



PRACTITIONERS' CORNER

Religion as a Peace Tool

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Most religions ... have two distinctly contrasting cultures: the 'holy war' and the 'peaceable kingdom.' (Elise Boulding, 1986)

Introduction

Research advocating the use of religion as a peace tool is an increasingly important response to the prominent use of religious differences by leaders as a basis for waging disruptive conflict and war. Appelby (1999), in *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation*, asserts that religion's ability to inspire violence is intimately related to its equally impressive power as a force for peace. He identifies what religious terrorists and religious peacemakers share in common, what causes them to take different paths in fighting injustice and the importance of acquiring understanding of religious extremism.

Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft (Johnston and Sampson, 1994, vii) opens with a forward by Jimmy Carter asserting that 'we all realize that religious differences have often been a cause or pretext for war. Less known is the fact that the actions of many religious persons and communities point in another direction. They demonstrate that religion can be a potent force in encouraging the peaceful resolution of conflict.' After six case studies of reconciliation, the volume concludes with implications for the foreign policy community and implications for four religious communities: Buddhist, Islamic, Hindu and Christian.

Other works provoking thoughts of how religion can be used as a peace tool include Sampson (1997, 304), who informs us of the institutional moves within some religious communities toward developing 'an increasingly intentional and systematic approach to peacebuilding.' Johansen (1997) has contributed 'Radical Islam and Nonviolence: A Case Study of Religious Empowerment and Constraint among Pashtuns.' Reychler (1997) asks for a serious study of the impact of religious organizations on conflict behavior, a comparative study of the peace building efforts of different religious organizations. He asserts that the world cannot survive without a new global ethic and that the religious ties of parties, passive bystanders, peacemakers and peace builders will play a major role.

Placing the Religious Focus in Context

Before examining the actual, and potential, value of religion as a peace tool, it will be useful to briefly summarize evolving trends in peace research in the last half century. This will offer the necessary context for pondering where religion fits in these developments. I have found it useful to think about these developments as adding drawers to the peace builders tool chest, as pictured in Figure 1. Highly significant is the fact that our paradigms now include positive peace as well as negative peace, thereby becoming inclusive of economic, human rights and ecological challenges to peace. At the same time, we have broadened our concerns beyond peacemaking (i.e. conflict resolution and conflict management) to include peacekeeping, and most important, peace building. As a result peace research has been significantly enriched by the tendency to encompass ever more kinds of actors and issues, and at the same time to

One benefit of placing peace tools in the historic context of their emergence is that it offers insight on how the shortcomings of available tools led to the creation of additional tools that overcame these deficiencies. Figure 2 reveals that League of Nations founders created three peace tools to respond to inadequacies of balance of power and traditional diplomacy: collective security, peaceful settlement and disarmament/arms control. Because of shortcomings of these tools, the founders of the UN added functionalism, self-determination and human rights in the Charter. New tools then emerged out of UN practice between 1950 and 1989, significantly shaped by the growing UN membership as a result of the dismantling of overseas empires: economic development, economic equity and ecological balance. After the end of the Cold War humanitarian intervention and preventative diplomacy were added. Simultaneously there has been growing involvement of NGOs/Peoples Movements who have created a number of tools to complement those invented by states: track II diplomacy, conversion from military to civilian production, defensive defense, nonviolence, citizen defense, self-reliance, feminist perspectives and peace education.




Figure 2: The Emergence of Peace Tools

No doubt efforts of others to plot the emergence of peace tools would result in a different array and different interpretations of the time at which specific approaches emerged. The main reason for sharing our effort is to illuminate the necessity that all



involved in the design of peace strategies be aware of the full array of tools available, and the relevance of a broad array of academic disciplines, professions, and institutions. Relevant government roles extend far beyond those in foreign offices and the military, including departments concerned with a variety of economic and social issues. Furthermore, important roles are available for various professional groups in what we now customarily refer to as 'civil society'. These include business, religion, education, media, ethnic communities, and development assistance. Also relevant are a diversity of provincial and local governments. The availability of such a diversity of options has made the design of peace strategies increasingly difficult. On the other hand, there is no doubt that peace builders now have more resources than were perceived to be available in the past.

