



PRACTITIONERS' CORNER

POLITICAL TRAVEL THROUGH THE HOLY LAND

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I

We have studied ethnic conflicts in many countries as insiders and outsiders over the past thirty years. Seldom have we felt so constrained to write as about our experience in Israel. That one of us is of German origin and the other lived through Apartheid victimisation evokes special sensitivities. It is the heavy burden of an atrocious anti-Semitic history that cautions against judging the descendants of century-long persecution, culminating in the horrendous Holocaust. Vulnerable, traumatised people long for security and protection at any cost, even at the price of expansionism. With Arab resistance to new Jewish settlers, the historically displaced inevitably engaged in displacement themselves. After four wars since 1948, the mythology of a promised land resulted in the Jewish domination of its Arab population. However, can the recent American settlers on the West Bank and Gaza still claim victimhood? With state subsidies and army protection, they confiscate more Arab land and use five times the scarce water per capita than the Palestinians are allocated.

Why concern yourself with Israel at all when there are so many worse human rights violations among Israel's Arab critics, some of our Jewish friends wanted to know? Why does the world pick on the only democracy in the Middle East – if not for its latent anti-Semitism? The suspicion runs deep and may even be partly justified, but at the same time it serves as convenient armour to silence any criticism of the Jewish state. Indeed, Israel should not be held more accountable than others. Israel receives disproportionate attention in global forums for a variety of reasons. First, it is precisely because Israel is a Western democracy, that it is judged by these standards. Western commentators feel a greater affinity to a like-minded polity than an autocratic Third World state. Second, the Jewish state enjoys a sophisticated diaspora for which it claims to be the spiritual home and sanctuary. Third, as a Western outpost in a strategic environment, the country is heavily bankrolled by the US taxpayer and donors and therefore linked to its outside supporters. Fourth, Israeli policies are used as a mobiliser for Islamist anti-Western sentiment. Above all, as former collective victims, survivors and descendants are expected to be particularly sensitive not to repeat ethnic discrimination. In short, concerns with Israeli policy for many reasons have to be distinguished from anti-Semitism. Criticism of its government does not question the legitimacy of the state of Israel, let alone should it be construed as an attack on Jewishness.

Problematic ethnic solidarity may also be questioned. We know of many Jewish friends who are deeply troubled about Israeli policies. Yet these highly principled colleagues remain silent and will not criticise Israeli government policy publicly, particularly abroad. Elie Wiesel, who rightly assailed the initial silence of the world about the Holocaust, personifies this contradiction best: 'As a Jew I see my role as a defender of Israel. I defend even her mistakes. Yes, I feel that as a Jew who resides outside Israel I must identify with whatever Israel does – even with her errors. That is the least Jews in the Diaspora can do for Israel: either speak up in praise or keep silent.' Such uncritical solidarity elevates fallible policies into the realm of the sacred. Acquiescence in the face of injustice constitutes complicity. Learning from the holocaust implies concern for human rights everywhere. Why should breaking ranks on Israel amount to a betrayal of identity? On the contrary, it reaffirms a cherished Jewish tradition of rational argumentation that risks being lost by an unquestioning loyalty. The five hundred

conscientious objectors who refuse military service in the occupied territories (but would defend Israel proper) bravely uphold this tradition of autonomous reasoning. Yet they are ostracised as betraying fellow Jews.

While a Western majority blindly endorses or quietly tolerates any Israeli government policy, another vocal radical minority abroad calls for apartheid-like sanctions. Other human rights liberals highlight the plight of victims, but they seldom analyse what causes the suffering. Most university administrations in North America, from Concordia to Harvard, would like to declare the controversial issue a taboo and ban all discussions among agitated students and activist faculty. Such a position shirks rational, analytic debate where it should be encouraged. Do the calls to boycott Israel assist peace efforts in the Middle East? Progressive forces on both sides would be better served by concerned academics visiting and supporting them directly, if only to act in critical solidarity.

