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Virulent Ethnocentrism: A Major Challenge for Transformational Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in the Post-Cold War Era¹

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Introduction

The purpose of this article is to discuss the origins and prospects for reduction of virulent ethnocentrism: a deep and violently aggressive sense of the 'Other', resulting from the apparent tendency of people across time and cultural space to subdivide others into 'them' and 'us' (see LeVine and Campbell, 1972). In the Balkans, this phenomenon has resulted in one world war plus the more recent 'ethnic cleansing' of the last ten years of the 20th century.

Although it has been nearly seven years since NATO military action stopped the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, followed by NATO-led maintenance of the '*negative peace*' (absence of hostilities), important provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords still have not been met; e.g., the return of all displaced persons and refugees to their former homes, presumably due to virulent ethnocentrism exacerbated by the atrocities committed in Bosnia between the spring of 1992 and the genocidal fall of the UN 'protected safe area' of Srebrenica in July 1995.

The more recent situation in Kosovo further highlights the apparently reconciliation-impervious nature of violent ethnic conflict, fed by virulent ethnocentrism which, in turn, has been reinforced by the conflict, including NATO's 78-day air campaign against Belgrade.

As the Balkan Wars seem to have run their course and the murderous regime of Slobodan Milosevic has been toppled by 'people power', with the FRY returning to the fold of European civilization, the time is right to pose two interrelated questions:

- (1) What are the origins of virulent ethnocentrism as expressed during the post-Cold War world, for example, in the Balkans?
- (2) What are the prospects for reducing it, such that, in the Balkans, the '*negative peace*' maintained by the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) can lead to a '*positive peace*', where the underlying causes and conditions of the violent conflict have been reduced, if not eliminated, and social justice has been significantly achieved for all concerned?

Generic Origins

As the thinkers and architects of transformational conflict resolution and peacebuilding attempt to wield their 'magic', to prevent, among other things, future Yugoslavias and Columbine High Schools, they may need to pay attention to a level of analysis that tends to be avoided for conceptual as well as ideological and emotional reasons: the *intra-psychic* level. If, as John Burton (1984) and Robert North (1990) have argued, the *individual is the basic unit of explanation*

¹ This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 43rd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), New Orleans, Louisiana, 23-28 March 2002. The author gratefully acknowledges helpful comments made by Dr. Stefan Wolff, editor of *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, as well as by anonymous reviewers.

² Strictly speaking, since World War 2 can be viewed as a continuation (or 'epiphenomenon') of World War I, we could even say that, in the Balkans, virulent ethnocentrism has resulted in *two* world wars!



at all levels, then we had better not only pay attention to the individual, but also to all that she or he (but probably mostly *he* [see Wrangham and Peterson, 1996]) brings to those other levels: interpersonal, intergroup, interorganizational, international, interregional, etc.

Quite simply, conflicts may be raging or suppressed by the Self, or repressed by Others and, therefore, merely 'on hold' as the ethnic conflicts of the 1990s were during the Cold War. Alternatively, conflicts may be latent at the *intra-actor level* – either *intrapsychic*, *intragroup*, *intraorganizational*, *intranational*, *intra-regional*. In either case, the conflicts may – either on their own (via *transference*), and/or through outside manipulation (via the *functions-of-conflict thesis* [see Sandole, 1999]) – spill over to the external domain.

Hence, as I have argued elsewhere (Sandole, 1987), unless conflicts at the *intra-actor level* are dealt with first, then conflicts at the *inter-actor level* – good intentions to the contrary – may only worsen. To deal effectively with conflicts at the 'second [or subsequent]-order of manifestation', we may have to deal with them first at their 'first-order of manifestation.'

The question arises, of course, how do we, the 'concerned international community', do that with *complex* conflicts where something that happened in 1389 for Serbs, 1453 for Greeks, 1690 for the Irish, 1915 for Armenians, has helped shape the identity, worldviews, and definitions of conflicts of present-day Serbs, Greeks, Irish, and Armenians? For until they deal effectively with such complexity, the Serbs, Greeks Irish, and Armenians, among many others, are consigned to 'forever fighting the last war.'

This is clearly the case with the Irish, as indicated by the ominous 'Marching Season' every summer, when thousands of marches take place dealing with the outcome of the Battle of the Boyne of 12 July 1690. In this case, time is not linear, but nonlinear; indeed, even 'compressed' (see Volkan, 1997) where, much like in 'post-traumatic stress syndrome', the same 'pivotal event' – the '*chosen trauma*' (ibid.) – is played out ('re-enacted') time and time again, almost as if, each time, for the 'first time.' As Richard Rose (1971, pp. 354-355) eloquently put it:

Londonderry on August 12, 1969, aptly illustrates how time past and time present can fuse together in an explosive way. Protestants there that day were commemorating the 280th anniversary of the liberation of the besieged Protestant bastion within the old walled city from Catholic hordes surrounding it. As they looked over Derry's walls, the marchers could see that Catholics, as in Jacobite times, were present in great numbers in the Bogside just below their fortifications. Catholics did not have to turn their minds further back than the previous twelve months to anticipate what might happen next. In that period, the Royal Ulster Constabulary several times entered the Bogside in large numbers, assaulting Catholics on the streets and in their homes in ways that official enquiries could later amnesty but not excuse. The Catholics began to build barricades to prevent a recurrence of this. This recalled Protestants from ancient

³ Interestingly, with the exception of the Irish case, the 'Other' for the Serbs, Greeks, and Armenians is the same: Ottoman Turkey. Hence, although the Ottoman Empire no longer exists, it remains an integral part of the *identities* of, among others, Serbs, Greeks, and Armenians, whose ancestors are perceived to have been assaulted and oppressed by it. That Serbs continue to refer to Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) as 'Turks', as do Armenians of Azerbaijanis, is further testament to the power of past events on the present and future.

history to the present. The barricades were interpreted as the beginning of yet another Catholic insurrection. The approach of the police to the barricades was seen by the Catholics behind the lines as yet another instance in which Protestants sought, in the words of an eighteenth-century Irish song, to make 'Croppies lie down.' In such circumstances, *it hardly matters whether an individual interpreted events in seventeenth, eighteenth or twentieth-century terms*. In Northern Ireland, the conclusions drawn – for or against the regime – are much the same in one century as in the next (emphasis added).

Under such circumstances, therefore, when previous process interacts with, blends into, and strengthens '*conflict-as-startup conditions*', '*conflict-as-process*' is never far from the surface: a latent fire always ready to be rekindled (see Sandole, 1999, pp. 129-131). Hence, Thompson's (1989, p. 691) observation 'that Northern Irish society generates cycles of violence that escalate rapidly. The escalation is independent of socioeconomic changes and is strongly *self-perpetuating*' (emphasis added).

Muzafer Sherif's (1967, p. 29) discussion of the 'heavy hand of the past' is relevant here as well:

each child in time acquires from his cultural heritage a past in human relationships that becomes his own, in the sense that he experiences its facets as his personal tastes, preferences, likes and dislikes....

Hence, "myths, traditions, and symbols of national pride handed down from one generation to another" are among the factors conducive to modern wars between nations and groups of nations' (Cantril, 1950, p. 18; cited in Sherif, 1967, p. 26). They help to keep conflicts-as-process in an ongoing or resurrectable state.

A proposition comes to mind at this point: The 'last frontier' is *not* 'outer space', but 'inner space'! Moreover, we may have more knowledge about 'outer' than we do of 'inner space'! Well-intentioned third parties, with between 15 and 45 hours of workshop experience under their belts, may be quite content to walk into – perhaps 'emotionally trespass' – the wretched, ravaged conflict space of, e.g., ethnic Albanians and Serbs or a divorcing husband and wife, to help them see 'reason' [?], without any awareness that Heisenberg's *Uncertainty Principle* is alive and well in the social as well as physical domain: our 'mere presence' in the parties' *turbulent*, dynamic, constantly shifting space may be enough to detonate further an already precarious situation (see Benjamin, 1990). But adherence to the theology of the primacy of the single factor (or of good intentions) does not allow us to see that.

There is a need, therefore, for a comprehensive, multilevel approach, as I have argued elsewhere (Sandole, 1993; 1998), not just for understanding but also for dealing with *complex* conflicts: where, again, everything is related to everything else! The parable of the three blind men and the elephant just will not do anymore (if it ever did!), to 'capture the totality of the beast'! We must put Humpty Dumpty back together again!

'Inner space', as a *complex* problem area, comprises at least three possibilities:

⁴ In this regard, see Wilson (1998).



- (1) *Individual*: a set of experiences and/or a physiological problem that affects one particular person's behavior in adverse ways (e.g., one of the Columbine High School shooters, Eric Harris, was on medication for a problem in this regard, plus was rejected for enlistment in the U.S. Marine Corps a week before the shootings);
- (2) *Group*: a set of experiences that affect a whole group of people in their relations with others (e.g., the returning ethnic Albanians of Kosovo as they envisage future relations with Serbs); and/or
- (3) *Universal*: something about 'human nature' that may predispose *all of us* to act in certain ways under certain circumstances. This is, of course, a reference to the '*nature/nurture*' debate that has exercised social thinkers and practitioners for years. We will discuss that option first, as part of our overall recognition that whichever of these possibilities applies in a given conflict situation, will (or should) affect the type of intervention selected.

The Role of Biological Factors in Human Behavior

In and outside the field, we tend to skirt the issue of hostile definitions of the 'Other'. Although we talk about 'images of the Enemy', such discussions tend to be framed in terms of *social constructionism*, of statements like, 'war begins in the minds of men, and it is in the minds of men that we must begin to eliminate war' (UNESCO Charter). While this is part of the problem, it is not, I would hypothesize, all of it, or indeed, even the most significant part of it.

Members of the conflict/conflict resolution community tend to be humanists, liberals, and others associated with flexible, optimistic views of human nature. We tend to agree with Albert Bandura (1973) and others that whatever humans do in conflict situations is a function of *learning*: change what they learn and change their behavior! This view (which is associated with the *Idealpolitik* paradigm) tends to ignore – on ideological, political, and emotional as well as practical grounds – the role of biology in conflict, especially violent conflict behavior. But we continue to avoid this issue at our peril.

Elsewhere (1990), I have argued that those of us who believe that biological factors play a role in human behavior, *as part of a complex constellation of multiple factors*, can now 'come out of the closet' without fear of suffering significant consequences, for perhaps being labelled as a purveyor of Nazi eugenic philosophies and political programs. I have also argued (1999, Ch. 8) that it is not simply a question of 'nature' or 'nurture', or indeed, in some simple additive sense, of 'nature and 'nurture', but of both *interacting* in complex ways, such that each can be affected by the other.

With that as some background to where I stand on the issue, how do I see the role of biology in human conflict behavior? Given the observations of Edward O. Wilson (1979), John Pfeiffer (1984), Joseph Montville (1988) and others, that our brains seemed to be preprogrammed to bifurcate everything, including fellow human beings into membership in *ingroups* and *outgroups*, it seems reasonable to conclude that 'nature' has invested *Homo sapiens* with this particular kind of 'hard wiring' to protect us from one another in Hobbes' infamous 'state of nature', where:

men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, ... in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre as is of every man

against every man ... where the life of man [is] solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short (Hobbes, 1950, pp. 103, 104).

From the time when we are infants to when we are older, we are sensitive to the 'Other': I'll never forget my infant son's emotional outburst when a young plumber passed through his bedroom on the way to fix the shower, or when a colleague from Africa attempted to hold him; or a colleague who revealed to me that, although he knew it was wrong, he still felt uncomfortable in the presence of people of a certain background; indeed, he would prefer *not* to 'touch' them.

Now, clearly, learning, culture and other aspects of 'nurture' can impact significantly who we come to define as 'threatening', and how we respond to them; but the *biological predisposition* to bifurcate fellow members of the species into 'them' and 'us' nevertheless seems to be there, ready to interact with culture to create certain 'histories', certain 'facts on the ground' which become the bases of violent conflict spirals, including the genocidal ethnic cleansing that has returned to Europe in the wake of the ending of the Cold War.

Now, before going any further, one possible implication of what I have said thus far is that we could start to teach children in the schools, *not* that racism, antisemitism, and other 'isms' are 'normal', but that they are *learned*, oftentimes *dysfunctional* expressions of our *biological predisposition* to bifurcate people into friend and foe. Given that the predisposition is part of our 'wiring', i.e., originally meant to have survival value, we are sort of 'stuck with it.' We are not, however, stuck with the culturally/experientially determined referents of that predisposition; indeed, as implied, some of those definitions may be counter to our survival, either as members of ingroups or as an entire species. Hence, it would be in our best interests to work on *changing* those definitions.

Imagine classrooms at all levels, up to university level, where pupils and students are actively encouraged, by conflict resolution-trained facilitators, to 'brainstorm' the kinds of emotions they experience when they think about, discuss, or interact with members of certain groups (thereby making it exceedingly difficult to do what Fisher and Ury [1983] counsel: to separate people from issues); to brainstorm where those feelings come from; the consequences of those feelings; examples throughout the country and the world where those kinds of feelings have translated into violent conflict situations; how to work on changing those feelings; difficulties in doing so, etc.

This is a *complex* 'tall order': the feelings we experience have a natural' base, they are, therefore, part of our 'human nature'; however, the culturally-defined 'targets' of those feelings are not part of our nature: they may be wrong, unfair, counterproductive and, therefore, should be – and *can be* – changed! This would be quite a challenge to bring into any level of classroom, but one that we must accept if we are to make a dent on the levels of violence that have, for example, turned the United States into the most violent country in the industrialized world, or that have brought genocide back to Europe.

⁵ Since the events and aftermath of 11 September 2001, this has become an even more urgent imperative.



'Wired'

When I first saw Fritz Lang's classic film, *M*, with Peter Lorre in the title role, playing a serial murderer of children, I could not completely grasp Lorre's dilemma when, toward the end of the film, under siege by townspeople, he declares, '*Ich will nicht, aber ich muss!*': 'I do not want to, but I must' [*kill!*]

Years later, when I came across Paul MacLean's (1975, 1978) *triune theory of the brain*, comprising three analytically distinct but operationally interrelated brains – the *reptilian, limbic, and neocortical brains* – my intuitive understanding of the dynamics of the behavior of the homicidal pedophile became clearer. According to MacLean, under stress the reptilian and limbic brains – sources of repetitive movements and affect ('fight or flight') – can overtake and overwhelm the neocortical brain – source of abstract thought, problemsolving, etc. – such that '*feeling, and not seeing is believing!*' In other words, 'cognitively', Peter Lorre's character knew that what he was doing was wrong, but, 'emotionally', he could not help myself. This lack of synchronization between the neocortical and reptilian/limbic brains, with the latter in the ascendancy, MacLean refers to as *schizophysiology*.

All this cohered with a distinction Kenneth Boulding had made years ago (1956) between *cognitive, evaluative* and *affective* images, with the cognitive dealing with our beliefs, evaluative with the values we attach to our beliefs, and affect with the emotional energy mobilized (perhaps by our *homeostatic* processes) to defend highly valued beliefs under assault. In other words, Maclean's schizophysiology occurs when, in Boulding's terms, the affective level overwhelms and overtakes the cognitive and evaluative levels.

What has all this got to do with transformational conflict resolution and peacebuilding? Well, in which of Maclean's three brains, or at which of Boulding's three levels of images would we imagine Vamik Volkan's (1991, 1997) 'chosen traumas' to reside? Alternatively, after someone has been brutalized and traumatized by a searing experience, or has been touched emotionally by the story of such an experience by a grandmother, and subsequently, via 'transference', experiences a series of recurring replays of the experience, as occurs in post-traumatic stress syndrome, what processes do we think might be involved? More importantly from a conflict resolution/conflict transformation point of view, which processes – indeed, which theories – seem to be relevant to helping traumatized persons caught up in 'time collapse' to 'let go' of what Sherif (1967, p. 29) calls the 'heavy hand of the past'?

We have here a paradox, a conundrum: on the one hand, people who have been brutalized by an experience that continues to define who they are, their perceptions and behavior, are, in a way, 'possessed' by that chosen trauma which resides at the affective [reptilian/limbic] level; yet, on the other hand, those of us who attempt to be helpful are dealing with them at the cognitive [neocortical] level. We talk to them, train them, including role plays, facilitate their processes and all this occurs at the cognitive level, rarely percolating down to the affective level. Granted, on occasion a role-play exercise might 'set someone off', but basically what we do occurs and is experienced primarily at the cognitive level, although with some spillover into the evaluative and affective levels as well.

So, the *research* and *practical* problem is: how can we in the peace and conflict studies fields influence the affective level, particularly the chosen traumas collected there, when our main tools are cognitive?

There is evidence from psychology and psychoanalysis that we can impact the emotional level by re-arousing the emotional response to the initial experience and, then, via our cognitive communication efforts, attempt to change the cognitive interpretations we [or others] make of those experiences and corresponding feelings. But is this not a bit 'tricky'? Imagine working with a victim of rape or one who survived the genocide in Rwanda or Srebrenica by 'playing dead' with countless bodies of those less fortunate upon her. By what ethical norm can we claim justification for recreating the feelings associated with the outrage?

Then, what about those who committed the outrage, like those treated by French physician (and revolutionary!) Frantz Fanon (1968), members of the French military who tortured Algerians during the Algerian civil war? There are those who do not believe they did wrong, but who might nevertheless be experiencing post-traumatic stress syndrome. Reflective of greater *complexity*, there are those who know they did wrong but still define people like those whom they have tortured and/or killed as less than human, who are troubled by that as well as by the fact that they have behaved terribly toward such people. How do we deal with them?

Is it a simple case of bringing oppressor [e.g., rapist] and oppressed [e.g., rape victim] together, like NBC journalist Jane Pauley did some years ago on her Monday night program, with the rapist still in jail for life? What are the ethics involved here, especially since the arousal of feelings in one or both cases might lead to further negative implications? But, perhaps surprisingly, in Jane Pauley's case, the rapist as well as the rape victim appear to have gotten something out of the session.

In any case, for some, this is the problem with *restorative justice*? How can we possibly justify not sending the perpetrator of atrocities to the gallows, or at least to life imprisonment with no possibility of parole [*retributive justice*]? Lots of questions, and few answers....

Enter the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC): painful, frustrating, upsetting, surreal; but yet, it may have been better for South Africans to experience that approach to justice instead of that which is going on simultaneously in Rwanda. What *theory* can we distill here that might help South Africans and others – Bosnians, Cypriots, Irish, Sri Lankans, Israelis and Palestinians, Armenians and Azeris – let go of the heavy hand of the past?

Ethnicity

Part of the 'nurture' that interacts with 'nature' is '*ethnicity*': a sense of shared culture, race, language, worldview, history, traditions. 'Ethnicity' is a component of *identity* shared with, in each case, members of an *identity group* (see Burton, 1979, 1990, 1997). Although identity can be constructed, expressed and otherwise experienced in terms of other criteria (not all of which are mutually exclusive) – such as gender, religion, class, nationality – the felt expression, satisfaction, and violation of one's need for identity through ethnicity can border on primordial intensity.

In this regard, the *need* for identity (but not its culturally-based *construction*) seems to be, like other needs (e.g., for recognition and security), a *basic human need* (BHN) common to all individuals (see *ibid.*). As such, ethnicity is a fundamental criterion in terms of which to express, satisfy, and experience violation of one's need for identity. Especially in the *Realpolitik* world, it is often in



terms of ethnicity (and related criteria such as religion and nationality) that fairly rigid, *ethnocentric* distinctions are made between *ingroups* ('us') and *outgroups* ('them'). Indeed, violent conflict and war are often played-out between such groups, leading to the construction and recording of their ethno-national histories in terms of great battles, victories and defeats, military leaders, and the like.

Accordingly, members of identity groups tend to be socialized not only in terms of who they are, but of who they are *not*, indeed, who has been out to 'get them!' In this regard, the results of interviews I conducted of senior CSCE/OSCE negotiators in Vienna in 1993 and 1997 indicate that historical memories of atrocities committed by members of certain ethnic groups against members of other ethnic groups are among the perceived primary causes of the Balkan wars of the 1990s (see Sandole, 2001).

So, it is not just the historically-based 'chosen traumas' – the collective memories of profound assault and loss associated with 28 June 1389 for Serbs; 29 May 1453 for Greeks; 12 July 1690 for Northern Irish Catholics; 24 April 1915 for Armenians – that are significant, continuing to be experienced emotionally on a regular basis in '*collapsed time*' as part of a post-traumatic stress syndrome (see Volkan, 1997, Chs. 3-4), but also each successive, 'real world' replay of the traumatic event which builds upon and reinforces the original sense of assault and loss and, therefore, grievance.

This is what makes *identity*-based conflicts so intractable. Unless these particular examples of '*conflict-as-startup conditions*' – deep-rooted historical memories of assault and loss among different ethnic identity groups – are dealt with effectively, then '*conflict-as-process*' is never far from the surface, always ready to be re-ignited under certain conditions, as is painfully clear in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Balkans and elsewhere.

Hence, the ultimate challenge for peacebuilders in each case is to discover or invent ways to deal with the past as a *necessary* (but clearly not *sufficient*) condition for the parties to 'let go' of the 'heavy hand of the past' and collaboratively develop a constructive future based on *common* security: not an insignificant task given that the parties' identities are based, in part, on their deep-rooted, historical memories of victimhood and corresponding, reinforced *virulent* ethnocentrism.

Understanding Identity Conflicts (I): Insights from Kuhn

For a number of years, I have taught research methods to undergraduate and graduate students, in each case assigning a book that has initially perplexed and confounded them: Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1970). Students continually ask, 'Why are we reading a book about the history of natural science – about physics! – in a core course of a program in international relations or in conflict resolution?'

In my ('nondefensive') efforts to explain Kuhn's relevance to conflict and conflict resolution, at the international or any other level, I usually start out by informing the students that Kuhn is relevant, first and foremost, to the Philosophy of Science, especially to *epistemology* and *ontology* –i.e., *how* and *why* we perceive *what* we perceive – which is an essential first step to any course on the 'nuts and bolts' of research design and implementation. To facilitate that discussion, I present a number of 'vignettes' from Kuhn that seem to explain what he is all

about. *Vignette number 1*, for instance, deals with the following scenario (Kuhn, 1970, pp. 50-51):

An investigator who hoped to learn something about what scientists took the atomic theory to be asked a distinguished physicist and an eminent chemist whether a single atom of helium was or was not a molecule. Both answered without hesitation, but their answers were not the same. For the chemist the atom of helium was a molecule because it behaved like one with respect to the kinetic theory of gases. For the physicist, on the other hand, the helium atom was *not* a molecule because it displayed no molecular spectrum. *Presumably both men were talking of the same particle*, but they were viewing it through their own research training and practice. Their experience in problem-solving told them what a molecule must be. Undoubtedly their experiences had much in common, *but they did not, in this case, tell the two specialists the same thing* (emphasis added).

So, what seems to be going on here? Sometimes, students will suggest that the physicist and chemist are using two different frameworks to assess the 'same' thing, which, given their different scientific trades, should not be all that surprising. Nevertheless, for one scientist – one 'high priest of truth' (see K. Boulding, 1956) to say that a single atom of helium is, and the other to say that it is not, a molecule, seems more complex than what one might expect from a mere difference in interpretation.

Hence, *vignette number 2* (Kuhn, 1970, p. 132):

...in a famous debate between the French chemists Proust and Berthollet[, the] first claimed that all chemical reactions occurred in fixed proportion, the latter that they did not. *Each collected impressive experimental evidence for his view*. Nevertheless, the two men necessarily talked through each other, and their debate was entirely inconclusive. *Where Berthollet saw a compound that could vary in proportion, Proust saw only a physical mixture. To that issue neither experiment nor a change of definitional convention could be relevant*. The two men were as fundamentally at cross-purposes as Galileo and Aristotle had been (emphasis added).

Vignette no. 2 is a more serious epistemological challenge than vignette no. 1 because experimental data have been mustered to support the otherwise irreconcilable views. Proust and Berthollet are not merely quibbling over theoretical definitions but also over corresponding *empirical data*. 'Still', one might argue, given different frameworks, even the 'same' data might be assessed differently. But, by two French chemists, sharing roughly the same cultural and professional space at the same point in time?

So, for further insight into Kuhn's message, and relevance to conflict analysis and resolution, we go on to *vignette number 3* (Kuhn, 1970, pp. 62-64):

In a psychological experiment that deserves to be far better known outside the trade, Bruner and Postman [1949] asked experimental subjects to identify on short and controlled exposure a series of playing cards. Many of the cards were normal, but some were made *anomalous*, e.g., a red six of spades and a black four of hearts. Each experimental run was constituted by the display of a single card to a single subject in a series of gradually increased exposures. After each



exposure the subject was asked what he had seen, and the run was terminated by two successive correct identifications.

Even on the shortest exposures many subjects identified most of the cards, and after a small increase all the subjects identified them all. For the normal cards these identifications were usually correct, *but the anomalous cards were almost always identified, without apparent hesitation or puzzlement, as normal*. The black four of hearts might, for example, be identified as the four of either spades or hearts. *Without any awareness of trouble, it was immediately fitted to one of the conceptual categories prepared by prior experience*. One would not even like to say that the subjects had seen something different from what they had identified. With a further increase of exposure to the *anomalous* cards, subjects did begin to hesitate and to display awareness of anomaly. Exposed, for example to the red six of spades, some would say: That's the six of spades, but there's something wrong with it – the black has a red border. Further increase of exposure resulted in still more hesitation and confusion until finally, and sometimes quite suddenly, most subjects would produce the correct identification without hesitation. Moreover, after doing this with two or three of the anomalous cards, they would have little further difficulty with the others. A few subjects, however, were never able to make the requisite adjustment of their categories. Even at forty times the average exposure required to recognize normal cards for what they were, more than 10% of the anomalous cards were not correctly identified. *And the subjects who then failed often experienced acute personal distress*. One of them exclaimed: 'I can't make the suit out, whatever it is. It didn't even look like a card that time. I don't know what color it is now or whether it's a spade or a heart. I'm not even sure now what a spade looks like. My God!' (emphasis added).

To the rejoinder that playing cards with reversed colors and shapes are not about life-threatening events – meaning that many of us would also not notice the *anomalous* cards – how do we explain the '*acute personal distress*' suffered by those who did not correctly identify the anomalous cards? How do we explain the apparent *cognitive dissonance* (Festinger, 1962) experienced by even one of the architects of the experiment? According to Kuhn:

My colleague Postman tells me that, though knowing all about the apparatus and display in advance, he nevertheless found looking at the incongruous cards *acutely uncomfortable* (emphasis added) (Kuhn, 1970, p. 64, fn. 13).

What is going on here? Is it the case, as I have argued elsewhere (Sandole 1984), that irrespective of *substance*, we all have *needs for predictability, regularity, and stability* that, when violated – even by something as otherwise trivial as reversed playing card colors and shapes – will cause us to experience dissonance, i.e., *acute personal distress*?

Let's go on to *vignette no. 4* (Kuhn, 1970, p. 112), derived from experiments conducted by George M. Stratton (1897) at the Hanover Institute during the 19th century:

An experimental subject who puts on goggles fitted with *inverting lenses* initially sees the entire world upside down. At the start his perceptual apparatus functions as it had been trained to function in the absence of the goggles, and the result is *extreme disorientation, an acute personal crisis*. But after the subject has begun to learn to deal with his new world, his entire visual field flips over, usually after

an intervening period in which vision is simply confused. Thereafter, *objects are again seen as they had been before the goggles were put on. The assimilation of a previously anomalous visual field has reacted upon and changed the field itself.* Literally as well as metaphorically, the man accustomed to inverting lenses has undergone a *revolutionary* transformation of vision (emphasis added).

But, the 'man accustomed to inverting lenses has undergone a revolutionary transformation of vision' only to continue to see as he had *prior* to putting on the inverting lenses; i.e., he has changed in order to recover the *status quo* – which, in effect, means no change at all! What does this say about Kuhn's concept of *paradigms* which lies at the heart of vignettes 1-4?

Paradigms – collective belief-value systems (see Sandole, 1993; 1999, Ch. 6) – are, like Boulding's (1956) *images*, significant because they constitute internalized 'lessons learned' that are relevant to our *survival*: biologically, psychologically, socially, or in any other sense. They are not, therefore, easily surrendered, nor, as Kuhn argues (1970, p. 65), should they be. Indeed, we should *dogmatically* adhere to our paradigms until it is clear that they are no longer relevant to our survival.

Implicit here is the notion that paradigms are related to the physiological concept of *homeostasis* (see Cannon, 1939): the built-in tendency of organisms to maintain themselves, their survival, over time, especially in the face of threats (e.g., Kuhn's *anomalies*; see below). In this sense, paradigms bridge the complex divide between 'nature' and 'nurture': although *learned*, and therefore *socially constructed* for individuals and groups of individuals, paradigms are embedded in a complex interplay of *cognitive [belief], evaluative [value], and affective [emotion] images*, such that a threat to the paradigm is an assault on the person. Hence, paradigms are what Boulding (1962) refers to as *inner core values*: things that possess us instead of things that we possess. In effect, we have learned the lessons of survival, what 'works' for us in a variety of situations. We have learned what it takes to fulfil our *basic needs for identity, recognition, and security* (such as the needs for predictability, regularity, and stability) (see Burton, 1997).

Although, in principle, what is learned can be *unlearned*, once we learn (or *socially construct*) the lessons of survival, in practice it is difficult (though not impossible) to supplant the old with the new. Consider the challenges involved in detecting *anomalies*. As background to this discussion, I present the elements of Kuhn's epistemological theory:

- (1) *Preparadigmatic Period* (characterized by *conflict* to determine which system should prevail);
- (2) *Paradigmatic Dominance*;
 - (a) Metaphysical Rules: Definition of legitimate subject matter;
 - (b) Theoretical Rules: Definition of legitimate explanation of behavior of subject matter;
 - (c) Instrumental Rules: Definition of legitimate techniques for conducting research on the subject matter; and
 - (d) Methodological Rules: Definition of legitimate problems in need of solution and criteria of validation;
- (3) *Perpetuation of the Paradigm*:
 - (a) Education and
 - (b) 'Normal Science';



- (4) *Threats to Paradigmatic Dominance: Anomalies*
 - (a) Novelties of Fact=Discoveries and
 - (b) Novelties of Theory=Inventions;
- (5) *Failure to Assimilate Anomalies: Crises; and*
- (6) *Responses to Crises*
 - (a) Strengthening of Existing [Status Quo] Paradigm or
 - (b) Replacement of Existing by Alternative Paradigm: *Scientific Revolution*.

Once a paradigm has come to dominate the perceptions and corresponding behaviors of a group of practitioners, we have a *Weltanschauung* or *worldview* for that community, detailing its legitimate subject matter and units of inquiry (the *metaphysical* rules of paradigms); legitimate explanation for the behavior of its subject matter (*theoretical* rules); legitimate techniques for conducting further research on the behavior of the subject matter (*instrumental* rules); and legitimate problems in need of solution for the community of practitioners, plus criteria of validation (or answers to the question, 'What is Truth?') (*methodological* rules; see Kuhn, 1970, Chapter IV, especially pp. 40-42).

'Normal Science' is the process by which the paradigm extends itself, by applying its legitimate techniques of analysis to legitimate problems in need of solution, concerning the legitimate explanation of the behavior of the legitimate subject matter. 'Normal science' is, therefore, paradigm-bound, paradigm-embedded. In this sense, 'science' is very cumulative, linear, building-block-oriented. So is the process of education by which neophytes are inducted and socialized into the community of practitioners.

'Normal Science' is meant to facilitate the fine-tuning and revision of the paradigm, leading to ever more discoveries that are compatible with the paradigm's parameters. Although not intended to lead to deviations from paradigm-based expectations – *anomalies* – normal science does nevertheless increase the probability that such deviations will be found. And here lies a paradox: although with advancing maturity, a community of practitioners should *logically* (*prescriptively*) be able to spot anomalies more easily against a background of sharper, paradigm-based expectation, *psychologically* (*descriptively*) they find it more difficult to do so. Why?

To facilitate answers to this question, I make use of my *Four-Worlds Model of the Perceptual-Behavioral Process* (see Sandole, 1987). Based upon Sir Karl Popper's work (1972), I envisage that all humans can be impacted by stimuli from either of two *extrasomatic* domains, *World 1*, the natural world, and *World 3*, the human-made world. Once stimuli from either of these two worlds detonate the 'discharge potential' of, say, a person's visual sense, then we have *information* being *encoded* through his central nervous system in one of his two *endosomatic* domains, his *World 4* – his biological/physiological world – where information is travelling from neuron to neuron via synaptic connection, up to the brain where it passes through *World 2*, his mental world – consisting of the various cognitive and evaluative components of his various internalized *paradigms* (with connections to their underlying, *World 4* affective components) – for *decoding* into at least four elements of the *definition of the situation or perceptions*:

- bare sensation;
- recognition and identification;
- analysis and explanation; and

- interpretation.

Now, assuming that what is 'out there' in either the natural and/or human-made worlds, gets 'in there', via the biological/physiological world into the mental world, for translation into something perceptible, what determines whether he or she will 'see' anything at all, let alone what others might see as well? Well, we know from our *vignettes* that the paradigm-embedded structures and contents of their mental worlds determined what the chemist and physicist saw, what Proust and Berthollet saw, what the participants in the Bruner-Postman playing card experiment saw. What kinds of paradigms – collective belief-value systems – might have that same effect in the field of conflict and conflict resolution?

Elsewhere (Sandole, 1993; 1999, Chapter 6), I have explored answers to this question by detailing four major paradigm systems that can be operative in the domains of interest to conflict analysts and conflict resolution practitioners: *Realpolitik*, *Idealpolitik*, *Marxism*, and *Non-Marxist Radical Thought*. The first two are familiar to students of international relations (see, e.g., Carr, 1939; Waltz, 1959); the third is certainly familiar to students and critics of Marxism alike; while the fourth reflects my attempt to use *basic human needs theory* (BHNTs) as a basis for developing a paradigm especially relevant to conflict analysts and conflict resolution practitioners.

While any individual in the 'real' (i.e., 'complex') world may reflect different weightings of all four of these paradigms,

- (1) those weightings may shift over time and space depending upon the relationships between the situationally impacted cognitive, evaluative, and affective dimensions of the person; but notwithstanding that,
- (2) some persons may be more reflective of any one of these worldviews than others. Accordingly, Realists might not be able to 'see' what Marxists 'see', and so on; or may have difficulty perceiving what an Idealist or NMRT analyst can detect (and vice versa).

Accordingly, identities based on different paradigms – different worldviews – inclusive of different ethnicities, religions, *different ethnocentrisms*, and the like, are, by definition, *in conflict with each other*; moreover, they do not lend themselves easily to change: perhaps a third party's 'worst nightmare'!

So, how might a conflict analyst and/or a conflict resolution practitioner make use of these insights from Kuhn? Indeed, can we begin to put all of the above together into something that resembles a coherent theory of transformational conflict resolution and peacebuilding? One potential response to this query is through the use of *complexity theory*.

Understanding Identity Conflicts (II): Insights from Complexity Theory

Complexity theory overlaps with *chaos theory*, *catastrophe theory*, and even *postmodernism*. In the midst of 'chaos' (increasing disorder/unpredictability [*postmodernism*]), 'spontaneous organization' takes place, from lower to higher levels (a bottom-up approach), enhancing 'order.' *Complexity theory* deals with the 'edge of chaos': a complex balance between chaos (*chaos theory*) and order. Within this 'critical region', radical discontinuities may occur (*catastrophe theory*), due to the sensitivity of initial conditions.



Order within chaos is what *Realpolitik* attempts, but as Vasquez (1993) and others have argued (see, e.g., Sandole, 1999), *Realpolitik* enhances disorder (*entropy*), making *Realpolitik* even more compelling and self-perpetuating (e.g., generating *self-perpetuating/self-maintaining conflict processes*). Catastrophe theory, however, suggests that a complete turn-around is possible. The 'trick' is, within the critical region represented by Langton's 'edge of chaos', to turn 'social entropy' around, so that *Realpolitik* is replaced by *Idealpolitik* as the dominant framework, or, in even more 'complex' fashion, by what I call the '4+2 framework' (Sandole, 1993; 1999, Ch. 6): a 'complex' synthesis of *Realpolitik*, *Idealpolitik*, *Marxism*, and 'Non-Marxist Radical Thought' (NMRT) political paradigms, plus *competitive* and *cooperative* approaches to conflict resolution – probably the ultimate expression of the 'edge of chaos' in conflict analysis and resolution.

This is what conflict *resolution* and *transformation* should attempt to do: through 'evolution' and 'learning', work toward a 'stable equilibrium' in the *coevolution* of cooperation and competition (as in Rapoport's/Axelrod's [1989] TIT FOR TAT).

A critical balance between *Realpolitik* and *Idealpolitik* – or better yet, the prevalence of the synergistic 4+2 framework – is compatible with a basic tenet of *postmodernism*: to 'let all flowers bloom'. Postmodernism and complexity theory as well as Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr (1989), also share an emphasis on dynamic *process* instead of static content, which overlaps with my distinction between *conflict-as-process* and *conflict-as-startup conditions*, and how the latter might be overwhelmed and replaced by the former (e.g., 'self-perpetuating/self-maintaining conflict processes') as the dominant fuel which drives the engine of conflict (perhaps because of the sensitivity of initial conditions). It is 'conflict-as-process' where Rapoport's/Axelrod's TIT FOR TAT strategy can help turn the system around and, through *learning* in the *coevolution* of cooperation and conflict, maintain a stable equilibrium in the critical region of the 'edge of chaos', between *Realpolitik's* order within chaos and, at minimum, *Idealpolitik's* chaos within order.

Shifting the balance within the critical region, from the dominance of *Realpolitik* ('negative peace') to the dominance of, at minimum, *Idealpolitik*, or, ideally, the '4+2 framework' (with in some cases, 'negative peace' achieved and/or maintained as a necessary condition of 'positive peace'), and maintaining the stability of that kind of 'complexity, will, in part, be a function of having new and improved mechanisms in place that are a response to Jean-Jacques Rousseau's statement that, 'Wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them' (cited in Waltz, 1959, p. 232).

Overall, then, the objective in transformational conflict resolution and peacebuilding should be to determine how to get to the 'edge of chaos' in relationships at all levels, and once there in each case, to remain there. *Complexity theory*, which is developing rapidly in physics, biology, economics, and elsewhere (see Waldrop, 1992), provides some significant insight in this

⁶ In this regard, see Holm and Sorensen (1993).

⁷ Rapoport's/Axelrod's (1984) TIT FOR TAT can be successful even in a Hobbesian world, precisely the milieu within which a Richardsonian (1939) stable Balance of Power can develop; i.e., where the product of the 'fatigue coefficients' [aB] transcends the product of the 'defence coefficients' [kI], but where long-term grievances [gh] still exist.

regard. This includes the use of computer simulation to explore the implications of models with various startup conditions.

Likely significant contributions of complexity theory to '*complex*' conflict analysis and resolution include:

- (1) the need to design interventions into complex conflict situations, using something like the '3 Pillar Mapping' to 'capture the complexity' of complex conflicts (see Sandole, 1998; forthcoming); and then
- (2) the need to 'play out' the designs and their implications via simulation – manual, mixed or computer simulation (see Sandole, 1999, Ch. 3) – as a necessary condition of effective implementation of the intervention design.

The possibilities here are endless and the need is great, particular since the 'War on Terrorism' conducted by the U.S. and its allies in response to the events and aftermath of 11 September 2001, is basically still wrapped in the garb of *Realpolitik*, targeting through law enforcement and military measures the *symptoms* of conflict processes more so than the deep-rooted, underlying causes and conditions of those processes.

Unless the deep-rooted causes and conditions are 'attacked' as well, including the difficult, historical ones, we will have more symptoms and the continuing, compelling attractiveness of the use of *Realpolitik* responses to them. This would likely be followed by further self-fulfilling confirmation of a basically counter-productive, self-defeating Hobbesian world where, among other things, the Israeli-Palestinian reciprocal slaughter, thermonuclear war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' actually appear to be *rational* options.

Dealing with Identity Conflicts (I): Nagorno-Karabakh

Clearly, 'chosen traumas' (as well as 'chosen glories') can become part of the 'heavy hand of the past' determining one's *identity* which, together with a hypothesized '*need for an enemy*' (Volkan, 1985, 1988), bifurcate the world into *ingroups* ('us') and *outgroups* ('them'), with 'them' being the ones who violated 'us' at some point in time, or at frequent points in time, the likelihood being that they will do so again (see Montville, 1993).

On the assumption that the *need for identity*, like the *needs for recognition and security*, are *basic human needs* (BHNs) (Burton, 1997), once identity based on certain traumas reflects this us-them bifurcation, it is very difficult to change. Moreover, the successive re-experience of the chosen trauma – either indirectly through recalled painful memories or directly through 'repeat performances' – further reinforces the original sense of loss and the us-them distinction, increasing the likelihood that, via transference, *current* experiences of loss will be interpreted in the light, and as reflections, of the *historical* ones. What this means is that many, including Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Turks, may be consigned to living forever 'in history' (see Fukuyama, 1989, 1992), unable to break loose from the past to develop their common futures.

Hence, as argued earlier, a major challenge for peacebuilders is to discover or invent innovative ways for aggrieved parties to 'let go' of the past – of their chosen traumas – so that they can *reframe* their definitions of the 'Other' as being part of a collaborative *common security system*, instead of continuing to be



the 'Enemy' which is out to destroy them and which, therefore, must be destroyed itself! (Current events in Israel/Palestine come easily to mind here.)

What is the relevance of these theoretical musings for the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh? Let me respond through a personal story. In June 1992, while the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan was still going on, I visited Armenia for the first time as part of my Institute's initial development of its Caucasus Working Group (see Sandole, 1997ab). The trip included visits to Yerevan State University – our partner in Armenia – to meet with Prof. Dr. Lyudmila Harutyunyan, chair of the Department of Sociology, plus the Rector, Vice Rector for International Affairs, and other officers of the University. We also visited Echevan, located along the border with Kazakh on the Azerbaijani side, to meet with the provincial governor Ms. Jema Ananian, and Armenian refugees of the conflict.

During the brief visit to Echevan, an Azeri offensive occurred at that point on the border, with my colleagues and I within earshot of heavy weapons fire. What impressed me the most – other than being in a country at war during a time (and at the site) of a major offensive against it! – was that Armenians defined Azeris as 'Turks'! Moreover, they saw themselves as roughly 3 million Armenians in Armenia, with some 4 million in the diaspora, juxtaposed to some 7 million 'Turks' in Azerbaijan and 63 million Turks in Turkey, for a total of 70 million Turks surrounding 3 million Armenians. The fact that both Turkey and Azerbaijan had imposed blockades on landlocked Armenia reinforced this sense of massive encirclement, plus the sense that the 'Turks' were intent on completing a process they started in 1915.

So, what is the Armenian chosen trauma – the deep-rooted historical memory of outrage – that seems to be at work here as an example of the heavy hand of the past? The 24th of April is the date on the Armenian calendar that recognizes events that began on that day in 1915 in Istanbul, lasting until 1923, that Armenians worldwide view as the first *genocide* of the 20th Century. Via transference from the past to the present, Armenians view the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh as an effort by Turks to finish off the 'final solution' they started in 1915.