How should growing emphasis on religion as a peace tool be placed in our tool box? Certainly many responsible for developing most of the peace tools in Figure 2 were motivated by visions of peace emerging out of their religious beliefs. Many might see religion to be a particularly significant factor in the emergence of peace tools such as human rights, economic equity and humanitarian intervention. At the same time, we can readily identify religious roots in the emergence of nonviolence, feminist perspectives, and other NGO/Peoples Movements.

One limitation encountered by those who approach this question from the perspective of traditional international relations research and teaching paradigms is that religious organizations and activity has largely been ignored, despite the fact that religious actors have long been involved in extensive activity across state boundaries. In an article on 'Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations', Jonathan Fox concludes that the paradigms we use to understand international politics, tend to omit religion from the equation. Although 'many case studies of individual international events do address religion, it is clear that the more aggregate and theoretical studies, which contribute to and develop the paradigms we use to understand international politics, tend to omit religion from the equation' (Fox 2001: 73). Of course, the media has transcended academic paradigms when informing us of the violence perpetrated around the world in the name of religion. On the other hand, when there are *sustained* efforts at peacemaking and peacebuilding by religious organizations they tend not to be considered as news. But, as we have already noted, there are an increasing array of scholars devoting attention to the role of religion in the quest for peace. In order to attain a brief overview we will now briefly summarize the contributions of a few scholars.

Three Scholarly Perspectives on Religion as a Peace Tool

In our effort to attain insight on the growing efforts to employ religion in the quest for peace we have found the broad analytic assessments of Cynthia Sampson (1997), Appelby (2000) and Reychler (1977) to be particularly helpful. In combination they provide a usefully comprehensive overview. We shall attempt to summarize their analyses as briefly as possible and attempt to draw some conclusions based on these three contributions. Obviously, we consider this effort to be preliminary because of the limited literature on which it is based, although we did consult a number of other works before choosing these three.

Luc Reychler usefully sets the stage by asserting that in an effort to understand what religions or religious organizations could do 'to promote a constructive conflict dynamic one could start by investigating systematically which positive or negative roles they play

now' (Reychler 1997: 20). He discerns four roles: conflicting parties, bystanders, peacebuilders and peacemakers. The four roles for conflicting parties are religious wars, low-intensity violence, structural violence and cultural violence. He offers a striking table of wars with a religious dimension that lists twenty-four cases between 1948 and 1983, beginning with Buddhists versus Christians in Myanmar/Burma, and ending with Hindus versus Moslems in Sri Lanka in 1983 (Reychler 1997: 22)

Cynthia Sampson

It is useful to begin with an overview of recent trends presented by Cynthia Sampson in a chapter on 'Religion and Peacebuilding' in a volume on *Peacemaking in International Conflict* (Zartman and Rasmussen 1997: 273-316) It is significant that she introduces her chapter with this warning: 'What follows should be viewed not as an exhaustive survey but, rather as suggestive of a larger body of experience yet to be acknowledged, documented, and better understood through more systematic research and analysis.' (Sampson 1997: 280)

The reader will be better prepared to comprehend her summary of trends if we first present her typology of roles played by religious actors. Briefly summarized from her presentation they are:

- (1) Advocates, including both those within the region of conflict and those abroad.
- (2) Intermediaries, including fact finding, good offices, peace-process advocacy, facilitation, conciliation and mediation.
- (3) Observers, providing a watchful physical presence that discourages violence, corruption, human rights violation or other threatening behavior.
- (4) Educators, building sensitivity to inequities, developing skills for advocacy, conflict resolution, democracy building, and promoting healing and reconciliation.
- (5) Institutional actors, the work of religious communities and other institutional actors, such as the Roman Catholic Church, Society of Friends, Mennonites, Moral Re-Armament, 'Engaged Buddhism', and the Nairobi Peace Initiative (Sampson 1997: 280-300).

