marginalization of large segments of the population. These are the exact breeding grounds for old and new forms of violence (129f, 137ff). Despite this pessimistic view of the peace processes in this region, it can be said that peace missions and the termination of violent civil wars was successful through the involvement of external players, regional and international, (i.e. neighbouring countries as well as the European Union, the United States or the United Nations and other supranational institutions). Bernardo Arévalo de León's study of Guatemala clearly shows these transformations in the form of violence.

The third region, the Horn of Africa, faced similar problems. It did so, however, in a context where state building and governance are even more problematic. Borders, for one, do not play an important role in this area with one of the worlds largest population of nomadic people constantly transgressing state borders in accordance with their own migration patterns (p. 157). The root causes of conflict in the fragile political environment of the region are conflicts over resources, environmental degradation and the role of the state, which are rather weak or often non-existent. Alex Klein draws a comprehensive, often disheartening, but realistic picture of this African region, which like no other is connected to the global system of conflict—and after September 11th to the 'global network of terror', as some would have it. Siegfried Pausewang presents a detailed analysis of a crisis of state in Ethiopia, in which the crisis results in the contradiction between the claims of a constitutional democracy and the interests of the power holders and their ruling party.

The most interesting contribution to this collection are the remaining two by Tobias Debiel, writing on 'Privatized Violence' and Axel Klein and James Oporia-Ekwaro on the 'Challenges of Identity Conflicts, Organized Crime and Transnational Terrorism'. Debiel's focus on 'privatized violence' is especially worthy of mention as it perfectly describes the problems of state security in the 21st century – after September 11th. Terrorism, organized crime and the various measures taken against these phenomena must be seen in a new light, that make peace initiatives of any kind a much bigger challenge.

The term 'privatized violence' refers to the loss of control by some states over their monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, and the state's resultant loss of control over its territory and peoples' security. The most obvious example of this is the growing number of security services offered, including mercenaries and the like, by non-state actors, a particularly acute problem in Africa and Latin America (p. 7). A 'market in violence' is replacing state regulation. This market now determines how and in what form violence will take place and with which side effects: drug trafficking, war-lordism and organized crime (p. 195). September 11th indicates another aspect of privatisation of violence, states are now facing a new threat of privatized violence that cannot be ascribed to any given state, but operates in a network-like structure across the globe. Security measures against these groups and conflict resolution scenarios seem to be ever

more complicated if at all possible. In this regard the term helps to describe the current situation of state and state failure in parts of the world and hence the sources of current conflicts, a task that the whole book perfectly achieves and hence is a useful and detailed resource for regional and theoretical analysis in the field of peace and conflict studies.

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No More Killing Fields: Preventing Deadly Conflict

David A. Hamburg

Rowman and Littlefield, 2002

HBK: ISBN: 0742516741 \$39.95

pp. xxv + 365 (including: notes, bibliography, index & appendices)

Probably the most significant marker of the (short lived) New World Order was American hegemony with a self-perception of the United States being the world's night watchman and moral compass. Dominance need not be reflected solely in terms of military might: it can assert itself culturally. How long was it, for example, before we found ourselves reverting to the staccato shorthand of '9/11' and 'Ground Zero' to convey our sense of bewilderment at the horrendous events at the Twin Towers and elsewhere? And as we mark the countdown to 'regime change' in Iraq how many of us query whether the Bush administration possesses that moral compass? These queries are relevant in the light of David Hamburg's significant contribution to the literature on preventive diplomacy.

This book is odd in that it is part-memoir, part-synthesis, part-audit and partly subversive. It fits into that last category in that Hamburg's mission statement is intent on rescuing American foreign policy from its own hegemonic reach and placing it more firmly in an interdependent world. There is little overt criticism of US policy, and what there is, is measured and heartfelt. Instead Hamburg takes us on a journey through the excesses of the twentieth century—what the philosopher Edith Wyschogrod (1990) calls the 'century of man-made mass death'—to enable us to look at conflict transformation afresh. Hamburg's personal journey began in May 1975 when four of his students were kidnapped in Tanzania. The months of intensive negotiation it took to have them released 'turned me toward a deeper quest for understanding the causes of human conflict and an active search for more effective practices of conflict resolution and violent prevention' (p. 187). The journey culminates with the publication of this book, itself a capstone of the voluminous research carried out by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, a body created by Hamburg and Cyrus Vance in 1994.