What is the Turkish view of all this? Officially, Turks say yes, many Armenians (but also Turks!) died in Eastern Turkey during World War 1, but nowhere near the 1.5 million claimed by Armenians and certainly not because of an official Turkish governmental plan to exterminate all Armenians, like Germans nearly did to European Jewry during the Holocaust of World War 2.

As evidence to buttress their view, Turks claim that, in Eastern Turkey, many Armenians – in fact, tens of thousands – were killed because Armenians joined Russians (and their Armenian kin from the Russian Empire) in waging warfare against the collapsing Ottoman Empire to carve out an Armenian homeland – a period in which total chaos reigned. It was this chaos and reciprocal fratricide, and not an ordered plan associated with official Turkish governmental edict that

⁸ Interestingly, although they are 'Turkic', Azeris are not, according to Turkish Law 2510 of 1934, viewed as 'Turkish.' In contrast to, say, Albanians and Bosniaks, they are not viewed as being of 'Turkish descent and culture', and hence, there has been a 'conspicuous absence of Azeri immigration to Turkey' (see Kirisci, 2000). Nevertheless, Turkey has consistently been supportive of Azerbaijan in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.

resulted in, from the Turkish point of view, the deaths of 500,000 Armenians, mostly from disease. In addition, Turks point to the fact that Armenians in Western Turkey were not subjected to atrocities and that the Ottoman ambassador to Britain was an Armenian. Surely, if Turkey was conducting a genocide against Armenians, its main emissary to the British Empire would not be an Armenian. As one Turkish colleague put it to me, 'can you imagine Hitler having a Jew as his ambassador to Britain?'

How do Armenians view this Turkish interpretation of events? On the one hand, Armenians see a massive Turkish coverup of a genocide that took place nearly 100 years ago, assisted by intense lobbying of governments abroad. On the other hand, they are outraged that, all these years later, Turks cannot even acknowledge what members of an older generation did.

This absence of acknowledgement of a major defining event in Armenian history, corresponding to a dominant component of Armenian *identity*, constitutes, for Armenians, a major assault to that identity – to their sense of who they are as Armenians. Contrariwise, for many Turks, although the accusations of genocide are not against them, but their grandfathers' generation, the accusations nevertheless constitute an assault on their identity as Turks, on who they feel they are as Turks.

So, what are the implications of all this for the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh?

My hypothesis is: for the *present* conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan to be effectively addressed, the still existing, *historical* conflict between Armenia and Turkey must be effectively addressed, if not prior to dealing with the current conflict, then certainly at some later point in time (see Lederach, 2001; Montville, 1993).

So, even though the Karabakh conflict has, since May 1994, been characterized by a fairly stable ceasefire, and Armenian President Robert Kocharian and Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev met in April 2001 in Key West, Florida – and have been meeting regularly ever since former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright brought them together in April 1999 – at some point in time, the Armenian-Turkish conflict will have to be addressed as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for whatever Armenian-Azerbaijani agreement does emerge, to lead to a long-term, self-sustaining peace on the Karabakh issue.

Accordingly, during their next meetings, which may well result in a breakthrough, the two presidents, with the assistance of their American, French, and Russian colleagues from the OSCE's Minsk Group Process (see *OSCE Handbook*, 2000, pp. 62-67), should concentrate on developing further:

- (1) the nature of the land exchange and other significant compromises they will have to make, plus
- (2) how they will 'sell' the agreement to their respective constituents, but agree that
- (3) a significant next step should be encouraging Turkey and Armenia to set up a *joint historical commission* to finally lay their common past to rest.



Once a major impediment to resolution of the Armenian-Turkish conflict, this last point has recently become more thinkable:

With world opinion turning against the Turkish position, some ex-government officials in Turkey are advocating a new approach: *convening a panel of scholars from around the world, including Turkey and Armenia, and giving them full access to all archives to look at the historical record.* This would benefit Turkey by taking the issue of the Armenian genocide out of the political realm, at least for awhile. The idea also appeals to Western diplomats and politicians who, more than anything else, want the issue to go away. [...] Ending this long-standing dispute will help Turkey achieve its primary national goal: winning entry into the European Union. Not ending it will put Turkey on a collision course with any number of nations that might pass Armenian genocide resolutions in the future, including the United States (Glastris, 2001, p. B4, emphasis added).

Hence, unless efforts are made to address the deep-rooted, historical conflict between Armenia and Turkey – the primary *conflict-as-startup condition* – efforts to deal only with the current Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict will be superficial, perpetually at risk of breakdown into the ordered chaos of ethnic bloodletting: renewed *conflict-as-process*.

We only have to look at events of the last 10 years in the Balkans to see the consequences of earlier applications of 'band-aids' to complex, deep wounds, as seems to have occurred during the Tito years in former Yugoslavia. Under the circumstances, all the Caspian Sea oil flowing from the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan and other pipelines may not be enough to withstand the gravitational pull of Armenians' unresolved chosen trauma of the past.

Accordingly, to facilitate long overdue economic development of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), as well as Turkey's entry into the European Union – with profound developmental and security implications for the North Caucasus and Central Asia – the time has surely come to lay to rest, once and for all, the matter of the Armenian genocide! *Cognitively* and *evaluatively*, a rational plea; but *affectively*, perhaps a nonstarter!

Dealing with Identity Conflicts (II): Bringing It All Together!

Imagine a problemsolving taskforce comprised of Turkish, Armenian, Israeli, American, and European scholars, facilitated by appropriately trained and experienced professionals (see Mitchell and Banks, 1996), the objective being to finally deal with the issue of the Armenian genocide, as a necessary condition for dealing with the Armenian-Azeri conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Let's also imagine that all members of the taskforce have had access to all archives – e.g., Armenian, Turkish, German, American – dealing with the Armenian genocide.

Using the aforementioned '*Four-Worlds Model of the Perceptual-Behavioral Process*' (Sandole, 1987) as a point of departure, the facilitator, operating at the 'cognitive' level, would be helping the parties to 'experience' perceptions at various levels, e.g.:

⁹ The reasons for including Israelis in such a taskforce are: (1) as direct or indirect survivors of the Holocaust, Israeli (and other) Jews would have much to offer participants in the process; and, perhaps paradoxically, (2) official Israelis tend to be supportive of the Turkish position.

- (1) *Bare sensation*: an ambiguous sense of *what* may be in one's perceptual field (Y).
- (2) *Recognition and identification*: a clear sense of *what* is in one's perceptual field (Y).
- (3) *Analysis and explanation*: a sense of *why* what is in one's perceptual field may be there (X).
- (4) *Interpretation*:
 - (a) The meaning of the 'what'-'why' (Y-X) relationship (e.g., acts of frustration [X] and aggression [Y]) within a more comprehensive frame (frustration-aggression theory). And
 - (b) An exploration of alternative responses to the 'what'.

Confounding the otherwise nice, neat progression from 'bare sensation' to 'recognition and identification' are some bases for resistance to perception which operate at the *unconscious* level of the perceiving actor:

- (1) *Cognitive blindness*: the condition of not being able to perceive something in, for instance, either World 1 (nature) or World 3 (human-made) because of the absence of a corresponding concept, model, theory and/or paradigm in the perceiving actor's World 2 (mental) (e.g., the initial nonperception of reversed colors and shapes in the Bruner-Postman playing-card experiment).
- (2) *Cognitive resistance*: the condition of not being able to perceive the anomalous thing over time, presumably because the existing concepts, models, theories, and/or paradigms in the perceiving actor's World 2 (mental) fail to shift in order to accommodate it (e.g., the successive nonperception of anomalous cards in the playing-card experiment).
- (3) *Evaluative-affective resistance (EAR) 1*: the perceiving actor's experience of cognitive dissonance the longer the anomalous thing remains in his/her perceptual field, suggesting to the actor that something is not quite right with 'what is going on' around her or him but which, like in 'bare sensation', he or she cannot quite grasp the nature of. What seems to be going on here is that the actor experiences dissonance affectively as anxiety but then, defence mechanisms are activated, protecting the actor from recognizing the nature of the anomalous thing and, in the process, protecting the status quo concepts, models, theories, and/or paradigms in his/her World 2 (mental) (e.g., when some participants in the playing-card experiment indicated their confusion over what they were 'seeing': red [black] hearts or black [red] spades).

Again, these three bases of resistance to the detection of anomalies operate at the unconscious level of perceiving actors. In the move from 'bare sensation' to 'recognition and identification', a well-trained, experienced, and effective third-party facilitator might be able to guide conflicting parties to shift from 'cognitive blindness' to 'evaluative-affective resistance [EAR] 1'.

But then an ethical dilemma presents itself: should the third-party facilitator actively generate further dissonance to the point that it overrides internalized defence mechanisms, in the process causing a Kuhnian *and* personal crisis on the part of perceiving actors?



Suppose Turkish and some Israeli members of the taskforce persist in arguing that, yes, thousands of Armenians were killed, but that this was not due to an official, Turkish governmental policy. By contrast, Armenian, American, European, and other Israeli members argue that all the data indicate that, while the deaths may have been confined to Armenians living in the eastern side of the country, it was certainly the Turkish government of the day that ordered the massacres. Should the facilitator 'push' the unconsciously/consciously resisting actors to experience even more 'acute personal distress' – in the process moving from EAR 1 (unconscious resistance) to EAR 2 (conscious, often hostile resistance) – to the point that they may undergo a 'paradigmatic shift' and experience the anomalous thing for 'what it actually is'?

Let's put this into the context of the current expression of the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with Israelis embedded in, and reliving and responding symbolically to the fears and horrors of the Holocaust and Palestinians locked in the grip of captivity, humiliation, persistent displacement from their land and marginalization by the international community.

Imagine a taskforce comprised of Palestinians and Israelis facilitated by American and European friends of the Middle East. Imagine also that the facilitators – nongovernmental conflict resolution professionals as well as governmental diplomats and other specialists – are encouraging the Israeli and Palestinian participants to shift from 'cognitive blindness/resistance' to EAR 1, by presenting 'objective data', such as: Israeli deaths as a proportion of the Israeli population; Palestinian deaths as a proportion of the occupied Palestinian population; elements of Israeli firepower (planes, helicopters, and tanks); elements of Palestinian firepower (small arms, homemade rockets and their own bodies attached to explosives); who surrounds and occupies whom?; who is surrounded and occupied by whom?; who controls whom?; who is controlled by whom?.

Suppose that, after such data have been presented, the facilitators surface the view that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's recent declaration of war on the Palestinians – resulting in U.S.-equipped Israeli F-16 fighter aircraft, Apache helicopter gunships and tanks invading Palestinian refugee camps and townships to inflict sufficient pain and punishment on the Palestinians until they beg for peace – amounts to, at minimum, a counter-productive, self-defeating policy, and at most, a series of steps toward *genocide*. In other words, suppose the facilitators move the more powerful party, the Israelis, from EAR 1 (unconscious resistance) to EAR 2 (conscious, hostile resistance). Has an *ethical* line been crossed? Does it matter if the Israelis back up, pause, and reflect on their behavior and in the process, recognize that they will never have security unless the Palestinians have security (and vice versa)?

Again, lots of questions, and few answers. But one thing is clear. The horrible acts of violence being committed against Israelis in cafes, pizzerias, discotheques and elsewhere have produced diverse responses. On the one hand, there are those who say, 'We have to kill them all, all the Arabs. Why does half the world tells us not to go to war? If we want, we could kill them in one hour' and 'Let's really let them understand what the implication of their actions is... Very simply, wipe them out. Level them.' By contrast, there are the 300-plus Israeli reservists

¹⁰ For insights on the role and value of emotion in third party interventions, see Jones and Bodtker (2001).

who feel that their country's '35-year occupation ... has corrupted the nation', who refuse any longer to 'dominate, expel, starve, and humiliate' the Palestinians (see Hockstader, 2002a, p. A17; 2002b). There is also the young Israeli journalist, Ilan Goren (2002, p. B2), who talks about what his generation is going through:

confusion, loss of belief, a quiet despair born of the realization that we kill them and they kill us and nobody is any better off. ... Can anyone in the government see that wrecking Palestinian houses, invading homes, killing hundreds and degrading another nation is not only an inefficient way to fight terror, but also is immoral?

So, there is hope, and as this article has revealed, some rudimentary knowledge for realizing that hope!

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Analysing Political Exchanges between Minority and Majority Leaders in Romania

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Introduction

The issue of minority rights in Eastern Europe can be approached from a multitude of perspectives. This article employs a political view not concerned with the cultural aspect of ethnicity which is emphasised by multiculturalist studies. My focus is on the changes that democratisation has brought about to the relationship between central and local actors, between the political elites representing ethno-territorial interests and the leaders of other political parties. The first part of the article is an attempt to conceptualise these ongoing negotiations, which seem to constitute a trend in several Eastern European countries. Several scholars have proposed Lijphart's concept of 'consociational democracy' to describe the dynamics of ethnic politics in the region. After discussing the applicability of this term to the Romanian case I turn to the concept of political exchange. I believe that analysing political exchanges between political leaders captures a better picture of the direction in which ethnic politics is heading across the region.

The second part of the article moves away from the discussion of political exchanges at the centre, shifting the attention to the mechanisms of influence and control between local and central leaders. Claims for autonomy put forward by the representatives of the ethnic parties are faced with the legacy of a highly centralised political system in which the political centre dominates the local authorities. Therefore, I discuss the implications the centralisation of political power has on the exercise of self-government rights in localities inhabited by national minorities using data from interviews conducted in Hungary with Hungarian local council officials in December 2000 in Gheorgheni, Harghita county, a town where 88% of the population is Hungarian. Finally, I turn to the strategies developed by local elites in the relation with central authorities.

Towards a Consociational Arrangement?

In Romania, the Hungarian minority numbers approximately 1,600,000 people (7% of the total population) who are geographically concentrated in the area bordered by the Carpathian mountains. Only 28% of Transylvania's Hungarians live along the long Romanian-Hungarian border, while 35% of them are concentrated in Szekler's region. The Hungarians became a minority in 1918, when the union between Transylvania and Romania was made possible by the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Although Romanians were in the majority in Transylvania, Hungarians enjoyed a higher economic and social status forming the majority of urban and educated dwellers. During the interwar period, the newly formed Romanian state actively promoted the interests of the ethnic Romanians and strove to reduce the economic differentiation between Hungarians and Romanians living in Transylvania (Livezeanu 1995). These endeavours were accomplished by the socialist regime which gradually abolished the political representation of national minorities and favoured a policy of internal migration which changed the ethnic composition of the Transylvanian cities.

The collapse of socialism has brought about a change to the political relations between Romanians and Hungarians. The political representation of minorities was re-established and minority claims were put forward using democratic channels despite the violent but singular outburst of street fights between



Hungarians and Romanians which took place in 1990 in Târgu Mureş. A turning point in the history of the relationship between the Romanian government and the Hungarian political leaders were the 1996 elections when the Hungarian party joined the ruling coalition and appointed two ministers in the government. This indicated a shift from the policy of control and domination towards one based on political exchanges between political elites.¹

The co-optation of ethnic political parties in the process of decision making took place in several countries in the region where ethnic parties have joined the ruling coalition. By ethnic party, I understand a political party which openly support the interests of an ethnic group and has an electorate which belongs predominantly to this ethnic group. Ethnic parties started to play an increasingly important political role after the collapse of socialism. The Hungarian party (coalition) has joined the ruling coalition in both Romania (1996) and Slovakia (1998). Similarly, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), representing the interests of Turkish minority plays today a balancing role between the two opposed poles of the Bulgarian political stage although it was seen with reluctance at the beginning. In this context, positions of ministers and the protection of minority rights are exchanged for domestic and international political support.

In order to explore the type of institutional arrangements which is taking shape, one needs new adequate conceptual tools. The question of how to describe these new trends of minority/majority inter-ethnic relations has become a priority for the political analysts. Can we speak about a so called 'Romanian model'? Do we witness an irreversible trend towards minority participation in the government and if yes what are its implications? These questions are recurrent in the debates of the Romanian scholars. Recently, Gusztav Molnar published several articles in *Provincia*,² which triggered off a lively discussion about the applicability of the term consociational democracy for the case of Transylvania and Voivodina. Molnar argues for the prospects of implementing a consociational system in Transylvania, where the population is divided along ethnic lines.

Consociational democracies are characteristic for plural societies, i.e., societies divided along cleavage lines, which can be of religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial or ethnic nature (Lijphart 1977: 4). The cleavage lines divide the society in social groups, which have their own distinct subculture and political institutions. They form the so-called 'pillars' or 'segments' of the plural society. In consociational democracies, political elites representing the 'pillars' or 'segments' of the society are engaged in negotiations at the top level. The three main features of the consociational model are (1) the elites representing the segments of the society have mutual veto regarding political decisions (2) these segments are represented proportionally in political institutions, civil service appointments and allocation of public funds (3) the system allows for a high degree of segmental autonomy (Lijphart 1977: 25).

¹ I refer here to ethnic political parties from various countries in the region: Romania (The Democratic Alliance of the Hungarians in Romania DAHR); Slovakia (Coexistence, Hungarian Democratic Party HCDM, the Hungarian Civic Party HCP), in Bulgaria (Movement for Rights and Freedoms MRF) and in Macedonia (Party for Democratic Prosperity PDP).

² *Provincia* is a Transylvanian periodical published in both Hungarian and Romanian which promotes the idea of a Transylvanian regional identity and culture regardless which could bridge the social and political cleavage existing between Romanians and Hungarians.

Is such an arrangement a realistic option for Eastern European democracies? As regards the Transylvanian case, several objections have been raised against this idea. Andreescu (2000) pointed out that in Romania the 'substance' of the consociational arrangement i.e., the participation of the minority leaders in the government, has not yet been accepted, but it is disputed and negotiated by political leaders. In addition, the consociational arrangement involves negotiations among leaders representing segments of the society. The Democratic Alliance of the Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) can be viewed in this sense as a legitimate representative of the ethnically defined Hungarian community.³ DAHR politicians negotiate however with the ruling parties and it is unclear whom these parties represent. Kantor (2001) for instance points out that the majority of Romanians do not support the claims put forward by the Hungarian political elite. Therefore the Romanian political elite does not represent the voice of its electorate while engaged in negotiations with the Hungarian counterpart and this renders the compromise heavily depending on political circumstances. At the same time, Romanian politicians do not necessarily see themselves as leaders of the Romanian population defined in ethnic terms. Those who tend to do that (i.e., leaders of nationalist parties) reject any kind of dialogue with the Hungarian political elite. The fact that Romanian political leaders who define their electorate in terms of non-ethnic citizenry claim leadership for all citizens when in government represents therefore an additional difference from the consociational model.

Another sensitive aspect is the balance of power between minority and majority, which endangers the stability of a consociational arrangement. Lijphart warns us that in plural societies 'if one segment has a clear majority its leaders may attempt to dominate rather than cooperate with the rival minority' (Lijphart 1977: 55). Consequently, he recommends the presence of at least three different segments among which there is an equilibrium of power. On the contrary, the cleavage line in Eastern European countries divides the overwhelming majority – not necessarily defined in ethnic terms and organized on ethnic basis – from one main national minority (representing at maximum 10% of the population) bordered by an external homeland.

In Romania, the majority is not willing to accept a high degree of segmental autonomy and power is not equally distributed among ethnic groups and central state leaders. Minority leaders have the veto right in the sense that they can withdraw from the government (or threaten to do that as in the case of the Hungarian state University)⁴ but their room of manoeuvre is severely constricted by the long-term social consequences of such a move. The November 2000 elections marked the rapid rise of extreme nationalism, limiting the bargaining options of the minority leaders. Basically, withdrawing the support for the government meant to give way to nationalist leaders, which could endanger the democratic gains of the post-socialist period.

³ DAHR reported a number of 500,000 members out of the estimated 1,500,000 total Hungarian population.

⁴ In 1998 DAHR claimed the right to establish a state university with teaching in Hungarian language, and when the partners from the ruling coalition did not agree on this subject, threatened that it would withdraw from the coalition. Finally, the parties from the coalition came up with a last minute proposal about a multicultural university with teaching in both Hungarian and German which did not meet the expectations of the Hungarian community. The issue of the Hungarian state university is still not solved, in the meanwhile a private university with teaching in Hungarian language (Sapientia) being developed.



A Model of Political Exchange

Taking these objections into account, I would like to draw attention to another concept which helps us better understand the trend of ethnic politics. Rothchild in his study on political ethnicity in middle Africa put forward the concept of hegemonic exchange (1986: 73). This arrangement takes place within less developed democracies (where free elections are not necessary accompanied by other democratic procedures such as pluripartidism, accountability, etc). The substance of the arrangement is that 'central state leaders quite typically give some measures of status, autonomy, power, representation or economic resources in exchange for the regional unit's support of and compliance with the state's regulation' (Rothchild 1986: 70). At the center, informal negotiations bring together political elites for which 'the conflict of interest is implicit' (Cyert and March in Rothchild 1986: 72). On the one hand, the government needs the political support of the ethnic groups but they are not willing to give away power. On the other hand, ethnic leaders seek autonomy and recognition and they see political support to the government as a compromise. Thus the two parties involved in negotiations have diverging interests. The relation is conceived as a zero-sum distribution of resources, i.e., what is gained by one party is lost by the other.

Hegemonic exchange is a particular type of political exchange, which occurs in less developed democracies. In the Romanian case discussed below, political exchange should not be seen as a stable characteristic of the political system, being heavily dependent on political circumstances and actors. I consider the Romanian example of political exchange to be illustrative for the societies in which the state is dominated by one ethnic group and national identity was built around the principle of ethnic homogeneity. Consequently, this type of political exchange can develop in democratic societies which show less toleration to ethnic diversity. In these cases, political exchange leads to a policy of 'control through co-optation' rather than to a consociational model based on segmental autonomy. In other words, political exchange allows for the accommodation of minority claims (which are conflicting with the national ideology of the majority) in a way which avoids a radical redefinition of the nation-state.

It can be however hypothesised that the institutionalisation of democratic principles will bring about an increase in tolerance towards ethnic diversity, the decline of majority rule, and the weakening of the centralised state, all being preconditions for the development of a consociational model.

In what follows I argue that the concept of political exchange enables us to analyse the dynamics of ethno-politics in Romania. I employ here the definition given by Parri (1990: 217) to describe the relationship between central government and sub-national actors:

the territorial political exchange between two public actors occurs when one of the two public actors, normally at the higher level, allows the other to influence the content of the public decisional [...] and implementation processes [...] so that it can profit from part of the public policy outputs and outcomes, and when, in exchange for this, the latter gives its consensus to the former, i.e., it puts at the other's disposal its power resources in order to guarantee the efficacy and the effectiveness of the public policy question.

Political Exchanges between Minority and Majority Leaders in Romania

General Considerations

In Eastern Europe political exchange involves the co-optation of minority leaders into the government. In the Romanian case, certain group-differentiated rights⁵ are exchanged for political support, whether in domestic or international politics, given the absence of territorial claims. This type of exchange was initiated in 1996 when DAHR (The Democratic Alliance of the Hungarians in Romania) joined the ruling coalition formed at that time by the Romanian Democrat Convention (RDC) and the Democrat Party (DP) (see Table 1 for the distribution of votes in elections). The main opposition party was the left-wing Social Democrat Party (SDP), led by Ion Iliescu. Iliescu, who lost the 1996 elections, had at that time a visibly nationalistic electoral discourse, picturing the imminent danger of federalisation in case that the other main candidate, Constantinescu, would win the elections. Against this backdrop, the political alliance between DAHR and the other two parties (RDC and DP) seemed to be facilitated by a common ideological ground, that is an anticommunist, pro-minority rights, pro-market economy orientation. During the four year term the protocol signed between the parties was endangered by numerous conflicts and broken promises. Nevertheless, DAHR achieved certain legislative changes of the education and self-government laws. Other legislative initiatives such as the use of the minorities language in local administration and the restitution of the real estate confiscated by the socialist state were debated without being passed by the Parliament.

Table 1: Results of National Elections, 1989-2000

Party	1990		1992		1996		2000	
	<i>Deputy Chamber</i>	<i>Senate</i>	<i>Deputy Chamber</i>	<i>Senate</i>	<i>Deputy Chamber</i>	<i>Senate</i>	<i>Deputy Chamber</i>	<i>Senate</i>
DAHR	7.23%	7.20%	7.46%	7.59%	6.64%	6.82%	6.79%	6.89%
PRNU ^a	2.12%	2.15%	7.72%	8.12%	4.36%	4.22%	1.39%	1.42%
GRP ^b	-	-	3.90%	3.85%	4.46%	4.54%	19.48%	21.01%
NSF	66.31%	67.02%	-	-	-	-	36.61%	37.09%
RSDP (NDSF)	-	-	27.72%	28.29%	21.52%	23.08%	7.03%	7.57%
DP ^c (NSF)	-	-	10.19%	10.39%	12.93%	13.16%	6.89%	7.47%
RDC	-	-	20.01%	20.16%	30.17%	30.70%	5.03%	5.28

^a Party of Romanian National Unity. During 1990 elections, PRNU formed a coalition with the Republican Party. In 2000, PRNU formed the coalition Party of National Alliance, but did not pass the electoral threshold.

^b Greater Romania Party.

^c Social Democratic Party. This party ran in 1992 elections as NSF (National Salvation Front), then split from DP and was named for a while NDSF (National Democratic Salvation Front). In 1996 elections it ran as RSDP (Romania Social Democrat Party).

^d The Democratic Party split from the NSF and ran under this name in 1992.

^e The NPL (National Liberal Party) withdrew from the CDR and ran independently in the 2000 elections.

^f The RDC in 2000 did not pass the electoral threshold which was 10% for coalitions of parties.

The 2000 elections changed radically the Romanian political scene, bringing to power the former opposition party (SDP) and its leader Ion Iliescu. The agreement between SDP and DAHR seemed improbable and against nature given the SDP's previous appeals to nationalism and its leftist political orientation. However, the two parties signed an agreement which proved to be more efficient than the previous one. According to this agreement, DAHR engaged to support

⁵ According to Kymlicka, differentiated rights cover 'territorial autonomy, veto powers, guaranteed representation in central institutions, land claims and language rights' (1995: 109).



the legislative projects put forward by SDP in the Parliament in exchange for political positions and measures of recognition and power.

During 1996-2000 DAHR was proportionally represented in the government, having the right to appoint two ministers and several positions at the county level (two prefects and eight sub-prefects).⁶ As opposed to that, the post-2000 agreement did not involve the representation of DAHR in the government. Rather the accent was put on legislative changes and the implementation of these changes at the local level. The new agreement signed on 29 January 2002 stipulates also a series of local agreements between local DAHR and SDP leaders aimed at solving in a top-down manner concrete problems about the situation of certain schools or historical monuments belonging to the Hungarian minority, where the consent of the local government was needed.

After 2000, DAHR achieved several priorities which the previous coalition was unwilling and unable to pass (such as the use of minority language in local administration, restitution of real estate confiscated by the socialist state, etc.). This came at certain expense for DAHR who voted laws which were strongly contested by the opposition and considered undemocratic (such as the law for classified information).

The course of events that followed the 2000 elections renders the concept of political exchange more fruitful for understanding. Political exchange is a very pragmatic institution. It follows the rules of an economic exchange in which the political colour of the partners is irrelevant. Political exchange thus does not necessarily involve a consensus or pact among elites nor the convergence of long term political projects. It is rather based on negotiations of concrete, short term objectives, on mutually imposed conditions, which can be easily broken by the partners trying to modify the agreement in their interest. After all, the parties have diverging interests and there is no genuine consensus to be achieved given the antagonistic national ideologies at stake.

The key issue over which no real consensus can be achieved is territorial autonomy. One could argue however that political crises were avoided due to the series of political exchanges and agreements between politicians.

Negotiating Autonomy

Autonomy plays a key role in the negotiation processes. According to DAHR's Programme territorial autonomy is defined as a reunion of local self-governments with a special status, conception which is in conflict with the Romanian Constitution. Support for the idea of a 'parallel' autonomous society distinguishes the loyal supporters of the Hungarian cause from those who seem to endanger the community by favoring flexible, permeable boundaries between minority and majority. In this context, the way autonomy is envisioned is a potentially divisive topic within the Hungarian political community. The consensus is forged (and imposed) within the party in order to strengthen the bargaining power in the negotiations at the center. In the name of unity, divergent voices are thus often marginalised (see also Magyari-Vincze 1997: 207).

⁶ Local state administration is headed by the county prefect who is appointed by the central government. The role of the prefect is to observe that things stay within the law. Formally, the relationship between the prefect and the county council chairman is not a hierarchical one, however in practice this depends on the informal networks of power relationships each of them has.

Territorial autonomy is also a controversial aspect of the relation between minority and majority. It cuts across the ideal endeared by the majority of an ethnically homogeneous and unitary nation-state. Minority claims for a separate, autonomous national existence thus collide with the centralized nation-state dominated by the ethnic group which forms the majority. In Eastern European countries nation-states were never a neutral arena of group interest conflict. Historically, the 'core nation' has been considered to legitimately own the polity (Brubaker 1996). The state, in this ethnicised version, has *the obligation* to promote the language, economic welfare and political hegemony of the core nation as a remedial for previous discrimination.

For the Romanian nationalists, the theme of autonomy is haunted by the spectre of federalisation and dismemberment of the state. This fear is tamed through the institution of political exchange. The very absence of the claim for territorial autonomy is negotiated and rewarded in the process of political exchange between elites. The imposed rule of the game during DAHR's participation in the government (1996-2000) was not to formulate any claim for territorial autonomy while in the government.

Deviations from this rule endanger the democratic representation of the minorities, as it happened in 1995. At that time, the self-government initiative of the Hungarian politicians triggered off a violent reaction on behalf of the Romanian nationalist parties, which asked for outlawing DAHR. The issue at stake then was the fact that DAHR established the Council of Hungarian mayors and local councillors, seen by the Romanian politicians and mass media as an initiative to establish ethno-territorial autonomy. The conflict reached its peak at the beginning of 1995 when the government (the ruling left-wing party was in coalition with nationalist parties at that time) gave an ultimatum to DAHR and asked it to abolish these 'antidemocratic and discriminatory practices'. Such political crises in the relation between DAHR and other parties were avoided after 1996. The claim for territorial autonomy was pursued by Hungarian elite only in an attempt to boost its potential for negotiations. By this I refer to the cases when radical leaders of DAHR would publicly claim the commitment to territorial autonomy and afterwards the party would officially deny these declarations as not representative for DAHR politics.

Types of Interactions

Having a closer look at the negotiations which are taking place between minority and majority leaders one could distinguish three types of interaction involving the political actors.

Hungarian local/centre elites

The political exchanges at the center are made possible through the co-operation between local and central leaders of the ethnic minorities. Interests are firstly negotiated at the local level, where ethnic political elites accommodate the diverging claims of the local factions. It is only in the second phase that ethno-regional elites are involved in political exchanges with the central government. In addition, local Hungarian elites also develop their own strategies in relation to the central authorities in order to increase their financial and decisional autonomy.

Romanian local/centre elites

The conflict over symbolic issues is often amplified by Romanian local authorities, which oppose the implementation of laws, being unwilling or unable to enforce



them.⁷ In several cities, where the display of ethnic symbols is acutely disputed, the Romanian local elites resisted the implementation of the provisions protecting the minority rights. An attempt to deal with these situations was the series of local agreements between DAHR and SDP leaders regarding the restoration of historical monuments. However while these agreements are enforceable in counties where SDP has won local elections, the situation remains unsolved in cities (such as Cluj, Koloszvar in Hungarian), where the mayor or the majority of local councillors are from nationalist parties.

Hungarian-Romanian local negotiations are not very influential because of the difficulties to short-circuit the intervention of the centre. Nevertheless, along with the devolution processes which weaken the intervention of the centre, the trend is towards the decentralisation of ethnic conflicts and the accommodation of ethnic tensions at the local level.

Few words could be said about the civic initiative to reinforce an overarching regional identity which lack the political and economic support. I have mentioned in this respect the periodical *Provincia*, which gives voice to intellectuals in favour of decentralisation and regionalisation. A Transylvanian regional structure would allow for the mediation between ethnic leaders to take place also at the regional level. However, this idea is very much disproved by Romanian politicians who strongly reacted against the Memorandum of *Provincia*. Therefore, given the absence of regional autonomy, consultation and mediations are possible only at the county level within the elected Local Council. In these cases, the balance of power between Hungarian versus Romanian politicians can be affected by agreements sign at the centre such as the DAHR-SDP protocol signed in Jan. 2002.

The negotiations between Romanians and Hungarians politicians are also influenced by external actors. The bordering homeland of the national minority feels responsible for the situation of the co-ethnics living in the neighbouring country. It strengthens the bargaining power of the minority leaders by mobilising international support and putting pressure on authorities to implement minority rights measures. Minimally, the role of the external homeland is to make sure that democratic procedures and rules are observed and minority rights protected. Sometimes, the homeland is tempted to actively intervene in the nationalising project of the minority. It may attempt to define and control the criteria for belonging to the nation and to establish a legal relation with its co-ethnics (as in the case of the Law on the Hungarian living in neighbouring countries, the so called Status Law).

A second external actor which intervenes in the negotiations is the European Union. International standards for minority rights are also invoked by Hungarian

⁷ Such an example is the issue of the bilingual signs for the locality names. In July 1997, the Government issued a decree (no. 22/97) stating that in localities where a minority ethnic group represents more than 20%, street signs should be bilingual. On 18th of July, in Tirgu Mures (Marasvasarhely in Hungarian), supporters of extreme nationalist organisation (Vatra Mare) gathered and painted the bilingual signs in the colours of the Romanian flag. At the same time, while local authorities were trying to implement this measure, the District Roads Office (subordinated to the Ministry of Transport) removed the indicators because of a misunderstanding (Kovacs, 1999: 203). Another example is the agreement between the Hungarian and Romanian prime ministers to inaugurate a park of 'Reconciliation Park' in Arad and to commemorate the statue of the 13 Hungarian generals who were executed in 1849. This attempt of reconciliation was unsuccessful, and again, local authorities, namely the Local Council, intervened by voting out the decision to give out the land for the construction of the park.

parties in their negotiations. Such an example is the Hungarian-Romanian treaty, the signing of which was protracted because of the Hungarian demand that the treaty should make a reference to Recommendation 1201 (1993) of the Council of Europe. Article 11 of this Recommendation referred to the collective character of minority rights alluding to the highly sensitive issue of territorial autonomy for ethnic groups.

Mechanisms of Influence and Control between Local and Central Leaders

Political exchanges at the centre are complementary to the relation between the Hungarian local government representatives and central leaders. Given the territorial concentration of the Hungarian minority in Romania, local government structures are crucial for advancing minority claims.⁸ For the last decade, the political priority on DAHR's political agenda has been the acceleration of the local government reform. Decentralisation would allow for the accommodation of ethnic tensions at the local level, without the intervention of the centre. This would improve the current situation when all minority claims have to be negotiated firstly with the central leaders. Many of the issues (concerning for instance education or symbolic aspects such as the names of the streets, monuments) would become the responsibility of local government and would not be anymore regulated from the centre. In addition, this would improve the legitimacy of certain institutions, such as the Police which is at present subordinated to the minister and it is not accountable to the elected local government.

The Hungarian local government representatives are faced with the legacy of the highly centralised political structures which survived the collapse of socialism. In the absence of a genuine local autonomy, the local government develops its own strategies to put pressure on central authorities. Local Hungarian elites are not in a position to offer direct political support to the Romanian elites at the centre, but they can put pressure using democratic means and EU policies to attain their goals. Consequently, the relation between local and central leaders can be characterised rather through strategies of influence and control than by political exchanges. Before turning to this, I will briefly refer to the socialist legacy and practices used to prevent and limit the local accumulation of power.

Political Control of the Centre

The attempts of central authorities to dominate the local after 1989 bear some resemblance with the practices used during the socialist regime. Daniel Nelson (1988) distinguishes several ways in which the Communist party prevented the accretion of local power. Firstly, governments initiated territorial – administrative reforms which were not rooted in a concern for administrative efficiency. On the contrary, often such reforms aimed at making administrative units less independent and more vulnerable by multiplying their number.⁹ Secondly, Nelson mentions the attempts to create an image of autonomy through the propaganda of 'local initiatives', and 'community involvement'. This propaganda was only a facade, meant to disguise the intention to control the sub-national units. Even when the reforms were aimed at local autonomy, their effect was nullified by the limitations imposed on the use of financial resources. Thirdly, local administration was controlled by the central party. The prefect as a supervisor of the local

⁸ In 1992, there were a total of 175 settlements in Transylvania in which the proportion of ethnic Hungarians exceeded 50%.

⁹ Such territorial administrative reforms took place in Poland between 1972-1975 (the number of wojewodztwa increased from 22 to 49), in Romania between 1968-1969 (39 judete replacing 16 regions), and in Slovakia in 1948 and 1960.



government exercised governmental control over local groups. After 1975 in both Poland and Romania local party secretaries simultaneously hold the position of people's council president. Mayors were therefore appointed by party officials to represent the local interests. Finally, socialist governments relied on the rotation of the local cadres and leaders to avoid power accretion.

The legacy of a dominant centre which manipulates local leaders and leaves no room for local initiatives is still present today. Although local/centre relations have been redefined after the collapse of socialism, some of the strategies survived the change of regimes. In Slovakia, for instance, the practice of administrative reforms was used by Mečiar's regime. Starting with 1993, Hungarian parties asked for a new territorial division according to the 'natural ethnic boundaries'. Nevertheless, in 1996 the Slovak government passed the law on the new territorial division according to which Hungarians did not form a majority in any of the newly formed districts. After the 1998 elections, the issue was again on the political agenda and eventually new regional authorities were instituted, without the 'Hungarian region' demanded by the Hungarian minority.

Limits of Local Autonomy in Romania

In Romania after 1989, a series of reforms were initiated in order to promote local government and decentralise managerial responsibility. The implementation of these reforms was, however, temporised, the post-socialist governments revealing their lack of political will to give away power. Very often the theme of local autonomy is ethnicised in order to hinder the transfer of power to sub-national units. The boundary between local autonomy as a principle of efficient administration and ethnic local autonomy as a Hungarian threat to the 'state unity' are blurred by the politicians who try to maintain the status quo.

The sluggish decentralisation processes constitute an impediment for the attempts of Hungarian politicians to increase the autonomy of the regions inhabited by their co-ethnics. Limitations are imposed on local government through legislation and lack of financial devolution. In Romania, the centre continues to maintain the financial control and exercises its influence through informal and formal political hierarchies. The interviews conducted in December 2000 with Hungarian representatives from Local Council (in Gheorgheni, Harghita county, a small town where the vast majority of inhabitants are Hungarians) show a deep dissatisfaction with the degree of financial autonomy granted to Local Councils.

The local budget law is more than incomplete. It does not grant sufficient autonomy because even at this moment all the money goes first to Bucharest and then a certain percentage is returned. Abroad some of the local taxes stay in the locality right from the beginning. Here it happens that the money to be returned is negotiated and this I consider to be a form of political manipulation in economy.

The interviews pointed out that the redistribution of financial resources is perceived to be unjust, since it does not reflect the needs or the contribution to the total budget but the political influence of party leaders.

In this context, any increase in the responsibilities delegated to elected local representatives is perceived as a burden:

The Local Council has more and more responsibilities (it is responsible for schools, health care, poverty, etc.) but it hasn't received a penny more from the state budget.

The law stipulates that schools are to be paid from the local budget. We cannot afford to finance that from the local budget and, consequently, this responsibility is perceived as a burden, especially as long as our competence is limited to the financial aspect of school administration. The strategies for the development and functioning of the schools should also become the responsibility of the Local Council.

Thus, the delegation of responsibilities has no impact whatsoever in the absence of a long term strategy backed by the transfer of economic resources.

Mentalities

Besides the legislative limitations on local autonomy which allow for the interference of the central authorities in local affairs, all the respondents pointed out to the persistence of old mentalities which seem to change very slowly. As they put it, 'actually, there is no will to get things done'. Even when the legislation allows, people behave according to old mentalities, avoiding responsibility.

A lot has to be changed in the mentality of the people to make them value the existing possibilities. I think we should ask for more, only after we use what we have.

In the last years certain progress has been made, but more with respect to the form (than to the content). Mentalities remain anchored in the past.

All games are played in Bucharest and this is because both the interests and the mentalities of the people favour this state of affairs. For many the already established hierarchies of power are a routine.

The processes of devolution is thus constrained and temporised not only by the unwillingness of central leaders to give away power, but also through the persistence of old mentalities attached to the paternalistic role of the state.

Strategies of Local Elites vis-à-vis the Central Authorities

The local is not as passive as it might appear from the picture above. Given the persistence of centralisation, one way to maximise the pressure put on central authorities is to articulate firstly the interests of local communities within the structures of the Hungarian political party and only then to negotiate at the centre with other political parties. From this perspective the ability to initiate changes and influence the policy outcomes depends on the consensus and unity of the party. Despite this internal diversity and complex organisation structure,¹⁰ the official discourse maintained by DAHR over the last decade conveyed an image of consensus and unity, marginalising the radical wing concerned with federalisation.¹¹

¹⁰ DAHR is an umbrella organisation, which co-ordinates in a loose structure the local autonomous branches, gathering together political, cultural and professional groups.

¹¹ A similar trend towards the unity of the ethnic political movements can be noticed in Slovakia where the different Hungarian parties have eventually formed a unique coalition. However, this evolution was largely influenced by the new electoral law which stipulated that each party entering a coalition has to pass separately the threshold needed to enter parliament.



In the interviews, people were also asked about their views on the concept of autonomy put forward by DAHR. The opinions varied from a genuine endorsement of how autonomy is defined within DAHR to considering the definition the result of an imposed consensus.

To maintain that half a million of people (i.e., the number of DAHR's members) think the same is stupid. Consensus assumes a mutual accommodation of opinions, but DAHR by itself is not a democratic but an authoritarian organisation. Thus, we cannot talk about consensus. Maybe about an 'imposed consensus', about orders.

As in any political party, there is a divergence of opinions also within DAHR. However, the concepts of personal, administrative and territorial autonomy were elaborated on the basis of consensus.

Secondly, local leaders can use democratic policy tools in order to generate direct pressure on central authorities. In 1995 for instance, the Hungarian community reacted promptly to the Law on Education (84/1995), which tries to restrain minority rights. DAHR territorial branches organised a series of protest manifestations including collection of signatures, meetings, seminars and so on.

In other countries from the region, referendums were also used by local actors to put pressure on the central government. In Slovakia, the referendum in Šturovo has become a symbol of resistance against central government. The local government organised a local referendum on the direct election of the president and the joining of NATO, which replaced the national referendum cancelled by Mečiar (Buček 2001: 288). Nevertheless, when the issue at stake was secession, referendums were used and misused by political elites to legitimise their claims. This was the case in the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia, where the collapse of the socialist rule was followed by the break up of the country. Referendums became a genuine 'political weapon' of minorities demanding autonomy. As Brandy and Kaplan mention, in Yugoslavia there was an 'anarchy of referendums' and 'they have often seemed more like the battle cries of highly mobilised and desperate populations than instruments of deliberative democracy' (1994: 206). Between 1990-1993, 17 referendums took place in the territory of former Yugoslavia.¹²

Thirdly, both the local and central leaders representing national minorities can use EU policies and institutions to assist their demands for autonomy. Ethnic parties tend to 'Europeanise' their goals, to integrate their claims for autonomy into the broader vision of euroregions. The interaction between self-government claims and the European integration process is twofold: not only that EU discourse shapes the goals of ethnic parties, but, at the same time, ethnic parties use EU policies and institutions to assist their demands for autonomy (Lynch 1996 : 10). Generally speaking, the positions of the ethnic parties vary from *negative linkage* (seeking independent statehood and full membership of EU) to a *positive linkage* (based on demands for regional autonomy and decentralisation in a

¹² Referendums were held before the proclamation of independence in Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Yugoslavia referendums were held in Kosovo where the result was overwhelmingly in favour of independence (99%) and in Montenegro where the population voted for staying in Yugoslavia (75%). As regards minorities demanding autonomy, referendums organised by Serbs from various parts of Croatia (Krajina, Slavonia, Baranja, Srem), and from Bosnia and Herzegovia (twice).