Sampson concludes her chapter with an informative list of eight recent developments and future trends which we briefly summarize (Sampson 1997: 305-307):

- (1) Within some religious communities, for example the Mennonite Central Committee, there is an increasingly intentional and systematic approach to peacebuilding.
- (2) The interreligious sphere is also adopting a more intentional approach, as in the World Conference on Religion and Peace/International.
- (3) Beyond efforts within specific religious communities, religious actors are being targeted as a critical constituency to be trained and mobilized for peacebuilding, as in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 and 1996.
- (4) A number of religiously affiliated NGOs working in relief and development are seeking consultation and training, at their headquarters, for their field workers in conflict transformation and peacebuilding



- (5) Religious peace actors work in regions where 'the most horrific conflicts' are experienced. Because they are able to draw on their spiritual resources, a growing area of specialization is likely to be in healing and reconciliation.
- (6) In particularly challenging conflict situations the above trends result in an array of religious actors performing a diversity of roles.
- (7) There is now a proliferation of proposals for ecumenically based citizens' services for peace, justice, and reconciliation, as in the proposal made by the Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation program of the World Council of Churches.
- (8) Citizens in many countries, both within and across denominations and religions, are now holding dialogues and internet conferences.

From this she concludes that there is a 'pluralism of actors, roles and methodologies in the religious sector', that they are here to stay and that: 'the time has come to identify, encourage, develop, mobilize, and empower the special resources and potentials of religious actors for constructive conflict transformation – and to coordinate their contributions as integral to the larger peacebuilding enterprise.' (Sampson 1997: 307)

R. Scott Appleby

Appleby (2000), in *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation*, argues that a new form of conflict transformation – 'religious peacebuilding' – is taking shape on the ground, in and across local communities plagued by violence.' While it is a promising development, he sees it as still 'inchoate and fragile, uncoordinated and in need of greater numbers of adequately trained practitioners, more study and testing, and theoretical elaboration' (Appleby 2000: 7). He then provides a very informative, comprehensive, and extensively footnoted overview of various roles played by a diversity of kind of religion-based actors in recent and contemporary conflicts around the world. We have tried to briefly summarize what seem to us to be the main conclusions from this rather complicated work.

In reviewing peacemaking activities of religious groups in a diversity of cases around the world he identifies these kinds of religious actors: religious militants, religious NGOs, national and transnational religious hierarchies, ecumenical and interreligious bodies and local religious communities. Based on this review he concludes that a range of peacemaking activities 'fall within the sphere of religious influence: preventive diplomacy, education and training, election monitoring, conflict mediation, nonviolent protest and advocacy for structural reform, and withdrawing or providing moral legitimacy for a government in times of crisis. It is important to recognize the interrelatedness of religious involvement in peacemaking at every phase of a conflict and at various levels of society.' (Appleby 2000: 211)

Based on his examination of a wide range of cases, Appleby perceives that 'religious agency' has contributed to conflict transformation in three ways. We will offer only brief examples of each. First, in conflict management they have been particularly active 'as *social critics* calling government officials and political, military, and business elites to account for unjust and abusive policies.' (Appleby 2000: 213). Second, religious actors have participated in conflict resolution by providing *good offices* and serving as *mediators*. In one example, beginning in 1968 the Catholic Church in Bolivia served for more than twenty years in helping resolve 'practically every major clash between the miners and the national government and in many impasses that were produced by the

elections for the presidency.' (Appleby 2000: 217) Third, based on their 'reputation for integrity and their long-term commitment to the society', religious actors have contributed to postconflict peacebuilding: structural reform. One prominent example is reform of the army and judiciary in Guatemala based on a church-sponsored Project for the Recovery of Historical Memory which developed *Guatemala: Never Again*, a report on government and rebel atrocities during war in Guatemala. (Appleby 2000: 220)

Appleby also notes the significance of the fact that religious actors approach peace issues from a number of social and religious locations. Some have a strong institutional base in a major religion that reaches across many states, while others represent an indigenous tradition. Actors coming from major religions can have religious roles that range from the very local to high office in a single state or in the worldwide organization. After providing an array of concrete examples of roles played by religious actors, including the Pope, a Guatemalan bishop and Mennonites in Northern Ireland, Appleby recognizes the need for 'identifying and documenting the roles of the full complement of religious actors in recent conflict settings, [a task] rendered all the more difficult by the sheer number of such actors in many cases.' (Appleby 2000: 226)

Of course, an additional complicating factor is the fact that large, and widely spread, religious organizations may play a diversity of roles, not all of which are complementary, in a specific conflict. Appleby offers as an example the roles of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines which ranged from 'critical collaboration' in the early 1980s, to gradually coalescing religious opposition to the regime. The shift was led by Catholic activists, later fueled by concern of bishops responding to government policy decisions prohibiting religious leaders from working with labor and peasant groups, and eventually to opposition of Cardinal Jaime Sin after consultation with the Vatican and Pope John Paul II.

