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Defeatism and Northern Protestant 'Identity'

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Introduction

Looking at the academic literature and media commentary, one can detect a shift in the identification of northern protestants. Once they were identified, and identified themselves in terms of modernity, triumph, and rationalism; increasingly they are identified and identify themselves in terms of tradition, defeat and associated emotions such as confusion, alienation, fatalism, resentment, fear and cognates such as anxiety and paranoia. More than one author has claimed to detect self-pity and a predilection for victim hood.

According to O'Halloran (1987), the image fearful protestant was invented in the early 1980s during the deliberations of the New Ireland Forum. I am not sure about that, but it is true that characterisations of northern protestants in defeatist terms became common after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 and proliferated during the peace process and in analyses of responses to the Good Friday Agreement.

Looking at this literature, I have distinguished at least four different approaches to northern protestant defeatism. Firstly, there are those who are content to describe or articulate its contours. The first, and, so far as I can ascertain, still the only, direct empirical research on the phenomenon falls into this category. Dunne and Morgan (1994) asked a group of middle class protestants what the then voguish term 'alienation' meant to them, and what had caused them to feel alienated. For most, their alienation was from the British government. The causes included constitutional changes, especially the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which was seen as a betrayal, and legislative changes, especially fair employment legislation, which were seen as an attempt to placate nationalists. Some respondents also mentioned the rising profile of nationalist culture. Subsequent descriptions of protestant defeatism give more emphasis than Dunn and Morgan's respondents did to the demographic advance of the catholic population and associated residential shifts, particularly in Derry and North Belfast, and to the collapse of shipbuilding, engineering and textile industries that had sustained the protestant working class (see Hall 1994, McBride 1997).

Secondly, there are those who, like O'Halloran (1987), see the fearful and confused protestant as a nationalist stereotype. By emphasising irrational fear, the stereotype functions to diminish the significance of protestant opposition to a united Ireland. Others have taken this further to suggest that some protestants have internalised this stereotype. Longley worries about 'an unfortunate tendency for working class Protestants to swallow a triumphalist rhetoric which absurdly claims all the art, intellect and culture of the island for Catholic Nationalism'. (1994: 11). On another occasion she writes of protestants 'internalis[ing] charges of "incoherence"' (1997: 113). Aughey is also concerned about northern protestants allowing nationalists to define their ideological contours (1989: viii).

Thirdly, there are those who treat defeatism as the expression of a singular pathological mentality that has more to do with the past, usually a colonial past, than with any current reality. Supremacism is seen as central to protestant identity and defeatism is its flip side: protestants are suffering from a 'deflated superiority complex' (Anderson and Shuttleworth 1994). In these approaches, defeatism is conceived as irrational: a cognitive distortion or form of false consciousness according to which attempts to redress nationalist grievances are perceived as protestant loss. Worse, defeatism is

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deliberately orchestrated by cynical political activists who use traditional forms of mobilisation that evoke a backs-against-the-wall siege mentality to mobilise protestants against change (In addition to Anderson and Shuttleworth, 1994, see also McKay, 2000; McVeigh, 1999; Fleischmann, 1995).

Fourthly, there are anthropologists who, in the name of the subject they profess, are critical of the latter approach. Traditionally, anthropologists recoil from the idea that social groups suffer from pathological mental processes. They argue that what seems irrational from the perspective of an outsider is often rational when located in context. This might be called the situated rationality approach, and I associate it with Ruane and Todd (1996) and Ruane (1996).

There are problems with each of these approaches, but my main concern is with the third. I would not deny the existence of defeatist currents among northern protestants or that they are to some extent orchestrated. But exponents of this approach do not give sufficient credit to other currents within the protestant community, notably those that have coalesced around David Trimble, that, initially at least, were explicitly articulated as an attempt to engage positively both with protestant fatalism and the need for change. And I share in Ruane's anxiety about any approach that rests on a notion that social groups suffer from pathological mental processes.

Whether it is a product of a traditional form of political mobilisation that evokes a siege mentality, or the product of a 'deflated superiority complex', the impression one gets from reading Anderson and Shuttleworth and the others is that mentalities, traditions, or identities forged in the seventeenth century continue to exercise a tyrannical hold over the northern protestant imagination such as to prevent them comprehending their present circumstances. Against this, I wish to suggest that contemporary protestant defeatism is less the product of a pre-existing identity than symptomatic of the absence of a northern protestant cultural identity and, perhaps, of an ongoing attempt to get one.

This suggestion or hypothesis involves a reinterpretation of protestant supremacism and a critique of the prevailing consensus that the Northern Ireland crisis is, at root, a conflict of identities. The relationship between supremacism and protestant 'identity' is not the only issue at stake, but perhaps also the relationship between the collapse of faith in modernity in the guise of progress and the growing attraction of pathetic identities in later modernity. I will begin by reviewing the relevant literature.

Defeatism as an inherited mentality or identity

Northern Ireland was established in 1920-21 as the largest area on the island of Ireland within which protestants constituted a significant majority over catholics. In this context, as Anderson and Shuttleworth (1994) note, it was not unusual for public discussion of population censuses to be dominated by 'sectarian head-counting'. Allowing for this, Anderson and Shuttleworth suggest that public discussion following the 1991 census was 'unusually sensationalist and misleading'. It was misleading in the way that 'simplistic arithmetic and crude empiricism' often is (1994: 92), but particularly in the case of census data in Northern Ireland where 'non-responses can... result in very misleading figures' (1994: 82). They conclude that the figures do not reveal 'a decisive shift in the sectarian balance of power in favour of Catholic nationalists' (1994: 74); rather public discussion of the figures reveal a, 'sectarian mind set, particularly on the unionist side. It has fed unionist paranoia and nationalist triumphalism' (1994: 74).

For Anderson and Shuttleworth the public discussion was not merely misleading, it was dangerous. They note that a tried and trusted - 'traditional' - method of unionist mobilisation is to evoke a backs-against-the-wall, 'siege mentality' and suggest that,

> 'the one sided and blinkered analysis characteristic of the sectarian mind set can easily fall into justification of paramilitary violence, in this case specifically loyalist violence. One factor behind its 1993-94 upsurge... might have been all the exaggerated talk of "Catholic advance" and "Protestant retreat"' (1994: 79).

If, as Anderson and Shuttleworth suggest, public discussion of censuses in Northern Ireland are usually dominated by sectarian head-counting and if interpretations of the 1991 census in terms of protestant retreat are misleading, one is left wondering why discussion of this census became 'unusually sensationalist'. Anderson and Shuttleworth do not confront this question directly, but some kind of answer can be discerned in their discussion of the movement of protestants in Derry to the Waterside from the city-side of the river Foyle and in their discussion of the effects of de-industrialisation on the Belfast's protestant working class, both of which draw heavily on the Opsahl Report (Pollak 1993). According to the report northern protestants' confusion and their sense of crisis has arisen because old identities have become fragmented, shattered by, and out of synch with, contemporary realities (Pollack 1993: 95). This is true for both catholics and protestants, but the latter's cultural identity is seen as more fragile. 'There is a defensiveness about Protestant culture, which is not helped by a certain inarticulateness', all of which renders protestants vulnerable to being 'vilified nationally and internationally'. (1993: 97).

Anderson and Shuttleworth concede that many Derry protestants have moved from the city-side to the Waterside and that many Belfast protestants have lost jobs. They imply that these changes contributed to a climate in which discussion of the 1991 census became 'unusually sensationalist'. Although they concede that population movements and job losses are real enough, they characterise the protestant interpretation of these changes as sectarian and therefore lacking in validity because the changes are the product of anonymous social and economic forces without conscious political motivation. Working class protestants in Belfast may be 'obsessed with a deeply felt sense that they are losing', they may have been affected disproportionately by industrial restructuring, but this is only because 'Protestants had more industrial jobs to lose in the first place' (1994: 89). Population shifts in Derry are presented as sub-urbanisation: not symptomatic of protestant retreat, merely moving house.

In so far as population shifts in Derry and elsewhere have any political or sectarian significance, it is not that protestants are being 'pushed-out', it is that some protestants choose to leave their neighbourhoods rather than share them with catholics. Such protestants,

> 'are suffering from what might be called a "deflated superiority complex". With the reduction in unionist political power since the imposition of "direct rule" from Britain, *supremacist attitudes towards Catholics which were integral to loyalist identity* are now very obviously out-of-line with reality, but many Protestants are unable or unwilling to come to terms with the changed circumstances and the resulting insecurities. This sectarian pathology, if such it is, helps explain the generally unspecified nature of "Protestant alienation" and the alleged "inarticulateness" of loyalism - the pathology is difficult to articulate and its full articulation would cast loyalism in a pathetic and very unattractive light. Maybe it is better sometimes not to be "articulate"? And simpler to talk in terms of population and territory?' (1994: 87 my emphasis).

In short, for Anderson and Shuttleworth, talk of catholic advance and protestant retreat is exaggerated. It is not based in contemporary reality; rather it is the expression of a pathological, paranoid, sectarian and supremacist 'mindset'. This 'mindset' not only prevents 'many' protestants from coming to terms with social, economic and political change, it is also used to mobilise protestants against such change through traditional tactics such as evoking a 'siege mentality'.

McKay's book (2000) is also concerned with protestant pathology. She begins by describing two sectarian murders carried out by protestants then explains that she wishes to explore the 'influences which were capable of producing such violent hatred'. She says that she is also interested in 'the views of other Protestants exposed to the same influences, who would abhor the actions' of the murderers, but the former aim is uppermost: 'How, in some, did "proud to be Protestant", turn pathological?' (2000: 11).

The book is a collection of interviews conducted by McKay. Her questions have been edited out, and, in the absence of these, one has to divine McKay's thesis from the cumulative impact of the interviews, the interpretative comments interspersed among them and a conclusion that comes in the form of an epilogue.

McKay answers the question she poses at the start of the book with a variation on the traditional Irish Marxist explanation of why protestants were unionists. This explanation was developed by James Connolly. It turns on the argument that the protestant working class failed to recognise their true class interests because of ideological manipulation through the Orange Order (see Finlay 1989 and Bew Gibbon and Patterson 1979). McKay implies that the Orange Order and other loyalist institutions play on protestant fears that they are losing ground relative to Catholics; fear turns to hatred, which fuels anti-Catholic violence. Her analysis of the successful campaign to prevent the Orange Order marching on the Garvaghy Road in Portadown provides an apposite example (see 2000: 111). She describes a leaflet that circulated in Portadown in the weeks before Rosemary Nelson was murdered in 1999. Rosemary Nelson was a local solicitor who worked on behalf of the Garvaghy Road Resident's Association, which opposes the march. The leaflet alleged that she was part of a Jesuit conspiracy, which included members of the Residents' Association. McKay comments: 'Residual fears, fanned up, turn to hatred... Some people translate their hatred into a militaristic ethnic solidarity and into violence' (2000: 367)

By suggesting that McKay's thesis draws on a Connollyist type of analysis I would not wish to give the reader the impression that she thinks defeatism is confined to the protestant working class. For example, she quotes Malcolm, a middle-class protestant from Portadown, who complains about concessions made to nationalists in respect of fair employment legislation, constitutional arrangements and the re-routing of orange parades, then comments: 'This sentiment, that Protestants have passively responded to nationalist aggression by conceding and giving until they could give no more, was ubiquitous' (2000: 142).

According to one interpretation, McKay's book provides further evidence of what Anderson and Shuttleworth call protestants' 'deflated superiority complex'. Marianne Elliot (*Irish Times* 27 May 2000) singles-out one of McKay's respondents, a Portadown businesswoman, who described a catholic couple she met in an expensive restaurant, as 'Jumped-up taigs'. Elliot comments:

> 'The sight of Catholics prospering is profoundly unsettling to this frame of mind... The belief that if Catholics prosper, they can only do so at the expense of the

> Protestants is a common one. The perception is that Catholic culture is confident and forging ahead and there is a sense in this book of Protestants feeling deracinated'

As with Anderson and Shuttleworth, Elliot's point seems to be that protestant fears are ill founded because they mistakenly interpret redress as loss. She quotes another of McKay's respondents who says of his fellow protestants:

> 'Protestants see sharing as losing. They are doomed, but it is almost as if they want to be doomed'.

McKay herself is ambivalent about the foundations and validity of protestant defeatism. She describes the horrific murder of a catholic man by protestants and compares it to the murder of an African American man, which was carried out by two white men influenced by the far-right Aryan Brotherhood. This leads to a meditation on the similarities between the ideas of the Ku Klux Klan and Ulster loyalists:

> 'The aggressive self-pity is similar. The paranoia about government among these far-right groups is also replicated in the North' (2000: 367).

She quotes from Michael Ignatieff's account of Slobodan Milosevic's mobilisation of Serbs in which he describes 'how Serbs, who felt "a combustible mixture of genuine grievance and self-pitying paranoia" were easily ignited' (McKay, 2000: 368). In relation to Northern Protestants, McKay is unsure if the fear of loss is delusional, 'residual' (2000: 367) or part of a strategic effort by organisations such as the Orange Order to claim a victim identity for protestants (see 2000: 120, 156, 249 and 282). The final paragraph of the book refers to protestants as both victims and perpetrators.

In a paper that McKay would have done well to read, Fleischmann (1995) develops a more nuanced analysis of the slippage between the statuses of victim and perpetrator and of how political mobilisation can turn on this very ambiguity. Fleischmann's develops a close reading of three loyalist texts: Rudyard Kipling's poem *Ulster 1912*, a UDA statement issued in 1972 and a sermon by Ian Paisley.

> 'What these three texts have in common is that they all make use of the Loyalists' half-conscious awareness of wrongs done to the minority in order to block off any tendency towards compromise or reconciliation, and to ensure that what is defined as "Ulster" will continue to say "No!". It is hard to imagine that this is done consciously and deliberately: it is more likely to stem form a well-developed instinct for power, an intuitive sense of how it is to be obtained and maintained.' (1995:73).

The 1972 UDA statement,

> 'begins almost as a plea for understanding, in which the authors describe their dilemma as "second-class Englishmen and half-caste Irishmen". But a tone of maudlin self-pity soon comes in when they bewail their fate as being constantly "betrayed and maligned"… devoid of friends, and helpless, inarticulate victims of the sophisticated nationalist propaganda machine. They maintain that they are facing extinction.
>
> 'The self-pity seems to act as a valve channelling the suppressed anger over their "betrayal" into the open. The reason for their anger is given as follows: "For four

> hundred years we have known nothing but uprising, murder, destruction and repression."'

Fleischmann points out that one would have expected the author to use the word 'suffered' in connection with murder, uprising and repression, but that the text reads 'we have known'. She suggests that 'Grammatically speaking, the loyalists could be both perpetrators or victims of murder and repression' (1995: 68). She is inclined to the view that 'the studied blandness' (1995: 69) of the expression is deliberate. The UDA are aware that they have perpetrated murder and repression and this explains the loyalists' particularly strong sense of grievance: 'those who have committed injustices for their cause should be especially resentful about being abandoned, since they would be left to face the consequences – the resentment and possible revenge of the dispossessed and disadvantaged.' She notes that the statement concludes with,

> 'a venomous snarl at British politicians described as "flabby-faced men with pop-eyes and fancy accents" who send soldiers out to fight with "their hands tied behind their backs". The UDA authors then threaten to do the job themselves, using both hands: "why not send the soldiers home and leave us the weapons and we will send you the IRA wrapped-up in little boxes and little tins like baked beans."'

On its own, Fleischmann claim that 'the viciousness of this utterance removes any ambiguity about the "knowing" of murder' (1995: 69) is not wholly convincing, but, when set alongside Kipling's poem and the Paisley sermon, her argument about the ambiguity between victim and perpetrator is more compelling.

Anderson and Shuttleworth, McKay and Fleischmann see present-day protestant defeatism as the product of an inherited mentality or identity. For Anderson and Shuttleworth it is the flip-side of a supremacist identity that is now out of synch with reality, and orchestrated according to traditional forms of political mobilisation that evoke a siege mentality. McKay and Fleischmann place more emphasis on the latter type of explanation, but reading all of these authors, the impression one gets is that seventeenth century struggles between protestant settlers and catholic natives for supremacy in Ireland have an unmediated significance so vivid that it over determines protestant perceptions of present-day realities. Fleischmann explicitly locates the texts she examines in the context of a colonial reading of Ireland's history, but this reading is also implicit in Anderson and Shuttleworth's allusions to supremacist and siege mentalities and in the glib parallels that McKay draws between Northern protestant and settler or frontier communities elsewhere.

In fact, many writers have been struck by the 'remarkable similarity' (Lowry 1996: 201) between the mentality of northern protestants and that of other colonial settler communities; these include Lowry himself, Clayton (1996), O'Dowd (1990) and J W Foster (1991). The issues are twofold for those who seek to understand northern protestants in a colonial context. One is that Ireland's colonial status is fiercely disputed. For example Walker argues that

> 'it is incorrect to describe Ireland's situation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and earlier, as "colonial" or "post-colonial" pure and simple... Further, this description excludes perspectives which an appreciation of the European context would allow' (1990: 38).

Kennedy (1996) suggests that the emphasis on the colonial aspects of Ireland's history is expressive of a predilection for 'victim identities' on the part of Irish nationalists, and, indeed, of some Ulster unionists.

The second issue is that those authors who suggest that present-day northern protestants bear the imprimatur of a colonial settler mentality or identity rely on a continuity that flies in the face of theoretical trends in historiography and in postcolonial theory which stress discontinuity: traditions are invented and identities are fluid and hybrid. McKay implies a key role for the Orange Order, but neither she, nor Fleischmann, nor Anderson and Shuttleworth adequately account for the continuity or durability of a supremacist identity, or a siege mentality or traditional forms of mobilisation from the seventeenth century to the present day. Let us see if Clayton (1996), J W Foster (1991) or O'Dowd (1990) do any better.

Clayton (1996: xiv) ridicules the recent discovery of protestant alienation:

> 'What has largely escaped notice is, first, that British policy has been perceived as unsatisfactory at least since the beginning of the twentieth century and, second, that a central feature of settler societies is the ambivalence of settlers towards their metropolis. Just as many Protestants today complain that the British do not know how to deal with rebel Catholics, so have settlers always objected to "native policy" as proposed by the imperial government.'

As Clayton makes clear, the 'remarkable similarity' between northern protestants and other colonial settler communities is not just in their relationship with the metropolitan power but with the natives.

In attempting to explain these similarities, Clayton, cites a battery of authors - Memmi (1990), Hartz (1964), Mannoni (1964) and Thornton (1965) - who characterise settler societies as resistant to change and ideologically fixed in the sense that the values developed by the original settlers are taken-on by subsequent generations and new immigrants. Thornton (1965: 43) argues that small size and close-knit relationships of settler societies tends to lead to towards cultural conformity rather than innovation and creativity. This argument about the essential conservatism and continuity of settler societies cannot accommodate settler societies such as those in North America and Australia. Nor can it accommodate Belfast Presbyterians in the latter half of the eighteenth century: one of the few examples of colonial settlers siding with the natives against the metropolitan power.

J W Foster (1991) attempts to address the difficulty posed by the United Irishmen by drawing on Tom Nairn's argument that catholic recovery and the rise of peasant nationalism in Ireland in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries forced northern protestants into a more dependent relationship with their British motherland (1991: 264). Beneficial in economic terms, political and cultural dependence on Britain underwrote the persistence of a colonial mentality. At times of crisis, when doubly threatened by the Irish nationalist advance and British ambivalence, elements of the settler mentality reassert themselves. Foster argues: 'The Anglo-Irish rapprochement [of 1985] has dangerously conjoined in the consciousness' of the Ulster majority the fear of Irish irredentism and the resentment towards England they always felt... as members of a truculent frontier society' (1991: 272).

In a similar ,vein O'Dowd (1990: 39) argues that with the onset of the troubles in the late 1960s and 1970s, 'Loyalists, who in calmer times saw themselves as ethnic citizens (Ulster or Irish) of a multinational UK state, now reassumed in sharper form many of the

preoccupations of Memmi's settlers'. The 'preoccupations of Memmi's settlers' are too various for me to itemise here, but given the importance attached to protestant supremacism by Anderson and Shuttleworth, McKay and others, we should note O'Dowd's discussion of the 'Nero complex'.

> 'Memmi's characterisation of the colonizer's "usurper's role" or "Nero complex" also finds an echo in Northern Ireland... Ulster "settlers" see their improving mission as an expression of their own "eminent merits": their technical and scientific prowess, their more rational forms of religion, their greater entrepreneurial capacity, their greater sense of social discipline, their superior welfare systems, roads, hospitals... To a degree these advantages are less dependent on the Loyalist's own efforts than on their links with Britain. An awareness of this dependence merely confirms love of the motherland... Yet, these very ties and supports make loyalist question deep down their own myth of self-reliance' (1990 43-4).

Comparing protestants with white South Africans who point out the poverty and tyranny of Black African states, O'Dowd claims that loyalists emphasise the demerits of the natives, by pointing to the shortcomings of the independent Irish state. They also denigrate northern nationalists whose 'demerits' include: 'their lack of gratitude for a standard of living superior to the southern counterparts, their laziness, proclivity to have too many children, inferior education and skills, and subordination to a clergy which denies the freedom of an individual conscience' (1990: 44).

In his discussion of the 'Nero complex', O'Dowd, makes reference to the Memmi's idea that identities actively forged in the colonial encounter: 'colonizer and colonized are linked together in a reciprocal but mutually destructive relationship within which the identity of each is forged' (1990: 40). Memmi's conception of identity formation is dynamic, but when reading O'Dowd, as when reading the others, one gets the impression that a core protestant mentality was encoded and fixed in the seventeenth century, lies dormant, and mysteriously reasserts its self in times of crisis. In the contemporary crisis it has reasserted itself with such force that protestants are incapable of comprehending their circumstances[1].

The image of northern protestants constructed by Anderson and Shuttleworth, McKay and Fleischmann is, as Elliot says in her review of McKay, bleak. Northern protestants are fearful, self-pitying and susceptible to conspiracy theories. In this bleak vision, there are only a few hopeful glimmers. Fleischmann sets John Hewitt's poem *The Colony* against the ominous vision of the other three texts she examines. In this poem, the colonists respond to the decline and fall of empire by seeking 'accommodation and reconciliation' (1995: 74). Anderson and Shuttleworth concede that 'evoking a siege mentality' is not the only tactic in the unionist political lexicon. They note that in the debates around Catholic demographic advance following publication of the 1991 Census, James Molyneaux, then leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, disputed the figures. Anderson and Shuttleworth suggest:

> 'Mr Molyneaux's more optimistic stance may be more politically astute. The danger for Unionism is that Protestants might begin to "believe their own propaganda" and be further encouraged to retreat and emigrate.' (1994: 80).

[1] Nationalist commentators such as Tom McGurk portray northern protestants as an 'intrinsically, culturally and emotionally... genetically disordered political community permanently incapable of even saving itself' (*Sunday Business Post*: 26.03.2000).

Similarly, in her conclusion, McKay reminds herself that 'a majority of Protestants voted for the Belfast Agreement which committed them to equality and democracy' (2000: 368). Like Anderson and Shuttleworth, McKay does not offer any sustained analysis of the currents within unionism that seek to engage positively with protestant fatalism and the need for change.

Questioning the consensus that the Northern Ireland 'problem' is a conflict of identities

These analyses of defeatist currents among present-day protestants draw in various ways on theories about cultural identity. To this extent they are in line with the prevailing consensus that 'the issue of identity is at the heart of the Northern Ireland crisis' (Lundy and MacPóilin 1992: 5, see also Graham 1997). The identification of strangers through a process that has come to be known as Telling has long been a feature of routine, everyday social interaction in Northern Ireland (Harris, 1972; Burton 1978; Finlay 1999), but the theory that the Northern Ireland 'problem' is a problem of identity is of recent provenance. It became salient only in the 1980s.

To understand the significance of the rise of identity theory in Ireland one needs to look beyond the island. It is common to trace the rise of identity – both as a category of analysis and as a form of politics – to the retreat from class signalled by the emergence of the New Social Movements in the 1960s (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). Calhoun (1997) and Finkielkraut (1988) take a longer view. They point out that cultural nationalism played a central role in the development of essentialist thinking that is also basic to the way race, gender, sexual orientation and other sorts of collective identities came to be constituted. Cultural nationalism draws on Herder's idea of the Volksgeist, which gained popularity amongst Germans following Napoleon's victory at Jena. The exaltation of collective identity and German culture compensated for military defeat and the humiliating subjugation which it entailed. Herder's ideas were taken-up not just by the Romantic Movement in Germany, but also by French conservatives who were dismayed by the terror and Napoleonic dictatorship which had followed the revolution. Both reacted against the Enlightenment ideas that had inspired the revolution.

The revolutionaries were also nationalists. In the name of the French nation they opposed the *ancien regime* based on aristocratic privilege and royal absolutism, and in which social hierarchy had been based on birth and monarchy on divine right. As Finkielkraut argues

> 'Misconstruing its own etymology (nascor means "I am born") the revolutionary nation uprooted individuals and defined them by their humanity rather than their birth. It was not a question of reinstating the collective identity of souls lacking any real bearings; rather it was a matter, on the contrary, of setting them free from all definitive ties, and asserting their radical autonomy.' (1988: 17).

The nation was a contract negotiated between free, rational individuals. Against this, the romantics and the French reactionaries followed Herder in asserting that men and women are not free-born, but situated and contextually determined by whatever language and culture and traditions they are born into. Where the revolutionaries saw history as the victory of progress and reason over tradition and prejudice, the romantics and the French reactionaries privileged tradition and emotion. Where the former espoused universal cultural values, the latter saw culture as the collective mentality or way of life of a particular people. In western Europe and North America, the romantic critique of Enlightenment ideas was muted during the late Nineteenth century and the

early Twentieth, but it gained a new purchase after World War II with the collapse in faith in Western values, particular the belief in progress.

Given the centrality of romantic ideas to the development of Irish nationalism, it is ironic that in Ireland the rise of identity-thinking was secured in the revisionist critique of traditional nationalist historiography. For traditional nationalists, the people of Ireland form one nation and the fault for keeping Ireland divided lies with Britain. Revisionists countered this by down-playing the role of the British and arguing that the problem was internal to Ireland: it was the result of a clash between two identities, Irish and Unionist. The latter was not a mere fabrication of the British, but had a historical integrity in itself. Arguably, the revisionists did not refute nationalist conceptions of identity; rather their challenge has had the effect of proliferating the number of identities in Ireland: where nationalist proclaim one Irish nation, the revisionists note a residual Anglo-Irish identity and the enduring integrity of Unionist identity. (See Whyte, 1990; cf O'Halloran, 1987; Deane 1994).

The consensus that the cause of the Northern Ireland 'problem' is a clash of identities is shared not only by analysts, it extends to politicians and policy makers. Through the efforts of Garret Fitzgerald and others, revisionist ideas about Irish identities entered the mainstream of Irish political life. The deliberations of the New Ireland Forum in 1983 seem to have been crucial. I would not suggest a continuous line of development between the New Ireland Forum and the peace process, but at the level of ideas about Irish identity, the influence of the Forum Report can be traced in the cultural policies introduced to Northern Ireland in the wake of the Anglo Irish Agreement, and ultimately in the Good Friday Agreement, which enshrines identity politics (See Farren , 2000). Cultural identity is hegemonic not only at the level of analysis, but at the level of political practice: community groups are encouraged to explore their cultural traditions, and the Good Friday Agreement is weighted against individuals and parties who do not define themselves as either unionist or nationalist (see Langhammer 2000 and McCann 2001).

In the face of the evident preoccupation of many in Northern Ireland with issues of identity, Brubaker and Cooper (2000) do well to remind us that even when lay-actors are preoccupied with identity – as seems to be the case in Northern Ireland today - this does not mean that social analysts have to accept the existence of identities. Indeed, for social analysts to do so is to risk contributing to the reification of identity. Identity is not ubiquitous; identities crystallise at specific moments and are the outcomes of human activity and historical processes:

> 'reification is central to the politics of "ethnicity," "race," "nation," and other putative "identities". Analysts… should seek to account for this process of reification. We should seek to explain the processes… through which… the "political fiction" of the "nation", - or of the "ethnic group", "race", or other putative "identity". - can crystallize, at certain moments, as a powerful, compelling reality. But we should avoid unintentionally reproducing or reinforcing such reification by uncritically adopting categories of practice as categories of analysis' (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 5).

Brubaker and Cooper are unimpressed by 'constructivist gestures' to the multiple, fragmented, fluid nature of identity on the part of analysts who seek to avoid essentialism: 'it is not clear why what is routinely characterized as multiple, fragmented, and fluid should be conceptualised as "identity" at all' (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 6). They suggest that, for analytic purposes, we should dispense with the concept of identity and replace it with concepts such as identification, self-understanding and commonality or connectedness or 'groupness.'

In relation to Northern Ireland, there are few analysts who have resisted the hegemonic force of identity theory. One such analyst is Terence Brown, who notes the roots of identity theory in cultural nationalism, discusses the influence of cultural movements in Ireland during the period preceding independence, and then asks why 'there were almost no equivalent movements of any kind within.... northern Protestant or unionist society or culture'? (1992: 42). He is unconvinced by those who would answer this question by suggesting that northern protestants 'were simply a colonial group, an imperial group, holding Ireland for the imperial authority.' (1992: 42). He finds Miller's suggestion more intriguing; i.e., that

> 'the Ulster Protestant is ... in a kind of pre-nationalist condition, that he has seen his identity, if it can be called that, as being constructed in terms of a kind of Lockean contract, with regard to the relationship between the state and the individual. This means that an Ulster Unionist, Ulster Protestant, feels no need of that kind of confirmatory identity that the Irish nationalist project seem to imply as an absolute necessity for being fully human... He is loyal in a contractual relationship. When you belong to a nation, you have no choice in the matter: you are born into it, it is your spiritual destiny. The thing about a contract is that you are a party to it and, if the contract is broken, you can be released from the contract, and therefore concepts of identity, as understood by the nationalist, have little significance.' (1992: 43).

Brown notes suggestions that during the seventeenth, eighteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Presbyterian church 'fulfilled the same function as a nation did for other peoples in the same period' (1992: 43). Taking this further he urges historians to

> 'look at the structure of mind involved in theories of Calvinist destiny...which set individuals with this background apart from the kind of culture within which nationalism can more readily develop...From my own experience, I could posit a sense within Calvinism in which history is actually rendered insignificant. History, in the nationalist sense of history, beginning in antiquity and moving through slow processes of time to reveal a historical destiny, is not something a Calvinist upbringing... induces in one at all. To adapt Ranke's famous description, everyone in Calvinism is equidistant from God; we all live at the same time, and there is not that sense of developing a cultural, social or national identity.' (1992: 44)[2].

Supremacism and defeatism

Brown's suggestion that - hitherto – northern protestants have not felt the need to develop a cultural identity is perceptive, all the more so in that it goes against the grain of the prevailing consensus about the centrality of identity in analyses of Northern Ireland, but he is, perhaps, too hasty in his dismissal of explanations which stress protestants' roots in a colonial settler community, and his alternative hypotheses as to

[2] There are also those would point-out that Puritanism and Calvinism are driven by fear of social disorder and suggest that this fear has an echo in present-day Ulster Presbyterianism. This line of thought remains underdeveloped in relation to defeatist interpretations of social and political change over the last three decades, and is not explored here. Nevertheless, I should point out Brearton's (1997) discussion and Kirkland's analysis of Rhonda Paisley's book about her father, Ian. Kirkland describes the book as being pervaded with a feeling of disillusionment, betrayal, failure and despair. He claims to detect a 'messianic concept of final destruction [which] leaves the text, and the Democratic Unionist philosophy it embodies, faltering on the final precipice of history and calling sado-masochistically for the final act of humiliation which will free it' (1996: 26).

why protestants felt no such need are not convincing. His suggestion that historians investigate the 'structure of mind in theories of Calvinist destiny' is not likely to be fruitful. Theoretically it signals a return to the transcendent mentalities beloved of theorists of identity, and his suggestion that Calvinism is inimical to the development of cultural nationalism is, as he himself acknowledges, falsified by the example of Afrikaners. Another explanation is required, and I would suggest that the place to look for that explanation is in the struggle against Home Rule: it is widely acknowledged, not least by Brown in an earlier publication, that this was crucial to the ideological formation of unionism (see Brown 1985, McBride 1997)

Looking at the ideological development of unionism in the struggle against Home Rule is also a valuable corrective to the now common tendency to see the Orange Order as the central organising institution in unionist politics and Orangeism as the ideological cement which united the protestant population behind unionism. The emphasis on Orangeism also leads to a misunderstanding, or, at least, partial understanding, of protestant supremacism as an inheritance from the seventeenth century struggles that the loyal orders commemorate.

As Bew, Gibbon and Patterson argued, against James Connolly and latter-day Connollyists , the ideology around which the Unionist ruling class mobilised itself and the masses against Home Rule was not primarily Orange.

> 'In 1886 Ulster Presbyterianism, while actually retaining strong anti-establishment and anti-landlord traditions and a general hostility to Orangeism, moved en bloc to the Unionist anti-home rule alliance. Although democratic, the ideology was intensely pro-imperialistic and hostile to nationalist demands. In all three anti-Home Rule agitations this relatively secular ideology was to play a dominant role in integrating the main elements of the Protestant bloc. Its durability was a consequence of the fact that it provided a specific representation of the structural division in Irish society which Connolly failed to recognise. According to the ideology, the social and economic character of the north, and in particular its monopolisation of capitalist machine industry, was the expression of two distinct racial and religious histories (Ireland – Two nations). It centred on the backward-agrarian/progressive –industrial antithesis' (Bew et al 1979: 8).

As Ruane and Todd suggest, this ideology linking northern protestants and Unionism with modernity, progress and capitalist development could be interpreted as having evolved from earlier settler ideologies which turned on the opposition between about civility and barbarism. But the point is, as Ruane and Todd stress - and which O'Dowd and Connolly fail to recognise - 'more is involved than settler ideology': the ideology around which northern protestants united in opposition to Home Rule had a basis in material reality: the uneven development of capitalism in Ireland. In other words, this ideology is not an example of an unchanging 'settler mentality' transmitted down the generations through the Orange Order, but of the invention of a new ideology which was durable, not merely because it was congruent with contemporary conditions, but because it drew on an older ideology in specific ways.

Having grown-up in Belfast in the late 1960s and 70s, this kind of ideology, is much more familiar to me than Orangeism. My parents themselves grew-up in Belfast in the 1920s and 1930s, and my father's formative political experiences were with the Workers' Education Association in the 1930s; the Second World War, when Stalin was an ally and the Communist Party of Ireland respectable among the Belfast protestant working class; and the post-war Labour Party victory in Britain and subsequent welfare legislation. The contrast with the south, and the rationale for remaining part of the United Kingdom was

not just that we had heavy industry and they did not, but that we had a welfare state and divorce was legal; we might not have had abortion, but contraception was more readily available and we had a more enlightened approach to maternal health; even if we did not buy-into protestantism as a religion, we nevertheless thought of it as historically progressive in the sense of being less obscurantist than catholicism (cf. Hyndman 1996: 229). This was not, as O'Dowd (1990) would have us believe, an 'echo' of Memmi's 'Nero complex', it was an ideology of modernity in the guise of progress, with a material basis and a strong socialist or, at least, labourist inflection. As with other such ideologies, it was sceptical of tradition, including Orange tradition; indeed, in my father's case, especially the Orange tradition.

I do not think I was that atypical, and, if I am correct to suggest that this kind of ideology linking Protestantism and unionism with modernity and progress was a significant current, particularly among the protestant working class[3], then, it seems to me that this goes someway to explaining why, amid all the other changes - constitutional, legal, political and demographic - the collapse of the traditional industries upon which the ideology was based has been such a blow. The weight of the blow is registered in discussions involving community activists in protestant areas of Belfast in the early 1990s such as those organised and documented by Hall:

> 'the Protestant working class has been demoralised on two fronts simultaneously. The Troubles – which forced Protestant's into cultural and political "retreat" – have coincided with the massive erosion of the industrial base which had provided them with their economic security... much communal and individual "worth" accrued to industrial skills, even to the detriment of other avenues of advancement. Further education... was seen as a second-best option to getting into a trade' (Hall 1994: 14-15).

Earlier, the discussants appear to have made a connection between the importance of machine industry to working class protestants, colonial ideologies of progress and the classic role of such ideologies in rationalising the power of the settler community, especially 'when their actions towards the native population breach the norms they observe in respect of one another' (Ruane and Todd 1996: 27):

> 'The "work ethic" label even had a cultural dimension, with the notion that the "Planters" were an industrious stock of people who transformed the Ulster landscape, whereas the "natives" were lazy. This had been translated in modern times into the perception that the Catholic community was quite content to live on welfare benefits while "doing the double", and that Catholic poverty was a reflection of their social and religious attitudes. One result of such perceptions was that a "blind eye" could be turned to the genuine social injustices suffered by the Catholic community' (Hall 1994: 13).