Europe of regions) (Lynch 1996). In Romania, the positive linkage had an impact on the political discourse of DAHR.

The program of the political party explicitly refers to forms of autonomy which are against the Romanian Constitution and are not backed up by European Union. Nevertheless, the public discourse of DAHR has increasingly moved into the direction of regionalisation and regional development, which is part of the EU integration strategy. Regional development seems to represent the middle way between the DAHR's conception on autonomy and the central government adherence to centralisation. In 1997, the Green Card of regional development policies was adopted and that seemed to be a promising beginning. Nevertheless, the regional structures (Regional Development Councils) established after 1997 are still far away from playing an influential role in the management of local affairs. As one of the respondents put it:

I consider the development regions as forms without content. They are established, it's clear to whom they belong, there are directors, offices, secretaries, computers, cars, but nothing is done! For every problem, when we ask their help, they answer: 'but we don't know, we have to ask the people from Bucharest'.

Although the persistence of old mentalities hinders the functioning of these new decentralised administrative structures, regionalisation has the advantage of not being that much associated in people's minds with the danger of federalisation.

Conclusion

Exchanges between minority and majority political leaders, the term put forward in this article, take place at two main levels. Leaders of Hungarian party negotiate with other leaders from the government and offer political support in exchange for the influence over policy outcomes. Given the ethnic geography of the Hungarian minority, local government representatives can also play a key role in advancing minority claims. However, the centre is not disposed to negotiate with local elites since they cannot offer a direct political support. Therefore, as I have argued, the relation between local and central elites is better described by mechanisms of mutual influence and control.

The thrust of the article is therefore that analysing political exchanges and strategies of influence between political leaders helps us understand the dynamics of ethnic politics in Romania. In the first part of the article I have criticised the opinion that the consociational model properly describes the current situation given the importance of ethnic ideologies, the scepticism towards segmental autonomy and the fragile balance of power between minority and majority. What is rather taking place is a political accommodation of ethnic claims through a series of political exchanges and compromises which avoid a radical redefinition of the nation-state. Indeed, the compromise was made possible by the fact that DAHR renounced the claims for territorial autonomy. However, the political support offered to the ruling parties brought undeniable gains for the Hungarian community. In concluding, I would like to point out that political exchanges have successfully accommodated ethnic tensions and contributed to the political stability of the system and that in the long run they lead towards the devolution of economic and political power as well as the granting of minority rights.



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The Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria: Social Integration and Impact on Bulgarian – Turkish Relations, 1947-2000

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Since the end of WWII, the key issue affecting Bulgarian-Turkish relations has been the status of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. During the period of communist rule in Bulgaria (1946-1989), the policy of the Bulgarian government concerning the rights of the Turkish minority was inconsistent. Periods of relative tolerance and respect for the rights of the Turkish community have alternated with decades of discrimination, including state programs attempting to assimilate the minority into Bulgaria's mainstream. The period of overt discrimination began in the late 1960s. By the 1980s, there were undue restrictions on the expression of the cultural identity of the Bulgarian Turks. Finally, the Bulgarian government's assimilation policies reached a low-point in 1984-1985, with a notorious state program forcing the Bulgarian Turks to 'apply' to change their Turkish names to Bulgarian alternatives. The infamous exodus of ethnic Turks to Turkey in 1989 marked the end of the policies of discrimination. Since the fall of the Communist regime in November 1989, the treatment of the Turkish minority has improved substantially.

Bulgarian-Turkish relations have largely reflected the treatment of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, except for the period 1968-1984 when a relative warming in bilateral relations coincided with a period limiting the cultural rights of Bulgarian Muslims. At present, Bulgarian-Turkish relations can be described as excellent; there are laws to protect the Turkish minority's rights. Bulgarian Turks participate in decision-making, Turkish-language classes continue funded by the Bulgarian government. The case of Bulgarian-Turkish relations in the post Cold war period provides an example of success in maintaining peaceful ethnic relations; hence, contributing to good-neighbourly relations between a Muslim and a Christian country in the Balkans. Analysing the history of the bilateral relations between Bulgaria and Turkey parallel to the developments in minority issues should provide valuable insights as to the factors that influence the success of both inter-ethnic and inter-state relations in the region.

The Turkish ethnic group in Bulgaria: government policies in the period 1947 – 1989

It is impossible to come up with a single term to define Bulgarian citizens of Turkish ethnic origin that would be valid for the period between 1947 and the present-day. In terms of definitions used by the Constitution, three phases can be distinguished. In the first phase, 1947-1971, a communist-dominated Parliament adopted a law that became known as the Dimitrov Constitution after the then head of government, with a clause stating 'national minorities are entitled to be taught in their mother tongue and develop their national culture' thus recognising the existence of national minorities and stipulating the rights conferred to them by the state. During the second phase, 1971-1991, the so-called Zhivkov Constitution was in force that 'dropped all references to minorities.' (Pundeff 1992: 106) The Constitution in force at present was adopted in 1991 by a Grand National Assembly in which the Socialists (the new name of the former Communist Party) had a majority (211 out of 400 seats), sufficient to pass the document despite the vehement disapproval of the opposition. (Bell 1997: 375) This Constitution and existing legislation do not use the term 'national minority.' (Bulgarian Helsinki Committee: 2000) The rights of all Bulgarian citizens are protected through provisions defining their individual, rather than collective rights. The fact that Bulgaria ratified the framework Convention for the Protection



of National Minorities in February 1999 has led some politicians to believe that the Convention does not have an object to protect in Bulgaria. It remains to be seen whether the concept of 'national minority', and concomitant collective rights, will be employed by the Bulgarian legislature in the future, or whether the emphasis will continue to rest upon individual rights and equality before the law, as is currently the case.

If one could judge the actual situation of the Bulgarian Turks solely from their rights as stated by the Constitution, one would infer that during the period 1947-1971 they enjoyed rights in the sphere of culture, such as studying Turkish and practising Islam. Some Bulgarian scholars argue that this was indeed the case until 1958, when a special plenum of the communist party Politbureau decided to introduce changes to the authority's policies towards the Turks. Thus, until 1958, the Turkish population was able to attend Turkish-language schools and publish periodicals in Turkish.¹ The fact that substantial cultural freedom was established during this period can be inferred by the strong presence of the Turkish language in both education and the media. Hundreds of Turkish-language primary schools operated, several Turkish high schools, three institutes for teacher training, three newspapers and one journal were published in Turkish; local newspapers had Turkish language supplements. In some urban areas plays were staged in Turkish and the state radio broadcast in Turkish on a regular basis. (Zhelyazkova 1997) By way of contrast, a Turkish scholar (Lutem 2000: 4) stated that by 1994 all Turkish newspapers had been closed, and the government insisted that Turkish schools teach the language using Arabic characters even though the Turkey had accepted the Latin alphabet in 1929. However, he admits that once the Communist government had consolidated their power, 'Turkish newspapers were allowed to be published again on the condition that they support government policies.' (Lütem 1999: 4) Since this was the case with all publications at the time, it is fair to say this was not tantamount to discrimination on the basis of ethnicity. In addition, these facts appear to reflect a rather tolerant policy when compared with the Communist regime's measures against other traditional communities: the Catholics and the Protestants during the same period. 'During the first years of communism they suffered severe persecutions when most of their clergy were subsequently executed after show-trials and were forced to lead an almost symbolic existence.' (Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2000)

Considering the situation of the Bulgarian Turks in the period 1946-1958, one should keep in mind the fact that the country was undergoing profound socio-economic changes as a result of the arrival of communist rule in 1944-1946. Although the Turkish community could still express its ethnic identity through the media and Turkish language education was a fact, it suffered from the same economic policies of the communist regime as the Bulgarian majority. Forced collectivisation of the land and nationalisation were the measures resented the most by Turks and Bulgarians alike. The centrality of the land in the life of the Balkan peasant is a factor generally recognised by both historians and anthropologists. The majority of the Turkish population consisted of farmers; and the expropriation of the land in 1949 was felt as a severe shock. The collectivisation of land became the reason for the first mass exodus of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria to Turkey in the post-war era.² In 1946 the Turkish population numbered 675,500 out of a total population of 7,029,349. (Pundeff

¹ See Zhelyazkova (1997: 20, Krazstev (1997: 2), Lutem (1999: 5)

² Zhelyazkova (1997: 1) provides statistics as to the migration of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria to Turkey from the independence of Bulgaria in 1878 to 1944 as follows: between 1878 and 1912 350 000 Muslims; 1913 - 1934 10-12 000 annually; 1940 -1944 15 000

1992) In the period 1950-1951, 154,397 individuals migrated to Turkey. They settled primarily in the Marmara and the Aegean Sea region, setting a pattern for subsequent waves of emigration.

Total Number of Immigrants: 1950 -1988		
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Regions: Sea of Marmara and the Aegean	Families	Persons
Bursa	11 828	46 301
Istanbul	13 712	46 152
Izmir	4 874	20 262
Tekirdag	3 852	14 957
Eski Sehir	3 512	14 075
Kirkalери	2 713	11 266
Manisa	2 488	10 241
Ankara	2 713	11 266
Kocaeli	1 694	7 114
Total	49 733	190 285
Other Regions	20 048	80 633
Total	60 781	270 918

Source: Dimitrova (1997)

<i>Total Number of Immigrants : 1950 – 1951</i>	<i>Total Number of Immigrants : 1952 – 1988</i>
154 397	116 521

Source: Dimitrova (1997)

Throughout the Cold War period the situation of the Bulgarian Turks was exacerbated by the fact that Bulgaria and Turkey belonged to the two opposing blocs – Bulgaria behaving as the most loyal satellite of the Soviet Union. This arrangement had one positive aspect: rendering an open clash between the two countries over minorities issues impossible. There were also several major negative consequences for the Turkish population: Bulgaria was increasingly apprehensive about the possibility of the minority's subversive links to an 'enemy' NATO member state; and dialogue aimed at achieving a compromise on minority issues was infeasible given the mutual suspicions about one another's 'real intentions' with the iron curtain between them. Of course, in this international context, any form of condemnation on the part of Turkey or the international community for the policies of the Bulgarian government would also have been futile.

Thus, in December 1947, Dimitrov warned the Bulgarian Turks not to act as agents of the enemies of Bulgaria (the NATO member countries). Furthermore, a Bulgarian government note dated 10 March 1951 accused Turkey of instigating the Turkish minority to revolt, while also accusing them of not issuing enough visas. The note stated that the Bulgarian government was ready to give passports to 250 000 people and asked Turkey not to obstruct their immigration. (Lütem 1999: 5) Turkey rejected the proposal but did increase the number of visas issued, which made the wave of emigration in 1950-1951 possible. The part of the Turkish community that was least happy with the collectivisation of land had



a chance to find a way out of the situation. In less than 2 years more people managed to emigrate than in the following 36 years.

The 1950-1951 events reflected the chaotic and inconsistent policy of the Bulgarian communist authorities regarding the Turkish minority. At first, the government acknowledged Bulgaria's desire to allow the emigration of Bulgarian Turks. Then it twice attempted to send gypsies instead of Turks; Turkey responded by stopping the immigration. Finally, contrary to its own stated goals, the Bulgarian government stopped the emigration flow it had previously asked Turkey not to obstruct.

Since at the time the Bulgarian government was accountable only to its Soviet counterpart, the explanations of its policies by various scholars often hint at a Soviet design for Turkey carried out through Bulgaria. Zhelyazkova (1997: 2) provides the explanation that Bulgaria attempted to export the communist ideology to Turkey through the emigrants. Lutem (1999: 5) indicates that the explanation of the Bulgarian government's policy during 1950-1951 could be that Bulgaria was acting on behalf of the Soviets who wished to punish Turkey for its participation in the Korean War. Both theories appear improbable in the light of the fact that the Bulgarian government halted the emigration unilaterally in 1951, thus abating possible 'punishment' or 'ideology export'. It is possible that the government simply acted alone, aiming to reduce opposition to its unpopular policies, or divert attention from the much-resented economic measures to a possible 'Turkish threat'. This scheme was to appear again at a later stage when it would become clear that the economic policy of the regime was clearly failing.

Whatever the motive behind this policy of the Bulgarian government, one of its logical consequences was that in the following twelve years (1951-1963), Bulgarian-Turkish relations reached their lowest point. The emigration of the Bulgarian Turks was forbidden, and at the same time, the Bulgarian government's policies concerning minorities underwent a change. In 1958, a special plenum of the Politbureau marked the beginning of more restrictive policies concerning the minorities' cultural rights. At first, this change in policies affected the Roma, whose bilingual newspapers began to be published in Bulgarian and the names of the Muslim Roma were changed to Bulgarian names. At the same time, the Turkish-language press was still being published in the early 1950s. In addition, party nomenklatura were recruited from the ranks of the Turks and Pomaks (Muslim Bulgarians). In the 1950s, thousands of Turks became members of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) and tens of thousands held public office and top managerial positions. (Zhelyazkova 1997: 3) Lutem (1999: 5) provides a criticism to the effect that few Turks were elected to the Central Committee and Parliament, and none were members of the Politbureau, ministers or generals.

In the early 1960s a drastic change in both the ideology and the policy regarding the Turks and the Muslim Bulgarians took place. The BCP passed resolutions to accelerate 'integration' of Muslims into Bulgarian society. Gradually, Turkish primary and the secondary schools were closed down, all newspapers were published in Bulgarian, and the curtains closed on Turkish theatres. In 1964, an effort was made to change the name of the ethnic Bulgarian Muslims from the Western Rhodopes region. This attempt was ended by the Central Committee of the BCP due to the strong resistance from the population. (Zhelyazkova 1997: 4) The number of imams (prayer leaders and authorities in Islamic law) dropped from 2,715 in 1956 to 570 in 1982 and 400 in 1987. (Pundeff 1992: 107) In

1962-1963, the Turkish missions in Bulgaria received more than 380,000 petitions from Turks requesting emigration. (Lütem 1999: 5)

Bulgarian – Turkish Relations, 1968 – 1984

In 1968, Bulgaria and Turkey again concluded an agreement on emigration of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria. The rationale of the Bulgarian government for concluding this agreement after a ban on emigration for 17 years has given rise to various explanations and hypotheses. Lütem (1999: 5) argues that, for economic reasons, neither country wanted emigration: Turkey refused to accept that Bulgaria needed the cheap labour of the Turkish minority (especially since Bulgarian labour was just as cheap at the time). He offers the explanation that in Turkey public opinion favoured emigration and Turkish diplomacy tried to negotiate an agreement. Since at the time (1968) Turkish-Soviet relations had been improving, the Soviet Union had forced Bulgaria into the agreement. By contrast, some Bulgarian authors (Pundeff 1992: 105, Zhelyazkova 1997: 3) imply that the agreement was in line with the policies of the Bulgarian Communist Party at the time, aiming at creating an ethnically homogeneous Bulgarian nation. Indeed, it appears rather logical that a government pursuing gradual cultural assimilation would prefer to weaken a potential centre of opposition. This is especially understandable in the light of the name-changing campaigns that were about to take place later on during the 1970s and the 1980s. In addition, the BCP Central Committee's propaganda at the time presented the Turks as an alien element and as 'the fifth column' of Turkey in the territory of Bulgaria.

Nevertheless, after signing the 1968 emigration agreement, relations between the two states improved considerably. A number of agreements on transportation, trade, tourism etc. were signed after 1968. The fact that Bulgaria never took sides openly with Greece on the Cyprus issue was appreciated in Turkey. Between 1968 and 1984 there were twenty-two high-level visits between the two (Lütem 1999: 5).

The Situation of Bulgarian Turks, 1968-1984

The 'warming' in Bulgarian-Turkish relations in 1968-1984 coincided with a period in which the rights of the Bulgarian Muslims were restricted. The Zhivkov Constitution adopted in 1971 dropped all references to minorities. In 1974, Turkish-language lessons became optional and the students were 'discouraged' from attending. (Lütem 1999: 5) In the early 1970s³ the authorities launched an action for changing the Turkish-Arabic names of the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims to Bulgarian equivalents. Unlike the subsequent renaming of the Bulgarian Turks that was about to follow in 1980s, this campaign produced no policy response from Turkey.

By contrast, the name-changing campaign of 1984-1985, this time affecting the Bulgarian Turks, drew the attention of both the Turkish and the international press. The formal procedure consisted of requiring people to fill out an application for changing their own names. State 'incentives' included measures ranging from economic sanctions to overt violence. Thousands of people who resisted were sent to prison or labour camps. This 'program', carried out in secrecy was completed in several months. Consequently, it was forbidden to employ traditional Turkish or Muslim dress and rituals, and even Turkish folk music, were banned. This policy went as far as destroying Muslim graveyards and changing

³ There is discrepancy as to when exactly the campaign took place: 1972-1973 according to Zhelyazkova (1997: 3) and 1971-1972 according to Lütem (1999: 6).



the names of dead people in the municipal registries. (Zhelyazkova 1997: 4) The state succeeded in curbing all resistance very quickly, as nobody was allowed to visit banks, hospitals etc. without an identity card bearing a Bulgarian name. (Lütem 1999: 6)

The propaganda accompanying the campaign aimed to portray Turkey as an imminent threat to the territorial integrity of the Bulgarian state. The terminology used by the press while describing the Turkish minority included terms such as 'the fifth column of an enemy state', 'terrorists', 'separatists'. Distrust and fear from Turkey and its 'aggressive plans' were instilled. (Zhelyazkova 1997: 4)

Bulgarian – Turkish Relations, 1984 – 1989

Naturally, Bulgarian-Turkish relations deteriorated sharply as a result of the campaign. In the early 1980s, bilateral relations had reached their highest point with the visit of General Evren to Bulgaria in 1981 and the visit of President Zhivkov to Turkey in 1983. In 1984, a sharp downturn in bilateral relations followed logically as a result of the treatment of the Bulgarian Turks. As a result of pressure from the opposition parties and the press, the Turkish government proposed on February 22 a new emigration agreement with Bulgaria. Bulgaria (and the Soviet Union) considered the question an internal affair and had no intention of signing an emigration agreement at this point. Turkey responded by restricting bilateral relations in the fields of trade, electricity imports from Bulgaria, culture, sports etc. Moreover, Turkey brought the issue to various international forums such as the Council of Europe, the NATO Assembly, the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), and UNESCO.

On the international scene, the US and the UK supported Turkey's claims. Germany, France, Italy and other EC members recommended that handling the matter in the CSCE, rather than bilaterally with Bulgaria. Greece was the only EC member-state that openly supported Bulgaria. Consequently, Greek-Bulgarian relations improved to such an extent that in September 1986 the two countries signed a declaration of friendship, good-neighbourly relations and co-operation, including provision for bilateral consultations should a threat to the security of either party arise. In Turkey some argued that this was not compatible with the obligations of Greece as a NATO member (Lütem 1999: 7).

Despite the international condemnation of the policies concerning the Bulgarian Turks, the Bulgarian government pursued its chosen course. This was made possible by the position of the Soviet Union, considering the minority problem as an internal affair of the Bulgarian state. Thus, internal factors rather than international involvement brought about the next development in the situation of the Turkish minority. In the spring and summer of 1989, some Bulgarian Turks engaged in protest actions demanding the recovery of their names. A clash in the village of Todor Ikonomovo resulted in seven deaths after the police had fired at villagers (Lütem 1999: 8). On May 27 the Bulgarian Head of State Todor Zhivkov had promised all its citizens worldwide valid tourist passports and asked Turkey to open its borders (Dimitrova 1997: 2). This 'request' was strange in the light of the fact that it was the Bulgarian government that had refused to sign an emigration agreement with Turkey. The Turkish Prime Minister Ozal replied that the Turkish borders were open and had never been closed (Lütem 1999: 9). This statement also proved to be somewhat far-fetched, as Turkey would close its borders three months after attempting to stop the tide of refugees. As a result of this new policy direction by Bulgaria from 3 June through to 21 August 1989

(when Turkey sealed its frontier), 311,862 ethnic Turks managed to leave. (Dimitrova 1997: 2)

It was during this massive exodus that the Bulgarian Head of State Zhivkov met Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev's views concerning the Turkish minority in Bulgaria as expressed at this meeting indicate the attitude of the Soviet Union throughout the 1980s. Gorbachev's inclination to view the matter as an internal affair of Bulgaria's substantially aided the government in maintaining its policies, despite the international community's criticisms. Zhivkov's views expressed during the meeting shed light on the Bulgarian government's rationale behind these policies.

Com. Zhivkov informed [Gorbachev] about the Bulgarian restructuring process. He pointed out the attendant economic difficulties and the 'Moslem' problem. He stated that the number of the 'Moslems' has been increasing at the rate of 15-16 000 per year and that in 20 years Bulgaria would resemble Cyprus. He confirmed that the country was interested in the expatriation of 200, 300 and even 500,000 Moslems but at the same time said that this was impossible because Turkey has not been able to receive them. He also explicitly pointed out that in no case could or should Bulgaria admit that the Moslems are of Turkish nationality...

[...]

Com. Gorbachev repeatedly stressed the firm position of the Soviet leadership that the responsibility for the situation in each country is its own problem.

[...]

Com. Zhivkov drew attention to the setback in Bulgarian - Turkish relations due to Turkish interference in the internal affairs of Bulgaria. Com. Gorbachev informed [Zhivkov] that two days ago the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara had submitted to him a special message from Turgut Ozal asking for assistance in initiating negotiations between Bulgaria and Turkey. Ozal had said that Turkey was able to receive no more than 30,000 people per year. ...[Zhivkov] said that he had asked the Bulgarian ambassador in Moscow to meet his Turkish colleague and tell him that a third country, the USA, had interest in such a development of Bulgarian - Turkish relations...Both leaders agreed that the announcement of their conversation should not mention their discussion of the Turkish problem.

[...]

Source: Bulgarian Central State Archives, Fond 1b, Opis 35, a.e. 133 - 189, pp 1-21, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/2/890623.htm>

The Soviet attitude has led some scholars to draw such conclusions as: 'According to Benningsen, the forced change of names imposed on ethnic Turks in Bulgaria might be the experimental prelude to a similar policy contemplated by the USSR for the Muslims living there.' (Karpas 1990: 10 quoted in Krazstev 1997: 3) Whatever the actual motivation for the position of the Soviet government, the Soviet policy at the time was indeed crucial for it did enable the Bulgarian government to impose its 'solution' of the Turkish 'problem'.

It is interesting to note that the Zhivkov's position, elucidated in his statement concerning a possible replication of the Cyprus issue in Bulgaria, was to influence events in the Bulgarian Parliament, even after the fall of his regime. Arguments



against the Cyprus situation in Bulgaria appeared in the Grand National Assembly, and largely shaped the Bulgarian Constitution of 1991 that is still in force.

The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria in the Post-Cold War Era

After the ousting of Zhivkov on 10 November 1989, the former foreign minister Petur Mladenov replaced him as leader. Several weeks in advance, on 24 October, Mladenov publicly renounced Zhivkov's policies in his resignation letter addressed to Zhivkov, the Politbureau and the Central Committee. The letter stated, among other things that Zhivkov 'has led the country to a profound economic, financial and political crisis' and had 'succeeded in isolating Bulgaria from the rest of the world.'⁴ As a foreign minister since 1971, Mladenov had to confront the criticism of the international community concerning the treatment of the Turkish minority and was aware of the detrimental effect the treatment of the Bulgarian Turks had caused to the image of the country.

Reinstating the rights of the Turks and the Pomaks were among the first democratic acts after the fall of the communist regime. Mladenov replaced Zhivkov as head of state, and on 29 December 1989 the government recommended that the Turks be given the right to choose their own names, practice Islam and use their language in public (Koinova 1999: 13).

The new Constitution, adopted in July 1991 by the Grand National Assembly (GNA), reflected marked concern for the preservation of national unity. The document states that Bulgaria is 'an integral state', its 'territorial integrity is inviolable' and that no 'autonomous territorial formations' may exist. During the debates, the example of Cyprus was frequently cited to emphasise the possible danger of separation along ethnic lines. Thus these provisions reflected a fear of potential separatism among the country's ethnic Turks (Bell 1997: 373). Since the name-changing campaign and the related propaganda was not very far behind, one could not fail to notice that the ideas of Zhivkov regarding the Turkish question (as expressed during his 1989 meeting with Gorbachev) were shared by an influential section of the political elite in the Grand National Assembly. In the GNA, the Socialists (the recently renamed Communist Party) had a majority (211 out of 400 seats), sufficient to formulate the necessary legislative provisions and have them passed without consideration of the opinion of the opposition, which tried in vain to block the passing of the Constitution in this form. The Constitution also bans political parties founded on an 'ethnic, racial or religious' base.

In reality, however, the treatment of the Turkish community in Bulgaria has improved steadily over the decade after the fall of the totalitarian regime. The latest (2000-2001) human rights reports on Bulgaria prepared by international organisations such as Human Rights Watch and the US Department of State, either do not mention the Bulgarian Turks at all, or point to the situation of the Bulgarian Turks as an example of successful integration.⁵

⁴ Excerpt from Mladenov's letter of resignation quoted in Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan, 1997, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*, 338

⁵ See: US Department of State. 'Bulgaria: Country Report on Human Rights Practices—2000', 15 March 2001 archived at <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eur/index.cfm?docid=705>; Human Rights Watch. World Report 2001 Bulgaria Human Rights Developments, 17 March 2001 archived at <http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/europe/bulgaria.html>

In addition, the above-mentioned provisions of the Constitutions are subject to different interpretations. Some authors say they are restrictive, others point out that the situation *de facto* concerning the rights of the Turkish minority has improved a great deal and the current Constitutional framework is suitable within the Bulgarian context.

Thus, for instance, the 2000 Bulgarian Helsinki Committee report on the implementation of the framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities states that a dispute continues on whether the Convention is applicable to the situation in Bulgaria; provided the Constitution does not use the term 'national minority'. The report indicates, however, that there seems to be an agreement (although not explicitly stated) that the provisions of the Convention will be applied to Bulgarian citizens 'whose mother tongue is not Bulgarian', a definition present in the Constitution, Art. 36 (2) (Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2000: 7-8).

By contrast, Karasimeonov (1999: 1) argues that the Bulgarian domestic legal framework has been able to establish an optimal balance between minority and national interests in a situation of a radical social transition conducted under extremely difficult economic, political and international conditions. The report of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee acknowledged the fact that the minorities in Bulgaria are protected directly by the international instruments concerning them, as the Constitution (Art. 5 Para 4) establishes the precedence of international law over Bulgarian national law. Bulgaria is a party to every important international instrument with a bearing on the regulation of the rights of minorities.⁶

What appeared to be a major concern of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee Report – the fact that the Constitution does not use the term 'national minority' – is explained by Karasimeonov as a logical consequence of the fact that Bulgaria is a unitary state. The Bulgarian Constitution follows the doctrine of the so-called 'one nation-state', recognised by all Bulgarian parties, including the representatives of the Bulgarian Turks. The concept of 'national minority' could not be established in Bulgarian law for two main reasons: first, it does not conform to the principle of unity of the Bulgarian nation enshrined in the Constitution. Secondly, the application of this concept could give rise to misunderstandings, because it is not defined exactly in international law. Not one of the many scientific definitions that exist is universally recognised in international law. The Bulgarian Constitution excludes granting collective political rights to the different religious and ethnic groups. The rights of the minority representatives are protected through the provisions guaranteeing protection of their individual human rights. This option was selected, since the Bulgarian state has the sovereign right to substantiate the extent to which human rights are granted by international law in accordance with the specific Bulgarian conditions and geo-political situation (Karasimeonov 1999: 1-4).

Religious and ethnic groups reported to be suffering discrimination in reports by the US Department of State and Human Rights Watch include the Roma and some non-traditional religious communities such as Jehovah's Witnesses. The general human rights situation is burdened by the economic problems associated

⁶ These include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education of 1960, the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ratified by Bulgaria in 1999 (Karasimeonov 1999)



with the transition. Antiquated procedures, low salaries and corruption obstruct the work of the judiciary. The US State Department 1999 Report noted that the Observation Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recommended its own dissolution in December 1998 when it announced that Bulgaria had made sufficient progress in the fields of democracy and human rights to no longer require monitoring (US Department of State 2000). The US State Department 2000 Report notes that although the Constitution forbids the formation of political parties along religious, ethnic or racial lines, the mainly ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) is represented in Parliament; and the other major parties generally accept its right to participate in the political process. By way of contrast, on 29 February 2000, the Constitutional Court ruled that the United Macedonian Organisation (OMO) political party is unconstitutional on the grounds that it promotes separatism.⁷ In terms of religious freedom, the same report notes that the Muslim religious community is among those perceived as holding a historic place in society and benefiting from a high degree of government and public tolerance. Furthermore, no religious group was discriminated against in the granting of restitution of properties nationalised during the Communist regime. Bulgarian Muslims are said to have complained that the procedure for restoring their original names was excessively burdensome. Some ethnic Turkish politicians have claimed that ethnic Turks are underrepresented in appointed positions in the state, police agencies and the military.

In 1992-1996, both the Union of Democratic Forces and the Bulgarian Socialist Party had replaced leading figures from both the Orthodox Christian and the Muslim faiths. There were attempts to substitute the leadership of both denominations with priests supported by one or another government. These attempts resulted in divisions of both religious communities into factions supporting one or another religious leader. The split within Islam was overcome in October 1997 conference when the overwhelming majority of Muslims elected a new leadership, recognised by the government. The split in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church has not yet been resolved, leading to a very strange situation: currently the Bulgarian Orthodox Church has two legitimate leaderships (synods) and two patriarchs (Bulgaria Helsinki Committee 2000).

In terms of education, Bulgarian Turks are provided the opportunity to study their mother tongue and religion in public schools. The US State Department 2000 Report notes that voluntary Turkish language classes continue, funded by the government. The Ministry of education estimates that 40,000 children currently study Turkish in Bulgaria. In addition, a school for imams, a Muslim cultural centre, university-level theological facilities and religious primary schools operate freely. Classes on Islam in regions with a significant Muslim minority were scheduled to begin in 80 schools from January 2001.

For the benefit of the Turkish minority, Bulgarian National Television launched Turkish language newscasts for the first time on 2 Oct. 2000. The local Bulgarian National Radio network broadcast Turkish language programs in those regions with an ethnic Turkish population (US Department of State 2000). A recent (February 2001) Los Angeles Times article has concluded that Bulgaria exhibits 'one of the past decade's greatest successes of ethnic relations in the troubled Balkans' (David 2001). Perhaps the current situation of the Bulgarian Turks is

⁷ According to the court rulings its leaders have advocated the secession of the Pirin Macedonia region of SW Bulgaria and its annexation by FYROM (US Department of State 2000).

best described by the chief mufti (the highest Muslim religious leader) of Bulgaria, Mr Selim Mumun Mehmet: 'Bulgaria is going in the right direction and we are very happy with that.' (Mehmed qtd in David 2001)

Bulgaria's success in maintaining peaceful ethnic relations could be explained by a number of factors. One of the most important factors would be the fact that the Turkish ethnic group has been represented in Parliament since the first elections (that took place in 1990) after the fall of the Communist regime. Initially there have been several unsuccessful attempts on the part of the Socialist (former Communist) party to challenge the Muslim-based Movement for rights and Freedoms (MRF) before the court. In the period 1990 – 1996 the Socialists once approached the Constitutional Court with questions about the MRF's legitimacy and twice made petitions demanding the same (Zhelyazkova 1997: 5). However, the choice of proportional representation created a situation in which the MRF provided the swing vote in the first elections (1990 – 1994). Hence, both major parties, the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the Union of Democratic Forces, had followed policies designed to make them a plausible coalition partner of the MRF.

MRF's Participation in the Elections 1990-2000:

1990: 6.02% of the vote; 23 seats in Parliament (GNA) out of 400
 1991: 7.55% of the vote; 24 seats in Parliament out of 240
 1994: 5.44% of the vote; 15 seats
 1997: 7.6 % of the vote; 19 seats (In the 1997 elections the MRF participated through a coalition called Alliance for National Salvation.)

Distribution of seats in Parliament in the elections 1990 - 1994

1990: BSP 211, UDF 144 seats, BANU 16 seats, MRF 23 seats
 1991: BSP 106, UDF 110, MRF 24
 1994: BSP 125, UDF 69, People's Union 18, MRF 15, Bulgarian Business Bloc 13

There are several reasons to question whether the MRF truly represents the interests of the Bulgarian Turks. Throughout the 1990s, it formed a coalition with BSP; and during the elections of June 2001, the MRF once again allied itself to the BSP. This choice for a coalition partner is strange for a number of reasons: first, BSP representatives attempted to challenge the legitimacy of MRF before the court. Second, one of the most often-stated reasons for emigration of the Bulgarian Turks in the early 1990s was their fear that the Socialist Party would win the elections in Bulgaria. (Gheorgieva 1997). The release in January 2001 of a documentary on the assimilation of ethnic Turks during the communist regime, the leader of the MRF – the party claiming to represent the Bulgarian Turks – criticised the film, saying that the documentary was an attempt to undermine relations between his party and the former communists in the renamed Socialist Party (RFE/RL 2001). In addition, after the confidential files were opened in 1997, it became clear that a number of the leaders of the MRF, including its chairman Akhmet Dogan, were agents of the former secret police (Atanassova 1999).



Nevertheless, the MRF did play a crucial role in the process of improving ethnic relations in Bulgaria. It provided the Bulgarian Turks with a chance of participating in decision-making, and it facilitated confidence building between ethnic Turks and ethnic Bulgarians in that it never called for territorial autonomy.

To sum up, the Turkish ethnic group in Bulgaria currently enjoys extensive rights in terms of education, practising Islam and participation in decision-making. Ironically, the improvement in the treatment of the Bulgarian Turks has coincided with a deterioration of the economic situation in Bulgaria. The current economic conditions stand as a major incentive for them to leave to Turkey. Thus, from June 1989 till the beginning of 1997 some 400-450 individuals had settled in Turkey (Dimitrova 1997: 2). It is interesting to note that many young people planned to settle in Western Europe instead. Some of them had new passports issued; re-adopted Bulgarian names and contacted the Bulgarian-based labour recruitment agencies for Western Europe (Gheorgieva 1997: 5). In any event, there is currently a sizeable community of Bulgarian Turks living in Turkey who have retained specific cultural features inherited from their unique background of Bulgarian local customs, communism/post communism and Islam.

The Bulgarian Turkish Immigrants in the Republic of Turkey

The most important reason for emigration after 1989 was the difference between the living standards in Bulgaria and Turkey. The main reason people decided to emigrate was to ensure a better standard of living in a country where the economic conditions were better. The Turkish government provided accommodation for the 1989 refugees who did not have relatives in Turkey by building ten camps for the purpose. The state provided some assistance in finding employment. The official state policy of providing accommodation, food etc. and the attitude of the Turkish people, differed: ordinary Turks tended to give the Bulgarian immigrants a cold reception. In the words of some of the immigrants from Bulgaria:

They had believed us to be inferior...They did not accept us as equals, even those who had emigrated in 1978 did not treat us as equals...They called us 'giavurlar', 'bulgarlar' (infidels, Bulgarians); we've heard enough names (Dimitrova 1997: 6).

Approximately 150,000 emigrants returned to Bulgaria after having left in 1989, feeling despondent after facing unemployment and a lack of opportunities. However, many of them managed improve their chances of by working hard and living frugally. An interesting feature that recurs often among the emigrants from Bulgaria is that they are willing to live in constant deprivation in order to save money for a house of their own. This reflects to a large extent a typical Bulgarian peculiarity: owning a house is considered an essential achievement and a basis for success. This is something that is in contrast to the Western emphasis on mobility, and produced what Dimitrova labelled a 'construction offensive' of the Bulgarian emigrants in Turkey. Another specific element 'imported' from Bulgaria is that in 'Bulgarian-Turkish' neighbourhoods women often wore miniskirts, and boys and girls wore shorts – far from the characteristic 'dress code' in most of the country. Young people adapt with difficulty to Islamic gender relations: student dormitories are separated, for example; and it would be regarded as immoral were a woman have coffee with a male colleague. Contact between emigrants and their colleagues/classmates are characterised by aloofness and restraint. Most emigrant marriages are consequently contracted within the émigré community. After 1994, the individuals who came as part of the wave of

emigration in 1989 were granted dual citizenship. Hence, many children and retired people prefer to spend the summer in Bulgaria. Some prefer to come back to pursue their higher education or perform military service in Bulgaria, particularly since there is a general fear of doing military service in Kurd-inhabited regions. The two states have an agreement concerning the mutual recognition of one another's military service (Dimitrova 1997: 10-17).

Despite problems of adaptation, the Bulgarian Turks have continued to emigrate on a massive scale ever since the end of the Cold War. Fieldwork and surveys indicate that for most of these people emigration is the only way out of the economic difficulties in Bulgaria. Between 1994 and 1997, 200,000 ethnic Turks from Bulgaria settled in Turkey. It is worth noting that the number of people trying to escape from collectivisation in 1950-1951 was smaller – at around 150,000. Seasonal economic emigration has even provided an outlet for obtaining some additional resources. Emigration after the mid-1990s continued to flourish but became, for all intents and purposes, illegal. Many young people had decided that no barriers on the part of either the Bulgarian or the Turkish government could prevent them from leaving. On the other hand, many people in Turkey want their children to be educated in Bulgaria, since they deem the state education in Bulgaria to be better, and they could not afford private universities (Gheorgieva 1997: 7). It is interesting to note that the emigrants in Turkey do not hate Bulgarians in general as a result of the name-changing campaign; they blame the communist regime alone. Furthermore, a number of people interviewed by Bulgarian scholars express their pity for the economic hardships the Bulgarian people currently endure: 'We have already managed; may you, poor things, soon be all right too' (Zhelyazkova 1997: 7).

In any event, hundreds of thousands of Bulgarian Turkish immigrants to Turkey continue to rely on Bulgaria for practical reasons, such as education and military service, or because of the emotional attachment to the homeland. The developments in the Bulgarian-Turkish relations are of importance for these people who, at least for the time being, constitute a distinct community in their new home country.

Bulgarian-Turkish Relations in the Post-Cold War Era

Restoring the rights of the Bulgarian Turks and improving their treatment after the fall of the communist regime removed a major impediment to the development of Bulgarian-Turkish relations. However, the legacy of uncertainty and fear accumulated through the Cold War still posed a challenge in the beginning. The first measures aimed at enhancing mutual trust and co-operation included downscaling the military activity on both sides of the common border, and two agreements were signed to this effect: the Sofia Document in 1991 and the Edirne document in 1992 (Atanassova 1999). A Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourly Relations, Co-operation and Security was signed on May 6, 1992 (Atanassova 2000). A series of high-level visits followed: President of the Turkish Republic Turgut Ozal visited Bulgaria in 1993, and Bulgarian president Zhelev visited Turkey in 1994. President Demirel returned the visit in 1995. In 1997 the newly elected president Peter Stoyanov delivered a speech to the Turkish National Assembly asking for forgiveness for what had been done to the Turkish minority in his country (Lutem 1999: 11). A question concerning the delimitation of part of the border between Bulgaria and Turkey and the territorial waters in the Black Sea was resolved after forty years of negotiations, through an agreement signed in December 1997. During a visit by Bulgarian premier Kostov in Turkey in 1998, the two countries signed an agreement about the retirement benefits due from



the Bulgarian government to the Bulgarian citizens now permanently residing in Turkey. The agreement affects 40,000-50,000 Bulgarian Turks who emigrated after May 1989. On a number of occasions, Turkish officials have emphasised Turkey's support for Bulgaria's accession to NATO. At a press conference during a visit to Bulgaria in March 1999, President Demirel stated, 'NATO without Bulgaria and Romania is unthinkable' (Atanassova 1999).

In the light of these facts, one might easily conclude that Bulgarian-Turkish relations are currently excellent. Initially, after the end of the Cold War, some scholars in Athens expressed their concern that Turkey was trying to create a 'Muslim arc' on Greece's northern border (Larabee 2000). By contrast, Larabee (2000: 18) claims that Turkey has not tried to 'play the Muslim card'. On the contrary, it has demonstrated its credentials as a good NATO ally. It has participated in IFOR and SFOR and had supported increased political autonomy for Kosovo – though not for its independence – partly out of fear for setting a precedent regarding the Kurdish issue.

With no territorial disputes or claims for further improvement of minority treatment, the problems that need to be addressed through bilateral co-operation concern the economic development of the regions in Bulgaria where Bulgarian Turks are concentrated. Currently, joint projects designed to enhance the economic development in these regions focus on infrastructure and energy production. Turkey participates in financing large infrastructure projects (such as the EU-sponsored pan-European transport corridors number four, eight and ten). The two countries have already agreed that the gas pipelines from Russia for Turkey and from Turkmenia via Turkey to Europe will pass through Bulgarian territory (Atanassova 1999). A joint project expected to provide employment in the Kurdjali region, densely populated with ethnic Turks, is the hydroelectric plant 'Gorna Arda'. Bulgaria is a major exporter of electricity to Turkey (3,000 million kWh for the year 2000, and expected to have reached 4,000 million kWh in 2001). The project was formally launched in October 1999, but implementation stalled, as negotiations continued well into 2000. Deputy Prime Minister Yulmaz concluded in August 2000: 'There is a certain delay and stagnation in the realisation of bilateral projects' (Council of Ministers, Republic of Bulgaria 2000). Indeed, the major challenge facing the two countries is to enhance economic co-operation. A free trade agreement that entered into force on January 1, 1999, marked one more step in the right direction (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey 1999).

It is interesting to note that the major issues in Bulgarian-Turkish relations in the beginning of the post Cold War era differ considerably from the major issues confronting the countries now, a decade after the change of regime in Bulgaria. Initially, the main impediment to the development of bilateral relations was the mutual mistrust and fear on the part of Bulgaria concerning the military strength of Turkey, as well as possible interference in the internal affairs of Bulgaria. Now the situation appears to have reversed. Turkey is one of Bulgaria's major trading partners. Exports to Turkey accounted for nearly 4% of Bulgaria's GDP in 2000 – a significant amount by any standard (European Commission 2001). Thus, negative developments in the Turkish economy are bound to have serious consequences for the Bulgarian economy. If there were any 'Turkish threat' at present, it would be falling demand for Bulgarian exports.

Conclusion

In the first decade after WW II, Bulgarian Turks still enjoyed a number of rights in terms of expressing their cultural identity. The Turkish language was present in both public educational establishments and the local media. Although the Turkish community could, for the time being, express its ethnic identity freely, it was adversely affected by the forced collectivisation of land that followed the change of regime. A number of individuals from some rural areas (nearly 150,000) decided to migrate to Turkey as a direct consequence of the expropriation of land.

