

Conflict Resolution: Theories and Practice

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The Diplomacy of Conflict Resolution
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States have always sought both to pursue or to reduce conflict, as they work to maximize their security, the primary goal of foreign policy. Conflicts that are winnable are to be pursued, to the degree that the stakes are important and the means are available to the state; conflicts that are not or are damaging to the states are to be reduced. This goes for both one's own conflicts and the conflicts of others, the latter, again, to the extent that they matter to the third party state (Zartman 2010). Over time, however, the weights of these considerations have evolved somewhat, and the means by which they have been conceived and conducted have also developed. Hence a consideration of the diplomacy of conflict resolution could well focus either on the constancy of its prime parameters, despite the contextual changes in which it operates, or on the new emphases that have evolved, despite the constancy of the basic process. This discussion will do the latter, with the understanding that claims about what is new are usually only highlighting shifts in emphasis rather than total novelties.

Four such shifts in emphasis are significant to the topic. *Security* has moved from exclusive application to the state to inclusive application to its population as well. *Prevention* has come to orient states' policies beyond simply reaction to conflict and crises. *Scope* of states has expanded from purely bilateral or at most regional to global interests. The *arena* of conflict has shifted from a primarily interstate to a largely intrastate level. Each will be examined in turn for its role in the evolution of the diplomacy of conflict resolution, although together all four form an interrelated ball of wax.

Security

International relations were long treated as interstate relations, and when domestic conflicts were involved, it was as incidents concerning state security. This is still strongly true, but at the same time, there is a rising concern on many fronts about human security, the security of people, populations, and human lives. This concern is reflected in the significant rise in importance of humanitarian conditions, emergencies, and intervention, bypassing the state and often holding the state responsible for the plight of its citizens. Humanitarian efforts are the turf of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), both as direct intervenors and as advocates who seek to mould public opinion and state policy. But they are also the stuff of state actions, as they lead diplomacy into areas that were earlier considered out of bounds.

The no-fly zone in northern (Kurdish) Iraq in **19xx** and the relief operation in Somalia in 1992 were the first two UN operations justified as humanitarian interventions, in areas where the US and other Security Council members had no direct interest. Arguably, the UN intervention in the crumbling state of Kampuchea (Cambodia) was a humanitarian operation, even though not justified as such, where most of the UNSC member had no direct interest but all were impelled by the murderous insecurity of the Cambodian people. On the other side of the policy divide, the same UNSC members (except, later in "Turquoise," France) avoided intervention in the Rwandan genocide where no national interests were at stake, but were roundly criticized by public opinion and by other states for their inaction (or for one-sided action in the case of France).

In addition, a growing number of conflict resolution or management demarches driven by concern for human security have marked a number of countries' foreign policy. Norway has developed a calling to mediation, notably in offering good offices to Guatemalans in **198x** and Palestinians and Israelis in the Oslo negotiation in 1993 and then in seeking to mediate the internal conflict in Sri Lanka in 2007. A unique institutionalized multilateral effort is the

Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), specifically devoted to the preservation of human security.

Most notably, the shift to human security has brought about two major reorientations in international law that pose important problems still awaiting a lengthy political and legal examination. One is the Responsibility to Protect (R2P); the other is universal jurisdiction. R2P replaces the standard but dangerous doctrine of Sovereignty as Protection, accepted since the Peaces of Westphalia of 1648, with the equally dangerous notion of Sovereignty as Responsibility (Deng et al 1994; Evans and Sahnoun 2002). The first protects the state from external interference, particularly from stronger states, giving it the right to do what it wants with its population, whereas the latter protects the population against its own state, empowering others—particularly stronger states—to intervene to accomplish that protection if the state does not live up to its responsibilities to its own people. The dangers are evident, to the people in the first case and to the smaller states in the second. The international community has not yet worked out the limits and thresholds of the new doctrine, and the risks involved have caused it to take a less prominent place interstate politics and discussion after the mid-2000s—despite being adopted by the UN Summit in 200x—than in the previous decade. Nevertheless, the new doctrine is on the table, giving a criterion for action in conflicts contradictory to that of the previous doctrine.

