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The Power of Perception: The Impact of the Macedonian Question on Inter-ethnic Relations in the Republic of Macedonia

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Introduction

The present article explores the impact of the Macedonian Question on the relations between the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority in the Republic of Macedonia. The central argument put forth here is that the attitudes of Bulgaria and Greece, and to a lesser extent Serbia and Albania, towards the Macedonian nation, influence the ongoing conflict between Macedonians and Albanians as to the kind of state the Republic of Macedonia should be. At the heart of the Macedonian Question are conflicting perceptions and dogmas of the ethnic origin of the Macedonian nation, and the specific question of whether a distinct Macedonian nation actually exists.

The Bulgarian perception of the Macedonians has historically been – and remains – that the Macedonian people originate from the Bulgarian nation and that the Macedonian language is simply a dialect of Bulgarian. Therefore, from a Bulgarian point of view, the territory of the Republic of Macedonia is culturally and nationally Bulgarian. Although political leaders in Sofia today officially maintain that Bulgaria makes no territorial claim on Macedonia, the Bulgarians nonetheless retain a strong attachment to Macedonia, which in turn is influenced by the fact that many Bulgarians originally arrived in Bulgaria as immigrants from Vardar and Aegean Macedonia. The Bulgarian attitude is illustrated by the decision to recognise the Macedonian state in the early 1990s while refusing to acknowledge the existence of a distinct Macedonian nation.

Greece, in turn, opposes the application of the name 'Macedonia' to any other place than what to them is Macedonia, namely, northern Greece, and denies the existence of any Macedonian national minority, claiming instead that those who call themselves Macedonians are Slavophone Greeks. Following the Republic of Macedonia's declaration of independence in 1991, Greece exerted great pressure within the European Union to deny the incipient republic diplomatic recognition unless it changed its name, and placed a trade embargo on Macedonia.

In contrast to Bulgaria and Greece, Serbia's position towards the Macedonians is more ambiguous. While Belgrade was instrumental in promoting a sense of Macedonian national consciousness during the communist era, Serbia has in the past often maintained that the territory of the Republic of Macedonia constitutes a southern part of Serbia and that ethnic Macedonians are Serbs by origin.

Albania, in turn, does not reject the existence of a Macedonian nation but given the relatively large Albanian population in the Republic of Macedonia, objects to the present constitutional structure that effectively makes Macedonia a state belonging primarily to the ethnic Macedonian majority where Albanians are relegated to the status of second-class citizens.

At the same time as Bulgaria and Greece continue to exert rhetorical and psychological pressure on the Macedonian nation and state, the conflict between the ethnic Macedonian and Albanian communities in the Republic of Macedonia continues, as the political leaders of the Albanian minority demand that Albanians be conferred the status of a constituent nation, on a par with the Macedonian nation, and that the Albanian language be made an official language of the

Republic of Macedonia, alongside the Macedonian language. From a Macedonian perspective, however, there is a widespread fear that the realisation of such demands from the Albanians, as well as potentially threatening claims from neighbouring states, would spell the end of the Macedonian nation-state.

The Power of Perception: National Identity and the Macedonian Question

A nation, according to Smith, can be defined as 'a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.' (Smith 1991: 14) This implies that each nation's history and experiences are unique and distinguishable from those of other nations. In the case of the Macedonian nation, however, its uniqueness and separateness has been strongly contested by several of Macedonia's neighbours, which in turn impacts on Macedonian domestic attitudes and policies towards its Albanian minority.

National identity is largely shaped by perceptions of self and other. Perceptions, in turn, are crucial in that they influence the information base on which people form beliefs and create 'truths'. They influence 'both what things are seen as facts, and what significance these "facts" carry...', and '...perceptions vary according to where the observer is located in relation to the thing viewed....' (Buzan 1991: 343) The subjectivity of perceptions, therefore, results in conflicting perceptions in general and, sometimes, conflicting perceptions of national identity and 'truth' in particular. The Macedonian Question is a case in point.

Perceptions play a significant role in the contentious Macedonian Question. As Troebst points out, the modern history of Macedonia from Serbian, Greek, Bulgarian and Macedonian points of view '...suffer[s] from one and the same distortion of perspective: [Macedonians, Serbs, Greek and Albanians] assume one single line of tradition that, however thin it may be, is considered to be decisive and is extended rigorously in both directions along the axis of time. Contemporary ideas are easily projected back into the past, just as historical facts are extrapolated into the present and then on into the future.' (Troebst 2001: 62) Consequently, competing perceptions about the origin, character and 'ownership' of Macedonia become intransigent as neither the Macedonians nor their neighbours consider the notion that '...nations exist in time ... are shaped by temporal processes and thus have temporal components.' (White 2000: 15) A reason for this is the importance of the territorial component of nations. That is, nations exist not only in time but also in space, as a '[s]ense of territory and emotional attachment to place are integral components of national identity.' (White 2000: 13) Nations, White notes, '...express their identities in the cultural landscape of places and territories.' (White 2000: 21) The emotional link between place and national identity is a crucial factor in the Balkan region, as one and the same place is often claimed by several nations, so that, for example, Kosovo is perceived as essential to both Serbian and Albanian expressions of national identity; the historical town of Ohrid in the Republic of Macedonia is claimed by the Bulgarians as an integral part of the Bulgarian national history, just as it is regarded by Macedonians as the cradle of their national culture; Salonika (now Thessaloniki in Greece) is regarded as an integral part of greater Macedonia, and so on. As White suggests, in the Balkans '...many nations feel that their identities have been violated because their territories have been continually transgressed by other nations.' (White 2000: 6) Hence, the problem of competing and conflicting perceptions of national identity and historical places in the Balkans is compounded by, on the one hand, the notion that national identities are fixed in



time and space and, on the other hand, the historical reality that a given piece of land in the Balkans has been ruled, in different time periods, by different states and empires.

The focal point of the Macedonian Question is the issue of the origins of the Slavic people inhabiting geographical Macedonia and, consequently, the issue of who has the right to the Macedonian lands as well as the ownership and significance of the name 'Macedonia'. In Roudometof's words, '...the central contemporary controversy concerns the manner in which Bulgarians, Greeks, and Macedonians view and interpret Macedonian identity. In particular the conflict centres on the premise that the Slavs of Macedonia constitute a distinct nation, the Macedonian nation.' (Roudometof 2000: 7)

Geographically, Macedonia is divided into three parts: Vardar Macedonia which constitutes the present Republic of Macedonia; Pirin Macedonia which is part of today's Bulgaria; and Aegean Macedonia which is the regional name of northern Greece. Historically, Macedonia has belonged to Bulgaria, Serbia, Byzantium and the Ottoman Empire at various times, although the Bulgarian claim to Macedonia is perhaps the most challenging and compelling. In the Byzantine era, 'the name "Macedonia" applied to part of what is now Thrace, and the territory of the present-day Republic of Macedonia was the core of the Byzantine province of Bulgaria.' (Drezov 2001: 55) As the Turks made headway into the Balkans, Macedonia came to be incorporated into the Ottoman Empire but, as Drezov notes, '[u]ntil the late nineteenth century the Turks did not even know that they were in occupation of a place called "Macedonia".' (Drezov 2001: 55)

The Macedonian Question was born in 1870 when Russia, on behalf of the Bulgarian nation, pressed the Ottoman Empire into allowing the creation of a Bulgarian Orthodox Church, or Exarchate, separate from the Greek Orthodox Church. The authority of this newly established Exarchate was to include parts of Macedonia, then an Ottoman province (Barker 1950: 7). Greece and Serbia felt their national interests threatened by this development and began to compete with the Bulgarians in extending their influence over Macedonia. As a result of the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, geographical Macedonia was divided, with Greece and Serbia taking the majority of the territory and Bulgaria being left with a minor part. Bulgaria had been against the division and, consequently, was compelled to ally itself with Germany in both world wars with the intention of regaining Macedonia.

It was not until the second half of the 1940s, when the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito established the Socialist Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - thereby elevating the Macedonian people to the status of nation - that it seemed as if the Macedonian Question had been resolved. Under the leadership of Tito, and with the blessing of Joseph Stalin, the Yugoslav political elite aimed at solving the national problems 'under the slogan of "Brotherhood and Unity", and the Macedonians were recognised for the first time as a separate nation.' (Poulton 2000: 125) Thus, Macedonia became the sixth constituent republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. According to Bell, it was with the founding of the Yugoslav Macedonian republic that a sense of a Macedonian national identity gained strength and became systematised. Under Yugoslav rule, and mainly directed from Belgrade, a Macedonian language was codified, an autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church was established, and academics 'developed a "usable past" and projected Macedonian national feeling far into history, for example by converting the medieval Bulgarian Empire of Tsar Samuil into a

Macedonian one and even claiming a link to Alexander the Great.' (Bell 1998: 193) As Perry points out, Tito's decision to promote a Macedonian national consciousness served several strategic purposes:

[the establishment of a Macedonian republic based on a Macedonian nation] undermined Bulgarian territorial claims to Macedonia and scotched the notion that Macedonians were Bulgarians. The recognition of a Macedonian nationality also made it difficult for Serbians to maintain that Macedonians were part of the Serbian nation. The founding of a Macedonian republic thus reduced the size of any potential Greater Serbia. Because it included a fair-sized Albanian minority, Yugoslav Macedonia also was a guarantee against a Greater Albania. (Perry 2000: 271)

Similarly strategic was Tito's naming of the Muslims in Bosnia as a separate nation, thereby offsetting competing Serbian and Croatian claims on Bosnia-Herzegovina, and for the duration of Tito's rule it seemed his strategic moves had brought peace and stability to the Balkans. Ironically, Tito's manoeuvres in Macedonia and Bosnia, including the 'establishment' of two new nations, were in part an effort to curb nationalism in the Yugoslav republics.

In Yugoslavia, the Macedonian nation acquired legitimacy in the face of Bulgarian and Greek claims. Therefore, when Yugoslavia began to crumble, the Macedonian leadership was initially in favour of remaining in the federation for security reasons, but as it became clear that a truncated Yugoslavia would be dominated by the Serbs, Macedonian political leaders concluded that in order to protect the Macedonian nation they had to declare an independent Macedonian state. As Macedonia gained independence, however, the security of the Macedonian nation was again at stake as the Macedonian Question re-emerged in 1991, illustrated by the actions and official attitudes of Bulgaria and Greece. While recognising the Macedonian state, Bulgaria refused to acknowledge the separateness of the Macedonian language from Bulgarian. Implicit in Sofia's position on the language issue was the denial of the existence of a Macedonian nation.

The Greek reaction to the Macedonian declaration of independence was characterised by vehement opposition to the application of the name 'Macedonia' to anything that was not Greek. Furthermore, according to Greek interpretations, the newly created constitution of the Republic of Macedonia made references not only to the lands of the Republic but also to territories within the Greek state. Finally, the issue of the flag of the Republic of Macedonia prompted anger in Athens, as the Macedonian flag carried the ancient Macedonian emblem, the Star of Vergina, which the Greeks regard as an integral part of the Greek cultural heritage.

Thus, issues concerning the Macedonian Question, some of which communism had temporarily suspended, regained momentum in the early 1990s. Without the protection of the Yugoslav federation, Macedonia found its security weakened and as a response to Bulgarian and Greek attitudes a more assertive and uncompromising strand of Macedonian nationalism emerged, which would have a significant influence on Macedonian-Albanian relations in the new state. As Poulton suggests, the aggressive assertion of Macedonian nationalism was a means to hide the potential weakness of the Macedonian nation and state (Poulton 2000: 172).



Macedonia and its Neighbours: Conflicting Perceptions of National Identity

As an independent state, the Republic of Macedonia found itself in various disputes with its neighbours during the 1990s, many of which were rooted in Macedonian, Greek, Bulgarian and to a lesser extent, Serbian sensitivities concerning national identity. For what has been at the core of these conflicts is the question of the origins of the Macedonian nation (Kofos 2001: 255).

Bulgaria

Although the Macedonian identity has been questioned by several nations and states in the Balkans, the Bulgarian perceptions of, and attitude towards, the Macedonian nation and territory is perhaps the most important and the Bulgarian case the most challenging one. Since Macedonia became an independent republic in 1991, Bulgaria has assumed the role of 'big brother', taking an overt interest in the political development in Macedonia, whilst assuring that Bulgaria makes no territorial claims on the Republic of Macedonia. From a Macedonian perspective, however, Bulgaria's self-declared big brother status has more often than not been regarded with suspicion. Despite the fact that Bulgaria's policy towards Macedonia today reflects a wish for neighbourly cooperation rather than aggressive nationalism, Macedonia is still considered by Bulgarians as an essential part of their national history and, therefore, what from a Bulgarian perspective is considered the protection of the Bulgarian national identity, is perceived by the Macedonians as a threat to their own national identity.

Bulgaria was the first country to extend formal diplomatic recognition to the Macedonian republic in 1992, but while recognising the state, it was clear that the Bulgarians did not accept the Macedonians as constituting a nation distinct from the Bulgarian. While the issue of the nation was not explicitly mentioned in the Bulgarian declaration of recognition - as in international law, it is the state, not the nation, that is officially recognised - it was nonetheless raised, indirectly, through the issue of language. The Macedonian language shares most of the characteristics that distinguishes Bulgarian from other Slav languages, hence prompting the Bulgarian view that Macedonian is nothing else than a Bulgarian dialect (Poulton 2000: 116). This became a source of contention between Bulgaria and Macedonia in the 1990s, as the former refused to employ interpreters or translators in official communications with the latter. While the question of the nation was a theoretical one, the issue of language was very much a practical one, including such essential questions as how to draft the necessary documents that would define the relationship between the Bulgarian and Macedonian republics. In 1992 the Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev explicitly stated that Bulgaria recognised the Macedonian state but not the nation (*The Independent* 1992: 11). Zhelev's remark was made in response to the Prime Minister of Greece, Constantine Mitsotakis, who reacted strongly to Bulgaria's decision to recognise the Macedonian state. To placate the Greeks, Zhelev reassured them that from a Bulgarian point of view, 'Macedonia' was only a geographical term and not the name of a nation (*The Independent* 1992: 11). Zhelev's remarks raised the issue of nation to a critical level between Bulgaria and Macedonia. In February 1999, however, the political leaders of both states signed a joint declaration that was aimed at resolving the language dispute between Bulgaria and Macedonia. Accordingly, both parties agreed to solve the practical problem of language by employing the formula, 'Bulgarian language according to the Bulgarian constitution and Macedonian language according to the Macedonian constitution'. (Williams 2000: 29) In this way, official documents between the two states could be drafted in both Bulgarian and Macedonian

without Bulgaria having to recognise the existence of a separate Macedonian language and, implicitly, nation. The issue of language was thus treated in legal terms and not as an ethno-national category.

According to Drezov, 'Bulgarians either deny the contemporary reality of a Macedonian nation and language, or – when they do acknowledge it – ascribe it entirely to Serbian, Comintern and Titoist propaganda.' (Drezov 2001: 51) Hence, the Bulgarians, as well as Macedonia's other neighbours and the Macedonians themselves, fail to consider the changing nature of national identity and language, a process illustrated by the observation that from the 1920s onwards the Bulgarian identity in Vardar and Aegean Macedonia went into decline (Drezov 2001: 51).

The Bulgarian perception of the Macedonian lands and people is further illustrated by the fact that Bulgaria still celebrates the 3rd of March as its national day. It was on this day in 1878, following the Russian liberation of the Bulgarian nation from Ottoman rule, that the San Stefano treaty was signed. Under this treaty most of geographical Macedonia was incorporated into the new Bulgarian state. But only a few months later the San Stefano treaty was annulled by the Great Powers at the Congress of Berlin and replaced by a second treaty, which severely truncated the territory of the Bulgarian state by handing back the Macedonian territory to the Ottoman Empire. The reason for this revision was British and Austro-Hungarian fears that a large Bulgarian state would inflate Russian influence in the Balkans. From a Bulgarian point of view, the replacement of the San Stefano treaty with the treaty of Berlin, and the consequent loss of Macedonia, violated the rights of the Bulgarian nation, as Bulgarians from Macedonia were unjustly left out of the new Bulgarian state. As Roudometof notes, '[e]ver since [the treaties of 1878], both the Bulgarian state and its intelligentsia have repeatedly asserted their claims to Macedonian territory, claims that are viewed as part of Bulgaria's process of national unification.' (Roudometof 2000: 6)

In regards to Bulgarian and Macedonian history, 'the Macedonian historical figures are also claimed by Bulgaria as Bulgarian heroes...' (Poulton 2000: 117), prompting many Bulgarians to insist that Bulgaria and Macedonia have a shared history that cannot be separated from each other. History, of course, plays a crucial role in nation-building, and one of the defining characteristics of a nation is that it perceives itself to have a unique history, separate from that of other nations. Hence, by asserting the shared history of the Bulgarians and Macedonians, the former effectively lays claim on the latter as being part of them. From a Macedonian point of view, in turn, there is an acutely felt need to assert the separateness and uniqueness of the Macedonian national identity by constructing a history and a language that cannot be identified with those of either the Bulgarians, nor the Serbs, nor Greeks.

Territory also plays an important part in Bulgarian assertions vis-à-vis the Macedonians, for not only do the two nations make claims to the same national heroes, but these historical figures, in turn, are directly associated with a particular place. The old town of Ohrid is a case in point. Located in today's Republic of Macedonia, Ohrid is claimed by both Macedonians and Bulgarians as the cradle of their national cultures and as capital of the medieval states of King Samuel. And when a monastery church in the Macedonian town of Lesok was destroyed in an attack by ethnic Albanian guerrillas in the summer of 2001, Bulgarian media lamented the destruction of this 'Bulgarian' church. Although Bulgaria today makes no official claims on the Macedonian territory, it



nonetheless continues to exert at least cultural pressure on the Macedonians. The Macedonian perspective of the Bulgarians remains grounded in the fear and suspicion that the latter's friendly attitude conceals more aggressive, nationalist sentiments that could be potentially threatening to the integrity of the Macedonian nation and territory. Such a fear is further exacerbated by the Bulgarian denial of the existence of a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria's Pirin region.

Greece

More direct and explicit in its attitude towards the Republic of Macedonia, Greece has exerted even stronger pressure on Macedonia than Bulgaria has. Official Greek policy since the end of the Greek Civil War has denied the existence of a Macedonian nation. But the Greek position differs from the Bulgarian in so far as it does not necessarily negate the existence of a distinct Slavic people in the Republic of Macedonia, but only the application of the name 'Macedonian' to this people. From a Greek perspective, the name Macedonia is, and has always been, considered 'a constituent element of Greek cultural heritage.' (Kofos 2001: 232) The Bulgarian position however, as noted earlier, was and remains that the Slavic people of the Republic of Macedonia do not constitute a people separate from the Bulgarians. Bulgarians, furthermore, do not object to the use of the name 'Macedonia' as they regard it as pertaining to a historical region, not a people (Kofos 2001: 232).