Appleby concludes his framework for approaching the activities of religious peace actors by noting three modes of religious conflict transformation: crisis mobilization, saturation, and interventionist (mediator and magister). (Appleby 2000: 329) First, in the crisis mode religious participation in conflict resolution is spontaneous and primarily unanticipated, emerging out of existing active involvement in a society. Examples offered by Appleby are emergence of resistance to British rule in India in 1947, the civil rights movement in the USA in the 1960s and the South African struggle against Apartheid. He tends to see these religious movements as responsive to charismatic leadership and tending not to be prepared to play a role as conflict transformer. Thus, they tend to appear mainly in times of crisis and to diminish in significance in the aftermath of crisis. (Appleby 2000: 236)

Second, religious peace activists may begin in a spontaneous mode but eventually saturate the society. Appleby offers Northern Ireland as an example in which 'peace advocates operated at several levels of religion and society and persisted through decades of continuous activity, [becoming] part of the institutional and social landscape. At the highest official levels of the Catholic, Presbyterian, Methodist, Anglican, and other churches ...religious leaders condemned sectarian violence, criticized their belligerent coreligionists, encouraged peacemaking efforts, entered in ecumenical dialogue with one another, and sponsored joint social, economic, and educational initiatives designed to foster cross-communal cooperation and build trust among erstwhile antagonists.' (Appleby 2000: 236-237) Based on the Northern Ireland experience Appelby concludes that the saturation mode 'stands the best chance of evolving into actual religious



peacebuilding.’ (Appleby 2000: 237) But he carefully notes that the saturation mode has been feasible only in rare situations in which very special conditions are present that include strong religious and cultural institutions deeply entrenched in a society that have nurturing assistance from abroad and ‘where civil society and democratic traditions were not distant hopes but historic realities.’ (Appleby 2000: 238)

Because of the limited value of the crisis mode, and the rare relevance of the spontaneous mode, Appleby concludes that his third mode – the interventionist mode – is the most promising. In this mode external religious and cultural actors usually intervened in conflict situations, primarily at the invitation of parties to the conflict.. These external actors worked with religious parties on the ground, but local religious actors assumed leadership and responsibility for sustaining the effort. In these cases Appelby discerned mediation to be the most common and productive form of intervention. For example, he believes that external religious mediators played a critical role in ending the Mozambican civil war, along with a complex cast of other actors that included UN agencies, secular and humanitarian NGOs, local secular actors and interested states.

Appleby notes that one shortcoming of this approach has been that it tended to involve only top-level officials and rarely established relationships with midlevel and grassroots leaders. As a result of this experience, he believes there emerged an approach aimed at ‘development, over the long term, of indigenous religious (and other) actors dedicated to sustaining cultures of peace in their respective societies.’ (Appleby 2000: 240). He labels this form of religious peacebuilding ‘magisterial’ because it has connotations of a master-student relationship. Noting the potential for neocolonialist connotations in this approach, he approves its application by Lederach through an elicitive method ‘based on an awareness and appreciation of culturally specific epistemology, or ways of knowing, and recognizes that any model of peacebuilding must be both multivalent and adaptive to local knowledge and customs.’ (Appleby 2000: 240)