What I am suggesting is that present-day protestant supremacism, whether or not it originated in seventeenth century settler ideologies, had a material basis in the uneven development of capitalism in Ireland and articulated ideas about modernity and progress that had a currency beyond Northern Ireland. By the same token, protestant defeatism, in some degree, expresses a loss of confidence in progress and the modernist project – a

[3] To add further support to my contention that the world-view communicated to me by my father and others was not atypical within the protestant working class, I should mention the enduring labour tradition in Northern Ireland. It sometimes seems that this tradition is being air-brushed out of history. It was always a subaltern tradition, and it is true that, politically at least, it was devastated with the onset of the present 'troubles', but we should recall that in the first Stormont elections held after World War II the combined vote for Communist Party of Ireland and Labour candidates in Belfast alone was nearly 80,000 (Farrell 1980: 190) and that during the early 1960s the Northern Ireland Labour Party secured four Members of Parliament at Stormont.

loss of confidence that is also evident beyond Northern Ireland. These suggestions, if valid, may illuminate other phenomena. One example is the resentment that some northern protestants feel about the economic success of the south in the last ten years (see for example Martin 1997). Another example is the effort of some writers to attach significance to the Titanic and, indeed, the Battle of the Somme, as symbols of the folly of a vainglorious belief in modernity and progress (see Brearton, 1997). More importantly, locating northern protestant supremacism and defeatism in relation to broader currents in Western thought allows us to reassess the adequacy of the notion that the Northern Ireland problem is the product of a clash of identities and to better understand some of the potential dangers of policies based on this notion.

Conclusion

As part of my argument, I have pointed out that cultural identity is not a universal phenomenon, but a specific hypothesis about the nature of humanity that has recently become central to the dominant consensus about the Northern Ireland 'problem' and solutions to it. In this context, northern protestant defeatism can be seen not so much as the expression of a crisis in some pre-existing identity, but as symptomatic of the fact that northern protestants did not develop a strong collective identity and, perhaps, of ongoing attempts to get one in a context where identity politics have, themselves become hegemonic[4].

To agree with Terence Brown's argument that 'concepts of identity, as understood by the nationalist, have little significance' (1992: 43) for northern protestants does not necessarily imply acceptance of the nationalist claim that protestants do not have a culture. J W Foster has suggested that (1996: 91) 'the triumph of unionism in the new Northern Ireland lessened almost to nothing the need for such a thing as an intellectual rationale and vision for unionism'. This is not quite true, there was a Unionist cultural project, as Gillian McIntosh's work confirms. McIntosh uses the term 'unionist identity' freely, but she also repeatedly alludes to diversity and dissent among protestants and the ways in which 'Britain, the Irish Republic and dissident forces within their own borders constantly impinged upon unionist visions of the state.' (1999:3). The point is that the unionist cultural project did not, to use Brubaker and Cooper's (2000) term, 'crystallize' into a strong and enduring cultural identity.

That some protestants are today attempting to acquire a cultural identity is most evident in the Ulster Scots movement and in the invention of a myth of origin in the pre-Celtic Cruithin people. But there are other straws in the wind. One of the more intriguing of these is the element of pathos which many commentators claim to detect in the protestant community. Amongst the authors whose work I have reviewed, Fleischmann (1995), McKay (2000) and Liam Kennedy (1996) allude to a maudlin preoccupation with suffering or self-pity. This theme is also apparent in some attempts to explain the motives of those protesting the route taken to the Holy Cross primary school by Catholic parents and Children.

Pathos is part of the logic of identity politics today. As Zaretsky points out protagonists of identity politics seek 'to reclaim a stigmatised identity, to revalue the devalued pole of a dichotomised hierarchy such as black/white, male/female, or heterosexual/gay' (1994: 199). This works by collapsing the distance between the individual and the collective,

[4] Bell (1998: 243) shows how the pluralist agenda promoted by the Northern Ireland Office can lead to the 'hypostatisation of sectarian divisions' that it aims to defuse.

and investing the latter with the dignity of the former and the pathos of his or her suffering or loss (see Michaels, 1995).

This logic is evident in publicity generated by the 'Long March' from Derry to Portadown in June and July 1999. There was a focus on the stories of some of the marchers: 'forgotten victims', individuals who had been maimed in bombs or whose relatives had been murdered. At a press conference which preceded the march in Glenavy, one of the march organisers, Mr Bell, 'said the main aim of the walk was to raise awareness of the forgotten victims'. But he also sought to link these individual stories to a much broader collective project: 'We are looking for respect for victims, for parity of esteem for Protestant culture and heritage and for support for deprived unionist communities.' (*Irish Times* 2.07.1999).

It is important to state very clearly that my suggestion that defeatism may be symptomatic of attempts to develop a protestant collective identity is not to deny that it has a basis in reality. The stories of the 'forgotten victims' who took part in the 'Long March' are harrowing. Moreover, recognising that northern protestant supremacism had a material basis also entails a sequel that some of the authors whose work I have reviewed seem reluctant to concede; i.e., that emergent defeatist identifications amongst northern protestants also have a material basis in the collapse of heavy industry, in the break-down of neighbourhoods and in constitutional, political and legal reforms implemented in Northern Ireland in the last thirty years.

In conforming to the logic of identity politics, protestant defeatism is also congruent with broader trends. Bernhard Giesen (2000) has noted that in the late twentieth century various collectivities have moved from an identification with a glorious, heroic past to an identification with a traumatic past. Others have noted that one response of white Americans to affirmative action programs and multicultural policies that were developed in response to the African American struggle in the 1960s has been to elaborate their own particularist identities based on readings of their collective pasts which stress hardship and suffering. In this analysis, the ironic nihilism of bands like Beck – 'I'm a loser baby' – or the victim-chic of celebrities like Roseanne or Curt Cobain who lay claim to white trash origins are only the most obvious, and benign, manifestation of a broader and more insidious phenomena (see Wray and Newitz 1997).

Several authors have noted the connection between the collapse of faith in modernity as progress and the rise of identity politics in late modernity (e.g., Finkielkraut 2001, and see various contributions to Werbner and Modood 1997). What is less well understood is the connection between this collapse and the political efficacy of pathetic identities. Finkielkraut provides a clue in his discussion of the futurist Polish poet Aleksander Wat. Looking-back on his experience as a member of the Communist Party in the 1920s, Wat recalled the centrality in communist circles of a culinary metaphor: 'Everyone who went over to Communism had to accept the Leninist principle that you couldn't make an omelette without breaking eggs' (quoted by Finkielkraut 2001: 81). Although Wat was speaking of communism (and indirectly of Nazism) this metaphor stands, albeit in one of its harsher forms, for the modernist idea of progress which justified social change – including expropriation, the uprooting of tradition and, indeed whole peoples together with their 'ways of life' - in terms of what was achieved or what might be achieved. Complaints from the victims of these processes could easily be set aside against the social, cultural, economic, technical and scientific achievements of the Soviets, or of capitalism, or, indeed, of colonial regimes.

After the horrors of the twentieth century, the logic of progress has been discredited, not least among those for whom it once provided a raison d'être but who are now among its victims.

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The Impact of Intervention on Local Human Rights Culture: A Kosovo Case Study

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Introduction

When and how are military and civil peacebuilding positive nurturers of human rights norms? And when do these efforts have unintended negative consequences? This article explores these questions using a case study of Albanian efforts to imagine and build a better society in Kosovo.[2] Other scholars concerned with societies emerging from conflict have examined the role of human rights in peace agreements[3] and, in particular, the mechanisms designed to deal with past human rights abuses, such as truth commissions and international tribunals.[4] Here, I am concerned less with human rights institutions and more with human rights culture. I am interested in exploring the ways in which the flood of peacebuilding and democratization brigades[5] into places like Kosovo impacts local human rights culture.[6]

This article is divided into two parts. The first part introduces the terms 'culture' and 'human rights culture' and specifically identifies the nature of the human rights culture extant in Kosovar society[7] prior to the NATO bombing. I explain that while human rights norms were inculcated into Kosovar culture, Albanians' operational understanding of human rights was perilously incomplete. Second, the paper explores the impact of military and civil intervention on the existing human rights culture in Kosovo. In this section, I am interested in both the 'side effects' of military intervention both on human rights norms and in the post-agreement attempts to influence Kosovars' shared understanding of human rights norms. Given the paucity of research on the subject, I focus my discussion on the relationship between non-military, post-agreement democratization efforts. My main finding is that the civil and military intervention in Kosovo, although undertaken with the aim of supporting human rights norms, has to

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[2] I leave to a later date a discussion of Serbian attempts to build a better society and the influence of human rights norms in their efforts. For particularly insightful analysis of this question, see Biserko (2001).
[3] For an excellent study of the human rights elements of the peace processes in Northern Ireland, South Africa, Bosnia and Israel/ Palestine, see Bell (2000).
[4] Among the plethora of new books on truth commissions, one of the most compelling accounts is Hayner (2001).
[5] One element of the building of a human rights culture involves democratization. Legal scholars such as Henry Steiner and Thomas Franck have argued that the chance to participate in one's own government is a human right, or, in Franck's analysis, 'on its way to being a global entitlement...' See e.g., Steiner (1988) and Franck (1992).
[6] My research was conducted in two distinct time periods. Prior to the NATO bombing in Kosovo and Serbia proper, in 1993-1995 and 1998, I conducted extensive interviews throughout Kosovo on the nature of local understandings of human rights and the extent to which these understandings saturated political and social discourse. Also during this time period I engaged in 'participatory' research, learning about the local human rights culture while conducting human rights education workshops in Kosovo and Serbia proper. Moreover, in 1999 and 2001, I conducted additional interviews with Kosovars on their self-understanding of human rights, on the impact of the NATO bombing on human rights culture, and on local experiences with internationals engaged in peace-building. During this period, in Kosovo, Washington DC and New York, I met with international governmental and nongovernmental employees working on peacebuilding in Kosovo. In addition, in the summer of 2001 I engaged in further participatory research when I taught a class on human rights and international law at the University of Pristina.
[7] By 'Kosovar' society, I refer to Albanian society in Kosovo.

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some extent served to undermine efforts to build a sustainable human rights culture in Kosovo.

Examining the Human Rights Culture in Kosovo

Elements and Importance of 'Human Rights Culture'

Culture is 'the shared beliefs and understandings, mediated by and constituted by symbols and language, of a group or society.' (Zaid 1996: 262) As Renato Rosaldo (1993: 26) succinctly explains, '[culture] refers broadly to the forms through which people make sense of their lives.' Two dimensions of culture are particularly relevant for our discussion here. First, cultures are not uni-dimensional and static; they are multi-dimensional and dynamic. Accordingly, this study examines Kosovar culture over two periods, the pre-NATO bombing period of 1989-early 1999, and the post-NATO bombing period of 2001 and, in so doing, recognizes that culture is 'interactive and process-like (rather than static and essence-like).' (Lapid 1997: 8) Second, cultures are not primordially given. Rather, they are socially constructed according to an ideological and/or political purpose (Handlet 1994: 29). This study attempts to explore the process by which culture develops in Kosovo and, in particular, the political strategy motivating the development of and adherence to beliefs. This study contends that it is culture that makes human rights norms effective.[8]

A human rights culture is the vehicle through which human rights norms take root in and influence a population. At the outset, human rights ideology stresses equality between human beings, asserting that each human being should be treated with dignity solely because he or she is human (Forsythe 2000: 3). This supports the importance of individualism, but also the centrality of community and communal responsibility. Jean Bethke Elshtain notes that '[rights] are woven into a concept of community' and 'are intelligible only in terms of the obligations of individuals to other persons.' (Elshtain 1999-2000: 14) The Kosovar human rights movement illustrates this insight. While Kosovars viewed themselves as being entitled to rights as individuals, they continually emphasized the communal nature of rights and of individual obligations to community.[9]

Human rights ideology also sets limits on the power of the state *vis-à-vis* its citizens.[10] In practice, human rights norms have both 'vertical' and 'horizontal' significance. Marie-Benedicte Dembour (1996) observes that 'although human rights standards are primarily set to govern the relationship between the individual and the state ("vertical" significance), they also necessarily govern relations among individuals ("horizontal" significance) and in some cases this may well be their main significance.' This was indeed the case in Kosovar society where Albanians identified themselves as being victims of human rights violations perpetuated by the state of Yugoslavia (or Serbia), by individual Serbians, and by collectives (of Serbians and their supporters) alike (Mertus 1999 and Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000).

Human rights talk is prevalent and persuasive in cases like Kosovo, because it so 'successfully manages to articulate (evolving) political claims.' (Dembour 1996: 35) Ultimately, human rights are 'claims for powers by competing social groups' that are 'continually transformed as the result of struggles over political, symbolic, or economic

[8] Witte (2001: 42) states that human rights norms 'need a human rights culture to be effective.'
[9] For example, when interviewed about being beaten by police, one man stated directly that the violation was against his people. Another man giving similar testimony also stressed his duty to his people to be strong in the face of human rights violations and to remain nonviolent. Interviews conducted in Kosovo in March 1994.
[10] For the evolution of the statist focus in human rights discourse, see Falk (2000).

resources within a state and transnational context.' (Wilson 1997) In the post-Cold War period, virtually no state leader will claim being a human rights outlaw but, instead, will cling to the identity of human rights supporter (Forsythe 2000). Thus, state leaders seek legitimacy by claiming that human rights norms support their actions, whatever they may be.[11] In this sense, human rights norms serve an enabling function for state actors (Finnemore 1996: 159, also Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Similarly, any collective or individual wishing to promote change in existing institutions, practices, or norms is more likely to gain an audience by framing their claims in human rights terms (Risse 1999).

The adoption of human rights language is an essential step in building a human rights culture, but this alone is insufficient. Human rights concepts enter culture slowly as a population develops its own shared (yet contested) understanding of the prominence and importance of the norms. Incrementally, they become part of the '"frame" in which people derive a sense of who they are and where they are going.' (Fitzgerald 1993: 186)

Central to this process is a population's own experiences of rights deprivation and rights affirmation, which often occurs through storytelling (Mertus 1999). Human rights storytelling serves several functions. As Richard Rorty has suggested in his pragmatic argument for human rights, storytelling provides a 'sentimental education' (Rorty 1993: 114) that generates the kind of sympathy necessary for the acceptance of human rights norms. This is particularly important when the goal is to motivate a majority to accept the human rights of a minority. Human rights activists in Belgrade, for example, exposed stories about abuses against Albanians in order to garner the sympathy of the Serbs.[12] Kosovars strongly believe that if not for the human rights storytelling, NATO intervention would have never occurred.[13]

Human rights storytelling also facilitates a common understanding of experience (Senehi 1996, also Narayan 1989) and in so doing promotes group cohesion. In Kosovo, the informal telling of stories in Kosovar family living rooms and the more formalized collection of stories by human rights groups served to strengthen Albanian solidarity as a united, oppressed people.[14] Similarly, Serbian telling of stories about Albanians solidified their identity as victim at the hands of Albanians (Mertus 1999f). In this way, within one society, human rights storytelling was both unifying and fragmenting. In neither the Serbian nor Albanian population did the storytelling promote the central value of human rights: respect for the Other.

The Human Rights Culture in Kosovar Society, pre-1999

To a great extent, the Kosovar parallel society of the 1990s stands as a paradigmatic example of the internalization of human rights norms by a people. It was through human rights claims that Albanians expressed their political aspirations for a more egalitarian society – that is, one in which ethnic Serbs could not abuse and discriminate against ethnic Albanians.[15] The primary goal of Kosovar human rights activists was to influence

[11] Wheeler (2000) asserts that the international community is now more open to 'solidarist themes'.
[12] Author's interview with Sonja Biserko, Helsinki Committee of Belgrade and Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington D.C., August 2001. Biserko stated that they were unsuccessful in persuading Serbs to be sympathetic to Albanians. 'They [Serbs in Belgrade] never thought much about human rights until the economic situation in Serbia got oppressive and they started to think about deprivation of their own economic rights.'
[13] Author's interviews conducted in July and August 2001 in Pristina and Prizren, Kosovo.
[14] Interview with Sevdie Ahmeti, Kosovar human rights activist, co-head of the Center for the Protection of Women and Children, Pristina, August 2001.
[15] The majority movement of Kosovars was less keen on other equality issues, such as the rights of women. 'When we Albanians have our freedom, we [women] will have our freedom', women members of the League for Democratic Kosovo (LDK – the primary Albanian party in the 1990s) used to say. See Mertus (2000) and Mertus (1999a).

how the 'international community'[16] understood their own behaviour and the behaviour of the Other according to some measure of justice. A secondary goal was to create a local sensibility to human rights norms that would shape Kosovar collective life (Wapner 1998: 118, 121). Just as the environmental movement in the West sought to get people to 'think green', human rights activists in Kosovo sought to have their people 'think human rights'.

The degree to which local human rights groups influenced the cultural perception of norms is reflected in analysis of the media, press statements of Kosovar politicians, NGO publications, the school curriculum and the lived practice of family traditions. Attitudinal surveys and interviews with the same subjects over a period of time also provide evidence of changes in cultural perception.[17] According to these measures, human rights activists in Kosovo achieved some degree of success. Nearly every Kosovar had either personally or through a close relative experienced some form of state-sanctioned abuse that could be framed in human rights terms. This frame was adapted throughout the 1990s by the independent Kosovar media, LDK press statements, and NGO press publications, which continually characterized the Kosovars' struggle in human rights terms. Moreover, human rights terminology was popularized through the Kosovar 'parallel' school curriculum and through everyday family life which put a premium on honouring victims of human rights deprivations. Kosovars decried the legitimacy of the constitution of Serbia and instead looked to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as a source of guiding principles for their lives.

The Kosovar human rights 'sensibility'[18] was tied to the Albanian political strategy of nonviolence. Just as the Kosovar identity as nonviolent victim of human rights abuses was constructed against a violent, human rights abusing Other (Maliqi 1998: 101-4), human rights were framed in oppositional terms. Human rights were not really viewed as something individuals had simply by virtue of their humanity. Rather, Kosovars perceived their own human rights in opposition to the human rights of other groups – that is, Albanians versus Serbs.[19] Given that Albanians no longer recognized the legitimacy of the state of Yugoslavia's rule over Kosovo, they looked not to their state for protection but to the international community; this community, they had no hesitancy in qualifying, meant the United States and to a lesser extent NATO.[20]

The practice of nonviolence and the emergence of a culture of human rights in Kosovo in the early 1990s served several useful purposes. By casting their struggle in human rights terms, Kosovars gained legitimacy before many governments and nongovernmental organizations concerned about human rights. Their strategy of using the language of human rights helped them to gain entry into important international fora where political concerns are discussed. In addition, the language of human rights 'served to validate the self-worth of Kosovars at a time when they were being vilified.' (Clark 2000) In this way, the language of human rights supported the nonviolent

[16] Kosovar Albanians usually imagined 'international community' in an instrumental manner that is being composed of the most influential Western nations who could respond to their plight.
[17] For an example as to how these techniques can be employed see Mertus (1999f).
[18] Paul Wapner (1995) helpfully describes a growing 'environmental sensibility'. I am indebted to him for his insight on the ways in which changes initiated by transnational (and local) activists occur independently of state policies.
[19] Sometimes the oppositional view of human rights was stated bluntly. For example, when asked in 2001 whether human rights mattered, an Albanian working with a women's humanitarian assistance project asked, 'by which group against which group?' Author's interview in Prizren, Kosovo, August 2001.
[20] In interviews in Kosovo in 1994 and 1995, Albanians continually stated that it would be up to America to protect their human rights and, some also said, NATO with America in command.

strategy by popularizing 'patience in the face aggression'[21] and claiming the moral high ground.

The nonviolent strategy, however, was built on a tenuous human rights foundation. While Kosovars did have a strong human rights culture, it was incomplete. Howard Clark has observed that 'the danger of deriving one's identity from a matrix of antagonisms is evident – a lack of flexibility, an inability to appreciate what is held in common… [and the acceptance of a] worldview where one is always the victim or martyr, the Other always the villain.'[22] The notion of respect for the rights and positions of the Other was 'underdeveloped in Albanian self-understanding…' John Paul Lederach reminds us that international mechanisms such as human rights are most useful for peacebuilding if they 'cut across lines of identity that mark the central divisions in society.' (Lederach 1997: 142) In Kosovar society, instead of cutting across lines of identity, the language of human rights served to cement lines of identity.

The challenge for the international community in responding to human rights violations in Kosovo was to support the positive aspects of the nascent Kosovar human rights culture: Kosovars were to abandon their adversarial identity and incorporate into their self-understanding respect for the Other. As explained more fully below, the international community offered no effective incentives for the development of a more inclusive discourse. Nor did the international community actively discourage Kosovar Albanians from tempering their hostile view of Serbs. Albanian leaders and not leaders of the international community invoked the instrumentalisation and selective interpretation of human rights. The international community cannot be blamed for the shortcomings in the human rights culture of Kosovar society. Moreover, mutual hostility can be viewed as both a cause and consequence of the incomplete human rights culture in Kosovo that existed prior to the NATO bombing.

Impact of Military and Civil Intervention in Kosovo

Impact of NATO Bombing

The NATO bombing failed to vindicate the Kosovar struggle for human rights. Instead, the timing and method of intervention greatly compromised human rights interests in Kosovo. When Albanians returned to Kosovo after the bombing, few were thinking in human rights terms as they had in the past.[23] Even the narrow view of human rights and nonviolence was missing from the discourse of returning refugees who spoke in pragmatic and instrumentalist terms about starting anew. While some still framed the struggle for Albanian self-determination as a human rights concern, they acknowledged that the underlying decision on Albanian independence would be a political one, determined by the interests of the world powers, not by human rights norms. The notion that one should recognize the dignity of the Other – a precept that was never very strong – reached a nadir. While the vast majority of Kosovars did not condone revenge killings, as a community they were unable to prevent them or to punish perpetrators.

There are several reasons why the international intervention in Kosovo, billed as a 'human rights intervention' (Roberts 1999), served to undercut human rights norms. Above all, the intervention came too late. The international community could have supported human rights groups in Kosovo and Serbia at a much earlier date. While the Soros Foundation and other private organizations aided Albanian and Serbian media and

[21] This is how Ibrahim Rugova described his nonviolent strategy to me in March 1994.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Interviews with returning refugees in Albania, June 1999.

other aspects of civil society throughout the former Yugoslavia beginning in the early 1990s, the United States and other major powers did not do all they could have to support civil society actors. They could have offered financial and technical support to independent Serbian and Albanian journalists, opposition political parties, and civic organizations of all stripes, from women's health groups to farmers' organizations (Clark 2000). While foreign governments have not traditionally engaged in such activities, they are beginning to do so as part of larger 'peacebuilding' efforts, realizing the cost-effectiveness of such endeavors as compared to alternatives, which may include expensive military commitments. Most important, they could have fostered feelings of economic security by bolstering private businesses and by using potential funding of government projects as inducements for concrete change on pressing human rights issues. Instead, the United States imposed economic sanctions against Belgrade, a move that serve to stoke Serbian feelings of victimization and which ultimately enhanced Milosevic's power.[24]

The failure of the international community to respond to Kosovars' nonviolent human rights struggle sent a clear message to Kosovars that world powers will respond only to guns, not to rights claims. Human rights reports on violations in Kosovo during the Albanian period of nonviolence – the early to mid 1990s – had little impact on decision-making. Tim Judah observes: 'Because there was no apparent urgency then, and no all-important dead bodies on television to galvanize Western opinion, the very few diplomats who ventured down to Kosovo and who were beginning to realize that things were in fact changing found that their reports were having little impact.' (Judah 2000:119) In the face of international inaction, the human rights abuses in Kosovo continued and, indeed, worsened. Finally, it was the collapse of the Albanian nonviolent movement and the rise of the Kosovo Liberation Army that prompted the international community to pay heightened attention to the crisis.

The failure of the international community to respond early and consistently to human rights violations also fostered the belief that human rights are only another bargaining chip of politically powerful countries to be used at their own discretion and when their own interests are at stake. For years, NATO allies turned a blind eye to systemic human rights abuses in Kosovo, issuing only an occasional empty threat to the Milosevic regime. The US and other NATO countries decided to take up the human rights flag only after the emergence of the Albanian paramilitary organization, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).[25] Only at that point did it appear as if the conflagration in Kosovo could result in a massive population displacement that would spill across country borders, disrupting trade and social relations among NATO countries. The resulting NATO bombing campaign expelled Yugoslav army and irregular Serb forces from Kosovo, but did nothing to protect civilians from mass displacement, killing and other abuses (Chomsky 2000: 42). Realizing the self-serving nature of diplomatic human rights talk, Serbians and Albanians alike grew bitter towards the international community and cynical about the notion of universal human rights.

Although in part motivated by human rights considerations,[26] the Clinton Administration refused to base its actions in Kosovo solely on human rights grounds. The Administration

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[24] For an argument that sanctions more closely targeting Milosevic and his supporters would be more effective at promoting democratic change in Serbia, see Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000: 234f.).

[25] For general agreement with this proposition, see Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000).

[26] Walt (2000) identifies one of Clinton's four goals to be 'build[ing] a world order compatible with basic American values by encouraging the growth of democracy and by using military force against major human rights abuses' (p. 67). See also, Editors (2000). They argue that the so-called Clinton Doctrine included a strong human rights component, although it was inconsistently and opportunistically applied.

mixed human rights talk with the need for regional stabilization, national security concerns over a long war and a large refugee flow, the need to protect NATO's reputation, and America's interest in preserving prosperous and secure trade with Europe. Even though many of the interests identified were relevant to human rights, the Clinton Administration chose instead to emphasize other justifications for the campaign. Acase could be made for the legality of the air strikes under the UN Charter – specifically, by arguing that by committing gross human rights violations Serbia had waived its claim to sovereignty and that intervention was therefore needed under articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter to address human rights violations and restore the sovereignty of the people.[27] Yet, no one in the US administration was willing to articulate a legal basis for intervention on human rights grounds.[28] The *ad hoc* and extra-legal justifications for the use of force appeared illegitimate, undermining the status of NATO and the legitimacy of the international human rights system (Ali 2000).

Equally troubling the intervention itself was not conducted in line with human rights norms and, thus, it established poor precedent for Kosovar society. To be legitimate, the means of intervention must be consistent with international humanitarian law.[29] In sum, the means employed should be necessary for a legitimate objective, they should be proportionate to a legitimate military outcome,[30] they should discriminate between civilian and noncivilian targets, and the efficacy of the means should be appropriately related to the probability of success. At all stages of their operations, those who intervene should consider whether their actions place noncombatants at increased risk (Burkhalter 2000: 25).

The NATO bombing was designed to avoid any allied casualties and, thus, prohibited at the outset the use of ground troops. The resulting dependence on air power entailed a greater risk that civilians would be injured.[31] The Geneva Conventions IV and Protocol I provide that civilians shall be protected against 'indiscriminate attacks' – that is, attacks that 'employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective' or 'employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required.' In addition, Protocol I requires military planners to 'take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.' It is not within the spirit of these provisions to greatly increase the risk to civilians in order to avoid casualties to one's own military.

Throughout the bombing campaign, the principle of 'proportionality' required NATO to undertake action designed to achieve some legitimate military objective (Gardam 1993). To the extent that the bombing campaign was necessary for ending human rights abuses and returning deported civilians, the action was within the scope of international law. Unavoidable and unplanned damage to civilian targets incurred while attacking legitimate military targets would also have been within the law. Yet the action's proportionality became questionable when it became apparent that the bombing was not

[27] I develop both of these theories in Mertus (2000). See also Reisman (1990).
[28] Author's interview with Mike Matheson, July 2001, Washington DC. I interviewed seven additional legal advisors on Balkan issues in the Clinton Administration and all of them said that the Administration had been unwilling to come up with a clear legal definition.
[29] The main sources of law for the law of war include The Law of The Hague (1907); the Geneva Conventions of 1949; the 1977 Geneva Protocols; and customary international law. See Roberts and Guelff (1989). See also Levie (1990).
[30] The concept of proportionality requires an ends-oriented comparative assessment: 'The anticipated loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.' (United States Army 2000; emphasis in original). See also Article 57 of Protocol I additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Protocol I).
[31] See Ignatieff (2000: 62) who states, 'The alliance's moral preferences were clear: preserving the lives of their all-volunteer service professionals was a higher priority than saving innocent foreign civilians.'

effectively advancing military objectives, the bombing of purely military targets was not yielding the anticipated results and the impact of the bombing was felt mainly by civilians. This result served only to further the belief now held by both Serbs and Albanians that claims to human rights could not be expected to be universally enforced but, rather, were another tool of powerful countries to wield as they saw fit.

Impact of Post-Agreement Efforts

Following the Serbian acceptance of the Kosovo peace agreement,[32] the UN Security Council, acting under the authority of its Chapter VII powers, adopted a resolution setting forth the mandate of the international mission that would attempt to rebuild peace in Kosovo.[33] UN Security Council Resolution 1244 directed the UN Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, to appoint a Special Representative 'to control the implementation of the international civil presence.'[34] On 2 July 1999, the UN Secretary General appointed Bernard Kouchner as his Special Representative in Kosovo.[35] Kouchner moved quickly to solidify his power in Kosovo. Pursuant to the authority granted by Resolution 1244, Kouchner issued a regulation on 25 July vesting in UNMIK all legislative and executive authority in Kosovo. Under UNMIK Regulation 1, this authority was 'to be exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.'[36] UNMIK Regulation 1 provides that the 'Special Representative of the Secretary-General may appoint any person to perform functions in the civil administration in Kosovo, including the judiciary, or remove such person.'[37] Moreover, '[i]n the performance of the duties entrusted to the interim administration under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), UNMIK will, as necessary, issue legislative acts in the form of regulations.'[38] In this manner, the authority of the Special Representative is virtually unlimited.[39]

UNMIK is unusual in that it encompasses the activities of three non-UN organizations under the UN's overall jurisdiction. UNMIK is comprised of five 'pillars': (1) interim civil administration (UN-led); (2) humanitarian affairs (UNHCR-led); (3) democratization and institution-building (OSCE-led); and (4) reconstruction (EU-led).[40] The fifth pillar was security, provided by the Kosovo Force (KFOR), comprising 45,000 NATO-led troops. All five of these pillars have an interest in human rights. The interim administration, for example, has specific officers charged with overseeing human rights issues and the OSCE offers training on democratization and human rights as part of its democratic institution building. The rush of activities focusing on human rights seemed destined to support a culture of human rights.

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[32] General principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis were adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, Annex 1 to UN Security Council Resolution 1244). The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia indicated its acceptance in a paper presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, Annex 2 to UN Security Council Resolution 1244).
[33] S/RES/1244 (1999), available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1244.htm>.
[34] S/RES/1244 (1999), para. 6.
[35] Chronology, UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), available at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/news/kos30day.htm
[36] UNMIK/REG/1999/1 (Section 1(1)) 'On the authority of the interim administration in Kosovo', 25 July 1999, available at<http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg1.html>.
[37] UNMIK/REG/1999/1 (Section 1(2)).
[38] UNMIK/REG/1999/1 (Section 4). Section 4 further provides that '[s]uch regulations will remain in force until repealed by UNMIK or superseded by such rules as are subsequently issued by the institutions established under a political settlement, as provided in United Nations Security Conceal Resolution 1244.'
[39] In examining similarly expansive powers granted to UN administrators in Bosnia, Bell (2000: 180) astutely remarks: 'It appears that the price of democracy is democracy.'
[40] Chronology, UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), available at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/news/kos30day.htm

Despite early promise, the post-agreement intervention did not fare much better than the NATO intervention in supporting a human rights culture in Kosovo. In place of a principled human rights culture, life in Kosovo is now defined by cynical instrumentalism – a 'whatever it takes' attitude, leaving principles behind – and individual self-help – 'everyone for oneself and one's own family' instead for the greater good. Local human rights activists still persevere in Kosovo, but the new instrumentalist attitude hampers their ability to organize. Activists face great difficulty in garnering popular support for any project that entails long-term thinking and brings little tangible rewards in the short term. A human rights approach, which by its nature requires patience and principles, today is a hard sell in Kosovo.

The relationship between internationals and locals on human rights issues is fraught with difficulties. In Kosovo as in many post-agreement societies, international human rights workers tend to conduct their operations in a messianic fashion, believing that they are coming in and delivering human rights to the local people.[41] However, locals have their own understandings of human rights. In fact, much of what is viewed by internationals as 'local culture' in opposition to 'outside ideas' is in fact already a reflection of the international human rights movement.[42] As explained above, the problem in Kosovo was not the complete absence of a human rights culture, but the underdevelopment of human rights ideas. The internationals working in Kosovo did not understand that in Kosovar society, human rights are adversarial and oppositional concepts and they do not form a common ground where different sides can agree on a shared set of values.

One of the greatest mistakes the international community made with respect to human rights was to place early prominence on the rights of Serbian residents from Kosovo to be protected. Serbs were being subjected to revenge killings and something had to be done to stop them, but this was the wrong tactic. '[The international community] came in saying, "the Serbs, the Serbs, you must protect Serbs' human rights", but all the time I wondered, "what about our human rights?'", one Albanian student told me, reflecting the sentiments of many Kosovars.[43] Albanians and Serbs both saw themselves as victims. The internationals wanting to protect the human rights of all people in Kosovo could have taken a more mediated approach, building on each group's sense of having been human rights victims and carefully expanding that sensitivity so as to rid it of its adversarial nature.

Some internationals argue that they did in fact stress 'the human rights of all people – Albanians, Serbs and everyone else.'[44] But this is not what Albanians heard. They understood only that Serbs were the new victims and that Albanians were the new perpetrators. 'It was like nothing every happened to *us*,' one former KLA fighter complained, 'and as if *we* were suddenly the bad guys.'[45] Not only did the international approach erase any acknowledgment of human rights abuses against Albanians. By emphasizing only the rights of Serbs, the international community also perpetuated the already prevalent notion in Kosovar society that human rights are 'all about one group versus another – who abuses and who is abused.'[46] Unwittingly then, the international community perpetuated an incomplete, adversarial understanding of human rights.

Additional factors impeding the internationally-assisted efforts to build a human rights culture in Kosovo are endemic to any kind of colonialist/dependency relationship. The

[41] Barnett and Finnemore (1999) have called international organizations the modern missionaries of our time.
[42] Conversely, the 'local' influences and is reflected in the global. Roland Robertson calls this phenomenon 'glocalization.' See Robertson (1995), also Sassen (1988).
[43] Author's interview with a student in Pristina, Kosovo, August 2001.
[44] Author's interview with an OSCE staff member in Pristina, Kosovo, August 2001.
[45] Author's interview with former KLA fighter in Pristina, Kosovo, August 2001.
[46] Statement of a Kosovar law student, Pristina, August 2001.

enormous power imbalance between internationals and locals skews decision making in favor of the internationals. UN administrators herald the benefits of 'localism' – that is, involvement of local experts and even utilization of direct grants to local NGOs (Carothers 1999: 335) – even as they attempt to tokenize locals. Vjosa Dobruna, a long-time human rights activist in Kosovo and former member of the joint interim administration in Kosovo, resigned from her post in the internationally sanctioned Kosovo government because of internationals repeatedly disregarding the concerns of locals. The last straw for Dobruna was when UN administrators in Kosovo failed to hear and account for the concerns local experts had over the new Kosovo constitution. The UN administration wanted to work with locals, but only insofar as they did not rock the boat on preordained UN plans.[47]

Failure to listen to local leaders and to learn about the history of the Kosovar parallel society has led internationals to overlook its potential as an efficient network for coordination of volunteer efforts, distribution of public goods, and development of human rights values.[48] Instead of drawing from the pre-existing structures of civil society, internationals came into Kosovo with a template that did not fit the problem. 'The main problem,' said Dobruna, 'is that [the internationals] came and tried to do what they did in Bosnia here. But in Bosnia there was no alternative movement. In Kosovo, people were prepared for war. Maybe it wasn't a perfect 'civil society,' but there was a structure, a network of nongovernmental services, NGOs. Instead of making the old structure better, they went backward – as if nothing had ever been here.' Whenever locals attempted to point out already existing structures and mechanisms, they were pushed aside. 'That parallel government wasn't really a good model for democracy', one OSCE staff member explained.[49]

On one hand, good arguments exist for ignoring the parallel government and starting anew.[50] The refusal by the international community to use pre-existing structures of civil society seems understandable if one considers that these were strongly divisive and contributed to an entrenchment of the communal divide. It might seem that replacing rather than transforming the earlier structure might lead to quicker and more desirable results. On the other hand, the parallel government was a rich resource of human resources and ideas that democracy builders could not afford to ignore. The parallel government did reflect a participatory ethos and efforts to build on it would have lent legitimacy and effectiveness to the international effort.