Hence, nationalists in Greece and Bulgaria both claim that the Macedonian nation is nothing more than an 'ideological construct' of the Cold War and of Tito's 'efforts to expand his reach into the southern Balkans. Indeed, Greeks and Bulgarians have suggested that ethnic heterogeneity and state-sponsored ethnogenesis cast doubt even on the Macedonians' claim to be a distinct nation or ethnic group.' (Roudometof 2000: 7) Athens' and Sofia's questioning of the existence of a uniquely Macedonian identity thus poses, if implicitly, a threat to the legitimacy of the Republic of Macedonia as the latter is founded on the principle of ethnic nationalism, that is, a Macedonian state for the ethnic Macedonian community.

In 1991 the newly independent Republic of Macedonia chose the Star of Vergina - a sun with sixteen rays and a symbol from the era of the ancient Macedonian kingdom - as the emblem on the Macedonian state flag. This prompted vehement protests from the Greeks who regard this symbol as distinctly Greek since, as they maintain, the ancient Macedonians were in fact nothing else but Greeks (Shea 1997: 190). The appropriation of the Star of Vergina, coupled with references in the new Macedonian constitution and preamble to Aegean Macedonia, suggested to the Greeks that the new republic laid claims on Greek Macedonia as well.

In response to perceived Macedonian aggression, Greece declared an embargo on Macedonia in 1994, an action much criticized by most of the EC/EU countries as well as by the United Nations. As a result of diplomatic intervention by the Clinton administration and Cyrus Vance an Interim Accord between Greece and Macedonia was concluded in 1995, according to which the two parties agreed to respect each other's territorial integrity and Greece recognised Macedonia as an independent state, although the conflict over the name 'Macedonia' had yet to be resolved. One of Greece's conditions for the agreement was that in seeking admittance to international organizations, Macedonia would use the name 'Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia'. Moreover, Macedonia assured that its

constitution made no references to peoples or territories within the Greek state and agreed to remove the Star of Vergina from its state flag (Shea 1997: 305).

To this day the Greek-Macedonian dispute over the use of the name 'Macedonia' has yet to be resolved although the Greeks have hinted that, contrary to earlier positions, they are ready to accept a compound name that includes 'Macedonia', such as, for example, 'New Macedonia', 'Upper Macedonia' or possibly even 'Vardar Macedonia'. But the basic conviction amongst Greeks, that Macedonia was and is Greek, remains and as Pettifer notes, '...the existence of Macedonia as a part of Greece has a fundamental place in the Greek political psyche.' (Pettifer 2001: 18)

Serbia

Whilst the Yugoslav army withdrew peacefully and voluntarily from Macedonia in 1992, it was not until 1996 that Yugoslavia recognised Macedonia - under the name of the 'Republic of Macedonia' - and this only after the Interim Accord between Macedonia and Greece had been signed. Serbia's decision to finally recognise Macedonia was largely influenced by the willingness of Greece, Serbia's ally, to establish diplomatic and trade relations with Macedonia (Williams 2000: 27). In the first quarter of 2001 the borders between Yugoslavia (Serbia) and Macedonia were finally demarcated, which put an end to the border dispute between the two countries that had been ongoing since Macedonia left the Yugoslav federation. But because the border demarcation also applied to the Kosovo/Macedonia border, the agreement signed between Belgrade and Skopje was met with protests from the ethnic Albanian political leaders in Kosovo, who claimed that Serbia/Yugoslavia no longer had jurisdiction over Kosovo and therefore had no right to enter into an agreement with Macedonia in regards to the Kosovo/Macedonian border.

The delay in Yugoslavia's recognition of Macedonia was in part due to the fact that some radical members of the Serbian elite opposed Yugoslavia's recognition of Macedonia on the grounds that there was no such thing as a Macedonian nation, and that Vardar Macedonia, therefore, constituted nothing else but 'Southern Serbia.' (Williams 2000: 27) In the interwar years this part of Macedonia was ruled by Serbia and at the time was considered not as a separate entity, but as part of Serbia. Although Serbia today officially acknowledges both the Macedonian state and the nation, the mainstream view amongst Serbian academics is, according to Drezov, 'that throughout the ages the Macedonian Slavs were devoid of any particular ethnic characteristics, and always represented a part of "une masse flottant" that stretched between "true" Serbs and "true" Bulgarians...'. (Drezov 2001: 53) Hence, the Serbian view of the Macedonians resembles their view on the Muslim Bosnians, another nation made official by Tito's policy. The Muslims, the Serbs claim, are in reality Serbs who converted to Islam during the Ottoman rule.

Albania

Whilst recognising the Macedonian state, Albania maintains that such a state does not belong particularly to the ethnic Macedonian people (Isakovic 2000: 220). Nonetheless, Albania initially welcomed the creation of the Republic of Macedonia, which it saw as a counterweight to Serbia (Pettifer 2001: 21). The Albanian state per se has not been regarded as a serious threat to the integrity of the young Macedonian republic, as the former has been mainly preoccupied with its own troubles since the end of communist rule. Nonetheless, statements made by the former Albanian president Sali Berisha in regards to the Albanian minority in



Macedonia did lead to more strained relations between the two countries in the 1990s. During his tenure, Berisha 'frequently and publicly raised the question of the rights of ethnic Albanians, which prompted protests from the Macedonian government that Albania was interfering in Macedonia's internal affairs.' (Williams 2000: 28) He also declared his support for the Albanian language university in the Macedonian town of Tetovo. The university was set up by the ethnic Albanian community but declared illegal by the Macedonian government, which maintained that higher education must be conducted in the Macedonian language. Albania-Macedonia relations were further injured as Berisha lent his support to the radical wing of the Macedonia-based ethnic Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity when the party split in 1994 (Williams 2000: 28).

Berisha's personal interference aside, the status of the Albanian minority in Macedonia was until recently less of a concern to Tirana than the treatment of Albanians in Kosovo. At the same time, Albanian nationalism grew in strength during the 1990s, particularly in the Albanian dominated parts of Macedonia and Kosovo, which may to a considerable degree be a reaction to the former Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic's policies towards Kosovo. NATO's intervention in Kosovo effectively prevented Serbian efforts to ethnically cleanse the province of its Albanian population, while inadvertently furthering Albanian (nationalist) interests. The strongest wave of Albanian nationalism thus comes from Kosovo and was initially abetted by Western dislike of Milosevic. But when Milosevic was removed from power in the autumn of 2000, the West's support for Kosovo Albanian demands for an independent, and effectively Albanian, Kosovo, diminished as a more democracy-oriented government took office in Belgrade. Today, however, the ethnic Albanian threat from Kosovo has again come to the fore as Macedonia finds itself embroiled in what increasingly looks like a civil war between the Macedonian political leadership and ethnic Albanian guerrillas, which are not only armed and supported by Kosovo's National Liberation Army, but also intimately tied to the Kosovo question.

In conclusion, the relationship between the Republic of Macedonia and its neighbours can be summarised as follows: Bulgaria is the main identity threat to the extent that identity is anchored in language; Serbs are the main identity threat to the extent that identity is anchored in religion; Albanians [are] the main identity threat to the extent that identity is anchored in statehood; and Greeks [are the main identity threat] to the extent that identity is anchored in the name of the nation, its language and state (Isakovic 2000: 220).

Although today Macedonia's neighbours have declared that they make no claim on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia, in all four of them there are nationalist political parties who do make such claims or 'who want a revision of the position of their compatriot minorities that would have a profoundly destabilising effect on the new Macedonia.' (Pettifer 2001: 17) Hence, the fear in Macedonia of a potential threat - particularly from Bulgaria and Greece - against its national and territorial integrity is still felt. While Greek policy towards Macedonia in the 1990s had a direct and overt impact on Macedonian nationalism, and therefore also affected the Macedonian position towards its Albanian minority, the Bulgarian perspective on the Macedonians can be said to have had a more indirect and predominantly emotional impact on the Macedonian national psyche, particularly as it related to the issue of national identity. Thus, as Bell suggests, Macedonian nationalism was mobilised in the early 1990s 'as a response to the Greek contention that the inhabitants of the new Macedonian Republic should not be allowed to call themselves "Macedonians" and to the

Bulgarian denial of a separate Macedonian identity.’ (Bell 1998: 193) In turn, this more assertive brand of Macedonian nationalism - strongly promoted by the Macedonian diaspora in Australia, Canada and the United States - has a negative impact on the ongoing tension between the Macedonian and Albanian communities as it makes the former less receptive to the latter’s grievances.

The Macedonian Question and the Establishment of the Republic of Macedonia

Macedonian national consciousness developed relatively late compared to other national movements in the Balkans, although this is disputed by Macedonian nationalists. The further mobilisation of a Macedonian national identity was to an extent a product of Serbian interference in Macedonia, Bulgarian perceptions about the ethnic origins of the Macedonians and, later on, of Tito’s strategy to formalise a Macedonian nation in order to balance the ethnic power symmetry in Yugoslavia and to undermine Bulgarian claims. The strength of Macedonian nationalism has therefore in part been contingent on the extent to which Macedonians have perceived their identity as being challenged by Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs and sometimes Albanians.

When the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was threatened with collapse in the early 1990s, Macedonia, like Bosnia-Herzegovina, was at first unwilling to go its separate way, acknowledging that from a security perspective it was better off as a republic in the Yugoslav federation where the Macedonian nation would be protected from any potential Bulgarian, Serbian, Greek and Albanian aggression. But as Croatia and Slovenia broke away from the federation, independence emerged as the only feasible option in order to prevent Macedonia from becoming wholly dominated by Serbia, the largest and most powerful remaining Yugoslav republic. Hence, as a newly independent state, Macedonia found itself in a situation where the potential threat from the ‘Four Wolves’ (Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Albania) compelled the Macedonians to mobilise their national consciousness in order to protect their identity and territory from outside claims.

Re-born in 1991, the Macedonian Question had a significant impact on the development of the new Macedonian state in so far as the attitudes of the neighbouring nations - Bulgaria and Greece in particular - promoted a more assertive Macedonian national consciousness, which in turn is reflected in the 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. The preamble of the Constitution (1991) explicitly declares the right of the Macedonian people to a state: ‘Taking as the points of departure the historical, cultural, spiritual and statehood heritage of the Macedonian people and their struggle over centuries for national and social freedom as well as the creation of their own state...’ Macedonia is established as ‘...a national state of the Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent co-existence with the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanics and other nationalities living in the Republic of Macedonia...’ However, equality as citizens is not the same as equality of ethnic communities, and the preamble strongly implies that the ethnic Macedonians are the primary owners of the state. The preamble thus asserts the culturally dominant status of the ethnic Macedonian population and clearly indicates that the character of the Macedonian state is premised on the principle of ethnic nationalism, on the right to self-determination of the Macedonian nation.

From a Macedonian perspective - in turn influenced by the history of geographical Macedonia as well as by Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian attitudes towards the Macedonian people - the revival of the Macedonian Question posed a problem for



the new Macedonian state: in order to justify the legal character of the Republic of Macedonia as a national state of the Macedonian people, the legitimacy of the Macedonian nation had to be consolidated, which effectively meant the assertion of a Macedonian identity vis-à-vis its neighbours. The justification of Vardar Macedonia as a Macedonian nation-state was further compromised by the fact that the ethnic Macedonian population constitutes a relatively small majority, approximating at the most two thirds of the total population. Albanians, the second largest ethnic group in Macedonia, make up a significantly large minority and given its size, the Albanian population objected to their classification as a minority in the new Macedonian state. Their protest was bolstered by the fact that in socialist Yugoslavia the Albanians had not been regarded as a minority but as a nationality, which had its autonomous region, Kosovo.

Macedonian National Identity and the Macedonian-Albanian Conflict since 1991

As Macedonia gained independence, the symbolic link between the Macedonian people and the Macedonian state needed to be protected, not just from outside threats but also from within the Macedonian republic, where the Albanian minority posed the greatest challenge to the consolidation of a Macedonian nation-state. Whereas the Macedonians insisted that the Republic of Macedonia must remain a national state of the Macedonian people, where other ethnic groups enjoy equal citizen rights, the Albanians demanded the creation of a bi-national state, in which the Albanian minority would be recognised as a constituent nation, alongside the Macedonian nation. The Albanian claim was based on the observation that the Albanian minority constitutes at least 25 percent (and according to Albanian estimates perhaps as much as 35-40 percent) of the total population of the Republic of Macedonia, and that in some Macedonian towns the Albanians outnumber the Macedonians. Tetovo, for example, which is the second largest city in Macedonia, has a local government led by Albanians. As Poulton notes, ethnic Macedonians fear that 'with the presence of large ethnic Albanian regions in the north-west bordering Albania and Kosovo, Vardar Macedonia might be truncated with the ensuing rump falling prey to predatory neighbours who view the very concept of a Macedonian nation as historically false.' (Poulton 2000: 176) From a Macedonian perspective, therefore, the territorial integrity of the Republic of Macedonia is directly linked with the preservation and consolidation of a Macedonian national identity.

As previously noted, the Macedonians saw their national identity contested from several directions at the beginning of the 1990s, most notably from Greece and Bulgaria, and from inside the new state the Albanian opposition to Macedonian political and cultural dominance added to Macedonian perceptions of national insecurity. In 1991, the Albanian community in Macedonia boycotted the referendum on independence and instead staged its own referendum in which an overwhelming majority of the Albanians voted in favour of territorial autonomy from the Macedonians. Eventually a more moderate Albanian leadership asserted that the Albanian population nonetheless remained committed to the unity of the Macedonian state, whilst demanding measures to grant them non-territorial autonomy in the political sphere (Ackermann 2000: 61-62). When the current crisis in Macedonia emerged in the spring of 2001, however, Albanian demands vis-à-vis the Macedonians again hardened, as did the Macedonian position towards the Albanians.

The Albanians in Macedonia do not object to the name 'Republic of Macedonia', which they regard 'as being territorial without any specific Slav connotations...'

(Poulton 2000: 187) Neither do they oppose Macedonian nationalist references to antiquity (Poulton 2000: 187), although it is not uncommon to hear Albanians claiming, if only to provoke their Slav neighbours, that Macedonians are nothing else but Bulgarians by origin. Rather, the conflict between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians since 1991 has focused on the issue of the legal and political status of the Albanian population in Macedonia and, ultimately, on the political and cultural character of the Macedonian state. Contentious issues have been those of language and education as the Albanian community calls for the recognition of the Albanian language as a second official language and demands that the illegal Albanian language university in Tetovo be granted the status of a state university. From a Macedonian perspective, however, giving in to Albanian demands regarding language and education would lead to a *de facto* division of the country and perhaps also to attempts by the Albanians to secede, tearing away the region around Tetovo, Gostivar and Debar from the Macedonian state. What is at stake from a Macedonian point of view, therefore, is the territorial, and by extension national, integrity of the Macedonian state. Territory, White maintains, contains the 'cultural landscapes of group identity' and therefore 'the expression of territoriality is...the expression of a group's need to protect its language, its religion, its essential identity.' (White 2000: 5) This is very much the case in Macedonia where the sovereignty of the Macedonian territory is regarded as key to protecting and asserting a distinctly Macedonian national identity vis-à-vis Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian claims. Any perceived threat to the territorial integrity of the Republic of Macedonia thus constitutes a threat to the legitimacy, and possibly even mere existence, of a Macedonian nation.

In contrast with both Macedonian and Albanian interests, representatives of the West, led by the United States and the European Union, wish to mould Macedonia into a multi-cultural state where no ethnic group dominates the other, and where a civic approach to nation- and statehood predominates amongst all communities. From an ethnic Macedonian perspective, however, such a scenario would undermine the security of the Macedonian nation, and could potentially open the way for Bulgaria, and perhaps even Serbia, to officially claim the Macedonians as Bulgarians/Serbians, thus making demands on the Macedonian lands as well. The West's wish to transform Macedonia into a Balkan version of Switzerland, Belgium or Canada thus seems an improbable project since, firstly, contrary to these three Western countries, Macedonia is named after its majority ethno-national group which implies that ethnic Macedonians will always constitute the culturally, if not politically, dominating group of the population; and secondly, while the Albanians in Macedonia might afford to see the Macedonian state turned into a civic state like Switzerland, the ethnic Macedonians cannot, for the same reason as mentioned earlier: the need to ensure the protection and survival of a contested national identity. Given that the Macedonian claim to national self-determination is based on the perception that the Macedonian nation is historically authentic, and the fact that this perception is contested by several other neighbouring nations and/or states, the need for the Macedonians to defend the basic premise of the current Macedonian state is particularly crucial. From a Macedonian point of view, it is their right, as a nation, to establish a state, just as the Bulgarian, Serbian, Slovene, Croatian and Albanian nations have their states. Hence, they do not consider themselves under obligation to give in to the demands of the Albanian minority.

As several of its neighbours contest the authenticity of the Macedonian nation, the identity of both the Macedonian nation and state becomes highly problematic. Firstly, as was suggested earlier, Macedonian nationalism necessarily grows



stronger in the face of the attitudes of Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs in regards to the Macedonian nation. This is seen as crucial in order to justify the continued existence of the Macedonian nation-state. For if there is no Macedonian nation, how can there be a Macedonian nation-state? Secondly, if the Macedonian state were to give in to Albanian demands that the Albanian minority be elevated to the status of constituent nation, or other demands that imply increased Albanian power over Macedonian state affairs, the justification for a Macedonian nation-state runs the risk of being undermined. This again would pose a threat to the Macedonian national identity. What is at stake, therefore, is '...the very "distinctiveness" of the Macedonians as a separate people, and this in turn is closely associated with their claim to form the Macedonian nation – for how would it be possible for a people without a "culture" or "ethnicity" of their own to lay claim to a separate political (i.e., national) identity?' (Roudometof 2000: 12)

According to Ackermann, the development of a Macedonian national identity conflicts with the need of the Albanian minority to preserve its cultural identity. 'The more Slavic Macedonians assert their cultural identity, the more ethnic Albanians feel the need to assert theirs, leading to a vicious circle.' (Ackermann 2000: 66) But the reverse is also the case, that is, the needs and wishes of the ethnic Albanians to assert their cultural and national identity clashes with the ethnic Macedonian effort to develop and consolidate their national identity. An example of this is the issue of language rights in Macedonia. According to the Macedonian constitution, the Macedonian language is the sole official language of the Republic although provisions for the use of Albanian are also made in municipal government, the judiciary, education and culture in communities where the Albanians form a majority of the population (International Crisis Group 2001: 6). The ethnic Macedonian position, however, is that the Republic of Macedonia can only have one official language, Macedonian, given that it is a Macedonian nation-state. Albanians in Macedonia are not recognised as a nation, and therefore, the Macedonians argue, do not have the right to demand that Albanian be declared a second official language of the Macedonian state. As a recent report from International Crisis Group states, '[e]thnic Macedonians see the republic-wide use of Albanian as a threat to their national identity and believe it is unreasonable for Albanian to be in effect acknowledged as the second official language when its native speakers comprise only one-quarter to one-third of the population.' (International Crisis Group 2001: 6) From an ethnic Albanian point of view, however, the fact that the Albanian population in Macedonia constitutes such a significant portion of the entire population is grounds for demanding that the constitution be changed so as to make the Albanians a constituent nation, alongside the Macedonian, thereby recognising Albanian as an official language. Were those changes to be made, however, the Republic of Macedonia would no longer be what the ethnic Macedonians envision: a national state of the (ethnic) Macedonian people. And without a state of its own, the Macedonian nation would become an easy target for those Balkan neighbours who regard this small nation as a historical falsification.