Based on his effort to develop a systematic overview, after examining a wide range of religious peacebuilding efforts, particularly in the years surrounding the end of the Cold War, Appelby concludes that ‘the most promising initiatives ...sought to train indigenous religious and cultural leaders in the art of nonviolent conflict transformation.’ (Appleby 2000: 243) Ideally he believes this should be part of a ‘a larger collaborative effort to build (or rebuild) a culture of civic tolerance in societies weakened by long-standing ethnic, religious or political strife ... through a process of evoking from within local religious traditions the conceptual and theological-ethical resources relevant to the culture-specific task of fostering peaceable relationships within and across divided communities.’ Finally, he notes that these efforts are not only contributing to the transformation of conflict itself, ‘but also the way in which politicians, human rights activists, international lawyers, social psychologists, political philosophers, and policymakers conceptualize conflict and its peaceful resolution.’ (Appleby 2000: 244)

Luc Reychler

Luc Reychler provides another useful overview in an article on ‘Religion and Conflict’ in the International Journal of Peace Studies (1997). Based on actual activities of religious peace actors, he offers an informative typology of their peace-making activities, dividing them into three types: traditional diplomatic efforts, Track II peace-making, and field-

diplomacy. With respect to traditional diplomatic efforts, he illustrates 'six resources' of traditional diplomacy with examples of diplomatic activity of the Vatican:

- (1) *Moral legitimacy*, e.g., the Pope's mediation in the Beagle Channel conflict.
- (2) *Neutrality*, e.g. in the Beagle Channel mediation it was obvious that the Vatican had no interests in the disputed islands.
- (3) *Ability to advance other's political standing*. e.g., 'a papal audience, papal visit or involvement confers political advantage on state leaders. This advantage can be used at key junctures in a mediation ...' (Reychler 1997: 29)
- (4) *Ability to reach the (world) public opinion*, the Pope can command the attention of the media.
- (5) *Network of information and contacts*, the information and communication networks of the Catholic Church are extensive..
- (6) *Secrecy*, 'Confidentiality is a major asset for mediation. As an organization with no claim to democratic procedures or open government, the Holy See is known to be able to keep a secret' (Reychler 1997: 30).

Reychler sees Track II Peace-making, which he also refers to as Track II Diplomacy, as an activity of both religious and non-religious NGOs, and refers to both Quakers and Catholics when offering religious examples. He concludes his discussion of Track II diplomacy by noting that it involves activities such as these four:

- (1) Establishing channels of *communication* between the main protagonists to facilitate private exploratory discussions 'without commitment in all matters that have or could cause tensions.'
- (2) Setting up an organization that can *offer services* for parties engaged in conflicts within and between nations.
- (3) Establishing a center to *educate* people undertaking such work.
- (4) Creating a *research* center or network in which know-how and techniques are developed to support the tasks listed above (Reychler 1997: 32).

Distinctive in Reychler's approach to Track II Diplomacy is his call not only for creating a second line of communication among conflicting parties, but explicitly requiring a backup organization that offers services, education and research.

Particularly notable is Reychler's third type of diplomacy, Field-diplomacy, which he defines as 'sending non-governmental teams to conflict areas, for an extended period, to stimulate and support local initiatives for conflict prevention.' (Reychler 1997: 32) He offers three reasons for the development of this activity. First, the failure of traditional diplomacy by states and inter-state organizations to prevent conflicts. Second, 'explosion of peace-keeping and humanitarian relief efforts' that consume large budgets when lesser resources applied earlier could have prevented violence escalation. Third, growing awareness that non-governmental teams must be in a conflict area for an extended period of time in order to develop local trust, facilitate early warning and keep communications open between conflict parties. Reychler notes that this approach is still in an embryonic stage of its development. (Reychler 1997: 32)

Reychler sees the Centre for Peace, Non-violence and Human Rights in Osijek, Croatia, founded in 1991, close to the Serbian border, 'as a model for field-diplomacy.' It was



founded by twenty people, with a core group of five that includes Croats, Serbs and Moslems. Their activities include promoting human rights, teaching methods and strategies of active non-violence, assisting in the resettlement of refugees, and mediating in conflict situations.

He asserts that field diplomacy is distinguished from Track II Diplomacy in eight ways:

- (1) a credible presence in the field is required,
- (2) a serious, long term engagement is necessary,
- (3) a multi-level approach is required, including top leadership, middle level leaders and local representatives of the people,
- (4) peace and the peace process cannot be prescribed from the outside,
- (5) a broad time perspective is required,
- (6) attention is focused on the deep layers of the conflict, including psychological wounds, mental walls and emotional and spiritual levels,
- (7) recognition of the complex interdependence of apparently different conflicts, e.g. the links between conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi and Belgian and French relations with these areas in the past and the present, and
- (8) importance of a more integrative approach of the peace process.