Failure to learn about the history of Kosovar society has had another drawback. It has continually led the international community to favor the development of local advocacy NGOs even when other mechanisms may better promote a human rights culture. The transplant of American-style advocacy NGOs to other countries is often unsuccessful, since advocacy NGOs are a product of the American experience and are completely alien to many socio-political cultures (Mertus 1999e and 1999c). As Thomas Carothers has observed, American NGOs 'have grown out of particular aspects of America's social makeup and history – whether the immigrant character of society, the 'frontier' mindset, the legacy of suspicion of central government authority, or the high degree of individualism.' (Carothers 1999: 98) The political culture in Kosovo arose out of a different historic and social context.

Advocacy NGOs are not always the best mechanism for the general concerns of a population to be heard. Advocacy NGOs are said to work when they promote civic

[47] Author's interview with Shkelzen Maliqi, Pristina, Kosovo, August 2001.
[48] I discuss the importance of such networks further in Mertus (1999b).
[49] Author's interview with OSCE staff member, Pristina, Kosovo, August 2001.
[50] I am grateful to Stefan Wolff for encouring me to address this argument.

participation and general human rights norms, as well as more specific expressions of public interest. However, advocacy NGOs often promote only the most popular (that is, monied) causes, often at the expense of the real public interest. The problem is particularly acute in cases like Kosovo where totally new NGOs sprung up almost overnight, propped up by foreign dollars. While some of these NGOs perform admirable functions, many of them are seen by their local public as reflecting the values and interests of foreign governments and foreign NGOs, and not representative of the most pressing local concerns (Carothers 1999: 212). As a result, many of the newly created entities cease to exist when the internationals pull out their support. Thus, they in fact have little impact on the development of local culture.

The structure of aid in Kosovo has encouraged people to create and operate through an NGO structure even when it would make more sense to work in some other manner, such as through an existing community network. Thus, donor dollars have unwittingly eroded and in some cases destroyed capable community structures and in doing so created new tensions between the new 'haves' and 'have nots.' To complicate matters, local Kosovars who succeed in the new NGO world often are not the ones with the greatest experience, relevant skills or legitimacy among their constituents. To be sure, some of the Kosovar NGOs are extremely capable and experienced, but many of the newly minted ones reflect an ability to respond to international demand more than local needs. Internationals award the local NGOs that are willing to be cheap service providers for international programs and that are staffed with people willing to attend (often useless and duplicative) trainings and interface with donors in a language and style deemed acceptable.[51]

Much of the post-war donor attention on women's issues, for example, has been to newly created local NGOs and with women's sections of political parties, instead of the local women's projects that had existed throughout the 1990s. 'They find us difficult to deal with', one long-time Kosovar women's rights activist explains, 'because they want to *train us* and we don't want their training.'[52] 'Look', another Kosovar women's rights activist explains, 'I've been in Vienna [UN 1993 World Conference on Human Rights] and Beijing [UN 1995 World Conference on Women] and I *do* gender trainings and they [the internationals] try to tell me what gender is and why we need a gender focal point.'[53] When women activists argued in favor of gender mainstreaming in the transitional Kosovo government, instead of the creation of a gender focal point, the internationals 'acted like [the local women] didn't understand.'[54] After several disputes with the UN-appointed gender experts, the core group of local women's projects – the Kosovo Women's Network – refused to meet with the UN Office of Gender Affairs (OGA) and eventually also closed the doors of their own meetings to OGA representatives. The large amount of funding for gender related projects, although well-intentioned and in some cases well-conceived, created conflict between locals and internationals as well as between various local representatives.

Internationals are seemingly unaware that the flow of money to local advocacy groups impacts local power structures which, in turn, often creates new cleavages and conflictual relationships. 'Aid providers treat political change in a pseudoscientific manner as a clinical process to be guided by manuals, technical seminars, and flowcharts specifying the intended outputs and timeframes.' (Carothers 1999: 98) They ignore the fact that political change involves people, relationships and power. Whenever foreign

[51] See Julie Mertus, *War's Offensive on Women: The Humanitarian Challenge in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan* (Kumarian, 2000).
[52] Author's interview, August 2001, Pristina, Kosovo.
[53] Author's interview, August 2001, Pristina, Kosovo.
[54] Ibid.

governments and NGOs offer support to local leaders they effectively choose some people over others and thus alter existing relationships and power structures. The 'newly anointed ones'[55] may not in fact represent their purported constituency and may not be viewed as deserving and legitimate by their own people. Attention to NGOs thus may diminish other voices in society, including those of official representatives and of other community leaders who either have failed in attracting international support or who have not chosen to operate through an NGO.

Very few donors are cognizant of the potential and actual impact of aid on local conflict. The US Agency for International Development (USAID), the principle vehicle through which the US directs democracy assistance, does not routinely undertake conflict assessments before embarking on a new project. While Andrew Natzios, the new head of USAID, has announced that conflict prevention will become one of the four pillars of USAID's work, the decision has not yet been fully implemented.[56] Many of the internationals attempting to build peace in Kosovo have been chosen by their governments and organizations precisely because of their ignorance about Kosovar history and local power dynamics. 'I don't understand it', said one British woman who had been working in Kosovo since 1993 and who found herself turned down for consultancy positions due to 'bias' toward locals. 'If I were to team up with a career UN person, we would balance each other out: He would bring sensitivity about the international bureaucracy and I about the local. But no one sees his potential bias, only mine...'[57]

To the extent that the internationals have had an impact on local culture, it has been largely negative. The flood of donor dollars into Kosovo has created an imbalance in the labor market and altered social values that promote community responsibility. With the promise of making ten times the amount of their parents, young, English-speaking students have abandoned their studies and accepted dead-end, short-term jobs with international agencies. With local government positions paying one-tenth the salary of parallel international positions, one-half the amount of a UN driver and one-third the amount of a translator, talented local professionals have little incentive to work in government.[58] The entry of international agencies into the service providing sector and the rise in the cost of living has killed any sense of volunteerism and reduced the Albanians' sense of group solidarity.[59]

The attempts to democratize Kosovo have ironically had a particularly negative impact on human rights norms. In implementing democracy programs, internationals are seen as being dictatorial and, in many cases, arbitrary, thereby raising concerns about elite representation. Through their projects, international donors attempt to reach out to and strengthen local leaders. But are they reaching the right leaders? Who speaks for a society? In Kosovo, the UN administration guessed that the leaders who spoke for the people of Kosovo at the Rambouillet and Kumanovo peace negotiations were the ones who still spoke for society in the post-conflict period. 'When it became clear that the UN needed to have some power sharing with local elites in running the place', UNMIK civil administrator Thomas Koenig explained, 'we decided that these were the ones most likely to have legitimacy.'[60] Out of a set of bad choices, Koenig said, the UN attempted to make the best one. When it became clear that reliance on the Kosovar peace negotiators would eliminate women and members of civil society from the transitional leadership,

[55] Quotation from member of Kosovar NGO group, in interview with author, August 2001, Pristina, Kosovo.
[56] Author's interview with Dayton Maxwell, USAID, July 2001, and Dick McCall USAID, August 2001.
[57] Author's interview in Pristina, August 2001.
[58] Author's interview with Vetton Surroi in Pristina, August 2001.
[59] Author's interview with Urim Ahmeti in Pristina, August 2001.
[60] Author's interview in Pristina, August 2001.

Koenig said 'an effort was made to include more representatives of civil society.' Nonetheless, despite their active participation in civil society prior to the NATO bombing, women remained disproportionately underrepresented in the Kosovar Transitional Council and UNMIK joint civil administration. Did the local men adequately represent the concerns of their people? Did the women?

Despite the values of participation, transparency and opennness preached by internationals, locals learn from the example set by the international effort in Kosovo that democracy is about gaining power. Kosovars tend to understand their struggle for democracy as a struggle for 'the right to rule'.[61] Indeed, the language of democracy in the US perpetuates this notion of a 'ruling party' and much USAID and OSCE democracy assistance is designed to develop the skills of political parties to participate in elections and compete for the right to rule.[62] However, democracy should not be about 'ruling', in the sense that that word refers to the absolute power to rule *over* the population and to distribute political patronage to the vic torious party.[63] Rather, democracy should be about the right to govern. Good governance entails power-sharing among majority and minority voices, with ample protections for the human rights of ethnic, national, gender and other minorities. Somehow the message on governance has been muted in the rush to fabricate other elements of popular democracy, stressing the formation of political parties and their operation in electoral politics.

Internationals do not only mis-transmit notions about ruling, they send the wrong signals about the nature of institution building and norm formation. Somehow Kosovars have received the message that the international community will leave them with a democratic government that will resolve their conflict with Serbs.[64] But no democracy can claim that its institutions settle all public grievances. On the contrary, democratic institutions seek to create processes that will permit public debates and conflict to be heard in a civil fashion, even as they are not finally resolved. To be sure, some norms are foundational for democracies, including fundamental human rights such as the right to life, freedom from torture, and freedom from discrimination on the bases of race, ethnicity or gender. But the acknowledgment of such rights does not determine the outcome of all cases in which they are alleged. Instead, and importantly, democratic institutions shape the context for resolution. The notion of process-enhancing democratic institutions and leaders who govern instead of rule is alien to the political culture of Kosovo, but these are precisely the concepts that must be understood and embraced if a more complete human rights culture is to take root in Kosovo.

Conclusion

In the summer of 2001, the civil administrator for Kosovo, Thomas Koenig, made a bold statement. He asserted that the success of the international administration in choosing and training future leaders and in planting the seeds for democracy will be evaluated when, after the fall general elections of 2001 in Kosovo, locals begin to govern themselves with far more limited government assistance. (An estimated 80% of control will be given to locals while 20% will remain in the hands of the UN administration).[65] To some extent he is correct. If a future Albanian-led (with Serbian proportional representation) government in Kosovo promotes stability and respect for human rights,

[61] Author's interview with a Kosovar university student, August 2001.
[62] USAID and OSCE may not speak of 'the right to rule' but this is how election assistance is understood by locals.
[63] I am grateful to Thomas Koenig for this point. Author's interview in Kosovo, August 2001.
[64] For the vast majority of Albanians this means independence from Serbia and integration into Europe.
[65] Author's interview in Kosovo, August 2001.

this will to some extent vindicate the military and civil interventions in Kosovo. But such a positive result may also reflect the re-emergence of local human rights values and skills that existed *prior to* the international intervention and that survived *despite* international meddling. A human rights culture did exist in Kosovar society prior to the NATO bombing, although it was incomplete. The final verdict on the impact of international intervention on that culture will, in time, emerge.

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Post-Communist Bulgaria's Ethnopolitics

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Introduction

In culturally heterogeneous societies, vertical differentiation (segmentation) on the basis of ethnicity, race, language or religion often has higher salience for their members than horizontal differentiation on the basis of socio-economic class or ideology (Bryant 1992). This may give rise to what Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan call a 'stateness' problem in aspiring new democracies. This may occur 'when there are profound differences about the territorial boundaries of the political community's state and profound differences as to who has the right of citizenship in that state…' (Linz and Stepan 1996: 16). Most scholars see 'stateness' issues as basic for democratic transition and consolidation, and some even consider a sense of national unity to be the only necessary condition for achieving stable democracy (cf. Rustow 1970, Schmitter 1994, Tarrow 1995). The democratisation literature has devoted relatively little theoretical attention to 'stateness' problems, because it has focused mostly on transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America, where the challenge of competing nationalisms is not a major issue (Linz and Stepan 1996: 16). By contrast, the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe precipitated a region-wide drift towards ethnic tensions, demagogic ethno-nationalism and separatism, culminating in the tragic fratricidal wars in Yugoslavia and in parts of the former USSR.

The explosiveness of cultural divisions is clearly a problem for ethnically plural new democracies of Eastern Europe (Bogdanor 1995). Ethnic nationalism, long suppressed by the former communist regimes, has re-emerged as the dominant political trend in the region. But how much of an existential threat is the new democracies' ethnic heterogeneity?

While majority-minority problems have strained the transition to democracy in Bulgaria, ethnic heterogeneity has not become a major obstacle to democratisation.[1] When the country began its democratic transformation, the ethnic conflict between the Slavic majority and the Turkish minority inherited from the communist past appeared to pose a threat to political stability and consolidation, if not to state cohesiveness itself. Trying to shore itself up by manipulating the majority's nationalist sentiments, the old regime had created a polarising conflict along ethno-religious lines by subjecting the Muslim Turkish minority in Bulgaria to a campaign of cultural and linguistic assimilation. When the anti-Turkish assimilation drive was officially ended in December 1989 and the rights of ethnic Turks began to be restored, this reversal of policy provoked an explosion of nationalist sentiments among majority Bulgarians. Symbolic for majority-minority tensions here and elsewhere, the leaders of neo-nationalist groups even denied the existence of any ethnic minorities in Bulgaria. In an atmosphere of heightened tensions and nationalist mass protests, the ethnic Turkish-dominated Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), the largest and most influential ethnic minority party in Bulgaria,[2] barely won legal recognition and for a time its very existence was in danger. The ethnic issue has resisted democratic crafting as much as any other major problem on the transition agenda. Even

[1] 'Minority' is understood here to mean an ethnically, racially, religiously, culturally, or linguistically distinct group living within the context of a larger society. As the term is used in political science, a minority is usually (but not necessarily always) subordinate to the dominant majority within such a plural society, thus making both numerical inferiority and subordinancy the main defining characteristics of a minority group.

[2] Although the MRF is not officially registered as an ethnic minority party, everyone in Bulgaria is aware of and recognises its status as an ethnic minority party comprising over 100,000 ethnic Turks and just 3,000 ethnic Bulgarians (most of them Muslim Bulgarians or Pomaks).

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today, ethnic tensions continue to smoulder beneath the seemingly placid surface. For instance, recent events in Kosovo have encouraged Bulgaria's ethnic Turks to take a more assertive stand against the Bulgarian majority. The Bulgarian case confirms that it is much harder for political leaders to reach consensual unity in societies deeply divided along ethno-religious lines, and that such divisions have a powerful impact on elite strategies and interactions. It may take much longer for such societies to achieve the political consensus and cooperation essential for democracy, even though a broad-based bargain is obviously not altogether impossible.

Table 1: Bulgaria's Ethnic Groups

Ethnicity	Population	Percent
Bulgarian	7,271,185	85.67
Turkish	800,052	9.43
Gypsy	313,396	3.69
Armenian	13,677	0.16
Others	89,007	1.05
Total	8,487,317	100.00

Source: Official Population Census, December 1992

Despite the existence of unmistakable evidence of nationalist fervour and irredentist aspirations, the ethnic conflict has not exploded into a 'stateness' crisis, thus strengthening the democratisation process and reducing the danger of future challenges to the integrity of the Bulgarian state. All post-communist governments have publicly admitted the existence of a Muslim Turkish minority in Bulgaria, including through the officially published results of the December 1992 population census (cf. Table 1), and have taken steps to promote its human rights and freedoms. When the Bulgarian government signed the Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 1997, it officially recognised the ethnic Turkish minority in Bulgaria, even though the Constitution of 1991 does not acknowledge it as such. The political establishment now includes Bulgaria's largest and most influential ethnic minority party, the MRF. The democratic logic of bargaining and cooperation between different ethno-religious groups has ultimately prevailed over intolerance and divisiveness, providing an effective solution to ethnic minority problems.

The Ethnic Conflict

Bulgaria's minority problems arose well before the transition process was initiated. One of the darker legacies of Todor Zhivkov's rule was the conflict involving the large Turkish community, which comprises over 9% of Bulgaria's population, according to the 1992 census. More than 80% of Bulgaria's ethnic Turks are concentrated in the north-eastern and the south-western parts of the country. A majority of them are employed in tobacco farming, but a large number of Turks also used to work in the more profitable manufacturing sector. A privileged elite of urban-based, college-educated Turks was formed during the communist era and, as one Bulgarian-born writer notes, 'among them are to be found the most ardent exponents of a distinct ethnic consciousness.' (Todorova 1992: 154) It is from this influential and well-to-do ethno-social stratum that the future ethnic Turkish leaders arose.

Turks and Bulgarians had coexisted peacefully for much of the last century, although the absence of reliable polling data makes it impossible to judge what the prevailing attitudes towards the Bulgarian majority were in the Turkish-populated areas. Tensions between them flared up in the winter of 1984-1985 when the Zhivkov regime initiated the so-called 'national revival' campaign, that is, the outright attempt to assimilate ethnic Turks within the larger Bulgarian population. Provoked by the rise of Islamic theocratic fundamentalism abroad and the intense pan-Turkish propaganda by neighbouring Turkey, the forced assimilation of ethnic Turks led to clashes with the police resulting in about a half dozen deaths and strained relations between the two ethnic communities. The Zhivkov regime declared that those claiming to be minority Turks were actually Bulgarian Muslims, known as 'Pomaks', that is, ethnic Bulgarians descended from ancestors who had converted to Islam during the five centuries of Ottoman rule.[3] The government decided to Christianise the names of the Turkish-speaking and Muslim population for the purpose of forming an ethnically monolithic Bulgarian nation and reducing the danger of Turkish irredentism and Islamic fundamentalism in the country. Muslim Turks were suddenly deprived of the right to study the Turkish language in school, observe Islamic holidays, or openly follow Islamic customs and traditions—practices that had been earlier tolerated, if not encouraged, by the communist regime in the hope of winning the support of the ethnic Turkish minority. Turkish-language newspapers, magazines and radio broadcasts that were legal and state-supported until 1984 were also banned, leading to charges from Turkey (itself with a record of abusing human and minority rights) that Bulgaria was engaged in 'cultural genocide.' These measures radically mobilised minority public opinion in Bulgaria and led to sporadic protests and demonstrations by ethnic Turks and Pomaks. In reaction to the activities of an underground Turkish resistance, a number of Turkish activists were imprisoned or expelled from the country. Bulgarian courts passed death sentences on several ethnic Turks implicated in isolated acts of political murder and terrorism.

Pressure to assimilate the Turkish minority continued through 1989, despite the fact that such a policy was obviously in conflict with the political and economic liberalisation of late Communism. Many Bulgarians, especially the pro-Western urban-based intelligentsia, viewed the 'revival process' as a national embarrassment brought about by the regime's chauvinism and political insensitivity (Perry 1991: 5-8, Poulton 1991). Encouraged by widespread sympathy among Bulgarians, the Turkish minority staged mass demonstrations and hunger strikes in May 1989. In a televised speech, Zhivkov urged Turkey to open its borders for all ethnic Turkish Bulgarians willing to emigrate. As a result, some 310,000 ethnic Turks departed for Turkey before the startled Turkish government sealed the border. Nearly half of them eventually returned because they

[3] Muslim Bulgarians or Pomaks number 143,788, according to the official results of the 1992 census (24 Chasa, April 4, 1993).

were disappointed with poor living conditions in Turkey (Engelbrekt 1991: 5-8). During this mass exodus, another 400,000 filed emigration applications, creating a fertile ground for the rise of both ethnic Turkish separatism and Bulgarian defensive nationalism.

The assimilation campaign only served to deepen divisive national identities and exacerbate ethnic scapegoating and myth making. At the beginning of the transition, the problems of ethnic conflict seemed particularly intractable, since such indivisible fundamentals of identity like culture, language, religion and ethnicity were at stake. Old prejudices and stereotypes and the poisonous effects of the previous regime's anti-Turkish propaganda lingered on, creating serious political tensions within post-communist Bulgaria's democratic consensus.

Even though Bulgarian nationalists have refused to negotiate with the MRF and there is no grassroots-level dialogue between the two ethnic communities, the more pragmatic argument that reconciliation and cooperation are necessary for peace and stability has prevailed. Another reason why mass mobilisation based on traditional ethnic identities and animosities has faltered is the evolution towards moderation by both the MRF and its neo-nationalist foes, both of which were frightened by the extreme interethnic violence in neighbouring Yugoslavia. Even though the ethnic conflict has continued throughout the transition period, it never evolved into a serious stateness problem.

The Nationalist Backlash

After the fall of Zhivkov in November 1989 and following mass demonstrations by ethnic Turks and Pomaks, the rights to practice Islam and bear Turkish names were legally restored. The ruling communists rejected Zhivkov's campaign of forced assimilation as anti-constitutional and leading to a serious erosion of national unity. But the decision to renounce the 'revival process', made public on 29 December 1989, sparked nation-wide protests by Bulgarian nationalists to resist the new policy. Widespread fears of Islamic fundamentalism and Turkish irredentism as well as the negative historical memories of five centuries of Ottoman domination fuelled the protests. With slogans like 'No to Separatism' and 'Bulgaria for the Bulgarians', the protesters demonstrated against what they called the government's 'policy of national nihilism.' They set up the Committee for the Defence of National Interests (CDNI), which accused the Turkish minority of nourishing irredentist aspirations and called for a referendum on the ethnic issue. The ethnonationalists saw the return of Turkish names as a step toward Muslim cultural and administrative autonomy, as well as a threat to the territorial integrity of the nation-state. By exploiting widespread fears of a military invasion by NATO member Turkey and the 'Cyprusisation' of Bulgaria (that is, the forcible partition of the country between ethnic Bulgarians and Muslim Turks), the nationalist backlash seriously threatened the country's political stability and peaceful transition to democracy.

The post-Zhivkov communist government must be given credit for restoring peace and tranquillity in the country with the help of other mainstream parties and public organisations. It rejected a referendum on the ethnic question on the grounds that human rights issues should not be resolved by popular opinion. During the weeks of protests and strikes by ethnonationalists, the opposition Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) openly supported the government's principled position on ethnic issues.

Alarmed by the nationalist demonstrations, the Grand Mufti (the spiritual leader of Bulgaria's Muslims) declared that the Muslim clergy were opposed to extremist demands for regional autonomy or territorial partition, and supported the current status of

Bulgarian as the only official language. His conciliatory stance was intended to reassure the nationalists that ethnic Turks were not seeking to fragment Bulgaria. Talks aimed at ending ethnic strife and restoring order were held in January 1990 between the government and various independent groups and associations organised in the Social Council of Citizens (SCC). The rallies and strikes ended only after the Council, representing forces from the entire political spectrum, reached a compromise that condemned past violations of minority rights in Bulgaria, but opposed separatist movements and confirmed Bulgarian as the official language. A draft declaration was signed by the government and the SCC and presented to the National Assembly for approval. It pledged to restore ethnic Turkish names and religious freedoms, but rejected local autonomy for the Turkish minority and recommended that all secessionist groups be outlawed (Perry 1991). It also insisted that Bulgarian should remain the only official language of the country. In January 1990, the Assembly approved the declaration and passed an amnesty for all ethnic Turks prosecuted in connection with the assimilation campaign.

In the wake of the SCC talks, the atmosphere in the country improved to such an extent that the danger of violence between Bulgarian nationalists and ethnic Turks seemed to have been averted (Ashley 1990: 4-11). A Turkish-language newspaper published by the MRF and focusing on Bulgaria's ethnic problems was allowed to appear for the first time since 1984, when all Turkish-language publications had been banned. But the danger of interethnic conflict had not completely disappeared. While the government pledged to restore civil and religious freedoms to the ethnic Turkish population, the nationalists were engaged in well-organised mass resistance to the new ethnic policy. Moreover, thousands of ethnic Turks and Pomaks protested in the capital Sofia in March 1990, demanding more concessions from the government on the restoration of Muslim names and rights (BTA in English, 5 March 1990). President Petar Mladenov met with their representatives who complained about employment, housing, and education problems faced by migrants returning from Turkey. As a result, another high-level body was formed, the Public Council on the Ethnic Issues (PCEI), which included representatives of the ruling Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the MRF, the UDF, the labour unions and other concerned public organisations.

Following the June 1990 elections, in which 24 MRF representatives were elected to the constituent Grand National Assembly (GNA), the PCEI reported mounting ethnic tension in the country and issued an appeal for calm and tolerance. The PCEI blamed the problem both on the legacies of the Zhivkov era and on minority impatience with the slow progress in combating human rights abuses. After nationalist demonstrators had tried unsuccessfully to prevent MRF deputies from attending the first session of the new parliament, CDNI organised several large demonstrations to protest what it called 'the creation of a pro-Turkish parliamentary group in the Grand National Assembly.' The protesters demanded the immediate recall of the parliamentarians from the MRF, which they blamed for the recent escalation of ethnic tensions. But in a rebuff to the ethnonationalists, the newly elected parliament passed a resolution firmly supporting the rights of ethnic minorities in Bulgaria (BTA in English, 20 July 1990).

In November 1990, the Assembly finally approved a law allowing ethnic Turks and Pomaks in Bulgaria to resume the names they were forced to give up during the period of involuntary assimilation. In reaction to this decision, the neo-nationalists staged protest demonstrations in areas where the population is ethnically mixed. CDNI announced the establishment of the so-called 'Bulgarian Republic of Razgrad.' (BTA in English, 22 November 1990) Centred in the city of Razgrad, which is located in a region in north-eastern Bulgaria heavily populated by Muslim Turks, the Razgrad Republic grew into the Association of Free Bulgarian Cities with Free Bulgarian Citizens, which included

dozens of towns with large Turkish populations. The nationalists threatened that if the government remained indifferent to the alleged militant separatism of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, the Associated Free Cities would declare their independence from the Bulgarian state and perhaps even join Greece. Bulgarian citizens of other cities and towns announced their intentions to join the Association. After staging several protest rallies in ethnically mixed areas, CDNI and the neo-nationalist Fatherland Party of Labour (FPL) appealed for work stoppages and civil disobedience. They declared all branches of the national government to be illegitimate, because, in their opinion, they did not reflect the actual correlation of political forces in the country (BTA in English, 19 November 1990)

Most Bulgarian politicians criticised the neo-nationalist campaign and distanced themselves from its demands. President Zheliu Zhelev went on national television to denounce the Razgrad Republic and call on all political parties and public institutions to condemn the nationalist protests, strikes, sit-ins, and traffic blockades (BTA in English, 24 November 1990). But many ordinary Bulgarians living in predominantly Turkish regions vehemently opposed the new policy as betrayal of national interests. The government had to perform a delicate balancing act—from the point of view of the MRF, progress was too slow, but from the neo-nationalist perspective, the regime was encouraging anti-Bulgarian separatism (Perry 1990).

Mass protests by the nationalists thwarted government plans to reintroduce Turkish-language instruction, starting in January 1991, in the school curriculum in areas inhabited by ethnic Turks. The new government decided, in an attempted compromise, to include the extracurricular teaching of Turkish and other minority languages in Bulgarian schools only from the next academic year. In response, 35,000 ethnic Turkish students went on strike and boycotted classes throughout Bulgaria to protest this delay. The MRF leadership called this step a 'moratorium' on the issue and insisted that it contradicted President Zhelev's recent assurances in the European parliament at Strasbourg that the rights and freedoms of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria had been reinstated.

In a televised speech to the nation, the new, politically independent Prime Minister Dimitar Popov criticised the nationalists for spreading feelings of mistrust and intolerance between Bulgarians and ethnic Turks. He warned that ethnic hostility was damaging Bulgaria's image abroad and declared that his cabinet was determined to implement the parliamentary decision on the optional teaching of Turkish. Turkish was finally included in the school curriculum in September 1991 and, with the exception of some nationalist groups which opposed it as a surrender of national interests, most political parties supported the change.

The government's room for manoeuvre remained limited, as Bulgarian public opinion was badly divided on this issue. According to one poll (Times Mirror Center 1991), an absolute majority of Bulgarians (59.5%) blamed post-communist reforms for the worsening state of interethnic relations in their country. Hunger strikes and sit-ins organised by the nationalists continued, as the protesters demanded that the legislature take urgent measures to deal with the ethnic tensions. Strong resistance to the government's policy on the ethnic question brought these groups dangerously close to being an anti-system opposition. At a press conference in April 1991, FPL leader Roumen Popov vowed that his party would fight with all legal means at its disposal to preserve the Bulgarian character of the nation-state. He implicitly endorsed Zhivkov's policy of ethnic homogenisation by suggesting that an 'agreement be concluded on the emigration of all those who do not feel Bulgarian and wish to leave the country.' With reference to the conflict over the teaching of Turkish in Bulgarian schools, he also complained that learning a foreign language should be a common right and not a 'privilege for people with non-Bulgarian consciousness.' (BTA in English, 4 April 1991)

The next month, another neo-nationalist group, the National Radical Party (NRP), held the constituent session of an 'alternative civil parliament' to serve as a counterweight to the existing Grand National Assembly, electing party leader Ivan Georgiev as its 'speaker.' It also appointed a 'shadow' cabinet as another forum for expressing nationalistic public opinion and called President Zhelev 'a traitor and inspirer of the idea of introducing Turkish language in our schools.' If its demands were not met, the NRP threatened to wage 'a life-or-death struggle for the survival of the Bulgarian nation.' (Duma, 15 April 1991)

Tensions were aggravated by hunger strikes of ethnic Turks calling for the restitution of their homes, which had been sold during their mass exodus to Turkey in 1989. Bulgarians who had cheaply purchased real estate and other property from the departing Turks were now opposing a government decree that annulled all such transactions and compensated ethnic Turks who had returned to Bulgaria. The nationalists protested that the measure was an act of illegal discrimination against ethnic Bulgarians (BTA in English, 16 May 1991). They also opposed the so-called Dogan Act of 1992, which restored housing, property and employment to all ethnic Turks who had fled to Turkey in 1989.

Public opinion polls illustrate some of the difficulties that the new pluralistic regime experienced in satisfying legitimate minority demands, while trying to placate hard-line nationalist opposition, which claimed substantial popular backing for its anti-Turkish stance and engaged in a dangerously acrimonious and demagogic style of political discourse. It is evident from statistical data presented by McIntosh and MacIver (1993: 14) that Bulgarians tend to be more willing than most West Europeans to grant ethnic minorities the right to form political organisations or have parliamentary representation. However, they lag behind other European nations on the more divisive issue of teaching classes in minority languages – a reluctance that was skilfully exploited by the Bulgarian nationalists in their anti-Turkish propaganda.

Majority suspicions of any positive measures to protect minorities also found reflection in the 1991 Constitution. While providing extensive legal safeguards for individual rights and freedoms, the constitution avoids explicit recognition of collective rights and restricts the electoral participation of parties based on ethnic or religious allegiance. The parliamentarians who drafted the constitution sought to counteract the effect of the new proportional representation (PR) electoral law, introduced in the same year as the new constitution, which tends to encourage the formation of such parties. Although constitutional clauses allow minority language schools and other elements of minority cultural life, there is no emphasis on consociational power-sharing at the executive level or any other institutional mechanisms by which the political participation of Bulgaria's ethnic minorities could be guaranteed. This reflects the great concern felt by a strong majority of ethnic Bulgarians (69.9% in the 1991 Times-Mirror Center for the People & the Press, East/West Poll) that minority groups inside the country pose a serious threat to national unity and territorial integrity. This level of apprehension was exceeded in the same poll only by Czechs and Slovaks on the eve of their federation's 'velvet divorce.'

Despite such constitutional omissions and strong nationalist pressures, Bulgaria's various post-1989 governments stood firm in their determination to guarantee basic rights to every Bulgarian citizen regardless of his or her ethnic origin and religion. There are several reasons for the regime's resolve and steadfastness in the face of heated nationalist opposition. To begin with, the nationalists have a relatively narrow political base, as popular support for their protests and radical positions has been unstable and

generally limited in scope.[4] Public opinion polls in particular show that the level of xenophobic, including Turkophobic, intolerance is quite limited in Bulgaria, depriving the nationalists of a reliable base of mass support. When asked to rate various ethnic minorities in their own country, Bulgarian respondents are distinctly more positive in their ratings of minorities when compared to answers to similar questions in the other East European countries. Only the Roma come out with an unfavourable rating of more than 50%, while all other ethnic groups receive more than a 50% favourable rating (cf. Table 2).

Table 2: Opinions about Different Ethnic Groups in Bulgaria (in percentages)

Question: I'd like you to rate some different groups of people in Bulgaria according to how you feel about them. For each group, please tell me whether your opinion is very favourable, mostly favourable, mostly unfavourable or very unfavourable?

	Very favourable	Mostly favourable	Mostly unfavourable	Very unfavourable
Turks	13.7	38.4	28.4	10.9
Muslim Bulgarians	13.6	47.6	17.4	4.3
Roma	5.5	15.2	31.8	39.3
Jews	11.1	52.1	8.3	1.3
Armenians	15.1	52.6	5.8	1.3
Bessarabian Bulgarians	10.9	45.3	2.2	1.1

Source: Times-Mirror Center for the People & the Press, East/West Poll (1991).

The extent of Bulgaria's ethnic and racial tolerance can also be gauged from a comparison of attitudes towards different ethnic and racial groups. Bulgarian respondents in the 1991 Times-Mirror Center for the People & the Press, East/West Poll emerge as more tolerant than most other East European nations (Macintosh et al. 1995). Therefore, the new regime's principled consistency and firmness on this issue has been based on a relatively solid foundation of ethnic and racial tolerance, which is the result of centuries of multinational and multilingual communal life.

Although there is a strong popular opposition to granting too many rights and privileges to ethno-religious minorities in Bulgaria, neo-nationalist parties have garnered few votes from the population in national electoral races. Only the FPL has had a representative independently elected to parliament in June 1990. In October 1991, the nationalists made it into parliament thanks to their pre-election union with the BSP, but the combined total votes for their two most successful parties, the National Radical Party (NRP) and the National Democratic Party (NDP), did not exceed 1.5% of the total vote. Nationalist candidates had their best showing in the second round of the 1992 presidential elections with 47.15% of the vote, but that was only because the Valkanov-Vodenicharov ticket was officially backed by the Socialists. Not a single nationalist candidate has been independently elected to the National Assembly since then, even though the neo-nationalist parties had united in an electoral alliance called the Patriotic Union. This, however, only brought them 1.4% of the popular vote in the December 1994 election. The only exception is again the FPL whose candidates have been elected on the party list of the BSP. Nationalist-leaning George Ganchev received nearly 22% of

[4] This finding is supported by attitudinal data and electoral results, as well as the observations of area specialists (cf. Troxel 1993: 200f.).

the ballots in the first round of the 1996 presidential race, while his party, the Bulgarian Business Bloc, got about 5% of the vote in both the 1994 and 1997 parliamentary elections. However, this good showing owed a lot to the votes of disgruntled BSP members and supporters.

The regime's opposition to chauvinistic sentiments has paid off over the long run. After consecutive governments resisted successfully the nationalist challenge to the restoration of the rights and freedoms of minority Turks and Muslims, tensions between the two ethnic and religious communities are on the decline. Organised nationalist opposition to the MRF has declined. Despite intense political competition for office, most of the party elites representing the two major ethnic groups clearly subscribe to a broad system of democratic norms and values, which has allowed the ethnic conflict to proceed within established institutional channels, thus gradually dissolving the initial explosive disagreements into compromise solutions.

The Evolution of the MRF

Another reason why the minority problem has been resolved peacefully and in a manner acceptable by international norms is the evolutionary change of the MRF itself, which has cast off its earlier semi loyal overtones and ambiguities. The central government's firm stand against minority discrimination and exclusion has been facilitated by the gravitation of the MRF from sectarianism, political alienation and semi loyalty to greater participation and accommodation. While Turks and other Muslims face some ethnic hostility on the part of the Bulgarian majority, for the most part they have not responded with destabilising demands for political and territorial autonomy and separatism, thereby precipitating a stateness crisis, similar to the one experienced by neighbouring Yugoslavia.

The MRF began its activities openly in January 1990, claiming to represent the interests of the sizeable Turkish community. It also claims to have previously existed in secret and to have been behind the anti-government protests of May 1989. Its political platform is based on defending the rights of Bulgaria's Turkish and Muslim population, including the Pomaks. The MRF has demanded legal protection for the Muslim community in accordance with international standards of political and civil rights and guarantees for the protection of distinct ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identities. MRF leader Ahmed Dogan, a former university professor of philosophy imprisoned by the Zhivkov police for anti-government activities, insists that 'anyone who neglects the liberties of citizens and the ethnic minorities inevitably places a question mark over the security of the entire community and the whole of civil society.' (Duma, 5 November 1990) From this perspective, his party has sharply criticised the new constitution for inadequately protecting collective minority rights and especially for banning political parties on grounds of religion and ethnicity. The Movement has also criticised the lack of Turkish-language instruction in the regular curricula of public schools. In this way, the MRF has been able to articulate the interests of ethnic Turks and other Muslims in Bulgaria, successfully mobilising their electoral support.