While criticising the ethnic Macedonians for refusing to grant further rights to the Albanian minority, the West fails to comprehend that what is at stake in the present conflict between Macedonians and Albanians is not just minority rights for the latter but, equally important, the legitimacy and recognition of a Macedonian national identity. It is the latter issue, which itself is influenced by Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian perspectives on the Macedonians as well as the Macedonians' perceptions of those perspectives, that shapes the current conflict between the two largest ethnic communities in the Macedonian republic. The failure to resolve

the disputes between the Macedonians and Albanians can thus be explained partly by the failure to recognise how the Macedonian Question continues to exert influence on the Macedonian national psychology.

As Schöpflin suggests, identity ‘...offers individuals the security of community and solidarity, of shared patterns of meanings, a bounded world in which to live and in which one can find others like oneself.’ (Schöpflin 2000: 10) As a category of identity, therefore, nationality is important as a means of security, and the Macedonian national identity becomes a security mechanism vis-à-vis the Bulgarians, Serbs, Greeks and Albanians, all of whom have laid claim on the Macedonian lands, its people or the name ‘Macedonia’.

Conclusion

Suggesting a link between the Macedonian Question – the issue of the origins and authenticity of the Macedonian nation – and the conflict between the ethnic Macedonian majority and Albanian minority in the Republic of Macedonia, this article put forth the argument that the former influences the latter in so far as Bulgarian, Greek, and to a lesser extent, Serbian and Albanian, perceptions of the Macedonian nation exert emotional, cultural and political influence on Macedonian attitudes and actions towards the Albanians. Whilst recent US/EU-led negotiations aimed at forging a peace deal between the Macedonian and Albanian communities have focused on the issues of minority representation and language rights, Western mediators have failed to comprehend that the underlying reason for the Macedonians’ unwillingness to grant the Albanians the status of constituent nation and declaring Albanian a second state language, is directly connected with the Macedonians’ perceived need to assert their national identity vis-à-vis neighbouring nations. Were Albanian demands to be met, the Macedonians fear, the territorial integrity of the Macedonian state might come under severe threat, which in turn could have disastrous consequences for the Macedonian nation. The West’s formula for peace, which envisions the consolidation of a civic-minded, multi-ethnic Macedonian state where no ethnic group dominates the other, thus goes against the most fundamental principle of the ethnic Macedonians who regard it as not only their right to retain a Macedonian nation state - albeit with equal rights for Macedonian citizens of non-Macedonian origin - but also a necessity in order to ensure the survival of the Macedonian nation in the face of continued Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian scepticism towards the Macedonian nation.

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Post Apartheid South Africa's Democratic Transformation Process: Redress of the Past, Reconciliation and 'Unity in Diversity'

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Introduction

Discussions pertaining to reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa mainly focus on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and its work.¹ However, a good understanding of the complex issues of transformation in this divided society requires a broader approach. Reconciliation involves not only telling the truth about the past and forgiveness, but also requires reparation for material and other forms of deprivation and the restoration of a human community in a spirit of respect for human rights and democracy. Indeed, it also necessitates the creation of a society within which the chances of reoccurrence of the kinds of gross violations of human rights that occurred in the past are reduced to a minimum. Consequently, the evaluation of the constitutional negotiation process and the way in which the themes of redress of the past, overcoming the legacy of apartheid and nation-building played their role are equally if not more important. The provisions of the Bill of Rights as well as some other sections of the Constitution are important building blocks in this reconciliation and transformation process. The ongoing implementation of these constitutional provisions and the perceptions surrounding that process also has an important impact on the actual transformation and reconciliation process.

A brief description of the most striking features of the apartheid regime is followed by an explanation of the overall constitutional negotiation process, which is particular to South Africa. Subsequently, the constitutional basis, relevant legislation and a brief description of the TRC process, as well as its current status and overall assessment of its actual impact on reconciliation, are discussed. A fourth paragraph then goes on to analyze the constitutional negotiations with respect to the provisions dealing with controversial issues like equality, language and education, self-determination and minority rights, and land. The implementation of the constitutional provisions with respect to equality, language and education, self-determination and land reform is ongoing and confronted with several hurdles. Nevertheless, there is a steady progression and the concomitant transformation will hopefully entail a higher level of reconciliation in South African society.

The Most Relevant Features of the Apartheid Regime

It is appropriate to give an overview of events, policies and mechanisms related to the apartheid era that explain not only the heightened sensitivity in post-apartheid South Africa to certain concepts and techniques but also certain reactions and attitudes of the Afrikaner, coloured and Indian population groups. Several historical events and regulations of the apartheid system have negatively tainted, amongst others, the concepts of group classification, group rights, ethnicity/race, minority rights, and self-determination.

Apartheid is generally said to start after the 1948 election victory of the National Party (NP), which used that concept and program as the focus of its election cam-

¹ I adopt an institutional focus regarding the reconciliation process in South Africa, which does not consider the role of individuals in the reconciliation process. However I want to highlight that this institutional focus does not imply a denial of the importance and impact of specific persons, like Nelson Mandela.



paign (Davenport 1991: 519; Worden 1994: 87). However, segregationist policies and attempts to classify the South African population were already noticeable centuries before, effectively since the early roots of colonialism in South Africa (Brown 1988-1989: 40; Worden 1994: 112). By the end of the 18th century certain racially discriminatory regulations were in place (Worden 1994: 66-67), but it has been argued that 'it was only in the period between the end of the Anglo Boer War in 1902 and the 1930s² that a cogent ideology of segregation emerged and was implemented' (Worden 1994: 72). Although apartheid started as an Afrikaner project, which is visible in several of its preferential measures for Afrikaners, it managed to get broader white support, as it also entailed distinct advantages for the white English speaking population.

Apartheid is characterized by its central policy of 'divide and rule', which was aimed at ensuring white survival and hegemony by dividing the non-white population along racial and even ethnic lines (Kashula & Anthonissen 1995: 98; Bennett 1995: 7). Consequently, the corresponding majority was divided into a host of minority groups, which could no longer pose a threat to the white minority (including both the Afrikaners and the English population). In that way apartheid can also be described as a scheme to disempower the non-white population³ while giving privileges to the white, and especially the white Afrikaner population. That design of apartheid was *inter alia* demonstrated by the official language policy, which excluded any indigenous language and was limited to English and Afrikaans, by the job reservations for Afrikaners in the public service and by the attempt to promote the Afrikaner people through a highly compartmentalized education system (Pelzer 1980: 136-139, 163; Wilkins & Strydom 1978: 253). Consequently, apartheid was suitably described as a pervasive system of affirmative action for the white population and especially for the Afrikaners (Sachs 1992: 98; Sonn 1993: 6).

Apartheid and its labyrinth of regulations were based on an imposed group membership on the basis primarily of race but, for the black population, also ethnicity (Manby 1995: 27; Kotze 1997: 2). The entire classification process was legally imposed and ascribed, more specifically on the basis of the 1950 Population Registration Act, and often arbitrarily implemented (Coetzee 1995: 90; Harries 1989:110). The act distinguished four major racial categories, namely white, black/African⁴, coloured and Indian/Asian. The apartheid regime indeed did not limit its racial classifications to black and white but also further subdivided the overwhelming non-white majority in three sub-groups namely Africans, coloureds and Indians/Asians. In furtherance of its divide and rule policy and in an attempt to prevent the emergence of a unified resistance movement, the apartheid government deliberately created an intermediate position for the coloureds and the Indians (Carrim 1996: 47, 50).

The preferential treatment of these two population categories, *inter alia* in respect of the distribution of resources (Manby 1995: 28), contributed to some kind of

² The impact of the Broederbond, established in 1918, on this increase in segregationism cannot be underestimated. The bond was formed after the Anglo Boer War as a reaction against English dominance (Wilkins & Strydom 1978: 141) and its major goals were achieving Afrikaner unity, supporting the Afrikaner's love for his language, traditions and history, and more importantly, maintaining and promoting Christian values (Pelzer 1980: 14).

³ For a description of the apartheid regime in terms of (a denial of) multi-culturalism, see Soudien 1998: 128; Cross & Mkwana-Twala 1998: 28.

⁴ The term 'black' does not have an unambiguous meaning in South Africa. During the 1960s to the 1980s 'black' referred to non-white and thus to and the Africans and the coloureds and the Indians; whereas from the 1980s onwards 'black' referred to the Africans and currently there exists considerable confusion about the exact coverage of the term.

internalized white racism and a concomitant condescending attitude towards the African population (Carrim 1996: 47; Sonn 1993: 66). This apartheid strategy entailed for the coloured and Indian population group an ambiguous but still marginalized position, which has ongoing implications and effects (Galiguire 1996: 14-15).

Furthermore, the African group was subdivided in ethnic categories, such as Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele etc. Subsequently, this rigid scheme was implemented and extended to just about every area of human life through various pieces of legislation. The most important of these acts, revealing the all pervasiveness of the classification and concomitant segregation (Davenport 1991: 328), include the 1950 Group Areas Act (implementing nationwide and obligatory residential segregation), the 1953 Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (instituting obligatory segregation of all public amenities), a host of pass laws and labour control legislation (to support the segregated residential pattern while instituting migrant labour for the black population), the 1953 Bantu Education Act (and the other acts implementing segregation in education) and the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act. The latter Act laid down the basis for the policy of independent homelands or Grand Apartheid (Davenport 1991: 336-341).

Verwoerd and his successors implemented a broad plan of political and social engineering, called 'separate development' or Grand Apartheid, which attempted to concentrate and limit African political rights to the respective, ethnically defined Bantustans (Bennett 1995: 7). Indeed, '(e)thnic homeland loyalty was to replace national political aspirations in a move which the state hoped would defuse calls for the moral necessity of African self-government within South Africa itself' (Worden 1994: 110-111). The above analysis of Grand Apartheid elucidates why ethnicity is such a sensitive concept in post-apartheid South Africa (Bonthuys 1993: 128). Because the Grand Apartheid strategy was justified in terms of self-determination for the distinctive ethnic groups, that concept, as well as a system of federalism on ethnic grounds, are burdened with negative connotations and thus looked upon with suspicion in contemporary South Africa.⁵

Several issues pertaining to education during apartheid should be mentioned as they present sensitive issues in the current, post-apartheid phase. A first issue is the racially segregated structure of education in South Africa, which went hand in hand with marked differences in state funding, affecting teacher/pupil ratio, qualifications of the teachers and other quality features. The curriculum was also differentiated on racial lines so that the distinctive groups could be prepared for the jobs they were meant to take up. 'Bantu Education' or the system for the African population can be described as a system that prepared for a subordinated position in the workplace via a focus on practical subjects and an inferior curriculum (Davenport 1991: 535; Dube 1985: 93-97). Even tertiary education was designed to be segregated from 1959 onwards as most of the faculties in the open universities were closed to African,

⁵ For a balanced approach to issues of language and ethnicity, see *Report of the Commission on the Demarcation/Delimitation of SPRs* 1993: 4, 13. The Commission was asked to make up a report on the demarcation of the territorial sub-units of South Africa (states, provinces or regions - thus SPRs). The Commission was instructed to take into account ten criteria which included demographic considerations and cultural and language realities (ibid., 4-5). The Commission makes the following remark on the basis of comparative research regarding language criteria: 'it seems that regions should not be 'gerrymandered' at the cost of geographical and economic cohesion merely for the sake of language homogeneity. The reorganization of homogeneous language and cultural regions may provide the opportunity for the exploitation of ethnic sentiments, claims and counter claims and constant new majorities and new minorities. On the other hand, regional boundaries should not cut across the spontaneously formed areas where particular language communities live' (ibid., 13).



Indian and coloured students and separate ethnic institutions of higher education were set up 'as agencies of academic apartheid' (Davenport 1991: 535).

Language policy regarding education has been and still is a very sensitive issue in South Africa. Under apartheid the policy regarding the African population, was constructed in such a way as to promote ethnic identity while hampering proficiency in the official languages in order to limit access to employment (Currie loose leaf: 3.1-37.2; Desei & Taylor 1997: 169). Indeed, the principle of mother tongue education was conveniently applied to further the political interests of division amongst all communities' (Heugh 1995: 42). The sudden change from mother tongue instruction to the double medium or 50/50 policy (English/Afrikaans) caused a great deal of the educational backlog among African students⁶ and caused major upheavals.⁷

The concept of Christian National Education was based on Afrikaner exclusivity and aimed at single medium institutions for Afrikaners. During apartheid, education was the only sector in which a strict distinction was made between Afrikaners and English-speaking people (Dube 1997: 87; Heugh 1995: 42). Christian National Education furthermore required schools to educate their students about and in line with the spirit of Christian values (Malherbe 1977: 147). The official apartheid policy wanted to give a Christian character to state schools and targeted state funding preferentially to private schools with such a character (Beckman 1995: 97). Furthermore, the courses that were part of the public curriculum, namely 'religious studies' or 'biblical studies', had an essentially reformed and very conservative theological perspective in the sense that the focus was on Christian essentials, while hardly anything was said about other world religions.

The Constitutional Negotiation Process in General

In the 1980s there were increasingly intense negotiations between the National Party (NP) government and the African National Congress (ANC) and other parties from the resistance movement. Eventually, this led to President De Klerk's famous speech, 2 February 1990, at the annual opening of parliament, which set in motion the protracted constitutional negotiation process leading up to the first multiracial elections in April 1994 and the first democratic constitution for South Africa (De Klerk 1994: 4-6; Manby 1995: 35).

An important issue for all sides to the negotiation process was the process envisaged for achieving a constitution to govern the post-apartheid, democratic South African state. The need for some kind of transitional period and related mechanisms was obvious to every one but the issue was mainly whether there would be a one or a two stage process. For the NP government it was important to be able to secure certain things for the future and limit the 'damage' of giving up power. For the ANC, on the other hand, it was crucial that 'the Constitutional Assembly should be bound as little as possible by the non-elected negotiating forum' (de Villiers 1994: 38). Consequently, the NP was in favour of a one stage process so that the negotiating parties at the Congress for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) would draft the Constitution. This would have ensured an important voice for the NP in the formulation of the eventual Constitution. The ANC, however, was in favour of having an elected body being responsible for the drafting of the so-called

⁶ The shift from mother tongue education to the dual medium English/Afrikaans education occurred at a stage when the students did not have the adequate proficiency in these two languages to meet the requirements of the syllabus which was in any event cognitively impoverished.

⁷ The 1976 Soweto uprisings, rather significant for the entire resistance movement, were mainly caused by the inflexible attempt to implement the 50-50 policy after 1975.

'final' Constitution so that it would have full democratic legitimacy (Coveliers & Veys 1998: 236), while the period before the adoption of the latter constitution would be governed by an interim constitution, drawn up at CODESA (Van Wyk 1994: 143; Corder 1994: 498).

During the course of the negotiations at CODESA a two-stage process was accepted with sufficient consensus and it was a firm point of departure for the Multi-Party Negotiation Process (MPNP) negotiation round (Corder 1994: 500). The eventual acceptance of this unique process of constitution-making entailed a compromise (Erasmus & de Waal 1997: 40-41) and confirmed that compromise politics was one of the forces of the process securing its eventual success (de Klerk 1994: 10). In the first stage an interim Constitution would be drafted by the negotiating political parties before any democratic election. That Constitution would govern the country during the period covering the first democratic elections and during the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the so-called final Constitution. 'In order to give greater comfort to all parties, it was agreed that the final Constitution could not erode the fundamental values and principles contained in the interim Constitution. Agreement was reached on a series of 34 Constitutional Principles with which the final Constitution had to comply' (Chaskalson & Davis 1997: 430). These 34 Constitutional Principles undeniably imposed constraints on the subsequent negotiation process as they provided the obligatory foundation for the 'final' constitution.⁸

Consequently, the negotiation process in general reflects a genuine concern for reconciliation and reconstruction, especially because of the conscious choice to include the previously ruling minority and to take its concerns seriously.

The Truth and Reconciliation Process: Constitutional Foundation, Relevant Legislation, Basic Structure and Assessment of its Overall Impact

The negotiations leading up to the 1993 or interim constitution also dealt with the question of how to deal with the human rights violations of the past during the transition to democracy. Several factors necessitated compromises in the new South Africa and this resulted in the remarkable post-amble entitled National Unity and Reconciliation, which provides for the grant of amnesty for politically motivated offences along the lines set out in an Act of Parliament. According to Sarkin, this implied that 'the drafters of the interim Constitution recognized the primacy of reconciliation and reconstruction to the pursuit of national unity and peace and they accepted the principle of amnesty as a necessary tool for this purpose' (Sarkin 1996: 620). A process of public truth telling was considered to be an essential component of the healing process and grant of amnesty necessary to reveal that truth to the utmost extent. Parliament enacted in 1995 the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (no 34 of 1995; henceforth PNURA) and determined that the central objective of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission would be to overcome the injustices of the past by promoting national unity and reconciliation (PNURA, section 3/1).

It should be underlined that the work of the Commission was limited to gross violations of human rights, which were exhaustively enumerated. Consequently, more general injustices, like the forced removals of millions of people do not fall within the brief of the Commission (PNURA, section 1/9). The land issue or actual

⁸ This also explains why section 71(1) and (2) of the interim Constitution state that the 'Final' Constitution will only come into effect when the Constitutional Court has certified that it complied with these Constitutional Principles.



redress of the systemic racial discrimination are not touched upon through this process.

The Act provides for three committees to achieve the objectives set out for the Commission, namely the Committee on Human Rights Violations, the Committee on Amnesty, the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation. The Committee on Human Rights Violations has to inquire into human rights violations, gather information and evidence of these and record them (PNURA, section 14), while the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation has to gather evidence concerning the identity of victims, their fate, present whereabouts and the type of harm suffered by them (PNURA, section 25).