Universal jurisdiction and international criminal courts have had the same effect and as a results are undergoing the same type of defining debate. Where formerly legal accusations and more broadly class action suits could be brought against individuals within the plaintiff's country, universal jurisdiction opens such suits for crimes against humanity to be brought against defendants outside the country by plaintiffs only broadly concerned. Furthermore, political leaders and followers can be indicted and tried for crimes against humanity by international tribunals, either with global jurisdiction similar to that of the International Court of Justice, as in the International Criminal Court (ICC), or else with jurisdiction limited to a specific country, as in the International Tribunals on Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. All of these legal innovations carry the issue of human security directly into the offending state, with incontrovertible effect.

These various mechanisms that reflect new directions in security, away from state to human concerns, pose major problems of orientation and contradiction. While human security policy in regard to the Kurds was consistent with the rest of US policy toward Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the implications of action in Somalia and Rwanda were complicating for the US as for other countries, and in the end brought heavy opprobrium for getting out and for not getting in, respectively. R2P was, in part, the consequence, but the doctrine poses immediately the implementary question: when and how? The first major application of R2P was in Iraq in 2003, to widespread world condemnation because the required UNSC majority was not available, even though intervention in Iraqi Kurdistan in **1999**, Kosovo in 1999, **and** Macedonia in 2001, occurred without UNSC authorization. Thereafter, for the rest of the decade, the responsibility to protect human security became elusive, despite opportunities to do so in Zimbabwe, Congo, Darfur, and Sri Lanka, among others. Because of the authority of the action, universal and international criminal courts jurisdiction over human security issues poses major problems for conflict management efforts toward the states in question. Mediation in Sudan and Uganda has been seriously impeded by ICC indictments brought against Omar al-Bashir, president of Sudan, and Joseph Kony, rebel guru in Uganda. Mediator relations between Great Britain and the Middle East have been seriously complicated by the threats of suits to be brought against Israeli public figures over the Gaza incursion of January 2009. Diplomacy to resolve conflicts overstate security is often at cross purposes with efforts to protect human security.

As an extreme ample, a salient case of conflict in the current era concerns the basis of self-determination. Since the World War I era at the beginning of the twentieth century, the

overriding policy guideline has been that of national self-determination. The effect of the doctrine was originally extremely limited, applying only to selected empires, the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman. An attempt was made to create new states that approximated the territorial limits of major nationalities. When the doctrine was carried to its logical application, as by the Egyptian Wafd movement, to justify post-colonial independence, it was summarily rejected, to be applied to European colonies only a war later. After World War II, the term “national” was given an equally formal definition, referring only to constituted colonial territories and thereby slipping into a new guideline defined as state self-determination (Emerson). The notion was locked in in Africa by the application of *uti possedetis* to sanctify and nationalize often badly-drawn colonial boundaries and to launch states on the process of constructing a state nation, in the absence of a nation state Thompson and Zartman; Zartman 19878. In both periods, many nationalities were crammed into states dominated by one majority, pieces of which were often assigned to other states. State self-determination has strengthened its hold over post-Cold War conflict management, dominating the settlements over the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and disregarding human (ethnic) criteria. Post-Cold War self-determination in Africa followed the same state criterion in regard to Eritrea, Somaliland, and (stretching it) Southern Sudan although with less damage to national criteria at the same time. But instances of claimed national self-determination of Albanians in Macedonia, Serbs in Kosovo, Armenians in Azerbaijan, Indians in Chiapas, Tamils in Sri Lanka, and Diolas and others in Casamance have been rejected. National self-determination would have caused major squabbles and conflicts over the shape of the new units, a fact that doubtless played a large role in the diplomatic adoption of state self-determination as the criterion.

Nonetheless, significant diplomatic efforts have been made to advance human security in the midst of conflict. The initial intervention in Somalia in 1992 was the result of a shock imparted to the Bush administration by the famine. The same administration issued the 1990 Christmas warning on Kosovo in the face of impending mass killing, which then took place throughout the decade and finally brought on diplomatic efforts at Rambouillet and then the NATO bombings in 1999 to eventually bring about Kosovar independence in 2008. Diplomatic and then physical interventions in Haiti in the early and again late 1990s and then in 2010 were the result of compelling attention to human security. UN mediation in the intrastate conflicts in El Salvador in the 1980s and Guatemala in the 1990s was impelled by the same concern.