This reviewer was present at the very grand launch of the Commission's Final Report in December 1997 in Washington DC. It was evident then that the media was deeply sceptical of the one big idea emanating from years of research at the cost of millions of dollars. The one big idea was preventive diplomacy, a term first coined by Dag Hammarskjöld in 1960 when he sought to find ways to prevent local conflicts from feeding into the larger superpower rivalry. It was an idea whose time had not yet come and it is only in recent years with the end of the Cold War and the intensification of ethnic, religious and regional conflicts that it has merited serious consideration. Few in 1997 could foresee that terrorism could be so pervasive, invasive and innovative as it proved to be in September 2001. It put to rest the complacent nostrum that generally ethnic conflict was remote from the First World and that a policy of 'doing nothing' would suffice.

Hamburg and his ilk, who argued for a policy of humanitarian realism, were considered to be too softly focused. It was easy to be cynical. Indeed the very title of this book and its



frontispiece—a photograph of a young boy holding a dove against a devastated landscape—could encourage the skeptics. But it is the contemporary context and the moral suasion that Hamburg brings to his argument that counts. His is a common sense approach built on a mass of applied research. Besides a policy of preventive diplomacy he argues for the building of democratic institutions and the upgrading of socioeconomic development to create a ‘coalition of the “willing”’ (p. 236). It is the antithesis of isolationism and unipolarism.

He asks his readers to ‘take away from this book a sense of the tangible promise of preventive diplomacy for coping with emerging crises before they become catastrophes’ (p. 227). It is an eloquent plea that now is being taken seriously by governments, transnational organisations and NGOs. He challenges the Woodrow Wilson model of a world of discrete nation-states by citing a distinguished African diplomat who argues that sovereignty carries responsibilities and that if these are not upheld the international community has a moral and legal right to intervene on behalf of citizens whose rights are ignored, neglected or violated by the state. It is an argument that is compelling but it has to be said that the 133 countries who gathered in Warsaw in June 2000 to support democratic principles for human rights were in favour of consolidation and cooperation only ‘with due respect to sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs’ (p. 290).

So work remains to be done. Hamburg will not despair. He can take comfort from the knowledge that an idea that was launched in 1960 is only now becoming fashionable. This book bears witness to the huge intellectual propagation of the concept by organizations like Carnegie and individuals (although he is too modest to say so) like the author. It is rich in detail, in sources and resources, in humanitarian optimism and is the perfect antidote to the cynicism of the century of man-made mass death. More importantly it has an agent who can move forward the work of Hamburg’s generation and that is Kofi Annan. In many respects that will be the true test of preventive diplomacy—can the United Nations run with it in the face of powerful vested interests? If so the UN becomes the world’s night watchman and moral compass, a position that was envisaged for it at its inception. Hamburg demonstrates that we are living in interesting times and not in the ancient Chinese sense but in a world where humanitarianism matches realism. For that and that alone this is a conspicuous and challenging publication.

Reference

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Paul Arthur, University of Ulster, UK

The Fall of Apartheid: The Inside Story from Smuts to Mbeki

Robert Harvey

Palgrave, 2001

Hbk: ISBN 0-333-80247-0

pp. 256 (includes: index and select bibliography)

The title of this book is deeply misleading. This is not an analysis of the collapse of apartheid based on the thesis that the system contained the seeds of its own destruction going back to the defeat of Smuts in the 1948 general election in South Africa, as seems the most plausible reading of the title. The awkwardness of the title reflects the fact that there are really two short books contained within one set of covers. One tells the story of

pre-negotiations between the South African government and the African National Congress (ANC) during the 1980s, focused principally on the previously largely untold story of the British channel in these talks about talks. The other is a potted history of South Africa going back to the negotiations that concluded the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, involving the young advocate, Jan Smuts – hence the reference to Smuts in the title. Did the publishers think that the story of the pre-negotiations was too slight or too specialised a topic to be published as a book on its own or was it the author's idea to pad his material out?