The Committee on Amnesty has to decide the individual amnesty applications according to the essential requirements as stated in the Act, namely that the actions in question should have had a political motive and that the applicant makes full disclosure of all relevant facts (PNURA, section 20).

Significantly, the Act states that amnesty rules out the possibility of criminal or civil suits against those to whom it is granted (PNURA, section 20/7). This provision has been very controversial and certain victims of apartheid abuses even challenged it in terms of the Bill of Rights of the 1993 Constitution before the Constitutional Court in 1996. The scope of this paper does not allow me to discuss this case in any depth. Suffice it to say that the Court rejected this challenge on the basis of two rationales: the necessity of amnesty legislation for a democratic transition and the value of truth resulting from the bargain at the heart of the amnesty legislation.⁹ According to the Constitutional Court, the amnesty legislation was probably a necessary precondition for a successful transition. In its evaluation the Court also considered it important that no blanket amnesty was granted and that there were strict requirements of full disclosure and of political objective before individual applicants can obtain amnesty.

By the end of June 2001, the TRC's work was basically complete and the main outstanding task was the compilation of the final report (ANC News Briefing 6 June 2001). When assessing the impact of the TRC process on reconciliation, it is striking that opinion polls to this effect have been widely divergent. Nevertheless, there seem to be several indications that the TRC had a rather negative impact, and in any event did not contribute significantly to reconciliation since there is strong evidence of ongoing racial isolation, impeding reconciliation (ANC News Briefing 11 June 2001). Indeed, 'it can rightly be said that the Commission has succeeded in its main task of telling the essential story of what happened between 1960 and 1993. Nonetheless, not all the truth emerged and the objective to achieve national reconciliation was, as a result, seriously undermined' (Klaaren & Varney 2000: 574). Although it can be argued that the approach to amnesty by the TRC has a number of safeguards to limit impunity, amnesty decisions have been particularly controversial. Furthermore, it is important to underline that several reprehensible acts of the apartheid regime, like the forced removals, are not covered by this process.

The reparation process arouses negative feelings and resentment because of the government's slow pace in finalising its policy on reparations. While the limited

⁹ Constitutional Court of South Africa, *The Azanian Peoples Organization and others v the President of the Republic of South Africa and others*, CCT 17/1996, 25 July 1996. For an in depth discussion of this case, see Sarkin 1996: 626-630. See also Klaaren & Varney 2000: 581-586.

resources of the state are an important factor explaining government's reluctance to acknowledge reparation as a right of victims (Jenkins 2000: 417), government's conviction that the TRC process should be mainly about finding the truth and restoring dignity to the victims also plays a considerable role. This obviously causes feelings of disillusion and discontent with the process on the side of the victims (Jenkins 2000: 449), and can also be argued to disempower them to some extent (Jenkins 2000: 480).

The Constitutional Negotiations Regarding Specific Matters, Especially Relevant to Reconciliation

Equality, including affirmative action (in the public service)

In view of apartheid's divide and rule policy, its legacy of group-based discrimination (Currie 1994: 154) and the exclusion of the non-white population from political participation, it is understandable that there was throughout the negotiations extensive emphasis on equality and the need to redress previous disadvantages, on democracy and on nation-building (Kentridge loose leaf: 14.1; De Waal 1998: 153). There can be no doubt that the equality principle 'lies at the heart of the constitution and pervades it'.¹⁰ Regarding the equality principle, it should be underlined that 'the Constitution is not neutral as between different conceptions of equality. It subscribes to a particular vision of equality, one which is usually called substantive equality' (Kentridge loose leaf: 14.35), which can be contrasted with mere formal equality. Substantive equality demands a contextual approach, which takes into account differences in circumstances. In this regard, substantive equality allows and even requires remedial measures 'geared to redressing both individual and group disadvantage created by a history of oppression and apartheid' (Kentridge loose leaf: 14.35). Consequently, the principle of affirmative action to address disadvantages due to past discrimination in itself was easily agreed upon for the 1993 Constitution (Davis 1994: 210; Van Wyk 1994: 158), which sharply contrasts with the controversy surrounding its formulation in the 1996 Constitution and its implementation.

Understandably, in view of the history of legally instituted and entrenched discrimination under apartheid, the equality section of both the 1993 and the 1996 Constitution contains a non-discrimination clause (Constitution, 1993, section 8/1). Equality before the law and equal protection of the law (ibid.) are also taken up so that the entire section deals with most aspects of the equality principle as distinguished and recognized in international law. Regarding the non-discrimination provision, it should be remarked that indirect discrimination is expressly included, which can be related to the pervasive impact of apartheid policies and the desire to prevent any re-appearance of these and related policies

A problematic issue in the negotiations for the 1996 Constitution was the affirmative action clause in general, and the recognition of the need for affirmative action in the public administration. Although the principle of affirmative action as a means of addressing disadvantages due to past discrimination was not contentious, the exact formulation of the affirmative action clause was. Eventually the following formulation was agreed upon:

Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and

¹⁰ Constitutional Court of South Africa, *Fraser v The Children's Court and Others*, CCT 31/, 5 February 1997, 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC), 1997 (2) BCLR 153 (CC), § 20.



other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken (Constitution, 1993, section 9/2).

Arguably, this clause clarifies that affirmative action is an implementation of and not an exception to the equality principle, thus confirming the fact that the constitution embraces a substantive conception of equality (Kentridge loose leaf: 14.35-14.36).

The debate on affirmative action does become rather more contentious the more it is applied to concrete situations or fields of law, as exemplified by the discussions with respect to the chapter on public administration. Whereas the transitional provisions of the 1993 Constitution had secured the positions of the members of the public administration of the old order (Constitution, 1993, section 236/2), the ANC felt very strongly about the need to include a constitutional commitment to affirmative action in that specific chapter, as otherwise the *status quo* would remain. The Democratic Party (DP) and the NP, however, felt that a general affirmative action clause in the Bill of Rights would be sufficient.

The minister of constitutional development, underscored that in view of the fact that during apartheid the public service had excluded non-white people more than in any other area in South African society, the affirmative action principle should be repeated in the provisions on the public service to emphasize its importance. At the beginning of the post-apartheid era, it was indeed the case that '(o)fficials who dominate senior positions in these institutions ... are predominantly white, and many or most still harbor strong sympathies for the apartheid order they served for many years' (Ellmann 1994: 27). However, it is difficult to deny in relation to the civil service that 'the make up ... is an issue with ramifications for the future of *ethnic and racial* politics in South Africa' (Ellmann 1994: 27).

In the end the following clause was included as one of the basic values and principles governing public administration, which demonstrates that 'affirmative action in the public administration has won the day' (Ellmann 1994: 27):

Public administration must be governed by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution, including the following principles: ... (i) Public administration must be broadly representative of the South African people, with employment and personnel management practices based on ability, objectivity, fairness, and *the need to redress the imbalances of the past to achieve broad representation* (1996 Constitution, section 195). (italics added)

Language and Education

Prior to elaborating on the issues raised during the constitutional negotiations pertaining to language and education, some demographic information seems on point. A glance at the constitutional provision on the status of languages already reveals the extent of the linguistic diversity present in South Africa. Next to the 11 official languages (Afrikaans, English, Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, isiNdebele, isiXhosa and isiZulu), that provision also mentions in a non-exhaustive enumeration of languages used in South Africa: Khoi, San, Nama, German, Greek, Gujarati, Hindi, Portuguese, Tamil, Telegu, Urdu, Arabic, Hebrew and Sanskrit.

The results of the official census of 1996 pertaining to the 11 official languages clearly establishes that no single language is overwhelmingly dominant, and that

English is only the mother tongue of a mere 8.4 % of the South African population. The most numerous linguistic group are the Zulu, isiZulu being spoken by 22.9%, while isiXhosa by 17.9%. Afrikaans is, due to its prevalence among coloureds, the mother tongue of a large group of South Africans, namely 14.4%. The other language groups are, in descending order of demographic importance: Sepedi (9.2%), Setswana (8.2%), Sesotho (7.7%), Xitsonga (4.4%), Siswati (2.5%), Tshivenda (2.2%) and finally the Ndebele (1.5%).

The respective status of the languages spoken in South Africa, the regulation of language in education and 'separate' schools for distinctive population groups proved sensitive issues during the negotiation process, which can once more be related to apartheid's legacy. *Several* (white) Afrikaners were and still are very concerned about the status of their language, especially in relation to English, which can be explained by the severe language struggles in the past (Currie loose leaf: 37.1). On the other hand, most parties felt strongly about the fact that something should be done about the previously undervalued and neglected African indigenous languages. An attempt to accommodate, to a reasonable extent, all sides to the debate resulted in a very extensive and detailed provision.

It was no problem for the National Party (and other 'white' parties) that there would be 11 official languages as long as Afrikaans was among them.¹¹ They did, however, bargain for a non-diminishment provision,¹² which would ensure that the rights and status of the pre-1994 official languages were maintained and entrenched (Currie loose leaf: 37.6-37.7), so as to prevent the erosion of Afrikaans in favour of English. The other parties could accept such a provision to the extent that it was understood that 'it was envisaged that the other nine languages would be developed to the point that all eleven languages enjoyed the same status and rights' (Currie loose leaf: 37.6). Although it was not required that all eleven official languages were treated equally (Sachs 1994: 9-15), it was agreed that efforts should be made to develop and promote the equal use of all official languages.¹³ The possibility of provincial legislatures to declare any of the national official languages as official language(s) of the province (Constitution, 1993, section 3/5) can furthermore be considered as 'an attempt to recognize and accommodate the regional concentration of various linguistic groups' (Brand 1997: 692). Provision was also made for the establishment of an independent Pan South African Language Board, which is meant (*inter alia*) to further the development of the official languages and to promote multilingualism in South Africa (Constitution, 1993, section 3/10a).

Education was not as much a cause for deadlock in the negotiations during the CODESA and MPNP rounds as in those preceding the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. Agreement was relatively easily reached on a guarantee for equal access to educational institutions.¹⁴ The equalization of educational opportunities is indeed

¹¹ Section 3(1), 1993 Constitution: 'Afrikaans, English, isiNdebele, Sesotho sa Leboa, Sesotho, siSwati, Xitsonga, Setswana, Tshivenda, isiXhosa and isiZulu shall be the official South African languages at national level, and conditions be created for their development and for the promotion of their equal use and enjoyment.'

¹² Section 3(2), 1993 Constitution: 'Rights relating to language and the status of languages existing at the commencement of this Constitution shall not be diminished, and provision shall be made by an Act of Parliament for rights relating to language and the status of languages existing only at regional level, to be extended nationally in accordance with the principles set out in subsection (9).'

¹³ Section 3 (9) (a), 1993 Constitution: 'Legislation, as well as official policy and practice, in relation to the use of languages at any level of government shall be subject to and based on the provisions of this section and the following principles: (a) The creation of conditions for the development and for the promotion of the equal use and enjoyment of all official South African languages'

¹⁴ Section 32(a), 1993 Constitution: 'Every person shall have the right - (a) to basic education and to equal access to educational institutions'



crucial in view of apartheid's policy of separate but unequal education as that had resulted in grossly inferior education for the African population and the concomitant under-qualification of this population group (Dlamini 1994: 589-590).

The freedom to choose the medium of instruction¹⁵ was very important to the parties representing the previously disadvantaged groups, in view of the mandatory regulation during apartheid. It also remains very significant for an important section of the Afrikaner population, because this would enable them to choose mother tongue instruction, which is felt to be vital to maintain and promote the Afrikaner language and culture. However, it was clear to everyone that there are certain practical constraints to its complete realization and the right to choose the medium of instruction was thus made dependent on a requirement of 'practicability'.

Finally, the urge of certain Afrikaners to have separate educational institutions, conforming to their specific cultural values was also voiced. In so far as there would be no racial discrimination, this was something the ANC could agree to. However, subsequent events during the negotiations leading up to the 1996 Constitution demonstrated, that there were some attempts to circumvent such a prohibition by relying on arguments of culture and the like. This attempted circumvention incited resentment, and burdened the ongoing negotiations.

Indeed, two of the issues that remained unresolved until the very last moment in the constitutional negotiations leading up to the 1996 Constitution concerned the provision on the status of languages and the provision in the Bill of Rights on education. These matters involved core principles for the two major parties, namely NP and ANC, and the formulation of the respective clauses remained contentious even after the momentous three-dimensional agreement on minority protection issues.

For a good understanding of the sensitivity of the language clause, it is appropriate and even necessary to give some information about the general trend as to language use in the public sphere after the adoption of the 1993 Constitution. Despite the 1993 Constitution's insistence that the state was required to promote the equal use and enjoyment of all 11 official languages (Constitution, 1993, section 3/1), there was (and is) an undeniable shift towards mono-lingualism in the public sphere, with the effect that English is increasingly emerging as the *lingua franca*. The establishment of the Language Plan Task Group (LANGTAG) as an advisory body to the minister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology in December 1995 was *inter alia* meant to counter this trend. LANGTAG's mandate was to advise the minister on a coherent national language plan which would aim at promoting national unity, while at the same time promoting respect and tolerance for linguistic and cultural diversity. Although both the draft and the final report of the language board only came out after the adoption of the (first version of) the 1996 Constitution, both reports criticize the official attitude in the national and also the provincial sphere of government for moving towards an English-only policy.

Both the NP and the Freedom Front (FF) fear(ed) that Afrikaans was going to be marginalized and eventually completely swamped by English, and they wanted therefore the retention of the 1993 Constitution's non-diminishment provision. Although the negotiators of the other parties, and especially the ANC, realized that it was vital to find a balanced way to calm this fear, the ANC was adamant about the fact that the non-diminishment provision was not acceptable in the long run. For the

¹⁵ Section 32(b), 1993 Constitution: 'Every person shall have the right - (b) to instruction in the language of his or her choice where this is reasonably practicable'.

ANC it was vital that there should be the constitutional possibility to improve the indigenous languages by reducing the status of Afrikaans so as to reach an equitable overall use of and status for all 11 official languages. In the end, the deadlock was resolved by an *in se minor*, but for the NP symbolically important, addition to one of the other subsections of the language clause. The NP was only prepared to agree that the non-diminishment provision be dropped on condition that the section dealing with 'use of language for purposes of government' at the national and provincial levels would require that this could not be only one language.¹⁶ The party felt that such a provision would at least counter the tendency that only English would be used at these levels.

The proclamation of 11 official languages in section 6 of the 1996 Constitution, as in the 1993 Constitution (Young 1995: 65), has important symbolic value (Currie loose leaf: 37.2), especially for the speakers of the nine African languages, which used to be deprived of such status. The feeling of inclusiveness that is created by this linguistic policy should not be underestimated and confirms that accommodation of a state's population diversity tends to have positive implications for the project of nation-building (Currie loose leaf: 37.5). Nevertheless, it is striking that the 1996 constitution no longer has the equal treatment of the 11 official languages as an - albeit distant-objective, but 'merely' the equitable treatment and parity of esteem of these languages (Constitution, 1996, section 6/4). 'Equitable' treatment can be considered to strengthen the internal reference to subsection 2, which expressed the need for positive measures by the state to elevate the status of the official indigenous languages. 'Equitable' would make explicit that there is, in view of the 'history of official denigration and neglect' of these indigenous languages, a need for differential and preferential treatment and not merely formally equal treatment (Currie loose leaf: 37.5). However, 'equitable treatment' may also acknowledge that not all 11 official languages should or can always be used for all purposes. 'Parity of esteem' would then 'insist(s) that considerations of practicality aside, a sincere attempt must be made to ensure that particular languages do not dominate while others are neglected' (Currie loose leaf: 37.6), and would imply a rejection of an over-powering *lingua franca*.

Finally, the right to education, and more specifically the issue of language in education and single medium institutions, proved to be the greatest stumbling block of all and was only resolved 7 May 1996, the day before the adoption of the (first version of) the 1996 Constitution (Currie loose leaf: 35.7; Loban 1997: 107). Eventually, the discussions turned around the issue of single medium institutions, as pressed by the NP (and the FF), which was (after many rounds of negotiations) integrated, to a certain extent, in the subsection on the medium of instruction. The starting point of the controversy around the education provision had been the NP's proposal for a right 'to educational institutions based on a common culture, language or religion, provided that there shall be no discrimination on the ground of race and, provided further that the state shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it has been established on the basis of a common language, culture or religion'. Whereas such a right to state-funded schools with a distinctive linguistic, cultural or religious character was considered to be imperative by the NP to protect and promote the Afrikaner culture and language, while offering the same advantage to other minorities, this was completely unthinkable for the ANC as it would imply a return to Verwoerdian (apartheid) practices (Currie loose leaf: 35.6-35.7).

¹⁶ Section 6 (3) (a), 1996 Constitution: 'The national government and provincial governments may use any particular official languages for the purposes of government,..., but the national government and each provincial government must use at least two official languages.'



Furthermore, the judgement of the Constitutional Court in the *Gauteng education case* of 4 April 1996 had clarified that the analogous section 32 of the 1993 Constitution (which did not contain the explicit words 'at their own expense'), reflected the appropriate option about state obligations regarding the funding of minority schools. According to the Constitutional Court, the state has, under section 32(c), 1993 Constitution, a mere negative obligation of non-interference regarding private efforts to that effect.

This judgment influenced the eventual formulation of the right to set up independent educational institutions, in the sense that the 1996 Constitution makes explicit that this is 'at their own expense' and that two other provisos are added to the one that prohibited racial discrimination (Constitution, 1996, section 29/3). The Constitutional Court had indeed held that the 1993 Constitution also implied that these independent institutions should be registered with the state and should live up to certain minimum standards.¹⁷ The outcome of this case furthermore 'increased anxiety about the formulation of the education clause on the side of the Afrikaners' (Malherbe 1997: 63). Subsequently, the NP insisted on the need for a right to single medium institutions in the public education sector, which indicated a shift of emphasis in its claim regarding the right to education. However, the ANC was not open to any concessions in this regard and the NP finally agreed to a 'much diluted version' of its original proposal in the provision on the medium of instruction:

Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in public educational institutions where that education is reasonably practicable. In order to ensure the effective access to, and implementation of, this right, *the state must consider all reasonable educational alternatives, including single medium institutions*, taking into account (a) equity; (b) practicability and (c) the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices (Constitution, 1996, section 29/2). (italics added)

Although the NP's feeling in hindsight was that 'they have lost this one', it can be argued that this subsection makes 'express concessions to minority interests' (Kriel loose leaf: 38.15). The factors which the state is to take into account when implementing the right to receive education in the official language or languages of choice apparently have some but not much potential for single medium Afrikaans institutions. Although the third factor does not seem to be conducive to a choice for single medium Afrikaans institutions, this might be balanced out in certain circumstances by the 'equity' factor, for example in areas where the majority of the people speaks Afrikaans. Furthermore, and in view of the collective aspect of an educational institution of this kind, section 31 and its recognition and protection of the collective dimension of the rights of persons belonging to (cultural, religious and) linguistic communities, can arguably also be used to canvass claims of single medium institutions for linguistic communities.