Reychler ends his analysis with lists of the strengths and weaknesses of religious peace-making, beginning with seven items of strength (Reychler 1997: 35-36):

- (1) over 2/3 of people 'belong to a religion',
- (2) religious organizations have the capacity to mobilize people and to cultivate attitudes of forgiveness and conciliation,
- (3) religious organizations can rely on soft power sources to influence the peace process: reward power, expert power, legitimate power, referent (relationship) power, and informational power,
- (4) non-governmental organizations fulfill tasks for which traditional diplomacy is not equipped,
- (5) most religious organizations can make use of their transnational organizations, and
- (6) religious organizations are in the field.

He insightfully follows with these four weaknesses:

- (1) Religions are still perpetrators of violence. 'In many of today's conflicts they remain primary or secondary actors or behave as passive bystanders' (Reychler 1997: 36).
- (2) They tend to be reactive players.
- (3) There is a lack of effective cooperation between religious organizations.
- (4) Those involved need more professional experience

Reychler concludes that 'Religions and religious institutions have an untapped and under-used integrative power potential. To assess this potential and to understand which factors enhance or inhibit joint peace ventures between the Christian religions, but also between the prophetic religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam), the Indian religions (Hinduism and Buddhism) and the Chinese wisdom religions, is an urgent research challenge' (Reychler 1997: 37). Toward this end he sees a need for a typology of the religious dimension of conflicts, a study of the impact of religious organizations on

conflict behavior and comparative research of peace-making and peace-building efforts of different religious organizations.

Other Approaches Briefly Noted

Before proceeding to overview conclusions based on the efforts of these three scholars, it is important that we note just a few examples of approaches taken by others, as a way of illuminating the diversity found in this growing field of inquiry. Two other works offering broad coverage are one by Marc Gopin and an edited volume by Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson. In *Between Eden and Armageddon: the Future of World Religions, Violence and Peacemaking* (2000) Gopin provides a twenty-eight page concluding chapter of 'Systematic Recommendations for Intervention in Contemporary Conflicts that is divided into three categories:

- (1) the religious world,
- (2) policy formation by both governmental and non-governmental organizations, and
- (3) special recommendations for regional conflicts that take into account specific aspects of religions in these areas.

He has chosen these regions: United States, Latin America, the Indian subcontinent, Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.

In *Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (2000), Johnston and Sampson offer case studies of Franco-German reconciliation, Nicaragua, East Germany, Philippines, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, followed by chapters on implications for the foreign policy community (Burnett 2000), values relevant to conflict resolution to be found in an array of world religions (Cox 2000), and 'Looking ahead: Toward a new paradigm'. (Johnston 2000) Johnston suggests that 'reconciliation born of spiritual conviction can play a critical role by inspiring conflicting parties to move beyond the normal human reaction of responding in kind, of returning violence for violence.' (Johnston 2000: 333).

After noting the evolution in the peace research agenda from concern only for negative peace, to concern also for positive peace, Groff and Smoker draw attention to the fact these are both forms of outer peace. They argue strongly, and at length, that peace research must be extended to include inner peace. In their words, the internal aspect of religion is the 'mystical, direct spiritual experience or esoteric part.' (Groff and Smoker 1996: 58) They summarize their argument with these five points (Groff and Smoker 1996: 105-108):

- (1) Peace research must focus on both inner and outer peace and the dynamic interrelationships between them.
- (2) Peace research must elaborate on the different dimensions and levels of inner peace, just as it has done for outer peace.
- (3) To explore inner peace, peace research must acknowledge other ways of knowing besides the scientific method (based on the five senses).
- (4) Peace research must focus not only on what it wants to eliminate, but also on what it wants to envision and create in a positive sense – if peace is to be achieved.
- (5) Peace research must explore and include how cultures influence people's perceptions of 'peace' as well as how much people believe the world can be changed or not.