Prevention

Certainly in past times, diplomacy sought to prevent crises among states, and one can well analyze and even judge interstate relations as an exercise of “normal diplomacy,” an ideal type akin in International Relations to “normal politics” in comparative politics. Normal diplomacy is based on the notion, contained in official instructions, that the prime task of ambassadors is to promote good relations between the home and the host state (Freemen 83, 84, 85, 274; Satow, deCallieres) and, by extension, to prevent conflicts between them. It works, as testified by the literally innumerable conflicts that have not taken place or have not escalated into worse violence, and by some specific cases where a diplomat was the agent of prevention. The history of diplomacy emphasizes this focus, but the delicate balance that characterized the Cold War carried with it a particular emphasis on crisis prevention (Brecher, COW). The focus, of course, was on bipolar relations.

But the focus on prevention of conflicts was earlier, deeper and now more pronounced in the post-Cold War period. It should be understood, to begin with, that the word “conflict” is subject to confusing usage, referring both to a simple incompatibility between positions and at other times to the violent expression of that incompatibility. Conflict per se is an

inevitable, even useful, aspect of human relations; even when passive conflict—the state of incompatibilities of positions—becomes active through escalation, it is part of normal relations. However, it also carries the seed of violence, if parties become too strongly attached to their positions and feel that further escalation into violence will enable them to prevail. It is necessary to examine and deal with conflicts before they become violent, in order to prevent crises but also to understand the source of the violence when it does occur. Therefore the aim is to tend conflicts before they escalate into violence, fend off conflicts that are in the violent stage, and mend conflicts that have been deescalated from violence (Hamburg; Cohen and Albright; .

In strategic terms, conflicts tend to take the form of a Prisoners' Dilemma Game (PDG) where deadlock where an outcome favorable to the opponent is the worst possible, worse than continued conflict. Normally, the conflict is continued by each party in order to attain its preferred outcome, by means that can either be violent, political or simply suspended; most conflicts follow one of the latter two paths. Conflict management refers to efforts to keep the conflict on those two levels; only if the incompatibilities that give rise to the conflict are removed can one talk of conflict resolution. If one party's goal becomes simply to prevent the other party from attain *its* preferred outcome, possibilities for conflict management begin to appear, and when the parties decide that continued conflict or stalemate is the outcome most to be avoided, those possibilities become salient, as in a Chicken Dilemma Game (CDG) (Snidel 1985; Goldstein 2010). Conflict prevention then means elimination or blockage of the means of pursuing the conflict that are violent and tending conflicts before they become so.

It was Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld who pressed the notion of preventive diplomacy and then his distant successor, Boutros Boutros Ghali, who brought it back into prominence, after a Cold War interlude. During the 1990s, preventive diplomacy was also addressed by academic analysis within nongovernmental research organizations. The Council on Foreign Relations undertook a group study on *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* where legitimacy was linked to a collective decision but also to the effectiveness of international organizations facing new challenges.ⁱ (Damrosch 1993). The US Institute of Peace published a strategic toolkit and analysis for conflict prevention by Michael Lund (1996).ⁱⁱ Under the inspiration of David Hamburg, the Carnegie Corporation set up its Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, that sponsored a broad collection of investigations into prevention, culminating in Jane Holl (Lute)'s *Preventing Deadly Conflict* (1997), followed by Jentleson's *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Prevented* (2000) and Zartman's *Preventive Negotiation* (2001).

On the official side, the 2000 meeting of the G-8 foreign ministers in Japan produced the *G-8 Miyakazi Initiative for Conflict Prevention* that laid out a strategy of “chronological comprehensiveness” covered structural prevention, early and late prevention, and post-conflict peace building. A notable attempt to address the questions of measures and mandates was the Swedish Initiative in connection with the Swedish presidency of the European Union (EU) in the first half of 2001, based on a 1999 report, *Preventing Violent Conflict*, that was designed to focus and energize Swedish and eventually EU policy to develop a culture of prevention.ⁱⁱⁱ

These various paths of attention came together in the Canadian-sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), whose 2001 report *The Responsibility to Protect*, took up the same theme to state that although “the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself, . . . where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.” (Deng et al 1996; Deng and Zartman 200x)^{iv} It also declared, in bold type, that “prevention is the single most important dimension

of the responsibility to protect, ” and sought to shift the debate from the “right to intervene” to the “responsibility to protect.” Prevention is divided into structural or root-cause prevention and direct (operational) or conflict prevention, and military intervention is circumscribed by a just cause threshold, precautionary and operational principles, and right authority (ICISS 2001, I: xii-xiii, 22-27, 47-69). These concerns then found their place, along with the R2P doctrine, in the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel that was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit.