The 'Turkish question' policy of the Bulgarian government throughout the Cold War period was highly inconsistent and chaotic. In 1950, the Bulgarian government accused Turkey of encouraging Bulgarian Turks to emigrate and, at the same time, not issuing enough visas. When Turkey did increase the number of visas issued – resulting in the emigration of the above-mentioned 150,000 people – the Bulgarian government halted the emigration unilaterally. In the same fashion it declined a Turkish proposal for negotiating an emigration agreement in 1984, while at the same time conducting an assimilation program in the form of a name-changing campaign that brought international condemnation. Since the late 1960s, the human rights situation in the country deteriorated, until the fall of the communist regime in 1989.

After the change of regime in 1989, ethnic relations in Bulgaria improved considerably. The rights of the Turkish community were reinstated and a Muslim-based party has been participating in decision-making ever since the first free elections were held. However, the emigration of Bulgarian Turks to Turkey has continued. This time it is the low standard of living in Bulgaria that motivates the Bulgarian Turks to continue to migrate to Turkey. This comes as no surprise, as many young people of both Turkish and Bulgarian ethnic origin are currently likely to choose emigration as an alternative to the problems of high unemployment and unattractive remuneration in Bulgaria. Thus, ironically, the Cold War situation of poor human rights records and restrictions on emigration has been completely reversed for the time being in Bulgaria. At present, the country has considerably improved the treatment of Bulgarian Turks and could not stop them from emigrating: this time Turkey is trying to limit the inflow of economic immigrants.

Bulgarian-Turkish relations after WW II had largely reflected the changes in the treatment of the Turkish ethnic group. The period 1968-1984 is the only exception to that trend, as at the time a 'warming' in bilateral relations coincided with curbing the rights of the Bulgarian Muslims. In general, though, the treatment of the Bulgarian Turks has had a direct effect on the development of Bulgarian-Turkish relations. After the name-changing campaign of 1984-1985 conducted by the Bulgarian government, bilateral relations deteriorated substantially. Only after the change of regime in 1989 did the bilateral relations begin to improve. Currently, a decade after the fall of communism the Bulgarian-Turkish relations could be described as excellent. At present, the focus in bilateral talks has shifted from improving minority treatment to enhancing economic co-operation. Joint projects are underway aiming at increasing the economic development of the Bulgarian regions heavily populated with ethnic Turks.

The improvement in treatment of the Bulgarian Turks over the last decade has been impressive. Currently the treatment of the Bulgarian Turks includes measures Turkey would not be willing to grant to its minorities, although the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria form a significantly smaller minority than the ethnic



Kurds in Turkey. Some developments noted by the US Department of State 2000 report include the fact that Turkish-language classes funded by the government continued, and that on 2 October 2000 Bulgarian national television launched Turkish-language newscasts (US Department of State 2000). According to the 1992 census, there were 800,055 Turks out of a total population of 8,487,317; in other words less than 10% of the population (Koinova 1999). Indeed since 1992 emigration to Turkey has been considerable. By contrast, a Turkish MP and professor of constitutional law claims that 'the right to speak one's mother tongue and to write, publish or broadcast in that language may be exercised in the press or the media through books and periodicals and private radio and television stations' (Mumtaz 1999: 17), not the national media. The Kurdish ethnic group comprises one-sixth of the Turkish population. The improvements in the Bulgarian government's policy toward the Turkish community have been recognised in Turkey, as the Turkish head of government thanked the Bulgarian government for the good treatment of the Bulgarian Turks in 1999.

The issues that remain on the agenda in Bulgarian-Turkish relations involve primarily economic problems: alleviating the economic difficulties of the Turkish-inhabited regions in Bulgaria, facilitating trade and infrastructure projects. As we have noted in 2000, 4% of Bulgarian GDP comprised exports to Turkey. Currently there are no obstacles to maintaining good bilateral relations and enhanced economic co-operation. Turkish politicians have repeatedly demonstrated the necessary goodwill in this respect. A constructive, Western European type of vision for the development of bilateral relations was formulated by the Turkish Deputy PM in August 2000: 'We view Bulgaria not only as a neighbouring and friendly country. We view it as a future partner in NATO and we see us both as full EU members...We know that we have great potential for the promotion of the bilateral relations.' (Council of Ministers, Republic of Bulgaria 1999)

Lutem (1999) maintains that the future stumbling block to Turkish-Bulgarian relations could once again be the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, as discrimination still exists in practice. In the light of developments of the last decade, such a scenario appears highly unlikely. The Bulgarian Turks are well integrated into Bulgarian society and are granted more rights than Turkey would be willing to grant its minorities at present. At this point many Bulgarian Turks would like to have the opportunity to migrate to Turkey in search for a better standard of living, an opportunity only the Turkish state could offer. In addition, both countries would benefit substantially from maintaining good bilateral relations.

There is yet another factor that could affect the Bulgarian-Turkish relations: the overall direction of the foreign policy of Turkey as regards the Balkans – especially Greece. From 1945 to the present, the Cyprus question was brought up twice in Bulgarian politics. On the first occasion, the then head of state Zhivkov used it as a justification for the name-changing campaign directed at the Bulgarian Turks in 1984-1985. On the second, deputies in the 1991 Grand National Assembly used it as an argument for the specific formulation of some parts of the present Bulgarian Constitution. Thus, future developments in the Greek-Turkish relations are likely to affect the direction of Bulgarian-Turkish relations. At present, a more flexible position on the part of Greece toward Turkey's candidacy for the EU, and dialogue with Turkey, are causes for optimism.

At present, a number of prerequisites for maintaining the atmosphere of goodwill and co-operation in Bulgarian-Turkish relations are in place. The development of

bilateral relations between these two countries in the past decade has demonstrated that minority issues do not present an insurmountable barrier to good-neighbourly relations in the Balkans. This, in turn, provides evidence that a peaceful, Western European type of solution for minority issues is applicable in the region, provided moderation and tolerance on both sides.

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The Price of Free Lunches: Making the Frontier Latvian in the Interwar Years

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This article examines an important shift in state policy in Latvia in the 1920s, uncovers the workings of a secret, extra-legal government committee and outlines some fundamental assumptions of Latvian nationalists working within the central state before and after the authoritarian coup of 1934.

Throughout 1919 and 1920 the national ministries of the newly independent Latvia, particularly the Ministry of Interior and the Army identified the Socialist left as the primary threat to the new state's existence. The lessons of 1917 and the war for independence (fought first against Latvian Bolsheviks and then against German adventurists) seemed to be that the Soviet state with its share of Latvian leaders provided an alternate or 'revolutionary' state to the 'nationalising' state model of Latvian nationalists (Brubaker 1996: 47, 55-78). Latvia's Social Democratic Workers Party was suspect to the Latvian nationalists at the levers of the new state because it was unclear which vision it supported. During the first elections to parish and municipal councils, the Ministry of the Interior carefully tracked the election of 'untrustworthy' elements of the political left. Only after the military front moved eastward into territory that was the home to few Latvians did government suspicion fall on minority communities. The election of representatives from minority political parties to the Constituent Assembly and their demands for guaranteed minority rights (both within the Assembly and in the League of Nations) pushed the central state to re-prioritize potential enemies and threats.

The attention that bureaucrat-nationalists bestowed upon minorities corresponded to potential irredentist claims of potentially aggressive neighbors. When Poland invaded Vilnius, for example, the Ministry of the Interior cast a wary eye at the Poles of Southeastern Latvia. Difficult border negotiations with Estonia and Lithuania brought some state attention to Latvia's Estonian and Lithuanian communities respectively. The state also warily looked on Baltic German, Russian, Jewish, Belorussian, and Roma communities with some apprehension, although Jews and Roma did not have a titular state of their own.

Table 1: Latvia's Ethnic Composition by Province in 1920

	Latvian	Russian	Baltic German	Jewish	Belo-russian	Polish	Other
Vidzeme	81.97%	2.30%	5.97%	4.90%	0.53%	1.55%	2.78%
Kurzeme	83.04%	0.76%	5.90%	5.10%	0.25%	1.33%	3.62%
Zemgale	78.27%	4.75%	2.34%	2.62%	2.17%	5.06%	4.79%
Latgale	53.46%	19.78 %	0.16%	6.10%	13.47 %	6.10%	0.93%
Iluskte ¹	39.46%	17.22 %	0.41%	2.75%	17.22 %	21.66 %	1.28%
Riga	54.89%	6.68%	15.75%	13.63 %	N/A	4.33%	4.72%
Total	72.76%	7.82%	3.64%	4.99%	4.74%	3.42%	2.63%

Source: Skujeneeks(1922: 223).

¹ Ilukste *apriņķis* is a part of Zemgale province but fits more closely into the patterns of Latgale province.



There were two separate attacks on minority rights: one from the centre and one from the periphery. Attacks from the periphery originated in municipal councils and local politics. Local Latvian nationalist politicians at times attempted to discriminate against minorities from municipal chambers. The discrimination usually revolved around under-funding minority education, the language of street signs, and denying non-Latvians tavern and market licenses. This discrimination alternated between being an occasional nuisance to approaching endemic proportions. Here, however, there was legal recourse; the Constitution and other laws and decrees forbade this harassment and minority representatives could and did challenge this discrimination through official channels (in court, national ministries, the floor of the Saeima [parliament], and the chambers of the Cabinet of Ministers). Minority communities also organized politically and fought attacks on their rights within the political arena by using their political strength to demand minority protection as a price of coalition building (nationally and locally).

The bureaucrat-nationalists in the national ministries, however, were much more successful and more insidious in their undermining of minority rights. The Ministry of the Interior particularly pursued a Janus-like policy. Publicly, the Ministry castigated local councils dominated by Latvian nationalists that overstepped the legal protections of minority rights. The Ministry, however, also led a secret extra-legal joint committee designed to undermine the position of minorities. The committee originally looked at a wide variety of plans to guarantee Latvian ethnic interests, but ultimately settled upon a subtle policy that attacked minority education. Historically, Latvian nationalists cherished the role of education in their national awakening, and remembered how Tsarist Russification policy targeted education to slow the growth of Latvian nationalism. The democratic rights of the Constitution, however, prevented any outright attack on minority rights. Still, bureaucrat-nationalists believed that by manipulating education non-Latvians could be transformed into loyal citizens, and perhaps even completely assimilated. The dilemma was how to tamper with minority rights within the constraints of the law.

The province of Latgale was particularly vexing with its large minority populations, its borders with Poland and the Soviet Union, and its uniqueness relative to the rest of Latvia. Originally, national ministries contemplated administering the province differently, and less democratically, than the rest of Latvia. The fear was that a democratic order would lead to minority control. The Ministry of the Interior toyed with keeping the Kerensky system of local government, and thereby diluting minority influence.² An *apriņķis* (district) government based on ethnic curias was also considered in order to guarantee Latvian majorities, but the plan was abandoned with the election of the democratically spirited Constituent Assembly and Saeimas.³ Nevertheless some towns were secretly denied municipal rights due to their 'Jewish character' (Kinklavs 1920).

Increasingly, the Ministry also questioned the allegiance of minority schools along Latvia's new frontiers, particularly in Latgale. Nascent Belorussian separatism, for

² Director of the Latgalian Affairs Department [*Latgales darišanu nodaļas vadītājs*], September 1919, Latvia's State Historical Archives [*Latvijas valsts vēstures arhivs*, hereafter LVVA], 3723, 1, 573, p. 40.

³ Deputy Director of the Department of Local Government [*Pašvaldības departamenta direktora vietnieks*], Letter of March 17, 1920, LVVA, 3723, 1, 311, p. 88.

example, seemed to sprout from Belorussian schools and teachers. The Daugavpils commander secretly reported to the Ministry that:

Traveling around the border at the end of January, I gathered the following information about Belorussian schools, where I found that the people still held out hope for Belorussian separatism and that you could find the source of this separatist hope in the Belorussian schools, particularly from the Belorussian teachers.⁴

Likewise, Polish agitation was seen to stem from Polish schools and churches where priests distributed anti-Latvian literature and teachers taught that Latgale was really called Inflantu-Polska.⁵

The Ministry of the Interior's, and the bureaucrat-nationalists', dilemma was how to combat the perceived threat from the minority schools within the system of democracy and minority rights guaranteed by law. The legal obligations to minority education seemed guaranteed. One of the state's first laws was that the language of instruction was to be in the family's tongue, and the Law about Latvian educational institutions dictated that minority schools could not be inferior to Latvian language schools (Ulmanis and Kasparsons 1918; Tschakste and Bitte 1919). In 1923, for example, the Ministry was forced to overrule a decision of the Daugavpils municipal council that cut funding to a Belorussian school because the protest went through proper, public channels, and the law was on the Belorussians' side.⁶ Likewise, when a Polish member of the Saeima complained of illegal obstruction and harassment of a Polish primary school as contrary to human rights and the laws of Latvia, the Ministry was forced to agree.⁷

The Ministry of the Interior, and other bureaucrat-nationalists found their solution in the congruence of the poverty of the frontier (east and southeast) and non-Latvian parents overwhelming desire to send their children to school.

By the late spring of 1924, key bureaucrat-nationalists in central ministries decided that the interests of national survival were more important than due process and equality before the law. The first Secret Committee met on May 7, 1924, with representatives from most prominent ministries. The Interior Ministry led the committee, but it was always organized in a logical, bureaucratic sense with representation from many ministries. The Committee's (initially named the 'Joint Committee for Bringing the Border Zone Economically and Culturally Closer to the Rest of Latvia') inaugural session was attended by: A. Birznieks (Minister of Interior), A. Dzenis (Deputy Minister of Interior), E. Bauers (Minister of Agriculture), J. Jaunzems (Deputy Minister of Education), J. Zankevics (Director of the Department of Local Government), H. Dzelzītis (Supervisor of the State Land Bank), and V. Ludins (Chairman of the Commission on State War Losses).⁸ The Minister of the Interior opened the Committee by stating the aims of the Secret Committee were:

⁴ Commander of Daugavpils District [*Daugavpils aprinča priekšnieks*], secret letter of February 11, 1925, LVVA, 3723, 1, 1991, p. 57.

⁵ Report of April 15, 1924, LVVA, 3723, 1, 1991, p. 164.

⁶ A. Jakubnieckis, Letter to the Interior Ministry, January 28, 1923, LVVA, 3723, 2, 149, p. 87. Here the initiative to close the schools came from the Russian school representatives.

⁷ Deputy of the *Saeima*, Letter of March 14, 1924, LVVA, 3723, 1, 1991, p. 162.

⁸ Minutes of the Joint Committee for Bringing the Border Zone Economically and Culturally Closer to the Rest of Latvia (hereafter Joint Committee) [*Starpresoru apspriede par pierobežas joslas saimniecisku un kultūrēlu tuvināšanu parejai Latvijai, protokols*], May 7, 1924, LVVA, 3723, 1, 543, pp. 4-5.



to discuss all means that could be taken to bring the outskirts of the country closer to the state economically and national-culturally, and to already work out concrete plans that could be executed in the near future.

The Committee initially considered plans for colonising the border belt with Latvian farmers; using land reform as an agent to give ethnic Latvians land near the border, and minorities land in predominantly Latvian districts in western Latvia. In this first session, J. Zankevics of the Department of Local Government took a soft line, suggesting emissaries could be sent to the border propagandising for the Latvian State stressing the poor conditions in Soviet Russia and Poland. Nevertheless, the focus of the meeting was rural colonisation and potential urban colonisation as well.⁹

Less than three weeks later the Joint Committee reconvened, and the Ministry of the Interior was firmly in the driver's seat; Department of Local Government Director Zankevics outlined a detailed financial plan of the expenditures needed to make the border zone an attractive area for potential Latvian settlers. Schools, parish buildings, and roads had to be built, while generous financial support would have to be provided to school children and instructors. The total was over 750,000 Lats, 400,000 Lats for 1924 alone. The monetary costs initially dampened the bureaucrat-nationalists' enthusiasm. Francis Trasuns, the leader of Latgalian Latvians in the Saeima, questioned if the project was even possible. Trasuns' participation in the Committee underlined a constant theme through the committee's lifetime: parliamentary deputies frequently worked with the bureaucrat nationalists within the Committee in a manner quite opposite their public persona. Trasuns' doubts, however, may have planted the seeds for the ultimate transformation of the committee's work away from colonisation toward education. Trasuns lamented:

Border zone schools with Latvian as the language of instruction cannot be materially similar to the minority schools, but Latvian schools have to be of a higher quality. I doubt that with the budgeted 500,000 Lats it will be possible to reach a tangible solution to the question of the border zone.¹⁰

The solution was discovered during a routine perusal of the minutes of a parish government employees' conference in the fall of 1924. The district of Talsi was one of the most ethnically Latvian districts in all of Latvia, but was grappling with poverty caused by the war. The local politicians and governmental employees faced chronic absenteeism in schools, and realised that students were not attending simply due to poverty. During agricultural seasons almost all children stayed on the farm, but through the rest of the year many parents could not afford to provide a week's worth of groceries for their children to take to school.¹¹ Local government responded by subsidising free school lunches and dormitories. Attendance rose substantially.¹²

⁹ The chairman of the Commission for State War Losses was particularly keen to take city property from minorities and hand it over to Latvians as well. He stressed the necessity of not allowing more minorities into the area, probably a veiled reference to the unofficial policy of making it more difficult for non-Latvian refugees to return to Latvia.

¹⁰ Joint Committee minutes, May 26, 1924, LVVA, 3723, 1, 543, pp. 10-11.

¹¹ See unpublished diary and memoirs of Līze Rungains in which this system is carefully explained. Most students were too far from their homes to travel to and from school daily, and had to board at the school the whole week. The expense of groceries and boards was too much for many peasant families, and the largest hindrance to mass education.

¹² Minutes of the Conference of Parish Representatives of the District of Talsi [*Talsu apriņķa pagasta pašvaldību priekštāvju apspriedes protokols*], October 15, 1924, LVVA, 3723, 1, 597, p. 17.

Throughout 1924 and 1925 the move to provide free lunches and beds accelerated through the wealthiest parishes of Latvia, but the central state decided against legislating free lunches nationally. J. Zankevics, the Director of the Department of Local Government, and the Director of the Section for Rural Local Government, P. Klinklavs, realised that free lunches could give Latvian schools a comparative advantage over minority schools in the Border zone region. Consistently, P. Klinklavs answered requests about free lunches from Latgale and the apriņķis of Ilukste by denying any financial support from the central state, but slyly adding that free lunches could be provided if they were funded locally. Klinklavs understood the region's chronic poverty and inability to provide universal free lunches, but he imagined the Joint Committee could secretly and illegally funnel money to Latvian schools for a free lunch programme that would give them the needed comparative edge over minority schools.

By the summer of 1925, the free lunch programme [kopēdināšana] was successfully test run in a few isolated spots, and the Vice Director of Schools and the Director of the Department of Local Government drew up plans for implementation in a further twenty-five schools. The Committee was renamed the Joint Committee of National Border Zone Politics, but several of its members were not yet convinced of the merits of free lunches. The Chairman of the Department of the State Budget, J. Bensons, particularly advocated colonisation as the only 'guaranteed' solution for the security of the frontier. He stressed that budgets were thin and may disappear, whereas gifts of land to reliable Latvian farmers could create a class of ethnic 'Latvian Cossacks.' He further doubted the permanent effect of free lunches: 'free lunches will give nothing permanent, because foreigners will only be nationalists as long as they are well-fed, and afterwards not'.¹³ Throughout several Committee sessions, J. Bensons, continued to propose different forms of colonisation as the only solution.

J. Zankevics, however, defended the free lunch programme and won the support of the majority of the Joint Committee with the rejoinder that economical colonisation plans could still be considered in the future.¹⁴ Zankevics admitted that colonisation theoretically was the best option, but that its drawbacks were its costs, and its long-term nature. He continued:

Therefore we have to do that which are conditions allow. The Interior Ministry has reviewed the progress of free lunches, and its results already live up to the high hopes placed on them. In some places minority children have fled from their schools to Latvian schools. From what we give to these children we will reap much more in fostering national support, than we could with older, grown up minorities with many more resources. In a few years time we can strongly change children's' direction in our favour.

The crux of the effectiveness of the free lunch programme was the congruence of poverty along the border, Polish, Belorussian, and Russian parents' desires to educate their children, and a minority education law that allowed for minority schools where there were substantial minority concentrations, and the schools were well attended. The free lunch, which was budgeted at 20 santimes a day per

¹³ Joint Committee minutes (now called Joint Committee on Border Zone National Politics) [*Nacionālas pierobežu politikas starpresoru komisijas*], June 30, 1925, LVVA, 3723, 1, 543, pp. 36-39. Bensons specifically referred to these colonists as 'Latvian Cossacks.'

¹⁴ He suggested a plan to found agricultural and technical schools first in Russian and gradually shift them to Latvian, a plan to build roads half to improve the local economy but also for military advantage, and a plan of awards to motivate the 'naturally lazy, and indolent Russian'.



student, but was often provided for as little as 8 santimes a day could be nothing more than hot tea and bread, but even this made a difference. Parents wanted to educate their children, but the cost of providing food for them while they attended school was often prohibitive. With the free lunch programme, this obstacle was removed, but the price of the free lunch was attending Latvian schools. As Latvian school attendance increased, minority school attendance decreased proportionately and when attendance fell below the needed minimum, the minority school was closed. Usually, an intermediate step first occurred in which the minority school was closed, but due to the continued concentration of non-Latvians, a mixed ethnic school would be opened whose primary language of instruction was, nevertheless, Latvian.

By the spring of 1926, J. Zankevics reported to the Joint Committee that the programme was working well, but some minority communities were frantically trying to stave off its effectiveness. In two *apriņķi*, Ilukste and Jaunlatgale, several Polish grade schools had closed already, but Germans had responded by raising money privately to provide free lunches at their schools (Hiden 1987: 41, 51-53, 190-191). This type of private initiative shielded the relatively affluent German schools and urban Jewish schools from the effects of the free lunch programme. Raising money, however, was not an option for poverty-stricken Russian, Belorussian, and Polish communities.¹⁵ Zankevics believed that these free lunches would, with time, 'take the sharpness' off of the minority question because the children affected would become a privileged clique that knew Latvian and their own mother tongue and could therefore work as loyal intermediaries with the Latvian State. He seemed to not believe in (or hope for) complete assimilation.

While many of the Joint Committee sessions became routine presentations of progress reports, with identifications of potential obstacles, the session of March 29, 1926 became a discussion of the *raison d'être* behind the free lunch programme. Although J. Zankevics maintained a pragmatic view that the programme would soften the minority question, other members of the Committee hoped that the programme would work miracles. A Vice-Director of the Schools Department, Zalīts, saw free lunches as a solution to the most vexing concern of 'blood nationalists'; through the programme, the hearts, minds and souls of Latvians who had strayed could be won back. The bureaucrat-nationalist of Zalīts' stripe could not believe that Latvia had so many minorities, and believed that successful Russification had converted many Latvians to 'mistaken' Slavic identities. Zalīts described the direction of ethnic identity in Latgale as very unclear and cited the many children in Polish and Belorussian schools with Latvian sounding surnames. In his opinion: 'our task is to save these Polonised and Russified children. If in their third year they start learning Latvian, then later they will feel Latvian'.

The Deputy Minister of the Interior, Velkme further interjected that the free lunch programme could actually create Latvians. Velkme boasted that in the Daugavpils *apriņķis* most Polish schools had closed even though many Poles lived in the *apriņķis*. He believed new efforts should target the Belorussian schools as well. Velkme further resuscitated the idea of colonisation, but now without aid. He argued that Latvians would move to the border zone without any aid, and that with time the area would become Latvian, by both colonisation and the free lunch

¹⁵ Zankevics alleged that some Polish communities received money from Poland. If Polish funds were funneled to Polish schools, they were much less effective than German money to German schools.

programme. Velkme, unlike Zalīts, did not see nationality as a question of blood, but conscious choice; minority students who took advantage of the free lunch programme would speak Latvian, they would start reading Latvian newspapers, and then for all practical purposes they would be Latvian.¹⁶

The session ended with concerns about the future. The Cabinet of Ministers was supportive of the programme and next year's budget was finalised, but parliamentary elections loomed the next year. Committee members worried that it would be increasingly more difficult to shield the activities of the secret Joint Committee from the eyes of minority politicians.

The secretive and criminal nature of the Joint Committee's work became a dominant theme in several following sessions. In October of 1926, for example, the Committee met to approve the budget for the following academic year and devised new methods for distributing funds to local schools. Zankevics, again, opened the meeting with the bottom line outlining how much was needed per student, per day, and announcing the budget had again increased, now at 96,000 Lats for the year. He warned that the Committee could not too aggressively expand the programme fearing that minority politicians may catch them in the act. The other Committee members, however, ignored his warnings and planned extensive expansion to more schools. Zankevics quickly brought them down to Earth, and blatantly identified the nature of the operation. He said:

The general parish budget consists of sums that are divided among all nationalities. We can not openly tell local governments about resources set aside for free lunches, because then we would also have to give money to minority schools, and that after all is not our idea. Therefore it is secrecy that ties our hands when it comes to finding resources. If we want to bring in the national principle, then at this time there is nothing else we can do...¹⁷

The Deputy Minister of the Interior Velkme, reiterated Zankevics' points, and mentioned that minority groups had gone beyond mere suspicion. Although some minority schools tried to match free lunches, a Belorussian complaint was also sent to the League of Nations. The complaint was not completely accurate; the Belorussians complained that local governments were not enforcing the national education laws. Of course, national ministries themselves had subverted these laws and often circumvented local governments in the process. The League ignored the petition; throughout the inter-war years the League's attention towards minorities was almost solely focused on Germans and Poles in Western Poland.¹⁸ The bullet had been dodged, but Velkme stressed that the Committee had to deal personally with sympathetic officials in school administrations and local government more carefully.

The first Joint Committee meeting of 1927 brought a new twist – a new initiate to the conspiracy. M. Maike replaced the earlier representative of the State Comptroller's office and naively asked what the Committee did. Zankevics' reply

¹⁶ The concerns and aspirations of the individuals involved in the free lunch programme largely reflected the individual's own idea of ethnic identity. They feared schoolteachers because teachers had been active agents in Latvian nationalism. They also identified newspapers, another important defining medium for themselves.

¹⁷ Minutes of the Joint Committee, October 26, 1926, LVVA, 3723, 1, 543, pp. 47-49.

¹⁸ See the League of Nations' official entries: *The Admission of the Republic of Latvia, and Admission of New members into the League of Nations: Latvia*. For a discussion of the League and the Baltic States see Peters (1988).



almost had a hint of gleeful relish and bravado, but the long reply is particularly insightful. Zankevics outlined the work of the programme specifically:

You can surely say that the expenditures for the free lunches return several times, and cannot be appraised even in gold. With relatively minute sources we have accomplished much. First and most importantly in the national sense this work gives us the best and safest returns: minority children flood into Latvian schools where there are free lunches, and because of this many minority schools have closed. The continuation and expansion of the free lunch programme promises even greater rewards. Secondly, thanks to the free lunches schools are much better attended. And free lunches have bettered children's health.¹⁹

Zankevics continued to describe the programme. Zankevics who in his public persona tirelessly pressed local governments to save every last santims on their local budgets said that 'there was no reason to try to save the state a mere 5,000 Lats' by supervising the programme more closely. Accounting, however, was becoming increasingly more difficult for the Joint Committee as minority schools asked for detailed receipts from Latvian schools that were able to offer free lunches. Furthermore, a few secret reports to sympathetic nationalist teachers had been uncovered and published; but the programme again weathered these mild controversies.

The main reason the Joint Committee was immune to scandal was its considerable and consistent support from across the Latvian political spectrum. Traditional interpretations of inter-war Latvia describe governmental paralysis caused by frequent cabinet shuffles.²⁰ The members of the Joint Committee, however, were primarily not elected officials, but bureaucrats. These bureaucrats did not turnover with cabinets. Likewise within the Interior Ministry there were general consistencies in policy from one Minister to the next. The most active Ministers got involved, but they did not rock the boat; the more dormant Ministers simply signed papers.

The Joint Committee and government operations in general, were further shielded from governmental paralysis by the ability to find 'fellow travelers' across Latvia's political spectrum. In 1927, for example, a Left coalition came to power and the important ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance and Education were all in the hands of the Social Democrats.²¹ The Left coalition's reliance on minority political support, coupled with its egalitarian rhetoric and ideology should have meant an end to the free lunch programme. The new Minister-President and Interior Minister, Mārgers Skujenieks, however, enthusiastically supported the programme. Furthermore, a new initiate, Brilovsks, represented Voldemārs Bastjanis, the Social Democrat Minister of Finance who aggressively attacked

¹⁹ Minutes of the Joint Committee, March 1, 1927, LVVA, 3723, 1, 543, pp. 52-53.

²⁰ For the traditional interpretation of the rapid turnover and weakness of coalition governments see: Bilmanis (1951), Carson (1956), Šilde (1976). The nature of the fall of cabinets, however, should be re-examined. Many fell due to external events or the new coalition closely resembled the previous one. Coalition governments by definition are not stable, but the instability of Latvian parliamentary democracy has been exaggerated.

²¹ See the memoirs of Bastjanis and Cielēns for autobiographical accounts of Social Democratic control of Ministries, or Hugh I. Rodgers, *Search for Security: A Study in Baltic Diplomacy, 1920-1934* (Hamden, Conn.: Archer Books, 1975) for a scholarly analysis of Social Democratic foreign policy initiatives. The archival collection, LVVA, 1632, 2 contains documents on the Social Democrat Minister of Education Rainis' involvement in book censorship despite a public persona that stressed the freedom of the press.

government corruption in the Committee. Brilovskis not only supported the programme, but reported on its effectiveness in Ilukstes apriņķis, where he said:

Now you can often see foreigners, school children, who freely and correctly speak Latvian. These young people will grow up to be real Latvian citizens.²²

The ability to find common cause through Latvia's political parties applied throughout the parliamentary era. The parties, with the possible exception of the extreme radicals, were not monolithic institutions. Within each party there was a range of opinion over three key issues that transcended the specific concerns of the party. In regards to centralisation, within each party there were politicians keen on a highly centralised state structure, while there were others that championed local responsibility and power. On ethnic affairs, it ran the gamut from the slogan 'Latvia for Latvians', to a concept of the nation as a political unit containing all within the borders.²³ Finally, parties were divided over the greater good, national security and growth, or democracy. The authoritarian coup, which overthrew democratic rule in Latvia in 1934, was successful in part due to these divisions within the political parties. Almost across the board, some politicians did not actively oppose the regime because they were sympathetic to the regime's moves towards a centralised, ethnic Latvian State that stressed duty and survival over democracy and law. The workings of the Committee anticipated these developments.

The Joint Committee meeting of the spring of 1928 stressed the continuity of policy despite the pendulum-like change of governments. The Left coalition fell in early 1928 in part due to a controversial trade treaty with the Soviet Union²⁴ that visibly split the country and increased rumours of a coup. Within the Committee, however, 1928 was business as usual. The change in government meant nothing, the new right of centre Minister-President was as enthusiastic of the free lunch programme as the previous left of centre Minister-President. He even earmarked an additional 10,000 Lats for the free lunch programme. The greatest concern was that the apriņķis council elections later in the year would return more minority politicians. If this happened, the money for the free lunch programme could not be funneled through apriņķis governments. Still, this was more of a nuisance than a hindrance; the Joint Committee successfully rechannelled the money through the Ministry of Education, and into their centrally controlled education system.²⁵

The Great Depression slowed the work of the Joint Committee and its free lunch programme more than any change in the electoral world of Latvia. As the Depression deepened, the 'relatively minute sources' which the Director of the Department of Local Government had referred to in better years were sacrificed along with the more general cuts in education and health care. The Joint Committee briefly returned to the use of land to guarantee security in the border belt and again earmarked land near the border for ethnic Latvian colonists. Here as well, democratic procedure irritated the Joint Committee's work, but did not

²² Minutes of the Joint Committee, October 18, 1927, LVVA, 3723, 1, 543, pp. 56-59.

²³ Arveds Bergs was a prominent Latvian of the political right, and a member of the Constituent Assembly and first *Saeima*. He also served briefly as Minister of the Interior. After losing in the elections to the second *Saeima* he continued his political work in the Riga City Council, and editing a conservative newspaper. In the newspaper, *Brīva Zeme*, he consistently called for a 'Latvia for Latvians', and criticized the Constitution, calling for its drastic revision.

²⁴ Again, see the works of Felikss Cielēns, and Hugh I. Rodgers as well as Anderson (1962) for the Soviet-Latvian trade treaty and subsequent fall of the left coalition.

²⁵ Minutes of the Joint Committee, March 6, 1928, LVVA, 3723, 1, 543, p. 60.



derail it. The Joint Committee operated through the State Land Bank, but when a Pole was elected to the Land Bank's Council the operation was temporarily put on hold. As with the free lunch programme that switched from *apriņķis* boards to the Ministry of Education, land distribution was moved to the Land Bank's Board²⁶ (on which the Pole was not elected).

The work of the Joint Committee was partially suspended by the economic crunch of the Great Depression. The national government had no superfluous income and as budgets were routinely slashed the Committee's work waned. Furthermore, minority communities were already suspicious of how Latvian schools were able to provide more services in financially healthy times; masking the funneling of money in times of massive cutbacks would have been difficult if not impossible. As Latvia emerged from the Depression, Kārlis Ulmanis overthrew the parliamentary order before the Committee could reorganize. Ulmanis, however, represented everything the Committee stood for. The work of the Committee during the Ulmanis regime no longer needed the secret extra-legal approach to undermining minority education and democratic process; this became the standard operating procedure of the new authoritarian regime.

Free lunches became less significant. After all, with full and public support of the government huge resources could be spent to undermine the attractiveness of minority schools by building new, modern Latvian schools. Nevertheless, the core idea of the Joint Committee's work was used by the Ulmanis regime in its attacks on minority education. Instead of inviting domestic confrontation and international disfavor by closing minority schools outright, the Ulmanis regime continued the pattern of making Latvian schools more attractive. Then, as minority children left their schools, minority schools could be closed for lack of attendance. The end was never far out of sight; as minority schools closed and the only school became a Latvian or mixed school, the Latvian content of education was increased and assimilation foisted upon minority students. The radical change in education was disguised as 'rationalisation' of the school system, but its ethnic component seems clear. From 1934 to 1937, for example, 109 primary schools were closed, 30 were reorganized and 31 opened. Of these 109 primary schools, 71 were minority schools whereas only 5 of the 31 new schools were minority schools.²⁷

Several parishes and *apriņķis* demonstrate how complete the changes were. In Ilukste *apriņķis*, for example, by 1939 a minority education system that had fourteen schools serving 953 pupils (8 Russian schools with 643 pupils, 2 Polish schools with 128 pupils and 4 Lithuanian schools with 182 pupils) was reduced to four minority schools serving 214 pupils (one Russian school with 134 pupils and 3 Lithuanian schools with 80 pupils). Within this *apriņķis* in Silene parish, the 1st Border Primary School became a mixed nationality school in the fall of 1939 even though 59 of its 62 pupils were ethnically Russian.²⁸

The example of Gaura parish, located on the frontier with Soviet Russia is indicative of minority education under Kārlis Ulmanis. In the summer of 1939,

²⁶ Minutes of the Joint Committee, January 7, 1930, LVVA, 3723, 1, 543, p. 62.

²⁷ 'Reorganization of the Primary School Web from August 1, 1934 to September 1937' [*Pamatskolu tikla pārkārtojumi no 1934.g. 1. Aug-1937.g.sept.*] in LVVA, 1632, 2, 1306. Of the 71 closed minority schools, 35 were Russian, 14 Belorussian, 8 Jewish, 7 Polish, 6 German and 1 Lithuanian.

²⁸ Ilukste *Apriņķis* School Inspector's Yearly Overview, 1939/1940 first half year [*Ilukstes apriņķa tautskolu inspektora darbības pārskats par 1939./40. Mācības gada 1. Pusgadu*] in LVVA, 6642, 1, 201, p. 81-88; 114.

near the very end of the Republic, the secret police reported to the Ministry of the Interior that there were reports of unhappy Russians in the parish. The Department of Local Government investigated and submitted a detailed report.²⁹ In Gaura parish, there were 10,857 residents, 10,104 of which were Russian. The parish council had six Latvians and fifteen Russians, while of the seventeen schoolteachers, nine were Russian, eight Latvian. The teachers spoke only Latvian amongst themselves, and in the three previous years, two Russian schools were converted to mixed nationality schools. Within the next year, a new modern Latvian grade school for 500 students would be opened, and with its opening the last Russian grade school would be closed. The army and the paramilitary organization, Aizsargi, maintained language skills after school. The report concluded that the Latvian schoolteachers could be more active in society to provide role models for the Russians, but that otherwise all was well:

There is no news or anything to suggest that the inhabitants are unhappy using the state language. All around I must admit that the use of the state language is increasing year by year, albeit slowly.

This was the reality of Latvia's much touted minority education system by the end of the Republic.³⁰ There were only 753 of 10,857 parish residents who were not Russian, yet Russian schools had been carefully curbed and eliminated. Ethnic Latvians were represented beyond their proportion in local administration, and school administration. Even after their years in Latvian schools, Russians were to remain exposed to paternalistic, assimilating Latvian nationalism in the army, and in day-to-day life. The Department's assessment of its minority citizens, however, was too optimistic. Minority grievances, chief of which was inadequate minority education, pushed minorities into support (sometimes very active support, often much more passive support) for the invading Soviet army in 1940.

The story of the Joint Committee is indicative of several themes in interwar Latvia's history. The first theme is that as war gave way to peace, the central state began to identify minority communities within Latvia as the greatest threat to the state's existence, particularly as potential fifth columns for neighboring states (Poland and the USSR seen as Soviet Russia). This assumption fueled into the general idea that Latvia although not monolithic was a nation-state for ethnic Latvians. Ethnic minorities were not seen as an organic part of the citizenry (despite their legal status), but as a group of more or less threatening others. The central state saw Latvia's Baltic Germans and Jews as economic threats that due to their wealth and strength were not at all easy to assimilate. After the coup of 1934, the central state used its economic muscle to decrease the economic power of these two communities. Latvia's Russians, Poles, and Belorussians, however, were different. These communities were economically disadvantaged, had low literacy rates, and were poorly organized politically and culturally. Furthermore, they were geographically concentrated on Latvia's eastern frontiers.

The Joint Committee's work was an attempt to either assimilate some of Latvia's Slavic peoples through education or at least guarantee their allegiance to the state. Within the minutes of the Joint Committee's meetings we see a glimpse of differing ideas about nationality and identity (innate versus learned), but also a common determination to use the powers of the state against the spirit of the law

²⁹ Ausmanis, Director of the Department of Public Order Police [*Kārtības policijas departamenta direktors*], August 1, 1939, LVVA, 3723, 1, 16,734, p. 20.

³⁰ Exaggerated accounts of the benevolence and liberalism of Latvia's minority education system can be found in most general accounts of inter-war Latvia including: Bilmanis (1951), Kavass and Sprudz (1972).



and democracy. This penchant for statism long preceded the coup of 1934, but was symptomatic of it. Equally important, this view was shared by ethnic Latvian intellectuals, bureaucrats and politicians across the political spectrum. Their common general assumption that free lunches could shift school attendance and engineer identity is indicative of how they understood Latvia's eastern borders and communities. These ethnic Latvian bureaucrats (and others) saw an ambiguous ethnic frontier that had to be made Latvian to guarantee the survival of the state.

The 'success' of the bureaucrat-nationalists' efforts is difficult to measure. The free lunch programme, like the state itself, was short-lived. Fifteen years of free lunches (and in most places far less) was too little time to create the transformations that the bureaucrat-nationalists imagined. Nevertheless, the free lunch programme and the general nationalising policy of the state had a definite affect. By the 1935 census (still before the more all-encompassing efforts of the authoritarian regime), Latvia's chief statisticians discussed the ethnic transformations of Latgale Salnītis and Skujenieks (1936: 329-338). These statisticians differentiated between 'natural' (births exceeding deaths) and 'mechanical' (internal migration and change of ethnic affiliation) growth of ethnic populations. Although considerable more research must be done on this topic, provisionally 'Latvianising' the frontier was partially successful. From 1930 to 1935, for example there were nearly 20,000 more ethnic Latvians in Latgale by 'natural' means and over 27,000 by 'mechanical' ones (the Central Statistical Office was unsure how much of this was migration and how much was change of identity). The ethnic Russian community, however, also benefited at the expense of Belorussians and Poles. There were more than 11,000 fewer Belorussians in 1935 than 1930. More work needs to be done, but the state seems to have converted some to a Latvian identity while pushing others to an ethnic Russian one.

The free lunch programme sheds new light on the ethnic policies of Latvia during the inter-war years. The state, although not forceful and violent, clearly had malevolent intentions towards minority communities and acted on these intentions in the minutiae of state policy. The minutes of the Committee (and the work of the Census office) also suggest that Latvia's bureaucrat-nationalists uneasily merged an essential, primordial definition of ethnicity with an ability to alter ethnicity by careful governmental policy. They managed this contradiction by believing (or claiming) that many of Latvia's Belorussians and Poles were Polonised or misinformed Latvians that were being 'reclaimed'. There was, however, a difference of opinion over this matter and the tensions surrounding different understandings of national identity confused policy decisions. Finally, the past presents a general lesson to the present. Latvia again faces tempestuous ethnic relations (similar in some ways, but also very different) and tension revolves around exclusive citizenship laws, naturalisation policies and language laws. The inter-war experience suggests that democratic process and law, although important, can be undermined by a state bureaucracy dominated by ethnic Latvians.

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Ethnic Kurds, Endogenous Identities, and Turkey's Democratization and Integration with Europe

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Introduction

This article argues that, in examining the domestic dynamics of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, research should focus on finding new ways of conceptualizing different formulations of ethnic and national identities. The dominant understandings of these identities should be treated as variables rather than as predetermined and fixed categories, and their variation should be explained by changing state policies and economic-political developments. The article's goals are, first, to offer a conceptual framework for such an analysis, and, second, to use this framework to analyze the bottlenecks of Turkish democratization vis-à-vis the Kurdish conflict. One such bottleneck is identified as restrictive policies that systematically crowd out social-political actors who could promote inclusive and harmonious understandings of Turkish and Kurdish identities. The article's focus is on improving our theoretical approach to this conflict, although limited policy implications and projections into the future will also be generated.

A brief review of this conflict's main characteristics is in order.¹ Kurds are a transnational ethnic group forming significant minorities in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Kurdish is distinct from Turkish, but Turks and Kurds are, in general, indistinguishable physically and religiously. The latter enjoy full citizenship rights in Turkey unless they publicly accentuate their ethnicity. In accordance with a conservatively interpreted official ideology of national unity, stringent laws and state practices ostensibly intended to stem separatism have the effect of discouraging any activity promoting specifically Kurdish interests, even in cultural and educational spheres. Eastern and Southeastern Turkey, which are heavily populated by ethnic Kurds, are the country's least developed regions socio-economically. An armed conflict, which began in 1984 between the Turkish state forces and the Kurdish rebel group the PKK, generated extensive human rights violations and cost more than 30,000 lives by 1999. That year, the PKK's leader was captured and sentenced to death.² Since then, armed clashes have practically ended, although most of Southeastern Turkey remains under emergency rule.