But however the structure was arrived at, it was misconceived, since unfortunately the author does not have sufficient knowledge of South African history to do justice to the subject in the seven chapters he devotes to it. In his acknowledgements the author thanks the veteran journalist, Anthony Sampson, for reading the manuscript and for correcting many errors, as well as contributing a preface. (In his preface, Sampson rightly focuses on the significance of the part of the book dealing with the Mells Parks talks held at the initiative of the public affairs director of Consolidated Gold Fields, Michael Young, between October 1987 and July 1990.) Despite Sampson's efforts, however, the historical section of the book contains many errors and misconceptions, some of such a striking character that one fears that South African readers will burst out laughing at a number of them. The author has not been helped by the sources he relied upon for his part of the book, including a sensationalist potboiler about the Afrikaner secret society, the Broederbond.

Unfortunately, straightforward factual errors are not confined to the historical section, which the charitable reader might simply disregard. They are also present in the account of the South African transition itself. Confusion (or perhaps typographical error) abounds in relation to the dates of events, including that of Mandela's release. The author refers to the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) as the Council for a Democratic South Africa, says that it was boycotted by the Communist Party as opposed to the Conservative Party, and wrongly assumes that negotiations continued under the aegis of CODESA in 1993. All this is a great pity since it detracts from the core of the book, the author's account of the talks in the British channel between members of the Afrikaner elite and the top-ranking leaders of the ANC, based on access to Michael Young's records. These pre-negotiations were taking place in parallel with another set of secret talks taking place in the same period, those between the South African government and the prisoner, Nelson Mandela.

With considerable analytical skill, Robert Harvey discusses the political problems that the existence of two sets of talks posed to the parties, but particularly for the ANC which was the more vulnerable to 'divide and rule' tactics. This was especially so, early in the process. As Harvey puts it,

[Mandela] had no idea that the government was already negotiating with the ANC at Mells and no way of knowing that he might be used to undermine their negotiating position. The ANC outside had no way of knowing what was being said in the talks between Mandela and the government. The latter, it seemed, held all the cards (pp. 143-4).

How Thabo Mbeki, the leading figure in the Mells Parks talks, and Nelson Mandela avoided the traps while ensuring the process moved forward makes for fascinating reading. Mandela's genius is widely appreciated, so it is Mbeki whose reputation is enhanced by this book. There are lessons here for mediators and negotiators dealing with other intractable political conflicts. Indeed, chapters on these lessons would have been a much better use of Robert Harvey's intuitive understanding of political issues than his hasty attempt to mug up on South African history. In spite of its flaws this is a book that



those interested in the South African transition ought to read as it adds a further dimension to our understanding of what happened. However, there is another aspect of the book that will frustrate specialist readers. The book has no footnotes, endnotes or references, though occasionally sources (without page numbers) are identified in the text. The general reader is likely to be bemused by the book's different levels.

Adrian Guelke, Queen's University of Belfast.

The New Germany and Migration in Europe

Barbara Marshall

Manchester University Press, 2000

HBK: ISBN: 0719043352 £45.00

PBK: ISBN: 0719043360 £14.99

pp. 186 (including: index)

On 1 March 2002, Germany's parliament, the Bundestag, adopted a new law on immigration. On 22 March 2002, the upper house in which the individual states are represented, the Bundesrat, following a highly emotional debate and a dispute over the validity of the vote of the state of Brandenburg, passed the law as well with a narrow margin. On 20 June 2002, President Johannes Rau signed the law after careful consideration of the vote of the Bundesrat. Rau criticised the way, the Bundesrat had adopted the law, and encouraged a decision by the constitutional court, Bundesverfassungsgericht. Then, on 15 July 2002, the Conservative governments of six states filed a complaint with the constitutional court, based on the voting procedure in the Bundesrat. Thus, the Conservative opposition even after the elections of 22 September hopes to prevent the law becoming effective on 1 January 2003.