The subsequent decade, however, saw the doctrine of prevention running aground on the same sorts of difficulties as had the doctrines of R2P and human security. As in the previous case, the shoals were practical and conceptual. Practical difficulties concern the implementation of prevention. The UN doctrine on peacekeeping, as constituted in “Article VII/2” not written in the Charter, is that peacekeeping forces (PKF) are rigorously held to keeping a peace already agreed to rather than intervening in situations of violence; the Mission of the UN in Congo (MONUC) has stretch this doctrine toward intervention when it learned that no peace had been agreed to in Eastern Congo, but possible UN prevention was dodged in 1997 in Congo-Brazzaville on the grounds that peace had not taken hold (Zartman 1995; Zartman 1998). Preventing conflicts not yet violent from becoming so, a rising emphasis of the prevention doctrine (), is even more difficult, for it amounts to telling sovereign states not to pursue their conflict with external or, more seriously, internal enemies (Zartman 2010; Anstey and Zartman 2010;. Since intrastate conflict often arises from deprivations imposed by a narrowly based government or discriminations imposed on internal rivals, such advice and efforts to implement it are sharply resented by target states and their leaders. Governments carrying out a policy of violent conflict against an identified—and, almost necessarily, demonized—internal or external enemy are not likely to take kindly to external attempts to prevent their efforts for the defense of the country or regime.

The conceptual difficulties are similar to those of human security, and they underlie the practical difficulties. “What to prevent when” is a major operative as well as conceptual question. Early prevention is the most difficult to justify, for the chances of the foreseen event’s taking place are highly uncertain and, if prevented, never to be proven. Commentators call for early action to validate early warning, but the guarantees of a tropical storm warning turning into a tropical storm are inconclusive (Zartman and Faure 2005). Warnings and intervention to prevent Israel from carrying out expansionist policies that arguably will take it to Masada, or Egypt from carrying out repressive policies that predictably will introduce a Muslim Brotherhood takeover, or Iran from carrying out nuclear policies that will assuredly feed their persecution complex inevitably complicate attempts to cultivate better relations with the target countries. On the other hand, “early late” prevention efforts, before the conflict has reached the crisis or “too late” stage, have major obstacles of overcommitment to overcome, that earlier action would have avoided.

Nonetheless, preventive diplomacy has achieved notable successes in conflict management, and even resolution. The two preventive interventions in Macedonia by both physical and diplomatic means in 1992 and 2001 are frequently cited as the model cases (Lind 2000). Russian diplomatic intervention in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 1994 brought a management of the conflict that still holds, providing an eventual basis for resolution (Mooradian and Druckman ; Hopmann and Zartman 2010). The dissolution of the Soviet Union gave rise to some notable cases of preventive diplomacy in the Baltics, Ukraine and Near Abroad (Hopmann 2001; Jentleson 2000). Congo-Brazzaville in 1993 was an excellent case of native African preventive diplomacy, unfortunately unmatched in the revival of the conflict in 1997 (Zartman and Vogeli 2000)

Scope

The twentieth century displayed a striking spread of state concerns beyond the bilateral and the regional, at an astonishing pace. The two World Wars linked an European and an Asian theatre of operations; the Cold War made them one. Great power concerns have always extended beyond their immediate neighborhood; superpower concerns became global. Businesses became multilateral corporations that drew on world markets and outsourced and offshored their production around the globe (Friedman 2009). The most notable sign of globalism is the rise of a multinational corporation with a secret, mobile headquarters, a corporate culture, multinational branches and international cadres, diaspora and criminal protection funding, IT and electronic communications, and state security penetration to attack a worldwide range of targets, named The Leadership (al-Qaeda).

There are three reasons for this extension of diplomacy and national interest around the world: strategic interests, new national interest, and human security (again). *Strategic interests* have a strongest effect on great and superpowers, as far away events have an increasingly direct effect on their concerns and welfare. Although the colonial era has passed, the former metropolises maintain their historic interest and economic ties, as well as political relations, with their former colonies. Superpower strategic concerns more often tended to be preemptive, demanding an interest in order to prevent the other superpower from gaining a foothold, rather than deriving from direct interest in Third World areas. Cold War interest rushed in to fill the vacuum left by colonial withdrawal; when the Cold War ended, the decline of preemptive interests produced a similar withdrawal, and the Third World area burst out into their own conflicts, liberated from the constraints that their Cold War protectors had imposed. At that point, strategic interests returned in their own right, as the US is drawn into Sudan, Darfur, Somalia, Philippines, and the Sahara and Sahel by concern about al-Qaeda, and into Congo and Burma by concern for stability in a strategic and unstable neighborhood. But other great powers and members of the UNSC find themselves responsible for the course events in troubled areas, including Congo, Sudan, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Palestine, because of their position in the UN and because of their concept of interests that goes beyond their immediate neighborhood.