This development has coincided with increased pressures from the European Union (EU) on Turkey to release legal-political restrictions on non-violent Kurdish activities, within a context of democratic opening. Combined with considerably diminished direct threats to state security, the environment of this conflict has significantly changed. It has become possible that considerations other than internal and external security and actors other than the security forces and the PKK may begin to play an influential role in determining the parameters of this conflict.³ Until now, however, progress has been limited.

Turkey faces a series of reforms that are prerequisites for starting negotiations for full membership in the EU. Among these, those related to ethnic Kurds, such

¹ For comprehensive reviews see Olson (1996); Gunter (1997); Kirişçi and Winrow (1997); Barkey and Fuller (1998); Kramer (2000); Robins (2000).

² The sentence has yet to be approved by Parliament. There are plans to abolish capital punishment by then.

³ Reportedly, the PKK abolished itself in April 2002, apparently in response to expectations of being banned by European governments, and reorganized its activities under the new name 'Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan' (KADEK).



as the removal of restrictions on education and broadcasting in Kurdish, have encountered the most political resistance.⁴ Yet, for theories of international political economy, especially the neo-realist perspective, Turkey's reluctance to comply with EU norms presents a puzzle. Turkey's interests appear to lie in full compliance. Since a Customs Union went into effect in 1996 between Turkey and the EU without any insurance for the former's membership, Turkey has yet to participate in the Union's decision-making mechanisms and gain full eligibility for EU funds. Meanwhile, the EU is already reaping most of its expected benefits from the alliance. Hence, the EU may prefer to keep Turkey as a close, 'westernistic' ally short of enjoying full membership.⁵ Turkey does not have a lot of leverage in determining the terms of her relations with the EU and seems to have everything to gain from accelerating the political integration process. Popular support for the EU is also far-reaching.⁶ Thus, it seemingly is a puzzle why progress on reforms regarding Kurds has so far been insignificant.

Perceived interests are a major stumbling block, but the real question is why these perceptions have not changed significantly in light of the changing security environment. For various historical reasons that are outside the scope of this article, Turkey's political elites, especially the military and conservative groups within the judiciary and the bureaucracy, tend to associate public accentuation of ethnic-cultural differences with social-political disintegration.⁷ They also tend to view minority demands in social-cultural domains as a prelude to more radical demands such as political-territorial secession. Such perceptions produce suspicion of ethnic group demands and an urge to curtail the group activities that express these demands. In contrast, Western European policy makers generally regard the accommodation of ethnic-cultural demands as a requirement of democracy and as a way of preempting more radical demands.⁸ The problem is not limited to one of elite interests. Elite suspicion of ethnic-political activities and resentment of Kurdish separatism is widely shared. As an indirect sign of this, in 1999, two parties that ran on a mainly anti-Kurdish-nationalist platform, the ultranationalist MHP and the leftist-nationalist DSP, together won 40.17% of the national votes. This is not to say that all popular preferences support the status quo; as already mentioned, people support the EU, and, it will be argued later that tolerance for ethnic diversity is generally high on a personal level. The point here is that popular support for change in general, and the EU in particular, do not necessarily translate to strong popular support for democratic opening in regard to the Kurdish issue. The reasons may be related to negative expectations regarding the political consequences of liberalization on ethnic-cultural expressions, and to beliefs regarding what serves national interest.⁹

⁴ Among others, see Ümit Sezgin, www.ntvmsnbc.com, February 26, 2002, and 'Cepheler Artık Net', *Radikal*, June 8, 2002.

⁵ For Turkey as a westernistic state see Buzan and Diez (1999). See also Mango (1998).

⁶ In recent surveys, popular support for EU membership is consistently found to lie around 70-75%. Among others, see 'Türkiye Dış Politikası Araştırması' by Ali Çarakoğlu and Kemal Kirişçi of Boğaziçi University, İstanbul, conducted in November 2001. See summary report in <http://hamlin.cc.boun.edu.tr/~ces/index.htm>. Also see www.hurriyetim.com.tr, March 30, 2002, and www.ntvmsnbc.com, August 18, 2001.

⁷ Kirişçi and Winrow (1997) and Barkey and Fuller (1998) offer reviews.

⁸ Robins (2000: 73-75). Kramer (2000). Also see Kinzer (2001).

⁹ For instance, Jenkins (2001) points to the fact that the military, which is widely seen as the bulwark against Kurdish nationalism, is found to be highly popular and trusted in opinion surveys. A major reason for this may be distrust of political parties. For a perceptive commentary, see Mehmet Ali Birand, 'TSK'nın Gözetleme ve Koruma Görevi', (The Military's Task to Supervise and Protect), *Milliyet*, April 30, 2002. See Çarakoğlu and Kirişçi study cited above on popular preferences regarding EU-related reforms.

These perceptions of interest can change through social and political processes whereby social and political actors who are trusted by the public articulate new visions of society. From this perspective, the foremost obstacle to reform appears to be an outcome of past policies and restrictions. These have generated conditions under which pessimistic expectations about how domestic identities would change in response to EU-led reforms become self-fulfilling. Restrictions produce two consequences, short-term and long-term. For reasons to be explained in the following section, restrictions disproportionately affect Kurdish actors integrated with the rest of the Turkish society and drive them out of the public-political sphere. Hence, in the short-term, restrictions increase the visibility of Kurdish nationalists with little interest in integration, and seemingly corroborate the pessimists' claim that Kurds asserting their ethnicity are all potential separatists.

Meanwhile, the long-term effects of the restrictions reproduce the conditions under which the expectations of those who are skeptical of liberalization could be borne out. Skeptics expect that lifting restrictions would strengthen the Kurdish identity, as opposed to the Turkish national identity, and feed Kurdish separatism. By crowding out Kurdish actors integrated with the rest of the Turkish society, heavy-handed approaches erode the organizational capacity of these potentially conciliatory actors relative to that of extreme Kurdish nationalists. It takes time to build a constituency and organizational capacity for any social-political actor. Hence, past restrictions increase the odds that nationalists who oppose any affiliation with Turkishness, and who are likely to be more vocal and better organized than the moderates, could monopolize the representation of ethnic Kurdish interests in a less restricted environment.

For instance, the Constitutional Court has regularly shut down explicitly Kurdish parties for allegedly promoting separatism.¹⁰ Middle-of-the-road parties have disproportionately been affected by these actions, while more radical parties have managed to be reopened. As a result, the main and practically only legitimate political party that explicitly promotes Kurdish interests, HADEP (People's Democracy Party), is a party widely associated with the PKK. This party was founded after two predecessors were shut down between 1990 and 1994.¹¹ For the state, and presumably for a substantial portion of Turks, HADEP is Kurdish nationalism (Robins 2000: 78). A related perception is that Kurdish nationalism is the PKK. It matters little how strong the PKK and HADEP affiliation really is. This is because the perceived overlap of the two is sufficient to make it a highly risky strategy for any mainstream party to cooperate with HADEP. For example, in response to allegations that his party may cooperate with HADEP in elections, a center-right party deputy immediately had to defend his party by maintaining that his party 'would not even exchange greetings with a divisive party.'¹² In a more recent example, premier Ecevit accused a rival party of considering cooperating with 'a divisive party'.¹³

The effects of past restrictions also manifest themselves in the public-political discourse. Indirectly, restrictions drive out social-political actors who could develop non-oppositional understandings of the Turkish and Kurdish identities.

¹⁰ For instance, the Democratic Mass Party (*Demokratik Kitle Partisi*), led by former minister Şerafettin Elçi, was shut down by the Constitutional Court for threatening national unity. See *Milliyet*, February 27, 1999.

¹¹ HEP (People's Labor Party) and DEP (Democracy Party).

¹² ANAP deputy Erkan Mumcu. See *Radikal*, February 27, 2002.

¹³ The accused party is CHP. See www.ntvmsnbc.com, April 25, 2002.



Directly, restrictions push expressions of views and beliefs that support ethnic pluralism into the private. Hence, skeptics of pluralism are disproportionately represented in the public-political discourse. This may also be leading many people to endorse restrictions: people rely on the views and information expressed in the public-political discourse to foresee the consequences of a pluralistic opening.

In order to be able to adequately analyze such complexities, research should create new analytical categories and explanations. First, one needs categorizations that are flexible enough to capture the diversity of the ways in which identities are constructed. It is argued here that, simple distinctions such as moderate versus extreme, or ethnic versus civic definitions of nationalism are insufficient. Whatever specific way they are constructed, the most important distinction between different formulations of the Turkish and Kurdish identities is whether they are portrayed as rival or complementary categories. The first type makes the relationship between the two identities, and between the associated group interests, a zero-sum relation. It leads people to choose one or the other. The second type makes the relationship a positive-sum relation and enables people to embrace a combination of the two.

Second, research should formally incorporate into its explanations the diversity of interests among ethnic Kurds. More than 50% of ethnic Kurds in Turkey are thought to live outside of Eastern and Southeastern Turkey, which Kurdish nationalists consider their traditional homeland. Substantial portions of them are highly integrated with the rest of the Turkish society. In short, in contrast to most journalistic assessments of the issue, ethnic Kurds, like many other ethnic groups in the world, hardly constitute a monolithic group with uniform identities and preferences.¹⁴ As a result, as survey findings to be discussed confirm, one cannot expect all ethnic Kurds in Turkey to have the same notion of Kurdishness. Hence, one can anticipate that intra-Kurdish divisions may play an increasing role in political developments and new actors and visions of Kurdishness may emerge in the future.

Third, research should anticipate that official and popular definitions of Turkishness may shift to accommodate (or further exclude) ethnically conscious Kurds. In a less restricted environment, many views and interests that were hitherto kept in private can come out and compete in the public-political space. In order to capture such changes, one should distinguish between expressed and unexpressed identities and interests.

This article is aimed at contributing to such analytical-conceptual developments and to complement existing explanations of the weaknesses of Turkish democratization and the problems of Turkey's integration with Europe.¹⁵ The second section below theorizes how legal-political restrictions affect various social-political actors. It develops a framework to conceptualize the endogenous relation between identities, collective actions, and public policy, and presents new categories to describe different *definitions* of the Turkish and Kurdish identities. The third section discusses the dynamics of the public-political discourse. The section defines and distinguishes between the private and public expressions of

¹⁴ For a typical journalistic analysis, see 'The Battle-Lines in Turkey', *Economist*, January 13-19, 2001. Also see Robins (2000) and Kasaba (2001: 172) who highlight intra-Kurdish diversity and argue that the Kurdish identity is still 'in the making.'

¹⁵ The bottlenecks of Turkey's democracy include a fragmented political party system and a relatively weak democratic culture. Among others, see Özbudun (2000).

different formulations of ethnic and national identities, and discusses how the dominant public-political discourse may change. The fourth section discusses existing evidence on the private understandings of the Turkish and Kurdish identities in order to assess whether they can form a basis for democratic change (Somer 2001b). The last section discusses preliminary policy implications and projections into the future possibilities.

Restrictions on Ethnic Activity and Endogenous Identities

People do not necessarily acquire their identities through their own actions. Especially, ascriptive group identities such as race, ethnicity and religion evolve historically and are usually adopted by individuals at birth. However, the level of solidarity among group members, and the degree to which people value these identities socially and psychologically result, at least partially, from the collective actions on which they depend to obtain group benefits (Hechter 2000). This view is consistent with the major social psychology finding: even in artificially created group divisions, attachment to group grows when people participate in collective actions with other group members, especially in competition with rival groups.¹⁶

In other words, people are not only more likely to attend collective actions organized in the name of their identities given by birth, but their level of involvement in these actions shape the social and affective importance of these identities for them. The more they participate, the more they will self-identify with these categories. For instance, many Kurdish leftist intellectuals became more 'Kurdish' in a social-psychological sense after they left leftist movements with mixed Turkish-Kurdish memberships and joined predominantly Kurdish movements in the 1970s (van Bruinessen 2000).¹⁷ This way of looking at the relationship between identities and collective actions de-essentializes ethnic identity, instead of treating it as historically or biologically rigid.¹⁸ At the same time, by analyzing ethnic categories as variables, it enables one to examine how public policy affects ethnic identities by encouraging or discouraging different types of collective actions. Here I use the term public policy as a short cut for a large array of state-led policies that shape the economic and legal-political environments of potential ethnic collective actions. The opportunities and incentives-disincentives that are created by these environments affect which type of collective actions materialize and become long-lasting and which type of collective actions do not. The goals, organization, and membership composition of these collective actions then influence the identities of the participants in these collective actions.

Take the region (*hemşehrilik*) and ethnicity-based associations among rural-migrant communities in urban Turkey. A theory based in an essentialist reading of ethnic identities would interpret these associations as products of ethnic-cultural awakening caused by some exogenous force such as migration or political developments. The perspective here has a different focus. Accordingly, the causal relationship flows from action to identity. Such associations are founded to provide certain group benefits such as social insurance. But once they materialize, they are expected to enhance the regional or ethnic identities of the

¹⁶ Robbers Cave experiment (Sherif and Hovland 1961). Only a simplistic account is given here. For a good discussion including an overall evaluation of Social Identity Theory's contributions, see Hechter and Okamoto (2001).

¹⁷ Ethnic Kurds living in Europe also experience shifts in their ethnic-national identification.

¹⁸ For an excellent discussion, see Laitin (1998). 'Identity strategies' are not in flux to the same degree at all times. They are especially variable during cataclysmic periods of political change and conflict.



participants, depending on whichever identity becomes emphasized within the movement. The important point here is that different collective actions compete with each other in providing group benefits such as insurance and solidarity. Hence, prior to collective actions, it is not a forgone conclusion how the identities of a group of people will evolve. For example, collective actions with ethnically mixed membership will nurture a different understanding of ethnic identity than those with homogenous membership. Public policies in turn affect which type of collective action is more likely.

This analytical framework is mapped in Figure 1. The first line restates that identities partially follow from collective actions. The second line depicts how public policy can therefore affect identities. How can one summarize the mechanism through which public policy affects identities via collective actions? In a totalitarian society, the state determines which collective actions people attend. In other societies, however, individuals face a choice between individual pursuits and collective actions. They also face choices among different collective actions. As a matter of simplification, collective action theories express the attractiveness of a collective action to an individual as the inverse of that collective action's price: expected benefit less the cost of attending.¹⁹ The expected benefit of a collective action is largely subjective for each individual. It can include economic as well as psychic benefits such as an enhanced sense of equality. However, given their subjective evaluation of these benefits, people choose the collective action that provides a given benefit with least cost to them. These costs can include the cost of time, expected punitive action by the state, or loss of social status. Thus, public policy affects the likelihood of different collective actions by changing their relative prices. Everything else being the same, those with lower costs are more likely to materialize.

The third and fourth lines in Figure 1 summarize the policy implication. The more a state integrates with a supranational structure such as the EU, the more one can expect policymaking on the supranational level to influence domestic public policies. Indeed, EU institutions and policies increasingly affect Turkish policymaking. Through their influence on domestic policies, supranational institutions and policies thus create endogenous changes in domestic identities. Line four suggests that supranational policymaking should therefore take into account these possible changes in the identities and preferences of the affected populations. Similarly, domestic policymaking should evaluate possible impacts of the policies in question on integration with the supranational entity. In a nutshell, integration makes it imperative that domestic-national and supranational public policies be shaped interactively and requires better understanding and information flow between the two levels.

Defining *ethnic activity* as a short hand for ethnic group-specific goods and activities, the ostensible aim of restrictions on ethnic activity is to reduce the social-psychological importance of ethnicity. While most restrictions are directed at public ethnic activity, they also affect semi-private ethnic activity such as reading or watching TV in one's home. However, these restrictions can also have unintended consequences. In particular, they might end up boosting divisive ethnic activity while crowding out the conciliatory.

The intended effect of restrictions is to drastically increase ethnic activity's

¹⁹ Tarrow (1998) and Lichbach (1998) offer comprehensive discussions of the collective action theories. Also see Laitin (1998).

relative price vis-à-vis nonethnic (or individual) activity, and to reduce its occurrence. However, such restrictions also tend to alter the relative prices between different kinds of ethnic activities. In order to capture this effect, let me define different kinds of ethnic activities according to the type of relationship that they promote between ethnic and national identity. According to Table 1, *rival activities* promote the view that ethnic and national identities are rivals, or substitutes, and the associated group interests are in a zero-sum relationship. *Compatible activities* promote the view that they are complements and in a positive-sum relationship. In other words, the former types of collective action promote what I call the *rival definition*, while the latter promote the *compatible definition*.²⁰ The lead organizers of these activities are called *rival* and *compatible entrepreneurs* in respective order.




Figure 1: Collective Action—Identity Relationship.

²⁰ For related definitions, see Somer (2001a).



Table 1: Rival vs. Compatible Activities: Organizers and Identities Promoted

<i>Type of activity</i>	<i>Organizers</i>	<i>Ethnic-National Identities Relationship Promoted</i>
Rival	Rival entrepreneurs	Substitutes (or rival); zero-sum relationship: <i>rival definition</i>
Compatible	Compatible entrepreneurs	Complements; positive-sum relationship: <i>compatible definition</i>

An example of compatible activities would be that of associations established by people who trace their origins to immigrants who left the formerly Ottoman territories in the Balkans and the Caucasus for Turkey during the last century. Such associations have become increasingly visible in Turkey since the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia. The members of these associations, Karpaz argues, 'do not see any conflict between their current Turkish identity and their ancestral and regional identities shaped during Ottoman rule' (Karpaz 2000: xvi). This observation may hold for the majority of ethnic groups in Turkey as well as for ethnic Kurds who integrated with the mainstream society in urban centers of Western Turkey.

How can one categorize collective actions based in Turkish and Kurdish identities according to the rival-compatible definition criteria? Rigid versions of Turkish nationalism, and their counterpart, rigid versions of Kurdish nationalism, are essentially incompatible because they compete for the undivided loyalty of the same people and for the ownership of the same territory. Their relationship is a zero-sum game. In other words, they promote a rival definition of ethnic-national identities. Hence, examples of rival definitions are rigid versions of Turkish nationalism that view any notion of sub-national diversity potentially subversive, and rigid versions of Kurdish nationalism based on the belief that national (Kurdish) and state boundaries should coincide. According to the former, any notion of a separate Kurdish cultural or linguistic identity threatens the security of the Turkish nation and its vital interests; according to the latter, the territory and policies of the Turkish state by definition infringe upon the Kurdish homeland and interests. But both assume that people, territories, and perhaps even animals should be categorized as either Turkish or Kurdish, but not both.

In one example, one spokesperson of a radical group recently accused the Turkish army of trying to eradicate the exotic Van cats by poisoning them because 'the cats are Kurdish, and the Turkish authorities cannot digest this'. Ethnonationalist groups have also called into question the ethnic-national credentials of the indigenous *Kangal* dogs.²¹ The counterpart of this view in Turkish nationalism is the denial of any culture, territory, or people that can be labeled Kurdish as distinct from being Turkish.

²¹ Amberin Zaman, 'German Group Pounces on Kurdish Cat Eradication', *Los Angeles Times*, October 6, 2000. Turkish extreme nationalists responded by trying to prove that the cats originated in Central Asia, as did Turks. Also see 'Kangal Komedi'si', *Hürriyet*, February 2, 2002.

In contrast, a compatible definition implies that the Turkish and Kurdish identities are not rivals but can complement each other. In other words, ethnic Kurds holding the compatible definition would believe that they could be hyphenated Turks who, presumably like most Mexican-Americans, may embrace their ethnic-linguistic identity without necessarily opposing their national identity. In turn, ethnic non-Kurds holding the compatible definition would think that a Kurdish ethnic-cultural minority within Turkey is not a threat to social cohesiveness, national security, and territorial integrity. Official definitions and policies significantly affect which of these definitions people hold. However, people's own definitions, especially in private, are not necessarily the same as those of the state. The characteristics of rival and compatible definitions and activities are summarized in Table 2.

The rival-compatible definition distinction is related to, but not the same as, the distinction between ethnic-civic definitions of nations. The usefulness of the latter distinction is limited because the constructions of most national identities entail ethnic as well as civic elements (e.g., Yack 1996; Özdoğan 2000). The distinction here is broader than the ethnic-civic distinction. Rather than qualifying the specific way (ethnic, cultural or linguistic) in which two or more identities are constructed, the emphasis is put on the question of whether they are made rivals in people's minds. This enables one to apply the formulation to non-ethnic identities as well, such as a supranational identity (e.g., European) and national identities.

Table 2: Rival vs. Compatible Activities: Defining Characteristics and Descriptive Qualities

<i>Type of Activity</i>	<i>Defining Characteristic</i>	<i>Descriptive (typical but not necessary) Qualities</i>
Rival	Expressing the Rival Definition of National / Sub-national Categories	Oppositional, homogeneous membership valued, essentialist
Compatible	Expressing the Compatible Definition of National / Sub-national Categories	Accommodating, neutral toward heterogeneity, potential fluidity of identities acknowledged, individual choices to enter and to exit respected

We can now return to the effects of restrictions on ethnic activity. Restrictions tend to decrease the relative price of rival ethnic activity vis-à-vis compatible ethnic activity. Hence, in addition to decreasing the level of ethnic activity in general, they tend to increase the share of rival activity within all ethnic activities. Thus, compatible ethnic activity is disproportionately affected by the restrictions. The reason is related to the supply of rival activity. Mainly because of differences of group size, organizing rival activities tends to be less costly than supplying compatible activity. Compatible entrepreneurs try to appeal to a cross-ethnic audience because they see these groups as mutually inclusive and part of the same nation. In order to reach a large and diverse audience, they have to supply



a large range of ethnic and non-ethnic activity, and satisfy a large spectrum of different interests. For example, when they organize a rally, they want a multiethnic attendance; when they start a TV station, they want an audience that crosscuts ethnic groups. In addition to ethnic issues, they have to take an interest in other issues; for instance, they may have to engage labor unions or offer solutions to environmental problems. In a nutshell, compatible ethnic entrepreneurs' efforts are split between many goals, and their target support base tends to be larger, possibly including social groups with conflicting interests. They suffer from all organizational and collective action problems that afflict large groups.

In comparison to compatible entrepreneurs, rival ethnic entrepreneurs need only appeal to a smaller group, their own ethnic group, and a more narrow, ethnically specific agenda. They can concentrate their resources on achieving a small number of goals, putting other issues on the backburner. In addition, thanks to their smaller target group, rival entrepreneurs can more easily monitor their activists, punish defective behavior, and reward those contributing to their cause. Hence, they incur lower organizational and enforcement costs than do compatible ethnic entrepreneurs, given that state restrictions on ethnic activity affect both.

Note that restrictions cannot limit ethnic activity to the extent that nobody dares to undertake it. Consider the banning of books considered to be ethnically inflammatory by the judiciary. As a result of this policy, entrepreneurs-publishers who promote the compatible definition would be driven out of the market, while rival entrepreneurs would likely continue their activities. Rival entrepreneurs tend to have a higher reservation price, the maximum price they are willing to pay in order to continue their activities despite the law. This is mainly because their activities are less costly in the sense argued above. This tendency is reinforced to the extent that many rival ethnic entrepreneurs have already found themselves in conflict with the state. Insofar as rival ethnic entrepreneurs already operate in an illegal or extra-legal environment, the social and political consequences of clashing with the law and the state – otherwise an important deterrent – is a sunk cost.

For instance, despite Turkey's ban on broadcasting in Kurdish, MED-TV, which allegedly is linked to the PKK, has continued broadcasting into Turkey for years, notwithstanding Turkey's pressures on European governments to ban it (e.g., Kirişçi and Winrow 1997: 174, 197; Gunter 1997: 57, 122).²² Reportedly, MED-TV found a large audience in Southeastern Turkey. In other words, the demand for Kurdish broadcasting has largely been met by a supplier that is illegal in Turkey and is targeting an exclusively Kurdish audience. To quote Barkey and Fuller, 'it seems amazing that the Turkish government would prefer that Kurds get their TV news and culture in Kurdish from PKK-TV [MED-TV] rather than provide Turkish state or private TV in Kurdish inside Turkey from non-PKK sources' (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 33). Potential legal suppliers of Kurdish broadcasting, which presumably could have targeted mixed Kurdish-Turkish audiences in order to enlarge their market size, have been driven out.

If it were allowed, would providers of Kurdish broadcasting really promote the rival definition? Separatist organizations such as the PKK would certainly try to exploit Kurdish broadcasts to advance their own cause. But such organizations already have their propaganda networks despite the laws prohibiting them. As for

²² Local radio stations in Kurdish are tolerated in practice to a limited extent.

the potential commercial suppliers of Kurdish broadcasts, they would have to consider what type of programming the average ethnic Kurd demands. Insofar as ethnic Kurds are integrated with the larger Turkish society and embrace the compatible definition, they would have to supply programs reflecting their worldview and interests. However, one should note that the answer to the above question is irrelevant to policy makers if it is impossible to prevent Kurdish broadcasting anyway. In this case, the relevant question becomes whether a small number of illegal, or a larger number of legal providers are more likely to have polarizing effects on society.

Public Discourse and Ethnic Activity

For the purposes of this article, let me define the *public-political discourse* (henceforth public discourse) broadly as the collection of views, beliefs and cultural-political references that people feel comfortable using openly, that is, when they cannot expect to be able to restrict their audience. This definition covers for instance the discourse of representatives of organized groups such as political parties in public settings and the discourse of the mainstream media. It also encompasses ordinary people's discourse when talking or writing to strangers.

In terms of tipping and cascade models of identity formation to be discussed further below, this definition denotes the discourse people use outside their *private* realm, such as their household members and close friends. Accordingly, *public discourse* can be defined as the views, beliefs and cultural-political references people openly use when they cannot control the dissemination of their views.

It was discussed above that restrictions on ethnic activity tend to crowd out compatible ethnic activities. The natural consequence of this on the public discourse in Turkey is that the discourse of the rival definition will be overly represented in the public discourse. With compatible actors discouraged, there are significant social-political pressures to hold back views in favor of mutual inclusiveness. Indeed, Turkish nationalists who view the Turkish and Kurdish identities as mutually exclusive rivals tend to associate any suggestion to open up the public space to Kurdish expressions as being pro-Kurdish or, worse, pro-PKK. Within their discourse, interpretations of the Ottoman Empire's disintegration as the consequence of tolerant attitudes toward ethnic-religious plurality remain intact. Meanwhile, Kurdish nationalists accuse ethnic Kurds who fail to reject Turkishness of betraying the Kurdish cause.

At the same time, as will be elaborated below, tolerance of cultural diversity and interethnic mixing continue to exist on a personal-private level, alongside the dominant public discourse. Despite a substantial degree of cultural and linguistic homogenization that resulted from national education and other nation- and state-building practices, Turkey's ethnic-cultural composition remains quite heterogeneous, with Kurds being the second largest ethnic group among the forty-seven identified by an authoritative 1989 study (Andrews 1989). A growing awareness of this actual diversity also continues to exist alongside the public discourse (Kramer 2000: 44). Can these private beliefs and attitudes give rise to a transformation of the dominant public discourse?

Research recognizes the possibility that private or 'latent' belief structures provide a source of unifying change in different contexts (Karpas 2000). It has been put forward, for instance, that values stemming from Turkey's multicultural past in



the Ottoman period or from Islam, the religion of the vast majority of the population, may breed tolerance and serve to conciliate ethnic Turks and Kurds (Yavuz 2001). I argue that the possibility that any private beliefs may successfully give rise to a conciliatory public discourse hinges on two conditions.

First, new social-cultural actors have to remold historical identities to create new formulations of ethnic-national identities. Historically held belief structures may produce different consequences in a changed social-political context. The history of secularization and of the relations between the Sunni and Alevi Muslims in Turkey restrict the identities that can play a unifying role. The same identities or ideologies that might have been unifying in the past may prove polarizing in the present. In fact, the 1980 military regime tried to place a renewed emphasis on Islam in order to stem ideological polarization and Kurdish nationalism, which not only failed to do so but might have fueled polarization between the secular and religious portions of the population. Thus, the emergence of new social categories and definitions is a complex phenomenon that requires human agency and creativity.²³ Once again, the prior crowding out of compatible actors who could play this role emerges as a major obstacle.

The second condition derives from cascade models. Cascade models describe how the discourse or behavior of people can rapidly change through chain reactions.²⁴ This occurs when a critical mass is reached, which denotes the number, or social-political significance, of those who are already willing to change their behavior or discourse. Thus, cascades explain situations in which the individual incentives for taking an action or using a discourse depend significantly on the behavior of others. For instance, the incentives for learning a specific computer language drastically increase once a critical mass of other people have begun to use it. After that critical point, the language can rapidly become the standard because, among other reasons, people would like to learn the language that will be compatible with that of most others.

The logic of cascade models implies that leading state actors play a key role in signaling future changes in 'appropriate' definitions of ethnic and national identities. Their role is, along with other social-political actors, to signal a critical mass of people to express new definitions in public. Hence, the issue of coordination is important. Even if the majority of Turks felt free to express a more heterogeneous and inclusive national self-image, and expected to be better off with such a new self-image, change may not occur unless a critical mass of people begin to express this new self-image simultaneously. Individuals who use a heterodox discourse on their own put their public image and social-political relations at risk. Therefore, most people would feel that it is not in their self-interest to change their discourse on their own.

Until the 1990s, it was considered taboo to publicly use the word 'Kurd' to denote an ethnic group in Turkey. The word was almost never used in that sense in official documents and in the public discourse. Consequently, many assumed that only people with radical political views would choose to use it. With such a stigma

²³ Sakallioğlu (1996) argues appropriately that 'creative ideas' are more important than 'political will' for the resolution of the Kurdish conflict. Yavuz makes a related point when he maintains that a dynamic, tolerant version of Islam peculiar to Turkey can play a unifying role. See *Zaman*, March 7, 2002. However, given the politicized nature of the relations between the secularist and religious groups in Turkey, an enhanced role for an even moderate version of Islam may prove polarizing.

²⁴ For discussions of cascade and tipping models, see, among others, Lohmann (1994), Kuran (1998), Laitin (1998), Somer (2001a).

attached to it, people with no political intentions shunned the word in order to avoid risking their reputation within their social reference groups, thus making the assumption self-reinforcing. These incentives reflected the dominant public discourse at that time, which associated the use of the word with sectarian personal beliefs and intentions. The same way as Americans who display the confederate flag risk being labeled racists, Turks who employed the word 'Kurd' in their public discourse risked being labeled a *bölücü*, literally 'one who stirs up divisions' or a 'separatist'.

President Özal's public announcement in 1989 that he is partly Kurdish, followed by President Demirel's public recognition of the 'Kurdish reality' in 1992, have 'tipped' a critical mass of people to use the word 'Kurd' publicly. Hence, the incentives shaping the public usage of the word have changed significantly. Generally, it is no longer thought that the expression of terms such as 'Kurd', 'Kurdish', 'Turkish Kurd', or 'Kurdish Turk' signals one's radical personal beliefs, intentions, or group memberships. This is not to say that everybody is using these words readily or that nobody is stigmatizing them. In fact, for some people these categories might have accrued new and more politically sensitive meanings. But in general the intentions people impute to others who express these categories, and the social-political consequences of their expression, appear to be significantly less negative than before. A simple search in a major Turkish newspaper's online edition found more than 400 articles containing the word 'Kurd' during the last one and a half years.²⁵ The relative ease with which this change in dominant public discourse took place may suggest that on a personal level, opposition to the acceptance of the Kurdish identity is insubstantial. However, so far, lack of opposition has only applied to recognizing Kurds as an ethnic-linguistic category. For reasons already discussed, expressing views in favor of recognizing them as a group that may be entitled to cultural or political rights continues to face public opposition.²⁶

A fuller discussion of the dynamics of the public discourse in terms of cascade models is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, a few key implications will be summarized:²⁷

- (1) The dominant public discourse may be a poor predictor of the underlying private beliefs.
- (2) Cascade effects can generate rapid and massive shifts in public discourse, if state actors signal a critical mass of people that they can simultaneously shift their publicly expressed beliefs.
- (3) Political and social-cultural entrepreneurs constantly compete to shift the dominant public discourse. To this end, they endeavor to manipulate information on actual support for their beliefs, and employ social and political pressures to silence opposing views.
- (4) Because of the imperfect observability of private beliefs, social-cultural entrepreneurs who represent a minority of private beliefs can dominate the public discourse by creating the impression that they represent the majority's beliefs, or by silencing the dissenters.
- (5) Public policy affects the outcome by shaping the opportunities for various social-political actors to participate in public discourse and by protecting – or not protecting – dissenters.

²⁵ The newspaper is *Hürriyet*.

²⁶ Notably, however, these ideas are no longer 'unthinkable.' Increasingly, political party leaders and the media challenge on these issues powerful state actors such as speakers of the military.

²⁷ The reader is referred to the cited references for further clarification.



Private Beliefs

The gist of the previous section is that the public discourse in Turkey may downplay private acceptance of ethnic diversity. In private, do people in Turkey view Turkish and Kurdish identities as rivals or complements? Ethnic Turks and Kurds have shared a homeland for most of the last millennium, depending on how one interprets history and the roots of each ethnic category. Leaving loyalty to the Ottoman state aside, religious community remained the primary identity of Ottoman people, and ethnic-linguistic categories carried only secondary importance (Lewis 1995: 321-323; Karpas 2000). Religious divisions, such as those between Sunni Muslims and Alevi Muslims often override both linguistic and ethnic divisions, among ethnic Turks as well as Kurds (Kehl-Bodrogi 1999: 439-454). Thus, generally, 'Kurdish' conflicts have occurred between Kurdish groups and state forces rather than between ethnic Kurds and Turks. The PKK's armed conflict with the Turkish state has not defied this rule, either, and tensions between ordinary Turks and Kurds have been limited, given the seriousness of the conflict.²⁸ Hence, the historical background does not lend itself to the development of a rival definition of Turkish and Kurdish identities.

In accordance with this prediction, ethnic background is not found to be a significant determinant of respondents' choice of spouse between Kurds and Turks (Özdağ 1995; Pope and Pope 1998: 253-254). This is important because marriage decisions are long-term investments and intermarriages produce ethnically mixed children. One would not expect a person to enter an interethnic marriage if that person believed the spouse's ethnic-national identity and group interests to be incompatible with his or her own.

Given the politically sensitive nature of the issue, data on ethnic-national self-identification are scarce and largely static. Studies available to scholars are also criticized on theoretical, methodological, and political grounds (e.g., Sakallioğlu 1996; Turgut 1996). In addition, again because of the sensitivity of the issue, responses in surveys may be affected by self-censorship even in meticulously conducted studies.

Given these caveats, however, existing data appear to be fairly consistent in two senses. First, even findings from the Southeast provide weak support for the prevalence of the belief that Kurdish and Turkish are viewed as rival categories. When given the chance to choose a combination of identities in surveys, substantial portions of self-conscious ethnic Kurds identify with Turkishness on a national level. This suggests that they do not see ethnic and national identities as mutually exclusive substitutes. Findings on primary identities support this thesis. For example, in a recent nation-wide survey, 12% of the population declared Kurdish as their mother tongue, which suggests that they identify with Kurdishness as an ethnic-linguistic category. However, in response to the question 'Do you identify yourself primarily as a Turk, Muslim, Citizen of the Republic of Turkey, Kurd, Zaza, Kourmanji, or Alevi', only 2.7% and 0.7% chose the categories 'Kurd' and 'Zaza' respectively.²⁹ In other words, at least 71% of

²⁸ For observations of tensions and discriminatory behavior between ordinary Turks and Kurds see, among others, Kılıç (1992); Belge (1996).

²⁹ Çarkoğlu and Kirişçi study cited above. Preliminary results based on communication with the authors and summaries posted in <http://hamlin.cc.boun.edu.tr/~ces/index.htm>. The survey was funded by Boğaziçi University Research Fund, Istanbul, and the United States Institute for Peace (USIP). It was conducted in November 2001 by a public opinion research company, which surveyed 3086 randomly selected rural and urban residents in 20 provinces. Results are reported to have a standard error of +/-1.8 (95% confidence).

the Kurdish speakers primarily identified with nation-level categories such as Turk, citizen of Turkey, and Muslim (27%, 35%, and 31% for all respondents), or responded 'other' or 'no opinion' (3.3% and 0.7%). The low percentage of 'no opinion' responses suggests that the respondents did not necessarily think that they would be judged by their answers.

Data on interethnic relations suggest that the ethnic dimensions of the Kurdish conflict rank below socioeconomic dimensions of the conflict in terms of people's own valuation (Özdağ 1995: 73). Social class and ethnic dimensions are difficult to separate in the Southeast where a two-decades-long conflict has deepened an already existing developmental rift between Western and Eastern Turkey. But Turkish-Kurdish relations, as opposed to relations with the state, are not necessarily seen as antagonistic. In one study, where the majority of respondents (70.9%) self-identified as *fully or partially Kurdish* (including Zaza, Kourmanji, and Turkish-Kurdish mixed), people were given a number of options to choose from to describe relations between people from different ethnic backgrounds (Özdağ 1995: 137).³⁰ 73.6% of respondents chose the options 'We are one indivisible nation' (40.8%) and 'We need a bit more tolerance and respect between people from different ethnic backgrounds' (32.8%). Only 5.8% chose the option that 'The relations between people from different ethnic backgrounds are not good, especially those between Turks and Kurds. In the future, these relations will deteriorate.' 3% declined to respond.

Second, existing data on identities reveal significant variation when one moves from Eastern to Western Turkey. Take findings on ethnic-national self-identification. In one study conducted among urban residents of Southeastern provinces and among immigrants from the Southeast to Mediterranean towns, people were asked their primary self-identity (Ergil 1995: 37).³¹ 37.6% primarily self-identified with either Turkishness or a combination of different identities such as ethnic, national, or religious. But the largest percentage of respondents, 40.3%, declared their primary identity as Kurdish. The differences between these findings and those from Western Turkey are striking. In a 1993 poll conducted in Istanbul, 7.67% and 13.3% of the respondents reportedly declared themselves ethnically Kurdish on both sides of the family and just partly Kurdish, in respective order. However, in response to the unprompted question: 'We are all Turkish citizens, but we may be of different origin. What do you feel your origin to be?' only 3.9% of all respondents thought their origin to be Kurdish. In other words, only about a fifth of those who had full or partial Kurdish descent declared their 'origin' (suggesting primary identification) specifically Kurdish. The rest felt their origin to be categories cross-cutting ethnicity such as Turkish, Turkish-Muslim, or Muslim.³²

To the extent that ethnic Kurds and Turks hold the compatible definition, one can argue that the rigid public discourse is, as predicted by (1) in the last section, a

³⁰ This study was conducted by a group of academics for the Union of Metal Workers (Türk Metal Sendikası), based on questionnaires administered by professional interviewers to a representative sample of 8802 individuals living in Southeastern Turkey.

³¹ The survey was funded by the Association of the Chambers of Commerce of Turkey (TOBB in Turkish). It was based on personal interviews with 1,267 heads of household. Reportedly, interviews were conducted in people's private homes and the respondents were ensured that their identities would be kept anonymous. For a summary in English, see 'Chamber of Commerce Report on Kurds Detailed', *FBIS-WEU-95-152*, 8 August 1995.

³² Survey reported in Pope and Pope (1998: 254-55), and Önder (1999: 6-7). Conducted by Konda research company for the newspaper *Milliyet*, by surveying 15,863 people. Also see *Milliyet*, February 27, 1993 and August 16, 1995.



poor predictor of the underlying private preferences. One might also conclude that ethnic Turks and Kurds could simply reconcile their differences only if their private preferences would be revealed in a less restrictive environment. In light of the theoretical framework discussed, however, the paucity of information on private preferences is not easy to surmount. The distribution of private preferences across the population is largely unobservable to the average person. Therefore, people usually look at the deeds of representative individuals from each group to infer the intentions of others. Insofar as actors who have, or are perceived to have, radical goals represent their groups in public discourse, interethnic distrust would continue to thrive. Hence, the views of PKK members may come to represent the views of all ethnic Kurds in the eyes of ethnic Turks, unless the preferences of other ethnic Kurds are adequately represented in public discourse. Similarly, rigid versions of Turkish nationalism come to represent the intentions of ethnic Turks in the eyes of ethnic Kurds, unless more pluralistic versions of Turkish nationalism are more widely expressed. As implications (2) through (5) indicate, the representations of the whole spectrum of Kurdish interests and preferences cannot be taken for granted simply by eliminating legal-political restrictions. Cascade effects can significantly exaggerate the impact of a vocal, well-organized minority's preferences.

Election results are a major source of information regarding ethnic Kurds' preferences. For various reasons, however, they are hard to interpret. In 1999, HADEP received 4.8% of votes nationally, but enjoyed as high as 60% electoral support in local elections in Southeastern provinces (Robins 2000: 64). The 10% national threshold for any party to enter the parliament may have lead many potential HADEP voters to vote for other parties in national polls. The local election results outside the Southeast show that, as predicted in this article, this party has largely remained a regional party. But, in the absence of alternative political actors representing Kurdish interests, it is hard to deduce the reasons and goals that motivate people to support HADEP. The spokespersons of the party reject separatism, although, as argued, the party is widely associated with separatism and the PKK by ethnic Turks.³³ Once again, what seems to be crucial is not ethnic versus civic definition. Both the PKK and HADEP are ideologically leftist organizations that claim to reject ethnic definitions. However, this does not prevent the perception that they portray Kurdish and Turkish identities as mutually exclusive rivals.

Conclusions

Accounting for the diversity within Kurds explains a great deal of the puzzle posed in the introduction: why has progress been slow on Kurdish reforms although Turkey's interests seem to lie in integration with the EU as soon as possible. As explained, past state policies have crowded out credible moderate actors. Hence, mutually reinforcing versions of extreme Kurdish and Turkish nationalism could sway the political arena in a less restricted environment. This would be disastrous given the high level of geographical and socioeconomic mixing of ethnic Kurds and Turks, especially in Western Turkey. Pressures to 'unmix' tightly integrated communities on social, economic, and identity levels would be detrimental. It is not clear how the effects of past policies can be rectified through new policies. This may explain part of the resistance to reforms. This article has maintained that research can properly analyze this problem by creating new and endogenous

³³ Interview with Ahmet Turan Demir, leader of HADEP (People's Democracy Party), *Radikal*, September 18, 2000.

categories of ethnic and national identities. The article has offered new categories and a preliminary analysis of public policy-identities relation.

In terms of projections, one should expect intra-Kurdish divisions of interest to gain increasing importance in the future development of the Kurdish conflict. Competition between moderate and extreme nationalists may make the latter more prone to violence.³⁴ Further ascendance of what has been called rival ethnic activities would inevitably escalate the conflict both within Kurds and between Kurds, ethnic Turks, and the state. The rival definition would compel ethnic Kurds who are integrated with the mainstream Turkish society to make a choice between Turkishness and Kurdishness. Any strengthening of state policies that reject the Kurdish identity would also have the same effect. In comparison, the strengthening of compatible definitions can contribute to the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish conflict.