At the same ultimate session where section 29(2) was agreed, the DP also proposed an additional subsection (Constitution, 1996, section 29/4), which would provide for the possibility of state subsidies for independent educational institutions, as catered for in section 29 (3). This proposal was readily accepted by the ANC and welcomed by the NP since it carries the possibility of their 'educational institutions based on a common language, culture or religion' to be private but nevertheless state-funded.

¹⁷ Cf. Constitutional Court of South Africa, *Gauteng Education case*, §§ 10-11.

In the end, the further implementation of the education clause, its application and eventual adaptation, will demonstrate to what extent this provision effectively caters for minorities and accommodates South Africa's overall population diversity (Brown 1997: 3).

Self-determination, the *Volkstaat* and Minority Rights

Claims of certain Afrikaners for self-determination, and more specifically a *Volkstaat*, proved to be a controversial issue during the 1993 constitutional negotiations which remained outstanding until the last moment. In the end, the ANC made several concessions so as to make the constitution as inclusive as possible and to persuade all parties to participate in the elections. Eventually, constitutional amendments were agreed to in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act 2 of 1994 so as to placate the parties advocating a *Volkstaat*. The amendment provided *inter alia* for a *Volkstaat* Council and another Constitutional Principle dealing with the right to self-determination for a community sharing a common 'cultural or language heritage' (Corder 1994: 504-505).

Constitutional Principle XXXIV of the 1993 Constitution embodies a qualified recognition of a right to self-determination, not limited to the internal dimension of that right (Currie loose leaf: 35.33), in that it states that would not be precluded: 'constitutional recognition for a notion of the right of self-determination by any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage, whether in a territorial entity within the Republic or in any other recognized way'.

The *Volkstaat* Council was meant to 'enable proponents of the idea of a *Volkstaat* to constitutionally pursue the establishment of such a *Volkstaat*' (Constitution, 1993, section 184/B1). Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the Council's powers were not far-reaching as it was envisaged to be an advisory body that has powers to gather information and make representations on the *Volkstaat* issue to the Constitutional Assembly, entrusted with the elaboration of the 1996 Constitution (Van Wyk 1994: 165', 168).

Indeed, one of the sensitive issues in the 1996 constitutional negotiations was the right to self-determination for an ethnic group ('a community sharing a common cultural and language heritage') and the way in which CP XXXIV would be realized in the 1996 Constitution in view of its merely permissive wording. Self-determination on ethnic grounds tends to have many negative connotations due to apartheid's Grand Apartheid scheme, but the idea of a *Volkstaat* was furthermore perceived to be an attempt to perpetuate the concept of apartheid and to hold on to privileges gained during that era. Nevertheless, the ANC was aware of the fear felt by *some* Afrikaners that their language and culture would be swamped (and die) if they did not have some form of (preferentially territorial) self-determination.

During the public negotiations, virtually no reference was made to the right to self-determination and its shape in the final Constitution (Currie loose leaf: 35.33). In view of the Freedom Front's mandate and its focus on the *Volkstaat* ideal, that party argued that CP XXXIV legitimized their demand for constitutional recognition of a territorial *Volkstaat*. The ANC resisted such a recognition and relied *inter alia* on the fact that the first interim report of the *Volkstaat* Council, as presented to the Constitutional Assembly (CA), had demonstrated that there was a lot of internal division on the future shape of such a *Volkstaat* (Currie loose leaf: 35.34). Whereas initially these discussions only involved the ANC and the FF (bi-lateral), eventually, as time-pressure was getting stronger and the need to make 'deals' grew, this issue was settled at a 'marathon of 36 hours of negotiations' 18-19 April 1997 (Currie



loose leaf: 35.5; Strydom 1998: 900-901). During several hours of that marathon there was a tri-lateral of the ANC, the NP and the FF. Since during the previous bi-laterals between the ANC and the FF the ANC had formulated promises of cultural councils and rights analogous to article 27 ICCPR, the NP joined the discussion to further their goal of including minority rights in the constitution.

Eventually, the result of this tri-lateral was a three-dimensional agreement on a Commission for the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities, cultural rights like article 27 ICCPR (section 31) and a provision on self-determination, the wording of which mimics CP XXXIV. Although the word 'community' is used instead of 'minority', the similarities between article 27 ICCPR and section 31 are striking. The concept 'community' was preferred because 'minority' is related to the apartheid ideology and because the former concept would express ties of affinity and connectedness rather than ties of blood (Currie loose leaf: 35.12). It can nevertheless be argued that 'the most pragmatic way to deal with the difficulties of definition of the term community is to see it as doing more or less the same work as the term it substitutes for article 27's category of a 'minority'' (Strydom 1998: 899-900). Apartheid's abuse of ethnicity furthermore explains the use of 'cultural' instead of 'ethnic' (Currie loose leaf: 35.12).

It was decided that this Commission would be provided for in the chapter on State Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy, thus confirming the link between democracy and minority protection. The Commission is to be broadly representative of the several communities in South Africa and is empowered to monitor, investigate, research, educate, advise and report on issues concerning the rights of these communities (Constitution, 1996, section 185/2). Further details should be provided by the legislation which will actually establish this commission (Constitution, 1996, section 185/4). Section 185 (1) explicitly enumerates the following primary objectives of the Commission, which reveals that it is meant to contribute to the accommodation of South Africa's population diversity (Erasmus & de Waal 1997: 35.34):

- (a) to promote respect for the rights of cultural, religious and linguistic communities;
- (b) to promote and develop peace, friendship, humanity, tolerance and national unity among cultural, religious and linguistic communities, on the basis of equality, non-discrimination and free association; and
- (c) to recommend the establishment or recognition, in accordance with national legislation, of a cultural or other council or councils for a community or communities in South Africa.

Secondly, agreement was reached on the inclusion in the Bill of Rights of a section with additional 'cultural rights', meant to reflect the spirit of article 27 ICCPR. The rights are indeed framed as collective rights, more specifically in terms of 'members belonging to communities' and arguably enshrine a right to identity. There was some contention about the exact wording of the clause, namely whether it would be negative like article 27 ICCPR or positive, but eventually the first option was taken up and section 31 (1) (a) of the 1996 Constitution reads as follows:

Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other members of that community - (a) to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language.

The third and final component of the package agreed to by the ANC, FF and NP was that a provision would be added to the Constitution which would enshrine the content of CP XXXIV. The eventual provision, which was acceptable to the parties, is equally vague in its formulation as the Constitutional Principle and so open-ended that it cannot be said to enshrine a right at all (Currie loose leaf: 35.33-35.34):

The right of the South African people as a whole to self-determination, as manifested in this Constitution, *does not preclude, within the framework of this right, recognition of the notion of the right of self-determination* of any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage, within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way determined by national legislation (Constitution, 1996, section 235). (italics added)

The fact that national legislation will determine the acceptable ways of implementing self-determination underscores that section 235 actually does not grant a right to self-determination to communities but leaves this to the discretion of the national legislator. Nevertheless, it was argued that 's 235 requires that the phrase "self-determination" is interpreted so as not to exclude the possibility of vindication of the right of self-determination by external or by internal political means' and also that the expression 'community sharing a common cultural and language heritage' refers to an ethnic minority (Currie loose leaf: 35.34). Consequently, section 235 would at least leave the door ajar to forms of both external and internal (even with a territorial dimension) self-determination for 'minorities', thus securing the possible emergence of a *Volkstaat*, however tenuous that possibility might seem.

It should be pointed out that the section concerned, section 235, is part of the chapter with General Provisions and thus not of the Bill of Rights (Strydom 1998: 907). Finally, the overall tendency of the 1996 Constitution to move away from recognition of self-determination that would result in a *Volkstaat*, is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the *Volkstaat* Council can be abolished by Parliament at will (Constitution, 1996, schedule 6, item 20/5).

This three dimensional agreement lead to many spontaneous and very emotional speeches by several of the party leaders present at the Constitutional Sub-Committee. Roelf Meyer (NP) underscored that in this way the real needs of *all* cultural groups are accommodated and that it consequently amounted to an important step in the creation of a country where *all* peoples feel at home. Valli Moosa (ANC) added that these agreements capture in a democratic manner the aspirations of the country in that it may be a new way of dealing with the 'national question' without contradicting the concept of nation-building. The speeches of the other parties also acknowledged the importance of this breakthrough dealing with the stigmas of the past and working towards unity in diversity. Although these provisions came about due to claims and demands put forward by political parties representing (a section of) the Afrikaner population, it is clear that all parties realized and underscored its broader potential, namely for all population groups in South Africa that have a distinct identity and a wish to preserve that.

Without wanting to negate the importance of this kind of agreement so soon after apartheid was formally abolished, it should also be put in perspective by the overall picture. Section 31 and the provision for the Commission imply the introduction of collective rights and the recognition of collective interests (Currie loose leaf: 35.5) and thus amount to the entrenchment of some kind of minority rights (and minority protection). Although at first sight this contradicts the ANC's strong rejection of



special treatment for ethnic/cultural groups, it was the 'price' they were willing to pay to placate the Freedom Front by accepting the weak recognition of the right to self-determination, while giving the National Party the minority rights it wanted (Currie loose leaf: 35:5; Sacks 1997: 679).

It is appropriate to mention at this point that the ANC has emphasized the overall objective of nation-building in subsequent talks on the establishment of that Commission (and the rights provided for in section 31). At the same time it also acknowledged the need to accommodate the country's population diversity, thus taking up the theme of unity in diversity. It is not clear to what extent the prime objective of national unity and nation-building will leave effective scope for genuine protection and promotion of diversity, as are made possible by sections 31 and 185 of the 1996 Constitution (Sacks 1997: 672). Further implementation as well as application will show whether the ANC, as the dominant political party, senses that the goal of nation-building can be furthered, instead of threatened, by accommodating South Africa's population diversity effectively. In the end, the exercise will be about finding the right balance between promoting unity and accommodating diversity, which is not a straightforward matter and requires thorough consideration of all the relevant circumstances.

Land and Property Rights

During the 1993 constitutional negotiations, the property clause of the Bill of Rights 'was a bone of contention right from the outset' and 'a constitutional strategy providing for the restoration of rights in land to persons who had been dispossessed of such rights as a result of racially discriminatory policies were ... intensely negotiated' (du Plessis 1994: 97).

Eventually, the negotiators agreed on the one hand on a formulation of the right to property in the 1993 Constitution which implied that no expropriation of property could take place without just and equitable compensation based on a number of factors including the market value of the property. The white community and the political parties defending their interests had put up a serious struggle to obtain this protection (Jenkins 2000: 450).

On the other hand, the 1993 Constitution dealt with a limited right to restitution in the provision on equality and enabled parliament to make a law that would provide for restitution of land for people who were dispossessed of a right in land by racially discriminatory law. This was done in the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, which involve a Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights and a Land Claims Court. The remedies provided for range from restoration of dispossessed land rights, alternative state-owned land, compensation or alternative relief.

The property clause also proved contentious during the negotiations leading up to the 1996 Constitution. The ANC wanted to have sufficient possibility for land reform processes, falling short of restitution. Positive rights of redistribution and tenure security were also advocated. The 1996 Constitution grants in section 25 of the Bill of Rights constitutional protection to land redistribution and tenure reform in addition to land restitution. The state is obliged to take reasonable, legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis. Generally, 'the state exercises a wide discretion, but the discretion is not completely undefined and does not render nugatory the state's obligation' (Eisenberg loose leaf: 40.9). The 1996 Constitution itself does not contain any detailed provision pertaining to

land-restitution but the provisions of the Restitution of Land Rights Act still govern this matter.

The constitutional negotiation process in post-apartheid South Africa has clearly demonstrated the importance of compromise thinking and the search for a balanced approach, to as to accommodate the population diversity in a divided society and to contribute to reconciliation and reconstruction. Important considerations in the post-apartheid South African society, influencing the democratic transformation process, include redress of the past, nation-building, and the protection of diversity (unity in diversity). These themes do not always point in the same direction. As the following paragraphs will demonstrate, the actual implementation process is very slow and often highly deficient, and undoubtedly hampers the reconciliation process concomitantly.

The Implementation Phase

Although the agreement on these constitutional provisions and its contribution to the reconciliation and reconstruction process cannot be overestimated, the actual and ongoing implementation is equally, if not more, important.

However, the scope of this paper does not permit me to elaborate too much on this matter. Consequently, I will limit myself to some broad-ranging remarks and evaluations. Most affirmative action schemes developed and implemented up until now have been controversial, especially affirmative action in the public service and the Employment Equity Act. There are strong misgivings among the white, coloured and Indian population in this respect. The last two categories were in an intermediate category under apartheid and feel that they are now not black enough because affirmative action policies are perceived to be completely or mainly geared towards the African population groups. On the side of the white population, most complaints seem to focus on the irrational and rigid way in which affirmative action policies are implemented, overemphasizing numbers and lowering of standards. Typically, debates relating to affirmative action for victims of past discrimination and the use of the dreaded apartheid classifications reigned supreme.

Overall, post-apartheid South Africa has chosen to adopt a substantive conception of equality but it is still searching for the exact balance in achieving that, without alienating the population groups that were (more or less) privileged under apartheid.

The actual practice regarding language use for purposes of government and other related public functions, like the public broadcaster, are a far cry from the promising constitutional principles of the 1996 Constitution. Consequently, there is a rather uniform complaint about the dominant status of English as *lingua franca* and the concomitant negation of meaningful multilingualism, as demanded by the Constitution. Although certain public institutions and national departments are trying to develop language policies which contribute to the right of identity of the various linguistic groups in South Africa, while taking practical constraints and considerations of nation-building into account; there seems a *de facto* denial of several constitutional principles with respect to the status of languages and multilingualism.

Education is in general a very sensitive matter in post-apartheid South Africa, which is revealed by numerous teacher strikes and instances of student unrest, because of the lack of financial aid for most students from previously



disadvantaged backgrounds, the lack of racial transformation at schools and tertiary institutions, the decisions regarding choice of medium of instruction - especially at tertiary institutions - and the overall restructuring of the curriculum.

The theme of equal access to and integration of educational institutions is very important and should be seen against the background of racially structured education during apartheid. At the level of schools, non-discriminatory access is required and protected, while with respect to tertiary education several attempts are made to facilitate access for students from previously disadvantaged communities by adopting a flexible and progressive method to establish ability for higher education. A very sensitive aspect of curriculum choices is the policy pertaining to language of instruction. The Constitution determines in section 29(2) that 'everyone has the right to receive instruction in the official language or languages of their choice in public educational institutions where that education is reasonably practicable'. At the level of schools the national minister of education has proclaimed National Norms and Standards regarding Language Policy. These can be considered as a genuine attempt to realize the individual student's choice regarding medium of instruction as much as reasonably possible, while taking resource and other practical constraints into account. Recently, the minister has acknowledged the severe problems of effective implementation and he announced drastic changes with respect to enforcement and the like. The language policy for tertiary institutions is not completed as yet, although several activities are in progress.

Overall, the 1996 Constitution moves away from a recognition of a right of self-determination that might result in a *Volkstaat*. Since the coming into force of the 1996 Constitution, negotiations between the ANC and the FF are ongoing without, however, any significant break through. Nevertheless, it is striking that whenever there is a strong reaction by Afrikaners, due to perceived threats to their language and culture by one or another new policy document, which includes stronger claims to retreat and even use of violence and secession, there is a revamp of high-level negotiations. In view of the lack of progress on the official level and the increasing unlikelihood that an official *Volkstaat* will come about, there are some private initiatives towards the development of a *Volkstaat*, one of which, Orania, appears to be rather successful (ANC news briefing 10 August 2001). It remains to be seen how this town will develop, what reaction it will provoke from both the wider public and the authorities, but it sends a strong signal to the state that certain Afrikaners choose to separate instead of integrate and take this kind of action because they feel that their right to identity is not sufficiently protected.

Finally, the actual implementation of the land claims and broader land delivery process is rather slow. The resulting situation has caused severe feelings of resentment amongst the black population and has led to several instances of threats about land invasions in the Eastern Cape and the Northern Province and even actual land invasions in Gauteng (Bredell), the Western Cape (Khayelitsha) and Kwazulu-Natal. Government is well aware of the resulting dangers of a proliferation of land invasions and is committed to speeding up the project cycles for land restitution (ANC news briefing 12 July 2001).

Conclusion

South Africa's reconciliation and reconstruction process is clearly ongoing and will presumably take another couple of decades before it is fully concluded. The Truth and Reconciliation process in itself has a dubious or rather ambivalent impact on reconciliation in this deeply divided society, which is related to the adverse impact on race relations, the restricted scope of its mandate and the like. Whereas the entire constitutional negotiation process and its goals of unity in diversity, redress of the past and nation-building appear highly beneficial towards reconciliation, the actual implementation of the relevant provisions is slow, often deficient and consequently tends to inhibit this process. It is in any event remarkable that a country so deeply scarred and divided by apartheid, develops a constitution which not only contains individual human rights, but also 'minority rights' and a reference to self-determination for cultural communities. The constitutional foundations to achieve a system that successfully accommodates a plural society's population diversity and contributes to reconciliation are available, but everything will depend on the actual implementation over the coming years and decades.

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Multicultural and Assimilationist Models of Ethnopolitical Integration in the Context of the German *Nordmark*, 1890-1933

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Introduction

For nearly a century, from the German revolution of 1848 to the collapse of the Third Reich in 1945, there existed in Schleswig-Holstein a daily struggle between Germans and Danes for ethnic and political survival. Dynastically Danish but largely German ethnically, the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein first sought their independence during the European revolutions of 1848-49, only to fail as the nascent Frankfurt Assembly proved incapable of constructing a viable German state. Fifteen years later, motivated by *Realpolitik* and backed by popular support, Prince Bismarck forced Denmark to cede the two 'German' duchies to Prussia and Austria after the first of Germany's three wars of unification. Prussia's six-week victory over Austria in the second of these wars resulted in the annexation of both duchies by Prussia in 1867. And finally, von Moltke's stunning campaign against France in 1870-71 ended with Schleswig-Holstein's official incorporation into the new German Reich. Once the dominant culture, Danish speakers now constituted a small minority of fewer than 100,000 in a German Reich of fifty million. But the presence of this relatively meagre Danish minority initiated a half century of political prodding, cultural persecution and corporal expulsion by Reich authorities, all in the interest of creating an unambiguously German North Schleswig.