Abu-Nimer sees value in training for peacebuilding that involves participants from different religions. For him a goal of interreligious peacebuilding 'is to facilitate a change from the participants' narrow exclusionist, antagonistic, or prejudiced attitudes and perspectives to a more tolerant and open-minded attitude. '(Abu-Nimer 2000)

Finally, the recent Millennium World Peace Summit of Religious and Spiritual Leaders (Love 2001) has drawn attention to efforts to convene world gatherings of religious leaders in order to develop their support for, and involvement in, peacebuilding. This event gathered over 1000 religious leaders in the General Assembly Hall at UN headquarters. It was preceded by a gathering of over 8000 religious leaders at the 1993 Centennial Parliament of the World's Religions, and in 1968 by the International Inter-Religious Conference on Peace held in New Delhi in 1968 (Jack 1968). Two years later the World Conference on Religion and Peace was founded with a focus on multireligious cooperation and development of a network of religious people committed to cooperative action for peace.

It is very significant that the WCRP has recently 'shifted its emphasis to mobilizing religious communities in troubled regions, engaging them in collaborative conflict prevention/resolution and rebuilding civil society.' (www.wcrp.org) Facilitating these efforts are a Standing Commission on Conflict Transformation, an Analytical Working Group on Religion and Peacebuilding that attempts to involve leading scholars, and a Religious Practitioners Working Group that involves leading religiously-based practitioners of peacebuilding in exchange with the Analytical Working Group. Significant here is the evolution of this effort from an exchange of ideas through meetings to an emphasis on dialogue between scholars and religious practitioners toward the end of peacebuilding in specific cases of disruptive conflict.

Conclusion

Reychler's list of strengths of religious peace actors offers a useful introduction to our conclusion:

- (1) over 2/3 of people 'belong to a religion',
- (2) religious organizations have the capacity to mobilize people and to cultivate attitudes of forgiveness and conciliation,
- (3) religious organizations can rely on soft power sources to influence the peace process: reward power, expert power, legitimate power, referent (relationship) power, and informational power,
- (4) non-governmental organizations fulfill tasks for which traditional diplomacy is not equipped,
- (5) most religious organizations can make use of their transnational organizations, and
- (6) religious organizations are in the field.

At the same time, his list of weaknesses of religious peace actors provides a succinct list of challenges that they must overcome :

- (1) Religions are still perpetrators of violence. 'In many of today's conflicts they remain primary or secondary actors or behave as passive bystanders.'
- (2) They tend to be reactive players.
- (3) There is a lack of effective cooperation between religious organizations.

- (4) Those involved need more professional experience (Reychler 1997: 35-36).

Our summary of three overviews of increasing involvement of religious groups in peace activities has revealed it to be dynamically responding to these weaknesses. In a summary consistent with our other sources, Sampson finds religious peace efforts to be increasingly systematic and intentional. There is a growing diversity of roles. New actors are being targeted and trained, including field workers, whose roles are extending to healing and reconciliation. There is a proliferation of proposals for ecumenically based citizens' services for peace. Internet conferences are now being added (Sampson 1997: 305-307).

We have encountered four different typologies for listing the nature of emerging religious peace activity:

- (1) Sampson lists five religious peace roles: advocates, observers, educators, intermediaries, and institutional actors (Sampson 1997: 280-300) Appleby's list of religious actors includes: militants, NGOs, national and transnational religious hierarchies, ecumenical and interreligious bodies, and local religious communities (Appleby 2000: 211).
- (2) Closely related to these roles are lists of activities by Appleby and Reychler. Appleby's list of activities includes preventive diplomacy, education and training, election monitoring, conflict mediation, nonviolent protest, advocacy for structural reform, withdrawing or providing moral legitimacy. (Appleby 2000: 211). Reychler's list includes providing channels of communication, performing services for parties, education and providing a research center (Reychler 1997: 32).
- (3) Reychler perceives the primary resources offered by religious peace activists to be moral legitimacy, neutrality, ability to advance other's political standing, and ability to reach the world (public opinion) (Reychler 1997: 30)
- (4) Appleby draws attention to the number of social and religious locations available to religious peace activists. They include a strong institutional base in a major religion that reaches across many states, a high office in a single state, local offices and those involved in indigenous traditions (Appleby 2000: 226).