National interests have gone some way (not all the way) in the minds in many capitols in moving from national interests that are qualified as “narrow” to those termed “enlightened.” The first have long been dominant in diplomatic and Realist thinking, much as was the doctrine of Sovereignty as Protection. They relate to a geostrategic concern for national independence, territorial integrity and protection of the country’s way of life and standard of living (Morgenthau?). The latter are concerned with the maintenance of collective agreements and reciprocal security, under the Liberal or Institutionalist perspective that reciprocity is an important interest for the assurance of mutual security (Ikenberry 19xx). Thus, it is important for states to cooperate in managing farflung conflicts and to conceive of their interests in terms of mutual assurances of security and stability. In a memorable statement, Amb. Christopher Hill indicated that the purpose of the 6-party talks was to convince North Korea (DPRK) that its security would be better assured by taking its place in the international community than by unilateral measures that only threaten the other members of that community (). Managing distant conflicts builds on that notion and fact of an international community with reciprocal obligations that reduce conflict and justify intervention.

Human security provides a powerful motivation for the global extension of diplomacy beyond the direct effect noted above. Whereas states were formerly concerned with their own state security, as under the rubric of narrow national interests, or with reciprocal state security obligations, as under the notion of enlightened national interests, they now find themselves drawn into conflicts where they have no state

interest at all but where the horror of the human condition compels a response. The effect of this new criterion for action has already been discussed, above, but its impact on the scope of diplomatic activity is relevant to the consideration of globalism in conflict management. A striking example is the unexpected intervention of the US in the Somali situation in 1992, justified only by humanitarian concerns (unlike some other humanitarian interventions as in Kurdistan which were justified by strategic concerns as well). But the effect is equally notably evidenced in the diplomacy of other states. The most marked example is Norway, which has no national interests, enlightened or otherwise, in East or West Asia or Latin America, but extended important efforts into the mediation of the Guatemalan, Israeli and Sri Lankan conflicts, for purely humanitarian reasons.

In such cases, the combined reasons of strategic, enlightened national and humanitarian interest stretch the notion of interest far beyond its earlier definitions. Even smaller states have become involved in conflict management around the world, and have put their reputations on the line in the search for solutions. As in case of other sources of shift in emphasis, this stretch is not unilinear; it has its ebbs and flows. Overstretch causes domestic reaction and the country pulls back to a reduced circumference of interests. Then new events pull on the reasoning of strategy, enlightenment and/or humanity and the country or countries are impelled back into conflict management. The dynamic is interesting: a country may return to an expanded role invigorated, or timid, or pushed by a public reaction or electoral change, or it may pull back further, although the record of the US shows that isolationism can produce a more timid response but scarcely a full pullback from world events and interests.

Nonetheless, global interest has led to notable successes in conflict management, and even resolution. The multiple roles of Norway in Guatemala, Israel and Sri Lanka, outside its sphere of interest, have been noted. More broadly, the Scandinavian countries have been active in East Africa in development diplomacy. The US played the decisive role in bringing independence to Namibia and an end to the South African conflict with Angola, and was helpful in the change of regime in South Africa itself (Lyman). The US was pulled in to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan by its cold war interests in the 1980s and by its anti-terrorist interests in the 2000s, but the area, along with Central Asia in general, was long beyond US interests. In fact, the attention of the Security Council members was drawn to Kosovo and Cambodia in intense diplomatic efforts at conflict management, in new extensions of their previous interests.