While insisting on group rights and limited cultural autonomy, the MRF has opposed the idea of political and territorial autonomy, declaring it dangerous for national unity. It maintains that the rights of ethnic minorities can be safeguarded only if the rights of all Bulgarian citizens are guaranteed (Nedeva 1993: 136f.). Therefore, its priority of defending minority rights has not been at odds with the struggle to build a new democratic order in Bulgaria. The Movement has in effect become the party of human rights, an understandable position for a minority party.

The MRF has often drawn suspicion among ethnic Bulgarians because of its alleged links with the Turkish government and because of media reports accusing it of pressuring Pomaks to declare themselves as Turks. But it has generally avoided ethnic confrontation by pursuing a policy of defending minority rights based on loyalty to the national independence and territorial integrity of Bulgaria. This pragmatic approach is motivated partly by the fact that demands for political and cultural autonomy have met with intense opposition on the part of Bulgarian nationalists who have accused the MRF of being Turkey's 'fifth column' in Bulgaria. There were also implicit threats that the Movement might be outlawed under the new Constitution of 1991.

Its strategy has been very cautious, avoiding any sign of extremism, ethnic separatism, or pro-Turkey bias (ibid. 144f.). The MRF demonstrated from the outset that the promotion of ethnic minority rights will be achieved only by peaceful means and with due regard given to the rights of the Bulgarian majority. Its vice-chairman Yunal Lutfi has declared that

> 'the Movement will do all it can to secure a firm place for Islam as the second religion in Bulgaria after the Orthodox Church. At the same time we have to recognise as peaceful and friendly citizens that the Christian majority must be approached and treated with common sense and tact, because all minorities must co-exist without favouritism' (quoted in Ward 1992: 23).

Ethnic co-existence and cooperation in Bulgaria are possible because the extent of ethnic nationalism and religious fanaticism is quite limited. Very few ethnic Turks in Bulgaria fear that they may suffer the tragic fate of other minorities in the Balkans. Yunal Lutfi has predicted that '[t]he situation will never explode here as it did in Bosnia, because Bulgarians and Turks are not extreme nationalists or fanatics. They have a tradition of peaceful coexistence.' (The Economist, 1 April 1995: 45)

To allay the fears of Bulgarian nationalists, the MRF has also distanced itself from the extremist and pan-Islamic Turkish Democratic Party of Adem Kenan, which advocates the creation of a federation of Bulgarians and Turks in Bulgaria, in which all predominantly Turkish areas should be given administrative and cultural autonomy. The MRF has become a significant force in Bulgarian politics and has even played a broker role, holding the balance of power in an evenly split parliament between 1991 and 1994. The fact that it was also able to nominate a minority government headed by the politically independent Lyuben Berov shows that it has become part of Bulgaria's new political establishment.

Thus, neither the MRF's ideology nor the policies it advocates have deviated from the prevailing consensus about the basic system of government and economy appropriate for Bulgaria. Dogan has stressed from the very beginning that his Movement

> 'is not interested in turning Bulgaria into a second Lebanon ... We have not taken a destructive position on a single issue and there can be no question concerning separatism. Quite the contrary, we are striving to contribute to the positive development of the renewal' (FBIS-EEU, 7 November 1990: 8).

In this respect, the MRF's constructive attitudes and tolerance can serve as an example for minorities in other multiethnic societies. The activities of Bulgaria's largest and most influential ethnic minority party do not jeopardise the stability of the new democracy,

nor are they an immediate threat to the integrity of the Bulgarian polity. The MRF is an actor quite unlikely to challenge democratic norms and institutions, especially since the Turkish minority is a major beneficiary from the effective and unimpeded functioning of democracy in Bulgaria.

It must be noted that the MRF's original aloofness and perceived semi-loyalty was not entirely its fault. Its leaders were excluded from the round-table talks between the post-Zhivkov communist government and the anti-communist opposition in early 1990. It was not given due attention because the major political parties believed that it lacked a sufficiently strong base of mass support to challenge or disrupt the inter-elite negotiations (Simeonov 1996). The UDF leadership even refused to include MRF representatives into its round-table quota, fearing that anti-Turkish sentiments among Bulgarian voters might lessen its own electoral appeal. The UDF leaders also accused the MRF of being a creation of the BSP designed to split up the anti-communist opposition.

The MRF had to wage an uphill battle to overcome its public image as a polarising political force with a hidden separatist agenda. Dogan has had difficulty convincing Bulgarians that his party is not ethnically based. Public opinion polls show that most Bulgarians regard the MRF as the political party of the Turkish minority and many resent its ability to play the role of political powerbroker. Filip Bokov, a former reformist BSP leader, echoed such misgivings about the MRF's real motivations and intentions:

> 'They claim that they are not a movement based on ethnic origin but rather that they work for the freedom and human rights of all. But if one looks at where they campaign and hears their speeches, it is doubtless that they are a movement based on the ethnic origin of its members ... This movement cannot be viewed outside the context of Bulgarian-Turkish relations, what Turkey does to encourage this movement. There is also the fear that this movement might put up the question of autonomy in this country, which might be encouraged by Turkey. We are very aware of Turkish policies in the last 20-25 years in Cyprus' (quoted in Feffer 1992: 235).

Because the MRF was for a long time saddled with a semi-loyal reputation, its leaders repeatedly had to proclaim that their organisation supports the sovereignty and national security of Bulgaria. While striving to secure for ethnic Turks in Bulgaria the possibility of learning their mother tongue in school, the MRF has accepted the principle that the Bulgarian language is the only official language of the country. Also contributing to the MRF's perceived semi-loyal profile was its ambiguous stance on the issue of cooperating or entering alliances with ethnic Bulgarian parties. Partly because of the perceived strong anti-Turkish orientation of many Bulgarians, the MRF's early agenda precluded building coalitions with other parties or entering the government – an act of self-isolation that hampered its inclusion in the political elite structure early on. Invited by the victorious Socialists to participate in a broad-based coalition government after the June 1990 elections, Dogan refused and proposed instead that the BSP and the UDF form a ruling coalition as a 'way of guaranteeing the promotion of the democratic processes in Bulgaria.' (BTA in English, 29 June 1990)

It was only at a national conference in October 1990 that the MRF, decrying the dangerous political polarisation in the country and the shrill partisanship of public debate, decided it should join forces with other centrist opposition parties to become 'the nucleus of a future political centre.' (BTA in English, 25 October 1990) But given its vague position on the issue of entering the government, the MRF was not included in Prime Minister Dimitar Popov's grand coalition government, which incorporated all other

legislative parties and governed the country in 1990-1991. Nor was the MRF included in the short-lived UDF cabinet of Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov.

Beginning in 1991, the MRF had to adjust to a new political situation created by the greater intensity of nationalist opposition and the adoption of a constitution banning ethnic and religious parties. In the June 1990 election, the ruling Socialists supported the MRF obviously in the hope of drawing votes away from the UDF, but during the October 1991 election the BSP sided with the nationalists, trying to exploit ethnic divisions in order to broaden its electoral base. Given the participation of several parties with extreme nationalist agenda, ethnic issues assumed a much more central and divisive role in the emotionally charged atmosphere of the 1991 electoral campaign. The neo-nationalist parties accused the Movement of being a disloyal player, pointing to the fact that all but two of its deputies had abstained in the parliamentary vote for the new Constitution.

In response to such challenges, the Movement broadened its political platform to embrace all issues of civil liberties, while continuing to advocate full and unequivocal respect for the rights and freedoms of ethnic and religious minorities in Bulgaria. The MRF took this step partly to avoid the constitutional prohibition of political parties based on ethnic and religious ties. Another likely reason is that the 150,000 ethnic Turks who have returned from Turkey since 1989 tend to identify themselves more closely with Bulgaria than with Turkey (Nedeva 1993: 138), thus contributing to the restructuring of their national political identities. 'Such identities are less primordial and fixed than is often assumed', according to Linz, Stepan and Gunther (1995: 92), who assert that the emergence of complementary multiple identities among minority populations is conducive to democratic consolidation in polities with 'stateness' problems. While stressing the importance of Muslim religion, ethnic Turkish culture and close ties with neighbouring Turkey, Dogan has publicly professed that 'Bulgaria is our fatherland and our national self-consciousness is a Bulgarian one.' (Quoted in Angelov 1990: 27) The Movement has explicitly endorsed the new capitalist-democratic order as well as Bulgaria's traditional unitary state organisation, thus refuting the nationalist charge that its disagreement with certain constitutional clauses amounts to an anti-system stance. With these steps, the largest ethnic minority party fully joined in the democratic consensus, which more or less unifies post-communist Bulgaria's otherwise bitterly squabbling party elites.

The MRF's political and institutional integration has been assisted by a PR electoral system which, though limited by a 4% threshold, has contributed to accommodating minority interests. One of the political consequences of a limited PR system, with a mean index of proportionality (i.e., the fit between votes and legislative seats) of 85% in Bulgaria (Rose 1996: 163), has been to achieve a relatively fair representation of minorities, allowing minority voters to elect candidates who truly represent their interests. A PR system does not automatically guarantee a say in government for a small ethnic party like the MRF, which will always remain a minority presence in the national legislature. But it has ensured that the MRF's constituents are accurately represented in parliament and fairly treated, so that their voices can be heard in the halls of government. This has also been made possible by post-communist Bulgaria's revolving-door system where stable legislative majorities with firm control over the executive have been more the exception than the rule.

The constitutional ban on parties with ethnic and religious affiliation was clearly designed to avoid the proliferation of separatist ethnic minority parties, which could pose a threat to the internal cohesion of the Bulgarian polity. Since the MRF was already part of the existing national party system, and because it is too powerful and well-organised to be

easily suppressed, the Constitutional Court ruled in 1992 that the prohibition should not be enforced against it. But the constitutional ban has nonetheless forced the MRF to broaden its electorate beyond the Turkish and Muslim communities and to incorporate in its agenda many non-minority issues with wider voter appeal, which has further legitimised its right to compete for political office despite its minority status.

The Integration of the MRF

Initially the MRF aligned itself with the UDF in an anti-communist alliance aimed at removing the Socialists from power and punishing those responsible for the assimilation campaign. Because of the sensitivity of the Turkish issue, the Movement was not made part of the first UDF government formed in October 1991. Even though it provided the votes necessary for parliamentary approval of the new cabinet, the MRF again remained without a fair share in government. An informal elite coalition was formed between the two parties, as the parliamentary caucus of the MRF extended crucial legislative backing to the minority UDF cabinet of Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov, helping it to survive in office for almost a year. The two parties became allies in parliament due to the ideological hostility they shared towards the BSP, but their strategic alliance fell apart in October 1992. When the UDF refused to accommodate many of its social and economic demands, the MRF withdrew its support from Prime Minister Dimitrov, forcing him to resign (Bates 1994).

The *de facto* coalition with the UDF was replaced by a marriage of convenience with the BSP, which allowed the minority cabinet of the MRF-nominated Prime Minister Berov to survive in power for almost two years. The UDF leaders accused the MRF of betrayal and of selling out to the ex-communists, but the dogmatic neo liberal economic policy of the Filip Dimitrov cabinet had been controversial even within the UDF's own parliamentary caucus. Policy differences, rather than any unilateral demands for government posts or the formation of a coalition cabinet, split up the UDF-MRF alliance. With the Left-Right dimension regaining its traditional relevance in terms of party identification in Bulgaria, socio-economic interests rather than ethnic aspirations or ideological anti-Communism were increasingly defining the MRF's place in the political continuum. There was growing antagonism between the two partners over the UDF policy of economic austerity, crash marketisation, privatisation and land restitution, which was hurting the interests of the MRF's impoverished rural constituency. Social and economic interests have replaced ethnic nationalism and the goal of retribution for past communist abuses, redrawing the previous battle lines between ex-communists and anti-communists in Bulgaria. Miroslav Darmov, a former MRF parliamentary deputy, acknowledged this change of focus:

> 'We emphasise the social orientation of the market economy. Because our electorate is people of middle status, they are concerned with the social plan of the government. We also differ with the UDF on land policy. Because the Turkish population is mostly agrarian, they are not interested in having the land go to the previous owners' (quoted in Feffer 1992: 236).

Another reason was the deliberate policy of the MRF leadership to prevent, by means of shifting alliances, the dominance of national politics by either of the two party behemoths, the BSP and the UDF. The MRF assumed the dual role of defending minority rights and maintaining a balance of power in Bulgarian politics by careful equidistance between these modern-day successors to Bulgaria's traditional Left and Right.

The evidence thus points to the MRF's evolution from an alienated minority organisation with a narrow, ethnic-based agenda into a national centrist party, which has become a 'critical player' in modern Bulgarian politics (Ilchev and Perry 1993: 40). It is an explicit exponent of the socio-economic interests of its rank-and-file members (a large majority of whom are impoverished farmers) understood according to the traditional Left-Right model of party politics. At a press conference on 6 October 1991, Dogan announced that the MRF was 'returning to its natural place in the centre.' (BTA in English, 7 October 1992) In an article for the *168 Chasa* weekly, he explained this change in his party's position:

> 'In its analysis of the situation in Bulgaria, the MRF reached the conclusion that right-wing conservatism is taking the upper hand in this country and that there is a dangerous tendency of its development into right-wing extremism.' (Ibid.)

Dogan was clearly referring to the radicalism of the MRF's own coalition partner, the UDF. According to him, this 'dangerous tendency' had forced his party to 'turn to the left after having occupied the political space of moderate conservatism for months on end.' The MRF leader went on to criticise the 'shock therapy' economic policies of Prime Minister Dimitrov's cabinet, as well as its pro-NATO foreign policy:

> 'The failure of the government to take into account the interests of the majority of the Bulgarians may provoke social cataclysms which we do not wish to be held responsible for. They are trying to include us in certain international structures but this runs counter to the vital interests of the Bulgarian people and we can no longer remain accomplices and powerless observers of these tendencies. (Ibid.)

Pragmatic policy considerations and the socio-economic interests of destitute constituents have taken the upper hand over narrowly focused ethnicity, religious and cultural issues. The MRF has clearly evolved from a marginal ethnic-based group into a moderate mainstream party, whose pragmatic-minded leadership could not ignore the demands and preferences of its own mass membership, which was suffering from the hardships of the transition. Nor could it accept the instability and social conflicts brought on by its partner's hard-line policy of virulent anti-Communism and historical retribution against members of the old ruling elite.

The turning point of the MRF's gradual incorporation in the political elite structure was the appointment in December 1992 of the MRF-nominated government of Professor Berov.[5] The MRF's ultimate control over the new cabinet was recognised by Zlatka Rouseva, deputy head of the UDF parliamentary caucus, who declared that '[t]he mandate of the MRF means in practice the formation of a Turkish government in our country! Even if no MRF member participates in it, it would still be a Turkish government.' (Svoboden Narod, 23-30 December 1992) The party fragmentation of parliament allowed the MRF to convert its minority status into majority power as a political arbiter between the feuding UDF and BSP. To the amazement of many observers, a tacit BSP-MRF legislative alliance emerged, sustaining the Berov cabinet in office for almost two years until a three-month-old parliamentary boycott by the UDF and the BSP's own desire for new elections forced its resignation in September 1994.

[5] Although most of the ministerial appointees were ethnic Bulgarians, First Deputy Prime Minister Yevgeny Matinchev was a senior member of the MRF who supervised the work of the Berov cabinet on behalf of his party.

In another important development, the Socialists had to temper their nationalist impulses for the sake of preserving their parliamentary alliance with the MRF. The *de facto* coalition between the two former enemies largely neutralised the polarising effects of the BSP's previous anti-Turkish propaganda and became an important step towards the unification of the national political elite. The unprecedented fact of a modern democracy being 'ruled' by a relatively small ethnic minority party also implies that ethnic cleavages in Bulgaria are neither cumulative nor deep enough to override practical politics and socio-economic interests. Strictly partisan considerations – primarily in the form of an intense political conflict between the UDF and the BSP which led the reins of government to be entrusted to a neutral third party – appear to have been more salient than ethnic divisions and enmities.

Once they were allowed to influence decisions on political power, the MRF leaders realised that their minority party had much more to gain from participating in the democratic game of politics than from staying on the outside. At that point, there was a marked shift in the Movement's attitudes and behaviour, which grew more self-confident, moderate and mainstream in its politics. There was a change also in the pattern of its interactions with the other party elites, all of whom recognised its co-equal status. Even the most fanatical Bulgarian nationalists had to acknowledge that the MRF is not a disloyal political competitor and that their fears of the country being splintered along ethnic and religious lines were exaggerated. Even though many ethnonationalists still believe that the MRF represents a fundamental threat to Bulgaria's unity and territorial integrity, a major precondition for an ethnic majority's toleration of ethnic minorities, namely that the majority must not feel politically or economically threatened, has been satisfied. The 1991 Constitution's non-recognition of any collective rights for ethnic and religious minorities in Bulgaria may also have made it easier for the nationalists to accept the prominent role played by the MRF in domestic politics.

By the time of the 1997 parliamentary elections, the previously semi-loyal, anti-Turkish elements in the nationalists' rhetoric and propaganda had been largely toned down, thereby contributing further to the widespread acceptance of the MRF. In that election, the MRF led a broad and diverse coalition of left-centrist, centrist and monarchist parties called the Union for National Salvation, which opposed both the UDF and the ruling Socialists and was openly supported by former Bulgarian King Simeon II.

Despite predictions that this time around it might fail to pass the 4% electoral barrier to representation, the MRF received a respectable 7.5% of the vote and 21 seats in the 17 June 2001 parliamentary elections. The National Movement Simeon II, a new political party formed by King Simeon just two months before the election, won a surprise landslide victory. The ideological compatibility between the two centrist movements paved the way to forming a coalition government led by the 64-year-old ex-monarch, in which the MRF is represented with its own ministers. The presence of the ethnic Turkish party in the new cabinet will no doubt be a factor beneficial for the future of interethnic relations in Bulgaria. The MRF's electoral support also proved decisive in the upset victory of Socialist Georgi Purvanov over incumbent President Petar Stoyanov (UDF) in the second round of the presidential elections between 11 and 18 November 2001.

The ethnicity conflict in Bulgaria has diminished to such an extent that minority questions no longer present a direct challenge to the new regime. Unlike the Kosovo Liberation Army, ethnic minority parties in Bulgaria have not used the country's ethnic and religious heterogeneity to make separatist demands, use violence or seek diplomatic and military assistance from abroad in order to achieve local independence. While it may complicate the democratisation process by creating political tensions and making the

political elite's consensual unification and structural integration harder to achieve, the Bulgarian brand of ethnopolitics has not become a threat to democracy.

Of course, a destabilising challenge arising on the basis of ethnic politics cannot be ruled out for the future. Even with the political integration of the Muslim Turkish minority, Bulgaria's ethnic and religious cleavages, exacerbated by an impoverished and chaotic economic environment, remain a potential obstacle to long-term democratic consolidation. But Bulgaria remains nevertheless an oasis of interethnic peace and tranquillity when compared to other ethnically plural societies in Central and Eastern Europe.

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PRACTITONERS' CORNER

The News Media and the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: Ready for the Next Steps?

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Today's ethnic conflicts confront the news media with unprecedented challenges. This is especially relevant given the increasing complexity of such conflicts. This study is, by necessity, a work in progress, yet it is also part of a larger, ongoing effort to more narrowly review and analyze the role of the news media in explaining ethnic conflict and conflict resolution, as well as the way media consumers interpret and make use of information about such questions. Its aim is not so much to make specific points, but rather to provoke an ongoing debate about the role of the news media in covering conflict and its impact on media consumers. More specifically, does the news media cover conflict in such a way that only serves to inadvertently undermine and destabilize the process of resolution? Or can it play a role that upholds its highest professed aims and principles, (as well as what is necessary for its economic survival), while simultaneously contributing to public education and, in the process, approaching conflict in such a way that does not undermine support for efforts at resolution or democratic institutions?

Media organizations have tremendous influence in shaping public opinion and the views of public officials. The media's portrayal of ethnic conflicts, as well as the steps in their resolution, thus has immense consequences for conditioning public attitudes and influencing policy responses. It is an odd relationship acknowledged by the media, policymakers, and media consumers alike. The media influences the public, which in turn acts in complex ways to influence public officials and policymakers. Furthermore, in what can be described as a kind of 'echo chamber effect', public officials use the media to promote their views and aims on given issues, thus often refracting back to the public the very views which may have had a role in influencing the policymakers in the first place. The media thus have a profound role in influencing and conditioning the determination of policy. But it is also a role which, in many ways, increasingly reinforces the original assumptions of the media consumers.[1]

Thus the initial coverage of events is crucial for setting the tone for what follows. But the depth and nuance necessary for substantive coverage of conflicts is in many ways antithetical to the methodology and requirements of the modern media. This is particularly true when addressing the delicate steps in a peace process. The media, particularly the broadcast media, require controversy, conflict, certainty and confrontation. Its stock in trade is the thumbnail exposé. Yet the elements most necessary to better understanding conflict, such as nuance, ambiguity and complexity, are filtered out, or avoided altogether. Efforts to provide context are often perceived as complicating matters, yet even well-intentioned efforts to lend context to conflicts, when offered at all, have (often inadvertently) reinforced stereotypes, favored the conventional wisdom, and led to historical oversimplification. In many cases the seemingly unresolvable 'ancient ethnic conflict' paradigm suits the requirements of the modern media, serving as a convenient and easily packageable concept which precludes more complex investigation and analysis. This underscores legitimate and far-reaching questions about whether the news media is equipped at all to respond to the ever-changing complexities of conflict resolution.

[1] Conversation with Ambassador Robert Frowick, 23 February 2001, conversation with Frank McCulloch, [formerly with the Los Angeles Times], 22 May 2001. See also Seib (2000).

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Yet the stakes are enormous. US news media coverage of ethnic conflict has, in many respects, undermined the building of popular support for a constructive American role in international assistance, in part due to the nature and specific emphasis of the news coverage Kull (2000 and 2001).[2] Misrepresentation of the sources of conflict, as well as the prospects for resolution, is part of a larger failure of effective assessment which can contribute to a faulty determination of policy. While reporters cannot be burdened with all of the blame for this state of affairs, the perils of misleading analysis are all too apparent. When analyzing international news media coverage of ethnic conflicts, and examining the responses of media consumers, one frequently hears similar descriptive catch-phrases and truisms (Public Forum 2001).[3] Yet the origins of such views are important to investigate, if only because their pervasiveness in American life and opinion often undermine efforts at resolution. These conflicts are often described as 'ancient ethnic conflicts' pitting 'neighbor against neighbor' which are rooted in, and conditioned by an abstract and seemingly unknowable 'history' (Public Forum 2001b, 2001d). While generally acknowledged as tragic, these events often persist because 'that's just the way those people are' (Public Forum 2001d, 2001h, Plate 1996, Greenfield, 1998). Such statements have tremendous consequences for shaping public opinion, as well as for influencing the views of public officials. They also speak to concerns about whether the news media can ever equip itself to make the transition to the next level of peace processes, or whether it will remain rooted in ideas and preconceptions about the nature of conflict which do not necessarily hold up under closer scrutiny.

Where do such views come from? Are these conflicts truly as rooted in history and as deterministic as such dicta would have one believe? Why do more complex causations so easily defy media interpretation? These questions are especially relevant today as we embark upon the post-imperial and post-Cold War era, and they have significance far beyond today's contemporary ethnic conflicts. For, if the news media is unable (or unwilling) to explain the causes of ethnic conflicts in ways that take into account their complexity, then the prospects for continued international support for conflict resolution will become increasingly problematic.

The challenges for the news media, and policymakers, are manifold. While the 1990s proved to be a primer on global geography, the first few decades of the new century may very well witness much more upheaval and dislocation. World atlases may have to be revised annually. One factor is that territorial boundaries often do not conform with ethnic boundaries. For instance, when the colonial empires collapsed in the years after the Second World War, many newly independent peoples found themselves with artificial borders determined by, in many cases, European colonial powers in faraway capitals. Various ethnic groups thus turned up in the same nation state, or were divided by arbitrary borders and placed in different states, or dispersed over various states. One of

[2] The United States, for example, is an active, if at times reluctant, participant in international efforts to provide aid and other indirect supports to many areas in conflict. The US can be (if sometimes grudgingly) a significant source of reconstruction aid and loans, as well as occasionally (if very reluctantly) supplying peacekeepers and peacekeeping assistance. If economic development, infrastructure building and community support are increasingly seen as significant factors in long-term conflict resolution, then the role of the United States and, perhaps crucially, the opinions and attitudes of the US population toward overseas assistance programs, will continue to be an important factor. Indeed, the US government will only be as generous as (and, in most cases, less than) it believes public opinion will allow it to be.

[3] These informal discussion forums – or focus groups – were conducted over a period of three months with the valuable assistance of the Santa Rosa Junior College's adults and seniors current events discussion program. The findings emerging from these forums do not profess to be scientific samples, but rather are part of an effort to engage 'heavy users' of news media in an ongoing dialogue about their reactions to the news coverage of foreign affairs and ethnic conflicts. These ten forums, or discussion groups, were conducted between March and May 2001 in the Northern California cities of Cloverdale, Santa Rosa and Healdsburg and included more than 500 participants, hundreds of whom also completed written surveys and questionnaires on the news media. The author would like to acknowledge and thank the participants and the Santa Rosa Junior College for their cooperation and assistance.

the central themes of the new century may very well be about rearranging this complex state of affairs Jalali and Lipset 1997: 77f., Cheetham and Hewitt 2000: xi-xv).[4]

These future conflicts, like the ones of the past decade, will have many colorations, ranging from low-intensity, non-violent struggles such as those between the Flemmings and Walloons in Belgium, the Francophone and Anglophone communities of Quebec, and the Czechs and Slovaks from the former Czechoslovakia. Other conflicts will feature low-intensity, yet violent, struggles, such as has been seen in Northern Ireland and the Basque provinces. And finally, the most frightening prospect, we may continue to see high-intensity violent conflicts such as occurred recently in Rwanda and Burundi, as well as in parts of the Balkans (Jalali and Lipset 1997: 77f.).[5]

The concept of self-determination has helped the United Nations grow from 26 signatory nations of the United Nations Declaration in December 1941, to 51 members of the original United Nations in 1945, to 156 nations in 1990, to 190 today. The United Nations has estimated that of those nations only twelve can be described as ethnically homogeneous, and in more than sixty states the population is divided among more than five significant groups. And within those 190 states there are perhaps as many as 80 active ethnic conflicts and 2,000 discernible national identities (Jalali and Lipset 1997: 77f.). Many of the new states have emerged out of the ashes of collapsed communist states. Even in seemingly stable states like Britain or Canada, nationalist groups – Scottish, Welsh, Francophone – may pursue UN status of their own (Schmemann 1999).[6]

How will the international news media adjust to these ever-changing circumstances and challenges? Critical analyses of the media's handling of foreign news is nothing new (see for example Knightly 1975). Yet a vital, if often ignored question, is: how will the news media respond to the new challenges of ethnic conflict in the 21st century.[7] Judging by the precedents of the 1990s, the prospects are not encouraging. And yet, the media's portrayal of these conflicts will have huge consequences for shaping public attitudes, and thus conditioning how the world community responds, if at all (Public Forum 2001d, 2001g).

Media consumers in the US have expressed uncertainty about the ability of the news media to address these challenges. They express fear that the media, and particularly the broadcast media, is essentially provincial, and will only provide them with news and information about a given conflict that has the potential to involve the United States (Public Forum 2001a). Many consumers have grave misgivings that the news agenda is heavily shaped by the corporate dictates of the media conglomerates (Public Forum 2001e). Yet they also recognize that they have scant options for news and information about the world (Public Forum 2001i, Grayling 2001).

When the news media do focus on world conflicts, it frequently emphasises one particular causation at the expense of other possible explanations. Media concentration on 'ethnic identity' and 'history' with its stress on inevitability and determinism, can

[4] Many of these conflicts may share some common causations, such as the unsettled residual and lingering consequences of the end of empires (see Barkey and von Hagen 1997, Grayling 2001, Mandelbaum 1999).
[5] Yet, if globalism and the demise of a bipolar world have been contributing factors behind the multiplication of nation-states, the eruption of violence is still difficult to explain. With or without violence, nation-states have proliferated at a staggering rate, and the prospects for further dissension are immense.
[6] The sociological forces behind these conflicts are nothing new. Postwar Africa, for example, has been troubled by conflicts since the colonial powers gave the continent its arbitrary borders, whereas many of the crises in the provinces of the former Soviet Union may be not so much the consequences of any new nationalism than legacies of Soviet nationality policies designed to divide and rule.
[7] For an excellent analysis of the many new and complex questions the media will be confronted with, see Seaton (1999).

often overlook the critical political and economic factors that contribute to violence. Such approaches can contribute to popular misconceptions of wars being fought solely for 'historical' and 'ethnic' reasons which are beyond the comprehension of everyday media users (Responses 2001).[8] Increasingly, historical context is offered, if at all, as a 'final verdict.' In many cases, historical analogies and precedents are used, not to lend context or substance to a particular conflict, but to support an all-encompassing theory to explain a specific conflict (Rudolph 1993).

There are numerous explanations for why national groups might themselves seek to mythologize their histories. After all, as the French philosopher Ernest Renan once noted, getting history wrong is an essential factor in the formation of a nation (Hobsbawm 1997: 270, Alterman 1999, Hobsbawm 1997). While that may partly explain the often inaccurate or heavily mythologized versions of group histories, it does little to explain why the external independent news media, particularly the broadcast news media, should so readily embrace and repeat such highly partisan interpretations of the origins of conflict, and why so many media consumers seem so susceptible to such interpretations (Public Forum 2001f, Anderson 1991).

A common wisdom that has emerged is that the lifting of the cold war system has released ancient ethnic ambitions and hatreds, potentially leading to a world far more complex and dangerous than the familiar bipolar East and West. Certainly for the news media, the Cold War struggle was in many ways a much easier contest to cover, with the seeming simplicity of the Moscow-Washington dichotomy. In contrast, today's ethnic conflicts are seen as presenting the news media with myriad problems. In many respects, the depth and nuance necessary for substantive coverage of ethnic and religious conflict are perceived as antithetical to the methodology of the modern media, with its emphasis on celebrity culture, entertainment, market shares, ratings, and the financial bottom line. Thus, the news media's half-hearted efforts to lend context to ethnic politics have often reinforced stereotypes and led to oversimplification.

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Many media consumers have made much use of the multiplicity and wide variety of broadcast and print options now available, yet the feeling persists that 'more' options does not necessarily equate with 'better' or better quality coverage (Public Forum 2001a, 2001g). The coverage of the Balkan wars of the 1990s, for example, may have underscored this point. What is remarkable about the coverage of this crisis is that it was covered not by a few networks or foreign 'beat reporters' but by numerous news organizations and scores of broadcast outlets. Yet this proliferation of the quantity of news services and intensified competition did not necessarily improve the quality of the coverage. Recall for a moment the way the news media resorted to the 'ancient ethnic conflict' explanation for the crises, which was often emphasized merely because many Balkan nationalist leaders sought to use it as a justification for their actions (Bonner 1995, Morrow 1993, Preston 1996). Unwittingly or not, the international news media lent legitimacy to such claims. Much of this was due to sloppy journalism, but in many ways it occurred because the 'ancient ethnic conflict' paradigm fit neatly with the demands of the modern news media. 'The Battle of Kosovo', wrote Time Magazine's Lance Morrow, 'when the Turks, advancing west toward Vienna in 1389, defeated the Serbs and left their bodies to the crows—might have been the day before yesterday.' (Morrow 1999,

[8] Yet many media users respond that they would like more historical context to the coverage of ethnic conflicts, and, in fact, the former publisher of the Washington Post, the late Philip Graham, once described journalism as the first rough draft of history. Yet many journalists today, and most particularly the consumers of media, have allowed the media's interpretations of such matters to reign supreme, often without qualification, context or further explanation. As one respondent to our media survey put it, media consumers frequently take the news media, and printed word in particular, 'as absolute fact.'

Preston 1996) Such comments served as a convenient and easily packaged rubric precluding further investigation(Horowitz 1985).

Media consumers' willingness to embrace the 'ancient ethnic hatreds' account speaks to another question involving the media's interpretation of history: the matter of 'historical myth' and its relationship to the origins of conflict. Indeed, separating historical facts from myths is never an easy task, particularly in areas of heated dispute. Many consumers came away from the coverage of the Balkan wars, for example, with deeply held beliefs about the 'inevitability' of turmoil in the region and the intimate relationship between 'history' and contemporary events. For example, discussions about the historic relationships between various ethnic groups often conclude on the pessimistic note that these contemporary struggles have been going on for a many centuries, leaving the lasting impression that some peoples have been struggling against one another throughout all of history. 'Is it better to remember or to forget?' wrote Time Magazine's Lance Morrow in the midst of the Balkan conflict. 'Forgetting – even without its sainted better half, forgiveness – is sometimes the only route to sanity. If only the Balkans, for example, could be enfogged by a massive forgetting. As it is, every generation of Serbs remembers, as if it were last Saturday, their defeat by the Turks at the Battle of Kosovo in the year 1389. The result has been centuries of self-renewing reciprocal atrocity between Serbs and Muslims. Massacre is the Balkan national flower.' (Morrow 1997) Thus the news media often desires an explanation which fits neatly into their preconceived notion of 'ancient ethnic hatreds.' (Finn 1999)

Matters such as these may seem like abstract points from the vantage point of foreign news bureaus, but they are matters of huge importance to the future of areas of conflict. Such questions have often reinforced the assumption that the only way out of many conflicts is ethnic partition or the creation of a mono-ethnic state, and that ethnic diversity is simply incompatible with a nation state. It may indeed be useful to point out that, even if the Balkans may ultimately have to be partitioned, it may happen not necessarily (as much of the US broadcast media has alleged) because of 'ancient ethnic conflicts' or a 'lethal history' but rather because of the very real abuses that have occurred due to the contemporary conflict in the region. The cycle of violence in the Balkans in the past decade has created a logic of its own, where ethnic cleansers committed acts of terror not necessarily due to ancient grievances, but often in response to the very acts of violence that have occurred in recent history.

The great debate of the 1990s over what US policy in the Balkans should be was significantly influenced by such media interpretations of the 'historic roots' of conflict and thus the US's inability to respond. The news media made much of the fact that US Secretary of State James A. Baker (1989-92) implied that grand historical forces were at work in the Balkans and remarked that the United States thus 'did not have a dog in the fight', unwittingly echoing Bismarck's nineteenth century comment that the whole of the Balkans was 'not worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier.' Lawrence Eagleburger, a former Ambassador to Yugoslavia, added that there was little or nothing outsiders could do to alter the course of Balkan 'history.' 'I have said this 38,000 times, and I have to say this to the people of this country as well', Eagleburger said. 'This tragedy is not something that can be settled from outside and it's damn well time that everybody understood that. Until the Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats decide to stop killing each other, there is nothing the outside world can do about it.' (See also Holbrooke 1999 and Zimmerman 1999) Since the news media, particularly the media organs based in Washington and most susceptible to the 'echo chamber effect', are so dependent upon 'official comment' and establishment confirmation, comments such as Baker's and Eagleburger's carried immense weight, and were not easily or lightly challenged.

The news media, and particularly the broadcast news media, immediately joined this theme. Baker's and Eagleburger's statements were also significant because they helped set the tone for the next stage of coverage. The broadcast media, in particular, was working at a disadvantage, for it is the broadcast media which relies so heavily upon the accepted wisdom of official Washington. It is the broadcast media which is much less likely than the print and non-broadcast electronic media to go beyond official circles or the 'usual suspects' of television punditry to explain the complexities of foreign ethnic conflicts (Allcock 1998, Ellis 2001). Strangely enough, the national news media, after exhausting the sources of official Washington and central casting from the pundit class, next began to manufacture hundreds of stories about the 'historic roots' of the conflict in the Balkans (Ajami 1999, Leff 1995).

Many reporters unintentionally contributed to the seemingly irrational and inchoate nature of the conflict. The work of freelance journalist Robert Kaplan, for example, has now been much examined.[9] Kaplan's contribution might have remained nothing more than a curious footnote to a broader story if only President Clinton hadn't discovered his work and recommended it to others, (what the New York Times termed 'the dangers of letting a President read.' [Kaufman 1999])[10] Much of the rest of the news media was not far behind Kaplan. 'Official' Washington soon began to frequently repeat the line that what plagued the Balkans was not the opportunism of contemporary political leaders or deeper economic, social or political problems, but rather the consequences of a 'lethal history' which had produced a genocidal mind set among entire peoples for successive generations ('Balkan Ghosts' 1999, Sadkovich 1998).