The issue of migration is of foremost interest to German society. Migration politics and issues related to immigration and integration regularly trigger emotional and impetuous dispute. The federal government has become tougher in its approach, and in Summer 2002, the Social-Democrat Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily, stated that the best form of integration is assimilation. Keeping these recent developments in mind, Barbara Marshall's book on Germany and migration in Europe, even two years after it was published, still seems very timely. She addresses issues and trends which still are of foremost actuality. Marshall analyses and discusses a number of problems: How migration has been 'acting as a catalyst for a certain maturing process in Germany's political culture', and the impact of migration on the wider German society (p. 2). She wants to 'consider together some of the more important facets of migration for Germany, which in the existing literature have tended to be examined separately' (p. 4).

Immigration to Germany actually includes several types of migration. Thus, Marshall distinguishes four main groups, which can be sub-divided into two 'German' and two non-German groups: German refugees and expellees following World War II, ethnic Germans, labour migrants (guest workers), and asylum seekers. After the war, some 15 million Germans from provinces now incorporated into Poland and the Soviet Union, but also from German minorities all over Eastern Europe, were forced to migrate West. Most of the refugees and expellees eventually arrived in Western Germany, changing the composition of the population, and causing many challenges concerning political, social and economic integration. In 1950, 16.4 per cent of Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) population were refugees. Marshall states, that the integration of this massive influx of Germans was remarkably successful (p. 7). The second category of migrants is the heterogeneous group of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the USSR migrating to

primarily FRG. As long as the flow of ethnic Germans was relatively small and restricted, this did not cause any real problems in West German society. However, with the upheavals around 1989, migration became unrestricted. In 1986, some 43,000 migrated, in 1989 their number went up to 400,000. Thus, during the period 1950-1998, a total of 3.9 million ethnic Germans arrived in FRG (p. 55). Unfortunately, Marshall does not point out that, especially in the 1990s, a large and increasing share of ethnic Germans, (now some 100,000 annually), mostly arriving from the post-Soviet states, are counted as ethnic Germans even though they actually are descendents of ethnic Germans and often (through intermarriage) belong to other ethnic groups.

The two non-German categories of migrants are foreigners, arriving in Germany as 'guest workers' (labour migrants) and asylum-seekers. The recruitment of labour from Southern Europe, Turkey and Northern Africa started in the early 1950s, initially in a rotation system regularly replacing the workers, which continued up till 1973 (p. 11). Then, the first oil crises lead to a ban on labour migrants. Asylum seekers have a different status. According to the Germany's Basic Law, every politically persecuted person has the right to asylum' (p. 15). Initially this category of migrants was rather insignificant. Up until 1973 it did not cause any political dispute, which was explained by the fact that most asylum-seekers came from Eastern Europe – and, as Marshall points out, 'they were white and their flight could be used for political purposes' in the context of the Cold War and a divided Germany (p. 15). However from 1973 the composition of asylum-seekers changed radically, when more and more arrived from other parts of the World. Simultaneously the assumption of abuse of the asylum provision became an element of the public West German political discourse, continuing up until the present day. After Germany's reunification, the issue of asylum-seekers became of foremost interest, causing political and social unrest, followed by many cases of violent acts, including murder, against individual asylum-seekers and arson attacks on asylum centres. During the years 1988-1997, more than 2 million applications for asylum were submitted in Germany (table, p. 34), coinciding with large-scale in-migration of ethnic Germans. The highest number of asylum seekers was registered in 1992, when 438,000 submitted their application, 61% of them had their origin in post-Communist Europe. Finally, even a fifth group of migrants have arrived in increasing numbers in Germany after the collapse of Communism—Jews from the former Soviet Union (p. 34). By February 1999 more than 102,000 Jews had been admitted (p. 34).