Of course, the First World War changed the stakes entirely. Articles 119-124 of the Versailles Peace Treaty guaranteed the inhabitants of North Schleswig two plebiscites, one for each zone of North Schleswig, to determine whether the territory would remain German or Danish (Rietzler 1982: 113). In the first plebiscite of February 1920, 80 per cent of the southern zone opted for Germany. In March, however, more than 75 per cent of the northernmost zone voted to join Denmark. Indeed, while the February plebiscite left 9,000 Danes in German Schleswig-Holstein, 40,000 ethnic Germans were lost to Denmark (Rietzler 116-117). For the next thirteen years a politically weakened and economically depleted Weimar Republic tried to preserve the German character (*Volkstum*) of these North Schleswig Germans. But this state of affairs, like the Republic itself, would not last. Within seven years the Nazis had reoccupied and annexed North Schleswig. It was only in 1945, after a century of ethnopolitical dislocation, that the region finally stabilised along the legal and geographical lines of the 1920 plebiscite, eventually permitting the integration of minorities on both sides of the border.

This article will take Danish-German relations in the antebellum *Nordmark*, and most specifically the period 1890 to 1933, as a case study for examining two competing models of liberal integration, the *assimilationist* and the *multiculturalist*.¹ Contrary to contemporary claims in Europe and elsewhere regarding the intolerance and unfeasibility of an *assimilationist* model - often referred to as *Leitkultur* in Germany - this article will argue that the application of

¹ The author would like to thank two colleagues in the political science department at Stetson University, Gary Maris and Gene Huskey, for their invaluable suggestions in revising an earlier version of this paper. This shorter version was presented at the conference, 'Integration - Fiction or Reality?', held at the University of Greifswald, Greifswald, Germany. December 5-7, 2001.

multiculturalist models can be equally problematic. As we shall see many of Schleswig-Holstein's foremost liberals justified political and cultural autonomy - what we might now call multiculturalism - on ethnically exclusionary, even openly racist grounds. While many liberals defended state-supported assimilation through the constant invocation of tolerant, universalist principles.

Schleswig-Holstein's liberal parties, both German and Danish, provide the focus for this case study for two reasons. First, the German and Danish liberals dominated local elections and regional political culture for the majority of the period in question, at least until the rise of the radical right in the mid-1920's (Lange 1996: 464).² Second and more importantly, the very pluralism of liberal views Schleswig-Holstein indicates the historical contingency of any concept of integration which we might reflexively call liberal (Kurlander 2002). In Central Europe in the period immediately before the First World War, and for some time afterwards, democratic tolerance and universalism were not always central to the liberal platform. Rather, early twentieth century liberalism, particularly in Germany, was best defined by values such as free market capitalism, bourgeois individualism and the occasional *anti-étatisme* (Langewiesche 1988; Sell 1953). Devout "liberals" in a party political sense, members of the left-leaning Progressives (*Fortschrittliche Volkspartei* before 1918; the Democrats or *Deutsche Demokratische Partei* (DDP) after 1918) and more centrist National Liberals (*Nationalliberalen*; later the *Deutsche Volkspartei* or German People's Party/DVP) held views which often had little to do with secular humanism and much in common with messianic *völkisch*-nationalism (Kurlander 2002; Sheehan 1978; Langewiesche 1994; Eley 1996).³ By examining these liberal attitudes towards ethnic integration in the period 1890-1933 this article will suggest that exclusionary political practices might be pursued, not only under conservative, nationalist pretexts but also under the rubric of "multiculturalism". At the same time it will seek to rescue the concept of 'assimilation' from the pejorative connotation to which it has fallen, arguing that an assimilationist policy based on liberal-universalism often represented, at least in the context of this case study, the greatest safeguard for minority rights.

The 'Universalist' and 'Völkisch' Paradigms

Two prominent theoreticians of ethnic integration, Rogers Brubaker and Charles Tilly, understand the practice of ethnopolitical integration as emanating from two very different kinds of political cultures, one inclusive, the other exclusive. Borrowing from the modernisation theories of political scientists like Barrington Moore, but eschewing social class for the category of political culture, Brubaker has argued that there is an essential dichotomy between the French 'assimilationist', or state-centred model of ethnic integration, and the German

² For example, of the 10 available parliamentary seats in the national elections of 1907 and 1912, 7 went to the German liberal parties, and 1 to the Danish liberals. Only one other district in all of Germany, Lower Silesia, ever approached this level of liberal electoral dominance (Lange, 464; Schmädeke 1995).

³ See, for example, the deep-seated racism and anti-Semitism professed by the chairman of the Rhineland's German People's Party (DVP), Paul Moldenhauer, 'As a liberal party, we believed in rejecting racist thinking [*Rassengedanken*] and recognizing the Jews as citizens with fundamentally equal rights. On the other hand, there lived within us a powerful, instinctive dislike for the Jews, particularly in the... destructive form in which they appeared to us in politics, literature and art. We salved our conscience by explaining that we did not want to combat Jews as such, but only the destructive spirit of Jewry. In fact the Jews played no roll in the DVP' (NL Moldenhauer, BAK: N 1019, #19/1 (1936): 119).



'differentialist', or ethnocentric model (Brubaker 1992: 1-17).⁴ In rather more nuanced fashion Charles Tilly suggests that within Brubaker's framework of assimilationist (what he calls 'learned') and differentialist (what he calls 'primordial') states, there persist further discrepancies along lines of ex- and inclusivity societies based on the practical difficulty of becoming a citizen (Tilly 1996: 3-17).⁵ Both models represent useful conceptual frameworks for investigating the problem of ethnic integration in the modern world, and there is much we can learn from social scientific comparisons. But for our purposes, which are as much historical as theoretical, I propose a greater degree of theoretical specificity. What Brubaker calls *assimilationist* and Tilly *learned* I believe is best described in our case by the term *universalist*. I would furthermore argue that what Brubaker calls *differentialist* and Tilly *primordial* is better explained in a *Nordmark* context by the German term *völkisch*.

The *universalist* world view considers its task at once emancipatory and inclusive. It tries to integrate local nationalities into the state at home, while freeing foreign nationalities from oppressive situations abroad. To the *universalist*, political principles and values are far more important than cultivating ethnic sameness. For while aspects of nationality broadly defined, such as language and cultural habits might be desired they are nonetheless secondary to the individual's open acceptance of the constitutional principles that accompany becoming a citizen of a liberal-democratic polity. A universalist will never assume *a priori* that because a population in a contiguous state speaks a similar language or has a similar ethnicity (e.g. Wallonia in the case of France, Canada for the United States) it should automatically be integrated into one larger, ethnically homogenous nation. Moreover, a universalist will support national self-determination - that is political independence from another state - only if that nation is willing to accept the liberal-democratic values that would make it possible for ethnic minorities to become equal citizens. Conversely, in the *völkisch* (racist) world view state boundaries are understood neither in geographic nor political terms, but are meant to encompass as many racial kin as possible.⁶ Hence *völkisch* groups are more intent on integrating ethnic 'brethren' who lie in other states than they are on consolidating a political-constitutional identity for those who already inhabit a given geographical space or polity, whatever their ethnic background. To the *völkisch*-nationalist 'self-determination' means only the agglomeration of similar ethnicities into one nation-state for which liberal-democratic constitutional principles are wholly secondary, if not antithetical, to the preconditions of national unity.

⁴ Although Brubaker has recently revised his stance on this ethnic versus civic divide (Brubaker 1999).

⁵ As examples, Tilly points to Israel and the Ottoman Empire as primordial (differentialist) states and France and the United States as learned (assimilationist). However, given the difficulty of obtaining citizenship, Tilly calls both France and Israel 'exclusive', the Ottoman Empire and United States 'inclusive' (Tilly 1996: 3-17). For more on the debate between inclusionary and exclusionary forms of integration, see also Tamir (1995), Gellner (1983, 1987, 1994, 1997), Breuilly (1992, 1994), Smith (1998, 2000), Chatterjee (1993), Greenfeld (1992), Hanagan and Tilly (1999).

⁶ Needless to say, race has no objective value as a category, historical, scientific, political or otherwise. Insofar as it expresses the values of certain historical actors. However, the word 'racist' remains the most accurate translation of '*völkisch*'. 'Ethnocentric' is simply too benign a translation, and nationalist too unspecific. Moreover, there already exist perfectly good German equivalents for ethnicity (*Volkstum*) and nationalism (*Nationalismus*). *Völkisch* is really more accurate in connoting a virulently essentialist, racist sense of national identity anchored in blood and soil (*Blut und Boden*).

Herein lies a paradox. For universalists, despite their frequent embrace of multicultural tendencies are generally less willing to allow a minority to persist in civil society for any significant length of time without being integrated into the state. *Völkisch* groups, however, are less actively concerned with the persistence of ghettoised minorities, provided they remain in the minority and do not seek or achieve the full benefits of inclusion in the *Volksgemeinschaftn* (racial community). Such attitudes are illustrated, for example, in the near impossibility of Jews obtaining government or university positions in Imperial Germany; or in African-Americans' unsuccessful attempts at achieving social equality in the pre-Civil Rights South).⁷ Of course liberal-universalists seek the eventual integration of all minorities, whether or not those liberals accept a multicultural paradigm. But a *völkisch* liberal will actively oppose such integration, even while claiming to support the liberal *Rechtstaat* (a state based on the rule of law) (Moldenhauer 1936: 119; Tilly 1996: 81; Cohen and Bains 1988: 71-72)⁸ As we turn to our case study, it is crucial to keep in mind these theoretical distinctions.

'Völkisch' versus 'Universalist' Multiculturalism

Already before the turn of the last century *völkisch*-inflected liberalism had gained widespread acceptance across Schleswig-Holstein. Opposed to the privileges of the hereditary Junker aristocracy, liberals pitted the democratic preservation of a regional North Germanic ethnicity (*Volkstum*) against conservative, 'East Germanic', Prussian nationalism (Wulf 1969: 148-149; Zimmermann 1978).⁹ In this way, democratic liberalism in Schleswig-Holstein became intertwined with a defence of self-determination essentially democratic and multiculturalist but also racist in tone (Reventlow 1910; Hauser 1936: 35). Indeed, by invoking the virtues and traditions of the regional *Stämme* (racial branches) to defend their own rights, regional liberals found moral justification for maintaining the rights of their neighbours, the Danes, whose ties to blood and soil bore out their membership in the North Germanic *Volksgemeinschaft*. So long as the Danes remained loyal to the German Reich, German liberals argued, the Danes could determine their own cultural and linguistic policies (Langbehn 1922).¹⁰ This liberal toleration of Danish cultural autonomy, in short a 'multiculturalist' defence of Danish rights, seemed universalist enough in practice. But there were theoretical dangers to this ethnopolitical version of multiculturalism. As *völkisch*

⁷ Unless one converted to the Lutheran faith, and often in spite of such conversions, Jews were simply not named Full Professors in Imperial Germany. While some converted Jews can be found in the lower administration, the same was true in government circles.

⁸ As recent studies of citizenship have shown it is possible to have civic equality and yet for class, ethnic and religious inequality to persist (Tilly 1996: 81). Or, to quote Philip Cohen and Harwant Bains, '... racist ideology, however totalising in scope, is not necessarily totalitarian. It becomes so only when hegemony breaks down and racist norms are directly enforced throughout society by the coercive power of the state' (Cohen and Bains 1988: 71-72; Walzer 1997).

⁹ In Schleswig-Holstein, argues the historian Peter Wulf, 'regional particularities... played a special political role in relation to the Reich... This local and racially-conscious thinking worked to create a certain degree of common political views...' (Wulf, 148-149; Zimmermann 1978). The seminal work on *Heimat* as a political, social and cultural artifact is Walker 1998; also see Applegate 1990.

¹⁰ No Schleswig-Holsteiner exemplified this contradiction better than the Hadersleben-born cultural critic, Julius Langbehn, whose most famous work glorified Rembrandt as the ideal exponent of *völkisch* North German culture, while at the same time providing political support for a specifically Pan-German politics of expansion, and consequently the suppression of the oppositional Danish minority (Langbehn, 1922).



multiculturalists, many liberals registered altogether different attitudes regarding non-Germanic minorities such as the Poles. After all, wrote one member of the left liberal Progressives, there exists a 'justification, indeed the duty... to remedy sickly limbs, or even to permit amputations of abnormal growths'. To many *völkisch* liberals, the Poles and Czechs, indeed, the Jews, were just such an abnormal growth which needed to be 'amputated' from the racial body politic (*Fortschritt* 1908: 321-325).¹¹

This peculiar sort of *völkisch* multiculturalism was endemic not only to the radical or conservative right, but also to the progressive liberal camp in Wilhelmine and Weimar Schleswig-Holstein. It is obvious, moreover, that *völkisch* preconceptions which supported Danish ethnic autonomy likewise justified widespread liberal discrimination towards certain 'inferior' minorities such as the Poles. The Danes were 'Germans, like us, a well bred and capable nation... even if they overtake us, it is our own blood'. The Poles, however, were 'depraved, intellectually and bodily inferior'. According to *völkisch* multiculturalists, only racially superior Germanic peoples deserved the right to determine their own pace of integration. The Danes unimpeachable racial character virtually necessitated the right of self-determination. Like any 'honourable nationality' the Danes must 'choose their own way' until such time as they joined their German brethren out of respect for the 'overwhelming greatness' of Germany's 'nation and culture' (*Schleswiger Nachrichten* 1907: 9.01.07; Hanssen 1955).¹² Because the Slavic peoples belonged to a racially inferior culture, the Poles experienced an entirely different response by many liberals to their cultural and linguistic travails, in most cases an increasingly paternalistic and repressive policy of educational and political discrimination (*Itzehoer Nachrichten* 19 August 1908).¹³

Certainly not all multiculturalists were *völkisch*. Many true universalist liberals supported a principled multicultural policy of cultural and linguistic autonomy for all minorities, the Poles as well as Danes. Ardently opposed to racial or any other essentialist criteria, these universalist liberals refused to 'sacrifice all liberal principles... in disdain of the universal applicability of the idea of nationality, viewing any oppression of other nationalities within or without the state borders as a patriotic deed and thereby betraying a basically false conception of patriotism'. Indeed, many liberals were allergic to all forms of *völkisch* bias, arguing that framing the nationality struggle in such a way would 'lead [only] to war and cannon cults on the one side, and to the disenfranchisement of foreign-

¹¹ 'Where, however, national consciousness infringes upon the equal rights of other nations in representing the true or ostensible rights of one's own nation, they undermine their own principles in their total disregard for the commonality of the ideal of nationality' (*Fortschritt* 1908: 321-325).

¹² 'Do they want to institute German schools and the dispersion of the German language where it is not desired, no matter what? Nothing could be more unpleasant...'. (*Schleswiger Nachrichten* 1907: 9.01.07). The Danes themselves did not necessarily see this kinship that Germans of all *national* parties often rhapsodized, as H.P. Hanssen remarked, referring to the linguistic and educational debate 'Wir sind Dänen, wir wollen Dänen bleiben und wir fordern als Dänen behalten zu werden' (LAS: Abt. 301, #59. Police Literary Bureau 10.09.06; Hanssen 1955).

¹³ When accused by the Danes of exacerbating the North Schleswig question with their intransigent policies and open campaign coffers, one National Liberal article answered that it would be even more important for Danish-German relations if 'the Danes would just once close their mouth by uttering an intelligible German word' (*Itzehoer Nachrichten* 19 August 1908).

speaking citizens on the other' (*Fortschritt* 1908: 321-325).¹⁴ Rather, the universalists argued that integration into the German Reich would come about through a long-term policy that practised patience, tolerance and promoted political democratisation. Even if it slackened the pace of integration in the short-term cultural and linguistic tolerance was to be accorded all foreign nationalities, whether Danish or Polish.

Thus we find a wide range of Schleswig-Holstein liberals united in practice - in granting considerable cultural and linguistic autonomy to the Danes - but diametrically opposed in world view. For *völkisch* multiculturalists, though seemingly tolerant of difference, adhered to an ideology of 'blood and soil' which prepared the way for the exclusionary racial policy (if not necessarily the genocidal outcomes) of the Third Reich. Conversely, universalist multiculturalists supported the general application of cultural and linguistic self-determination to all ethnicities in the ultimate interest of integration. This remarkable dichotomy in the liberal position was exemplified by the Peace Association for North Schleswig (*Friedensverein für das nördliche Schleswig*), a predominantly liberal organisation in defence of Danish rights in the *Nordmark*. Founded by the liberal pastor, Johannes Schmidt-Wodder, the Peace Association sought reconciliation between Germans and Danes through mutual acknowledgement of each others cultural, linguistic and religious rights. Many universalist liberals, for example, the Jewish Progressive Felix Waldstein and the Nobel Peace Prize winner Ludwig Quidde, endorsed this policy. Both felt that Poles as well as Danes should be permitted to attend church services and take classes in their native language, so long as they took German as well. But the Peace Association's core constituency in Schleswig-Holstein included a great number of *völkisch* liberals, individuals like the blood and soil mystic Christian Tränckner and the future *Gauleiter* (provincial governor under the Nazi regime) for the Baltic provinces Hinrich Lohse, both of whom would later join the Nazi Party.

'Völkisch' versus 'Universalist' Assimilation

Not all liberals agreed with the Peace Association's defence of Danish cultural freedoms. After all, the persistence of any *Volksplitter*, (fragmenters of the unity of the *Volk*), however racially 'pure', constituted an invitation to cultural chaos and political dissent. Hence liberal assimilationists on both sides of the race debate promoted a program of cultural and political integration in North Schleswig little different from the Germanization policies practised in Polish Silesia or Alsace-Lorraine (Hagen 1980; Igersheim 1981; Hiery 1986). Importantly, however, a great many of these assimilationists cited universalist reasons for state-supported assimilation policies. Germanisation policy, they argued, would promote 'egalitarian tendencies peculiar not only to liberalism, but the essence of our entire state'. For those who could not 'read, write or speak German' could never fully integrate, and therefore could 'not make use' of their rights (*Schleswiger Nachrichten* 1907: 1.09.07). Liberal assimilationists thus reminded their multiculturalist colleagues that 'the Prussian constitution recognises no Pole as such... only Germans' and this 'describes our North Schleswig relations

¹⁴ Some progressives reasoned, for example, that 'patriotism and nationalism' were 'quite dissimilar concepts', and that 'love of country and national feeling stand starkly opposed'. Certainly ethnic similarities existed among Germans. This had created a national community of individuals who possessed a common 'feeling of survival [*Selbsterhaltungsempfinden*]'. But 'nationalism' was dangerous because it privileged one 'nationality' over all others, while 'patriotism [*Patriotismus*]' was acceptable because it represented the innocuous expression of regional particularism, 'no different than one's love of one's own mother ...love of Heimat... the true love of fatherland' (*Fortschritt* 1908: 321-325).



perfectly' (*Berliner Tageblatt* 1901: 7.02.01 as quoted in *Die Nordmark* 1901: 8.15.01).