Headlines such as 'For 600 Years, Violent Nationalisms Have Bloodied the Balkans', 'The Balkans' Heritage of Hatred', and 'This Will Never Be Over', 'Ancient Fears and Hatreds Pervade the Countryside', continued to appear with increasing frequency in the mainstream news media well into the late 1990s (Morrow 1999, Ajami 1999, Hesser 2000). Strangely enough, this occurred at the very time that a number of other observers of the Balkan conflict began to pursue a very different track. What they found was not necessarily centuries of ethnic hatred as portrayed in the media, but rather a more complex story of coexistence, punctuated by occasional crises and violence.[11] Noel Malcolm (1998), for example, sought to resurrect a deeper history of the region, one that eschewed simple explanations for what happened such as 'ancient ethnic conflicts' pitting 'neighbour against neighbour' which are rooted in, and conditioned by, an inchoate and ungraspable historical past. Malcolm, among others, argued that the 'ancient ethnic hatreds' thesis was grossly misleading. For one, it failed to underscore the degree of historical coexistence and even cooperation among the peoples of the Balkans. It also tended to over-emphasise elites and the struggle among them, rather than looking at the history of the region from the bottom up.[12] One would come away, Malcolm warned, from the 'ancient hatreds' argument with a vague but convenient sense that the history of the Balkans is too complicated (or even trivial) for outsiders to

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[9] Eschewing detailed historical research, Kaplan relied upon his own immediate observations, his interviews with contemporary ethnic politicians, and his intense reading of the works of an earlier renowned travel writer, Rebecca West. In fact, Kaplan was so enamoured of West's observations that he merely repeated many of them, along with their ethnic generalizations and simplistic version of ethnic history which she so successfully wove in the 1930s and 1940s. Kaplan also embraced West's detestation of the Ottoman Empire and he too was ready to blame the regions many and complex problems on the Sultans in Istanbul, despite the fact that the Ottoman Empire had ceased to exist in 1919, and that much of the violent turmoil in the Balkans occurred during the Second World War, and, after 1987 (see Schmemann 1999 and Goltz 2001).

[10] Clinton later acknowledged that he had 'misread Balkan history.' (Seelye 1999)

[11] Christopher Bennett with his Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse and Karen Barkey, for example, sought to look anew at the history of the peoples of the region.

[12] Malcolm and others such as Serif Mardin and Dennison Rusinow also revised the history of the Ottoman Empire in the region, emphasizing the allowance of local autonomy, among other factors (see Richardson 2000, Mardin 1997, Rusinow 1996).

master. Other observers began to fear that the news media's excessive use of historical arguments merely served the ambitions of opportunistic contemporary leaders in the region, who were only too happy to point to the 'ancient ethnic hatreds' thesis to underscore the alleged deterministic nature of the crisis and to excuse their more aberrant behavior (Dobbs 1999, Fisher 2000, Deak 1998).

Many media consumers, particularly the heaviest users, were indeed often hungry for further context that would help establish the proper sense of 'background and motivation' of the conflict. Yet frustration persists that the media's less than perfect efforts to provide historical context often only further complicated matters (Rubin 1999, Wilkinson 1999). When violence in Kosovo began to grab world attention, the media had already been reporting warnings that NATO might need to occupy the Balkans for years to come. It thus seemed to many that a durable peace anywhere in the Balkans was an unattainable goal. The conflicts by and large stemmed from ancient hatreds, many in the media asserted, and while such tensions might be buried for years or decades, they would ultimately surface. Such coverage further demonstrated that while it is certainly dangerous to underestimate the weight of history, it can be just as problematic to overestimate it. Certainly socio-ethnic tensions in the Balkans, as elsewhere, have produced cycles of killing and revenge, thus providing the political context for more conflict, but such crises also require other contributory factors which, by necessity, must be very much of the present.

These matters soon found their way into the American political class, where elected officials, no doubt obtaining much of their information from the news media, began to repeat the same sorts of themes. Perhaps one of the more remarkable examples occurred during the 1999 debate over whether NATO should mount a ground operation in Kosovo (Boustany 1999, 'Orthodox Church' 1999). The news media not only helped to manufacture historical 'precedents' which were repeated in Congress, but then echoed those Congressional misstatements as if they were revealed truths ('Balkan Ghosts' 1999, Goltz 2001, Sadkovich 1998, 'Ethnic Hatreds' 1999, Fearon 1999). This occurred several times during the debate over what did or did not actually happen in the Balkans during the Second World War, a dispute hotly followed in the news media because of its alleged consequences for the seemingly imminent ground invasion of NATO forces in Kosovo.[13]

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The coverage of the Balkan crisis was not necessarily uniquely bad. For example, US news media coverage of the conflict in other areas, such as Northern Ireland, demonstrated similar problems. Broadcast and print agencies had produced relatively little coverage of the Northern Ireland problem prior to the growing US involvement there after 1993. Thus, the opportunity emerged for shaping the views of the public because so few had preconceived ideas about the conflict, which had often been for the most part covered for the international press by London-based media bureaus or stringers. This, coupled with the constraints of space, time, and the presumed lack of interest on the part of the American public, naturally precluded much coverage of the

[13] Members of Congress repeated manufactured media mythologies on the House and Senate floor, such as that a small handful of wartime Yugoslav partisans brought the might of the German army to a standstill in the western Balkans, or that the Germans kept almost one million troops in Yugoslavia to keep down a courageously resisting population, (when in reality the struggle for Yugoslavia was completed in only twelve days with only 151 German casualties). One Senator told a national television audience that the Yugoslav resistance kept 21 German divisions tied up in the Balkans (the Germans never had more than four divisions there). These strangely incoherent arguments had a huge impact on driving public opinions about what might happen in the Balkans during that time. Only a handful of publications sought to challenge the accuracy of such statements about the Balkans during World War II (see Ellis 2001, Whitney 1999, Yevtushenko 1999).

day-to-day questions of the ongoing peace process. Nor was there much substantive coverage of the more complicated issues at stake in the years that followed. Stories about violence continued to garner most of the attention. There thus continued to be frequent stories about bombings and killings, but little about the day-to-day progress of peace negotiations, of the nuance of the societal roots of the conflict, the contemporary political and cultural environment, or the intricacies of various peace initiatives.[14]

Many American media outlets emphasized Ireland's alleged 'tragic history' without going into any detail about what that history actually contained (Candaele 1999).[15] Much of the news media, when focusing on Northern Ireland at all, frequently sought to interpret almost any tragedy that occurred in Northern Ireland in the context of 'ancient ethnic hatreds.' (Hillenbrand 1998, Taylor 1998, Candaele 1999)[16] The Irish novelist Dermot Bolger has lamented that 'we must go back three centuries to explain any fight outside a chip shop.' (Walker 1996: 58f., Brown 2000) This approach to conflict, most prevalent among the columnists and opinion makers, continued for years after the initial breakthroughs in the peace process. 'Among the Irish, a bardic genius for remembering', wrote Time Magazine's foreign affairs columnist Lance Morrow, 'the grievances singing in the genes, has kept the kettle of sectarian vengeance boiling since the Battle of the Boyne in 1690.' (Morrow 1997)[17] Such attention to the 'historic roots' of conflict may, in some cases, be doing a disservice to media consumers by relentlessly emphasizing the past at the expense of very real contemporary factors. This approach leaves one with the impression that such conflicts are unresolvable, thus to many observers 'ancient ethnic hatreds' has been the paradigm easiest to accept; a position that often conditions official policy determinations, reinforcing a sense of 'time collapse' where observers of, and participants in, a given conflict make references to an often heavily mythologized past as if it occurred very recently (O'Brien 1995, Fisher 2000). Many conflicts may stem in some part from old divisions, but it often takes a political elite, seeking to maintain power for themselves, to exploit such grievances into something larger (Grayling 2001, Fisher 2000).

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The antagonists are often very real, but they are not always necessarily 'historic' or 'ancient'—and may not be so very different from those in conflicts elsewhere. More nuanced coverage of contemporary developments, such as economic change, modernization, social upheaval, class mobility, and religious identity, would no doubt aid in creating a fuller understanding of a given conflict. Even some contextual discussion of these conflicts in a framework of imperialism and decolonization might be instructive (Orme 2000).[18] Yet due to the pressure to 'be first' and an unrelenting emphasis on the

[14] American broadcast coverage of events in Northern Ireland often followed the dictum of local television 'if it bleeds it leads' (see, for example, 'Two killed in shooting at Catholic-owned bar in Northern Ireland', CNN.com, 3 March 1998, 'Blair Condemns Northern Ireland Arson Deaths', CNN.com, 12 July 1998, Miller 1998, 1999, Tuohy 1996). On the broadcast news the names of several of the participants in the process were mispronounced, their parties misidentified (Hamilton 1996, O'Toole 1998).

[15] Back in Washington, the whole affair provoked bafflement on the part of the Washington-based pundits, or was ultimately often seen as an exercise in futility.

[16] The tenor of the coverage changed little even when events lent themselves to more substantive coverage. The broadcast media coverage of the historic Good Friday Agreement of 1998, for example, demonstrated the perils of journalism by celebrity correspondent. Several US broadcast networks sent well-known broadcast correspondents to Northern Ireland who subsequently demonstrated little familiarity with the political terrain.

[17] Yet other journalists sought to lend context to the problem without resorting to such deterministic rhetoric (see, for example, Brown 2000a, 2000b, Candaele 1999, Hamilton 1996, O'Toole 1998, Pogatchnik 1999, Cowell 2000). Much of the American news media also failed to note that violence was also occurring within the respective communities, not solely between them.

[18] Furthermore, acute economic distress is a significant, if often misunderstood, factor in many ethnic conflicts, and resolution approaches which emphasize the necessity for economic development are often seen by media professionals as highly complex questions which will only complicate a story and confuse media consumers. Yet

'bottom line' in journalism economics, as well as time and spatial constraints, the media often simply reject many of the very factors that might be addressed to produce better, more nuanced, coverage of foreign ethnic conflicts. Instead of increased coverage of subtle and complex trends and processes (which, granted, are not only difficult to discern but challenging to explain) we have the ubiquitous and oft-sensationalized 'human interest story.' Such reportage only further serves to fuel an inchoate atmosphere of 'something must be done', yet at the same time undermines and obscures the understanding and subtlety necessary to make better sense of a given conflict. The media often fetishises the symbolic, thus making symbols, either human or material, more important than they might otherwise be. This is partly due to the growing ascendancy of the broadcast media at the expense of print journalism. The broadcast media works under profoundly different pressures than print journalism. Broadcast news divisions have smaller 'news holes' than newspapers and magazines and thus have less flexibility in going into much detail about a given subject and taking the time to explain various sides and perspectives, and the broadcast media's obsessive dependency on pictorial images make it more beholden to superficial symbolism and the sensational. The economic pressures of broadcast journalism force newsgathering institutions to compete for valuable time and advertising with the entertainment portion of the media, thus placing pressures on the news media to be entertaining at the expense of informative. Beyond that, the broadcast media is increasingly relying upon paid commentators, often former journalists or former government officials, in many cases operatives from political parties or corporate-sponsored think tanks, to give immediate and certain answers to profound questions that have confounded specialists for decades. These instant analysts, or pundits, seek to explain a specific crisis or conflict with short, entertaining answers, which often only serve to impart a sense of helplessness and confusion on the part of the media consumer.

One further problem common to this kind of broadbush approach to ethnic conflicts is that it commonly leaves the impression that many of these problems are deterministic or foreordained, thus inadvertently aiding the handiwork of the ethnic cleansers and sectarian ethnic politicians who are seeking exoneration and legitimacy for their actions (Cohen 1998).[19] Many media consumers, even the most savvy 'heavy users' of the media, often demonstrate difficulty delineating between the strictly 'news' portion of the media from the 'opinion' portion, which is occupying an increasingly greater share of air time. Analysts of the news media can only ignore this steady transformation at their peril. Pundits and commentators are increasingly prominent in discussions about world affairs. In many cases, the media consumer receives 'primary' information about a specific conflict from talk shows or broadcast opinion commentators.[20]

This may also contribute to a kind of 'breathless' broadcast coverage of peace processes, which, for example, often overemphasizes the nature of ephemeral consensus and

while some media consumers say they would appreciate more coverage of the economic subtext to conflict, the economic question remains relatively low on media consumers' lists of priorities.

[19] Many media observers have concluded that for lasting peace in areas of conflict, the world must have the ability to spot and prevent those conditions before violence begins. With the news media merely reacting to event after event, media users lament that they have little idea where future conflicts may arise. Consumers also lament that more routine day-to-day coverage of news and events around the world is rarely pursued, as opposed to news coverage which merely reacts to crises. For example, if the news media are drawn to ethnic brush fires, there is the less dramatic fact that many regions where ethnic violence was thought probable have handled their transitions, so far, with some success.

[20] See references to the rise of the pundit class in James Fallows (1996). The broadcast media, and particularly vehicles with more programming time such as the US cable news networks and the Public Broadcasting System, are also increasingly relying upon manufacturers of popular history to explain complex, multi-layered controversies which have occurred far beyond their areas of expertise. Whatever other merits these instant analysts may possess, their pontifications on the recent elections, say, in the former Yugoslavia, are usually completely irrelevant and often erroneous to what is actually happening there.

heavily play up the 'peace' angle while simultaneously downplaying the equally important point that a 'process' implies an ongoing commitment to peace and reconciliation. The media often seek to satisfy an impatient human need for 'closure' in a given conflict, whether or not a clear and final resolution is within sight. Furthermore, the proliferation of conflicts makes it more difficult for users to follow world affairs. Many consumers possess less essential knowledge about today's conflicts than they did about the seemingly 'simpler' foreign policy issues during the Cold War era, and are thus more dependent than ever on the news media for information and interpretation about complex foreign crises (Forum 2001b).

Yet the media itself is undergoing a profound transformation, at the very time that it is still seeking to address the new challenges thrown up by globalization and the Cold War. Media mergers and corporate ownership increasingly dictate the substance of coverage, with alarming consequences for those urging a more considered approach to foreign affairs.[21] Modern conflicts are increasingly complex and often difficult for reporters to immediately grasp and convey to their audiences. Well-intentioned reporters have often lamented the lack of resources and time for further study and investigation for issues such as those raised herein. Private, business-oriented philanthropies have created foundations which are seeking to improve the coverage of business issues and economics, while journalism schools and fellowships are emphasizing issues such as ethics. While these are all worthy causes, certainly deserving of the funds allocated, stepped up efforts might perhaps be made to include working reporters in forums such as this.

Yet many media consumers in search of more substantive coverage are also increasingly making use of the Internet as a means to obtain the news and information they desire. Consumers often lament that the corporatisation of the news business has produce a 'sameness' to much of the media and has also led to the disappearance of easily obtainable 'alternative' publications (Grayling 2001, Public Forum 2001c). The Internet may help revive what was once a thriving media culture of alternative voices, now somewhat drowned out by the corporatisation and homogenization of media.[22]

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[21] For sources on the increasing corporatisation of the news media see Bagdikian (2000), Barnouw (1998) McChesney (2000).
[22] Can the Internet Provide an Alternative? It has thus far provided a means for media consumers to eliminate the barriers of time and space between them and the kind of news they may desire. Many consumers have increasing expressed a desire to have more choices, and not be limited to local 'hard copy' media sources. Granted, not every media consumer is going to go looking for more substantive coverage of world events, and a preliminary survey of the question seems to demonstrate that media consumers will behave on the net much the same way they previously behaved prior to their use of the Internet.

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REVIEW ESSAY

The Politics of Language and Ethnicity

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Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language
Stephen May
Longman – 2001
Pbk: ISBN: 0582-40455-X £19.99
pp. 400, (including: index & bibliography)

The Politics of Language: Conflict, Identity and Cultural Pluralism in Comparative Perspective
Carol L. Schmid
Oxford University Press – 2001
Hbk: ISBN 0-19-513775-2 £50.00
Pbk: ISBN 0-19-513776-0 £15.99
pp. 228, (including: index, bibliography, tables and graphs)

The politics of language and ethnicity has become the focus of an increasing amount of research in recent years, and rightly so (O'Reilly 2001a, 2001b). With an ever-decreasing amount of linguistic diversity as languages die out all over the world, the dominance of a small number of state languages has meant that regional, minority, indigenous and lesser-used languages have had to strive for a place. Struggles for civil and human rights are very often tied to issues of language, as are the ongoing debates over nationalism and national identity that seem to characterise the post-modern western world. Indeed conflict over language has become a part of or a proxy for all kinds of political struggle, from the recent violence in Macedonia, to the nationalist revival of the Irish language in Northern Ireland, to the issue of immigration in the United States. Wherever it is not possible or politically correct to debate openly in terms of 'race' or ethnicity, language is used as a sort of shorthand for cultural and identity politics (O'Reilly 1999).

The politics of language is the subject of two recent publications by Stephen May and Carol L. Schmid. Both are primarily concerned with the rights of minority language speakers, though their regional focus is somewhat different. Schmid's primary focus is the United States with comparative chapters on Canada and Switzerland, while May is primarily concerned with the issue of minority rights in a European context with comparative chapters on North America and Aotearoa/New Zealand. There is much to recommend in both books, which cover different but complementary areas with some geographical and topical overlap. While Schmid takes a rather more statistical and legal-historical approach, May pays greater attention to the wider philosophical justifications for minority language rights. Both come across as sympathetic to the rights of minority language speakers, although May is rather more passionate in tone.

Stephen May has written extensively on multiculturalism and multicultural education (see for example 1994, 1999a, 1999b). *Language and Minority Rights* is an erudite work, pulling together themes and threads of debate from a variety of disciplines that all too often fail to absorb each other's work even though they deal with the same issues. In the introduction he provides context with a discussion of minority language loss and the prospects for the survival of global language diversity. May does not say anything particularly new here, but he presents the basics in the same clear and articulate fashion that characterises the entire book, making it very suitable for use as a textbook in undergraduate courses. May also introduces the key arguments that he develops in later

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chapters. Essentially he argues that minority language rights 'are both sociologically and politically defensible in the modern world', and that we need 'to radically rethink, or *reimagine*, the traditional organisation of nation-states' because it is this 'more than anything else, which most threatens the ongoing survival of minority languages' (May 2001: 15-16).

May also argues, perhaps more controversially, that a greater accommodation of minority languages and cultures within the nation-state will require 'an acceptance of the legitimacy of some form of group-based rights in modern liberal democracies' (May 2001: 17). He qualifies this, however, by saying that it must be done in conjunction with a recognition of the rights of minority language speakers as individual citizens. He suggests that the accommodation of minority language rights is not simply a matter of increasing democracy; it is essential if we wish to avoid the potential fragmentation of the nation-state, which we have seen occur with such dreadful consequences over the last few years. A common assumption of opponents of minority rights is that such recognition will lead to increasing fragmentation, disunity, and ultimately conflict – arguments that are rejected both by May and Schmid. Indeed, May argues that 'ethnic and national conflicts are most often precipitated when nation-states *ignore* demands for greater cultural and linguistic democracy' (2001: 17).

In Chapter 1 May discusses 'the denunciation of ethnicity' both in academic and political circles, and the implications of this for ethnic minority groups and the languages they speak. In popular commentary, ethnicity is seen as a cause of conflicts such as those in Northern Ireland, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda/Burundi and Sri Lanka. He attributes the pejorative perception of ethnicity held by many to the unfavourable juxtaposition of ethnicity, primitivism and particularism on the one hand, and the nation-state, modernity and universalism on the other. This is followed by a detailed exploration of the polarisation of the debate on ethnicity into 'primordial' and 'situational' approaches. May concludes, and I would concur, that such a dichotomy is ultimately unhelpful. Instead he proposes that ethnicity be viewed as both constructed and contingent, *and* as a significant social, political and cultural form of life (by which he means material ways of being in the modern world). He accomplishes this by adapting Bourdieu's concept of habitus from class to ethnicity and applying it as a way of thinking and asking questions, and using Smith's concept of 'ethnies' for the particularities of how ethnicity is enacted.

May makes a similar argument in Chapter 2, where he examines debates over modernist versus primordialist approaches to nationalism that in many ways closely parallel those on ethnicity. Once again, he suggests that a middle position is the best way forward. While broadly in agreement with a modernist approach to understanding nationalism, May argues that we need to take into account both the legal-political dimensions and the cultural-historical in order to avoid conflating the nation with the state, and consequently failing to acknowledge that the civic culture of the nation-state is in fact that of the dominant ethnic group. This is a problem also highlighted by Schmid in her analysis of language politics in the US, where the 'white Anglo-Saxon Protestant' dominant culture assumes a neutral position as a unifying civic culture while all other cultures are seen as 'ethnic' and therefore divisive.

Chapter 3 is devoted to a discussion of current political theory in relation to the claims of minorities for greater representation within nation-states, in particular the prominent debates on individual versus group-differentiated rights. He combines the theories of Will Kymlicka and Iris Marion Young to 'marry a theory of rights to the complexities of political practice' (May 2001: 125-6). In Chapter 4, May returns to the issue of language loss and language shift, focusing on the cultural and political aspects of the relationship between language and identity. He uses two case studies, the decline of the Irish

language and its replacement with English and the rise to dominance of French, to illustrate the centrality of power relations in the construction of national languages. As May points out, language death seldom occurs in communities of wealth and privilege. In Chapter 5 the focus is on education, both its role in helping to create a unified nation-state and its inability to reverse or even halt language shift without sufficient support in other sectors of society, both private and public.

The remainder of the book is dedicated to detailed case examples. In Chapter 6, May discusses the current hegemony of English as a world language. He then compares and contrasts two very different responses to this in the United States and Canada. In the US, the rise of the English-Only movement is characterised as a substitute for racial politics and anti-immigration sentiment, a view that is shared by Schmid whose book is dedicated to a detailed examination of this debate. The movement to protect and promote French in Québec, and to a lesser extent the rest of Canada, provides an interesting contrast. May concludes that laws promoting French in Québec are not illiberal because although they are restrictive in some senses, cultural and linguistic pluralism are actively fostered. In the US, on the other hand, English only laws are based on a number of misconceptions about language and immigration throughout the history of the US, and constitute an attempt to not only marginalise, but actively penalise, minority language speakers.

In Chapter 7 May extends the discussion to include ethnolinguistic democracy in Europe using Wales and Catalonia as primary examples. He outlines the achievements in the promotion and protection of both languages, but also points out how both examples demonstrate the ongoing contested nature of minority language policy development in modern nation-states. Chapter 8 explores similar issues, but in relation to the claims of indigenous people for greater cultural and linguistic rights, recognition and self-determination. May focuses first on national and international law with respect to the rights of indigenous minorities, and then turns to the case of the Maori and the nascent reformulation of Aotearoa/New Zealand as a bicultural and bilingual nation-state.

In the final chapter May reiterates his main conclusion, that the disavowal of cultural, linguistic and political expression of minority ethnicities is the cause of many problems in the modern world. In saying this he is careful to avoid the reification of ethnic groups, emphasising that all forms of identity are 'permeable, fluid and subject to change' (May 2001: 308). While there is indeed nothing inherent about ethnic identities, they are no less meaningful for it and we ignore their ongoing influence at our peril. May is also keen to remind us that if minority ethnic identities are constructed, so are majority (national) identities. Minority language rights are essential to the maintenance and extension of democracy, and while most aspects of minority language protection can take place under the aegis of individual rights, some recognition of group rights is necessary in some cases (particularly for indigenous groups and national minorities).

Schmid's work on *The Politics of Language* in North America follows her previous work on multilingual Switzerland (Schmid 1981). 'The contention of this study', she writes, 'is that bilingual education and the usage of non-English languages in the public realm has become a substitute for tensions over demographic and cultural change, increased immigration from third world countries, new linguistic based entitlements, and changing attitudes toward racial and ethnic assimilation' (Schmid 2001: 4). The rate of immigration increased nearly twice as fast in the 1980s as in the 1970s, fuelling the perception that newcomers no longer learn English. A significant proportion of these new immigrants are Spanish speaking, concentrated in the states of California, New York and Florida where the debates over English-only legislation have been most fierce.

The rapid rise of organisations such as US English and English First since the 1980s has taken many by surprise, as has the level of hostility towards language minorities. A key question addressed by Schmid is why laws declaring English as the official language have suddenly appeared on both the state and federal levels after the United States has gone for approximately 200 years without any formal declaration of an official language. This can be answered in part with reference to the importance of an 'imagined' linguistic homogeneity in the development of American nationalism and national identity, in spite of the fact that the US has never been linguistically homogeneous at any point in its history. Schmid asserts that 'In the American context, controversy over Official English and bilingualism is about competing models of Americanism' (2001: 10).

Schmid poses a number of questions about language diversity and language conflict in her introduction. It is worth outlining these here, since Schmid's method is to address each of them systematically in subsequent chapters.

- What are the roots of language policy and conflict in the United States? Were they present prior to the nation's founding, or are they of more recent origin?
- Is the push toward 'English-Only' a new movement, or is it merely ethnic intolerance clothed in a new form? How is it similar or different from the Americanization movement that came before it?
- To what extent is there a right to work or to be educated in languages other than English? Is the United States becoming a 'tower of Babel' with the right to be able to work and be educated in tongues other than English?
- To what extent do attitudes differ between Hispanics and Anglos on language issues and core values? Is the situation in the United States comparable to that in Canada, a bilingual confederation confronted with separation because of ethnic and linguistic tensions?
- How can we explain recent cases of language conflict in Puerto Rico and California? Is language becoming the new dividing line in American society? (Schmid 2001: 11)

In Chapter 2, Schmid outlines the historical background to the current battles over English and bilingualism in the US. She charts developments relating to minority languages, and highlights differences in attitudes towards white and non-white non-English speakers (for example Dutch and German, which were significant minority languages in the period up to World War I, as opposed to Native Americans and Mexicans). In the early years of the Republic language was considered an individual matter for white immigrants so long as they did not threaten the dominant elite. Conquered ethnic groups were never allowed the freedom to maintain their languages (Schmid 2001: 30-1). Schmid concludes that with few exceptions, languages other than English have been merely tolerated rather than embraced.

In Chapter 3 Schmid compares the nativist and Americanisation movements of the first part of the 20th century with the more recent wave of English-only sentiment. She concludes that the US has followed cyclical patterns of welcoming and rejecting language minorities and immigrants, the more accepting periods generally coinciding with good economic times and gaps in the labour market. Significantly the latest wave of rejection has been aimed primarily at Spanish speakers, and there are strong connections between the organisation US English and the anti-immigration group F.A.I.R. (Federation for American Immigration Reform) (2001: 44-5).

Chapter 4 is dedicated to the legal status of languages other than English. In the second half of the 20th century, non-English speaking immigrants do have more legal protections than in earlier decades. However language itself is not protected under the equal

protection clause of the Constitution, unless closely linked to discrimination based on national origin, which is protected (Schmid 2001: 58-61). Following a detailed review of the laws and court cases relating to the English-only movement, Schmid admits that rather than promote national unity – the stated aim of the English-only movement – they have done nothing but promote prejudice (2001: 73-4).

Chapter 5 is the weakest chapter in the book. In it, Schmid relies heavily on a variety of attitudes surveys to ascertain views on language, national identity and cultural pluralism in the US, attempting to compare the attitudes of Hispanics and Anglos. There is little critical discussion of the source of these surveys, the sample sizes used, and the problems inherent in attempting to gain a clear picture of something as complex and changeable as social attitudes through survey techniques. In addition, Schmid tends to present the material as if it supports her findings when on occasion it raises as many questions as it answers. For example, if '61% of Hispanics and 84% of non-Hispanics believed that it is a very important obligation of citizenship to speak and understand English' (Schmid 2001: 89), that begs the question of what the other 39% of Hispanics think about the issue. There is also a 23% difference of opinion between Hispanics and non-Hispanics here that is not explored further, and this is just one example among many. She is more successful in showing up some common myths about language and immigrants, such as most immigrants are illegal (not true); they do not learn English (they do, as fast as in the past and faster than immigrants in other countries); they are not patriotic (surveys strongly suggest otherwise); and that bilingualism negatively affects educational achievement (rather, it is subtractive monolingualism that has negative effects, while additive bilingualism to the level of fluency in both languages has beneficial effects on educational achievement).

Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the contrasting cases of Canada and Switzerland. The contrast with Canada is meant to counter superficial comparisons that are often drawn between the situation in Québec and Spanish speakers in the US. Schmid considers simplistic suggestions that Spanish/English bilingualism is divisive on the grounds that there has been conflict over French and English in Québec as spurious, considering the completely different history and geographical, social and political context of the two countries (2001: 121). In Chapter 7 she discusses identity and social incorporation in Switzerland in order to suggest an alternative model of integrating linguistic and ethnic minorities into the US polity, though she admits that the territorial aspects of the Swiss approach would be inappropriate except perhaps in the case of Puerto Rico. More might have been said by way of concrete suggestions for how the US might learn from the Swiss experience.

Chapter 8 includes a consideration of three interesting case studies within the United States – the Ebonics controversy in Oakland, California, the question of statehood for Puerto Rico, and the bilingual education controversy in California. Ebonics is a name for the dialect of English spoken by many urban African Americans, called African-American Vernacular English (AAVE) by linguists. The controversy arose when the Oakland School District announced that Ebonics was the normal language for many African-Americans, and that therefore they should be taught through it at least part of the time and be eligible for bilingual education grants. The announcement precipitated a wave of public outcry, and not just by white Americans. The debate illustrates the extent to which issues of 'race', class and language have become tied together in the public mind. The debate over statehood for Puerto Rico has centred on the language issue – can a territory where 98% of the population speak Spanish become a state, and should English be made the official language in an effort to make statehood more acceptable to the US Congress? Would statehood for Puerto Rico create Québec-like problem for the US? Finally, the debate over Proposition 227 in California, which largely eliminated bilingual

education, reveals the extent of polarisation in the US public over bilingualism and identity.

In Chapter 9, Schmid argues that in the debates over the meaning of American identity, 'defensive nationalism' is taking hold, defining the difference between 'us' and 'them' in such a way as to preserve a particular conception of what it means to be American – a conception that for a large proportion of Americans means speaking only English. The heat and bitterness that the controversy over English-only and bilingualism has generated is surprising when one considers that 97% of the population speak English well, a staggering level of linguistic homogeneity in a country made up almost entirely of immigrants and their descendants. Schmid concludes that 'the irony of the recent growth in linguistic defensive nationalism in the United States is that there was never a language so little in need of official support as English at the end of the twentieth century' (2001: 178). She ends with a plea for Americans to see bilingualism as an asset in an age of globalisation, a call that is unlikely to be heard any time soon.

Schmid's book is an interesting read, full of detail and useful information. However, I was left craving more critical discussion of how and why the English-only movement has gained so much ground, given the true level of linguistic competence in English in the US. What can be done about it, and what are the implications for the future of democracy and equality for all American citizens, especially for the Hispanic population?

There are a number of important common issues dealt with by both authors that I would like to briefly highlight. The first of these is multiculturalism. Schmid points out that in the US, language is a 'blind spot' in the ongoing and controversial debate on multiculturalism. In Europe, on the other hand, it tends to be of primary concern in such debates. In keeping with his argument that different types of ethnic minorities should be granted different degrees of institutional support for their language and culture, May sees multiculturalism as tending to distract from the goal of bilingualism and biculturalism for national minorities. However, he suggests that a certain degree of multiculturalism is necessary to ensure the rights of other ethnic and linguistic minorities.

Another common issue is the primacy of national identity above all other forms of identity. As Schmid shows, this is very much demanded in the US, perhaps because it has had to work to forge a common identity for its mostly immigrant-descended population. Ethnic identity has been perceived as a problem in spite of, or perhaps because of, its persistence for some groups over the generations. It is also problematic because the civic culture of the US tends to be more or less synonymous with white Protestant culture, although the dominant group rarely openly acknowledges this. While some attempt has been made to take account of the contributions of Native Americans, African Americans, women and other minorities, there has been a powerful backlash against such efforts to re-write US history. In any case, it is unlikely that the US will adopt a multicultural or bilingual approach in the foreseeable future. There is also considerable debate in Europe over the primacy of national identity, particularly in light of increasing European Union integration. However there is a far greater acknowledgement and a growing recognition of other identities, including regional, ethnic and a supranational European identity. Debates in Europe are as likely to centre around how to reconcile these multiple identities and their respective loyalties as how to eliminate or minimise them.

Finally, both Schmid and May explore the arguments over group versus individual rights as a basis for the protection of minority languages, although May provides a more comprehensive look at the issue. May discusses liberal theory in relation to group rights

in some detail, concluding that it is best to conceive of minority language rights in terms of individual rights, with some acknowledgement of group rights in certain circumstances. Schmid, on the other hand, highlights the different approaches taken by the US, Canada and Switzerland regarding the balance of group and individual rights, with the US recognising only individual rights, Canada opting for the protection of group rights as part of its multicultural policy, and Switzerland combing the two at different levels of government (group rights at the territorial level of the canton, and individual rights when dealing with the central government).

Comparing the work of May and Schmid, it is interesting to note the different directions being taken by the US and Europe in relation to minority linguistic and cultural rights. In spite of the tacit tolerance of languages other than English that has characterised much of the history of the US, it now appears to be going against any form of bilingualism as being potentially divisive. At the same time, much of Europe is attempting to accommodate or even encourage bi- and multilingualism. May would argue that the route the US is taking is more likely to engender future conflict, aside from being the less democratic option. While some in both Europe and the US still cling to the traditional nationalist model of the nation-state, believing it to be the most stable, it clearly does not fit changing circumstances, is highly likely to promote the conditions for conflict, and goes against the very ideals of rights and democracy they claim to hold dear.

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REVIEW ESSAY

History with a Divided and Complicated Heart?[1] The Uses of Political Memoir, Biography and Autobiography in Contemporary Northern Ireland

Stephen Hopkins, University of Leicester, UK

Gusty Spence
Roy Garland
Blackstaff Press, 2001
HBK: ISBN 0-85640-698-8 £16.99
pp. *xvi* + 333 (including: index)

Belfast's Dome of Delight: City Hall Politics 1981-2000
Máirtín Ó Muilleoir
Beyond the Pale Publications, 1999
PBK: ISBN 1-900960-08-7 £8.99
pp *vi* + 227 (including: index)

Personal Accounts from Northern Ireland's Troubles: Public Conflict, Private Loss
Marie Smyth and Marie-Therese Fay (eds.)
Pluto Press, 2000
HBK: ISBN 0-7453-1619-0 £35.00
PBK: ISBN 0-7453-1618-2 £10.99
pp. x + 147 (including: index, references & appendices)

It may not be immediately obvious that these books should be reviewed together, and it is certainly the case that there are significant differences in both content and style, but nonetheless I want to argue that they all shed light on a number of parallel themes. At the risk of clouding the important issue, it is possible to identify one of these volumes as biography, one as political memoir, and one as an edited collection of autobiographical reflections. These may be different genres, but they share several common elements, and provoke some interesting methodological concerns.

The uses (and, it must be said, abuses) of political memoir, biography and autobiography ought to be the subject of much discussion and debate among political scientists and contemporary historians. *Ought to be*. In fact, relatively little substantive thought seems to have been given to the advantages and pitfalls for researchers who make use of these sources. Recognising the complexity and diversity of the elements that have been included under the rubric 'political memoir', Egerton (1994: p. xiii) argues that it should properly be conceived as a 'polygenre', encompassing a number of potential characteristics, for example:

a) contemporary descriptive recording of events (as participant or observer)
b) retrospective narration with explanatory or interpretative reflection
c) autobiographical portrayal
d) biographical depiction of political contemporaries
e) revelation of the hidden working of a political system

This is by no means an exhaustive list, and the books under review contain several of these features, in complex combination. For contemporary historians, there is a

[1] Marie Smyth and Marie-Therese Fay (2000: 137) argue that the accounts they include seem extraordinary because they 'are not usually part of the official record, that history is often history from above – or maybe even history without a divided and complicated heart.'

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tendency, perhaps understandable, to relegate the significance of memoir, in the face of the demands and rigours of an established, professionalised discipline (historiography). Despite the fact that autobiographies and memoirs need to be viewed and used with circumspection, they are often accessible, intriguing and revealing, engaging the reader in a way that the patient collection and collation of documentary evidence may not. Although these sources can be highly selective, self-serving, providing the opportunity for retrospective self-justification by (ex-) protagonists, rendering coherent and consistent episodes or lives that were anything but, it is still true to say that using political memoirs, carefully and cautiously, can permit a richer, more textured account of public events and figures. If this is true for stable, advanced liberal democracies and their polities, is it also the case for deeply divided societies seeking paths towards conflict resolution, as in the specific case of Northern Ireland under review here?