Marshall discusses the problems and implications of each of these groups. She takes a closer look at the socio-economic aspects of immigration, the impacts on the German economy and the labour market, and the challenges to the German welfare state. In each case, she offers relevant data, argues and shows her points clearly. She even offers some comparative data showing patterns of migration to other European countries (for instance, pp. 22, 34). Unfortunately, she rarely extends her analysis to a comparison between Germany and other European states. This could have added a relevant perspective and contributed to the main analysis, pointing to similarities and differences. However, she does include the supra-European dimension in a chapter addressing migration within the context of EC and EU policies (pp. 118ff.).

A full chapter is devoted to the issue of citizenship and immigration law (pp. 138ff), leading to the adoption in May 1999 of a law easing the acquisition of German nationality, especially for children of non-German migrants born in Germany. The new law allowed limited dual nationality up to the age of 23 years (p. 152). The political discussion about a new immigration law is introduced as well, but naturally, the dispute and final adoption of the new immigration law in 2002, could not be included.

Marshall's final assessment is that many 'aspects of Germany's migration policies have been short-term, pragmatic responses to specific emergencies or requirements without a



consistent central approach. But there might also be signs that the country is learning to live with migration as part of its new 'normality', such as the new nationality law. However, the fact that over three million signatures against the inclusion of dual nationality in the Act could be collected within three months also indicated the particular, tortuous relationship to this reality by a large section of the German people' (p. 165).

As stated in the beginning of this review, Marshall's book is a relevant and important contribution to the study of migration, not only in the case of Germany, but also in a wider European perspective.

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Right-sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders

Brendan O'Leary, Ian S. Lustick, Thomas Callaghy (eds)

Oxford University Press, 2001

HBK: ISBN: 0199244901 £30.00

pp. 444 (including: maps, references & index)

This is an excellent book and seems set to become a foundational work. In this edited collection eleven authors engage with the concepts of right-sizing, right-shaping and right-peopling the state with the intention of extending and advancing the theory of state contraction and expansion developed by Ian Lustick in *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands*. In that book, Lustick developed a theory which sought to identify the conditions under which states would be prepared to yield sovereignty over parts of their territory.

The book originated with an SSRC workshop which began in 1997 and is a good example of the kind of work the New York based organisation appears to be trying to encourage: work which is both theoretically strong and directly politically relevant.

At the heart of the book is the editors' ambition to begin laying down an academic foundation for new international norms and policy approaches that admit the possibility of changing international boundaries in the pursuit of political stability. The editors aim to challenge 'traditional and prevailing prejudices against adjustments in the territorial location of boundaries' (Lustick, p. 392). The editors have a clear policy agenda that is baldly stated. In the introduction O'Leary expresses the hope that 'present hypocrisies may be replaced by effective moral codes' (p. 28). While in the conclusion Lustick writes that: 'One of the most important challenges of the Cold war era is to develop new perspectives on how to cope with the inevitability of change in the way states and nations/peoples are matched with one another' (p. 389).

Brendan O'Leary has written both the introduction to the book and the first chapter. His typically jaunty style is in evidence in the chapter 'The elements of right-sizing and right-peopling the state', in which he provides a short political history of territory and political borders since the dawn of time. He writes of 'Rational emperors... fleecing their subjects in ways that encouraged them to believe that being a sheep was not so bad after all' and of 'the thugs who called themselves the best: nobles or aristocrats' (p. 18). At the end of the chapter O'Leary teases out certain aspects of Lustick's theory while also summing up the constructive criticisms of the theory made by some contributors to the book.

The book displays the kind of coherence and clear sense of purpose which is lacking in many edited books. All of the authors engage directly with the theoretical issues around right-sizing and with Lustick's theorisation of the concept, each of them discussing these

ideas in the context of particular geographical areas. All of the contributors bring a wealth of empirical data and a fine-grained understanding of the specifics of place to the book.