Predictably enough, a number of assimilationists maintained a *völkisch* agenda as well, best expressed rather succinctly by Schleswig-Holstein's *Deutscher Verein für das nördliche Schleswig* (DV) or German Association (*Die Nordmark* 1898: 2.15.1898).¹⁵ The DV's official purpose was to purchase books, build libraries, and sponsor wide-ranging *Kulturarbeit* among the Danish-speaking population in North Schleswig, whose racial character it considered impeccable (Lange 1996: 477-479). But realistically, the DV wished to eradicate the pro-Danish opposition, led by politicians like Hans-Peter Hanssen and Jes Jessen (*Die Nordmark* 15 November 1902). Racial purity after all meant little if one failed to recognise a Pan-German community of interests. As far as the DV was concerned, in any case, a Danish speaker who 'thought' German was better than a fluent German speaker who nevertheless 'thought' Danish (*Die Nordmark* 1901: 2.15.01). If the Poles remained an unassimilable, alien presence in the Reich, the Danes were prodigal sons, always capable of returning to the ancestral Germanic fold (*Fortschritt* 1907: 97-101).

Hence liberal views on Danish integration were defined by two peculiar paradoxes. The first paradox is that some liberal Germanisers justified their more paternalistic integration policies by invoking universalist principles. How could one become a full member of the state, these liberals reasoned, if they refused to learn the language or imbibe the culture? Of course, there are many problematic policies associated with this kind of assimilationist logic. But insofar as liberal assimilationists assumed that *all* ethnicities, whether Danish, Polish or Jewish, might be assimilated by a simple process of mass acculturation, their creed reflected universalist values. The second paradox is that while many liberal multiculturalists supported Danish cultural autonomy, their motivations were often *völkisch* in origin (Lange 1996: 478-479; *Schleswiger Grenzpost* 1912: 26.01.12; *Sonderburger Zeitung* 1912: 24.12.12). Tolerant of Danish cultural pride, but antagonistic towards Poles and Jews, this racist version of multiculturalism, although liberal in origin, lacked the universal applicability of classical liberalism. In this regard, it contrasted greatly with the position of Danish liberals vis-à-vis minority integration in the *Nordmark*.

Danish Universalism

In the northernmost regions of Schleswig-Holstein, the cultural and linguistic gulf between Danes and Germans was not terribly vast. A large number of ethnic Germans spoke or at least understood some Danish, and many more Danes spoke German. While staunch German nationalists like Otto Scheel often descended from old Danish families, the surnames of some Danish leaders indicated a German ancestor or two in the not so distant past. As one German nationalist, himself probably of part-Danish descent, explained, a Danish speaker who 'thought German' was better than a German speaker who 'thought Danish' - not that such scenarios were common (*Die Nordmark* 1902: 11.15.02). Yet this close ethnic brotherhood did not breed political fraternity. Danish liberals were, much like German liberals, divided into multiculturalist and assimilationist camps. However, virtually all Danes opposed the Pan-Germanic designs of the German

¹⁵ The goals were simple, as summarized in the first Copy of *Die Nordmark*: 1. To make Danish feeling Schleswigers more German. 2. To avoid attacking individuals 3. To combat anti-German feeling and propaganda wherever it was found (*Die Nordmark* 1898: 15.02.98).

völkisch-nationalists. The majority of Danes behind H.P. Hanssen felt that Danes and Germans could coexist in a German North Schleswig so long as Danish cultural and linguistic rights were respected. Hence they were inclined towards a 'multicultural' solution to the North Schleswig question. Admittedly, a more assimilationist Danish minority insisted that North Schleswig must rejoin Denmark if there was to be lasting ethnopolitical peace. Yet both Danish liberal wings put forth a universalist program which eschewed the language of race. This was particularly true in the case of Hanssen's Danish Party, by far the dominant political force in North Schleswig. Hanssen always protested that the Danes were loyal to the *Reich* - he even went so far as to call himself a German - while emphasising just as strongly that in constructing any national political and cultural community it is more important to foster liberal-democratic principles than to nurture a homogeneous ethnic community (*Fortschritt* 1907: 71-74, 216).

Not surprisingly, Hanssen and the Danes were appalled by the *völkisch* tenor of German liberal politics after the outbreak of the First World War. While continuing to protest loyalty to the German state, Hanssen voted alongside the German Socialist, Polish, Czech and Alsatian deputies in the *Reichstag* in opposing war-time annexations. Particularly sensitive to racial and religious intolerance, in his memoirs Hanssen made it a point to recount his surprise and dismay when a Jewish Socialist took the *Reichstag* podium to deliver a pacifist-inclined speech, and a respected leader of the left liberal Progressive Party, Julius Kopsch, shouted him down with cries of "Again a Jew! A Jew! What do the Jews want here?" (Hanssen 1955: 134).

Of course, the Danish Party's increasingly critical stance did little to improve the prospects of Danish cultural autonomy in the Nordmark.¹⁶ In the crucible of the First World War, many German liberals insisted that all Germanic peoples should be fighting side-by-side against the Slavic and Roman peoples. When the Danes refused to accept this covenant of race liberal leaders threatened them with figurative banishment from 'Odin's tribe' and literal expulsion from North Schleswig. Both Karl Strackerjan, a 'right' liberal leader of the German Association, and Johannes Tiedje, a 'left' liberal founder of the Peace Association, attacked Hanssen and the Danish Party for committing 'racial miscegenation' (*Rassenschande*) in allying with the Poles in order to push for the Danish rights (Strackerjan 1916: Vorwort, i., 40, 59-60, 78-89, 102-107).¹⁷ Invoking the Danes own Nordic mythology, Strackerjan now compared German supporters of the Danes to Hödur, the blind gatekeeper to Asgard's rainbow bridge, and the Danes themselves to Loki, the traitorous stepson of Odin who secretly sought Asgard's ruin (Strackerjan 1915: 89, 102-103). Unwilling to recognise these *völkisch* precepts, the Danes came under increasing persecution and arrest (Naumann 1913, 1915: BAB: N 3001, #229; *Kieler Zeitung* 1918: 31.10.18; *Kieler Zeitung* 2 November 1913, 3 November 1913; *Itzehoer Nachrichten* 6 November 1918).

¹⁶ Hanssen to Naumann, 9 August 1914; Naumann to Hanssen, 14 August 1914, 19 August 1914, 12 September 1914, 4 November 1914; Christiansen to Naumann, 7 September 1914; Naumann to Rade, 19 May 1915 (NL Naumann, BAB: N 3001, #229).

¹⁷ Karl Strackerjan accused the Danes of colluding with the French, 'taking up the matters of oppressed nations' like Serbia, and thereby bringing about the World War. Invoking Nordic mythology, Strackerjan compared Naumann to Hödur, the loyal but blind gatekeeper of Asgard, and Naumann's colleague Erich Schläijker to Loki, the traitorous stepson of Odin who secretly sought Asgard's ruin (Strackerjan 1916: Vorwort, i., 40, 59-60, 78-89, 102-107).



Integration in the Interwar Period, 1918-1933

In the wake of the First World War *völkisch* ideologies found an even greater reception among Schleswig-Holstein liberals. This included Weimar's two great liberal parties, Friedrich Naumann's DDP and Gustav Stresemann's DVP. The Democrat Christian Tränckner, for example, demanded a 'rebirth of German *Volkstum*' and a 'quickening of Schleswig-Holstein's racial character [*Stammestum*]' (Schwensen 1993: 186-188).¹⁸ An erstwhile supporter of the left liberal Peace Association, Tränckner acknowledged the Danes' 'Nordic character', their 'roots of soil and race fixed deep in the earth'. But he worried about their loyalty to a Greater German *Reich* (Rietzler 1982: 307-308). Tränckner's colleague in the rival liberal DVP, Johannes Tonneson, also demanded that the Danes recognise the German '*Volkstum* and the powers slumbering within it... must... be surrounded by a shimmer of mystical reverence, in which we witness with respect the life forces which will lead us into our new future' (Schwensen 1993: 191-192; Rietzler 1982: 308).¹⁹

Though representing itself as more self-consciously 'republican' and 'democratic' than its mainstream liberal brethren, Schleswig-Holstein's smallest liberal party, the *Liberaler Landespartei*, was even more virulently racist and anti-semitic. Already in 1919, the *Landespartei* had allied with other particularist groups in the Weimar National Assembly in order to sponsor a federalist constitution, which permitted extensive self-administration and ethnic autonomy (Rietzler 1982: 94).²⁰ By 1921, the *Landespartei* openly supported the creation of a racial democracy based on the mutual constitutional affirmation and protection of all Germanic *Stämme*, whether Bavarian or Saxon, Danish or Friesian. Having imbibed racialist theories of natural selection to the hilt, the *Landespartei* insisted upon the superiority of North Germans over all other Germans, and of the Germanic race over all other races, a 'liberal' principle which the party's chairman, Hinrich Lohse, would later apply with great vigour in his capacity as Nazi *Gauleiter* for the Baltic provinces (Heberle 1970: 46-47, 53; Rietzler 1982: 306).²¹

¹⁸ Tränckner's racialist sentiments often found expression in frequent attacks on the city, 'the greenhouse of non-culture... filth and kitsch' and in the idealization of North Schleswig's Germanic character (Schwensen 1993: 186-188).

¹⁹ He called on his flock to carry forth the 'instinct of the blood', to hearken the 'pulse of the *Volk*', and to bring forth a leader 'out of the silent *Volkstum*' who would make Germany great (Schwensen, 191-192). Though 'congruent with National Socialist ideas', they represented the *Weltanschauung* of many of Schleswig-Holstein's liberal elite (Rietzler, 308).

²⁰ 'Hand in hand with the popularization of race and 'border'-ideology came a reactivation of those irrational images of *völkisch* cultural pessimism' which influenced 'public consciousness' widely before the War, and which now 'found a political organizational framework in the *Landespartei*' (Rietzler, 94).

²¹ 'We of the *Landespartei* claim to be the representatives of the old Schleswig-Holstein liberalism. Democracy as conceived in Schleswig-Holstein is something entirely different from democracy as for instance represented by the *Berliner Tageblatt* or the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. The Schleswig-Holstein democracy... is a green democracy in contrast to the golden democracy... Any predominance of the Jews in business and government we shall fight with all our energy'. 'Autonomistic-federalistic and equally... national, it propagated a specifically 'Schleswig-Holstein liberalism... It is further important that some of the leading National Socialists began their political career in the '*Landespartei*'" (Heberle 1979: 46-47, 53, 58).

The point here is not to argue that all German liberals were *völkisch*, but that many *völkisch*-nationalists were members of the liberal parties. Custodians of the national soul, devastated by the potential loss of blood (ethnic Germans) and soil (North Schleswig, Upper Silesia, Alsace-Lorraine, etc.) which the Versailles Treaty entailed, a great many Schleswig-Holstein liberals banded together in the Schleswig-Holstein Association (the *Schleswig-Holsteiner Bund* or SHB) in order to promote a policy of (namely German) self-determination in post-war Europe. There were conservative and National Socialist members, but the association's leadership, with few exceptions, was composed of prominent members of the three main liberal parties (Rietzler 1982: 93, 300-308; Schwensen 1993: 55, 69-72, 129, 179; Stoltenberg 1962: 19-21, 32-34, 84; Heberle 1979: 140; Lehmann 1969: 30-39).²² Ideological differences existed among the *Bündler*, largely reflecting the pre-war divisions between the Peace Association and the German Association. But the group's declared purpose to defend 'German' interests in North Schleswig increasingly drowned out dissenting voices, as only a minority of multiculturalists continued to stress the need to preserve Schleswig-Holstein's independence from both Denmark and Prussia, themselves motivated by an excessively parochial view of racial purity (Schmidt-Wodder 1919: 3-6; Schwensen 1993: 16-17, 46-55, 69-72, 331-332; Lehmann 1969: 26-28; Rietzler 1982: 300-308; Heile in *Die Hilfe* 13 November 1919).

Virtually all such differences dissipated after the 1920 plebiscite in favour of Denmark. Almost immediately both multiculturalist and the assimilationist wings within the *völkisch*-inclined SHB began to invoke even more strongly Wilson's ideals of self-determination in order to justify Weimar's support for 'languishing' German minorities in Denmark, Poland, France, Czechoslovakia, Belgium and Italy. Motivated by common goals, the erstwhile 'multiculturalist', Hjalmar Schacht, a member of the left liberal Democrats, hosted the assimilationist, Anton Schifferer, the former chairman of the DVP, at a 1925 *Bierabend* celebrating two thousand years of German racial purity in Schleswig-Holstein. Schifferer gave the keynote address, titled 'German Cultural Work in Schleswig-Holstein'. Received with rousing applause, Schifferer argued that the *Nordmark* was different from the Rhineland or *Ostmark* because there persisted in the latter two areas a conflict between the Germans on the one hand, and the Latin and Slavic races on the other. In the *Nordmark*, however, there prevailed a '1000 year exchange between West Germanic and North Germanic culture' which was only made untenable by the 'political consequences' attendant to this dispute. Schifferer hoped to reconcile the Danes to the German *völkisch* element on the basis of Schleswig-Holstein's 'geographic position, history and nationality in the framework of great German culture' (Schifferer 1925: 3-16; Schifferer 1928: 18-21).

Thus by the advent of the Third Reich in 1933 a wide-ranging coalition of Schleswig-Holstein liberals demanded the return of 'lost territories' and the preservation of Germans abroad. Yet their motivations were a far cry from the universalism which motivated Western leaders like Woodrow Wilson and Aristide Briand. As the historian Bruce Frye notes, liberal support for German self-determination was, at the very least, 'ironic, given the indifference of [even] left

²² Willy Iversen, chairman of the Landespartei in 1921 and a DVP leader after 1924; the DDP's Christian Tränckner; the antebellum Progressive and Landespartei leader, Karl Alnor; the DVP publicist, Jacob Bödewadt; the DVP chairman, Anton Schifferer; the progressive pastors and DDP-affiliates, Schmidt-Wodder and Johannes Tiedje; the DVP Reichstag representative Dr. Jane Voigt; the Kiel professors Otto Baumgarten (DDP) and Otto Scheel (DVP); Ludwig Ahlmann, owner of the *Kieler Zeitung*, was also a member.



liberals to such questions before 1919' (Frye 1985: 129-131). Simply put, self-determination could be employed by a multiplicity of actors, from Theodor Heuß to Adolf Hitler, in ways both universalist and racist. This conceptual malleability made it more than a little difficult to discern what sort of politics lay behind the invocation of self-determination in the Nordmark (*Deutsch-Demokratische Beiträge* 1921: 4.02.21). When leading liberals put forth policies seeking 'stronger self-administration for all German tribes', this suggested a kind of democratic federalism, but it was a privilege which could only be granted to racial branches of Germanic peoples. And if many assimilationists moderated their rhetoric on the Danish Question it was because they recognised the Danes, unlike the Poles, as a kindred Nordic race whose sympathy was needed to preserve German *Volkstum* in North Schleswig. This was precisely the line taken by the provincial Nazi Party (Schmidt 1929: LAS: Abt. 309, #35298; Schwensen, 370-373, 403-404).²³ Thus many *völkisch* and universalist liberals - indeed, even Nazis - agreed that Danish North Schleswigers had a right to assimilate on their own terms, all the while preserving their culture and language, without being persecuted by the state. The logic behind this 'multiculturalist' policy, however, could not have been more disparate.

Conclusion

We live in a world where a new metaphor of integration, multiculturalism, has replaced the assimilationist model exemplified by the classical American conception of the assimilationist 'melting pot'. Inspired by trends in modern ethnology and literary studies, politicians, particularly liberal politicians, have shown in recent years a welcome sensitivity to subaltern cultures. This post-colonial consciousness has freed classical liberalism from many of the nagging prejudices which it once perpetuated in an attempt to emancipate the second and third worlds, overrunning their cultures and societies with 'modernisation theories' and 'western' models. The new multicultural paradigm has worked to strip away the veneer of altruistic universalism and reveals its subjective core values. In this way, multiculturalism has attempted to reduce social reality to its organic components, to return agency and voice to those marginalised ethnic, cultural and social groups which have heretofore been overshadowed by a dominant *Leitkultur*. Indeed, a multiculturalism tempered by universalism may lead to a more diverse, cohesive European polity; it would be absurd to argue, in any case, that members of the European Union should consciously discard their cultural specificity in the name of one, uniform all-encompassing *Leitkultur*.

Nevertheless, there is the danger that a multiculturalism unqualified by some kind of overarching universalist consensus will perpetuate the same intolerance as an ethnocentric, state-sponsored, assimilationist *Leitkultur*. For multiculturalism, as our examination of the Nordmark has shown, can devolve into any number of ethnic particularisms, with racial and religious essentialism being two of the most prominent manifestations. An assimilationist model of integration may tend towards intolerance in the interests of inclusion. But a multiculturalist society may eventually fracture or turn upon itself as the most powerful social group excludes those groups that are most different from itself. Having for many years extolled the virtues of a federalised *Volksgemeinschaft* inclusive of Austrians, Danes,

²³ The DVP's Wilhelm Iversen seconded Schmidt, calling for a 'national organism' awakening the forces which 'slumbered in the race'. A majority of Nazi members 'swore' themselves to Iversen because he possessed impeccable *völkisch* credentials, *Führer* qualities and 'Nordic-Germanic' views (Schwensen, 370-373, 403-404).

Frisians and the Dutch , but exclusive of Slavs or Jews, is it any surprise that so many Schleswig-Holstein liberals would go on to join the Nazi Party? If one takes this *Nordmark* debate seriously, it is clear that an ethnocentric multiculturalism can preserve disintegration, even prejudice and xenophobia, under the rubric of liberalism.

Differences between liberal assimilationists and liberal multiculturalists are anyway less great in practice than they are in theory. The ideological disparities between the two are often purely definitional, depending upon the national context and the correlating criteria for inclusion or exclusion. Let us take, for example, a policy that requires minority recognition of the state constitution and a good faith effort to learn the language, but permits minorities full linguistic, religious and cultural freedoms, perhaps even promoting minority cultures through state or local initiative. In historically universalist but ardently assimilationist France such a policy, in its laissez-faire attitude towards creating a uniquely French national identity, might smack of multiculturalism. However, in the American context there are many 'multiculturalists' who would consider this policy of minimal state interference in, and perhaps even the promotion of minority cultures to be assimilationist because such a policy would lead to the gradual co-optation of minority cultures in the interest of producing a national consensus. Certainly there are any number of academics who now consider the American 'melting pot' model shallow, culturally oppressive and overtly assimilationist. Whether one professes to support assimilation or multiculturalism, however, it is important to search for some kind of 'overlapping consensus' on a universalist basis, to borrow a term from John Rawls (Rawls 1993: 1-15, 134-147). For a state which eschews universalism in the name of multiculturalism might end up promoting the same abuses as a state which promotes an essentialist *Leitkultur*.