There are a number of salient points here. First, the recent spate of memoir and auto/biography published about Northern Ireland is an indication that, for many protagonists in the conflict, the 'peace process', the IRA and Loyalist ceasefires and the negotiation of the Belfast Agreement, represent a 'line in the sand', an implicit recognition that their 'war' is over. There is a perceived opportunity to 'set the record straight', and shed light on actions and events, many of which may have been too sensitive to discuss previously. Of course, this effort can have as a primary objective self-justification and represent an attempt to shape the agenda of historical discourse, so the 'judgment of posterity' reflects favourably on the author (memoir/autobiography) or subject (biography), and his/her political party or organisation.

Second, and alternatively, the primary purpose of such publications can be to continue the conflict by other means. In this case, the purpose is not so much an effort to influence the historical record, but is rather a contemporary political device, an element in the ongoing conflict, whereby the protagonist seeks to use memoir as a proxy weapon. For those authors/subjects who have played an 'active' role in the conflict, and belong or have belonged to paramilitary organisations, this can serve as a means of conducting the battle by force of argument, rather than by the argument of force.

Nonetheless, in this scenario, there are both advantages and disadvantages for the academic or general reader. In the Northern Irish conflict over the last 30 years, as with conflicts elsewhere, a good deal of 'political' activity (especially, but not exclusively, the use of violence for political ends) has been, of necessity, clandestine and conspiratorial. It is extremely difficult to verify the veracity of claims made in published memoirs or biographies, and they cannot easily be confirmed or undermined by official archives or documentary sources. Generally speaking, in the case of Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups, for example, we have not had access to reliable or authorised documents concerning internal affairs or political debates. However, precisely because of the relative paucity of these other primary sources, much of what is now commonly accepted by historians of the conflict has been gleaned from memoir and personal recollection. In the absence of official or authorised accounts, and despite the significant difficulties associated with their use, contemporary historians simply cannot afford to write off these protagonists' accounts.

Third, we should not discount the possibility that in a conflict resolution situation, some protagonists of the erstwhile conflict will be ready and willing to commit their experiences and interpretations to print, more in a spirit of self-criticism than self-justification. In this case, memoir and autobiographical material may well be used in a sincere effort to build bridges between the antagonists, with the objective of aiding mutual understanding, or as a clarion call to future generations, warning them of the mistakes of the present one.

Of course, this classification of the primary purpose of memoirs should not be understood in terms of mutually exclusive categories; many memoirs will include elements of self-justification *and* efforts to score points against the 'enemy'. Genuinely self-critical publications are likely to be much rarer.

Fourth, these memoirs are often marked by a significant degree of localism and sometimes parochialism. This is not unusual in autobiography, and detailed insights into the lived experience of an individual are likely, by their nature, to be restricted in their scope. However, the most useful volumes are also likely to be those that can offer a broader overview of the particular lives and events described. Recent memoirs from within the ranks (or ex-ranks) of the Republican movement serve to illustrate this point: Raymond Gilmour (1999) provides a detailed account of the IRA in Derry, with little attempt to connect this to the development of the movement more generally across Northern Ireland, while Shane O'Doherty (1993) covers similar territory, but with a broader perspective. Eamon Collins (1998) concentrated his account on Newry and South Armagh, and Martin McGartland (1998) and Gerry Adams (1996) reflect very different interpretations of the Republican milieu of West Belfast. The point here is not to assess the honesty or otherwise of these memoirs, or to investigate the motivation of the authors, but to argue that these accounts vary considerably in terms of their capacity to portray *particular* events within a broader context. Ultimately, several of these volumes are of limited help to contemporary historians in that *political* considerations and reflections appear only tangentially, if at all. Many of these writers tend to concentrate their interest on paramiltary activities, 'security' issues, and engagements with the 'enemy', etc. This may be the result of a deliberate decision to highlight these considerations, perhaps with an eye to sensationalism and sales, or it may be a reflection of these authors' relative lack of concern with the broader context of strategic and political thinking, with regard to the events they describe and their roles within the Republican movement.

Having considered a number of general methodological issues, I want to turn to the specific books under review. Marie Smyth and Marie-Therese Fay have collected autobiographical accounts of some of those injured or bereaved over the course of the 'Troubles'. Under the auspices of the 'Cost of the Troubles Study', they conducted 77 interviews; 14 edited transcripts are collected together in this volume, while others appeared in the 'Do you know what's happened?' exhibition in Belfast in 1998. This volume does not make for easy reading, for many of the interviews are harrowing, and the interviewers themselves 'were unable to maintain [a] detached, professional stand. We were often moved to tears by what we heard. Frequently, we left with the memory of a story that would stay with us for months, maybe years afterwards.' (p. 1).

The book also includes a thought-provoking introduction, conclusion and appendix concerning interview techniques. Smyth and Fay emphasise their role as 'instruments', whose purpose was to enable the interviewees to recount and document their stories. They distinguish this approach from more journalistic exercises, in the sense that the bereaved or injured continued to 'own' their stories; they were intimately involved with the editing process, in order that the 'integrity of the story, ... the sense and emotional tone of what was conveyed to us in the interview was presented in the shorter [published] version.' (p. 3). They acknowledge that this project is not about forming a balanced history of the period, but they do nevertheless aim for 'representativeness' in their selection of interviewees. This refers to the balance of Catholics, Protestants and (a single) ethnic minority interviewee, as well as to gender and geographical representation, although there are no interviews with 'those who had relatives killed in British security forces, nor with those who served in such forces, in spite of our attempts

to conduct such interviews.' (p. 2). A fuller explanation of this apparent gap would have been useful.

For Smyth and Fay, the purpose of their project is two-fold: first, the public at large are not, they contend, aware of the 'true consequences of violence', and this is 'profoundly dangerous' because without such an awareness, 'violence can seem an attractive way of dealing with conflict'; second, they argue that in the deeply divided society of Northern Ireland, there is a need to provide 'access to the experiences and views of those from the "other side".' (p. 3). Generally, the book succeeds in addressing these issues, but there are also clear limitations in this approach, particularly with regard to the latter objective. These individual experiences may be authentic and 'true', and provide some understanding of perceptions within both communities, but the wider interpretative historical or political framework within which these experiences are felt/understood is not often explicitly spelled out. There is still scope in these testimonies for inter-communal misunderstanding, and the perpetuation of mythologised or excessively ideological responses to recent history, because many of the assumptions made by these victims remain implicit and unspoken.

The sensitivities of the editing process are also an issue for Roy Garland in his biography of Gusty Spence, which makes very extensive use of direct transcription of Spence's 'conversations' with Garland. He uses this term, rather than 'interview', because the latter 'seems much too formal a description of our many discussions. These were never an onerous task for Gusty or myself.' (p. ix). Smyth and Fay clearly also attempted to reduce the formality of their interviews by asking only two simple questions: 'What has been your experience of the Troubles? How have the Troubles affected you?' However, the answers were complicated and sometimes contradictory, and 'people wanted to talk, to tell us about their experiences and the effects their experiences had on them ... They barely needed our questions, they only required our attention.' (p. 3). These interviews *were* often onerous and disturbing, partly because, at least initially, the interviewees were strangers, but also because they almost all dealt *directly* with 'the awful, gory and horrifying reality of the impact of war on the lives of ordinary people.' (p. 5).

The question of how frank some of the interviewees decide to be about their role as perpetrators of violence (as well as its victims) is of particular interest. Although Garland and Spence devote considerable attention to the latter's decision to turn away from violence (a decision made in 1974), there is less detailed assessment of the role played by Spence in planning or engaging in 'physical force' (both before and during his imprisonment). On his decision to abandon violence, Spence reveals, 'Whenever you'd spent as long as I had in the physical force game and seen what I'd seen, it was a bit of a wrench [to abandon it]. I was a physical force person. My whole life had been geared to physical force, in the army and in the UVF.' (p. 178). Laurence McKeown, a former member of the IRA interviewed by Smyth and Fay, does also enter into some discussion of his role in perpetrating violence, but it is overshadowed by his experience of prison and the hunger strike (pp. 51-62).

Smyth and Fay took the view that although on occasion they 'knew that the person [being interviewed] was presenting a facet of events that avoided highlighting their own role or that of others' (p. 4), they were not willing or able to judge 'whether such presentation is less true than another version ... Only some of the truths have been told. Some parts will be left out ... This book contains some accounts, not every possible account. These accounts are as true as any others' (pp. 4-5). This may be a sensible strategy as far as it goes, but surely the reader also needs a compass to help them chart the uncertain territory between subjective perceptions and memories, on the one hand, and more dispassionate accounts from observers with greater distance, and maybe

perspective. The editors refer convincingly in their conclusion to a 'perceptual hierarchy of events' for individuals (p. 133), with lower and higher order experiences, in terms of intensity and proximity (in time and space). For instance, some of the interviewees were used to living with the trappings of the violent conflict literally on their doorsteps, and seemingly became inured to routine manifestations of conflict (armed paramilitary or security force personnel, stop and search, etc.), remembering instead only the more intense or personal of their experiences. Whilst the experiences recounted here are often deeply moving, their *authenticity* needs to be complemented by an effort to understand the broader social and political significance of these experiences. Indeed, the Cost of the Troubles project has also attempted to deliver just such an account in a companion volume (Fay, Morrissey and Smyth 1999).

Smyth and Fay have brought together some powerful, affecting testimony, and a key conclusion of the project is that 'it is as if there are two or maybe three "worlds" in Northern Ireland in relation to the Troubles.' (p. 133). These are delineated especially by geography and social class; 'the Troubles have had most of their impact in relatively small concentrated geographical areas, and usually within poorer communities.' (p. 133). The experiences collected in this book bear this out, and the violent events of summer 2001 in north Belfast suggest that even after nearly a decade of the peace process, that impact remains unevenly felt (Fay, Morrissey and Smyth 1999: 141-155; Dixon 2001: 23-25).

Roy Garland's biography of loyalist leader Gusty Spence illustrates well the social and economic privations of working-class west Belfast during the middle of the twentieth century. Brought up in the Hammer district of the Lower Shankill, where poverty knew no sectarian barriers, Gusty took a very different route from his brother Ned/Eddie, who early on broke from Orangeism, and became a socialist, and later a member of the Communist Party and the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA). Gusty joined the re-born Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) in 1965 after serving in the British Army in Cyprus, was convicted of the murder of Catholic barman Peter Ward in Malvern Street in 1966 (a charge he denies vociferously, with support from Garland), and served the best part of 20 years in jail, before his eventual release in December 1984. He has gone on to have an important influence on the evolving politics of the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), and read the ceasefire statement on behalf of the Combined Loyalist Military Command in 1994.

The same objective social circumstances and family socialisation could produce highly divergent political paths; though they were to move closer together after Gusty's renunciation of violence and conversion to socialism, for many years the brothers were estranged. There is, in Spence's account of this relationship, a strongly self-critical reappraisal of his early political beliefs: in a letter to Ned in 1981, Gusty admits, 'As you know I have very much changed – not because of what prison has done to me, but because of what I have done for myself. If I had to serve a lifetime in dungeons like these, I wanted to know for what reason, and I searched for the truth … I feel deeply embarrassed when I think of my former "truths" which when investigated did not stand up to scrutiny or fact.' (pp. 244-5).

Although the localism of Spence's circumstances was extreme, spending almost two decades in Crumlin Road and Long Kesh, it is clear that his remarkable approach to these long years in prison, and the autodidactic education Spence gained, helped him to transcend this enclosed world, and draw broader lessons for the future, both in terms of his personal beliefs, and the political strategy of his organisation. His links with Republicans in jail (particularly with the socialists in the Official Republican movement), his emphasis upon discipline and his uncompromising approach to the prison authorities

all make for a fascinating glimpse into survival strategies utilised by Spence and his comrades.

There are aspects of this biography which are frustrating, although there may be understandable reasons for what appear to be strategic absences. For instance, it would have been illuminating to read a detailed account of Spence's relationship with the UVF leadership outside prison, given his great importance as 'commanding officer' of the UVF in the jail, and his public profile in the Loyalist heartland. Spence confesses himself to be uncomfortable with his public persona, arguing in 1981, '[i]t is my sincere wish and true desire to bury once and for all time the undeserved and unsolicited image and myth of the Gusty Spence often portrayed in the "popular press".' (p. 247).

We do hear about Spence's critical attitude to what he perceives as ill-discipline in the leadership of the UVF and naked sectarianism in some of its activities, which are partly responsible for his eventual decision to resign both as CO in Long Kesh in 1978 and from the UVF itself, and there are allusions to 'a period of years' where 'a bad [UVF] leadership took over' (p. 227) In the early 1990s, he acted as a 'willing conduit' for the UVF, by reporting Loyalist views to a priest from Clonard monastery in Belfast, but discontinued this role, explaining, 'I said to the UVF, "Look, you told me you don't shoot Catholics just because they are Catholics but yet you go across the road and shoot a building worker simply because he was a Catholic? I can't accept your word." That was for me the straw that broke the camel's back.' (p. 274) Spence certainly makes a determined effort to distance himself from accusations of maintaining a sectarian approach to politics, although he does admit that when he joined the UVF 'sectarianism might have snuck into it in some shape or form but I joined the UVF purely for patriotic reasons and during my whole time in prison I never allowed any form of sectarianism.' (p. 48) Later on, Spence resigned, at least partly because, 'I was disenchanted with a paramilitary organisation that in some instances was carrying out violence for the sake of violence.' (p. 226) This part of the story remains frustratingly incomplete for the reader. Other sources can shed some light on these questions (Cusack and McDonald 2000; Taylor 1999; Boulton 1973), but there is still research to be done.

Although Roy Garland has done a good job in editing Spence's 'conversations' with him, in the copious use of this direct autobiographical material, the reader gets little direction from Garland himself. As a former officer in Tara, a shadowy Loyalist paramilitary grouping of the early 1970s, and now a member of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), Garland is both personally and politically close to his subject. Whilst it is of course usual for biographers to have a certain degree of sympathy for their subject, in this case the admiration is perhaps too evident, despite Garland's final paragraph: 'In writing this book it has not been my intention to glamourise or lionise Gusty Spence, nor would he want this.' (p. 311) There is some pathos in the fact that as the book was being finished, Spence's home and those of members of his family came under attack during the Loyalist feud over the summer of 2000. Having spent much of his life, both in prison and since his release, arguing for progressive politics within working-class Unionism and Loyalism, and against gangsterism and political fragmentation within this community, it is easy to imagine the heavy heart with which Spence would have reacted to this violence.

A lasting legacy of Spence's influence is the existence of a cohort of politically astute Loyalists, in the shape of David Ervine, Billy Mitchell, Billy Hutchinson and others, who have helped the wider world to forge new perceptions of their community. Although this remains a minority viewpoint within Loyalist politics, it has been appreciated by many outside the movement, even by some in the Republican community. Garland points out the similarity between Gusty Spence's political journey, and that undertaken by Sinn

Féin (SF) politician Martin Meehan (p. 309), and there were several unexpected parallels between Spence's views and those put forward by Máirtín Ó Muilleoir, in his memoir of Belfast city council during the 1980s and 1990s. The clearest example is Ó Muilleoir's disdain for the mainstream unionist politicians, and their antics inside and outside the council chamber; he relentlessly documents and sends up the efforts of both the UUP and Democratic Unionist Party to frustrate the forward march of SF in Belfast (Ó Muilleoir, who made his name as an Irish language activist, spent 10 years on the city council from 1987 to 1997, and SF was the joint largest party by the time he stood down). Spence shares this disdain, although he may well take issue with Ó Muilleoir's view that 'by 1998, unionism was rapidly becoming a spent force.' (p. 217) Ó Muilleoir recognises that the PUP representatives (Ervine, Hutchinson and Hugh Smyth) were 'in every respect a mirror image (bar their Orange rosettes) of the working class, bedenimed Sinn Féin supporters.' (p. 213)

Essentially, although it is leavened by many humorous anecdotes, occasionally at his own expense, but more often at the expense of the Unionists, Ó Muilleoir's account is a morality tale, in which the selfless efforts of Republican councillors to win equal treatment for their Nationalist constituents are constantly thwarted by Neanderthal bigots and bogeymen. There is, throughout, a confident expectation that Unionists will do the Republicans' PR work for them, by haplessly portraying themselves as sectarian and intransigent, and there is a wealth of material here that confirms this impression. Only late in the day do Unionist councillors wake up to the self-inflicted damage to their cause, due to their implacable determination to isolate SF: Fred Cobain, Unionist whip, argued, 'I think that we have such a bad image that even when we are right, we are wrong.' (p. 95) Ó Muilleoir presents a frank account of a cynical exercise, and it is not an uplifting read, although understandably he is delighted to report the growth of SF as a major force, and the shift of power between the sectarian blocs on the council.

While Ó Muilleoir is undoubtedly right to argue that 'the loss of City Hall, the jewel in the Unionist crown, was of inestimable historic and symbolic importance to Nationalists and Unionists alike …' (p. 213), the wider context of this development is not much to the fore. This may well be because the target audience will probably be aware of such a context, but it still risks appearing a parochial focus. At times, the broader evolution of politics across Northern Ireland, whether in the constitutional or paramilitary arenas, is glossed over in this account. This is particularly the case with regard to the IRA campaign of 'armed struggle'. There is the occasional intriguing aside, for instance: 'The years following the hunger strike were a time of great optimism in Republican Ireland, even if delight at electoral successes was serving to smother the much-needed debate on the IRA campaign.' (p. 16) However, we learn little more about what this debate should have entailed, and why it was smothered.

In the end, these volumes of political memoir and auto/biography should not be read in isolation, or treated as if they reveal incontrovertible truths, but researchers can utilise these sources with caution, and with a constant effort to verify and check the consistency of the arguments presented (both internally, and with other available sources). Researchers will probably have to accept that they will still be left with an incomplete picture, but some judgments regarding the relative utility of the numerous publications in these genres can be made. Insofar as they meet the criteria for internal consistency and accuracy, and they provide a relatively close 'fit' with other reliable sources, memoir and auto/biography make for useful tools for the contemporary historian. With the recent news that the rights for the second volume of Gerry Adams' autobiography have been sold, this is an issue for researchers that isn't going to go away, you know…

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WEB SITE REVIEW

Regions and Nations in the United Kingdom: Constitution Unit

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Name of site: Regions and Nations Site
Author: Constitution Unit
Url: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/leverh/index.htm
Type of site: research homepage
Housed at: University College London site
Status [at September 28th 2001]: live

Housed within the website of the Constitution Unit (CU) at University College London is a separate site devoted to the Leverhulme monitoring project on nations and regions. The project itself is designed to track the developments of constitutional change since the election of the New Labour government in 1997. Although there is considerable debate among academic circles on the extent to which the various campaigns for change are part of a coherent package, the usual suspects of constitutional reform fall under the remit of the Leverhulme report: devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and proposals for changes in the English regions. Also contained within the general CU site is a separate section devoted to its Nuffield-funded devolution and health care project. The Nations and Regions project contains three broad research questions:

- How is identity affecting and affected by devolution?
- How does devolution fit in with changing voter attitudes and changing demands on the nation-state?
- How is devolution working?

A combination of sociological and international relations approaches to politics are employed in a list of research projects organised and operated by various researchers at UK universities. The research agenda appears ambitious and the recent appearance of a work edited by Robert Hazell (and advertised on the site) includes many of the same participants whose work appears in research reports contained within the site.

Designed as a clearinghouse for information on the project, the CU Nations and Regions site offers monitoring reports on events in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the English regions, and inter-governmental relations in addition to a list of publications offered in scholarly journals and as edited works. Descriptions of the project and contact details are available but the main meat of the site has, until recently, been the monitoring reports on events in the constituent units. The recent addition of an annual report adds to the content of this page. The site appears to have identified its purpose as promoting its own material rather than contributing to the debate on devolution itself.

The site is relatively easy to navigate although on numerous visits within working hours the server was found to be both slow and uncooperative. At times, individual monitoring reports are impossible to access, and it is sometimes best to exit the entire site before re-attempting to uncover information. On one attempt all of the Northern Ireland reports proved inaccessible and the drop-down menus frequently appear to have minds on their own. Adobe Acrobat is required to view the reports; and whether it is a problem with the site itself or its interface with Adobe, accessing the monitoring reports sometimes proves impossible. Often it is more reliable to print the report rather than wait for the computer to freeze, something that may concern those seeking to conserve money from printing budgets. For whatever reason, my computer crashes roughly one quarter of the time I visit the Nations and Regions site, something that has yet to happen with any other site

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on the Internet. The computer is not old, and is typical of resources available at any university, and thus typical of the resources available to any user at a university. The sheer determination that is required to view the reports may worry the architects of the site.

While the content of the reports is usually quite good, the presentation undermines its analysis. Title pages and fonts are forever changing, some with logos, some without. Some with title pages, some without. Some reports list the authors of each section, some do not. There is a breath-taking inconsistency of information that plagues the monitoring reports. By 2001, for example, it becomes clear that the project is jointly funded by Leverhulme and the ESRC, while earlier reports neglect to mention the ESRC. If the funding status of the report has changed, nothing appears on the site to this effect. Tables of contents sometimes indicate that sections are 'nil return' (see for example, Northern Ireland quarterly report November 2000) leading one to wonder why they weren't excluded from the list of available options. Some of the sections resort to listing relevant events while others employ clear and concise analysis. In short, there appears to be diversity in the quality of work in addition to the diversity in its presentation. In some of the earlier reports it is not clear how the material is different from that available from the local newspaper, while others contain material worthy of inclusion in academic journals. An analysis of one specific monitoring report further illustrates this point.

In a blind point-and-click it was decided at random to review the November 2000 Scottish monitoring report. After 5 minutes, page 2 of the pdf file had yet to become visible. It later became impossible to view the report and the site froze, forcing me to close down my Internet connection and begin again. This happened three more times before I gave up and decided to view August 2000. This, however, proved equally impossible so I opted to view May 2000, which also proved impossible to access. In the end, it required 12 attempts, during which the site would freeze and I would have to exit the internet, before I gave up attempting to access the Scottish reports and instead consulted a quarterly report for Northern Ireland that I had printed out earlier in the year. Sometimes the Scottish reports are easy to view, sometimes it is the Northern Ireland reports that prove difficult to access. The experience, however, is an exceedingly frustrating one.

The monitoring reports address the third of the previously listed research objectives, leaving aside the impact of and on identity and the changes to the nation state. The February 2001 Northern Ireland report contains one 'nil return' on devolution disputes but otherwise presents a full complement of topics covered under the regular reports. There appears to be an uneven distribution of labour, as Robin Wilson is either solely or jointly responsible for seven of the twelve sections. Authors of the reports appear to have scoured not only the official proceedings and various press releases of the assembly but also newspapers, journal articles and books in compiling their summaries. The section on Northern Ireland is well-written, providing a neutral examination of the problems faced by decommissioning, the schisms among the unionist camp, the culture of secrecy in the assembly and the lack of trust that appears to hinder relations both between and among the various interested parties. At times, comparisons with the progress of devolution in Scotland and Wales are explicitly made, usually citing the lack of progress made in Northern Ireland relative to the mainland nations. The analyses cover both the substance of devolved legislation, including proposals for health, economic development and investment, and the series of issues raised by the establishment of an assembly, including the ability of statutory committees to meet their workload and the bouts of unparliamentary language that mar the debating chamber. Considerable concern surrounds the timidity with which committees are placing

information in the public domain. The reluctance to provide comprehensive minutes of committee meetings and the frequency with which the committees meet in private has caused consternation among advocates of 'new politics'. The reports on the media coverage of the visit of the US president Bill Clinton, the resignation of then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Mandelson, and the contested use of the word 'massacre' to describe the events of Bloody Sunday equally projected the range of opinions held within the print media, while the section on public attitudes and identity tracked support for Mr Trimble and the continued if decreasing support for the Good Friday Agreement. Two reports analyse relations with the EU and the inter-governmental arrangements among the various governments within Ireland and the UK. Both list the various meetings that have taken place since the previous monitoring report between the governments in Dublin and London. The analysis contained within these two reports stands in contrast to the seven-line report on relations with local government. In short, the reports provide in detail notes on the important events since the previous report and, in most cases, provide analysis both on the progress thus far and the future success of the arrangements. As stated previously, inconsistency in presentation undermines the analysis.

It is not clear from the writing whether some of the comments are designed for inclusion or escaped editing. 'John Reid replaced the discredited(?) Peter Mandelsohn' is one such example, although others are frequent in several of the reports. It is not clear whether the author wasn't sure if he was discredited, or wasn't sure whether such comments should be included in the report. The beginning of the section on political attitudes notes that confusion about e-mail addresses had led to the exclusion of the analysis from the previous report. As the reports are taking the place of journal articles or edited collections they cannot be faulted for editing inconsistencies that would be corrected by copy editors. It seems that their presentation on the internet, however, would warrant a little extra editorial attention. If the internet site is designed to promote the Nations and Regions research programme, the research team might be discouraged to learn that the image, at present, is of a research team producing interesting work under considerable pressure of time and personnel.

On the whole, the authors of the reports appear to be let down by the inconsistent presentation and accessibility of their work. Those who feel it necessary to keep abreast of developments may find it useful to consult the monitoring reports. For those seeking more analysis, and a more polished product, it may be more rewarding to wait for the inevitable tidal wave of publications coming from Robert Hazell and the devolution research teams.

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REVIEWS

Nationalism, Devolution and the Challenge to the United Kingdom State
Arthur Aughey
Pluto, 2001
HBK: ISBN: 0745315267 £45.00
PBK: ISBN: 0745315216 £15.99
pp. 224 (including: bibliography & index)

Dahrendorf noted early in his 1982 Reith lectures *On Britain* that, unlike many Continental countries, Britain had long avoided any 'national question'. Instead the British question that taxed him and so many others at that time referred to the seemingly intractable problem of the country's relative economic decline – a decline that was a century old and still continuing. Britain with its poor economic growth, even poorer industrial relations and a propensity for wage inflation was often portrayed as the sick man of Europe. Now it is the other way round. The British question is no longer economic, but political. The governments of Thatcher and Blair, Conservative and New Labour, have gone a long way towards transforming the British economy at least in terms of securing a performance comparable to, sometimes conspicuously better than, those of other members of the European Union. But Britain now has a national question of real difficulty. In 1982 Dahrendorf could write, 'devolution may be an issue, but the nation is not. Felix Britannia!' Today no such easy happiness is possible.

Arthur Aughey, with his special interest in Ulster Scots, might be expected to offer challenging ideas on the British question - and so it proves. His is by far the best book in the rapidly expanding literature on devolution and the break-up of Britain, or the avoidance thereof, that I have yet seen. For Aughey four nations and a funeral is but one possibility; five nations and a future – the fifth being Britain – is another. In Part I, Aughey reviews a wide range of answers to three big 'Questions'. First, when was Britain? This addresses the historical formation of British identity and the historiography of Britain. In particular what made Britain between 1707 and 1837, according to Linda Colley's seminal text, above all Protestantism and empire, no longer makes it now. Second, what was Britain? Here Aughey explores whether 'Britishness involved an idea of the people and of its identity rather different from that of nationalism' (p. 27), vis-à-vis that of the constitutional people as the sovereign people. He is fascinating on the 'genteel tradition' of Britishness and on Ernest Barker's argument that nations are not given by nature but are rather made, and therefore modifiable. Barker also argued that social and cultural nations of the first degree could find political expression in a nation (not just state) of the second degree. Hence his 1927 claim that the British 'can be both multi-national and a single nation, and teach its citizens at one and the same time to glory both in the name of Scotsmen, or Welshmen or Englishmen and in the name of Britons' (p 34). Achieving this is, of course, easier said than done, and sometimes it has to be redone which is what the current debate about constitutional change is about. Quite where this leaves the Northern Irish then and now is another matter. Third (and note the change of tense), why is Britain? Does Britain, could Britain, stand for anything worth having? For Aughey, answers involving pragmatism, the civic tradition and pluralism still have some purchase.

Part II on 'Narratives' traces the Conservative and Labour ideas of the British nation and the policies which have accompanied them. Particular attention is paid to Tory Unionism, the contradictions of Thatcherism, Labour on class and nation, and new Labour's rebranding of Britain. A third chapter deals with national peoples with particular reference to debates about the national identities of the Welsh and the Scots. Along the way, Aughey often takes issue with Ton Nairn Part III on 'Futures' discusses devolution,

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and assesses the prospects for regional government in England and/or an English parliament. Aughey sums up the English problem 'in these devolutionary times' astutely: 'on the one hand, for all the recent concern about an identity crisis, England's sense of nationhood remains deeply ingrained. On the other, local allegiance is also deeply ingrained but in a manner which rarely means identification with a region – however it may be defined' (p. 168). The final chapter considers Britain and its constituents, united or separated, in the European Union and the tangled arguments about sovereignty.

Aughey brings prodigious learning and great discernment, as well as style and lucidity, to debates which are always intellectually complex and often emotionally fraught. But he offers no certainties. Quite the contrary, Aughey takes the job of the academic to be to counter the ideologue. Where the ideologue seeks to remove ambiguity in the pursuit of certainty, Aughey resolves to reinstate a measure of ambiguity in the interests of accuracy. Even so, his conclusion is clear. Devolution is a new chapter in Britain's history but not necessarily the last. Ernest Barker carries more weight, it seems, than Tom Nairn.

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From Pluralist to Patriotic Politics: Putting Practice First
Charles Blattberg
Oxford University Press, 2000
HBK: ISBN 0-19-829688-6, £50.00 US$85.00
v + 294 pp, (including: notes, bibliography & index)

In his book 'From Pluralist to Patriotic Politics', Charles Blattberg advances what he calls a 'patriotic' conception of politics that allows us to deal with moral and political conflict in such a way that incommensurable values may be reconciled. This conception, which bases itself on a rejection of the neutralist approach to politics and a critique of pluralism, advocates what Blattberg sees to be a superior alternative – hermeneutical practical reason assumed by the patriot.

Blattberg's choice of the term 'patriotic' may utterly confuse his readers, for the thesis that patriotic politics holds substantial advantages over pluralism isn't something that we expect in the age of transnationalism and globalisation. Conventionally, we associate a somewhat narrow focus with the term 'patriot', whereby the patriot commits her loyalty to her country and her nation. Precisely because it may evoke a particular ideology, Blattberg breaks with that meaning while, however, retaining the term – and it remains unclear throughout the book why he sticks to it. As Blattberg points out in the preface, in his usage the term 'patriotic politics' is meant to cover 'a whole philosophy of politics' (p. xi), one that draws flexible and dotted rather than – as the neutralist and, to an extent, the pluralist does – rigid and solid lines between goods or values. But we have to wait for the conclusion, where Blattberg actually gives reasons for holding on to the term: As for the first, he writes that 'patriotic' politics invokes the republican tradition of political liberty reminding us 'that politics should always strive to be true to the goods shared in common by all of a polity's citizens' (p. 199). He then goes on to argue that this requires the kind of reconciling dialogue offered by a hermeneutical approach to politics. The second reason for a 'patriotic' politics that Blattberg offers is its ability to motivate

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people so that they stand up for their ideals. Throughout the book, I was wondering why Blattberg didn't call it 'hermeneutic politics' in the first place and these two reasons for a 'patriotic' politics, given at the end, did neither convince me otherwise nor did they remove the confusion that the word 'patriotic' evokes.

The book contains eight chapters, including an extensive introduction – in which Blattberg argues against neutralism – and a conclusion. In chapters two and three, Blattberg subjects the conceptions of politics advocated by pluralists to an in-depth examination. He introduces two pluralist polities, challenging the clear-cut distinctions that 'weak pluralists' such as Robert Dahl, Joseph Raz, and Michael Walzer are making between the state and civil society. By contrast, 'strong pluralists', while still recognising the state-civil society distinction, allow for the two domains' integrity to be compromised, in that, for example, the government answers to the demands of particular groups within society in granting them special status. Though strong pluralists go some way towards the dotted lines Blattberg advocates, it is their normative assumptions and their reasoning that he rejects in favour of hermeneutics. As he explains in chapter three, pluralists make an 'atomistic claim' (p. 75) regarding values in that they consider them to be isolated from each other. Furthermore, they claim that values may be expressed both 'thinly', that is, as a set of universal, out-of-context principles, and 'thickly', as embedded in certain historical circumstances. The practical reasoning that derives from the pluralist conception when confronted with a moral conflict is a 'zero-sum balancing of two or more clashing, independently distinct incommensurables' (p. 92). In doing so, the pluralist proceeds linearly, subjecting conflicting values to an instrumental rationality. As a result of pluralist compromising, moral loss is inevitable.

For Blattberg's hermeneuticist, these pluralist notions are unacceptable, as for him goods are always 'thick', that is integrated, contextualised, and part of a practise. Because, as Blattberg argues, for hermeneuticists goods are always integrated with each other, their reasoning can avoid the zero-sum nature of pluralist practical reasoning, and thus make room for a reconciliation of competing goods. 'Rather than weighing separate values *against* each other', the hermeneuticist strives 'to harmonize the regions of discord that the goods occupy within the whole' (p. 92). In doing so, the hermeneuticist engages in a conversation in which 'every good may be conceived only against the background of all the others' (p. 95). This includes hearing, and listening, to the other side, 'and so being open to transforming oneself through what one may learn' and, thus, for reconciliation (p. 102). As a result, the hermeneuticist differs from the pluralist in that the latter disengages himself from the conflicting values in search for a compromise, while the hermeneuticist is himself always embedded and can not simply bypass his self.

In chapters five to seven, Blattberg applies his notion of 'patriotic' politics to questions of governance, welfare, and recognition. To illustrate Blattberg's claim of the superiority of 'patriotic' politics, I will limit myself to a brief discussion of what he has to say about governance and how the conflicts that arise in a multicultural polity may be resolved. For the patriot, the real meaning of democracy is practise, that is, 'engaging in reconciliatory conversation about shared goods' (p. 160). As Blattberg argues, 'the goods of ostensibly separate ways of life are actually to some extent integrated' (p. 129). Therefore, questions of membership of the polity are not resolved by an instrumental process in which traditions shared by people are seen in isolation and so negotiated over. Rather the patriot will take a holistic approach in which what matters is 'the extent to which persons do or do not share in a public common good', and 'the varying extents to which all other kinds of goods are shared' (p. 159).

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To me, Blattberg's dotted lines that allow for this kind of reconciliation are all too ideal. Looking at debates in Germany on immigration and the integration of foreigners, we are a fair way away from the 'patriotic' politics Blattberg envisions.

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Ethnography
John Brewer
Open University Press, 2000
HBK: ISBN: 0335202691 £50.00
PBK: ISBN: 0335202683 £16.99
pp. 224 (including: list of figures, glossary, bibliography & index)

Ethnography is a useful cornerstone to the new textbook series *Understanding Social Research*. The book provides an introduction to ethnography, not least for those engaged in researching ethnicity. Brewer's focus is the methodologies and methods of what he calls 'ethnography-understood-as-fieldwork' or 'little ethnography'. Here the emphasis is placed on systematic data collection mainly through the observation of people in local, 'natural' settings by a researcher participating in the setting. This type of research aims to capture people's social meanings and ordinary activities without imposing meanings on the data from outside. Brewer differentiates this from 'big ethnography' or ethnography as used as a synonym for qualitative research as a whole.

From this discussion of definitions and a brief description of the history and critiques of ethnography in the first chapter, Brewer moves on in the second chapter to consider methodology in ethnography and its relationship to method. He begins with a succinct and apposite comparison of positivist and naturalist (interpretive) ethnography. The largest part of this chapter, however, covers newer ground. Here, he looks at the crises of representation and legitimation in contemporary ethnography, describing the strong role the postmodern critique played in precipitating these crises. Critiquing the extreme postmodernist position which would consign ethnography to the waste bin, Brewer constructively defends ethnography. Here, he discusses the merits of forms of 'post postmodern' ethnography rooted in a combination of naturalism and postmodernism: subtle realism, analytical realism, critical realism and Brewer's own brand, the 'ethnographic imagination'. He also outlines criteria for good practice of these newer forms.

The next section of the book offers a lucid and interesting discussion of the research process, looking at research design, data collection techniques, case studies and good practice in the field. Throughout, Brewer argues for a systematic approach to fieldwork. There are valuable discussions of how ethnographic work can be generalised (an oft-discussed problem for case studies) and how qualitative sampling can be carried out. Brewer's discussion of the challenges of handling identity in the field is particularly enlightening. The section on the problem of handling ethnic identity partly draws on the experience of a Catholic researcher working in the largely Protestant police force in Northern Ireland. The section on ethics could be enhanced by a consideration of the links between ethics and methodologies and in particular by looking at the feminist critique of ethics.