The book includes case studies of the Democratic Republic of Congo (by Thomas Callaghy, one of the co-editors), Pakistan (Vali Nasr), Jordan (Marc Lynch) and Russia and the other ex-Soviet Socialist Republics (Alexander J. Motyl). Two chapters examine the Kurds, one as a 'problem' for the Republic of Turkey (Ümit Cizre) the other examines the plight of the Kurdish people in Iraq (Denise Natali). Two chapters take a comparative approach Stephen Zunes deals with Western Sahara and East Timor, Oren Yiftachel compares three situations in which consociational government was put in place as part of a 'right-shaping' strategy: Belgium, Cyprus and Lebanon.

Yiftachel focuses on territorial aspects of the three consociational governments that he examines. He concludes by arguing that a key element in stable consociational arrangements, an element in ensuring that 'right-shaping' is morally and normatively 'right' (in that it allows justice and stability), is minority territorial integrity. It is fascinating that Yiftachel should identify this as so important when it is perhaps one of the most difficult and controversial aspects of inter-ethnic relations. Most states are hugely resistant to any such recognition, at least within their own boundaries. This goes far beyond the principle of federal autonomy. It also conflicts very directly with western liberal ideas of individual freedom. Nonetheless there is no doubt that many states have less formal low-level policies that do this to some extent. Many more have policies that deliberately attempt to break down such integrity. It is an awkward area, full of moral and philosophical difficulties but one that is well worth exploring further, and indicative of the difficult issues raised by this volume.

In the conclusion Ian Lustick gracefully accepts criticisms and extensions to his theory and emphasises that his intention is not to argue for anarchy and instability but to open up a debate about using boundary changes to bolster stability.

One of the most interesting aspects of the book is the way in which discussion of right-sizing is tied by so many of the authors to right-shaping and right-peopling policies, emphasising the continuum between international politics focused around international borders, and the internal politics of ethnicity and identity. It shows how clear and direct is the link between those internal state policies on citizenship, identity and loyalty which reach deep into people's day-to-day lives, and the particular shape and character of a state's external borders.

This is an amazingly rich book, both theoretically and empirically. It is to be hoped that the approach taken in this book and its central theoretical concerns permeate deeply into the disciplines of political science, political geography and international relations.

Reference

Lustick, Ian, (1995), *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands*, Cornell University Press, New York

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Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994

Christopher C. Taylor

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The aim of Christopher Taylor's book appears to be to arrive at some kind of understanding of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Unfortunately, he never adequately outlines what the overall purpose of the work is. The introduction makes up a sizeable chunk of what is a comparatively small book, yet is almost entirely a descriptive narrative of his experiences living in Rwanda and his escape to Kenya. While fascinating on a personal level, bringing to life the oppressive atmosphere of a country about to descend into brutal genocide, this takes up a lot of anecdotal room in a small academic text. This problem is compounded by the fact that the first chapter, a summary of Rwanda's political history, while being rich in background detail is also primarily descriptive and lacking in analysis.

In his chapter on the 'Hamitic hypothesis', Taylor reveals his excellent scholarly abilities. This theory developed in Europe in the nineteenth century, as part of the new pseudo-scientific ideas of race. To account for troubling evidence of advanced civilisational traits they found in east central Africa, which did not fit their Great Chain of Being theory, European colonists categorised Tutsi as 'Hamites', part of a lost tribe of Israel. Thus Tutsi were seen as quasi-Caucasian (explaining their 'civilisation') and naturally disposed to rule, whereas Hutu were naturally disposed for labour and Twa were little more than apes; therefore a colonial system of 'indirect rule' through Tutsi was established. This racist and racist theory unfortunately became internalised by many Rwandans, and the categories 'Tutsi', 'Hutu' and 'Twa' became hardened, racialised and much less malleable over time.