One cannot expect all Kurds to embrace the compatible definition. From the beginning, Turkish nation- and state-building failed to incorporate a portion of ethnic Kurds, which resulted in a series of brutally suppressed ethnic-religious rebellions during the 1920s and 1930s in Eastern Turkey (e.g., Olson 1989). The participants of these early conflicts and many of their descendants presumably never fully embraced the national identity and hold the rival definition (Bucak 1991; Ballı 1991). Other ethnic Kurds' sense of Kurdishness became steeped in bitterness as a result of the PKK insurgency and the state's equally violent counter-repression. The PKK guerillas who lived for years under extreme circumstances and in isolation from the rest of society, and PKK members and sympathizers who live outside Turkey, are especially apt to have developed hardened beliefs regarding the incompatibility of the Turkish and Kurdish identities.³⁵ The substantial minority of voters who support extreme Turkish nationalist parties can also be expected to hold the rival definition. Nevertheless, it has been argued here that substantial proportions of Turks of various ethnic stripes appear to hold tolerant and non-exclusive beliefs about ethnic diversity. These beliefs could be a basis for the evolution of a more pluralistic public discourse and politics.

In order for the public discourse to change, compatible definitions need to be first formulated by new social-cultural entrepreneurs. It takes time and ingenuity to mold existing private beliefs into new definitions that are consistent with local belief systems and that people can embrace. To provide opportunities for the emergence of compatible Turkish and Kurdish actors is Turkey's greatest challenge. Once this occurs, state policies are crucial to signal a critical mass of people that it is becoming acceptable to adopt a more tolerant and inclusive discourse in public. Another condition for change is the credibility of the actors who represent the change. Actors who have an actual or perceived track record of separatism are not credible, because their actions can easily be interpreted as strategic falsification of their actual intentions, especially but not exclusively by ethnic Turks. Similarly, mainstream political actors who have promoted ironhanded methods against even moderate Kurdish expressions may find their ability to compromise diminished.

³⁴ See Lichbach (1996: 60-61) for a theoretical elaboration.

³⁵ For an illustrative source on guerillas' lifestyles and belief structures see Gürsel (1996). Many of the guerillas reportedly decided to join the PKK as a result of socioeconomic dislocation and experiences that involved excessive use of force, or outright human rights violations, perpetrated by security forces. Also see İçduygu et al. (1999).



More research is necessary to identify policies that would ensure an open and representative public discourse. These policies may include legal and institutional frameworks to diversify information dissemination and media ownership, and political party and election reforms to encourage more plurality of views expressed within political parties. The emergence of compatible definitions of Turkish and Kurdish identities requires reevaluation of Turkish history from fresh angles and the adoption of educational policies and textbooks accordingly. Cultural-educational policies is an important arena in which external actors such as the EU can have a positive, long-run impact by helping Turks to challenge beliefs that attribute social disintegration to ethnic and cultural pluralism. State behavior and political developments should be expected to significantly affect the self-definitions and political preferences of the large spectrum of ethnic Kurds living in Turkey.

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PRACTITIONERS' CORNER

Religion as a Peace Tool

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Most religions ... have two distinctly contrasting cultures: the 'holy war' and the 'peaceable kingdom.' (Elise Boulding, 1986)

Introduction

Research advocating the use of religion as a peace tool is an increasingly important response to the prominent use of religious differences by leaders as a basis for waging disruptive conflict and war. Appelby (1999), in *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation*, asserts that religion's ability to inspire violence is intimately related to its equally impressive power as a force for peace. He identifies what religious terrorists and religious peacemakers share in common, what causes them to take different paths in fighting injustice and the importance of acquiring understanding of religious extremism.

Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft (Johnston and Sampson, 1994, vii) opens with a forward by Jimmy Carter asserting that 'we all realize that religious differences have often been a cause or pretext for war. Less known is the fact that the actions of many religious persons and communities point in another direction. They demonstrate that religion can be a potent force in encouraging the peaceful resolution of conflict.' After six case studies of reconciliation, the volume concludes with implications for the foreign policy community and implications for four religious communities: Buddhist, Islamic, Hindu and Christian.

Other works provoking thoughts of how religion can be used as a peace tool include Sampson (1997, 304), who informs us of the institutional moves within some religious communities toward developing 'an increasingly intentional and systematic approach to peacebuilding.' Johansen (1997) has contributed 'Radical Islam and Nonviolence: A Case Study of Religious Empowerment and Constraint among Pashtuns.' Reychler (1997) asks for a serious study of the impact of religious organizations on conflict behavior, a comparative study of the peace building efforts of different religious organizations. He asserts that the world cannot survive without a new global ethic and that the religious ties of parties, passive bystanders, peacemakers and peace builders will play a major role.

Placing the Religious Focus in Context

Before examining the actual, and potential, value of religion as a peace tool, it will be useful to briefly summarize evolving trends in peace research in the last half century. This will offer the necessary context for pondering where religion fits in these developments. I have found it useful to think about these developments as adding drawers to the peace builders tool chest, as pictured in Figure 1. Highly significant is the fact that our paradigms now include positive peace as well as negative peace, thereby becoming inclusive of economic, human rights and ecological challenges to peace. At the same time, we have broadened our concerns beyond peacemaking (i.e. conflict resolution and conflict management) to include peacekeeping, and most important, peace building. As a result peace research has been significantly enriched by the tendency to encompass ever more kinds of actors and issues, and at the same time to illuminate the interdependencies of an array of peace related actors and issues. I recently summarized these developments by noting seven main trends (Alger, 2000):

settlement and disarmament/arms control. Because of shortcomings of these tools, the founders of the UN added functionalism, self-determination and human rights in the Charter. New tools then emerged out of UN practice between 1950 and 1989, significantly shaped by the growing UN membership as a result of the dismantling of overseas empires: economic development, economic equity and ecological balance. After the end of the Cold War humanitarian intervention and preventative diplomacy were added. Simultaneously there has been growing involvement of NGOs/Peoples Movements who have created a number of tools to complement those invented by states: track II diplomacy, conversion from military to civilian production, defensive defense, nonviolence, citizen defense, self-reliance, feminist perspectives and peace education.

	19 th Century	1919	1945	1945-1990	1990-	
NEGATIVE PEACE	I Diplomacy (1) Balance of Power (2)	League Covenant	UN Charter	UN Practice	UN Practice	NGO/Peoples Movements
		Collective Security (3) Peaceful Settlement (4) Disarmament/Arms Control (5)	Collective Security Peaceful Settlement Disarmament/Arms Control	Collective Security Peacekeeping (9) Peaceful Settlement Disarmament/Arms Control	Collective Security Peacekeeping (9) Peaceful Settlement Disarmament/Arms Control Humanitarian Intervention (15) Preventive Diplomacy (16)	Track II Diplomacy (17) Conversion (18) Defensive Defence (19)
POSITIVE PEACE			Functionalism (6) Self-determinism (7) Human Rights (8)	Functionalism Self-determinism Human Rights	Functionalism Self-determinism Human Rights	Non-Violence (20) Citizen Defence (21) Self-reliance (22) Feminist (23) Peace Education (24)
				Economic Development (10) Economic Equity (NIEO) (11) Communication Equity (12) Ecological Balance (13) Governance for Commons (14)	Economic Development Economic Equity (NIEO) Communication Equity Ecological Balance Governance for Commons	
			III	IV	V	VI

Figure 2: The Emergence of Peace Tools

No doubt efforts of others to plot the emergence of peace tools would result in a different array and different interpretations of the time at which specific approaches emerged. The main reason for sharing our effort is to illuminate the necessity that all involved in the design of peace strategies be aware of the full array of tools available, and the relevance of a broad array of academic disciplines, professions, and institutions. Relevant government roles extend far beyond those in foreign offices and the military, including departments concerned with a variety of economic and social issues. Furthermore, important roles are available for various professional groups in what we now customarily refer to as 'civil society'. These include business, religion, education, media, ethnic communities, and development assistance. Also relevant are a diversity of provincial and local governments. The availability of such a diversity of options



has made the design of peace strategies increasingly difficult. On the other hand, there is no doubt that peace builders now have more resources than were perceived to be available in the past.

How should growing emphasis on religion as a peace tool be placed in our tool box? Certainly many responsible for developing most of the peace tools in Figure 2 were motivated by visions of peace emerging out of their religious beliefs. Many might see religion to be a particularly significant factor in the emergence of peace tools such as human rights, economic equity and humanitarian intervention. At the same time, we can readily identify religious roots in the emergence of nonviolence, feminist perspectives, and other NGO/Peoples Movements.

One limitation encountered by those who approach this question from the perspective of traditional international relations research and teaching paradigms is that religious organizations and activity has largely been ignored, despite the fact that religious actors have long been involved in extensive activity across state boundaries. In an article on 'Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations', Jonathan Fox concludes that the paradigms we use to understand international politics, tend to omit religion from the equation. Although 'many case studies of individual international events do address religion, it is clear that the more aggregate and theoretical studies, which contribute to and develop the paradigms we use to understand international politics, tend to omit religion from the equation' (Fox 2001: 73). Of course, the media has transcended academic paradigms when informing us of the violence perpetrated around the world in the name of religion. On the other hand, when there are *sustained* efforts at peacemaking and peacebuilding by religious organizations they tend not to be considered as news. But, as we have already noted, there are an increasing array of scholars devoting attention to the role of religion in the quest for peace. In order to attain a brief overview we will now briefly summarize the contributions of a few scholars.

Three Scholarly Perspectives on Religion as a Peace Tool

In our effort to attain insight on the growing efforts to employ religion in the quest for peace we have found the broad analytic assessments of Cynthia Sampson (1997), Appelby (2000) and Reychler (1977) to be particularly helpful. In combination they provide a usefully comprehensive overview. We shall attempt to summarize their analyses as briefly as possible and attempt to draw some conclusions based on these three contributions. Obviously, we consider this effort to be preliminary because of the limited literature on which it is based, although we did consult a number of other works before choosing these three.

Luc Reychler usefully sets the stage by asserting that in an effort to understand what religions or religious organizations could do 'to promote a constructive conflict dynamic one could start by investigating systematically which positive or negative roles they play now' (Reychler 1997: 20). He discerns four roles: conflicting parties, bystanders, peacebuilders and peacemakers. The four roles for conflicting parties are religious wars, low-intensity violence, structural violence and cultural violence. He offers a striking table of wars with a religious dimension that lists twenty-four cases between 1948 and 1983, beginning with Buddhists versus Christians in Myanmar/Burma, and ending with Hindus versus Moslems in Sri Lanka in 1983 (Reychler 1997: 22)

Cynthia Sampson

It is useful to begin with an overview of recent trends presented by Cynthia Sampson in a chapter on 'Religion and Peacebuilding' in a volume on *Peacemaking in International Conflict* (Zartman and Rasmussen 1997: 273-316) It is significant that she introduces her chapter with this warning: 'What follows should be viewed not as an exhaustive survey but, rather as suggestive of a larger body of experience yet to be acknowledged, documented, and better understood through more systematic research and analysis.' (Sampson 1997: 280)

The reader will be better prepared to comprehend her summary of trends if we first present her typology of roles played by religious actors. Briefly summarized from her presentation they are:

- (1) Advocates, including both those within the region of conflict and those abroad.
- (2) Intermediaries, including fact finding, good offices, peace-process advocacy, facilitation, conciliation and mediation.
- (3) Observers, providing a watchful physical presence that discourages violence, corruption, human rights violation or other threatening behavior.
- (4) Educators, building sensitivity to inequities, developing skills for advocacy, conflict resolution, democracy building, and promoting healing and reconciliation.
- (5) Institutional actors, the work of religious communities and other institutional actors, such as the Roman Catholic Church. Society of Friends, Mennonites, Moral Re-Armament, 'Engaged Buddhism', and the Nairobi Peace Initiative (Sampson 1997: 280-300).

Sampson concludes her chapter with an informative list of eight recent developments and future trends which we briefly summarize (Sampson 1997: 305-307):

- (1) Within some religious communities, for example the Mennonite Central Committee, there is an increasingly intentional and systematic approach to peacebuilding.
- (2) The interreligious sphere is also adopting a more intentional approach, as in the World Conference on Religion and Peace/International.
- (3) Beyond efforts within specific religious communities, religious actors are being targeted as a critical constituency to be trained and mobilized for peacebuilding, as in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 and 1996.
- (4) A number of religiously affiliated NGOs working in relief and development are seeking consultation and training, at their headquarters, for their field workers in conflict transformation and peacebuilding
- (5) Religious peace actors work in regions where 'the most horrific conflicts' are experienced. Because they are able to draw on their spiritual resources, a growing area of specialization is likely to be in healing and reconciliation.
- (6) In particularly challenging conflict situations the above trends result in an array of religious actors performing a diversity of roles.
- (7) There is now a proliferation of proposals for ecumenically based citizens' services for peace, justice, and reconciliation, as in the



- proposal made by the Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation program of the World Council of Churches.
- (8) Citizens in many countries, both within and across denominations and religions, are now holding dialogues and internet conferences.

From this she concludes that there is a 'pluralism of actors, roles and methodologies in the religious sector', that they are here to stay and that: 'the time has come to identify, encourage, develop, mobilize, and empower the special resources and potentials of religious actors for constructive conflict transformation – and to coordinate their contributions as integral to the larger peacebuilding enterprise.' (Sampson 1997: 307)

R. Scott Appleby

Appleby (2000), in *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation*, argues that a new form of conflict transformation – 'religious peacebuilding' – is taking shape on the ground, in and across local communities plagued by violence.' While it is a promising development, he sees it as still 'inchoate and fragile, uncoordinated and in need of greater numbers of adequately trained practitioners, more study and testing, and theoretical elaboration' (Appleby 2000: 7). He then provides a very informative, comprehensive, and extensively footnoted overview of various roles played by a diversity of kind of religion-based actors in recent and contemporary conflicts around the world. We have tried to briefly summarize what seem to us to be the main conclusions from this rather complicated work.

In reviewing peacemaking activities of religious groups in a diversity of cases around the world he identifies these kinds of religious actors: religious militants, religious NGOs, national and transnational religious hierarchies, ecumenical and interreligious bodies and local religious communities. Based on this review he concludes that a range of peacemaking activities 'fall within the sphere of religious influence: preventive diplomacy, education and training, election monitoring, conflict mediation, nonviolent protest and advocacy for structural reform, and withdrawing or providing moral legitimacy for a government in times of crisis. It is important to recognize the interrelatedness of religious involvement in peacemaking at every phase of a conflict and at various levels of society.' (Appleby 2000: 211)

Based on his examination of a wide range of cases, Appleby perceives that 'religious agency' has contributed to conflict transformation in three ways. We will offer only brief examples of each. First, in conflict management they have been particularly active 'as *social critics* calling government officials and political, military, and business elites to account for unjust and abusive policies.' (Appleby 2000: 213). Second, religious actors have participated in conflict resolution by providing *good offices* and serving as *mediators*. In one example, beginning in 1968 the Catholic Church in Bolivia served for more than twenty years in helping resolve 'practically every major clash between the miners and the national government and in many impasses that were produced by the elections for the presidency.' (Appleby 2000: 217) Third, based on their 'reputation for integrity and their long-term commitment to the society', religious actors have contributed to postconflict peacebuilding: structural reform. One prominent example is reform of the army and judiciary in Guatemala based on a church-sponsored Project for the Recovery of Historical Memory which developed *Guatemala: Never Again*, a report on government and rebel atrocities during war in Guatemala. (Appleby 2000: 220)

Appleby also notes the significance of the fact that religious actors approach peace issues from a number of social and religious locations. Some have a strong institutional base in a major religion that reaches across many states, while others represent an indigenous tradition. Actors coming from major religions can have religious roles that range from the very local to high office in a single state or in the worldwide organization. After providing an array of concrete examples of roles played by religious actors, including the Pope, a Guatemalan bishop and Mennonites in Northern Ireland, Appleby recognizes the need for 'identifying and documenting the roles of the full complement of religious actors in recent conflict settings, [a task] rendered all the more difficult by the sheer number of such actors in many cases.' (Appleby 2000: 226)

Of course, an additional complicating factor is the fact that large, and widely spread, religious organizations may play a diversity of roles, not all of which are complementary, in a specific conflict. Appleby offers as an example the roles of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines which ranged from 'critical collaboration' in the early 1980s, to gradually coalescing religious opposition to the regime. The shift was led by Catholic activists, later fueled by concern of bishops responding to government policy decisions prohibiting religious leaders from working with labor and peasant groups, and eventually to opposition of Cardinal Jaime Sin after consultation with the Vatican and Pope John Paul II.

Appleby concludes his framework for approaching the activities of religious peace actors by noting three modes of religious conflict transformation: crisis mobilization, saturation, and interventionist (mediator and magister). (Appleby 2000: 329) First, in the crisis mode religious participation in conflict resolution is spontaneous and primarily unanticipated, emerging out of existing active involvement in a society. Examples offered by Appleby are emergence of resistance to British rule in India in 1947, the civil rights movement in the USA in the 1960s and the South African struggle against Apartheid. He tends to see these religious movements as responsive to charismatic leadership and tending not to be prepared to play a role as conflict transformer. Thus, they tend to appear mainly in times of crisis and to diminish in significance in the aftermath of crisis. (Appleby 2000: 236)

Second, religious peace activists may begin in a spontaneous mode but eventually saturate the society. Appleby offers Northern Ireland as an example in which 'peace advocates operated at several levels of religion and society and persisted through decades of continuous activity, [becoming] part of the institutional and social landscape. At the highest official levels of the Catholic, Presbyterian, Methodist, Anglican, and other churches ...religious leaders condemned sectarian violence, criticized their belligerent coreligionists, encouraged peacemaking efforts, entered in ecumenical dialogue with one another, and sponsored joint social, economic, and educational initiatives designed to foster cross-communal cooperation and build trust among erstwhile antagonists.' (Appleby 2000: 236-237) Based on the Northern Ireland experience Appelby concludes that the saturation mode 'stands the best chance of evolving into actual religious peacebuilding.' (Appleby 2000: 237) But he carefully notes that the saturation mode has been feasible only in rare situations in which very special conditions are present that include strong religious and cultural institutions deeply entrenched in a society that have nurturing assistance from abroad and 'where civil society and democratic traditions were not distant hopes but historic realities.' (Appleby 2000: 238)



Because of the limited value of the crisis mode, and the rare relevance of the spontaneous mode, Appleby concludes that his third mode – the interventionist mode – is the most promising. In this mode external religious and cultural actors usually intervened in conflict situations, primarily at the invitation of parties to the conflict.. These external actors worked with religious parties on the ground, but local religious actors assumed leadership and responsibility for sustaining the effort. In these cases Appelby discerned mediation to be the most common and productive form of intervention. For example, he believes that external religious mediators played a critical role in ending the Mozambican civil war, along with a complex cast of other actors that included UN agencies, secular and humanitarian NGOs, local secular actors and interested states.

Appleby notes that one shortcoming of this approach has been that it tended to involve only top-level officials and rarely established relationships with midlevel and grassroots leaders. As a result of this experience, he believes there emerged an approach aimed at 'development, over the long term, of indigenous religious (and other) actors dedicated to sustaining cultures of peace in their respective societies.' (Appleby 2000: 240). He labels this form of religious peacebuilding 'magisterial' because it has connotations of a master-student relationship. Noting the potential for neocolonialist connotations in this approach, he approves its application by Lederach through an elicitive method 'based on an awareness and appreciation of culturally specific epistemology, or ways of knowing, and recognizes that any model of peacebuilding must be both multivalent and adaptive to local knowledge and customs.' (Appleby 2000: 240)

Based on his effort to develop a systematic overview, after examining a wide range of religious peacebuilding efforts, particularly in the years surrounding the end of the Cold War, Appelby concludes that 'the most promising initiatives ...sought to train indigenous religious and cultural leaders in the art of nonviolent conflict transformation.' (Appleby 2000: 243) Ideally he believes this should be part of a 'a larger collaborative effort to build (or rebuild) a culture of civic tolerance in societies weakened by long-standing ethnic, religious or political strife ... through a process of evoking from within local religious traditions the conceptual and theological-ethical resources relevant to the culture-specific task of fostering peaceable relationships within and across divided communities.' Finally, he notes that these efforts are not only contributing to the transformation of conflict itself, 'but also the way in which politicians, human rights activists, international lawyers, social psychologists, political philosophers, and policymakers conceptualize conflict and its peaceful resolution.' (Appleby 2000: 244)

Luc Reychler

Luc Reychler provides another useful overview in an article on 'Religion and Conflict' in the International Journal of Peace Studies (1997). Based on actual activities of religious peace actors, he offers an informative typology of their peace-making activities, dividing them into three types: traditional diplomatic efforts, Track II peace-making, and field-diplomacy. With respect to traditional diplomatic efforts, he illustrates 'six resources' of traditional diplomacy with examples of diplomatic activity of the Vatican:

- (1) *Moral legitimacy*, e.g., the Pope's mediation in the Beagle Channel conflict.
- (2) *Neutrality*, e.g. in the Beagle Channel mediation it was obvious that the Vatican had no interests in the disputed islands.

- (3) *Ability to advance other's political standing.* e.g., 'a papal audience, papal visit or involvement confers political advantage on state leaders. This advantage can be used at key junctures in a mediation ...' (Reychler 1997: 29)
- (4) *Ability to reach the (world) public opinion,* the Pope can command the attention of the media.
- (5) *Network of information and contacts,* the information and communication networks of the Catholic Church are extensive..
- (6) *Secrecy,* 'Confidentiality is a major asset for mediation. As an organization with no claim to democratic procedures or open government, the Holy See is known to be able to keep a secret' (Reychler 1997: 30).

Reychler sees Track II Peace-making, which he also refers to as Track II Diplomacy, as an activity of both religious and non-religious NGOs, and refers to both Quakers and Catholics when offering religious examples. He concludes his discussion of Track II diplomacy by noting that it involves activities such as these four:

- (1) Establishing channels of *communication* between the main protagonists to facilitate private exploratory discussions 'without commitment in all matters that have or could cause tensions.'
- (2) Setting up an organization that can *offer services* for parties engaged in conflicts within and between nations.
- (3) Establishing a center to *educate* people undertaking such work.
- (4) Creating a *research* center or network in which know-how and techniques are developed to support the tasks listed above (Reychler 1997: 32).

Distinctive in Reychler's approach to Track II Diplomacy is his call not only for creating a second line of communication among conflicting parties, but explicitly requiring a backup organization that offers services, education and research.

Particularly notable is Reychler's third type of diplomacy, Field-diplomacy, which he defines as 'sending non-governmental teams to conflict areas, for an extended period, to stimulate and support local initiatives for conflict prevention.' (Reychler 1997: 32) He offers three reasons for the development of this activity. First, the failure of traditional diplomacy by states and inter-state organizations to prevent conflicts. Second, 'explosion of peace-keeping and humanitarian relief efforts' that consume large budgets when lesser resources applied earlier could have prevented violence escalation. Third, growing awareness that non-governmental teams must be in a conflict area for an extended period of time in order to develop local trust, facilitate early warning and keep communications open between conflict parties. Reychler notes that this approach is still in an embryonic stage of its development. (Reychler 1997: 32)

Reychler sees the Center for Peace, Non-violence and Human Rights in Osijek, Croatia, founded in 1991, close to the Serbian border, 'as a model for field-diplomacy.' It was founded by twenty people, with a core group of five that includes Croats, Serbs and Moslems. Their activities include promoting human rights, teaching methods and strategies of active non-violence, assisting in the resettlement of refugees, and mediating in conflict situations.

He asserts that field diplomacy is distinguished from Track II Diplomacy in eight ways:



- (1) a credible presence in the field is required,
- (2) a serious, long term engagement is necessary,
- (3) a multi-level approach is required, including top leadership, middle level leaders and local representatives of the people,
- (4) peace and the peace process cannot be prescribed from the outside,
- (5) a broad time perspective is required,
- (6) attention is focused on the deep layers of the conflict, including psychological wounds, mental walls and emotional and spiritual levels,
- (7) recognition of the complex interdependence of apparently different conflicts, e.g. the links between conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi and Belgian and French relations with these areas in the past and the present, and
- (8) importance of a more integrative approach of the peace process.

Reychler ends his analysis with lists of the strengths and weaknesses of religious peace-making, beginning with seven items of strength (Reychler 1997: 35-36):

- (1) over 2/3 of people 'belong to a religion',
- (2) religious organizations have the capacity to mobilize people and to cultivate attitudes of forgiveness and conciliation,
- (3) religious organizations can rely on soft power sources to influence the peace process: reward power, expert power, legitimate power, referent (relationship) power, and informational power,
- (4) non-governmental organizations fulfill tasks for which traditional diplomacy is not equipped,
- (5) most religious organizations can make use of their transnational organizations, and
- (6) religious organizations are in the field.

He insightfully follows with these four weaknesses:

- (1) Religions are still perpetrators of violence. 'In many of today's conflicts they remain primary or secondary actors or behave as passive bystanders' (Reychler 1997: 36).
- (2) They tend to be reactive players.
- (3) There is a lack of effective cooperation between religious organizations.
- (4) Those involved need more professional experience

Reychler concludes that 'Religions and religious institutions have an untapped and under-used integrative power potential. To assess this potential and to understand which factors enhance or inhibit joint peace ventures between the Christian religions, but also between the prophetic religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam), the Indian religions (Hinduism and Buddhism) and the Chinese wisdom religions, is an urgent research challenge' (Reychler 1997: 37). Toward this end he sees a need for a typology of the religious dimension of conflicts, a study of the impact of religious organizations on conflict behavior and comparative research of peace-making and peace-building efforts of different religious organizations.

Other Approaches Briefly Noted

Before proceeding to overview conclusions based on the efforts of these three scholars, it is important that we note just a few examples of approaches taken by others, as a way of illuminating the diversity found in this growing field of inquiry. Two other works offering broad coverage are one by Marc Gopin and an edited

volume by Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson. In *Between Eden and Armageddon: the Future of World Religions, Violence and Peacemaking* (2000) Gopin provides a twenty-eight page concluding chapter of 'Systematic Recommendations for Intervention in Contemporary Conflicts that is divided into three categories:

- (1) the religious world,
- (2) policy formation by both governmental and non-governmental organizations, and
- (3) special recommendations for regional conflicts that take into account specific aspects of religions in these areas.

He has chosen these regions: United States, Latin America, the Indian subcontinent, Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.

In *Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (2000), Johnston and Sampson offer case studies of Franco-German reconciliation, Nicaragua, East Germany, Philippines, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, followed by chapters on implications for the foreign policy community (Burnett 2000), values relevant to conflict resolution to be found in an array of world religions (Cox 2000), and 'Looking ahead: Toward a new paradigm'. (Johnston 2000) Johnston suggests that 'reconciliation born of spiritual conviction can play a critical role by inspiring conflicting parties to move beyond the normal human reaction of responding in kind, of returning violence for violence.' (Johnston 2000: 333).

After noting the evolution in the peace research agenda from concern only for negative peace, to concern also for positive peace, Groff and Smoker draw attention to the fact these are both forms of outer peace. They argue strongly, and at length, that peace research must be extended to include inner peace. In their words, the internal aspect of religion is the 'mystical, direct spiritual experience or esoteric part.' (Groff and Smoker 1996: 58) They summarize their argument with these five points (Groff and Smoker 1996: 105-108):

- (1) Peace research must focus on both inner and outer peace and the dynamic interrelationships between them.
- (2) Peace research must elaborate on the different dimensions and levels of inner peace, just as it has done for outer peace.
- (3) To explore inner peace, peace research must acknowledge other ways of knowing besides the scientific method (based on the five senses).
- (4) Peace research must focus not only on what it wants to eliminate, but also on what it wants to envision and create in a positive sense – if peace is to be achieved.
- (5) Peace research must explore and include how cultures influence people's perceptions of 'peace' as well as how much people believe the world can be changed or not.

Abu-Nimer sees value in training for peacebuilding that involves participants from different religions. For him a goal of interreligious peacebuilding 'is to facilitate a change from the participants' narrow exclusionist, antagonistic, or prejudiced attitudes and perspectives to a more tolerant and open-minded attitude.' (Abu-Nimer 2000)

Finally, the recent Millennium World Peace Summit of Religious and Spiritual Leaders (Love 2001) has drawn attention to efforts to convene world gatherings



of religious leaders in order to develop their support for, and involvement in, peacebuilding. This event gathered over 1000 religious leaders in the General Assembly Hall at UN headquarters. It was preceded by a gathering of over 8000 religious leaders at the 1993 Centennial Parliament of the World's Religions, and in 1968 by the International Inter-Religious Conference on Peace held in New Delhi in 1968 (Jack 1968). Two years later the World Conference on Religion and Peace was founded with a focus on multireligious cooperation and development of a network of religious people committed to cooperative action for peace.

It is very significant that the WCRP has recently 'shifted its emphasis to mobilizing religious communities in troubled regions, engaging them in collaborative conflict prevention/resolution and rebuilding civil society.' (www.wcrp.org) Facilitating these efforts are a Standing Commission on Conflict Transformation, an Analytical Working Group on Religion and Peacebuilding that attempts to involve leading scholars, and a Religious Practitioners Working Group that involves leading religiously-based practitioners of peacebuilding in exchange with the Analytical Working Group. Significant here is the evolution of this effort from an exchange of ideas through meetings to an emphasis on dialogue between scholars and religious practitioners toward the end of peacebuilding in specific cases of disruptive conflict.

Conclusion

Reychler's list of strengths of religious peace actors offers a useful introduction to our conclusion:

- (1) over 2/3 of people 'belong to a religion',
- (2) religious organizations have the capacity to mobilize people and to cultivate attitudes of forgiveness and conciliation,
- (3) religious organizations can rely on soft power sources to influence the peace process: reward power, expert power, legitimate power, referent (relationship) power, and informational power,
- (4) non-governmental organizations fulfill tasks for which traditional diplomacy is not equipped,
- (5) most religious organizations can make use of their transnational organizations, and
- (6) religious organizations are in the field.

At the same time, his list of weaknesses of religious peace actors provides a succinct list of challenges that they must overcome:

- (1) Religions are still perpetrators of violence. 'In many of today's conflicts they remain primary or secondary actors or behave as passive bystanders.'
- (2) They tend to be reactive players.
- (3) There is a lack of effective cooperation between religious organizations.
- (4) Those involved need more professional experience (Reychler 1997: 35-36).

Our summary of three overviews of increasing involvement of religious groups in peace activities has revealed it to be dynamically responding to these weaknesses. In a summary consistent with our other sources, Sampson finds religious peace efforts to be increasingly systematic and intentional. There is a growing diversity of roles. New actors are being targeted and trained, including field workers, whose roles are extending to healing and reconciliation. There is a

proliferation of proposals for ecumenically based citizens' services for peace. Internet conferences are now being added (Sampson 1997: 305-307).

We have encountered four different typologies for listing the nature of emerging religious peace activity:

- (1) Sampson lists five religious peace roles: advocates, observers, educators, intermediaries, and institutional actors (Sampson 1997: 280-300) Appleby's list of religious actors includes: militants, NGOs, national and transnational religious hierarchies, ecumenical and interreligious bodies, and local religious communities (Appleby 2000: 211).
- (2) Closely related to these roles are lists of activities by Appleby and Reyhler. Appleby's list of activities includes preventive diplomacy, education and training, election monitoring, conflict mediation, nonviolent protest, advocacy for structural reform, withdrawing or providing moral legitimacy. (Appleby 2000: 211). Reyhler's list includes providing channels of communication, performing services for parties, education and providing a research center (Reyhler 1997: 32).
- (3) Reyhler perceives the primary resources offered by religious peace activists to be moral legitimacy, neutrality, ability to advance other's political standing, and ability to reach the world (public opinion) (Reyhler 1997: 30)
- (4) Appleby draws attention to the number of social and religious locations available to religious peace activists. They include a strong institutional base in a major religion that reaches across many states, a high office in a single state, local offices and those involved in indigenous traditions (Appleby 2000: 226).

Based on insight derived from their typologies of roles, activities, resources and locations of religious peace actors, Appleby and Reyhler each discern that religious peace activity combines these dimensions in three fundamental ways. Appleby's three-fold typology of religious conflict transformation includes

- (1) crisis mobilization,
- (2) saturation and
- (3) interventionist.

He sees the interventionist mode, in which external actors work with local religious actors toward the end of facilitating their leadership and responsibility for sustaining the effort, as the most promising. But, after noting concern that this effort could have neocolonialist connotations, he warns that it must be 'adaptive to local knowledge and customs' (Appleby 2000: 240).

Reyhler (1997: 32) also offers a three-fold typology of religious peace-making activities:

- (1) traditional diplomacy,
- (2) Track II peace-making and
- (3) field-diplomacy, which he defines as 'sending non-governmental teams to conflict areas, for an extended period, to stimulate and support local initiatives for conflict prevention.'

His list of the characteristics of field-diplomacy merit repeating (Reyhler 1997: 32):



- (1) credible presence in the field,
- (2) serious, long term engagement,
- (3) a multi-level approach, including top leadership, middle level leaders and local representatives of the people,
- (4) peace and the peace process cannot be prescribed from the outside'
- (5) a broad time perspective,
- (6) attention to the deep layers of the conflict, including psychological wounds, mental walls and emotional and spiritual levels,
- (7) recognition of the complex interdependence of apparently different conflicts, e.g. the links between conflicts within the country and links to other countries.

What relationship is there between the escalating activities of peace activists and our 'peacemaker's tool chest'? Two aspects of these activities seem to be particularly relevant. First, religious peace activists tend to employ a broad array of peace tools. These certainly include diplomacy, Track II diplomacy, human rights, humanitarian intervention, peaceful settlement, preventive diplomacy, non-violence, and self reliance. At the same time, many others are implied. There is no doubt that religious peace activists have a broader approach to the quest for peace than many state actors do.

Second, it would seem that religious peace actors have added a tool to our chest: field diplomacy. We conclude that 'field diplomacy', as described by Reychler above, should be added to the NGO/Peoples Movements column of Figure 2. When religious peace actors combine a diversity of peace tools in a sustained effort at the site of a conflict, toward the end of long term peace building, this is a distinctive approach that merits inclusion in the peace activist's tool chest. On the other hand, I do believe that 'field diplomacy' title does not fully convey the nature of the contribution of this tool. One other possibility would be 'sustained field peacebuilding.'

Finally, all of the scholars whose work we have reported, as well as others, urge systematic research on the activities of religious peace actors. We certainly agree and would suggest that particular emphasis be placed on discerning the degree to which field diplomacy is being employed, and comparative studies of its impact. Given its broad and sustained approach, it would be particularly useful to learn how these efforts are related to, and impact, peace efforts by other actors. This would be useful in fulfilling Sampson's recommendation that religious peace actors 'coordinate their contributions as integral to the larger peacebuilding enterprise' (Sampson 1997: 307).

It would also be useful to investigate the degree to which the motivations and career patterns of religious peace actors are similar to, and different from, other peace actors, particularly those in other kinds of NGOs/people's movements. This question comes in response to Appleby's characterization of the special nature of 'religious peacebuilding'. He asserts that it must come to be viewed as both an area of expertise and a preeminent expression of religious commitment, a 'professional 'calling as well as a religious 'vocation' that is highly prized within the religious community and by which its practitioners are lifted up for specific recognition and support...' (Appleby 2000: 306).

The results from these two lines of inquiry could help to strengthen the efforts of those devoted to the second religious culture identified by Elise Boulding in our introduction.

Most religions ... have two distinctly contrasting cultures: the 'holy war' and the 'peaceable kingdom' (Boulding 1986).

At the same time, in the light of the fact that field diplomacy takes a broad positive peace approach, including efforts to avoid neo-colonialist forms of peacebuilding, results of the recommended research could even encourage those now involved in the 'holy war' culture to shift to 'the peaceable kingdom.'

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Web Sites

Millennium Peace Summit of Religious and Spiritual Leaders,
www.millenniumpeacesummit.com
World Conference on Religion and Peace, www.wcrp.org



REVIEW ESSAY

Kosovo and the Remaking of International Relations

David Chandler, Brunel University, UK

The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned

Independent International Commission on Kosovo

Oxford University Press, 2000

HBK: ISBN: 0199243085 £35.00

PBK: ISBN: 0199243093 £11.99

pp. 372 (including: index, notes, bibliography, annexes, and map)

Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO's War: Alliance Force or Forced Allies?

Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley (eds)

Palgrave, 2001

HBK: ISBN: 0312238177 £32.50

pp. 246 (including: index)

Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship

Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (eds)

United Nations University Press, 2000

PBK: ISBN: 9280810502 \$39.95

pp. 536 (including: index, tables and figures)

Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion

Michael Waller, Kyril Drezov and Bülent Gökay (eds)

Frank Cass, 2001

HBK: ISBN: 0714651575 £45.00

PBK: ISBN: 0714681768 £17.50 \$24.50

pp. 190 (including: index, documents and maps)

The Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?

Tony Weymouth and Stanley Henig (eds)

Reuters/Pearson Education, 2001

HBK: ISBN: 0273651587 £19.99

pp. 316 (including: bibliography, index and maps)

Introduction

The books reviewed here argue that the international intervention in Kosovo lays down important markers or guideposts for the future of international relations. As the editors of *Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion* note: 'NATO's decision to launch air strikes against Yugoslavia in response to a perceived Serbian campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was a cardinal defining moment in the development of the international order since the end of the Cold War' (p. 145). UK Prime Minister Tony Blair famously declared the conflict to be a war 'fought not for territory but for values'. The edited collections under review all analyse the relative importance of 'ethical principles' in the policy-making of the states involved. Apart from being seen as the first post-modern 'humanitarian' war, NATO intervention bypassed the UN Security Council, indicating an important shift in the structure of international security. The war over Kosovo has been generally recognised as a crucial point in the gradual evolution of a new set of international norms and accompanying reform of international security arrangements.



Most commentators agree that, overall, this development is a progressive and desirable one: the confusions, ambiguities and inevitable 'inconsistencies' surrounding the lessons of Kosovo are generally seen to be a necessary and unfortunate part of the process of change. As Alex Danchev argues, in *The Politics of Delusion*, the international commitment to Kosovo highlighted that international society was entering a 'healthier moral zone'; so, despite acknowledging that international action was 'selective, late, manipulative, erratic and, in many cases (too many cases) fatal', the final judgement has to be that Kosovo was, at least, 'a good place to start' (pp. 95-7). The assumption that the shortcomings of the Kosovo experience should be seen positively, as part of the 'learning curve' towards a more progressive and ethical international order, enables much of the discussion of the lessons of Kosovo to focus on future possibilities rather than dwelling on the more uncomfortable problems of the conflict itself.

This optimism makes a pleasing change from the rather gloomy prognoses that seem to dominate in most areas of international policy-analysis. However, beyond agreement on normative aspirations, there is little clear view of exactly how new institutional norms and practices can emerge following the direction taken over Kosovo. What is the role of the UN vis-à-vis 'coalitions of the willing' prepared to take unilateral action to uphold international norms? How are the right of intervention and the protection of individual human rights to be squared with the traditional concerns of state sovereignty and non-intervention. How can the strict international prohibitions on the use of force be enforced at the same time as recognizing the need to prevent widespread human rights abuses? As Patrick Thornberry notes, in the same volume:

We are in general terms witnessing a sea-change in the relations between sovereignty and human rights... but the precise contribution of the Kosovo imbroglio is as yet unclear. If Kosovo is a step on the voyage to somewhere, direction and destination are still shrouded in mist (p. 44).

This review essay considers the extent to which it is possible to match normative aspirations with new institutional structures and briefly considers three areas where the Kosovo crisis has raised new questions of international relations: the reform of the international security architecture, the changing nature of international law and, finally, the experiment with new forms of regulation in Kosovo and the wider Balkan region.

Security Architecture

Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, the editors of *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention*, argue: 'Military action outside the UN framework was not NATO's preferred option of choice. Rather its resort to force was a critical comment on the institutional hurdles to effective and timely action by the United Nations' (p. 501). In the foreword to *Alliance Politics*, Stanley Hoffman asserts that the Kosovo crisis highlighted the central flaw of the current architecture of world governance, that 'it is the Security Council that is the legitimate authority and that regional bodies can only act with the Security Council's consent' (p. ix). With the power of veto, Russia and China can limit or prevent humanitarian intervention, which 'explains why Washington and London have favoured "coalitions of the willing"' (ibid.).

Many contributors to these works wish to preserve the international authority of the UN. Thakur and Schanbel making the questionable claim that: 'The recourse

to force by NATO was an effort to restore UN authority in the Balkans, which was crumbling under the sustained challenge from Serbia' (p. 501). However, it appears that the only way of preserving the UN is to remove its authority as the final arbiter of the use of force while preserving its legitimising function. In practice this was done, as Patrick Thornberry notes, the conflict 'ended' with a UN resolution, 'which appears to wash over any NATO illegalities like a wave on the beach' (p. 55). He adds that: 'There is a bitter irony in resolution 1244's "reaffirmation" of "the commitment of all member states to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" – after its "degradation" by NATO action'.(ibid.) The *Kosovo Report* suggests that, to avoid such an obviously artificial face-saving device, the UN should be reformed along two lines. Firstly, the UN Charter could be amended to privilege the protection of human rights alongside the existing priority of international peace and security, thereby legitimising international intervention on humanitarian grounds, secondly, the right of veto should be removed from members of the Security Council, allowing intervention where there is no international consensus (pp. 195-8).

These proposals would give formal legitimacy to military intervention, where there is no Security Council consensus, but in doing so remove any international sanction against unilateral action declared to be in aid of human rights. It, in fact, seems unlikely that the final authorising authority for international intervention will ever return to the United Nations as the 'institutional hurdles' to Western activism stretch well beyond Russian and Chinese recalcitrance at the level of the Security Council. As the *Kosovo Report* notes, the NATO states did not seek legitimacy by bypassing the Security Council and putting the question to the General Assembly, under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, because it would have been unlikely to pass by the required two-thirds majority (p. 174). The United Nations' legitimacy is based on international diplomatic consensus rather than on military coercion. Stanley Henig states, in the concluding essay of *The Kosovo Crisis*: 'The UN has a proven, if limited, capacity to broker agreements and maintain peace: it is very rarely an organization capable of going to war' (p. 285). As long as there is no international consensus on intervention it seems inevitable that decision-making will be increasingly restricted to self-selecting 'coalitions of the willing'.

Both *Alliance Politics* and *The Kosovo Crisis* present collections of essays which study the motivation of the governments involved in the pre-eminent 'coalition of the willing' – NATO. Kosovo was a catalyst in transforming NATO from a defensive alliance, focusing attention on traditional security threats against its members, into a 'security community', overtly concerned with questions of shared values and identity. Essays, in *Alliance Politics* by Stephen M. Walt, S. Neil MacFarlane and David G. Haglund consider the 'constructivist' case, forwarded, for example, by Alexander Wendt and Thomas Risse, that NATO represents more than a 'realist' concern with national interest or an 'institutionalist' concern with consultation and coordination, and is a projection of a new collective democratic civic identity rather than a set of power relations.

Both collections indicate that while some states, such as France, Canada and the UK, may have seen themselves as 'norm entrepreneurs', keen to support NATO action, as a show of both individual and collective moral commitment to a new normative framework of policy-making, others such as Italy and Germany were keen to demonstrate their international credibility as part of the NATO alliance, despite domestic difficulties. However, contributors to *The Kosovo Crisis*, for example, Christopher Williams, are perhaps too optimistic in the claim that NATO



action strengthened the collective security system (p. 31). As Andrew Fear notes, in *The Politics of Delusion*:

NATO's marginalization of the UN is an act in defiance of, not in accordance with, the will of the international community, the majority of whom are opposed to its actions. It has set back immeasurably any chance that a distinct international forum will emerge, in particular one that could make binding decisions against the self-perceived interests of the USA (p. 94).