Arena

While internal conflicts, from riots to revolutions, have pockmarked normal politics and normal diplomacy over millennia, the post-War and then post-Cold War eras have seen a notable decrease of interstate wars and a corresponding increase of intrastate conflict. Despite or because of the touchiness of numerous pairs of interstate relations, escalation to war has become rare; in some deep-seated cases, such as India-Pakistan, Israel-Palestine, Morocco-Algeria, Iran-Israel, among others, Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) stalemates reminiscent of the Cold War have frozen the conflict and prevented a cataclysm from erupting. At the same time, the end of the Cold War brought into question the power, authority and centrality of the state in economy, society and polity in much of the Third and Second World. Democracy legitimized opposition and removed the monopoly of power from government; free enterprise encouraged competition and shattered a centralized economy; the end of bipolarity undercut foreign support for single-party regimes and shredded the philosophical support for democratic centralism and the general will. In addition, attempts to

create a state nation in the absence of a nation state sidelined traditional nations, tribes and ethnic groups and, contrarily, raised their salience when central state efforts were weakened. The result has been an absolute rise in internal, often ethnic, conflicts to challenge the weakened state and foster the collapse of post-independence social contracts, increasing in numbers in the 1990s followed by a decline and then rise again in the first 2000 decade (MAR; Uppsala).

Internal conflicts are a different kind of animal from interstate conflicts. Intrastate conflicts are often referred to as asymmetric, an insightful but not complete characterization. They involve unequal parties in terms of both power and legitimacy: the state is the stronger of the two parties, at least through much of the conflict, and the state is the sovereign, legitimate actor. This means that the rebels have to lead a triple struggle against odds—for attention, for power, and for legitimacy. But they do have an equalizing weapon, and that is commitment. Unlike a state, their cause is their only cause, and they are dedicated fanatics in its pursuit, taking up arms to call attention to their grievance. They have to, or they would soon be overwhelmed by the normal calculations of power. They seize the opportunity to claim legitimacy as spokesmen for their deprived and discriminated population and then seek to destroy the legitimacy of the state as ruler of the whole political system (Montville, Zartman 1995). The result has been a challenging need to revise the nature of conflict management diplomacy, to overcome obstacles to entry into negotiations, to reconceptualize attainable outcomes and retool for effective intervention.

Diplomacy is generally beyond the experience of the rebels and beyond the intentions of the state. At least initially, the rebels are a badly organized, inchoate body, with any political sense subsumed under the military demands of the struggle. Later in the struggle, if it is long enough, they can develop the elements of a proto-state, further complicating the nature of the conflict. If an agreement to manage or resolve the conflict finally comes, it poses the problem of rebuilding the state, to some extent if the conflict is only managed and to a greater extent as diplomacy moves toward conflict resolution where the dangers of “business as usual during remodelling” are enormous. When states make peace among themselves, the signing units generally remain intact and continue operations; when the parties end an internal conflict, they are under deep internal strains and have to construct new relations within the political system.

Rebels frequently are simply not organized to act and think as negotiators and need training to be able to participate in conflict management. During a decade of armed struggle, RENAMO had only a vague idea of what it was fighting for, as opposed to against, and need training and coaching in meeting the Mozambican government in negotiations. The same problem faced the several Darfuri rebel groups in Sudan, the RUF in Sierra Leone, and the UNITA in Angola. Even when the goal (independence) was clear in the rebels’ minds, the requirements of give and take in a situation where their victory was not acquired were foreign to the rebels’ abilities, as in the case of the Polisario in Morocco, Hamas in Palestine, the FARC and ELN in Colombia, and the LTTE in Sri Lanka. Thus, mediation is needed, not only to bring the parties together on an agreeable outcome but to train the parties how to act in looking for such an outcome.

A particular problem is the multiplication of rebel movements as the conflict moves toward negotiation and, presumably, resolution. Mediators and negotiators dealing with rebel movements often seek to split the movement and play on its factionalism in order to find leadership—often the political as opposed to the military wing—willing to talk conflict reduction. But what is often a necessary tactical move can work in the opposite direction. Rebel factions see that their movement as a whole won concessions—including willingness to negotiation—from the government by continued resistance; so they break ranks with the main movement to hold out for their own benefits or sometime to race to an agreement before the main body. The proliferation of rebel movements as the conflict goes on tests the process of

conflict management. Proliferation was destructive to negotiations in Liberia and Darfur (Zartman 2005; Mutwol 2009; Brooks 2009).