Based on insight derived from their typologies of roles, activities, resources and locations of religious peace actors, Appleby and Reychler each discern that religious peace activity combines these dimensions in three fundamental ways. Appleby's three-fold typology of religious conflict transformation includes

- (1) crisis mobilization,
- (2) saturation and
- (3) interventionist.

He sees the interventionist mode, in which external actors work with local religious actors toward the end of facilitating their leadership and responsibility for sustaining the effort, as the most promising. But, after noting concern that this effort could have neocolonialist connotations, he warns that it must be 'adaptive to local knowledge and customs' (Appleby 2000: 240).

Reychler (1997: 32) also offers a three-fold typology of religious peace-making activities:



- (1) traditional diplomacy,
- (2) Track II peace-making and
- (3) field-diplomacy, which he defines as 'sending non-governmental teams to conflict areas, for an extended period, to stimulate and support local initiatives for conflict prevention.'

His list of the characteristics of field-diplomacy merit repeating (Reychler 1997: 32):

- (1) credible presence in the field,
- (2) serious, long term engagement,
- (3) a multi-level approach, including top leadership, middle level leaders and local representatives of the people,
- (4) peace and the peace process cannot be prescribed from the outside'
- (5) a broad time perspective,
- (6) attention to the deep layers of the conflict, including psychological wounds, mental walls and emotional and spiritual levels,
- (7) recognition of the complex interdependence of apparently different conflicts, e.g. the links between conflicts within the country and links to other countries.

What relationship is there between the escalating activities of peace activists and our 'peacemaker's tool chest'? Two aspects of these activities seem to be particularly relevant. First, religious peace activists tend to employ a broad array of peace tools. These certainly include diplomacy, Track II diplomacy, human rights, humanitarian intervention, peaceful settlement, preventive diplomacy, non-violence, and self reliance. At the same time, many others are implied. There is no doubt that religious peace activists have a broader approach to the quest for peace than many state actors do.

Second, it would seem that religious peace actors have added a tool to our chest: field diplomacy. We conclude that 'field diplomacy', as described by Reychler above, should be added to the NGO/Peoples Movements column of Figure 2. When religious peace actors combine a diversity of peace tools in a sustained effort at the site of a conflict, toward the end of long term peace building, this is a distinctive approach that merits inclusion in the peace activist's tool chest. On the other hand, I do believe that 'field diplomacy' title does not fully convey the nature of the contribution of this tool. One other possibility would be 'sustained field peacebuilding.'

Finally, all of the scholars whose work we have reported, as well as others, urge systematic research on the activities of religious peace actors. We certainly agree and would suggest that particular emphasis be placed on discerning the degree to which field diplomacy is being employed, and comparative studies of its impact. Given its broad and sustained approach, it would be particularly useful to learn how these efforts are related to, and impact, peace efforts by other actors. This would be useful in fulfilling Sampson's recommendation that religious peace actors 'coordinate their contributions as integral to the larger peacebuilding enterprise' (Sampson 1997: 307).

It would also be useful to investigate the degree to which the motivations and career patterns of religions peace actors are similar to, and different from, other peace actors, particularly those in other kinds of NGOs/people's movements. This question comes in response to Appleby's characterization of the special nature of 'religious peacebuilding'. He asserts that it must come to be viewed as both an area of expertise and a preeminent expression of religious commitment, a 'professional ' calling as well as a

religious 'vocation' that is highly prized within the religious community and by which its practitioners are lifted up for specific recognition and support...' (Appleby 2000: 306). The results from these two lines of inquiry could help to strengthen the efforts of those devoted to the second religious culture identified by Elise Boulding in our introduction. Most religions ... have two distinctly contrasting cultures: the 'holy war' and the 'peaceable kingdom' (Boulding 1986).

At the same time, in the light of the fact that field diplomacy takes a broad positive peace approach, including efforts to avoid neo-colonialist forms of peacebuilding, results of the recommended research could even encourage those now involved in the 'holy war' culture to shift to 'the peaceable kingdom.'

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