For professional sociologists, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict represents an additional challenge. Many of our friends at home declared us suicidal masochists, when we planned to revisit Israel/The Palestinian territories for field research. There we talked to dozens of colleagues, diplomats, NGO activists and ordinary people in both camps of a deeply divided society. From relaxed dinners in exceptionally hospitable Jewish and Palestinian homes through joyful *iftars* breaking the Ramadan fast, from a formal seminar at the Truman Institute of Hebrew University to a fascinating symposium with professionals at the Palestinian Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) in East Jerusalem, we oscillated in an intense immersion course of contrasting perceptions between Tel Aviv and Ramallah. Perhaps only innocent foreigners get away with raising the sensitive, controversial questions that underlie the seething resentment behind the self-evident 'truths' on both sides. Outsiders benefit from easy access as well as unsuspecting frankness. The support groups that visit the region hear only one side, want their own partisanship confirmed and return even more prejudiced.

We consciously avoided seeking out only people with similar political outlooks. We broke bread with an engaging leader of the now marginalised and dispirited Israeli peace movement as well as a valued colleague who proudly displayed a poster of Sharon on his wall. When we tried to gauge the mutual reaction to the opinion of these adversaries, they both shrugged: 'What else do you expect from such lunatics?' The sophisticated Sharon supporter revealed no doubts. He harshly dismissed even the outstanding Israeli daily Ha'aretz (published in English also as a supplement to the International Herald Tribune) as 'predictable leftist nonsense'. It brought home to us again that the internal political cleavages in Israeli society are at least as deep as the gulf to the Arab other. These were secularised individuals who probably both consider the 20% minority of ultra-orthodox Jews in their dark suits yet another separate element. To this division should be added the one million Russian 'Jews', who are first of all cultural Russians and mostly political hard-liners, and the 200,000 ideologically distinct settlers in Palestinian areas, in addition to the 200,000 residents in hilltop settlements of subsidised housing on conquered post-1967 Arab land around Jerusalem.

Similar deep internal ideological divisions exist among Palestinians. It was surprising that hardly any of the dozen or so politically aware Palestinians we spoke to at length displayed any enthusiasm for Arafat and his corrupt security service, let alone for the fundamentalists of Hamas and the smaller Jihad. Nobody dares to dispose of Arafat as the symbolic figurehead of Palestinian liberation, but everybody is aware of his limitations. Yet exiling him, as Netanyahu advocates, Palestinians unanimously consider as the prelude to their own expulsion. In national opinion polls, 46% of Israel's Jewish citizens favour 'transferring' Palestinians out of the territories, while 31% even support transferring the one million Israeli Arabs out of Israel proper. Referring to the demographic threat, a prominent academic told us: 'One Arab is too many!' A Palestinian



academic referred to the ongoing 'soft transfer' of emigrating professionals as a major problem. Intolerable conditions, from curfews to travel and business restrictions, motivate people with options to emigrate voluntarily. You do not have to terrorise a population in order to demoralise and drive out its elites.

II

The feared Kamikaze pilots of the imperial Japanese army crashed their planes into the US navy in heroic acts of self-sacrifice. Here at least the vicious fighting was confined to two militaries officially at war with each other. Suicide bombers in Israel and the Palestinian territories deliberately aim at killing Jews, regardless of whether they are civilians or soldiers, children or adults, left-wingers or right-wingers. Although it is not official policy, when the Israeli army pursues Palestinian militants, many more civilians than gunmen are regularly killed, regardless of whether they are apolitical pacifists or violent activists. In the undeclared war in the holy land, the innocents on both sides are the main victims. As usual, it is also the poor who live in refugee camps or wait at bus stations who are disproportionately at risk and suffer most.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict bears all the hallmarks of mutual ethnic targeting. You are singled out because you are a Jew. Property of Palestinians only is expropriated and only Arabs with different license plates are checked at numerous roadblocks and there are long roads for Jews only to the West Bank settlements. Randomly, indiscriminately and unpredictably, life chances are curtailed, just because one is born into a historical label. There is no escape from the bitter history as long as you continue to live in the embattled place. Two hostile people view each other as collective enemies, engage in collective revenge, suspect and demonise all members of the other group, regardless of the widely differing stances of individuals on both sides. This makes the necessary alliances of peace-seekers across ethnic lines so difficult. The two most educated and sophisticated people in the Middle East stereotype and blame each other in mutual resentment that exceeds anything experienced in other communal conflicts.