Another aspect of the need to reorient conflict management diplomacy concerns the role of the military. The world's armed forces are undergoing serious reconceptualization as the conflicts they deal with shifts from interstate to intrastate. Conventional military tasks and tactics are totally out of place in handling rebellions. The intervening military is a third force, unable to rely on official armed forces or on the rebels, and cast in a role that is not simply one of supporting the state's self-defense. The military is often a peacemaker and institution-rebuilder in its own right, while at the same time a force to restore local security. This challenge is predominant in many current intrastate conflicts, from the Trans-Sahel Initiative to the military missions in Darfur and eastern Chad to the large theatres of operation in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Entry is a particular challenge for internal conflict management (Maundi). The state generally resists mediation, since it is interference in internal affairs and implies that the state cannot handle its own problems. Mediation is generally a boost to the weaker, internal party, and it raises the question of recognition and position as equal in the negotiations, the prime goal of the rebellion, who seeks state recognition as valid spokesman for the cause or the people it claims to represent.

A particular challenge to diplomatic entry is the practice of "diplomacy as usual" that is dominant in most situations of internal conflict. As noted, the conduct of normal diplomacy is based on the premise that the ambassador's job is to cultivate good relations between his/her country and the host country. This lends the ambassador to adopt the state's position on the rebellion and to turn a blind eye to the fact that, whatever their merits, rebellions are generally an indicator of a problem. In large and underdeveloped countries, embassies are concentrated in the capital, away from the scene of the conflict and away from intelligence and understanding of the conditions of the area. This problem troubled US policy in the second half of the 1990s as the government of President Sese Seko Mobutu collapsed, and it continued to limit a positive US role in the subsequent phases of the War of the Zairian Succession.

Outcomes in internal conflict are also of a different nature than in interstate wars. The restoration of peace between two sovereign states, with resolving attention to issues (such as boundary disputes) that started the conflict, and the return to the states' daily business is a far cry from internal settlements that tend to involve the creation of a new political system and the readjustment of social groups' roles and practices. DDRR(R) require new facilities through which to retrain the demobilized forces, a new combined military force within which to reintegrate the former enemies, and a functioning economy within which to reinsert the unemployed soldiers. The economy needs rebuilding, which often involves social restructuring, ethnic integration, infrastructural reconstruction, and new investments. The polity has to be restructured to involve former excluded forces, and new institutions must be installed and begun to run. Some of this may part of an interstate peace settlement, to be sure, but in no way in the depth and complexity that internal peace settlements require.

A current research concern with the durability of peace agreements (Fortna, Walter, Gartner, Collier, Z) show that there is a high tendency for conflict areas to return to conflict (the Conflict Trap) and that durability is associated with international monitoring and attention, as well as attention through peace dividends to initial and conflict-driven grievances. The challenge to conflict diplomacy is to maintain attention and engagement in the conflict area long after the peace agreement is signed, a demanding requirement in the face of donor fatigue and distraction by other new or renewed conflicts. The international community is simply not tuned to the need for longterm support for peacebuilding efforts. The story of Haiti, where it took a full collapse of the peace process of the mid-1990s to finally get a longterm international commitment for sustained attention in the 2000s. Similar

problems of the lack of sustained commitment have weakened peace diplomacy in Palestine, Congo, Lebanon, and Northern Ireland, among others.

Nonetheless, conflict management diplomacy has produced a few notable successes that have overcome these challenges to negotiation, entry and outcomes. Mozambique and South Africa, both in the early 1990s, are important instances of internal conflict management and even resolution diplomacy. Negotiations for Namibian independence in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s ended in a solid resolution in 1988 but were essentially interstate. Other cases can be cited for progress, although their lingering recurrence calls into doubt their ultimate success; such are the negotiation of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement, concluded in 2005, whose application with 2010 elections and a 2011 referendum is in doubt; the 1987 Taif agreement on Lebanon that certainly ended the violence with conflict management but left the conflict far from resolution; the Angolan negotiations of the 1990s never managed the conflict until Jonas Savimbi was killed in 199x. Other such attenuated cases abound.

Conclusion

This essay has been designed to highlight developments in conflict management diplomacy, involving security, prevention, scope and arena. In all of these areas, the evolution concerns a shift in emphasis rather than a sharp innovation or reorientation. However, the final point in analysing these changes is that they can frequently complicate the practice of normal interstate diplomacy, making the achievement of good relations between states more difficult to attain. Human security arouses conflicting interpretations among allies, prevention requires measures that make it difficult to mind one's own business, global outreach takes countries into areas where they do not traditionally belong, and intrastate conflicts bring out the maxim that mediating is meddling.

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