This theory possesses ongoing power today: Tutsi extremists use their version of it to claim intellectual superiority and Hutu extremists use their version to emphasise the supposed 'foreignness' of Tutsi. Although Taylor does not specifically mention this, very similar racist colonial ideologies operated in other parts of the globe as well. In Sri Lanka, colonists categorised Sinhalese as superior 'Aryans' and Tamils as 'Dravidians' (again conflating fluid categories into rigid 'races'), which has had a similar enduring, racist and violent impact on the local society. As with the Tutsi, in New Zealand British colonists described Maori as a lost tribe of Israel, again to account for disturbing evidence of civilisation such as advanced warfare techniques, complex administrative systems, navigational skills and so on.

One of the most significant contributions that Taylor's book makes is his potentially controversial contention, in chapter two, that destroying the ongoing power of the 'Hamitic hypothesis' has to enflame ethnic hatred and violence, we must challenge it not only at the level of discourse but also at the level of fact. He seems to challenge the utility and morality of hermeneutic approaches by arguing that when acts of massive violence have been committed and are likely to happen again, 'can we as anthropologists comfortably claim that the factuality – truth or falsehood – of our interlocutors' historical constructions is of little concern to us? Can we comfortably claim that our only concern is to determine what people take to be the "truth" and why?' (p. 57.) I find his assertion that we must investigate the factuality of racist ideologies as well as engage them as discourse intriguing and challenging, but I am unconvinced that doing so will achieve the end he desires. I agree that it is important to try and disabuse people of their racist views, but I do not place such faith on the power of 'facts' or 'truth' to achieve this.

Evidence from other countries suggests that this is simply disputed and ridiculed by extremists. More importantly perhaps, one could argue that in places such as Rwanda and Sri Lanka, the process of 'doing' history has become so impossibly entangled with nationalist/racist ethnic projects that the 'truth' is extremely hard, if not impossible, to discover. Nevertheless, his suggestions are extremely thought-provoking.

In the third chapter, in a fascinating (yet deeply disturbing) discussion, Taylor claims that some of the forms of violence used in Rwanda (e.g., impaling with stakes, emasculation of men, evisceration of pregnant women, breast oblation of women, forced incest, forced cannibalism of family members, the severing of the Achilles' tendon on people and cattle, and roadblock executions) follow a certain horrific logic when viewed in regard to Rwandan notions of bodily integrity and popular medicine, which are preoccupied with imagery of flow and blockage. He makes it clear that he is not suggesting that Rwandan culture or symbolism *caused* the genocide, merely that violence is culturally or symbolically *conditioned* and follows culturally-specific forms.

Finally, Taylor examines the issue of gender and the genocide. In an insight frequently missed by other scholars, he maintains that the 'the genocide was about power relations between men and women perhaps as much as it was about power relations between groups of men' (p. 151). He argues that Hutu extremists aimed to 'restore' an idealised image of the independence moment in Rwanda; included in this was the aim of reasserting male dominance. He explains this in light of changing Rwandan gender relations in the 1980s and 1990s, when more women began gaining prominent positions in public and economic life. The fact that the mass sexual violence was primarily directed at Tutsi rather than Hutu women relates both to their position as the 'permeable boundary between the two ethnic groups' (p. 155) and to the 'Hamitic hypothesis'. In pre-genocidal Rwanda it was much more common for Tutsi women to be married to Hutu men than for Hutu women to be married to Tutsi men, thus Tutsi women were seen as the prime carriers of racially 'impure' children. This and the sexual violence can largely be attributed to the claim of the 'Hamitic hypothesis' that Tutsi women are more beautiful and intelligent than Hutu women, and the persistence of this belief in Rwanda. Thus, the brutal sexual violence was in part an act whereby Hutu extremists tried to purge themselves of their ambivalence towards Tutsi women.