'How would you feel if requested to identify the bloodied pieces of your daughter because of some indoctrinated fanatic', asked our Jewish host in Jerusalem. Most likely, our unimaginable grief would also long for collective blame, if not revenge. 'Do you expect us to just stand around passively if their settlers confiscate more of our land, uproot more of our olive trees, shoot at us during their curfews and humiliate us in endless waits at their checkpoints', asked our Palestinian host ten kilometres away in Ramallah? 'They have all the weapons in the world – we have only our bodies and our will to resist their ongoing colonisation'. Both sides dwell on their legitimate grievances and nurture their respective victimhoods, each as poignantly felt as the other.

The cycle of mutual revenge has escalated after hopeful negotiation politics ceased in January 2001, and now the extremists shape events again. Apologists on both sides argue endlessly about cause and effect. Palestinians blame blatant settler expansionism on their land. Israelis invoke legitimate security concerns in light of unprecedented attacks on their normal way of life. Both 'righteous victims', in Benny Morris' famous book, brutalise each other. This undermines all prospects for future peaceful co-existence.

Can the impasse be broken? A similar despair and paralysis prevailed in the seemingly intractable ethno-racial conflict in South Africa during the mid-1980s. Until recently, few expected to see the communal strife in Northern Ireland, Cyprus or Sri Lanka ever to get settled. Yet in all these cases, visionary political leaders on both sides negotiated the non-negotiable. Can a similar historic compromise between two adversaries be achieved

in the religiously charged Middle East atmosphere? What must happen before people get tired of their brutalisation and exhausted from battle fatigue? Can outsiders help, facilitate, build bridges and restart negotiation politics as honest brokers?

The US administration, which has the most leverage on actors in the region, has conveniently washed its hands of it. Bush lets his hard-line Israeli allies determine the course of events. The Canadians, as eager impotent peacemakers everywhere, propose to inject peacekeepers into the volatile West Bank under an international trusteeship, even without a peace agreement. However, the extremists on both sides would most likely be gunning for the peacekeepers who would be as helpless as in Bosnia.

III

Outsiders are ill-positioned to give advice to insiders who struggle daily to live normally in a painful situation. Visitors should listen, learn and observe, but not lecture. Everybody knows a story of earnest consultants in developing countries who fly in from Washington or Ottawa and become instant experts overnight. But what if your hosts turn your questions around and press you for an answer to: What would you do in our situation? Feigning ignorance or escaping into evasive generalities shirks a moral obligation.

In this dilemma, the thrust of our response to our Palestinian audience was straightforward: recapture the moral high ground! Take a public stance against the counterproductive suicide bombings. Intentional killings of innocent civilians is immoral and a crime against humanity under international law. It marginalises the Israeli peace camp, a much-needed ally. Instead, adopt the Gandhian-style passive resistance, the non-violence of the first Intifada, rooted in the popular involvement and protest actions of shopkeepers and schoolchildren alike.

In contrast, the second Intifada consists of secretive, militarised attacks by autonomous rival militias in a fragile semi-state. With bombings and shootouts, opponents are challenged where they are strongest, rather than shamed with moral exposure of expansionism where Israel is weakest. Palestinians allow themselves to be branded as 'terrorists', besides triggering massive retaliation that has destroyed the social fabric of the emerging state. Preserve the few institutional gains of Palestinian statehood, rather than facilitate the Israeli right-wing to smash you into oblivion. The crushed ambulance on top of the pile of debris in Arafat's compound appeared to us as a reminder that this is warfare with few rules. After 9/11 at the latest, the militaristic strategy needed to be abandoned. Why unwittingly reinforcing Sharon's insistence that Palestinians are local Bin Ladens? Since you have nothing in common with the dogmatic anti-Americanism of Hezbollah leaders, why don't you say so publicly, as some of the Palestinian intellectuals have done internally? Disassociate yourself from al-Qaeda who want to piggyback on your cause for their own ends.

Our Palestinian audience received this pessimistic and critical vision with polite dismissal. Wishful thinking in place of realistic recognition of power differentials knows no bounds if you believe in the justice of your cause. Why did we use the insulting notion of 'suicide bombers' instead of the proper term 'martyr', one questioner wanted to know. Are we not aware that stone-throwing children did not persuade one settler to leave our land? But failure of non-violence does not logically mean that violence will succeed, we interjected. Besides, the protest of the first Intifada brought Palestinians some tangible gains, the Oslo accord, down the road a sovereign Palestinian state as well as global sympathy. But what kind of non-viable, non-contiguous Bantustan is created, insisted our interrogator? Another participant interjected, 'We would be the wardens of our own detention camps, completely at the mercy of Israel.' Indeed, Sharon seems to have something like this in mind when he talks about 'painful concessions': an eventual



Palestinian state on 40% of West Bank and Gaza territory under current official Palestinian Authority control, once the Israeli army withdraws.