Brewer's next chapter on data management, analysis, interpretation and presentation is particularly strong in showing the links between methodology and styles of work as well as providing a guide to practice. There is also a useful discussion of the use of computer

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packages for data management and analysis. I might quibble slightly with Brewer here when he says that data management [categorising, indexing and coding of ethnographic data] 'is not a form of analysis' (p. 110). Imposing a classificatory system developed by the researchers (in the context of their world views and theoretical positions/assumptions as well their engagement with the data) might be seen as part of the analytical process. However, there is a good discussion of reflexivity later on, which bears on this issue, as well as useful practical guidance on being reflexive and writing reflexive ethnography, part of Brewer's useful section on writing ethnography.

The chapter on the uses of ethnography will be of particular interest to those researching ethnicity wishing to delve into what ethnography can do for them. Brewer looks at the contribution of ethnography to knowledge generation, theory creation and policy making. He notes that ethnography has been used in many disciplines (although it is traditionally associated with social anthropology and some branches of sociology) but has particular strengths and weaknesses. Drawing on the typology of ethnography according to forms of data collected based on Gubrium's work, Brewer describes structural, articulative and practical ethnographies. The first two in particular are useful for the study of ethnicity. Structural ethnographies generate knowledge about the subjective meanings with which people in the ethnographic setting interpret experience, meanings that are traditionally hidden. This type of ethnography was used in Whyte's classic 1950s study of ethnicity and other issues in 'corner boys' society in the US. Articulative ethnography goes further in examining sense-making procedures used by people to construct such subjective meanings. Brewer gives the example of the use of this type of ethnography to investigate how sectarianism is sustained in Northern Ireland amongst conservative evangelicals. On the other hand, he notes the limitations of ethnography in its ability to generate theory even in the middle range (since grand theories about society have become increasingly suspect the fact that ethnography cannot generate these should no longer be considered a problem). He discusses two approaches to theory development through ethnography, analytic induction and grounded theory, but he argues that both 'survive merely as badges of honour to which lip service is paid' (p. 151).

Brewer concludes by asking the question, 'Whither Ethnography?' He appropriately situates the discussion in the context of globalization, noting the threat to ethnography through the vaunted disappearance of the local 'field setting', via homogenisation processes. He states that, without the survival of the local, 'ethnography would be reduced to documenting the onward progress of globularity' (p. 186). Brewer makes his second strong and constructive defence of ethnography at this point. Arguing that under globalization localities tend to survive because global processes are always mediated locally, he suggests that in the context of globalization the future of ethnography should be to 'chart the experience of people in a local setting to demonstrate how global processes are mediated by local factors', to 'address the persistence of tradition' and to 'describe how traditional identities interface with globally structured ones' (p. 176). Again, these are crucial questions to students of ethnicity. Brewer illustrates how ethnography can illuminate these issues with case studies of local constructions of identity in Ulster Loyalism and local crime management in Belfast.

As a textbook, the layout of the book (with its 'boxed' examples) is helpful, the style clear and engaging and Brewer's enthusiasm for ethnography (despite its failings and challenges) stimulating. Each chapter contains a short suggested reading section, which I always find helpful. Those seeking a general text may find the selection of case studies here useful, particularly as we are benefiting from Brewer's reflections on some of his own experience as an ethnographer, but a little narrow in scope in thematic and regional terms. On the other hand, as most of the examples in the book derive from Brewer's Northern Ireland research, this book will be of particular interest to those considering

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using ethnography in the areas of strongly contested identities, ethnic nationalisms and conflict, and, of course, in studies of the region itself.

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Culture, Citizenship, and Community. A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness
Joseph H. Carens
Oxford University Press, 2000
PBK: ISBN: 0198297688 £14.99
pp. ix + 284 (including. bibliography and index)

For Carens, most liberal responses to the questions raised by cultural diversity have paid insufficient attention to the theoretical significance of the way in which liberal states actually accommodate cultural diversity. *Culture, Citizenship, and Community* seeks to redress this imbalance by developing a contextual analysis of the challenges to the liberal conception of equal universal citizenship posed by demands for greater self-government and cultural commitments that potentially conflict with liberal principles.

Carens's analysis of these questions combines Walzer's concern with the historical and cultural particularity of different political communities with Kymlicka's commitment to multicultural citizenship. Whereas Kymlicka explores how liberal political communities ought to respond to cultural diversity, Walzer's emphasis upon the distinctiveness of political communities highlights not only the how liberal democracies differ from other regimes, but also draws attention to the differences between various liberal democratic states. Although every liberal democratic regime must uphold certain principles such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, majority rule and so on, these principles can be implemented in a variety of ways and practices among existing liberal democratic states differ significantly. Hence there can be reasonable disagreement about what the principles of liberal democratic justice require and within that range liberal states should be free to pursue different institutional arrangements and policies.

In order to explore just how wide this range can be with regard to the recognition of cultural diversity, Carens develops a sophisticated conception of justice that draws upon two distinct views of fairness: neutrality and evenhandedness. While the idea of fairness through neutrality is rooted in the fundamental liberal principle that people should be free to pursue and revise their own conceptions of the good, fairness through evenhandedness entails a sensitive weighing up of particular competing claims.

Although Carens acknowledges that the typically liberal ideal of fairness through neutrality has an important role to play in discussions of cultural diversity by setting clear limits to what may be done to promote a particular culture, he contends that neutrality on its own cannot provide an adequate account of justice. Not only does liberal democracy require that citizens share certain generic norms, attitudes and dispositions, every actual liberal democratic regime is thickly embedded in some particular cultural context. Hence the principle of neutrality must be tempered by the regard for local justice inherent in the idea of evenhandedness.

The strength of *Culture, Citizenship and Community*, and its most important contribution to debates surrounding cultural diversity, lies in the careful way in which Carens brings these two notions of fairness to bear in his discussion of particular cases. Thus the book explores the possible tensions between the liberal commitment to equal opportunity and

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cultural diversity through the concrete cases of Asian-Americans, the Amish, African-Americans and women; considers the extent and manner in which liberal states can legitimately expect immigrants to conform to the dominant culture via the example of Quebec; looks at which kinds of cultural diversities liberal democracies can tolerate by assessing the relevant similarities between widely accepted Western cultural and religious practices and frequently criticised Islamic practices; analyses demands for aboriginal self-government via a discussion of the different responses by First Nations, Inuit and Métis to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and debates efforts to protect cultural traditions by looking at the case of Fiji. In many of these discussions the interplay between the particularities of each case and the principle of liberal neutrality offers important insights. For example, while the Canadian Charter sets out to enable citizens to pursue their own conception of the good by safeguarding fundamental rights and freedoms, some aboriginal people have argued that the Charter should not apply to aboriginal governments, since it threatens to undermine cultural differences. As Carens rightly notes, in the Canadian context such fears must be seen in the light of the long historical experience of Canadian citizenship as a tool for the forced assimilation of Indians.

Although such careful analysis of particular cases is to be welcomed, the tensions between the commitment to autonomy (central to the principle of neutrality) and the respect for established cultural practices (inherent in the notion of evenhandedness) makes Carens' account of justice potentially problematic from a liberal perspective. The difficulties here are probably most apparent in relation to two issues central to many discussions of cultural diversity: the steps cultures may take to perpetuate their distinctive character; and the degree to which liberal societies should accommodate non-liberal cultures.

For Carens, policies like the Quebec language laws, which require that immigrants accept French as the language of public life, are justified to preserve the distinctive character of Quebec society. However policies that seek to guarantee the long-term survival of a particular cultural community by fixing the identity of new or future citizens are not readily compatible with the ideals of individual freedom and self-determination upon which liberalism is premised. Although immigrants can legitimately be asked to accept the constitutional principles anchored in the wider political culture, the liberal principle of impartiality implies that they cannot be expected to take on board the particular culture that prevails in a given country.

Carens is aware of the potential difficulty here and stresses that Quebecois culture should be defined in an open way with an almost exclusive emphasis on the French language as the shared cultural commitment and without privileging the culture of the descendants of the settlers of Quebec. However, not only may it be difficult in practice to distinguish between preserving the French language and upholding Quebecois culture, if the common cultural commitment could be limited to the French language it would difficult to see what would remain of the Quebec demand for distinctiveness and why Quebec should be entitled to restrict the freedom of citizens.

Similar worries regarding the tensions between liberalism and pluralism surround Carens's discussion of gender equality. While the public culture of a liberal society must uphold the principle of gender equality, Carens argues that a commitment to pluralism requires that liberal societies tolerate many of the gender differences inherent in the internal cultures of religious and ethnic groups. However, the comparatively low esteem in which women are held in such cultures and the restrictions cultural expectations place upon women's choices about the kind of lives they should lead, may well undermine women's sense of self-respect and thus threaten their ability to exercise their autonomy.

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While Carens believes that the commitment to equality inherent in a liberal public culture subverts patriarchal values, the worry remains that traditional religious and ethnic sub-groups may be able to resists such pressures only too well. To see if such worries are justified requires precisely the careful analysis of particular cases that Carens develops so effectively in *Culture, Citizenship and Community*.

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International Refugee Law: A Reader
B. S. Chimni (ed)
Sage Publications, 2000
HBK: ISBN: 0761993622 £39.99
pp. 613

This *Reader* brings together material from UN documents, conference addresses and a variety of journals and books including trusty textbooks such as Hathaway's *The Law of Refugee Status* (1991) and Guy Goodwin-Gill's *The Refugee in International Law* (1996). Even the well-read scholar of international refugee law is likely to find something new.

Chimni says of his *Reader* that it is 'intended for a wide and varied audience: student, researchers, judges, policy-makers and personnel of non-governmental organisations'. This target audience is an ambitiously wide one but Chimni outlines the main points of each chapter with an introduction that gives the articles greater coherence. The introductions will also be helpful to students who are less familiar with some of the issues. The Reader has been divided into eight chapters that deal with the definition of a 'refugee', the law of asylum, the rights and duties of refugees and the operation of the UNHCR. The next three chapters consider wider issues: the causes of refugee flows and the law of state responsibility, durable solutions, and the law of internally displaced persons. Finally, Chimni considers the legal condition of refugees in India, a country that is not a party to international refugee conventions.

Professor Chimni is a leading scholar of refugee law in India, based at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi and since 1996 he has been an advisor to the UNHCR. He is a writer who has combined theory with practice. Although the title may suggest a rather dry comparison of the refugee laws on individual countries this *Reader* uses the words 'international refugee law' to suggest an analysis of refugee law as a global phenomena. So Chapter one 'Who is a Refugee?' seeks not merely to define a refugee in legal terms but to ask the far more interesting question of why a refugee is defined as a person fleeing state persecution rather than a person fleeing a natural disaster, war, or political and economic turmoil.

Chimni finds his answer by considering the development of modern day asylum law in the aftermath of the Second World War. It is easy to forget that the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees limits its ambit in terms of time and geography. Until these limitations were removed by the 1967 Protocol only those fleeing persecution as a result of an event occurring before 1 January 1951 could be protected as refugees and ratifying states could choose to exclude those fleeing persecution from a non-European country. Extracts from Hathaway's *The Law of Refugee Status* explain that these restrictions met with Eurocentric concerns to redistribute the post-war refugee burden away from European shoulders. More subtly, but no less significantly, by defining

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refugees in terms of persecution due to civil or political status a powerful tool for condemning Soviet politics had been introduced.

The Cold War provides a framework for Chimni to explore other refugee issues. Chapter two considers the development of asylum law particularly since the Second World War. Quoting Guy Goodwin-Gill, Chimni notes that in 1951: 'voluntary repatriation was effectively obsolete. There was no talk of the temporary protection, temporary refuge, dealing with causes, promoting the condition for safe return, or preventing the necessity for flight.' For during the Cold War more than 90% of those given asylum in the West came from the communist block. They were welcomed and assimilated. The comparison with the treatment of asylum seekers today could not be starker. The talk now is of all those things that were an anathema less than 50 years ago. As the Cold War dissipated, Chimni observes, 'refugees have lost ideological and geopolitical value'.

Of particular interest is the chapter on internally displaced persons (IDPs). Now these people have their own chapter whereas, as Chimni notes in the preface, only a few years ago a book on international refugee law would not have contained much material on IDPs. In an extract from one of his own essays, *The Incarceration of Victims: Deconstructing Safety Zones* (1995), Chimni notes that IDPs are not really refugees at all because fleeing a state is a definitional trip-wire that distinguishes an IDP from a refugee. Yet the language of protection is increasingly applied to IDPs. After considering the treatment of IDPs in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia Chimni argues that IDPs and their places of 'refuge', usually called 'safety zones', constitute the new architecture of control that is being constructed in the aftermath of the Cold War. In a forthright passage Chimni states that safety zones are imposed by a UN Security Council dominated by two or three states as a pretext for intervening in the internal affairs of third world countries.

The strength of Chimni's Reader is that he focuses on texts and issues that draw attention to the relationship between power and law and to the contradiction between refugee law as a humanitarian idea and a tool of the powerful. So refreshing is his approach to international refugee law that it seems churlish to criticise it. But few of Chimni's texts post date 1995 and in the fast changing area of international refugee law this is unfortunate. Before the end of the Cold War this Reader could not have been written. Before the mid 1990s it would not have had a chapter on internally displaced persons. One wonders how the next edition will have changed when it surveys developments since 1995. Let us hope that Professor Chimni produces a second edition and that it does not have a five-year gestation.

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The Politics of Human Rights: A global perspective
Tony Evans
Pluto Press, 2001
HBK: ISBN: 0 7453 1457 0 £45.00
PBK: ISBN: 0 7453 1452 X £14.99
pp. 144 (including: index & bibliography)

Tony Evans contends that elegant philosophical and by-the-book legal analyses of human rights can mask a messy political reality. In *US Hegemony and the Project of Universal Human Rights* (1996), Evans illustrated the normative force of human rights, but also showed how those norms could be twisted to political ends. In *The Politics of*

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Human Rights, Evans expands this critical argument. The book is a humane and engaging polemic against globalization on grounds that it undermines human rights and retards democratization.

Evans prepares a three-pronged indictment. First is the familiar charge that neo-liberalism has produced a harsh, hierarchical world in which human rights of low-end workers are trampled by political design, not merely as a result of economic forces. Second is the idea that international law and liberal institutions have cast human rights in terms of low-cost political rights, quashing virtually all discussion of subsistence rights and distributive justice. Third is the original and important claim that while today's human rights regime is global in scope, enforcement remains the bailiwick of sovereign states. Yet, Evans argues, states are so compromised by global capital that they are unwilling and unable to perform this duty. Developed countries and their foreign offices have essentially become agents for transnational corporations, while peripheral states furiously bid down environmental, workplace and other human rights and health standards in order to attract foreign investment.

This indictment is wrapped around a critical history of human rights. The guiding thread is that law and economics have conspired to subvert a more humane and socialistic vision of rights. States rich and poor have directly discounted the human rights of low-end workers, but they have also translated this bias into international law and organizations which privilege 'negative' civil and political rights over 'positive' social and economic ones. Although Evans doesn't mention it, the new American focus on international religious freedom, a pet project of religious conservatives that has become core US human rights policy, carries this trend to its logical end by fixing on the spiritual realm rather than the material world. Nor does international law hold much promise. A vestige of the state-centric age, law has become technical scaffolding on the New World Order, its contours moulded by *laissez-faire* rather than any independent form of justice. At most, its role is 'to provide a formal framework for human rights talk, not to challenge the current economic and political world order' (p. 49). Thus, a cramped view of justice has been institutionalized in a human rights regime that punishes discrete violations after the fact rather than proactively targeting structural causes.

As a corrective, Evans advances the idea of subsistence security as a basic 'negative' right, on the argument that human suffering can be relieved by shielding people from the disastrous institutions – the WTO, NAFTA, the IMF, for example – which have greased the skids of exploitation. This notion runs against the liberal current, to put it mildly. Evans describes how the neo-liberal juggernaut has been swept along by its own hegemonic ideology. That is, free trade is not merely considered beneficial, but also 'natural', 'inevitable' and in synch with 'common sense'. When Tony Blair declared that globalization was 'irresistible and irreversible' (p. 30), and Bill Clinton, addressing the WTO in 1998, said 'globalization is not a political choice – it is a fact' (p. 69), neo-liberalism had achieved the Gramscian nirvana of hegemony, where power politics fuses with political correctness. This view can also be overstated. Evans claims that the hegemony of neo-liberalism today is such that 'all issues must be subordinated to the imperatives of economic growth and development' (p. 46), and that 'legitimate human rights can only be defined as that set of rights that require government abstention from acts that violate the individual's freedom to invest time, capital and resources in processes of production and exchange' (p. 60).

On democratization, the book notes wisely that given the character of globalization one should treat with caution the formula 'if democracy then human rights' (p. 79). Evans believes that globalization jeopardizes liberal democracy by undermining the core conditions associated with it: territorial community, accountability, autonomy, and a

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sense of the common good. Evans sees instead a proliferation of 'low-intensity' democracies, which damp down religious, ethnic and other tensions (along with trade unions, environmental activism, dignified wages and a critical media) in order to create conditions for economic growth and development. Moreover, states increasingly relinquish their traditional functions to international organizations, which are often unaccountable and undemocratic. Evans contends that the state has become a 'passive unit of administration' rather than an 'active policy maker', its function to implement the diktats of the World Bank and the IMF, and serve as handmaiden to transnational corporations and a nexus for capital. All of which suggests 'the dangers of substituting the language of democracy for that of human rights' (p. 90).

Though globalization is hotly contested, the polemic can outrun the proof. One longs for definitive data on whether or not globalization has hindered or helped international human rights. The issue may simply not be settled, or the effects of globalization may be more ambiguous than our pundits suggest. Certainly structural inequalities abound, and capitalism has undoubtedly introduced insecurities unknown in traditional societies. Yet, while in some cases globalization has been brutal towards human rights, in other instances it has lifted people out of misery. As Robert Brenner and other 'statist' political economists have argued, some poor, peripheral countries have accommodated international capital more ingeniously than others. The institutions of globalization probably have speeded this process and increased the gap between outcomes, particularly with regard to democratic development. But localities may have greater autonomy than Evans allows. Good or bad, the effects of globalization are not foreordained.

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Urban Exodus: Why the Jews left Boston and the Catholics Stayed
Gerald Gamm
Harvard University Press, 1999
HBK: ISBN: 0674930703 $42.00 £28.95
Pbk: ISBN: 0674005589 $20.95 £13.95
pp. 384 (including: footnotes, index, maps & pictures)

This book examines interactions between and within Jews and Catholics in Dorchester and Roxbury, inner suburbs of Boston, Massachusetts, from the mid-19th century to the mid-1990s. The study contrasts their different responses to the inward-movement of other ethnic groups, especially African-Americans: and as its sub-title suggests, primarily addresses the question of why the Jews left while the Catholics stayed put.

The book starts and ends with dramatic contrasts between the abandoned Jewish Seaver Street Temple, 'awesome in its loneliness' (p. 1) and the vibrant Catholic church and school in the same neighbourhood. A photograph shows the temple shortly after its dedication in 1925, when it was a source of inspiration and inward-movement of Jews. The Jewish community, however, felt itself under increasing threat by the 1950s; exodus was under way by the 1960s and the temple was closed in 1971. It was briefly used as a Jewish day school and an African-American school for performing arts before being

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abandoned yet again; in the mid-1990s there was 'nothing left but the husk' (p. 2). In contrast, just a few blocks away St Peter's Church remained busy in the 1990s as the centre of a community and intimately associated with St Peter's School.

Gamm combines a densely descriptive historical analysis of the experiences of the two groups with an analytical account of the differences between them, and stresses the significance of institutions in neighbourhood change. He argues that because Catholic congregations are organised on a spatially defined parish basis, whereas Jewish congregations are essentially a-spatial, the latter have less attachment to a particular area and are more likely to move away when feeling threatened. He argues that the hierarchical structures of Catholicism, and the restriction of parish membership to residents within a specific geographical area, contrast with the greater autonomy enjoyed by Jewish congregations. He reviews some literature on urban neighbourhood change and suggests that other authors have paid insufficient attention to the impact of different religious institutions, including their sources of authority and their geographical organisation.

The book examines changes in the Jewish and Catholic communities in inner Boston in great detail, especially throughout the 20th century. This provides some rich and fascinating accounts of individuals within the two communities and may be interesting to specialists interested in local community history or to members of those communities. I greatly enjoyed the richness of these accounts, although this degree of detail adds little to the book's main thesis.

The book's sub-title suggests that it is concerned with differences between groups defined in terms of members' *religions* and that this distinction provides an explanation of different group behaviours. I am not sure that the book succeeds as well in this analytical objective as in its dense description of changing communities.

Firstly, the text makes clear that the groups are not just defined by religion, but by their *ethno*-religious characteristics. The key dynamic influencing movement and resistance, moreover, was in-migration by other ethnic groups (*not* defined primarily by religion). In much of the book, 'Catholics' are *Irish* Roman Catholics: all the priests, for example, had Irish names. Scant regard is paid to other Catholic communities in Boston or other US cities, though it is noted towards the end of the book that Hispanics were moving into the neighbourhoods as the Irish moved out. The book, therefore, is about why *one* Irish Roman Catholic community stayed in Boston and a *particular* Jewish community left. Gamm suggests that Irish Catholics were racist defenders of their turf: '... the Catholic parish became the institutional nexus for white resistance... The parish was a fortress for old-time residents... Conscious policies of racial discrimination helped restrict entrance to the parish's institutions at a time when the area's population had begun to change' (p. 239). This emphasis on ethno-religious identity, rather than religion alone, raises doubts about Gamm's key explanatory variable for the different behaviour of two groups, namely features of different *religious* institutions. The racism and resistance, as discussed, could derive as much from their being *Irish* as being Catholic. That possibility is not explored and so I was left feeling that the analysis was at best only half-done.

Secondly, it is remarkable that Gamm has virtually nothing to say about the *origins* of these Jews and Catholics. Perhaps the Irish diaspora and the flight of Jews from oppression in Europe are too well-chronicled to bear mention, but Gamm's central thesis would have been stronger if it had been demonstrated that the Catholics had come to Boston as a result of *greater* pressures than those experienced by other immigrants. If that were not the case, and we can not tell from his evidence, then the central thesis

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effectively becomes an assertion about the behaviour of groups *only once they are in US cities*. This is implausible, and would certainly require further elaboration and evidence.

Thirdly, by the end of the book we see that the Irish Catholic community barely remained in the neighbourhoods by the mid-1990s anyway, thus it had merely stayed *longer* than the Jewish community. Out-movement by successful Irish Catholics is mentioned in the prologue, where Gamm notes that St Peter's School and Parish were no longer 'an Irish Catholic stronghold' by 1991. Thus the resilience of the Catholic parish may owe as much to other Catholic incomers, especially Hispanic but also African-Americans. A sub-title which more accurately reflects the actual content of the book would be something like 'Why the Jews left Boston before the Catholics'.

The book has limited discussion of debates about residential segregation and changing urban ecologies and is very light on recent urban analysis. Overall, though, it is a well-written work, with an interesting central thesis, which could stimulate further debate and research.

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The Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?
Tony Weymouth and Stanley Henig (eds.)
Reuters/Pearson Education, 2001
HBK: ISBN: 0273651587 £19.99
pp. 316

This ambitious edited collection approaches the Kosovo crisis squarely in its international context. Rather than focus on the history of Kosovo and the Balkan region, or the conflict itself, this book studies the external reactions of the major Western powers and international institutions that chose to intervene in the Kosovo crisis. Most of the individually commissioned chapters are dedicated to policy-making debates within a single government or international institution, including Britain, Italy, Germany, France, Russia, the United States, the European Union, NATO and the UN. There is also a chapter on the media and two chapters with differing perspectives on Kosovo.

The promising potential of the book's structure and aims can be seen in Umberto Morelli's chapter on Italy, Sabrina Ramet and Phil Lyon's chapter on Germany and Bernard Lamizet and Sylvie Debras' chapter on France. These consider how the Kosovo conflict was a catalyst for changes in both the domestic and the foreign politics of these major European states. The end of the political alignments of the Cold War had made these changes necessary, but it was only through the highly moralised debate around the Kosovo crisis that old political party identities and state constitutions could be finally recast. This process highlighted not only the political bankruptcy of the Euro-communist left and German Greens, forcing them to jettison resistance to American militarism and renounce their former political *raison d'être*, but also the demise of the Gaullist right in France. While the foreign policy of both France and Italy was hastily realigned to post-Cold War circumstances, it was Germany which gained most from the Kosovo conflict, tearing-up the constitutional restrictions on militarism abroad and legitimising a new expansionist international role for the European powerhouse.

Christopher Williams and Zinaida Golenkova's chapter on Russia is also of interest, usefully highlighting the collapse of Russian international influence since the end of the Cold War and how any international 'assertiveness' is heavily muted by economic

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dependence on maintaining good relations with the US and Western Europe. Perhaps the most interesting chapter is John Simons' Kosovo chapter which raises a series of challenging questions over international policy and flags up how NATO's moral narrative sits uneasily with the complexities of the Balkan situation and could have destabilising consequences. Despite being flagged up in the introductory chapter as a 'pro-Serbian text', this chapter is a highly prescient one regarding the regional consequences of the conflict. Simons asks if the time will come 'when KFOR will be forced to carry out joint counter-insurgency operations with the Yugoslav army?' due to the creation of safe havens for terrorists raiding Serbia and Macedonia, and successfully draws out the irrational nature of much of Western policy-making in the region.

The editors state that they hope the book will amount to more than the sum of its parts; unfortunately it fails to achieve this aim. It does little to tie together its themes by drawing out the dynamic of Western intervention or, as flagged-up in the sub-title, establishing the likely consequences of the conflict for European/US cooperation and for the post-Cold War international order. The reason for this lies mainly in the over-simplified and frustratingly superficial nature of the majority of the rest of the contributions. Unfortunately some of the key chapters, especially Christopher Williams' Kosovo backgrounder and Sabrina Ramet's on the United States, are badly written and poorly researched, with them both misspelling the names of key commentators and political figures. Williams regularly refers to Maria Todorova (the author of the excellent *Imagining the Balkans*) as Tomova (pp. 15, 37, 290, 315) and Ramet's anti-Serb tirade is replete with the crudest of *ad hominen* criticisms of commentators with whom she disagrees. These and several other chapters, including those on Britain, the media, NATO and the UN, attempt to provide a crude apologia for their chosen government or international institution, and in the process tend to degenerate into superficial description, platitude or polemical bias.

The excessively defensive and uncritical style of the majority of the chapters compromises any analytical claims made for the book. Anthony Weymouth's chapter on the media is disappointingly uninformed and uncritical, focusing on how the ideological legacy of Nazism and the Cold War can justify 'unintentional' media distortions rather than any desire to mislead the public. Peter Anderson's NATO chapter celebrates how the alliance 'was relatively restrained in terms of the level of 'aggression'' (p. 184) and how NATO's 12,000 bombing raids from 15,000 feet allegedly helped realise the ethical value that 'the taking of innocent human life is not permissible' (p. 200). This lack of critical engagement with the subject matter is particularly disappointing in David Travers' chapter on the UN where he seeks to deny the importance of NATO's sidelining of the UN, argues that the Secretary-General and international secretariat have been strengthened, and seeks to blame Belgrade, Russia and China for the farcical performance of the UN protectorate administration in Kosovo.

The book's editors are right to flag up the importance of the Kosovo war for post-Cold War international relations, unfortunately the book, for the most part, fails to grasp the implications for international law and the UN framework of sovereign equality. In rejecting any critical perspective, the book has few insights to offer. This rather conservative approach is highlighted by Stanley Henig's conclusion, which sees the Kosovo conflict as an ongoing Balkan war 'entering its eighth century' (p. 277) and regards the impact of NATO's usurpation of the UN as having 'not brought any significant change' (p. 285).

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Un/settled Multiculturalisms: Diasporas, Entanglements, Transruptions
Barnor Hesse (ed.)
Zed Books, 2000
HBK: ISBN: 1856495590 £49.95 $69.95
PBK: ISBN: 1856495604 £15.95 $25.00
pp. 288, (including: bibliographical references & index)

Hesse's edited volume, *Un/settled Multiculturalisms: Diasporas, Entanglements, Transruptions*, is divided in two parts, 'Diaspora Formations' and 'Cultural Entanglements'. The introductory chapter by Hesse sets the tone of the book and presents perhaps necessary, discussion on terms such multiculturalism, race, diaspora, transruptions and cultural entanglements, particularly the complexity and discourse of these subjects and even more so the context in which these terms are used. In the introduction Hesse refers the to three ways, or connecting thoughts, by which the book 'explores' the multicultural: looking at the meaning of diaspora formations; challenging the concept of homogeneity of national and social forms through the analysis of cultural entanglements; analysing, through the concept of transruptions, the unsettlement of diasporas in Western societies.

The first part focuses on the experiences of a diaspora. Hesse writes that '[d]iaspora formations currently define the post-colonial sense in the proliferation of and interaction between cultural differences that shape transnational configurations of dispersed histories and identities within and against the cultural legislation of the western nation' (p. 20). This is well illustrated in Sayyid's chapter 'Beyond Westphalia: Nations and Diasporas—the Case of the Muslim Umma' and in St Lois chapter 'Readings within a Diasporic Boundary: Transatlantic Black Performance and the Poetic Imperative in Sport'. Both with interesting examples of more loosely formed diaspora communities.

The two remaining chapters, Parker's 'The Chinese Takeaway and the Diasporic Habitus: Space, Time and Power Geometrics' and Hesse's 'Diasporicity: Black Britain's Post-Colonial Formations' are two excellent and informative contributions. Parker's use of the take-away in describing the dynamics of 'celebratory multiculturalism' and 'ethnic food' (for an interesting contemporary example of references to 'ethnic food' as a way of discussing multiculturalism see: Cook 2001) shows the need to look at the larger picture and what Parker refers to as the 'ethnoscape'. Hesse, in his chapter elegantly dissects the concept of 'Black Britishness', with particular reference to the arrival of the SS Empire Windrush in 1948. Both chapters provide the reader with an extensive overview of the diaspora concept and the search for identity in a political, cultural, social and historical context and they are, in my opinion, the most accessible chapters in the volume. These two chapters superbly deal with the concept of 'ethnic communities' and how they are constructed and particularly how these develop and change. Perhaps Parker and Hesse's chapters also stand out because they so accurately deal with the situation in today's Britain.
The second section has its focus set on 'post-colonial cultural differences', particularly those which can be described as 'marginal or minority concerns. These are cultural differences which do not fit dominant national categories or social conventions of

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analysis and tend to be silenced, devalued or misrecognized' (p. 22). The first chapter of the section, Alexander's '(Dis)Entangling the 'Asian Gang': Ethnicity, Identity, Masculinity' is, in hindsight of the problems in Oldham in the summer of this year, of particular interest, as Alexander carefully examines issues regarding gender and race. She refers to 'racialisation' of masculinity and its representation in, for example, the media. She concludes by referring to this weave as 'a product of complex processes of racialisation and hyper-masculinization.' (p. 145). The chapter is somewhat 'heavy'—but this is perhaps necessary, just referring to 'Asian gangs' (as media tends to do) somehow misses the point, the reality is more complicated than that and therein lies the strength of this chapter. The chapter by Noble, 'Ragga Music: Dis/Respecting Black Women and Dis/Reputable Sexualities' is an interesting contribution as it opens up further discussion on what she refers to as 'Black female desire'. These two chapters well illustrate and clarify the concept of entanglement.

Stuart Hall's conclusion of the book provides a layman with food for thought with an insightful and understanding analysis—something welcomed when dealing with a complicated theoretical framework in a somewhat complex historical context. This chapter ties the volume together very well, particularly as Hall attempts to reassess previous findings and to establish what he refers to as the 'new political logic'. Together with Hesse's introduction the various concepts are re-assessed and re-assembled, as is the 'homogeneity of the British culture'—and perhaps the need to establish this inclusiveness.

I welcomed the opportunity to read *Un/settled Multiculturalisms: Diasporas, Entanglements, Transruptions*. It adds to the growing number of titles in the field and ON THE subject of multiculturalism, particularly as it questions definitions and concepts we more or less tend to take for granted. I found the approach to 'ethnic communities' and the discussions on 'group identities' interesting and helpful as this is an issue which needs to be discussed here and now wherever we are (perhaps whoever we are?). The volume is therefore an important contribution in an ongoing debate. The downside is perhaps the sometimes-complicated theoretical approach in some of the chapters, which makes the reading somewhat challenging and that is a shame. However, the volume does deliver, and does deal with the premises set out in the introduction.

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Globalization and National Identities: Crisis or Opportunity?
Paul Kennedy and Catherine J. Danks (eds)
Palgrave, 2001
HBK: ISBN: 0333929632 £45.00
pp. 256, (including: Bibliography, List of Tables, Notes on the Contributors, List of Abbreviations & Index)

This book is an editorial product of a 1999 conference on *Globalization and Identities* sponsored by the Institute for Global Studies and the Department of Sociology at

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Manchester Metropolitan University. Its premise is that the concept of identity should be viewed in light of its potential for social fragmentation, and that the impact of globalism on any society may be seen as either a threat or an opportunity. Poignantly, in light of the September 11th events in the United States, one is tempted to ask: 1) How does the creation or the revitalization of the American 'patriotic' identity impact globalization, and 2) Does globalism also influences such groups as the Taliban and their erstwhile 'guest' Osama bin Laden?

Globalism and identity have been described in numerous ways. Joseph Nye (2001) views the potential for their use in the creation of a worldwide civil discourse stressing 'democratic accountability.' William Anthony Hay (2001) urges us to distinguish between globalism and multiculturalism, while Mohammed Noman Galal (2001) suggests we consider international discourses in terms of interdependence rather than globalism. The *Economist*, not to be deterred, believes that nothing is really new in this debate, at least from the economic perspective, since globalism has been with us since at least 1570. Peter van Horn (2001) classifies identity in terms of 'branded' states interacting within a global polity. Finally, Julie Scott (Kennedy and Danks 2001) notes that globalism, 'Is a contested term and that it can be taken in its broadest sense to refer to the seemingly unstoppable and accelerating process whereby the world becomes increasingly interlinked and interdependent through convergence of its economic, cultural and political systems.' (p. 89)

Paul Kennedy and Catherine Danks, the editors of this book, divide their work into the following three sections based upon the perceived threats and opportunities of global influences. Part I describes groups under pressure, Part II discusses opportunities and successful adaptations to globalist influences, and Part III reviews those specific identity challenges from globalism where it is hard to predict future results. Though the editors believe that this format may be 'somewhat contrived,' I share their belief that this classification scheme does, 'Relatively little injustice to empirical reality while providing a useful framework for thinking about the issues of identity formation, and its tensions and dynamics, at a time of rapid globalization' (Kennedy and Danks 2001, p.21).

The essays that stand out for me include Paul Kennedy's introductory piece 'Globalization and the Crisis of National identity,' where he lays out the work's format and then discusses current trends in the diverse views of globalization. The key for him is that identity formation is a dynamic process and if a society is to survive in the 21st century's version of relative pluralism, an identity group must exhibit flexibility. Noting the above, the approach for an operations-oriented practitioner of cultural conflict resolution such as myself is to distinguish successful models of adaptation to globalism and then use these in an appropriate manner based upon specific circumstances.

I found the contributions to Part I, representing case studies for groups under pressure, to be of mixed quality. Catherine Danks' piece on 'Russia in Search of Itself,' initially provided a good sense of why Russians need a new identity, but she never seemed to offer reasons for this other than in terms of a generalized response to what she refers to as Russia's perceived humiliation and their traditional distrust of the Western 'other.' Ioannis Armakolas' essay on Bosnian Serbs supplied appropriate theoretical constructs for Serbian paranoia but was never able to evoke for me the revulsion I experienced in viewing the results of their ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and later Kosovo. On the other hand, Julie Scott's piece on the Christian fundamentalist's response to the battle with modernization was well done and offered an excellent historical context for the impact of globalization for this and other similar movements. Ironically, considering the subject matter of this book, Scott's composition was the first place in this entire work, page 89 out of 256 pages, where even an attempt was made to define globalization.

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The essays in Part II relating to the advantages of globalization were generally better done than those in Part I. I found Asawin Nedpogaea's piece 'Glocal Culture in the Thai Media,' to be fascinating and an easy read. His thesis is that the Thai identity has been enhanced by the impact of globalization and he used an adroit analysis of Thai advertising strategy emphasizing the influence of the Western 'other' to great advantage. In G. Honor Fagan's piece on 'Globalization, Identity, and Ireland,' the author argues that Ireland's ability to re-invent itself is based upon traditional Celtic values. She suggests that the 'new' Ireland has been successfully able to 'brand' itself using a mix of economic, traditional and global influences. Also in this section Darren O'Byrne discusses the political implications of globalization noting that globalization has 'de-linked' both society and culture from the politics of the nation-state. This is an intriguing process that could lead the practitioner of international politics to ponder whether there is a transnational political identity, and if so, how is it formed and maintained?