In fact, the lesson of Kosovo was not just that the UN was not a viable instrument for organising coercive international intervention. NATO too, came under sustained criticism for being bound by diplomatic and political consensus-building. The criticisms of the military tactics and the hesitancy to commit ground troops stem from a belief that the need to maintain alliance unity meant action around the 'lowest common denominator'. For Ray Funnell, writing in *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention*, the humanitarian aims of minimising casualties were undermined by diplomacy, he argues that: 'What should have been promised was that air attacks would be relentless, and that is precisely what should have been delivered – no bombing pauses, no hint that the attacks would ease if Milosevic did anything other than fully accept NATO's terms' (p. 445). In the same volume, Jean-Marc Coicaud draws out the 'dilemmas of international democratic culture' which meant that the NATO alliance pursued 'half-hearted measures' as the political leaders were held back by the need for consensus between themselves and for domestic support (p. 474). In *The Kosovo Crisis*, Peter J. Anderson similarly bemoans the fact that 'the extent to which NATO could be "aggressive" was limited clearly by the domestic political agendas of such Alliance members as Germany..., Italy and Greece' (p. 184).

The status of particular institutional forums is increasingly put to question. Rather than the creation of new security structures it seems likely that Kosovo highlights the shift away from formal mechanisms towards a much more ad-hoc set of security arrangements. *Alliance Politics* usefully goes beyond constructivist v realist debates over the success of NATO in the post-Cold War world and highlights the fragmentary nature of 'postmodern' policy-making of 'coalitions of the willing'. As Anne Deighton notes, rather than NATO *per se* usurping the UN 'of most importance was the informal group, the so-called Quint' a transatlantic steering group of political directors from the US, UK, France, Germany and Italy, meeting privately and 'effectively making Western policy on the hoof' (p. 61). Just as the UN Security Council failed to meet the needs of co-ordinating 'effective and timely' military intervention, so to did the NATO structures and other earlier ad-hoc forums, involved in Balkan policy-making, such as the Contact Group.

Rather than giving credence to conservative 'institutionalist' views which suggest that existing collective bodies, such as the UN and NATO, are set to remain unchanged, or radical 'constructivist' conceptions of new security-communities of post-material values and identity, it would seem that we are witnessing are much more ad-hoc process of security structure formation, which 'realists' would recognise as based on US dominance. The reluctance of US policy-makers to be restrained by the formal mechanisms of NATO, let alone those of the UN, was demonstrated in the 'war on terror' against Afghanistan where the US took direct control of the military aspects. It seems likely that international security structures will increasingly rely on self-selecting and informal 'coalitions of the

willing', where US power will be less restrained by the opinions of other, less powerful states, like Russia or states from African and Asia.

International Law

Just as the security architecture was put to question by the Kosovo crisis so was the basic framework of international law. *Kosovo and the Challenge of International Intervention* attempts to clarify the legal ambiguity of the post-Kosovo world. As G. John Ikenberry notes:

In past historical eras, the end of major wars culminated in peace settlements that allowed the great powers to promulgate new rules and institutions of post-war international order. Power, interests, and norms were brought together and international order was recreated. For example, 1648, 1713, 1815, 1919, and 1945 were each a defining moment when basic principles, understandings, and institutional mechanisms for governance were fashioned. The end of the Cold War did not culminate in such an order-building moment (p. 86).

James Mayall's chapter, 'The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention Revisited', notes that law is a product of politics and power. Post-1945 international society was reconstructed under the influence of two central factors, which were no longer relevant in the 1990s – firstly, the discrediting of colonial rule and ideas of great power superiority and, secondly, the need to contain Cold War confrontation. These factors were reflected in the institutionalisation of legal and political equality of sovereign states and in the restriction on the use of force to instances where a consensus could be achieved in the Security Council (p. 323). Alan James' essay, 'The Concept of Sovereignty Revisited', highlights that the post-Cold War balance of politics and power necessitates a new legal framework. Today, in the forums of the United Nations, the formal political equality of respect between former colonies and their old colonial masters, despite their vast political, economic, social, and military distinctions, seems anachronistic. James argues: 'As politics customarily works, such inequality would express itself in the weaker entities having to defer, to one degree or another, to the stronger. To a largish extent, this is what tends to happen. But, as the outcome of legal and political developments since 1919, the ultimate sanction of force has been more or less ruled out' (p. 339).

This realignment between international law and political power was partially achieved through international responses to the Kosovo conflict. As Coral Bell notes, in the same volume, Kosovo demonstrated the clash between the old norms of international society, based on the political balance of 1945 and enshrined in the international law of the UN Charter, and 'newer norms' appealed to by the NATO powers, which asserted that the restriction on the use of force and presumption of equal rights of sovereignty were a barrier to effective international regulation (p. 451). The question that is left open, however, is whether the new 'norm driven' action of the NATO powers is capable of fully-fashioning a new institutional and legal framework. Andrew Linklater's chapter, 'The Good International Citizen and the Crisis in Kosovo', argues that rather than international law being based on a 'statist' conception of legal rights it should be based on a 'solidarist' conception of international society 'that argues that individuals are the ultimate members of that society, and states are obliged to protect their interests' (p. 486). In order to protect the rights of individuals from abuse:



good international citizens should be prepared to use force. As custodians of the global human rights culture they should take action to ensure that war criminals are prosecuted, and they should be prepared to reconfigure political systems that violate fundamental moral principles. Establishing international protectorates, partitioning societies, and promoting the establishment of federal or confederal arrangements are three possibilities available to the good international citizen (p. 486).

At present, international law is based on 'statist' principles, putting 'good international citizens' in the awkward position where they 'respect existing international legal principles' but also 'apply pressure to them' and 'challenge the status quo'. Linklater argues that Kosovo may well constitute a catalyst in the creation of a new legal framework:

Significantly, many who supported NATO's actions – albeit with reservations – did so not only because of a belief that a humanitarian catastrophe was possible but also because they believed that Kosovo might be a catalyst that introduces a new era of 'cosmopolitan law-enforcement'... Whether Kosovo will give rise to a new legality that removes the moral dilemma of the good international citizen is unclear ... but one of the fundamental responsibilities of the good international citizen is to strive to resolve the tension between legalism and progressivism in a new legal order (p. 493).

However, it would seem that the tension between legal universalism and progressive 'solidarist' aspirations cannot be resolved. The *Kosovo Report* argues that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is unlikely to take the universalist form of modern law, situating its interpretation: 'in a gray zone of ambiguity between an extension of international law and a proposal for an international moral consensus. In essence, this gray zone goes beyond strict ideas of *legality* to incorporate more flexible views of *legitimacy*' (p. 164). It seems that the 'moral imperative' of 'good citizenship' can only be hamstrung by 'adopting a legalistic view', the Independent Commission therefore argues that 'the effectiveness of rescue initiatives would seem to take precedence over legal niceties' (p. 176). The Commission stresses that 'the NATO campaign was illegal, yet legitimate' and that the gap between legality and legitimacy is inevitable without a new international consensus (p. 186).

Peter J. Anderson, contributing to *The Kosovo Crisis*, stresses that 'law and specific systems of ethics, of course, often do not coincide' (p. 199). Anderson argues that '*whatever* views we take of NATO's real motives... it could be said to be justified ethically in terms of its results' (ibid.). The Commission also asserts that, unlike legality, ethical legitimacy can operate retrospectively and clearly places the 'moral imperative' above law and diplomacy:

[I]t must be acknowledged that even a negotiated outcome attained by NATO diplomacy would still have consigned over 90% of the Kosovo population to oppressive and discriminatory rule under the FRY. The NATO military campaign... liberat[ed] the majority of the population... Such a favourable set of circumstances for Kosovo Albanians would not have been achieved even if the restoration of pre-1989 style autonomy had been agreed to by Belgrade (p. 176).

Whereas international law was based on sovereign equality and international consensus, ethical 'human rights' intervention presupposes the acceptance of sovereign inequality and the need for coercion. In effect, international law can no longer take a form analogous to domestic law, of equality of treatment, the power to coerce and intervene to force a 'favourable' outcome, remains the prerogative of the rich and powerful.

Kosovo and the Balkan Region

The Independent Commission does not favour the current 'transitional' protectorate solution for Kosovo, where, despite elected bodies at local and provincial levels, the UN Special Representative holds the highest level of civilian authority, capable of dismissing elected representatives and imposing legislation by decree (along similar lines to the indefinite international protectorate powers held over Bosnia). The Commission regards the current settlement as too 'statist' and argues that more ambiguity over sovereignty would be a positive step: 'It might be better to leave questions about the future in limbo, since a constructive ambiguity about the political future of the province might make it easier for all sides to overcome their reluctance to work together' (p. 261).

The Commission argues for a new principle to be openly established in Kosovo – the principle of conditional sovereignty: 'While conditional independence would effectively end FRY sovereignty over Kosovo, it would not immediately confer the full international legal personality of statehood either' (p. 274). The key reason for the solution of 'conditional independence' is that it is seen to create an important precedent. It would:

commit the international community to the... principle that states can lose their sovereign rights... Indeed, one of the central messages of the whole Kosovo tragedy is that by defending its sovereignty in Kosovo at all costs and by rejecting every attempt to internationalise the human rights problem in Kosovo, Serbia ended up accelerating its loss of the province (pp. 277-8).

As Peter J. Anderson argues, the principle of 'conditional sovereignty' was already implicit in international intervention. NATO 'accepted Serbia's continued legal right to exercise sovereignty over Kosovo, *but only after it had gained its credentials as a civilized, even handed, and competent authority to do so*' (*The Kosovo Crisis*, p. 199; emphasis in original). While the FRY would lose its sovereign rights over Kosovo, the gaining of sovereign rights for Kosovo would be dependent on conditions laid down by the international community. The concept of the 'gray zone' of conditional statehood highlights the shift in international approaches to the Balkan region as international involvement has been extended.

The Commission judges that 'conditional statehood' is preferable to 'full, unlimited and unconditional independence' because Kosovo lacks the external and internal preconditions necessary for recognition (p. 272). Firstly, it lacks the means to defend itself against attack from its more powerful neighbour and therefore is dependent on a NATO presence. Secondly, the Commission claims Kosovo 'lacks the other capacities of statehood: the ability to guarantee internal order, domestic safety and inter-ethnic peace' (p. 272). Because of the necessity of international community supervision of both its external security and internal human rights regimes, Kosovo can only aspire to conditional independence.



The judgement that statehood depends on a set of international prerequisites has a wider importance for sovereignty in the Balkan region. As Mathew Wyman notes, in *The Politics of Delusion*, this is a 'most positive development', praising President Clinton's 'entirely appropriate parallel with the process of child-rearing' where the kindest response to misbehaviour is to take action rather than ignore the child (p. 108). It appears that once it is accepted that the people of Kosovo are incapable and 'child-like' it is a short step to seeing other small states in the region as being equally in need of acts of kind intervention. The significance of this precedent is drawn out by the Commission:

Conditional independence for Kosovo is only a viable proposition within the context of a stability pact for all the small states in the region so that they can develop their infrastructure, trading ties, political and strategic partnerships within an enduring framework of peace. The European Stability Pact is a crucial step towards creating such a framework, but the Commission believes that the pact must acquire a political dimension as well as an economic one (p. 274).

The Balkan region is the test-bed for new experiments with 'conditional sovereignty' as the regulatory power of the EU expands in to the area without the Balkan states being treated as equal partners in the policy-making process. As Juan Diego Ramirez and Manuel Szapiro note, in *The Kosovo Crisis*, the result of military intervention has been the extension of both formal and informal EU regulatory structures in the region (pp. 128-33). In May 1999, in the wake of the conflict, the EU transformed its policy towards the region, offering the Balkan states the 'carrot' of future membership, through the Stabilisation and Association process. This process is described by the EU General Affairs Council as 'both pedagogical and political', whereby, in exchange for financial assistance, the Balkan states are forced into accepting EU conditionality tying aid to political and economic reforms laid down by Brussels. In July 1999, the EU pushed the process of external interference further through the launch of the Stability Pact which, unlike the formal EU accession process, has no formal constitution restricting the EU's coordination of international measures for security, economic relations and institution-building in the region.

Conclusion

Schnabel and Thakur, in the concluding chapter of *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention*, suggest that new, more 'complex', conflicts are the cause of current ambiguities in international codes of conduct, whether these concern security mechanisms, international norms of behaviour or the question of rights of sovereignty. They highlight, in particular, the problem of humanitarian intervention, which is seen to pit two international principles against each other – upholding international law and protecting human rights – the dilemma of intervention meaning 'being damned if we do and damned if we don't' (p. 497).

The experience of Kosovo suggests that the lack of certainty in international relations does not stem from the 'complexity' of events on the ground as much as the dissolution of an international order established, after the Second World War, on the basis of sovereign equality. The reassertion of great power authority and the importance of economic and military inequalities at the expense of the purely formal 'legalism' of political equality means that there is no basis for recreating a new institutional order based on the universals of law and equal sovereignty. While the advocates of 'progress' lead the challenge to 'statism' and 'legalism', and are happy to see the undermining of the UN Charter framework, the

'ambiguity' and 'gray area', which appears to be the only replacement available, recalls an earlier, less progressive, era of 'gun-boat diplomacy' and 'might makes right'.



The WWW Virtual Library: International Affairs Resources

Niall O Dochartaigh, National University of Ireland, Galway, Republic of Ireland

Name of Site: WWW Virtual Library: International Affairs Resources

Author: Wayne A. Selcher, Professor of International Studies

URL: <http://www.etown.edu/vl>

Type of site: directory/links

Housed at: Elizabethtown College, USA

Status [on 28^h June 2002]: live

This directory of Internet resources is part of the Virtual Library, a loose umbrella for hundreds of subject directories of widely varying quality. *International Affairs Resources* is divided into five major categories. 'Getting Started' includes 'Starter Tips for Internet Research', a list of links to tutorials and other sources on using the Internet for research. 'Media Sources' includes sub-sections on news sources, on radio and TV broadcasts and on International Relations journals and magazines. Much of the content of these two categories is thus quite general, pointing to resources of interest to people in a huge range of subject areas.

The latter three categories, on 'Organizations', 'Regions and Countries' and 'Topics' are the heart of the directory and each of them contains several sub-sections. Among the sixteen 'topics', for example, are 'Peace, Conflict Resolution and International Security', 'World Religions' and 'International Development'. Each topic includes a list of a large number of links but the author provides minimal description of the resources linked to.

Several years ago academics, library staff and researchers across the disciplines began to put up guides to resources in their own subject areas. By now there are innumerable guides to resources in every social science subject area you can imagine. All such directories face a few fundamental questions: what does your directory add that is not already provided by some other guide elsewhere? What audience are you addressing?

International Affairs Resources and other such guides which deal with a relatively broad subject area, rather than with a particular specialism, seem to me to be most useful to undergraduate students. The general tone and content of this directory suggests that this is the primary audience envisaged here, an impression reinforced by the inclusion of a section on 'Study, Work, Internships, and Service Abroad' in the category 'Topics'.

Such broad subject-area guides are immensely valuable for teaching purposes where they are of high quality. Teaching staff can simply ask undergraduate students to use particular guides and to limit themselves to the resources which a quality academic guide points to, unless the students have a powerful argument for using other online resources. It provides a measure of quality control over student use of the Internet while not involving a lot of work for the teachers.

If you consider this to be the prime function of such a guide, with a supplementary function being to direct more advanced students to other research resources, then certain things follow. The trick, as in teaching, is in what you leave out, not what you include. There are a million and one resources out there. What makes a guide valuable is not only the work of classification but also the work of quality-control, selecting central high-quality resources.

In this guide Selcher has clearly put a higher priority on being comprehensive than on being focused. In many cases the pages of links would have benefited from the eye of a ruthless editor. Because space is not at a premium on a web site the tendency is towards inclusion rather than exclusion. But there are other good reasons for exclusion. If this guide only contained half the links it does it would be a more valuable resource for undergraduate students.

There are several sub-sections in the guide which could be abandoned entirely. There are Spanish, French and German language sub-sections. The German language section, to take one example, points to language teaching sites, engines for searching German-based websites and German-language sites, among others. This is an example of the web site author expending energy on areas in which many others have produced directories. The selections in these sub-sections are not so directly targeted at International Affairs students that they justify the effort and the duplication of work done by existing guides.

By contrast the sub-section on 'International Relations Journals and Magazines' is particularly useful and this seems to me a good example of the kind of 'core business' which the site editor could develop further, prioritising those very focused sub-sections which cater directly to those in international relations.

At least one medium-scale study of Internet users has found that animated graphics alienate and frustrate a lot of users, distracting them from page content (Spool et al, 1999). The animated graphics used in this directory could be cut without any great loss. The directory had been updated just a few days before I last viewed it and there didn't seem to be any problem with broken links. This is, in any case, becoming less of a problem for researchers as the larger organisations and services realise that it is important to maintain stable URLs. There is a 'site map' at the bottom of each page, listing all of the sub-sections in the directory. While perhaps not very visually attractive it is extremely useful. You never have to go 'back' to reach another part of the site. I'd like to see this on more sites but the concern with sleek graphic design inhibits many from doing it. The site looked almost exactly the same in Netscape and in Internet Explorer with no access difficulties for either browser. There is an email link to the author on each page, allowing easy contact.

This is a good comprehensive guide, particularly useful for undergraduate students but I think it would be improved if the author focused on developing the 'core business', cutting the number of links radically and perhaps adding a little more description to the links which remain.

Reference

Spool, J. M., Scanlon, T., Snyder, C., Schroeder, W. and DeAngelo, T., 1999, *Web site usability: a designer's guide*, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, San Francisco.



REVIEWS

A Force More Powerful: A century of nonviolent conflict

Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall

Palgrave, 2000

Hbk ISBN 0312228643 \$29.95

pp. 544 (including: index, notes)

Is peaceful protest more powerful than armed resistance? Ackerman and DuVall would have us believe that civic disobedience constitutes a superior force to military might. Their bulky volume, a by-product of a documentary television series, is a global survey of a whole range of non-violent sanctions deployed against oppressive regimes. However, the reader may be justified in feeling sceptical about the success of the unarmed protests as presented in this volume.

What did peaceful sanctions achieve in tsarist Russia? How much does a chapter on the Palestinian intifada fit into the theme of peaceful resistance? Why and to what extent were the Danes more successful in 'withstanding German occupation without undergoing many of the rigors experienced by other Europeans held down by the Nazis' (p. 231)? In spite of many such questions, *A Force More Powerful* is a thought-provoking and challenging read. The authors are methodical and convincing in their attempt to explode the myth of violence. Unfortunately, however, they replace the old myth with a fanciful new one of 'victory without violence'. Despite the long narrative and the extended analysis, this book is essentially a journalistic advocacy of the ultimate strength of people power. Thus, professional historians are likely to baulk at most of the premises of this work. Was the twentieth century really a turning point in the history of political protest? Is it appropriate to discuss the Ruhrkampf of 1923 in the same breath as anti-Nazi resistance in wartime Europe? Can we really trace a 'century-long progression of ideas about nonviolent power and practice' (p. 5) starting in January 1905 in Russia?

It is acknowledged by the authors that peaceful methods 'have not always worked' (p. 8). Yet probably the most troubling aspect of this work is the repetitive and dubious claim that peaceful political 'techniques' – such as strikes, economic sanctions, and street demonstrations – are more effective in overthrowing dictatorial regimes than brute force. Although it is plain to see that violence hinders democratic developments, it is just as obvious that sporadic violence has tainted the achievements of nearly all civic resistance movements around the globe. More importantly, the softening of dictatorships and the eventual collapse of authoritarian regimes from Poland to South Africa were surely more the result of external factors than of popular dissent. Take the case of Solidarity in Poland, which is discussed in great detail in the book. The strikers of Gdansk, unlike the anti-communist demonstrators of Budapest in 1956 or Prague in 1968, achieved eventual victory because of the economic and political weaknesses of the Polish government and the deteriorating international position of the Soviet Union. Arguably, Solidarity's triumph had less to do with 'pragmatic choices', non-cooperation, or ingenuous techniques of resistance than external factors.

As the authors freely admit, this ambitious book is not a comprehensive history of all twentieth-century clashes in which peaceful sanctions played a part. Nevertheless, more than a dozen case studies sufficiently demonstrate the chronological and geographical span of twentieth-century political movements that achieved some success in challenging authoritarian regimes without overtly

resorting to armed struggle. Some chapters, notably those on tsarist Russia, the American South, and Gandhi's India, consist of long narratives, while others, such as those on anti-Nazi resistance and post-communist Mongolia, contain only cursory discussions. In all the case studies, the authors seek to illustrate the familiar thesis that 'military sanctions are not enough to stamp out a popular movement' (p. 231). In a number of case studies, they also conclude that democracy cannot be built on violence. The examples of Romania and the Philippines are chosen simply to reinforce the point that 'with no popular movements to lend direction to events new authoritarians step into the breach' (p. 438).

The storytelling style of the book makes it a popular and eloquent exposition of the 'power of the powerless'. However, the reader may feel that the differences in the political aims and methods of the various movements described are far more striking than the similarities. Furthermore, one could argue that the most striking common factor in the 'success stories' recounted is not the effectiveness of civil disobedience but the waning resolve of oppressive regimes to use violence against unarmed protestors. After all, the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square turned into a bloodbath because of the strength and determination of the communist regime and not, as the authors allege, because of the provocative style of the campaigners. Setting aside the historical debate on Hitler as 'a weak dictator', the resistance against Nazi Germany is the only case study in this volume that shows the success, however modest, of peaceful sanctions against an oppressive regime at its zenith. The other regimes discussed here were either economically bankrupt (communist Poland), militarily defeated and demoralised (tsarist Russia after the war against Japan), politically isolated (South Africa and Chile), or highly vulnerable to public opinion (interwar France, imperial Britain, and the US). For all that, *A Force More Powerful* makes an interesting read. It will certainly appeal to those who want to learn more about the power of civil protest and disobedience.

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The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics

Anna Cento Bull and Mark Gilbert

Palgrave, 2001

HBK: ISBN 0333750683 £45.00

pp. x + 204 (including: 5 tables, references, index)

Of Italy's political parties, the one that has almost certainly had the biggest impact on the course of the country's political development over the last fifteen years is the Northern League. Achieving its first real success in 1987 with the election of two members of Parliament, by 1992 it had taken almost 20% of the vote in the areas where it contested seats, and sent fifty-five representatives to the Chamber of Deputies. This achievement was then one of the most significant precipitating causes of the collapse of Italy's traditional parties of government and of the transformation of its party system.

The 1992 election outcome revealed the extent of public anger towards, and the consequent electoral vulnerability of, the Rome-based 'partyocracy'. It thus made clear to judicial investigators, whose exposure of the traditional parties' corruption would ultimately lead to their disintegration, that established



politicians no longer had the reserves of authority they had once been able to rely on to curb the activities of 'excessively' zealous magistrates. In the period since then, the League's calls for 'federalism', variously understood, have become common currency across the political spectrum; and now, even though it is not *numerically* decisive, the party occupies a position of considerable power within the Berlusconi coalition from where it is engaged in pushing forward the – so far, largely ad hoc and piecemeal – process of decentralising reform of the state begun in the previous legislature. In terms of the combination of electoral durability and political impact, it is difficult to think of any other party created *ex novo* in post-war Europe that has managed a performance more striking.

It is not very surprising then, that the party has attracted considerable attention from scholars. Yet, while there has been a large volume of literature published in Italian, *The Lega Nord* is, to my knowledge, only the second book-length investigation published in English. This excellent study is therefore very much to be welcomed for the significant contribution it will surely make to enhancing understanding of the League phenomenon outside Italy. And this contribution will certainly be the greater for the approach the authors adopt. That is, rather than insisting, as so many others have done, that the League can *only* be understood as an instance of this or that type of political movement, the authors accept that the competing categorisations hitherto advanced all have something to offer, and instead concentrate their efforts on the more straightforward task of attempting to understand the emergence and subsequent development of the party in the specific politico-economic context of the northern Italy of the 1980s and 1990s. The result is an account that is far more enlightening than those based on single categories – which inevitably provide insight into some aspects of the phenomenon while failing to do so in relation to others.

The authors' underlying epistemology is based on structure and agency and the dynamic interplay between them. There are, they say, therefore 'three aspects that need to be taken into consideration when studying the Lega Nord: structural factors, the party's programme and its evolving world-view, and the nature of its electorate. Each of these aspects affects the others and is affected by them' (p.65).

In terms of structural factors, the authors' argument is that crucial to the League's emergence was the development from the 1960s of tens of thousands of highly specialised small firms in the North East and elsewhere. In the former area where Christian Democracy, like the communist subculture in the central regions, had played an important role in the emergence of small-scale enterprise, the Catholic party gradually lost its ability to represent the interests of small businesses effectively. Its pragmatism gradually degenerated into clientelism and corruption with significant costs for small entrepreneurs at a time of economic uncertainty. Its unwillingness to delegate to the regions at a time when the latter needed strengthening in terms of their capacity to help local businesses confront the uncertainty, added to the sense of frustration. This created an opening for a party like the League, whose local leaders were drawn directly from the small-business sector, and which also mobilised support by appealing to the exclusionary aspects of the cultural values that had played such an important role in small-business development in the area in the first place. This explains why the League found it particularly difficult to expand its support by appealing to a *national* constituency of small businesses and the self-employed and why characterisation of it as a poujadist party is wide of the mark.

Later – the authors continue – for reasons connected to its strategic location within the national-level party system, the League’s ideological trajectory began to diverge from the trajectory taken by the local economic interests whose concerns it had originally sought to articulate – with the result that it began to lose resonance in the milieu from which it had sprung. The ‘Padania’ project – with no historical legacy to draw upon and which was a shift from an attack on the institutions of the Italian *state* to an attack on the idea of Italy as a *nation* – simply failed to find an echo among northern industrial districts where autonomy was supported because ‘it is useful, not to create nations or peoples in opposition to the nation state’ (p.101), and whose economic fortunes had in the meantime moved on. Having seen its substantive federalist policies stolen by the mainstream parties and obliged to acknowledge the failure of ‘Padania’, the League has been forced to defend its political distinctiveness by accentuating the anti-immigrant and other far-right themes in its rhetoric – with the problem that many such themes, especially anti-immigration, now clash with the desperate labour shortages being faced by northern businesses. The book’s final chapter places the League’s political project within the broader context of the processes of globalisation and economic change, and of institutional and other reforms being pursued in response to these processes.

What we have here then, is an analysis which, in drawing on an impressive quantity of research material, offers an understanding of the League that is based on the impressive combination of an array of analytic perspectives. The result is a well-balanced account, one that provides real insight into where this remarkable party is now and how it has come to be there. Above all, through its detailed analysis of the political and economic reality from which the League arose and in which it currently operates, the book shows the compatibility of the seemingly disparate and contradictory features of the League phenomenon. It thereby makes possible an understanding of voters’ *own* perspectives and thus of why their support for the party was possible. The book is therefore essential reading, not only for Italian politics specialists, but also for comparativists wanting to study the League in search of defensible generalisations.

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Culture and Rights: Anthropological Perspectives

Cowan, Jane K, Marie-Bénédicte Dembour and Richard A. Wilson

Cambridge University Press, 2001

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pp. 258 (including: index, references)

This book makes a valuable contribution to the study of rights, moving the debate far beyond the conventional terms of universalism versus relativism that have dominated much of the mainstream discussion. In recent years it has increasingly been recognized that the alternative to the universalism of liberalism is not relativism and somewhere between these extremes the resolution of conflicts about rights must be found. The main argument of this book is that any discussion about rights must recognise the cultural nature of the discourse about rights. Rights – and more generally equality and difference – do not exist outside culture but are always negotiated – and even constructed – in particular contexts. The recognition of this is not detrimental to rights because culture is not a closed



system but is highly flexible. Moreover, cultures are not incommensurable but related. Empirical case studies, such as those presented in this book, by anthropologists and sociologists demonstrate that universalistic ideas about rights are always appropriated by local contexts.

The relationship between rights and culture is a complex one. The excellent Introduction by the editors distinguished between the idea of a right to culture and rights as culture. The former pertains largely to group rights, that is the rights of a culturally defined people to defend their cultural identity and way of life. This may take the form of special or differential rights (special representation rights, for instance) or exceptions from certain obligations. In this sense cultural rights establishes a groups right to difference. The second refer to the tendency by which rights may in fact constitute a kind of culture in that the rights discourse, in essence law, is becoming the basis of many cultures viability given the world wide consciousness of human rights. Legal reasoning is one way many groups, for instance indigenous groups, make sense of their situation. However, there are two issues here in this idea of rights as culture and which need to be more differentiated than they are in the volume, namely the idea of rights as a kind of global legal culture and, secondly, the social construction of groups by such universalistic legal cultures.

The contributions demonstrate what I take to be the two main arguments about the relation between rights and culture. The first argument concerning rights to culture is reflected in the five chapters that constitute the first part of the book where the stark dichotomy of universalism/particularism or equality/difference is rejected as an account of what actually happens in concrete situations. These chapters address the challenge of cultural rights as requiring discursive and pragmatic solutions. Sally Engle Merry demonstrates the debate is often grounded in processes of colonization and taking Hawaii as an example she shows how women activists use universalistic ideas to affirm indigenous rights. M.-B. Dembour show in an entirely different context how French excision trials do not always affirm universalistic notions of rights and that in practice legal reasoning is flexible. In a case study of Thai child prostitutes, Heather Montgomery shows that the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child may in fact be detrimental to the interests of children. Like many contributors, Anne Griffiths argues for a non-essentializing pluralism, in this case with respect to Botswanan peasant women for whom formal equality and monogamy as stated in the 1979 UN Convention on the elimination of discrimination against women frequently have to be compromised. Thomas Hylland Eriksen offers an insightful analysis of the 1995 UNESCO document, *Our Creative Diversity* showing how it embodies both a commitment to universal right and to cultural rights. In these chapters, perhaps with the exception of the last mentioned one, the assumption in general is that rights to culture are made on the basis of an *existing* culturally defined group. The second part of the book explores scenarios in which this is not the case.

In Part 2 four chapters explore the ways in which activists claim cultural rights and thus how cultures are constructed on the basis of rights. The central argument here is that rights are claimed by various groups who appropriate universal ideas to advance a local, ethnic cause. In this case what is at issue is the idea of rights as culture. Jane Cowan uses the interesting concept of 'minoritization' with respect to Macedonian minority claims in Greece. Her chapter suggests that in fact the confluence of rights and culture can led to an essentialization of culture. David Gellner in a study on Nepal shows how the official declarations of identity do not correspond with the real identities that

people have. In a study on Guatemala Rachel Sieder and Jessica Witchell warn against the dangers of imagining there is such a thing as a harmonious and traditional indigenous people. Colin Samson argues how the Innu have been forced into unequal relations in official state discourses in Canada and as a result are forced to claim rights that in fact are detrimental to their interests.

It is difficult to fault this excellent collection, which is very well edited and rich in detail and theoretical analysis. On the whole the first part is the more coherent in terms of rationale. The individual chapters in part 2 are equally excellent but what is not as clearly worked is how nascent discourses of cultural rights can undermine the very capacity of culture to be flexible and negotiable as demonstrated in the chapters in Part 1. Perhaps the key contribution of the volume is that it shows the value in seeing culture as an analytical category for discussing rights discourse. But what should not be neglected is power, for every cultural discourse is also one of power relations.

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British Government Policy in Northern Ireland, 1968-2000

Michael Cunningham

Manchester University Press (UK), Palgrave (USA), 2001

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pp. vii + 184 (including: index, bibliography, appendix)

Michael Cunningham's (1991) invaluable *British Government Policy in Northern Ireland, 1969-1989* has been out of print since the mid-1990s. On a number of occasions in the late 1990s I suggested to both Dr Cunningham and Manchester University Press that they should produce a revised and updated version. I was delighted, then, to receive a review copy of *British Government Policy in Northern Ireland, 1968-2000*. My delight turned to disappointment, however, when I realised that the new book is not really a second (revised and updated) edition. The 250 pages of the earlier book have been condensed into 80 pages, and much has been lost in the process. For example, the 17 pages outlining the relationship (constitutional and party political) between London and Belfast has been condensed into five pages, in the process of editing a nuanced understanding of the 1920 settlement, which partitioned Ireland, is lost. Gone too are the useful appendices, cut down from five (Principle legislation, Westminster party positions on security legislation and constitutional initiatives, Northern Ireland Office [NIO] Ministers, Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental meetings) to one (NIO Ministers).

The new book has the advantage over the previous book that approximately half of it covers the 1990s, the decade in which the peace process developed. This is a considerable advantage given that the 1990s have witnessed the most comprehensive and thoroughgoing changes to British government policy on Ireland since partition in 1921. Given these differences between the two books it is perhaps unfair to measure Cunningham's latest book against the one published in 1991. Especially given that the book under review is useful and informative in its own right.

British Government Policy in Northern Ireland, 1968-2000, in Cunningham's own words, 'provides a comprehensive account of the legislative and institutional



initiatives of the British government over the period of direct rule [i.e., from 1972]' (p. vi). These initiatives are examined in four policy areas: constitutional, security, economic and social. The rationale for examining policy through these four categories is that 'successive governments have argued that a multidimensional approach is necessary to the resolution of the 'question' (p. vi). Cunningham himself is not rigid in demarcating these categories. He notes, for example, that during the peace process 'the decommissioning issue *de facto* merged security and constitutional questions' (p. 102). In the final chapter, a more theoretical consideration of policy formulation and execution, he questions whether the government actually employed a multidimensional approach in practice. He points to the 'methodological problems in demonstrating causal links and whether there was a reciprocal relationship' between different policy areas (p. 161), and to the claim by NIO Minister Richard Needham that there was no machinery for co-ordinating a multidimensional strategy.

The book provides a chronological outline of British government policy under direct rule. This is topped and tailed by brief chapters providing the background to British re-intervention (chapter one) and theoretical issues relevant to analysing British government policy in Northern Ireland (chapter seven). The rest of the chapters are largely defined by the party in power, (chapter three covers Margaret Thatcher's administrations, chapters four and five John Major's and chapter six government policy under Tony Blair's Labour government), the one exception is chapter two which covers both Conservative and Labour administrations in the 1970s. This division by political complexion of the government of the day belies a core theme of the book, bipartisanship.

Cunningham argues that even before the imposition of direct rule 'the differences between the front benches were more a question of detail than of substance' (p. 9). He emphasises that 'bipartisanship does not imply exact coincidence of outlook or of policy prescription' (pp. 158-9). The bipartisan nature of the Westminster parliament, for example, 'makes unreserved support for the opposing party tactically injudicious' (p. 159), but at a strategic level there is general agreement between the British parliamentary parties on the principles of their constitutional approach to Northern Ireland. The wealth of material in the book supports Cunningham's assessment that there is an ongoing, persistent, and in recent years even more firmly entrenched, bipartisanship in British policy towards Northern Ireland.

The main strengths of the book are its summaries of government policy documents, official reviews and reports and parliamentary debates and the key commentaries on these. The book is an excellent resource for students, or the general reader, interested in a broad outline of the main government policies in Northern Ireland aimed at dealing with the conflict. For those who are interested in more detailed discussion of particular policies the book provides useful references (in footnotes) for most of the key secondary literature that discusses aspects of British policy.

The focus on the public discourse found in policy documents, parliamentary debates and official reports is also one of the main weaknesses of the book. One consequence is that the interplay between government and non-government actors, (such as the Unionist parties, Sinn Fein, peace groups and the paramilitaries), appears only as an occasional consideration. Perhaps a more surprising consequence is that often the reader is left with the impression that policy formulation and implementation is simply a technical administrative task. It is only in the final chapter that Cunningham notes the different elements within

the British administration, for example the NIO and the Home Office sometimes have conflicting interests.

The final chapter indicates that Cunningham is aware of many of the methodological difficulties involved in analysing British government policy. To someone, like this reviewer, who is familiar with British policy in Northern Ireland and the secondary literature discussing British policy it was too little too late. The emphasis on description rather than interpretation meant that the book felt routine rather than thought provoking. For those who are unfamiliar with British policy in Northern Ireland, however, this is the most comprehensive overview available.

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Carrots, Sticks, and Ethnic Conflict: Rethinking Development Assistance

Milton J. Esman and Ronald J. Herring (editors)

University of Michigan Press, 2001

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pp. 264 (including: index, bibliography)

This book addresses the impact – both actual and potential – of development policy on ethnicity. It includes reviews of the experience of two key development institutions – the World Bank’s approach to displaced populations and the United States Agency for International Development’s orientation to ethnic conflict. It then presents country case studies from Kenya, Sri Lanka, Russia and Ecuador. It frames these studies within a discussion of how most effectively to modify future development policy by better taking into account the intricacies of ethnicity in order to achieve desirable developmental outcomes.

Overwhelmingly, these studies suggest, development policy has had the detrimental impact of creating or exacerbating ethnic conflict. Within USAID, Heather S. McHugh points out, there is ‘considerable awareness’ that externally-encouraged democratisation reforms play an important role in ‘opening the door to ethnic strife’ (p. 58). Similarly, reforms imposed through the conditionality associated with structural adjustment are implicated in exacerbating ethnic tensions in Kenya, Russia, Sri Lanka and Ecuador. In fact, as Ronald J. Herring points out, even where market reforms have had a positive impact on economic growth, for example in Sri Lanka, the outcome is negative in terms of resulting ethnic conflict – ‘new material consumption possibilities fed new relative deprivation and anger’ (p. 158).

The perceived pernicious impact of past development policy is attributed to ‘the culture and institutions of development assistance’ (p. 238). The contributors to this edited collection are suggesting that the political assumptions underlying development policy resulted in an approach to conditionality which inevitably complicated ethnic relations. In particular, formal deference to state sovereignty and a commitment to technocratic and economic methods and objectives are isolated as problematic. Deference to state sovereignty is perceived to be problematic because it resulted in a blind eye being turned towards development policy being manipulated by ethnic-based elites to shore up their own power and wealth in society. A focus on a technocratic and economic approach is regarded as problematic because its elevation was blind to consequences such as the



erosion of societal institutions important for the preservation of stability and harmony.

More fundamentally, the whole approach to development practised by dominant institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund is called into question. From Russia to Ecuador the promotion of economic growth through market deregulation is regarded as a causal factor in the exacerbation of ethnic problems. In Russia's case deregulation is attributed to have resulted in the destruction of institutions essential for societal stability. In Ecuador's case deregulation is perceived to have resulted in the destruction of cultural distinctiveness and indigenous values of harmony with nature, and by contrast resulting in a homogenising impact of creating a desire to wear jeans and watch violent American videos.

The authors draw heart from the emergence of a new culture within development policy, no longer premised on narrowly economic objectives, and no longer constrained by the straitjacket of sovereignty. 'The culture of foreign aid has begun to make room for political values' (p. 238), notes Milton J. Esman in the book's concluding chapter. He notes the new potential for more ambitious and penetrating interventions which reach 'beyond technical rationality, beyond macroeconomic variables, to the actual structures, values, and political dynamics of the societies in which they intervene' (p. 235).

In this sense these arguments mirror the general reorientation of development policy and conditionality led, ironically perhaps, by the World Bank itself. Today development policy typically elevates ambitious political interventions and downplays, even denigrates, the significance of economic growth and material transformation (see: Pender 2001).

In line with this new trend these authors are highly critical of past development interventions, they freely acknowledge that the understanding required to correct past errors does not yet exist, and they then propose highly political and all encompassing development policy interventions. In this instance 'ethnic impact assessments' and 'ethnic conditionality' are proposed, non-compliance with which Esman suggests, should result in the creation of 'pariah states, ineligible for development assistance' (p. 252).

Most perplexingly the authors do not even seem to perceive the avoidance of ethnic conflict as a pressing principle. Rather their own favoured political objectives seem to encompass the promotion of harmony with nature, societal stability and the avoidance of change, associated as it is with problematic outcomes.

To this end ethnic conflict can even be regarded as a means to an end. As Alison Brysk suggests, if economic change produces ethnic conflict, then 'some level of competition, mobilisation and even hostility may be necessary to achieve the self-determination of historically marginalized groups' (p. 226). The role here for development policy she suggests could be to encourage the 'organisational capacity for protest and resistance' (p. 223).

This book is a useful presentation of the type of studies and arguments informing the emergence of a new mainstream approach to development policy. It serves as an interesting if partial critique of past development policy interventions. Its focus on ethnic conflict reminds us of the potentially grave consequences of misguided interventions. Its authors' lack of hesitation in proposing a new breed

of more all-encompassing interventions, however, should give its readers more pause for thought.

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Islam, Kurds and the Turkish Nation State

Christopher Houston

Berg Publishers, 2001

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pp. 215 (including: index, bibliography)

Five years ago Deniz Kandiyoti noted that ethnographies 'that deal with the full complexity of the contemporary cultural landscape [of Istanbul] are long overdue' (1997, p. 113). Zeynep Çelik (1993), Ayşegül Baykan (1994), Alev Çinar (2001) and Çağlar Keyder (1999) have worked to fill that gap. Now comes Christopher Houston with a splendid guide through the warren of Turkish political and popular culture. Mapping everyday life in Istanbul, Houston lays bare the failures of Turkey as a modern nation based on civic identity. Kemalist nationalism, Houston argues, has masked ethnic chauvinism and spurred the colonization of religion by the state.

Much of the intellectual and social history treating Istanbul in the Republican period adopts a 'paradise lost' trope, underscoring how an ethnically, religiously, and linguistically diverse imperial seat has been homogenized into the commercial capital of a modern nation-state. Moreover, recent mass migration from Anatolia has rendered the city increasingly rural and Islamic. Once thriving cosmopolitan Greek and Jewish quarters of Balat and Fener, for example, are now shabby zones for new arrivals and strongholds of the Islamic right to boot. Houston is not immune to the charms of the city's golden age. His own adopted neighborhood, Kuzguncuk, a religiously-mixed enclave on the Asian side of the Bosphorous, is known as Istanbul's 'last heaven' (*son cennet*).

Nostalgia notwithstanding, Houston uncovers a new kind of diversity rising from the wreckage of modernity, as laicists, republicans, Islamists, Kurds, and their many hybrids vie for power and recognition. Houston shows how crudely misleading is the French Revolution idea of a laic Turkish Republic. Even the theme of a 'secular republic, underground Islam' adopted in some of the resistance literature misses the mark. The secular model, if ever accurate, has been in decline since the late 1960s. Rather, a variety of Islams co-exist uneasily, from the Taliban-like dictates of M. Düzdağ's *Müslüman Aile (The Muslim Family)* which aims, Houston notes wryly, 'to replace Atatürk's *şeriat* with Allah's', (p. 86) to Fetullah Gülen's flourishing Nurcu movement, a New Age syncretism of Islam and science which enjoys the support of some of the country's staunchest Republicans and modernizers.