A Palestinian lawyer questioned, 'After we have already conceded 78% of British-mandate Palestine to Israel and recognised their right to co-exist with us in the 1993 Oslo accord, how much more displacement and concessions must we tolerate? Colonial settlers are insatiable in their quest for our land and scarce water. While they enact a law of return for all Jews of the world, millions of Palestinian refugees, some still born on this soil, are barred from ever returning.' The return of refugees to their ancestral homes raises the most intractable issue of the conflict. Some Palestinians reject all compromises on this 'principal right', including compensation for lost land or symbolic return of limited numbers. For Jewish nationalists, from the right to the left, the demographic capture of the Jewish state means the end of their dream and the beginning of a nightmare. Apart from a few mavericks, like Meron Benvenisti or Jeff Halper, few political thinkers on the Jewish side envisage a bi-communal, federal and ethnically neutral common state of Jews and Arabs living together in relative multicultural harmony, like bilingual Canada or nominally 'non-racial' South Africa. Yet, Palestinian intellectuals increasingly rethink the goal of a separate state in light of the Israeli occupation. They now redefine their freedom as a civil rights struggle in a shared state, rather than national liberation in a separate state.

IV

Attempting to unravel these predicaments amounts to the impossible task of unscrambling history. Few other nationalist movements have succeeded in the way Zionism has established a modern ethnic state, despite the repeated military opposition of its Arab neighbours and local Palestinian population. The Jewish refugees from European anti-Semitism colonised the barren land not for economic reasons, but out of ideological commitment to the mythology of returning to a holy ancient home. Had there been no Russian pogroms in the 1890's and no Nazi holocaust, or had America welcomed the Jewish outcasts, Israel would not exist. The displaced Palestinians are the indirect victims of European crimes against a vulnerable minority that aimed at a safe haven. Just as other nationalisms invoked the right of self-determination, so did Jews, but clearly NOT in 'a land without people for a people without land', as the cliché asserts.

Our Palestinian colleagues largely agreed with our non-violent advocacy in private conversations. They wanted us to understand their own predicament as well as the context of the suicidal resistance. They felt uneasy denigrating the ultimate sacrifice of activists on their behalf. Under conformity pressure to honour the 'brave martyrs', they also could not publicly disavow them without marginalising themselves in Palestinian politics. Israeli Palestinians in Jaffa told us about a memorial service for the collateral Palestinian victims of a suicide bombing during which the grieving relatives did not utter any criticism of the bomber. Out of fear or support? We think Israel deceives itself when it takes for granted the loyalty of its 20% Arab citizens. These second-class citizens are increasingly alienated, as we sensed during our first day in a large Palestinian home in Jaffa. During a tour of dilapidated community facilities, the unequal allocation of public funds for identical taxpayers emerged as a major complaint. Just from a look at the potholes and sidewalks one knows whether one is in a Jewish or Arab quarter.

While emigration is on many people's minds, without outspoken moral leadership by the community's intellectuals, fragmented and irrational responses to the occupation continue. Palestinian society as well as Israel's security is increasingly threatened by autonomous militias outside the control of any political leaders. Among a militant youth with nothing to lose, the functionaries of the Palestinian Authority are discredited because of their perceived personal enrichment and collaboration. Utter powerlessness

and frequent personal humiliation produces an all-consuming rage that outsiders can hardly fathom. We had assumed that religious indoctrination motivates martyrdom, but were given quite different explanations.

A trusted Palestinian community leader conveyed the story of a well-adjusted high-school girl from a secularised liberal family who blew herself up in a supermarket. She told two women in traditional Palestinian dress 'to get out', before approaching a group of other female shoppers with children. They were all killed when she exploded. Why did she do this? 'Certainly not because she was a religious psychopath!' The teacher explained that he is not worried when one or two girls are missing from his class – but when ten are suddenly absent simultaneously he fears that they are competing for the 'honour' to be the next martyr. 'The girls save their own pocket money to buy the belt.' He also knows of families who rejected the money offered afterwards, because 'it is no substitute for our beloved child'. But who makes and abuses impressionable children as moving bombs?