In Part III, The Challenge of an Uncertain Future,' there were two essays I found of interest. Elizabeth Stanley's piece on South Africa offers a good historical analysis of the South African context regarding their experience with the impact of globalism on the Truth and Reconciliation process. John Books' discussion of the deconstruction of Scotland was well conceived but was probably better at describing global development theories than reviewing the evolution of Scottish nationalism.

In sum, I found this work to be a good read with particular application for those interested in reviewing contemporary case studies regarding global culture and identity issues. Though from an editorial perspective it must have been difficult to blend the results of a wide-ranging conference in to a book. Further, some of the contributions fell short owing to their over reliance on jargon rather than developing cohesive arguments. This, however, should not deter the academic reader from relying on this volume as a good contemporary reference for the impact of globalism on identity, cultural reconciliation and transformative issues.

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Asian Nationalism
Michael Leifer (ed.)
Routledge, 2000
PBK: ISBN: 0415232856 £17.99
pp. 203 (including: bibliography & index)

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The academic study of nationalism underwent somewhat of a renaissance in the late 1980s/ early 1990s with the onset of post-Cold War globalisation and the so-called 'end of ideology'. As communism fell and nations crumbled and re-formed along ethnic lines in Eastern and Central Europe, the search for new (or renewed) national identities became a core feature of state building, and nationalism became the 'new' ideology. In Asia too, states and citizens began to reformulate national identities, although the rise of nationalist sentiment in some nation-states was viewed with some concern in 'the West'. *Asian Nationalism* is a collection of essays by academics based at the London School of Economics that seeks to put the 'resurgence' of nationalism in the 1990s in Asia firmly within a historical and theoretical framework, dispelling many myths along the way.

The book is made up of ten chapters, with the first and last offering, respectively, an introduction and conclusion to the study of nationalism in general, and the study of Asian nationalism in an international context. The remaining eight chapters cover China (x 2) and Taiwan, Japan, India and Pakistan, the Philippines and Indonesia, each providing a useful potted history of nationalist movements (ranging from the pre-modern era to the present day), the emergence of nation-states and the struggles within those states between different nationalist voices. Anthony D. Smith provides the introductory chapter which takes us on a whistle-stop tour of the mainstream approaches to the study of nationalism. For the novice this is essential background, and an excellent introduction to the minefield of nationalism. Here we are introduced to the great names – Gellner, Hobsbawm, Anderson and so on – within an easily digestible typology and a clear focus.

The following three chapters are concerned with China and Taiwan. Yahuda's chapter on Chinese nationalism examines Chinese notions of the state from the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty to the present day, taking in the territorial basis, the ethnic make-up, and the aims and identity of the various Chinese states. Yahuda's point about the inability of minority groups in China to seek self-determination under a Han-dominated patriotism is developed in the following chapter by Karmel who considers the reasons for rise of ethnic nationalism amongst the peoples of Tibet and Xinjiang during the reform period, citing such factors as the challenges posed by the collapse of the Soviet Union, regional poverty and economic disparities between the minorities and Han Chinese, the persistence of centrally-inspired Han ethnocentrism, and the stifling of religious freedom. Taiwanese nationalism – or rather the lack of – is the subject of Christopher Hughes chapter which considers the constraints on the emergence of a strong sense of nationalism. Amongst these constraints are the dominance of the PRC's 'one China policy' and the attendant lack of international recognition of Taiwan as an independent sovereign state. In addition, Hughes outlines the lack of consensus within Taiwan on what constitutes 'Taiwaneseness' (plus a tendency for Taiwan residents to forge links with the mainland, further blurring the boundaries of national identity). Thus, referring to Gellner, Hughes suggests that Taiwan is 'moving towards a 'post-nationalist' political settlement' (p. 64), and highlights the creative ways in which the discourse on Taiwan's identity evolved in the 1990s. The section on East Asian nationalisms is rounded off with Nish's short piece on Japan which provides an overview of Japanese nationalism through the ages, and concludes that at the end of the 20th century Japan's was a 'mature nationalism', 'less sinister than it was in the past' despite the re-emergence of controversies over textbooks and the national flag and anthem (p. 88-9).

South Asia is represented by essays on Pakistan and India. The divisive nature of language, territory and religion is highlighted in these chapters. In the chapter on India, Desai takes us through a history of Indian nationhood, introducing the concept of communalism (Hindu-Muslim riots) and identifying the emergence of a national consciousness at the end of the 19th century. At that time, national consciousness took the form of an association with one of three 'subjecthoods' – the British, Maratha and

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Moghul empires – but Desai carefully traces the evolution of Indian nationalism thereafter, and the lengthy struggle for supremacy between proponents of three models of nationhood (Congress, federal and Muslim League). India's independence and partition did not bring an end to struggles over national identity, and Desai goes on to describe the problems faced by Indian leadership from 1947 to the present day, when once again several models present themselves as options for India's future. Pakistan's experiences as a nation state (or rather a *staatnation* p.127) are considerably shorter but no less tumultuous than others represented in the book, as the chapter by Hussain highlights. This chapter explains the origins, and reasons for the persistence, of rivalry between Pakistan and India, and the Kashmir situation, with an excellent overview of the ethnic and religious issues which continue to plague Pakistan today.

The starting point for the chapter on Indonesia (Michael Leifer) are the events of the late 1990s (the fall of Suharto and East Timorese independence) both examples of 'the relatively subordinate role' that nationalism played under Suharto (p. 154). As Leifer shows, this is in contrast to Sukarno's 'romantic' nationalism used as an 'emotive symbolism' during the years of struggle against the Dutch and the British. This is not to say that nationalist sentiment was lacking in post-Suharto Indonesia, rather it 'assumed a muted quality for the reasons of political economy and regional cooperative security' (p. 167). By the late 1990s, however, a more strident nationalist mood came to the fore in response to IMF intervention in the economy and international criticism of the East Timor situation. But Leifer assures us that this mood has not been exploited by political forces, nor is it likely to as long as economic recovery remains high on the agenda for Indonesia's leaders. James Putzel's chapter on the Philippines explores the relationship between nationalism and democracy, arguing that 'the content of Philippine nationalism has never been particularly democratic' (p. 171) and that a Filipino identity is hard to define. Tracing the history of the Philippines, Putzel describes the phases of nationalism up to and beyond independence in 1946, domestic political struggles and the various attempts to implement some form of democracy. Putzel is circumspect on the future of democracy in the Philippines, warning that 'an ugly, ethnically-defined nationalism could re-emerge in a time of economic crisis' (p. 184).

I have only a few reservations about this book. First, Smith's attempts to draw up a theoretical framework in the introduction are picked up in some, but not all, chapters. The task of tying up the loose ends is therefore left to James Mayall who questions the extent to which the Asian experience of nationalism conforms to, or challenges, Western conceptions, concluding in favour of the former. Second, some chapters lack balance (and length), and China/Taiwan are allotted three fairly lengthy chapters whereas the chapters on Japan and the Philippines are somewhat shorter. Chinese nationalism has been well covered (even over-exposed) in academic writing in recent years – so maybe a more comparative or integrated approach would have provided a fresh look at the subject.

Nonetheless, this is a timely book which touches upon issues that remain at the forefront of current affairs in 2001 (East Timor, China-Taiwan relations, Islam). In sum, it should be essential reading for any undergraduate or postgraduate student seeking an accessible overview of nationalism in general, and Asian nationalism in particular.

Caroline Rose, University of Leeds, UK

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Reimagining the Nation-State: The Contested Terrains of Nation-Building
Jim Mac Laughlin

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Pluto Press, 2001
HBK: ISBN: 0745313698 £45.00 $49.95
PBK: ISBN: 0745313647 £15.99 $27.50
pp. 304 (including: notes & index)

When offered this book for review, I took the title to refer to both debates about the (re)imagining of national communities (following Benedict Anderson) and debates about the place of, and prospects for, the nation-state in a globalising age (following innumerable social scientists from Daniel Bell onwards). I was wrong. It is a book about nation-building in Ireland, and mostly pre-partition nation-building at that. And I do mean nation-building in Ireland and not just Irish nation-building as Jim Mac Laughlin pays a lot of attention to Ulster unionism and British nation-building. I mention this not just because titles and sub-titles can be deceptive but because my interest in questions of nation has largely extended to Britain, the Netherlands, and Poland and other parts of Eastern Europe. I shall thus comment on Mac Laughlin, often critically, but also from a particular perspective. In particular, I am incapable of judging how perceptive, innovative and resourceful he has been in his use of Irish historical sources. There could well be distinguished scholarship here which I, in my ignorance, pass over in silence.

Mac Laughlin is a historical geographer who takes his theoretical bearings from a number of sources, but principally Gramsci and Anderson. What appeals in Gramsci is his version of human beings as neither wholly determined or wholly determining and his conceptions of contested hegemony and organic intellectuals. From Anderson he takes the motif of the imagining and reimagining of communities. But Mac Laughlin remains a geographer and is averse to abstractions which overlook that situated actors are indeed geographically situated. Hence his preferred theorizing of nationalism 'as an historical and geographical happening, one which binds people and place together in concrete social and political settings' (p. 33), and his interest in the contested terrain, the alternative engagements with the very land, of Ireland.

The best feature of the book is the insight it gives into the political predicament of Ireland today. When the English, and the Scots, and later the British, came to Ireland they did so believing themselves to be superior peoples with an opportunity to exploit and a mission to civilize the Celtic Irish. The Irish were savage and poor beyond necessity, failing even to manage the land productively. Variations on this theme are explored in considerable detail. But the social and economic gap between the stubbornly Catholic Irish and their Protestant settler neighbours and political masters closed only slowly. Additionally, the cultural gap did not so much close as change. Civilising the Irish turned out to be only partly a story of the Irish adopting the manners of the invaders; it was also a story of the Irish resisting by recovering and promoting their rich Celtic cultural inheritance. The barbarians had a history after all. Instead of the cultured and the cultureless, the polished and the rude of the Enlightenment (including very much the Scottish Enlightenment), there were two cultures the Celtic and Catholic Irish and the Protestant English, Scottish and British. Mac Laughlin is very interesting on the part played by the larger farmers ('kulaks'), the petty bourgeoisie and the Catholic priesthood in the formation of an Irish ethno-nation in the nineteenth century, without ever forgetting the class interests at work in the formation of the 'big nation' nationalism of the Ulster Unionists.

This brings us to the predicament of Ireland today. The 1916 proclamation of the provisional government of the Irish Republic refers to the people of Ireland as if there was only one and its inheritance is Celtic. That vein of Irish ethno-nationalism necessarily excludes the Other - the Protestants, the Anglo-Irish and especially the Ulster Unionists. The Ulster Unionists in turn have refused to 'surrender' to the papists in

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the republic. Those committed to bringing the two peoples of Ireland into one community and one polity have thus to define and develop a new inclusive and plural Ireland and much has been done along these lines. The disappointment of Mac Laughlin's book is not so much that it concentrates on the two old Irelands but that it ignores the seeds of the new. An historical geographer has the right to decide his or her historical period, and Mac Laughlin's sweep from medieval times to the early twentieth century is already vast, but the reader has the right to some conclusions and could be expected to want them to include some reflections on the significance or otherwise of his historical geography for what is happening in the vibrant Ireland of today. Astonishingly there are none – not just no reflections, no conclusions. The last chapter, one of the best, deals with the parts played by priests, professionals and the larger farmers in Irish nation-building in Donegal between the 1880s and partition, and that's that.

I have three other grouses. The first is that the book is irritatingly repetitive. Most points seem to be made many times, and Mac Laughlin's favourite verbal formulations are also used again and again. The book reads a bit like a collection of essays which have not been fully converted into a book. Editor, where were you? The second is that the passing comparisons with other countries are sometimes open to question. The several references to nineteenth century Poland, for example, always omit any mention of the partitions, which renders them misleading. And finally, Mac Laughlin is not always secure in his references to England as distinct from Scotland, as distinct from Britain, and in his references to Scotland as whole, or to Highland Scotland, as distinct from Lowland Scotland. He is, of course, hardly alone in that, but then one expects more of a writer on nations and nationalism.

For all my criticisms, it would wrong to end on a negative note. I learned a great deal from Mac Laughlin and he made me want to read more about Ireland. I am therefore in his debt and suspect very many other readers will be too.

Christopher G.A. Bryant, University of Salford, UK

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War, Hunger, and Displacement: The Origins of Humanitarian Emergencies. Volume 1: Analysis, Volume 2: Case Studies
E. Wayne Nafziger, Frances Stewart and Raimo Vayrynen (eds.)
Oxford University Press, 2000
(Vol. 1) HBK: ISBN 0198297394 £55.00
(Vol. 2) HBK: ISBN 0198297408 £55.00

This two-volume work is the result of an initiative from the United Nations University/WIDER in Helsinki and Queen Elizabeth House at Oxford. The latter brings an interdisciplinary developmental approach to the project with UNU/WIDER providing a largely economic perspective to conflict analysis.

The interdisciplinary nature of the books is particularly interesting for this journal, as the study of ethnopolitics is itself truly interdisciplinary. Whatever one may think of the departmental divisions in academia it is true to say that people reading this journal will most likely be cast as sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, historians, and scholars of international relations and other disciplines. Of course the divisions are to some extent arbitrary and many scholars will easily overlap between disciplines. What is perhaps most interesting about the project under review is that it engages the discipline of economics. Of course, most of us subscribe to the notion that it is important to consider economic factors when examining ethnic conflict. This is not a particularly new

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or enlightening insight. The importance of economics in the political sphere, or indeed as a political sphere, has been highlighted by figures as diverse as Karl Marx and Bill Clinton. It is the case, however, that many academics, while aware that economic factors are important determinants of ethnic conflict, do not explore this claim in any great detail. This book seeks to provide a more detailed and sophisticated analysis of economic factors than is sometimes the case and to combine this with political and social analysis. This is both interesting and challenging for this reviewer. Perhaps the project is not quite the 'first comprehensive study of the economic, social, and political roots of humanitarian emergencies', as it claims, but it is certainly a thorough study of the subject matter.

Volume 1 then examines the economic, social and political explanations of the roots and causes of conflict. While these factors will overlap, indeed this is main point of the book, they are largely treated individually in this volume.

Before we get to these explanations, Raimo Vayrynen provides a chapter examining the concept of complex humanitarian emergencies. This is welcome and thankfully there is no danger of the authors lazily employing the idea of humanitarian emergencies in the simple terms have other have done.

After this introduction we get chapters which examine some of the economic causes of humanitarian emergencies, and issues of resource competition. Readers without a background in economics should perhaps take a deep breath before delving into the chapter by Nafzinger and Auvinen with its dependent variables and regression analyses. Of course the study of political economy closes the gap between the disciplines but it is heartening to be able to argue that economic factors are important in understanding the causes of conflict with some substance behind the claim.

We are also offered more 'political' understandings of what causes conflict, in particular from Kal Holsti. David Keen then provides a useful link between economics and politics in his examination of the function of violence, which he makes clear, is not irrational for those who use it. As he says, 'crime pays' (pp. 283-302). Many will be familiar with Keen's previous work and he is a useful addition to this cast list.

Chapter 9 of Volume 1 will be of particular interest to readers of this journal. Examining the case of Matabeleland, Joleyn Alexander, Jo Ann McGregor and Terence Ranger provide a review that is critical of explanations for conflict that label it as 'ethnic', particularly in Africa, and that explain conflict as the product of disintegrating or 'collapsed' states. They conclude that, 'ethnicity may come to be experienced as the cause of conflict by perpetrators and victims alike, and it may be blamed for conflict by commentators in the western media, but academics, journalists and those who intervene in such conflicts have a responsibility to explore the historical myths which have sustained violent conflicts, to look beyond simple and reductive explanations to the political and economic context in which understandings of ethnicity are produced' (p.327). Certainly this is laudable and most of us would probably reject simple theories of tribal ethnic hatreds as explanations for conflict. This does not mean, however, that we can ignore the importance of ethnicity and ethnic group identification. Rather, we must take account, as the authors do to some extent, that however ethnicity is constructed and however historical memory is reimagined, it retains a potency for better or worse.

The main finding of Volume 1 is that in complex humanitarian emergencies, 'there is an interaction between factors with group perceptions and identity being enhanced by sharp

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group differences in political participation, economic assets and income and social access and well-being' (p. 31).

In Volume 2 the authors seek to apply the lessons of the first Volume to a series of case studies. The authors in these case studies reintegrate the economic, political, environmental and ethnic factors that were largely dealt with separately in Volume 1 in order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the particular cases. Obviously readers prior knowledge and expertise with regard to these case studies will vary enormously. Of the cases under examination Rwanda is best known to me and the work of Peter Uvin, who writes the chapter, will be familiar to anyone who has studied this case. The other chosen case studies are Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone, Congo (Zaire), Kenya, Haiti, El Salvador and the South Caucasus. Each case emphasises to different degrees a number of the explanations laid out in Volume 1 of the Book. They are interesting analyses with strong bibliographies, a remark that can be applied to the books as a whole.

The stated aim of the project is then to take forward this analysis and use it to formulate strategies for tackling the underlying causes of complex emergencies. We are promised a third Volume from the project, which will specifically address the prevention of humanitarian emergencies. The thinking behind such an aim is obviously that if you can better understand the root causes of these 'humanitarian crises' then you can try to provide policy that is more proactive and seeks to prevent or alleviate rather than react after a crisis has happened. To this end the editors stress the need for policy that is inclusive, both economically and politically with respect to all groups so as to reduce horizontal inequalities and help reduce tensions that can lead to conflict. Of course they recognise that very often it is a government in power that is the chief source of discrimination. They are not slow to point out the failings of 'bad rulers'. They suggest that institutions such as the IMF and World Bank may apply more pressure on governments to this effect. And yet when such institutions and others adopt such tactics it raises a whole series of new problems. It is a conundrum that we call for outside intervention or influence on the one hand, while on the other hand we have to be so wary of it. Perhaps more importantly, the perceived cost to governments and others in the 'international community', both in economic and political terms, of adopting the kind of worldview suggested in the book is such that it will not be universally applied.

Does the book deliver on the lofty claims set out at the beginning? The book started out by warning of the dangers of generalisations and stressing the complexity surrounding the cause of conflicts. It emphasised the importance of looking at economic, political and social factors for a more nuanced understanding of conflict. In some respects we're at the same point some 850 pages later. Frankly this is not a surprise. There are no easily digestible, short and snappy answers to the questions of what causes conflict and humanitarian emergencies. If there were we'd, probably, have found them a long time ago. What this project does is to put flesh on the bones of a lot of the claims about conflict that we readily make without giving much thought to.

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Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (third edition)
Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Longman, 2000
PBK: ISBN: 0321033272 £19.99

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244 pp, (including: notes, tables & index)

This relatively short book (around 200 pages) provides something between an introductory text on international conflict and an introduction to international politics after 1945. Nye's approach differs from that of regular textbooks in both international relations and modern history in that it tries to illustrate broad, general theories of international relations through references to specific historical events and in-depth case studies.

The first chapter of the book seeks to demonstrate the enduring nature of international politics by showing that the events in the Peloponnesian war are not fundamentally different from contemporary events in world politics. Nye provides a cute example presenting Thucydides' Melian dialogue, with merely a few words substituted, as how a Soviet general might explain his country's actions in Afghanistan in December 1979.

The subsequent chapters of the book attempt to show how different theories emphasizing factors at the level of the international system, the character of individual states and leaders and the interplay between domestic and international politics can be used to explain major conflicts in the twentieth century.

Nye's book is primarily intended for undergraduate teaching. For this purpose the book clearly has many strong pedagogical sides. The approach is quite successful in showing how specific events may be interpreted in light of general theories, and how historical cases can be used to evaluate the plausibility of theoretical arguments. The book is generally concise and well written. Another advantage is that the text easily can be read at several different levels of difficulty. It is simple enough that most students will grasp the key concepts. At the same time, it is rich enough to raise more challenging issues for advanced readers.

Its strengths notwithstanding, the books is not devoid of problems. Nye tends to introduce various theories – such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism – and then examine how these theories would account for some specific event in world history. Not content with simply summarizing the theories and letting the reader assess how well they stand up confronted with the empirical evidence, the author himself seems compelled to offer attempts to evaluate their respective strong and weak points. Unfortunately, Nye has a somewhat irritating tendency to conclude that all theories are 'a little right' since they help illuminate certain aspects of international conflict rather than focus on their differences. If these really were competing theories in the way that they are introduced in this text, then it would seem questionable whether all of the theories may be combined or compliment each other. Moreover, students may be left with the impression that all theories are equally good and that there are few reasons why one may prefer some theories over others. It would be useful to introduce students to some more explicit standards for evaluating theories in light of historical evidence.

Another main weakness is that the term conflict is never explicitly defined anywhere in the book. Nye uses the concept conflict in a fashion encompassing a rather heterogeneous type of international incidents and incompatibilities, including major armed conflicts such as the two world wars, latent hostility and rivalry between the superpowers during the cold war, conflict of interest among states in the 1973 oil crisis, and civil wars or conflict among actors within states. Many will question whether the same theories can be used to explain why conflict of interests arises in the first place and why incompatibilities lead to confrontation by violence rather than alternative means. The broad view of conflict is difficult to combine with the claim that there is

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something distinctive about international politics, which is at least partly defended in the first part of the book.

Readers of this journal will be particularly interested in the coverage of the role of ethnicity and nationalism in international conflicts. Nye argues that nationalism can play an important role in conflict as a mobilizing force. Nationalism appears to provide a stronger basis for group mobilization than other social groups such as class. Nationalism is held responsible for the demise of great powers such as Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire in World War I, and is considered a key cause of many contemporary conflicts such as Bosnia and Kosovo. Nye argues that nationalism is fostered when group identities are challenged by major social changes. Although Nye acknowledges that most individuals have many group references, he has little to say about why some potential group identities become politicized while others do not. Even if nationalism may be inherently defined on the basis of opposition to other groups, all nationalist movements do obviously not acquire violent forms. Nye notes that this is the case and tentatively suggests that forces such as economic prosperity and democracy may foster alternative means of resolving disputes. However, his treatment of theories of nationalism is quite brief, and no cases of ethnic conflicts are considered in much detail.

These problems notwithstanding, Nye's book provides an excellent text for undergraduate teaching. The book will engage beginning students to think about international conflicts in a theoretical fashion and provide a useful supplement to more traditional textbooks. This will eventually also provide a better basis for thinking about 'new' issues in the study of conflict such as ethnic conflict and nationalism.

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The New Macedonian Question
James Pettifer (ed.)
Palgrave, 2001
PBK: ISBN: 033392066X £17.99
pp. 311 (including: chronologies, maps, notes, suggestions for further reading & index)

This paperback edition of a book that was originally published in hardback in 1999 is in many ways engaged in a race against the rapid pace of changing events in Southeast Europe. Writing a book or editing a collection that includes coverage of contemporary affairs is always a challenge, as a well-thought out work can be overtaken by events, becoming an unintended work of history. James Pettifer acknowledges this in the preface to the paperback edition, as he offers the reader a resource aimed at informing discussion on the highly complex issue known as 'the Macedonian question'.

The chapters in this book are organised in 4 sections: 'The National Question in Modern Macedonia', 'Ethnic Minorities', 'Historical Perspectives', and 'International Relations of the New State'. The range of topics covered are broad and wide-ranging, and it is impossible to individually review the full scope of themes: Macedonia's internal politics and foreign affairs, the policies of neighbouring states regarding the country, protection of minority rights within Macedonia, historical underpinnings to contemporary problems, and more.

A few gems do stand out. Hugh Poulton's chapter 'Non-Albanian Muslim Minorities in Macedonia', illustrates the deeper complexity of the nationalities question by reminding the reader of the existence of the Pomaks, Torbesi, and Goran – the Islamicised Slavs of

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the region. Tom Winnifrith's chapter 'The Vlachs of the Republic of Macedonia' proposes that the Vlach model of seeking cultural privileges but not political demands might make it a model for complex multiethnic societies. 'In a way the Vlachs are perfect Balkan citizens, able to preserve their culture without recourse to war or politics, violence or dishonesty' (p. 134). Pettifer's chapter, 'The New Macedonian Question', clearly sets out the various interpretations of 'The Question' through the perspectives of Macedonia's geographical neighbours: Albania, Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria, providing a solid basis for understanding the interaction of internal and external affairs in Macedonian politics.

Dimitar Mircev's contribution to the volume, 'Engineering the Foreign Policy of a New Independent State: The Case of Macedonia, 1990-6', provides a strong overview of Macedonia's careful and difficult balancing act as it sought to carve out its own sphere in the international arena at a time in which the international community was focused on the warring factions of the former Yugoslavia. Sophia Clement, in her chapter 'Former Yugoslav Macedonia, the Regional Setting and European Security: Towards Balkan Stability?' notes that as Macedonia's conflicts stem from internal issues, 'NATO's presence is not appropriate' (p. 296). This is a particularly interesting example of the pace of regional events, opinion, and policy, as at the time of writing this NATO is currently involved in Macedonia, and may remain there in one capacity or another for some time.

While no book can be everything to everyone, this volume suffers from two primary flaws that reflect the difficult nature of the content, and which could be easily remedied. First, in selecting the chapters for this volume, Pettifer clearly sought to represent a wide variety of backgrounds and perspectives. Writers from Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece join with authors from throughout Europe, though there are few Macedonian voices included. However, these authors at times bring their various perspectives on the Macedonian question to their contributions in ways that can be problematic.

For example, Gjorgi Caca's chapter 'Status and Rights of Nationalities' provides a thorough review of the constitutional safeguards of minority rights and protections. However, his favourable, near propagandistic review of these constitutional provisions is only tempered in the final paragraph of the chapter, in which he acknowledges that 'a serious defect of the overall and consistent realisation of the rights of nationalities established by the Constitution is that some of them are not operational within the proposed laws' (p. 164). This understatement is not supplemented by a necessary look at *why* such operationalisation of constitutional provisions is lacking. Similarly, Evangelos Kofos' chapter, 'Greek Policy Considerations over FYROM Independence and Recognition' at times leads the reader to question the objectivity of the author. Phrases such as 'Skopje became the harbinger of a major escalation of propaganda against Greece', or 'the new irritants from the Slav Macedonian nationalists' (p. 233) at times detract the reader from the objective and otherwise informative parts of the text.

The second problem concerns the timeframe in which the various pieces were written; a potentially confusing issue in a volume with that many chapters, and on a subject that is changing so quickly. The introduction and chapters 2 and 10 (all by Pettifer) are the only new material that distinguish the paperback from the 1999 hardback (it should be noted that Chapter 2 itself is a reprint from a 1992 article). Many of the other chapters are reprints of pieces originally printed in years past. Pettifer's inclusion of older, reprinted pieces can be useful in reflecting the past debates that have shaped contemporary views. This is a useful exercise as the reader soon recognises that many issues have existed *within* Macedonia for a long period of time, while the *external* appreciation or interest in these issues has changed. However, reading chapters that were written at a variety of times, or that were contemporary in the original hardback but are now dated,

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can be confusing. The readers may find themselves continually referring to the first page of the chapter, to determine just when and under what circumstances various pieces were developed.

These two problems could potentially be addressed in future editions by inclusion of an editor's abstract or short introduction at the beginning of each chapter. An editorial introduction describing the timeframe in which the chapter was written, describing the background of the writer, articulating the primary arguments and perspectives of the author, and possibly challenging the reader to read the text to follow with certain considerations in mind, would provide the reader with an important contextual framework.

This volume provides a broad and useful overview of a complex subject. The maps, chronologies, and suggested reading list complement the individual chapters and help to make the book a general resource on the topic. However, readers new to the subject matter could become confused by the wide number of issues and often conflicting views expressed by the authors. This book will be most useful to readers with a intermediate understanding of Macedonia, who are interested in exploring some of the sub-currents that affect the country and the region. Pettifer's book does not seek to answer 'the Macedonian Question', but it will lead to more readers considering the nature and importance of this question.

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Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy
Kenneth A. Schultz
Cambridge University Press, 2001
Hbk ISBN 0-521-79227-4 £40.00
Pbk ISBN 0-521-79669-5 £14.95
pp. xv+301 (including: references, index & appendices)

It is always a pleasure to read a book with such a broad scope and possible important consequences not only for political theory, but also practice as the one written so intelligently by Kenneth Schultz. However, reviewing a work, whose aim is to develop a different (if not completely new) approach to the issues that it studies, has not been an easy task. Especially, when one considers the topics discussed in Schultz's research: democracy, information distribution and war (or the threat to use force). Obviously, the broad ramifications of such an investigation put the reader at a disadvantage, presenting him or her with the difficulty to grasp the complex subject matter. Nevertheless, the author's lucidity as well as command of his topic take one on a step-by-step exploration through a theory (with potentially significant political implications), which outlines Schultz's conviction that 'if democracies want to enjoy the benefits of their institutions while minimizing the liabilities, the answer lies not in circumventing debate or suppressing dissent but in *building true consensus*' (p. 246, my emphasis). A corollary, whose far-reaching implications have been made obvious in the unfortunate aftermath of the post-September 11 events, not only in the US, but also around the globe.

The author's analysis proceeds in two complementary parts – theoretical and empirical. Each of the eight chapters develops the interaction between nation-states in the international political arena and the role of their respective domestic politics for inter-state relations. The methods made available for studying and understanding the

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subsequent decision-making processes are put into the context of states' response to a threat of force (owing to a clash of preferences), which brings tension in inter-state affairs that has the potential to escalate into a war. The model worked out by Schultz is self-situated between 'neorealism and democratic peace theory' (p. 16) and pivots itself on the role of information in international relations, rather than on the interaction 'between interests and outcomes' (p. 17). The exploration of a series of statistical analyses and historical case studies, combined with the meticulously arranged and very helpful appendices on crisis bargaining, provide the necessary background, for solving the main riddle in this study: how will the spread of democracy affect 'the role of force in politics among nations' (p. 235). In his attempt to provide an answer to such a query, Schultz differentiates between selective and effective aspects of the threats to use force. The former feature deals with the nature of public contestation in a democratic environment, which places constraints on the government to issue threats and engage in international warmongering. The latter is based on the credibility of a threat and the signal that it sends to the target state. Schultz's treatment of the empirical evidence convinces him 'that democracy lowers the probability that the state will initiate or become the target of a crisis that escalates to war' (p. 234), because the space it provides for open public debate 'mitigates the problems associated with asymmetric information, reducing the attendant danger of military conflict' (p. 10). But if they have to use force, the threat issued by a democratic state is 'more credible [and it is] resisted at a lower rate' (p. 114).

What can be found problematic with this research is the premise of the study that 'international crises are driven by states' efforts to communicate and/or exploit private information' (p. 6). Following this statement, the subsequent discussions and inferences of the interaction between democracy and coercive diplomacy are played out in the context of nation-states' interaction, where the major concern is 'the need to defend the national interest in a dangerous world' (p. 20). The emergence of what has been called supranational (non-national)/economic states/entities on the horizon of political theory has not been considered by the author. Moreover, despite the number of examples and empirical evidence provided as supplementary material, (at times) one cannot help feeling like being present at a series of laboratory experiments, which although quite fascinating would not pertain to the immediate world of international relations. However, a dismissal of Schultz's exploration on these counts would be too harsh a verdict for such an informative and dedicated study. Instead, an explanation could be found in Schultz's thrust to emphasize his own train of thoughts, by consciously sidelining some other theoretical aspects that might have muddled the reader and could have cost the consistency of his line of argumentation. Perhaps a footnoted discussion on the importance of third-party actors (corporations, non-profits, etc.) or mediation could have endowed such an investigation with an added dimension of more immediate applicability. Another would-be flaw (well-acknowledged by the author) is the glossing over the nature of the preferences that the different sides could have when involved in an inter-state crisis situation. The study takes nearly for granted that the challenger and the target would like a share of the goods that are at stake. However, in a situation when the challenger's interest is not in the distribution but in the destruction of the target and the goods altogether, then the models developed by the author would not hold water. That is why a more in-depth analysis of the types of preferences that individual actors might have in international relations could have saved Schultz's study from some undeserved criticism.

Nevertheless, despite these weaknesses the conclusions on the relation between the spread of democracy and the existence of war would be very informative both for the student and practitioner of international relations. The perspectives from the theory of information, which Schultz takes, make his investigation a very important and

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stimulating work in the field. It will therefore be very useful for anyone working and dealing with international security issues; and perhaps, it would provoke others to further and elaborate the issues stirred up by Schultz's research.

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Nationalism in Italian Politics: The stories of the Northern League 1980-2000
Damian Tambini
Routledge, 2001
HBK: ISBN 0-415-24698-9 £50.00
Xvi + 176 pp., (including: 10 tables, 5 figures, bibliography &, index).

As its title suggests, *Nationalism in Italian Politics* is a volume that, in some of its chapters at least, seeks to challenge conventional accounts of the emergence and growth of the Northern League. 'Nationalism' is a notion that has tended not to be used comfortably in connection with the League given the absence, on the part of the groups it claims to represent, of most of the basic attributes of nationhood. But this is the author's basic point, set out in chapter one: nations are posited entities, socially constructed through processes of political mobilisation, and the League has repeatedly sought to use political mobilisation for this purpose. The book's central thesis, then, is that if we are correctly to understand the League phenomenon, we have to see it as a nationalist movement, where 'nationalism' is a political strategy that mobilises people because it is a set of claims that provides a feeling of ethnic identity. It provides this identity by marking, in public communication, symbolic boundaries that define 'in' and 'out' groups and that thereby make previously apolitical groups self-conscious as political actors.

Of course, nationalist identity construction was not a strategy that the League could successfully apply at will: it required fertile terrain, and chapter two describes in rich detail those features of the historico-social context that were most relevant for the League's growth: the growing economic divide between North and South, and accompanying internal migration, from the 1950s on; a 'blocked' political system and growing discontent with the 'political class'; cultural stereotypes and widespread latent hostility among northerners towards southerners. Subsequent chapters outline the various phases of the movement's development – from the origins of the Lombard League in the early 1980s to the formation of the Northern League in 1990; from the League's participation in government in 1994, to its search for a new stance to distinguish itself in the electoral market in the years thereafter. There is also a chapter on the organisation of the League. This, besides providing a description of the League's internal design also provides a useful overview of the social characteristics and attitudes of voters and members during the period of its growth.

As, to my knowledge, the first book-length study of the Northern League to be made available in English, this volume will be of undoubted value to both undergraduate and graduate students of Italian politics and contemporary history in the English-speaking world. However, I am less sure how useful it will be to specialists of Italian politics and the League. For while the 'nationalist' reading of the League is interesting, the chronology of the League's development, to which the larger part of the work is devoted will, one suspects, already be quite familiar to the specialist.

I am not sure, either, just how *much* the author's 'nationalist' interpretation contributes to our understanding of the League. There are two points here. First, many of the

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features (especially identity construction) that Tambini takes as typical of nationalism as a mobilising device and that he regards as so central to understanding the League are in no sense unique to it and may well be deployed, with greater or lesser success, by most parties. As Tambini himself acknowledges, 'there is a strong argument to be made that identity is the key resource in any attempt to create a political movement' (p. 14). But if that is the case, we are left wondering exactly what purchase it gives us on the growth of the League in particular. Second, if, as the author argues, 'federalism, 'ethno-nationalism', separatism and the cultural stereotyping that go with them were merely tools for … the assault on state power by the League' (p. 128), then the question remains, what was it about the League that was driving the application of these tools, and what was the nature of the link between such 'driving forces' on the one hand and the external conditions (North-South divide, crisis of the traditional governing class etc) which, on the other hand, are conventionally thought of as having contributed to the League's success? One's guess is that the author would regard the question itself as illegitimate, as evidence of the 'essentialism' (p. 6) of which he regards much earlier research on the League as having been guilty. But I have to confess that I fail to grasp the argument. I grant that the League is many things 'in part, none of them fully, and more besides' (isn't this true of most things?); but surely the point is that analysing the League as one or other of these things allows us to understand it better than if we analyse it as something else. If I am both a father and a member of a university, the chances are you will understand my behaviour towards my children better if you analyse it in terms of the concept 'fatherhood' than if you analyse it in terms of the concept 'academic'.

In sum, therefore, the author tends to overstate his case somewhat. That said, viewed, in more modest terms, as a descriptive account of the growth of the League to its height in 1994/5 (the period since then is dealt with, more briefly, in the final chapter) it is hard to find fault with this book. It is certainly a 'must' for inclusion on the reading lists of most Italian politics courses.

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