What Houston calls 'bureaucratized Islam' has attempted to sever religious life from civil society and nationalize it. The Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs does far more than surveil religious practitioners. With some 90,000 employees, the Directorate is one of Turkey's largest and fastest growing state agencies. Officially, every imam in Turkey is a civil servant, and is supplied by Ankara with model sermons freighted with civic messages. During the politically tumultuous 1970s and early 1980s, the government expanded the number of state-sanctioned religious secondary schools, the *Iman-Hatip* lycées, on the theory that it was better to be a Muslim than to be a communist. With state support, brisk construction of religious schools and mosques has continued ever since. Following the coup in 1980, the 'pashas', as the military leadership is known, instituted compulsory religious instruction in schools. The military has also played the Islamic card against the 'infidel' PKK and other leftist opponents of the regime. Koranic terms such as *şehit* (religious martyr) or *gazi* (warrior for Islam) have been republicanized and absorbed into the rhetoric of the secular state.

The Turkish Enlightenment has marginalized Kurds far more than Islamists. Turkey's national anthem lauds the 'heroic race', part of the grandiose vision of Turkishness constructed in the 1920s, and alive and well among supporters of the formerly-fascist MHP, or Nationalist Action Party, the lynchpin partner in Turkey's current coalition government. The state has used physical as well as cultural violence to Turkify Eastern Anatolia. Numerous uprisings – one of Houston's sources puts the number at 38 – have been forcefully quelled, while the government has refused to register 'Kurdish' names on birth certificates and has given thousands of villages in the region new, 'Turkish', names. All but the most folkloric of Kurdish cultural and historical representations were discouraged. The taboo surrounding all things Kurdish has lifted in recent years, and there is lively debate about Kurdish cultural rights. Houston suggests that the terms of that discussion are still framed by the contrast between the world-history of Turks and the tribal backwardness of Kurds. (Many Turks consider Kurds a drag on the country's sprint for European Union membership.) Houston describes in fascinating detail how some Turkish social scientists continue to police ethnicity, though in this case seeking to prove that Kurds descended from an obscure pocket of tribal Turkmens and thus really are Turks.

Often shoe-horned into political analyses, popular culture slips easily into Houston's ethnography. Turkish Radio and Television (TRT), the soporific state-run media, has been eclipsed by a constellation of private television channels offering everything from soft porn and Koran readings (both only late at night) to advertisements for 'honourable' Islamist resorts on the Mediterranean, and simulacra of English country living on the outskirts of Istanbul. At football matches, Kurdish fans shout veiled political messages. Censors, discerning subversive lyrics, have banned scores of specific Kurdish pop songs. Radio as well as television are drenched in Turkish-language 'Arabesk' music, a way of rendering Kurdishness politically palatable by cloaking – and commodifying – it in a kind of Orientalising popular culture.

Houston's evident fondness for Turkey does not blur his critical gaze: the wealth tax (*varlık vergesi*) levied against non-Muslims in 1942, hobbling Armenians with the most punitive rates, the anti-Greek pogrom in 1955 that vacated prime real estate in the city, and the Vietnam-style 'hamletting' of Kurds in the Southeast are presented squarely. With an even hand, Houston highlights the synthetic nature of Turkishness, but shows how Kurdish identity is also actively

constructed, noting how Med TV, the Kurdish-language satellite broadcast, mirrors TRT in the 'production of nationality'.

How does a state that has so relentlessly embraced modernity deal with the new postmodern reality? Houston explores the possibility that Islam may be the cement to hold together a multi-ethnic Turkey. A more likely scenario is that Turkish accession to the European Union may help to crack this dilemma. Turkey may even look to its own past. After all, the divided loyalty that a federalist Europe represents is more reminiscent of the *millet*, or 'nations' system of the Ottoman Empire than it is of the modern Turkish state. Turkish democracy will remain stunted as long as the government tries to enforce the fiction of a unitary nation. Under the European umbrella Ankara may be more tolerant of diversity in its midst.

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Race in Cyberspace

Beth E Kolko, Lisa Nakamura, Gilbert B Rodman (eds.)

Routledge, 2000

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The Internet is a gift to cultural theorists, whose stock in trade is representations of society. Offline, impressionistic accounts of social phenomena can be countered with empirical data. But when the object under study is the Internet, the cultural theorist can discover whatever truths about society they wish to. Online, one's perspective on society is distorted. When there are so few obstacles to setting up a website, or posting on a message board – anybody with a computer and a connection can do it – all voices appear equal. The Internet is a document of society where minority and extreme opinion are indistinguishable from the mainstream. Methodological rigour is needed, if any useful insights into society are to be drawn from what one finds online. Such rigour is conspicuously absent in *Race in Cyberspace*, a collection of essays about the constitution of racial identity in the digital age.

The impressionism of the book's contributors is best captured by Jeffrey A Ow, who, in his chapter on computer games, hilariously claims that a game character



– described as an ‘amalgam of middle-class white man and digital ninja’ – uses ‘postcoloniality to reinscribe master narratives based on racism and colonialism’ (p. 54). Such is the loss of perspective, when one uses computer games as a barometer of race relations. There is a similar problem in Tara McPherson’s chapter on deep-South redneck websites, ‘the many outposts of Dixie in cyberspace’ (p. 117). As McPherson regales us with the ravings of neo-Confederate eccentrics, one could be forgiven for believing that ‘The South Will Rise Again’, as the flags and bumper stickers put it. But then one realises that by that token, society must also be under siege from paedophiles, Satanists, and every other crackpot to whom the Internet provides a free platform. ‘How could we narrate other versions of Southern history and place that are not bleached to a blinding whiteness?’ (p. 128), asks McPherson, as though digital Dixie were a major social problem. But the Internet will always privilege the expression of marginal views. The mere fact that an idea is represented online, does not give that idea any great social consequence.

The features of the Internet that make it a methodological nightmare for the researcher, its anonymity, ease of accessibility and discontinuity from material reality, make it an exciting space where people can explore, communicate and experiment with ideas. The book’s contributors all celebrate the freedom that the Internet gives users not to be tied down by racial assumptions. Just as the contributors to *Race in Cyberspace* fear that the Internet empowers racists, so they believe that the free play of identities online is empowering to minorities. This freedom, however, is very narrowly conceived.

Jennifer González, in her chapter, looks at an art project that enables users to ‘build bodies’ online, and describes the resultant ‘community of bodies with symbolic meaning intimately tied to surface structure’ (p. 38). This is a diminished version of community. All that this community’s members have in common is a pseudonymous mouthpiece on the internet. Relationships of trust and common endeavour, the bedrock of any strong community, cannot flourish in an environment where people are anonymous, unaccountable, and go in elaborate disguises of their own design. González argues for the existence of an ‘appended subject’ on the internet, a subject ‘whose limbs and flesh are accessorised, linked to personality traits, and used as values of exchange’ (p. 40). Just as she diminishes the concept of community, so she diminishes the concept of the free subject. Subjectivity implies agency, where the subject’s actions have real consequences. The casual selection of identities by the ‘appended subject’, through pixels and text, is an activity of no consequence at all.

The conviction that the online representation of racial identities is a force for good is shared by most of the contributors to *Race in Cyberspace*. They hold to this view so fervently, that they disapprove when Internet users do not wish to discuss race. This is most clearly articulated in David Silver’s chapter where he berates the builders of an online discussion forum, for the residents of Blacksburg, Virginia, on the grounds that the forum fails to reflect the differences between its users. ‘It is disconcerting’, says Silver, ‘to note that none of the... newsgroups and lists revolve around issues of race, gender and sexuality’. Apparently, this oversight ‘signals a missed opportunity to foster a more diverse community network’ (p. 145). Silver’s arrogant (and rather sinister) conclusion is that ‘community networks... must set aside the popular myth that race, gender, and sexuality are magically nonexistent online’ (p. 148). But who is this writer, to say that community networks ‘must’ do anything? Heaven forbid that the good people of Blacksburg might want to set aside their racial differences, and chat to

one another as neighbours. Silver's argument represents multiculturalism at its most divisive and reactionary – rejecting any community that does not have as its basis racial division.

While the book's contributors celebrate the freedom that the internet gives users not to be tied down by racial assumptions they will not permit internet users to abandon racial identity altogether. The most degenerate thing about online anonymity – the irresponsibility of speech that cannot be accounted for – these authors promote. The most progressive thing about online anonymity – the fact that it allows us to communicate, not as members of a particular race or gender, but as human beings – these authors reject.

In the book's concluding chapter, Beth E. Kolko bemoans the absence of race tags for users in the virtual environments known as MUDs (Multi-User Dungeons – a text-based interactive discussion/games-playing environment). 'Bringing race to the forefront in a text-based virtual world will provide information that can be useful in graphical worlds and other computer-mediated communication systems', she says (p. 230). But 'useful' for what? How is it useful to know the race of the people you communicate with, unless you subscribe to the racist assumption that one's race is essential to one's character?

The Internet is, potentially, a universal communications medium which transcends race. But the authors of *Race in Cyberspace* would prefer the Internet to consist of an infinitude of divided racial categories. Despite their radical credentials, theirs is a deeply conservative project.

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Citizenship, Identity, and Immigration in the European Union: Between Past and Future

Theodora Kostakopoulou
 Manchester University Press, 2001
 HBK: ISBN 0719059984 £40.00
 pp. 214 (including: bibliography, index)

Citizenship, Identity, and Immigration offers an introduction, an overview and proposals for reform on citizenship and immigration policy in the context of European integration. Beyond that, it aims to develop an approach to 'constructive citizenship' with the twofold goal of applying normative critical thought towards developing proposals for institutional reform. This two-tiered perspective is labelled a 'constructivist' approach (p. 2). While taking a critical stance that aims at rigorous scrutiny of current theory and practice of citizenship, the book maintains an optimistic tone. Expectations for change in the area of citizenship are based on the particularity of the emerging Europolity as one that stems from a process of institution building which is *in flux*. In a nutshell, and following a number of other works on citizenship published in the 1990s, Kostakopoulou takes the unfinished Europolity's key features of process and pluralism as the cornerstones for her work. The novelty of this book is the ambition to develop a normative new 'political theory of European integration' (p. 5) that is not limited to a politico-theoretical debate on democracy and legitimacy but that strives to make concise proposals for institutional reform as well. Taking process as the key issue for both theory and practice, the book finds 'that there



are good reasons for thinking about things differently and for considering alternative institutional designs which are both normatively justified and feasible' (p. 65). More specifically, Kostakopoulou seeks to elaborate and justify a normative political theory of European integration based on changed concepts and practices of citizenship and immigration. Her concern is with prevailing unequal power relations generated by structural conditions of inequality brought about by race and gender relations. If there is no institutional change which specifically attempts to undermine these conditions of inequality, she contends, they will stabilise, hence her plea to grasp the chance and 'engage in normative theorising on the emergent institutional designs of European citizenship and immigration' now (p. 1). As a project, this approach means identifying the key features of constructive citizenship. It is addressed in seven chapters. Similar to the actual development of citizenship policy in the European Union (and previously in the European Community), the book begins with discussions of European identity and democracy, its importance in general, its emergence in the process of European integration, as well as the difficulty of making sense of the concept in a non-state realm. Here both theoretical and institutional perspectives (Chs. 1, 2) are offered at first, followed by selected references to the debate over citizenship that is not bound to the nation-state. In particular, she examines the legal case material on citizenship in the EU (Chs. 3, 4). The second half of the book entails at times more rigorously elaborated theoretical perspectives including 'propositions for constructive citizenship in the European Union' (Ch. 5), an 'alternative framework for a European migration policy' (Ch. 6) and 'Heideggerian insights' on 'dwelling, boundaries and belonging' (Ch. 7).

Despite the impressive display of theoretical knowledge and imagination as well as the application of a detailed expertise in European case law, this book, while provocative in its core argument, is likely to generate more questions than answers, given the somewhat idiosyncratic approach to existing debates and the resulting incoherence in theoretical and methodological clarity, explanation and detail. Particularly, those who have been following the respective debates in the manifold academic fields touched by the ambitious argument, including political theory, historical sociology, comparative politics and European integration studies and law will feel that methodological and theoretical terminology is used in a way which stretches beyond the challenge of interdisciplinarity towards an eclecticism that unnecessarily undermines the otherwise strong philosophical and empirical knowledge conveyed in this book. Yet, it is perhaps the author's readiness to engage with the challenge of interdisciplinarity that any academic studying the European Union is faced with (and few dare to take on) that contributes to the at times puzzling, if always interesting and provocative, reading. The overwhelming breadth of theory, ranging from scratching the surface of debates over European integration theory and European citizenship, to engaging more deeply with general theories of citizenship and proposals for migration policy – the strongest chapters of the book – to the final and unexpected turn towards Heidegger's notion of 'dwelling' as a basis for capturing the European Union's complex notion of belonging amongst and despite diversity (p. 160-164), leaves the reader uncertain as to the major theoretical thrust of the book. While the reference to Heidegger is not necessarily misplaced, after all, the Heideggerian turn sustains the book's core argument that 'belonging in the Union is not only multiple and flexible, but is also critical and transformative' (p. 163), it still comes as a surprise and is then left relatively unexplored.

The fact that some of the chapters are relatively dated, including, for example the, albeit revised, re-publication of several previously published articles in the

book as well as reference to material generated by a doctoral dissertation submitted in 1995 may have prevented a focus and in-depth exploration of some of these questions. Still, a more structured approach to presenting the important and innovative argument at the book's core, laying out the author's normative approach to constructive citizenship based on process and pluralism and an inherent *Herrschaftskritik* would have done both author and readers great service. However, there is no doubt that this book is likely to take the debate further and make an interesting additional reading for postgraduates and scholars.

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Globalization and Nationalism, the Changing Balance in India's Economic Policy 1950-2000

Baldev Raj Nayar

Sage Publications [New Delhi], 2001

HBK: ISBN: 0761995366 £29.99

pp. 287 (including: index, bibliography)

We live in an age of globalization. Although it may not constitute an entirely new phenomenon, globalization in its current phase can be described as an intensification of political, economic and cultural interconnection across national boundaries. However, not everybody experiences globalization in the same way, nor is every society convinced of the efficacy and benefits of global markets. There are then many stories to be told about current global trends and distinct national dispositions. Baldev Raj Nayar unfolds for us one such important story: about the changing roles of markets and the state in India. This book is especially important for those who want to know how ethnically divided countries like India incorporate and carry forward the new neo-liberal dispensation. Nayar carefully delineates the passage of new economy through the maze of India's coalition politics and federal polity. Set against the background of a declining Congress that had ruled as a majority party for more than four decades, the beginning of governments by coalitions – which has been an alliance of several ethnically based regional parties – marked a decisive turning point in Indian politics. That it should coincide with the dismantling of the state-led development and beginning of market-based reforms, have raised at least three questions about the changes in the past decade: Why did India abandon the commitment to state led growth? What role did the regionally based ethnic parties play in this transition? How would the new coalition politics determine the pace and success of the new economy? Nayar's book seeks to answer these questions. It outlines how ethnically divided societies deal with globalization and market reforms.

Although Nayar outlines the halting but enduring pace of economic reforms through the periods of crises and re-engagement in India, this study goes well beyond the purely economic explanations. It does what the bulk of the economic literature has largely ignored: incorporate in its analysis compulsions emanating from India's ethnic diversity, institutional structures, electoral rhythms. Nayar argues that for the Indian leaders, political independence and national security – each essential for domestic legitimacy – could not be separated from the quest for economic development. India rejected the 'Shock therapy' so enthusiastically advocated by the Harvard economists in the early 1990s because that would have meant dismantling the edifice of ethnic and regional collaboration so carefully



constructed to support Indian democracy. India settled instead for a strategy of incremental reforms. Its slowness allowed India to build a pro-reform domestic consensus. Although the halting pace provoked criticism, in Nayar's view, the critics had ignored what was really critical to economic transition, namely, a new balance between domestic and global demands and between economic sovereignty and greater openness to world markets.

Nayar's analysis underscores the importance of a political economy perspective to studying the new economy. Indian leaders, he says, were aware that India would lose status and power if they failed to break the trap of slow growth and stagnation that had marked the previous four decades of development. The success of the reforms however depended on the extent to which state governments cooperated in implementing the proposed changes. It also depended on the extent to which Indian industry was willing to risk competition from global firms. Nayar shows us how this was accomplished and how India's federal politics made the process different from that in other economies that are praised for their speedy transition to a liberalized market oriented economy.

Nayar's *Globalization and Nationalism* is a cogently argued study of interaction between domestic politics – one defined by ethnic pluralism – and international economy. The first chapter lays down the theoretical framework. Nayar argues that the advocacy of liberalization must take into account the legitimacy requirement of the state. Capital may be internationally mobile but legitimacy, he points out, is rooted in territorial states constrained by domestic politics. Globalization therefore does not replace nationalism but spurs it to new forms of expression. In the Cold war period, it coalesced around policies of nonalignment and economic self-reliance in India. The new forms of nationalism are yet to evolve but their likely direction is already visible in the emergence of Hindu nationalism and its exclusion of religious minorities. Whether ethnic identity will act as an antidote or aggravate religious polarization created by Hindu nationalism, remains unclear. The eventual outcome will depend on the extent to which ethnic pluralism enhances or retards the cause of growth and reforms.

Nayar's second chapter explores the relationship forged between economy and politics during the first two decades after independence. He argues that in the context of the Cold War, the Nehruvian formula of insulating India's unconsolidated democracy from the pressures of international politics made good sense, even though there was a price to be paid in runaway inflation and economic scarcity. The next three chapters examine the changing role of the private and public spheres through the years from late 1960s to 1996. Chapter five examines the business and corporate sector response to reforms, their initial reluctance to forego the protection of the state and the subsequent slow reaching out to international markets. The next two chapters are a virtual tour de force in delineating the reform strategies in the post 1996 years and its passage through the maze of India's federal politics. Baldev Raj Nayar concludes that contrary to popular impression, the Indian reforms were not initiated because of external pressures. They were home grown. They were also gradual because they had to accommodate to India's federal democracy. But their slow pace was a blessing in disguise. It permitted wider public debate on the merits of reforms and allowed time for social learning and self-correction.

Each chapter in this study analyzes how this happened and how it made the new balance between politics and economy possible and reforms irreversibly. In investigating this, Nayar has made an important contribution to the debate on

democratic development and neoliberal economic reform. The interplay of nationalism and globalization in this study beautifully conflates political calculations, security compulsions, economic policies and democratic rhythms and forges them into a single frame of analysis. This is the strength of this study. For practitioners and specialists interested in the interconnection between the new economy and ethnic pluralism, Nayar study will prove highly rewarding.

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Serbia: The History Behind the Name

Stevan Pavlowitch

Hurst & Company, 2002.

HBK: ISBN: 0814767087 £45.00

pp. 252 (including: bibliography, index)

In this book, Pavlowitch sets out to provide an account of the various 'Serbias' that have come and gone in the last millennium. Following a modernist approach, Pavlowitch sees 'Serbia' as a shifting referent to the ideas that have moulded territory and people into conceptual unities – national, cultural, historical. Consistently, it is the theme of the 'name' that gets foregrounded throughout.

To follow more pedantic lines, this is an accessible overview of Serbian history, starting from 12th century A.D. and ending with the 2000 presidential elections. As could be expected, the emphasis is on the 20th century, which is divided into three main periods covering the two world wars, the Tito years, and Milosevic's rise and fall. Within an ever-expanding literature on the Balkans, this is a much-needed account of an area still which is still under-published in English in relation to the wider topic of Yugoslavia.

The first chapter introduces a rather mainstream regional theme in describing the pre-modern Serbia as etched between Rome and Byzantium, the Hapsburgs and the Ottomans. The account does not focus exclusively on wars however, but extends to depictions of more fluctuating alliances, such as those with Byzantium (pp. 7-8). The battle of Kosovo is critically presented, alongside the legends and re-interpretations of it. The second chapter takes up the same theme, focusing on negotiations with the Ottomans for autonomy and on the relations with the Hapsburg Empire and Russia. Attention is paid to invented traditions like Peter II's interpretation 'of the Kosovo cult' (p. 40).

As the emergence of nationalism is traced in the third chapter, the theme of the name is emphasised (pp. 47, 55, 56) within an illuminating discussion of concepts (e.g., Illyrianism) and events that eventually led to the Treaty of Berlin (1878). Their effects however, are at times less rigorously presented. For example, the departure of the Ottomans is, rather benignly, one would suggest, attributed to their strong 'loyalty to the defence of the empire' (p. 43). Chapter four presents a story of population and territorial integration and intense nation-building. The data presented covers demographic change, the evolution of nationalist rhetoric and the development of political proposals. Archduke Ferdinand's assassination is presented in an exciting way that once again underscores the importance of symbolism.



In chapter five the problematic foundations of Yugoslav unification are discussed, the significance of names once again being highlighted (p. 103). The author seems to locate the basic problems in a poorly developed ideology of 'Yugoslavism' and diverse political expectations and 'political thinking' (p. 110) between the Croats and the Serbs. Put alongside the author's continuous plea against reading history backwards, this explanation seems to lack further elaboration precisely because of its straight-forwardness. Chapter six contextualises Tito's rise to power within an environment of political conflict between royalists and communists and constant negotiation between Serbs and Croats for power.

Chapter seven is a very readable treatment of the intricacies of Second World War conflicts – the coalitions, losses, and re-interpretations. The attention to names and invention shifts to an insightful etymology of the word 'Chetniks' (p. 146) and an analysis of the development of Communist mythologies (pp.154-5). The following chapter examines the Tito years from a critical perspective and locates Tito's key mistake in his failure to address sectarian differences between Serb Communists and Croat Ustashas (members of the Croat regime that had collaborated with the Axis powers during WW2). Yugoslav identity appears here to swing between support and opposition to Tito and 'feelings of sectional nationalism' are described as having become 'reduced to something basic and emotional' (pp. 160-1).

The questions posed by these perspectives are partly answered in chapter nine, which presents the Albanian students' demonstration in Pristina in 1981 as Yugoslavism's 'rude awakening' (p. 187), an explosion of nationalist feelings that had been brushed under the carpet during the Tito years. Milosevic's turn to nationalist rhetoric is also located in Kosovo and the centrality of this area to the future of Yugoslavia further underscored by the description of the 600th anniversary celebrations of the battle of Kosovo as the next historical turning point. The final chapter provides a valuable overview of Milosevic's rise to power, and accounts for his fall as due primarily to the erosion of meaningful political debate, the rise of para-state institutions, and economic collapse.

Overall, Pavlowitch's consistent argument is that the coalition between Serbia and Croatia failed because each of them had different political experiences and different ideas about the role of the state and that Yugoslavia failed because it demanded more imagination to make it work than its proponents were capable of. Although this argument is well served by the analysis, the author seems, at points, to be underplaying more grassroots-level approaches, which might for example provide a more nuanced account of electoral behaviour in 1991 than the statement that the lower classes and 'least educated... simply cast a vote but did not exercise a conscious choice' (p. 205). The religious tone with which the book concludes might sound a bit unsettling, but the condemnation of nationalism, which is voiced throughout, provides ample hope for the future.

This is a commendable piece of historical work, accessible to students of history and the area alike – it provides an excellent introduction to the Balkans and Serbia, and presents an array of factors, symbolic meanings being the most strongly emphasised, that many historical works tend to overlook.

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Hizbu'llah: Politics and Religion

Amal Saad-Ghorayeb

Pluto, 2001

Hbk: ISBN: 0745317936 £45.00 \$69.95

Pbk: ISBN: 0745317928 £14.99 \$22.50

pp. 264 (including: index, bibliography, appendices)

The prevailing perception of Hizbu'llah is that of a fundamentalist, armed organisation prone to violence and terror. While the first years of its inception were turbulent indeed, Hizbu'llah has since transformed into the largest and most prominent political party in Lebanon. In this timely and informative book, Amal Saad-Ghorayeb explores the extent to which the political transformation of the party clashed with its ideological pillars and how the party rationalised the apparent contradiction between the two.

Saad's core thesis is that when confronted with reality, Hizbu'llah has been able to reformulate its ideology by developing a dual strategy of 'confining the quintessentially Islamic and unattainable to the intellectual realm and the secular and attainable to the political realm' (p. 190). She argues that this strategy enabled Hizbu'llah to adapt without compromising its principles or losing its intellectual consistency.

One example is the party's endorsement of democracy in light of its Islamic Republic ideal (Chapter 2). The creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon remains the bedrock of Hizbu'llah's ideology. However, because of the religiously diverse nature of the Lebanese society and Hizbu'llah's reference to the Quranic injunction that Islam cannot be enforced upon followers of other faiths, this goal has been relinquished and its implementation postponed to an indefinite future. As a result, Hizbu'llah's political participation in the system was a radical departure from its earlier anathemisation of the Lebanese regime. How did the party deal with this contradiction? By striking a delicate balance, argues Saad, between the ideal and the real (p. 187). In other words, intellectually, the Islamic Republic remains the ideal system in Hizbu'llah's eyes, but when it is unattainable politically, democracy comes as the next best system to Islam (p. 55).

This dichotomy between the intellectual and the political levels has also enabled Hizbu'llah to reconcile its pan-Islamic leanings with its Arab and Lebanese identity (Chapters 3 and 4) by claiming that its supranational commitment to Khumayni and the Islamic Republic of Iran is only an intellectual affiliation (p. 87), while its political bond is reserved to the Lebanese nation state.

The struggle with the West (Chapter 5) has equally been revisited. Hizbu'llah believes it to be a 'civilisational struggle' against Western political and cultural hegemony over the Middle East dating back to the early days of Islam and the Crusades. However, in view of the party's rapprochement with France and its approval of Iranian President Khatami's desire for 'dialogue with the West', Hizbu'llah favoured characterising the struggle 'ikhtilaf' (dispute) rather than 'khilaf' (clash) of civilisations, as chosen by S. Huntington. The latter implies irreconcilability whereas the former connotes coexistence.

Even with those intellectual pillars deemed less amenable to temporisation such as the party's inveterate antipathy towards Israel (Chapter 6), Zionist ideology (Chapter 7) and Jewish religion (Chapter 8) Saad writes that it is not possible to



'overlook the room for ideological manoeuvre which the party has left itself with' (p. 153).

Drawing on speeches, statements and interviews of the party officials published or broadcast between 1984 and 2000 and relying on extensive interviews with Hizbu'llah leaders, Saad's analysis offers unique insights inside the political mind of one of the paradoxically most renowned and least understood Islamist movements. I found more information on Hizbu'llah in this study than in any other book so far published on the subject. And some of her analyses do stand out as daring rejections of widespread perceptions.

For example, her argument on Hizbu'llah's participation in the system is at the centre of a controversial and heated debate on the compatibility of Islam and democracy. The prevalent view is that Islamists do not *believe* in democracy but use it as a procedure to attain power. Saad claims on the contrary that Hizbu'llah is genuinely committed to democracy. Not because of an artificial synthesis between democratic and Islamic foundations resulting in an 'Islamic democracy' as many prominent scholars argue. But because Hizbu'llah makes no pretence at embracing democracy as an ideal and endorses it only as a realistically feasible system of government, there is no reason to question the genuineness of its endorsement (p. 56).

Hizbu'llah's rejection of political violence against secular and non-Islamic states (Chapter 1) is equally challenging. Unlike other Islamist movements who view their local regimes as 'infidels' and 'apostates' punishable by death, Hizbu'llah opposes political violence on the ground that the Shari'a (Islamic Law) deems 'an oppressive government preferable to chaos' and rebellion and civil disobedience 'unacceptable' (p. 22). In light of this principle, the party feels bound to preserve public order and civil peace.

However, although Saad's book succeeded in showing that the party's reversal of strategy is neither a proof of its ideological shallowness nor an indication a Janus-faced nature of the movement, its overall 'consistency paradigm' is more questionable.

First, Saad considers the scattered and ad-hoc statements and speeches produced by the party over a period of 20 years as forming one single coherent intellectual body whereas intellectual ruptures, dichotomies and contradictions might characterise more appropriately Hizbu'llah's history. For instance, don't the contradictory stances of the party reflect two different tendencies, a radical and a moderate one, as illustrated by Hizbu'llah's former secretary-general Sobhi Tufayli's resignation and the party's major split in 1992 because of ideological disagreements?

Second, she oscillates between demonstrating the party's consistency and relying on her assumption of consistency to prove other points. For example, claiming that the party disapproves today the use of violence against civilians, she infers that the accusation of its involvement in earlier terrorist attacks is not credible because 'it would be ideologically inconsistent for Hizbu'llah to denounce the killing of western tourists... if only a few years earlier it had engaged in lengthy terrorist campaigns' (p. 102). This is mere tautology.

Despite my reservations on the core thesis, I would recommend this book as outstandingly informative and, so far, the best published study of Hizbu'llah's

ideology. It is commendable for at least one more reason: Saad lived up to her initial desire to shift the focus away from the party's alleged involvement in terror, an even more commendable task in light of the recent US war on terror.

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Myths and Memories of the Nation

Anthony D. Smith

Oxford University Press, 1999

PBK: ISBN: 0198296843 £15.99

288 pages (including: index)

It was the title of Smith's latest publication that first attracted me, as I thought that the eminent thinker of national rhetoric would make connections between his work on nationalism and the highly engaging bodies of scholarship on myth and memory. *Myths and Memories of the Nation* is a different book than the one I had in mind. While Smith offers his readers a complex yet lucid framework for understanding issues concerning nations and nationalism, he does not actively engage the fields of memory and myth studies, but mostly employs notions such as 'ancestral memories' and 'descent' or 'origin myths' to contextualize national genealogical claims. Moreover, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* is a compilation of nine journal articles published since 1992 and one short piece the author wrote in 1984 clarifying his ethno-symbolic approach to understanding issues of nations and nationalism. As such, Smith's new book is less about the development of a new conceptual framework and more about the application of his already existing theory to different case studies and historical periods.

The underlying premise of *Myths and Memories of the Nation* is the same that was found in Smith's classic text *The Ethnic Origin of Nations* – that in order to better understand the behavior of modern nations and make sense of their discourse, we must ground them in a history of older cultural units called 'ethnies'. Analyses of the correspondences between nations and ethnies are found in almost every article of Smith's latest book, including the introduction, where the author summarizes and clarifies his ethno-symbolic approach to issues of nations and nationalism. Smith's ethno-symbolism synthesizes the two most dominant theories of nationalism, as the author himself suggests, those of perennialism and modernism – both of which are also defined and delineated in the introduction. Where the former theory claims nations and national identities to have been in existence for as long as there has been human history, the latter theory claims that nation-formation and nationalism are phenomena integrally related to the process of modernization traced since the French revolution. Smith suggests that the shortcoming of the two theories is their respective reductionism – perennialism being unwilling to acknowledge the unique character of national development that ensued since the eighteenth century, while modernism sees nations as phenomena uniquely created to respond to the new world order of historical modernity. Smith's ethno-symbolic definition of the nation closely resembles the modernist one – 'as a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members' – yet grounds most characteristics of the nation in older, ethnic units – 'ethnic origin myths, beliefs in ethnic election, the development of ethnoscaapes, the territorialization of memory, and the vernacular mobilization of communities' (p.



11). In this respect Smith situates the nationalist movements in the aspirations of previous ethnic groups, and suggests that to fully comprehend the power and durability of different nationalisms, we must take account of the histories that inspire them. The rest of the Smith's book demonstrates this idea.

Beyond the introductory chapter, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* is split into two parts, the former part, according to Smith, being theoretical and historical in focus, while the later is empirical and contemporary. This distinction is not an obvious one for the reader; every article appears to be grounded in a theoretical setting and offers both a historical perspective and examples for elaborating on its points. What *is* apparent in this collection is that each article elaborates on Smith's ethno-symbolic perspective by considering and analyzing either a specific issue that pertains to the ethno-symbolism, or a particular ethnic/national unit and its rhetoric, or a combination of the two. There are survey-type articles which offer exceptionally organized summaries of thinkers and theories pertaining to distinct aspects of nations and nationalism: territorial concerns, impulse toward homogeneity, historical memories, myths of descent. There are case-study articles which elaborate on the tensions and discords involved in specific ideological movements, such as Zionism and the unification of Europe; and there are articles that concern the resurgence of violent nationalisms and their aftermath in the post-1989 world order.

The one technical shortcoming of the book is the poor editing work that went into it, as certain concepts repeat themselves – an identical set of definitions for 'nation', 'nationalism' and 'ethnie' appears in almost every essay, while several other terms get defined in more than two articles – and Smith's ethno-symbolic approach seems to be contextualized anew in every one of the articles. This repetition tires the reader and tends to subdue her interest to the point, I'm afraid, that she may skip entire passages that, beyond recurrent explanations, may hold the interesting insights and pithy articulations which are definitely to be found in the book. And there are some gems to be found in every article, either in the form of compelling observations, or poignant assertions, or systematized patterns of ethnic and national histories and developments, for example, Smith's question regarding the 'memoryless nature of any cosmopolitan culture created today' and the difficulty of a 'new Europe' arising without 'myth' and 'memory' (in the essay: 'National Identity and European Unity'), his notion of 'history as martyrology' (in 'Nation and Ethnoscape' and 'Zionism and Diaspora Nationalism') and his definition of four patterns of ethnic survival, the 'imperial-dynastic', 'communal-demotic', 'emigrant-colonist' and 'diaspora-restoration' ones (in 'Chosen Peoples: Why Ethnic Groups Survive').

Overall, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* is a great collection of articles that concern nations and nationalism, and it raises many compelling questions while provoking further thought and debate. Finally this is a book that can be especially valuable for those who will use it as an introduction to Smith's work, for those who are interested in a broad overview of issues concerning national identities, and for those who enjoy Smith's work but have been unable to trace it in the different journals where it appeared in the last decade.

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Maya Identities and the Violence of Place

Charles D. Thompson, Jr,
Ashgate, 2001

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pp. 206 (including: references)

This is a book which asks us to question and rethink the processes of intellectual enclosure in which we place the subjects of our research. It does so through a beautifully written account of Mayan (descendents of the sophisticated indigenous culture that flourished in Middle America more than 20 centuries before the Conquest of the region by the Spanish in the 16th century) identities and cultures in transition as people move across territory, to and from, Huehuetenango in Guatemala, Chiapas in Southern Mexico and North Carolina, USA. While three international borders figure in the story, many other borders feature which are not just territorial but also cultural, social and subjective, and constructed over colonial and post-colonial time. They are also rapidly moving borders under the impact of contemporary global dynamics.

The movement and change that takes place through crossing borders is and has always been a vital part of Mayan identity construction. The Maya have crossed and re-crossed borders over historical time and even before the Spanish Conquest and through choice as well as through violence. Shared identities amongst indigenous groups have nevertheless survived, but cultures have not remained the same. The book sets out to open the eyes of outside observers who see the Maya only as victimised and constrained by their attachment to place and land. The Maya that Thompson meets and travels with, keep moving in order to survive, their attachments are to identity and dignity rather than locality and even culture as something time-honoured and fixed: 'Each individual and moving place I have represented in the preceding chapters' writes the author in his conclusion, 'tell a story not of the demise of cultural identities, but of their need for constant change in order to be' (p. 181).

I did not read this book as an anthropologist, but as a political scientist and peace researcher working within interdisciplinary or even transdisciplinary frameworks. I found myself in great sympathy with its theme, and 'borderlands' an enormously powerful and useful metaphor. Over the last few years I have been trying to understand the changing social and political contours of Huehuetenango, Guatemala where Thompson did most of his field work, in the wake of the 1996 Peace Accords. The Accords ended 36 years of civil war, which were experienced most violently in Huehuetenango in 1982, the year that the army carried out 88 massacres of mostly indigenous people in this impoverished department of highland Guatemala. Nor did I come to this research as an ethnographer like Thompson, but space and identity have played a key role in my efforts to understand the region and its people. Huehuetenango has 31 municipalities of which Jacaltenango where Thompson lived and studied is one. It has eight distinct ethno-linguistic groups, including the dominant Spanish speaking *ladino* (mixed white/Indian), and seven indigenous groups (distinct ethno-linguistic groups who are also descendents of the Maya). The relationship of identity to locality is enormously complex in the region, and Thompson's portrayal of the indigenous people 'not as placed, physically stable, and innocent, but as movers, as refugees, as travellers and innovators' (p. vii) is very helpful and appropriate.

My own research question 'how will the people of Huehuetenango learn to live together in the wake of prolonged violence and conflict?' is directly concerned



with how identity and attachment are constructed. As Thompson persuasively argues, this cannot be answered through assumptions of fixed and bounded choices and experiences. In my own research, the background context in Huehuetenango is itself generating rapid changes to the lives and livelihood possibilities of the people of the region. These changes include falling coffee prices, government road building projects creating differential market access, external donor agencies' post-war reconstruction projects, the rising cost of paying the *coyote* (intermediary) to organise a passage through Mexico to the US and a volatile democratisation process, to mention just a few factors. In addition, the value of attachment to ethno-linguistic group is mediated by attachment to village rather than municipal capital and vice versa; to religion (*costumbres*, the Maya indigenous form of spirituality, Protestantism or Catholicism); by experiences during the war as combatant, refugee, enthusiastic or coerced member of the civil defense patrols and/or activism in a socio/political organisation, and by the different gender roles associated with each of these. The Mam, a Mayan ethno-linguistic group of the south of Huehuetenango who were very active in the peasant support base of the guerrillas complain that the Q'anjob'al sat out the war and carried on making money. The Q'anjob'al of San Pedro Soloma are trading their way to cross long closed social borders and one Q'anjob'al family now owns a major hotel in Huehuetenango, stronghold of *ladino* wealth and power. However, the Q'anjob'al of Santa Eulalia, twenty minutes from San Pedro Soloma, do not trade and emphasise their cultural and educational achievements, eyeing the material advance of their neighbours with some disdain and resentment. Multiple attachments compete within a context of growing poverty and insecurity. It is interesting that Thompson's fieldwork leads him and his Jacal friends to look toward the North, to Mexico and the US. My own fieldwork can confirm that those with any means to travel look in that direction rather than inward to Huehuetenango or any other part of Guatemala. I took the departmental space rather than one municipality as the 'borders' of my research, but everyday life is in great flux beneath the administrative and political divisions of the Guatemalan state. However, there are growing numbers of people too poor even to pay the *coyote*. In that sense, Jacaltenango is a special place, regarded in the Department as the municipality that produced its teachers, where education levels are relatively higher than elsewhere.

My only caution on reading this book is that Thompson does not differentiate between social and geographic mobility. In my own research in Huehuetenango, mobility is becoming increasingly contingent on resources. It gives some the capacity to survive and change, especially when it means access to the US labour market. Those who can only manage to migrate internally to the lower paid and more exploitative agro-exporting estates of the Guatemalan coast do not fare so well. Increasing social differentiation amongst the Mayan as well as between them and the *ladino* is an outcome of the differential kinds of mobility.

Global economics unfold in particular ways in this region on the periphery of the periphery. They combine with a legacy of violent conflict that touched the lives of the indigenous population in multiple often invisible ways (very powerfully described by Thompson) dividing them against each other, particularly in municipalities with less prior cohesion than Jacaltenango. While some pan Mayan activists are trying to build a unifying indigenous identity, there are many dynamics working in the opposite direction.

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Asia's Emerging Regional Order: Reconciling Traditional and Human Security

William T. Tow, Ramesh Thakur and In-Taek Hyun (eds.)

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pp 342 (including: index)

The end of the Cold War prompted academics and politicians to re-conceptualise security and the role of the nation-state. Discussions of human security came to the fore as new (or rather re-newed) threats emerged not to nations *per se*, but to the communities and individuals living within their borders. Areas such as economic, environmental and maritime security, concerns about hunger and poverty, disease, displacement, human rights and so on fall under the category of human security, and it is often the case that it is the state, or groups within the state, that threaten, rather than protect, individual interests. These 'borderless' threats, it is suggested, can not be met through traditional, state-centric approaches but require a broad-based, cooperative effort on the part of governments, non-governmental organisations and interest groups, epistemic communities and the like.

This book explores the widening debate about, and application of, human security in the 1990s, using the Asia Pacific as a case study. Based on a workshop organised by Australian universities in 1998, the book consists of four parts dealing with definitions and the evolving conceptualisation of human security, the 'Asianization' of human security, key issue areas of human security in Asia, and human security at an institutional level. The underlying theme of the book is to illustrate that rather than acting as a threat to traditional security approaches, human security can and should be viewed as complementary. This is easier said than done, as the introduction highlights, given that the tension between the two schools of thought are born from the notion that 'sovereignty and human security are basically incompatible ideas, as the security referent shifts from the state to the individual' (p. 5). The barriers created by 'mutual intellectual disdain' (p. 14) as described by Tow and Trood are, however, not insurmountable, and potential linkages between traditional and human security are possible due to the overlap in agendas such as conflict prevention, reducing states' vulnerability and reconciling rival civilizations (pp. 22-3). The problem, however, as explained by Kim and Hyun in Chapter 2 is how to carry out human security strategies and policies 'in such a way that they do not hamper the pursuit of national and international security' (p. 41).

Another key theme is the potential role of middle powers in building up the networks and forging the consensus need to put human security policies on the agenda of regional and global organisations. The Asia Pacific has its fair share of middle powers and the region is therefore seen as playing a potentially crucial role in the development of the concept in the 21st century. Australia and Canada are covered in Carl Ungerer's chapter on the disarmament policies of these two countries. Japan, though not normally considered a middle power, could also be added to the list of regional advocates of human security given its lack of 'normalcy' in the sphere of traditional security, and its favourable policy stance as enunciated by former Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo. Surprisingly, the book contains relatively little on this subject, whereas a chapter on Indonesia's recent record on human security appears to sit a little uncomfortably in Part 2.



The Asia Pacific presents a good case study of the need for human security due to a number of crises – economic, political and social – of recent years. Various chapters in Parts 2 and 3 of the book consider some of the effects of these crises, considering for example the impact of the Asian financial crisis on people's security (loss of jobs, political instability), the environmental degradation brought about by industrialisation and so on and explores what is being done in the Asia Pacific to address some of these issues. The increase in the number and activity of NGOs dealing with human security-related issues provides some hope, but as Sucharithanarugse points out, problems are posed by a continued adherence amongst the region's states to non-interventionism. Human rights, discussed within the context of the Asian values debate, are considered in Chapters 7 and 8, while Chapter 9 discusses 'grey area phenomena' (GAP) – threats posed by non-state actors and non-governmental organisations to sovereign states. Southeast Asia faces particular GAP-related problems, as Chalk points out, not least because 'national and international preparedness against GAP remains inadequate' (p. 138).

Nations' lack of ability, or will, to cope with the growing array of non-traditional security threats appears to be a recurring theme in the book and is highlighted in Chapters 9, 10 and 11 which deal with refugees, environmental security, and maritime security respectively. The message throughout the book is clear, and is summarised neatly by Elliott who argues that 'human security requires more than a rethinking of threats. It requires a rethinking of what security means, who it is for, and how it is to be achieved' (p. 172). While the book leaves one with an overwhelming sense that government leaders, politicians, epistemic communities, non-governmental organisations and the whole gamut of grass-roots activists have some distance to travel to find the answers to these questions, some hope is provided in the form of what has already been put in place at a regional institutional level as highlighted in the chapters in Part 4.

This is an important book which sets out some clear agendas for current and future debates on an expanding definition of security, and offers some suggestions for ways in which traditional and non-traditional approaches could converge. In the wake of September 11th these agendas have become even more relevant and pressing.

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