We asked an attractive 23 year old Palestinian woman how she experiences 'the situation'. Her reply boiled down to one concept: humiliation. In her words, she feels symbolically 'raped' by the young men in green uniforms at the many checkpoints and she illustrated this with numerous stories of sheer harassment. We were told of boys, whose school bags were emptied and after they had picked up their books, the guard laughingly repeated the harassment.

When entering Israel a second time from Jordan at the Allenby crossing, we saw with our own eyes how Arabs in the queue were treated. An elderly dignified couple in their seventies were ordered around with finger-snapping gestures. Their meagre household goods in two overstuffed bags were thrown around with contempt. The body language of gun-totting youngsters, including hardened young women, expressed it all. We were travelling with two Canadian-based diplomats, always patient, calm and polite, who for the first time grew audibly incensed at the unfriendly hassle even they were subjected to at the hour-long procedure. If privileged visitors receive this treatment, how can Israel expect ordinary tourists to return?

In the eerily empty Novotel in the no-mans land between East and West Jerusalem, the receptionist wears a pistol in his belt and was prepared to drop his room rate to \$75 when we hesitated to book. Armed uniformed pensioners guard the university gates and check the garbage cans in the cafeteria continuously. At Tel Aviv University we saw a student with an Uzi casually slung over his shoulder. Israelis live on the edge and nerves are frayed. Generally, aggressive driving and horn blowing relieves the pervasive stress. The number of deserters and so-called 'problem soldiers' with post-traumatic stress disorder has risen substantially. These are the hidden, invisible costs of a siege society from which neither side is shielded. The unexpected boom of an air force jet breaking the sound barrier over Jerusalem caused panic below, because it sounded like a bomb blast. Restaurants frisk their rare customers at the entrance. Driving a bus or being employed as a security guard in a shopping mall ranks among the riskiest occupations.

Yet at the same time, life continues routinely as if calculating daily survival or forgetting about it is as normal as brushing your teeth in the morning. Our convivial Tel Aviv host showed us proudly his bomb shelter beside the kitchen and drove us to the supermarket a few blocks down to view the site where an explosion had killed people only two days ago. Fatalistically, both opponents carry on. One underestimates the resilience and generosity of spirit among a beleaguered people, that brings out the best and the worst.

Jewish security consciousness seems totally absent in the Arab quarter of Jerusalem where we stayed at the ill-named, but legendary 'American Colony Hotel'. Frequented mostly by foreign journalists and voyeuristic TV crews, the stylish meeting place exudes



relaxed calm. Most residents of West Jerusalem avoid this part of the city and are even reluctant to pick you up at the hotel although no hostile incidents have ever been reported here. When you walk as a visible stranger through the chaotic markets of a West Bank town or the narrow alleys of the Muslim quarter in the old city, you feel safe and welcome. Every desperate merchant explains that his prices have been lowered, because of 'the situation'. When you still resist the amassed religious kitsch and faked antiques, he even tries a guilt trip with the question, 'You don't like to buy from Arabs?'

The Palestinians – both the stateless former commuters in the territories and the residents of East Jerusalem with a special identity card – suffer most from the depressed Israeli economy and the understandable Jewish paranoia. It was a trusted Arab painter, employed for ten years by Hebrew University, who suddenly snapped and placed a remote controlled bomb in the crowded student cafeteria which he had painted only the day before. Citing alleged cost-cutting, the institution has just laid off most of its Arab cleaning staff to the protest of a few concerned faculty. Three hundred thousand migrants from the Balkans and Asia have replaced the collectively dismissed Palestinians. Israeli closure policies have increased unemployment in the West Bank and Gaza dramatically. Therein lies a major difference to apartheid. South African rulers wanted to *exploit* their subordinates; Israel's rulers want to *expel* Arabs. The very logic of Zionism implies an Arab-free state, or failing that, second-class status in an official Jewish state. Is heightened misery and inequality of a suspect minority the key to greater security of the dominant majority?

V

What does the future hold? More of the same and worse through a general shift to the right by the Israeli electorate and dwindling numbers of left-wingers who support the *Meretz* party. Could a strengthened Sharon, under US pressure, mutate into a de Klerk or a de Gaulle, who turns upon the settlers? De Gaulle abandoned a much stronger settler force in Algeria, who considered themselves a betrayed part of the motherland and relied on its protection.