Ultimately, Taylor's book is an extremely interesting and stimulating addition to the literature on the Rwandan genocide and will be appreciated by students/scholars of anthropology, African history, ethno-nationalism and conflict/war/genocide. His inclusion of a focus on gender is particularly welcome. However, I could not avoid the feeling that overall the book comes across as rather 'bitsy' – each chapter seems a little isolated from the others, and as noted earlier the introduction and first chapter are too heavy on description and light on analysis; correspondingly the conclusion is extremely short at under five pages, further entrenching the sense of a lack of a coherent whole. Although the other three substantive chapters are rich in analysis and innovative perspective, it struck me that each may have been better released as separate articles, rather than brought together as a book. However, as a political scientist, perhaps this is simply my misreading of the purpose of an anthropological ethnography.

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Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities

Mary Waters

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Mary Waters explores how the hopes, dreams and aspirations of West Indian immigrants to the USA crystallise into an American reality. The process of reaching an 'American' reality can be harsh: economically, psychologically and emotionally. I say 'American' and not American because it is not clear that even by achieving citizenship that these immigrants will fully become American. And that is because West Indians are black.

This book explores the relationship between race and ethnicity, including an account of how class intersects with these cleavages. Waters contends that 'West Indians are perhaps the quintessential postmodern peoples' (p. 329). This is due to the great capacity West Indians have to shift the focus of their social identity as well as the circumstances they find themselves in. To gain a representative picture of the West Indian journey through American society Waters and her team of assistants conducted interviews with a range of subjects from divergent backgrounds, including white Americans and the children of West Indian immigrants who may or may not identify with their parents' ethnic status. Thus the relationship between West Indians and whites is explored alongside their relations with black Americans.

West Indians are in a position to exploit their differential status from American born blacks as well as their sameness. They are distinct because they are immigrants to the USA and thus bring different perspectives, attitudes and desires from those of black Americans. But they have the choice to identify as black Americans, at least on initial appearance. Waters finds in her interviews with whites that they were unaware of the differences between black Americans and West Indians unless specifically pointed out to them, meaning that the West Indians were *prima facie* identified, by others, as black American. This is not always an identity they are happy to accept. In fact, Waters discovers that West Indians often go to great lengths to distinguish themselves from black Americans, sometimes cultivating a Caribbean accent where it was not present to begin with.

One can imagine that such attempts do not prove popular with American born blacks. Such distancing can be perceived as hurtful, as breaking solidarity with fellow victims of racism. But Waters explains that for the West Indians the meaning of 'black' can be fundamentally different. In the Caribbean, 'black' is not an oppositional identity the way it is in the USA. 'Black' is a fluid category that can shift depending on one's wealth and social status. There is also a range of shading with perhaps only the darkest skinned West Indians identifying as 'black'. So West Indians can genuinely be surprised to be classed as 'black' when they first come to the USA.

This means that if West Indians are to assimilate their only choice is to assimilate as black Americans. But one can see why they might want to resist this option. Black Americans continue to possess a low status in American society; money cannot 'whiten' as it does in the West Indies where one's economic wealth can buy status. In the USA, when a person is black they are marked by this identity no matter how wealthy or important they are. But the West Indian immigrants and their descents cannot escape the label 'black American' forever. Although the first generation may be able to maintain a distinct Caribbean identity, this becomes increasingly difficult for future generations that are American born.

Thus it seems this assimilation will bring West Indians to experience the same level of discrimination and develop the same feelings of resentment towards whites that many black Americans possess. Waters reports just how shocked the immigrants are to experience the high degree of racism in America. They expect to encounter some racism, but not on the scale of the USA, while the 'Caribbean is a society where there is racism' (p. 42) the USA is 'a fundamentally racist society' (p. 42).

Waters' final task in this thoughtful and challenging book is to consider the implications of the findings of her study for American race relations. Yet one is not sure that positive conclusions can be drawn here. If West Indian immigrants assimilate they can only do so by becoming 'black' Americans, a move which may damage their societal status. If they resist this assimilation, however, they are potentially damaging their relations with black Americans. So it seems as if the dichotomous black/white categorisation will continue for the foreseeable future. Waters notes that what needs to occur is for people not to see 'Others' as radically different from themselves, but while race relations continue to be characterised in such a stark manner the prospects for realising this hope seem dim.

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