Will the repositioned Labour Party swing the apolitical but scared voters in the ideological middle between a committed anti-Arab right and a dispirited peace camp? It was under the Labour Party's former leader, Ehud Barak, that settlements expanded the most. Few peace activists place much hope in Labour's new leader, Amram Mitzna, although the former general and mayor of Haifa has campaigned on a platform of full withdrawal from Gaza and, if possible, negotiated borders, or alternatively unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank.

If the Israeli electorate could only be convinced that the abolition of settlements and the establishment of a viable Palestinian state would bring peace, a majority would support disengagement. In the absence of a reliable negotiating partner among the fragmented Palestinians, many centre-left academics now support unilateral withdrawal. A long fence has been elevated to magical security. When iron curtains are falling elsewhere, many Israelis dream of walling themselves in. The settlers oppose the fence which cuts them off and looks like a final border with still more Palestinian land confiscated for 'security reasons'. However, as attractive as the 'two states for two peoples' sounds, it fails as long as fanatical settlers insist on living among the Palestinian population. What happens to the settlers who refuse to leave, we asked? 'They will just have to get out in the national interest', was the wishfully idealistic answer. Applying force and using the army, however, would amount to civil war in Israel. In their recent widely acclaimed book *The Global Political Economy of Israel*, Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler (2002: 356) state, 'Since the Oslo 'peace' agreement of 1993, the various Israeli governments have

removed *not a single* Jewish settlement in the Occupied Territories. On the contrary, they added more.' If the settlers cannot be forced out and the Palestinians cannot be 'transferred', then the logical outcome is to live together with equal citizenship in a single state.

It will take some time to convince both sides that co-existing in a bi-communal, common state may be the most economically sensible (though not yet politically feasible) solution. Even if the Palestinians eventually succeed in establishing a viable state of their own (as the negotiators agreed upon at Taba in January 2001, but which the now ruling Likud opposes), the sad truth is that this will not end the wider Islamist perception of a 'state of infidels' on sacred Muslim soil. There also has to be a recognition by the Muslim world of Israel's moral right to exist within pre-1967 borders. This was the essence of the Saudi proposal. It fell flat because of the unresolved right of return of refugees.

Indeed, the two-state-solution would certainly help to diffuse the militarised confrontation. However, a semi-sovereign, demilitarised Palestinian state in almost total economic dependency on Israel would most likely continue to give rise to new strife, especially if confined to Sharon's vision of a fragmented mini-state. Ironically, the very success of destroying the Palestinian Authority, reoccupying Palestinian areas and forging the entire British-mandate Palestine into one geopolitical entity, has fatally undermined the two-state solution, unless either expulsion or permanent Palestinian Bantustans are envisaged. Locked together by history, geography and economic interdependency, the two hostile people may well learn to live together equally, if not by choice then by necessity, just as whites and blacks learned to co-exist reluctantly in South Africa after centuries of antagonism.

One of the more cynical comments by a leading South African apartheid ideologue afterwards was, 'We had to try apartheid first in order to know that the system could not work!' Without repeating this crime, Israel can learn from South Africa that locking people into tribal reservations and restricting the rights of others in an ethnic state does not secure long-term peace. Nor does forced or induced 'transfer' abolish a people's sense of home and quest for return, apart from constituting a worse crime. A governing party, wavering between these two options of transfer or apartheid, and dominated mainly by military calculations, manifests its moral bankruptcy.

A sense of hope needs to be restored on both sides. People take risks when they have clear expectations of a better life and a stake in a promising future. Envisaged security, not increased insecurity, changes hardened attitudes. Since the partisan US is advocating more war and turmoil in the region, it falls on the European Union to hold out an alternative. An offer of EU membership for Israel/The Palestinian territories could perhaps provide a sufficient inducement for a negotiated settlement. If a divided Cyprus with a large Turkish Muslim population can become an EU member and the admission of Turkey itself is seriously considered for the future, a democratic Israel/Palestine with adherence to Western human rights standards would also qualify. Just as the European states have overcome their mutual enmity in common institutions, so the Israelis and Palestinians would be bound together in a supra-national arrangement to their mutual benefit.

Reference

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