If nothing else, this case study should remind us not to accept certain versions of integration at face value. Just as liberal claims regarding multiculturalism can be used to support illiberal solutions to minority integration, *Leitkultur* appears, in historical perspective, to be less ethnically essentialist and more inherently inclusive than many of its critics will admit. It may be hard to take Germany's Christian Democratic leadership at their word (*Der Spiegel-Online* 11 April 2000). Much like George W. Bush's calls for compassionate conservatism, there is a cynical edge to the doctrine *Leitkultur* in the Federal Republic, the thinly-veiled conviction that certain ethnicities - at one time the Poles, and now the Turks - will simply be unwilling or unable to achieve the cultural niveau set for their full integration. In denying dual citizenship and demanding language fluency exams, conservatives across Europe might hope to decrease immigrant access to full citizenship, all the while citing classical liberal goals of universal inclusion. But there is no reason to presume such bad intentions. If the concept of *Leitkultur*, of establishing an overarching political and cultural consensus, remains problematic in many respects, so too does a multicultural paradigm which, rather than seeking pluralist integration on a universal basis, promotes the maintenance of one's own ethnic purity by paying lip-service to the sanctity of others.

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RESEARCH NOTE

Lessons in Conflict Prevention: A Comparative Examination of the Content of Peace Accords

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Introduction

Most peace accords fail. More precisely if less dramatically, of the hundreds of agreements, ceasefires and declarations which have concluded between hostile parties since the Second World War, relatively few of them have led to durable settlements.¹ There are some notable successes: South Tyrol in Italy did succeed in completely avoiding an escalation of violence in the 1960s through an autonomy package, and Guatemala has succeeded in ending more recently a horrific period of widespread atrocities. The conflict involving Palestinians and Israel or the Muslim minority in the Philippines have endured for decades, despite the myriad of agreements. Nevertheless, there does appear to be a definite, observable and positive trend worldwide, as pointed out in the most recent report from the Center for International Development and Conflict Management. The number of conflicts and their intensity have lessened dramatically in the last decade, usually as a result of agreements offering greater autonomy and power-sharing to minorities.

This article proposes to examine this trend by considering the content of various peace agreements and offer suggestions as to available options in constitutional designs during peace processes. The approach will be on 'substance' rather than process, an approach which is perhaps contrary to prevailing views but which may offer more specific recommendations as to why some accords are successful, and why many others do not.

But in order to do that, it is necessary to first set the stage as to why conflicts occur and why they can be so difficult to control.

Why Minorities Kill

Most conflicts are no longer international. It is clear that armed conflicts which have plagued the world in the last two decades are within states rather than between states. While a number of conflicts involve revolutionary groups attempting to overthrow the central government, most are ethnonationalist in the sense that there is a minority group fighting for independence or at least some degree of autonomy. In a number of cases, minorities (Mohajirs of Pakistan; Albanians in Macedonia)² assert that they are simply struggling for their rights in a country where they are the victims of active discrimination by the government in areas such as employment, land use and property rights or language use.

A number of preliminary issues need to be clarified: Conflicts do not go hand in hand with the presence of minorities. Any systematic examination of the linkage

¹ There has never been an attempt to 'count' all peace agreements in ethnic or internal conflicts. In my own work I have collated over almost 300 documents, though this is by no means complete. Furthermore, there is a problem as to what constitutes a peace accord: ceasefires may be little more than a 'promise not to shoot first' and may have little substance beyond that commitment.

² While some Albanians are undoubtedly sympathetic to the dream of a 'Greater Albania', the demands of most Albanians, including the two Albanian political parties and the official statements emanating from the rebel side has consistently demanded an end to what they term as discriminatory treatment in employment and the right to use the Albanian language with national government officials.

between the presence of minorities and in Asia, Europe, Africa or the Americas makes it clear that there is none. To put that in a different way, it is not the presence of a religious, linguistic or ethnic minority in a state that is a natural source of conflict. What stands out in every continent is that despite the thousands of various 'minority combinations' worldwide, there are in fact so few conflicts.

Clearly, there must be a unique combination of factors under which some minority members are willing to resort to violence to advance their claims against the state, and willing to kill if necessary to achieve this aim.

Minorities such as Catholics in Northern Ireland, Basques in Spain, Corsicans in France, Chechens in Russia, Achenese in Indonesia, Albanians in Macedonia or Yugoslavia, Abkhazis in Georgia and Kurds in Turkey may be minorities, but they do not instinctively enjoy killing their neighbours. For even a small segment of the minority population to rise up in arms against the State there generally must be in place a relatively unique set of conditions given the actual absolute rarity of such conflicts in proportion to the number of minorities groups around the world.

The particular setting found in common in many of the conflicts which have arisen in different parts of the world almost always involve 'substantial minorities' who are a majority in a part of the state in which they live, or at least a very high percentage of the population on a given territory. This territory which they occupy is also generally 'their' traditional or historical territory. They are not new arrivals in the state. In fact, what tends to occur is that the longer a minority can trace its roots in a state, the more it feels it is entitled to the respect of its territory, culture, religion and language.

Very small minorities or recent immigrants almost never revert to violence in a conflict against the state and the majority in support of political demands. It is with larger, historically established minorities with some territorial identification that you find the setting under which have a potential for conflicts under certain conditions.

But why do minorities revert to the use of force against the state? This question is central since for most of us, to use violence against the state does not seem very logical when by definition you are not only outnumbered, but you are actually using force against the state which is almost always better equipped, with a standing army and vast or at least much greater resources at its disposal.

As the next sections will indicate, a dissection of various peace accords from around the world shows a fairly consistent pattern in terms of fundamental demands which are indicative of the underlying causes of tension and the structures and approaches that are most likely to be successful. This is critical to reaching a durable settlement, since no long term solution will be found unless one addresses the underlying source(s) of a conflict. To be blunt, the assertion that minority demands are simply 'ethnonational' is too facile and indeed unhelpful in trying to find specific, substantive measures on designing successful constitutional models.

From examining the couple of hundred peace accords concluded since the end of the Second World War one finds quite consistent, universal categories of demands. The accords which go beyond negotiating processes and immediate cessation of hostilities almost always tend to include one or more of the following,



in order of prominence:

- independence/autonomy/power-sharing
- human rights guarantees
- 'fair' distribution of resources/employment

One could conclude of course that it is self-evidence that any struggle for political power would include some kind of power-sharing formula. However, that ignores a more subtle signal the almost universal prominence of autonomy and power-sharing demands by minorities actually indicates: the belief among some segments of the minority population that the state itself does not represent their interest properly, and therefore the minority must control its 'own affairs' via a devolved or autonomous political structure within the state - or outside it in the case of independence movements. In other words, it is a loss of trust in the ability of the state to accommodate their interests which often drives minorities into the path of violence. The incubating period during which these conflicts develop can be characterised as one during which states, including democracies, were unable or unwilling to properly respond the needs and interests of substantial minorities. Whether in Franco-era Spain, or post-World War II Northern Ireland or South Tyrol, post-independence Sri Lanka and Sudan, active and pronounced discriminatory practices by the state and even suppression of the culture or language of minorities were the original sources of what would lead to conflict.

Failure of Inclusive Governance

In most states, governments are seldom completely neutral in ethnic terms. In the distribution of power within their structures, states inevitably reflect the dominant groups within society. France is not an ethnically neutral state, since the French language and culture is very much part of its 'national personality', and in fact reflects the cultural attributes of the majority, but not the totality, of the French population. France still is the scene of armed groups (Corsicans and very sporadically Breton hardliners) using violence to uphold demands dealing with minority rights.

Even in countries like the United States with 'civic' forms of nationalism, the argument that all minorities, especially racial and linguistic ones, have been or still are treated neutrally is historically impossible to sustain. On the contrary, the United States had a number of extremely violent ethnic conflicts involving its only traditional minorities on its territory during the Nineteenth Century. These armed insurrections only came to an end when the various Indigenous Peoples were either almost exterminated or accepted a modicum of autonomy when they were no longer in a position to offer any resistance to the overwhelming power and numbers of the 'European/Americans'.

One characteristic of states where a conflict has erupted is that minorities are systematically under-represented or outvoted. This might not have very serious consequences if the fiction of a neutral or ethnically-, religiously- or linguistically-blind modern state were true, and all citizens were to be treated equally without any disadvantages because of these personal characteristics. This is however a fallacy: all states usually tend to reflect and protect to a greater extent the interests of the majority, including in some cases demonstrating definite cultural, linguistic or religious preferences. Persons who belong to minorities therefore find themselves in a double-dilemma: they have interests in a number of areas that may be different from those of the majority, while in the electoral process and the

political sphere, persons who belong to minorities tend to be outvoted and under-represented. Minorities tend therefore to suffer disproportionately from a 'deficit' in terms of numbers and influence in many if not most political systems, democratic or not.

It is in most cases the discriminatory distribution of power and resources and other violations of the rights of minorities which constitute the deep-rooted sources of tension that can be sparked into violent conflict. The prominence of power-sharing arrangements in peace accords suggest that minorities usually revert to violence in frustration at not being able to change their government's policies because they are outnumbered and outvoted. They usually react to defend their interests in a legal and political environment which they believe they cannot control or even simply influence significantly.

Autonomy and power-sharing as part of the solution to an ethnic conflict suggest that these minorities no longer trust the 'national' government. They do not trust the government because it is dominated by the ethnic majority. And the ethnic majority's domination and ethnic preferences in countries raked by conflicts can usually be linked to a series of violation of the rights of minorities in areas of language, religion or culture, and especially discrimination in terms of employment and land rights.

Among the most common deep-laid sources of ethnic tension are the following:

- Exclusion from employment opportunities because of language requirements or subtle 'ethnic' preferences, both in the civil service or in private activities (discrimination)
- Actual exclusion of members of a substantial minority from most state employment positions, especially in the higher echelons (discrimination)
- Denial of land ownership, or refusal to recognise traditional land ownership
- Refusal to allow minorities to hold elected office because of language or other discriminatory criterion
- Economic development projects in minority regions which benefit the majority instead of the minority (discrimination)
- Expropriation of traditional lands without proper compensation, and/or transmigration programme which results in arrival of vast numbers of migrants (discrimination)
- Refusal to use minority language in public schools and administration where warranted by substantial number of speakers of a minority language
- Denial of citizenship and corresponding rights on a discriminatory basis
- Prohibition of use of minority languages, symbols or of minority religious practices in private activities

Usually outnumbered, outvoted, discriminated or ignored in majoritarian, political systems, segments of the minority population come to believe that violence may be the only available tool to change the situation. It is in this setting that members of the minority no longer trust the majority, even in a democratic setting, and therefore seek a degree of political and legal autonomy so that they are no longer completely at their mercy.

What Works?

So what does a perusal of peace accords from around the world tell us about the types of structures or constitutional arrangements which work? The answer in part depends in what one judges as a success: is it merely the (more or less



complete) cessation of widespread hostilities (Northern Ireland; Bosnia; Palestine) which offers no guarantee of long-term settlement, or is it a more comprehensive arrangement which clearly seems to have brought permanent peace? In this article, the latter criteria is adopted in trying to identify successful approaches and models. However, this is not to say that de-escalation of the magnitude of armed conflicts is not in itself an important objective. Indeed, it may often be a necessary prerequisite before a 'final solution' can seriously be embarked upon.

Autonomy/Power-sharing

The structure of the state is usually the main demand that needs to be addressed. Countries where ethnic conflicts have been solved or have de-escalated greatly in the last 50 years are almost always those where autonomy or power-sharing has been implemented. In this category one could include, tentatively in some cases, Bosnia, Northern Ireland, Nicaragua (Miskitos), France (New Caledonia), Italy (South Tyrol), Mali (Tuaregs), Niger (Tuaregs), Mizos (India), Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tribes), Papua New Guinea (Bougainville). Some conflicts ended by outright independence, as with Bangladesh (1971), Slovenia (1991), Croatia (1991), Eritrea (1993) and East Timor (2000).

The clear, even undisputable, conclusion, also contained in the 2001 Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy, is that:

... the most common outcome of self-determination conflicts is a settlement between governments and group representatives that acknowledges collective rights and gives them institutional means for pursuing collective interests within states. Sometimes a group gains better access to decision-making in the central government, often it gains regional autonomy, and of course some settlements include both kinds of reforms. Thus the outcome of self-determination movements seldom is a redrawing of international boundaries, but rather devolution of central power and redrawing of boundaries within existing states.

Concerns sometimes are voiced that autonomy arrangements are a prelude to all-out war for independence. This is an unlikely scenario. The most common scenario is that most people accept and work within the framework for autonomy while a few spoilers continue to fight in hopes of greater concessions. The greatest risk in autonomy agreements is not the eventual breakup of the state, rather it is that spoilers may block full implementation, thereby dragging out the conflict and wasting resources that might otherwise be used to strengthen autonomous institutions.

In the case of minorities with a territorial basis, there is also a general pattern: regional autonomy is the basis for a peaceful settlement. In the case of non-territorial minorities, demands are met through a system of proportional representation in terms of government ministries and public service positions and legislative veto in certain areas (Northern Ireland).

Successful agreements involving indigenous peoples (Miskitos in Nicaragua, Kanaks in New Caledonia) usually provide, in addition to territorial autonomy, greater legal recognition and enforcement of their traditional or customary laws.

In other cases some symbolic gesture is made: either a more or less express apology, or inclusive language as to important symbols of a minority.

There also tends to be a surprising uniformity in the terminology and areas covered in many of the agreements. For example, the two provisions below from the 1999 Honiara Peace Accord referred to the recognition of a form of territorial autonomy as well as the need to ensure that there be some form of non-discriminatory allocation of employment between members of the main ethnic groups:

2. Observe that since 1978 the issues which repeatedly appeared in the demands of Guadalcanal and which has been at the root of the current crisis are:

(iii) The demand that a state government be established in Guadalcanal and other provinces in order to achieve in Guadalcanal; control over sale and use of land; control over distribution of wealth derived from Guadalcanal province and control over migration of people from other provinces to Guadalcanal.

8. In order to promote a sense of national unity and bridge the feeling of alienation by ethnic persons of Guadalcanal from the Central Government, there should be an equal and fair representation of all provinces in the national civil service and the police force with emphasis on quality. The police in particular should be encouraged to improve its image in Guadalcanal.

Greater Democracy and Economic Development

Contrary to prevailing views, lack of economic development does not in itself breed ethnic conflicts. Almost no peace accord contains, or even prioritises, stand-alone development over autonomy. What is more central is steps to ensure that economic development be done

Since the underlying roots of many, if not most internal conflicts, appear to be based on claims of discrimination and exclusion of minorities, it appears that the most successful attempts at solving these conflicts rely, in addition to structural guarantees in the form of an autonomous, usually territorial political unit, demands for constitutional provisions which offer to the minorities stronger guarantees for the protection of their rights. Thus, the 'distrust' that these ethnic minorities have towards central authorities is reflected in the demands for:

- Constitutional guarantees that autonomy arrangements cannot be weakened easily by central government;
- Constitutional guarantees in terms of a share of resources and taxation bases for the autonomous unit, whether it is a canton, province, region, etc.
- Constitutional guarantees that enshrine and strengthen the of legal provisions dealing with human and minority rights and ensure access to independent judicial authorities



- Constitutional provisions, laws and other mechanisms to address the under-representation of ethnic minorities in civil service employment and political institutions

Conclusion

While the present article does not pretend to offer an extensive examination of the hundreds of peace agreements which have been concluded since the end of the Second World War, examining these documents does seem to have provided a number of potentially important lessons for purposes of conflict prevention.

The 'consensus' among most of the agreements on the centrality of some form of territorial autonomy and protection for the rights of ethnic minorities suggest that it is when minority members feel threatened, such as when they are subjected to discrimination, denied freedom of expression, are unable to use their language, practice their religion or enjoy their culture, or cannot obtain their 'just desserts' from public authorities to the degree appropriate to the strength of their relative numbers and territorial concentration, that a situation of ethnic conflict may develop. Peace agreements almost always tend to incorporate specific provisions aimed at correcting these underlying root-causes.

The recognition of territorial autonomy also enjoys similar popularity in peace agreements because it implies that an ethnic minority has a territorial basis over which it can exercise legislative and political control. This in turn tempers the degree of control an ethnic majority will be able to exercise over matters such as official language use, culture and religion, thereby ensuring the protection of the rights of a minority through a structural political arrangement that may only be applicable to one region of the State.



REVIEW ESSAY

Two Conceptions of Cultural Citizenship: A Review of Recent Literature on Culture and Citizenship

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Citizenship in Diverse Societies

Kymlicka, Will & Norman, Wayne, (eds)

Oxford University Press, 2000

Pbk ISBN 0-19-829770-X £15.99

pp. 444 (including: index, references, tables)

Culture and Citizenship

Stevenson, Nick (ed)

Sage, 2001

Hbk ISBN: 0761955593 £55.00

Pbk ISBN: 0761955607 £15.99

pp. 216 (including: index, references, tables)

Introduction: Culture and Citizenship

One of the striking developments in recent political discourse has been the increasing confluence of culture and citizenship. Until recently the concerns of most practices of citizenship have been quite different from cultural issues and conflicts over identity. As is well known, citizenship has been historically formed around civic, political and social rights. Even if T. H. Marshall's account of the formation of modern citizenship reflected a very one-sided view of what was at best the British experience, it is certainly true that his omission of the sphere of culture was characteristic of most conceptions of citizenship (Marshall, [1950] 1994).

Citizenship had been held to be based on formal rights and had relatively little to do with substantive issues of cultural belonging. Although Marshall acknowledged a relation between rights on the one side and on the other duties and loyalties, the substantive dimension of citizenship was never central to his conception of citizenship. In the civic republican tradition, which emphasized more strongly participation and an active as opposed to a passive view of the citizen, the cultural dimension of citizenship did not receive much more attention (Pettit, 1997; Putnam, 1999; Etzioni, 1995).

Until about the late 1980s multiculturalism and citizenship performed quite different functions. Citizenship on the whole pertained to the national citizenship of an established polity and was generally defined by birth, or in some cases by descent, while multicultural policies served to manage in-coming migrant groups. Today this distinction has virtually collapsed. Migrant groups have become more and more a part of the mainstream population and cannot be so easily contained by multicultural policies and, on the other side, the 'native' population itself has become more and more culturally plural, due in part to the impact of some four decades of ethnic mixing, but also due to the general pluralization brought about by postindustrial and postmodern culture. In Britain, for example, there is a greater awareness of the constituent nations of the Union as well as of regionalisation. The focus on production and social class, which informed Marshall's account of citizenship, has given way to greater interest in subcultures based around leisure pursuits and consumption. In addition, new and more



radical ideas of democracy have arisen as a result of the rise of new social movements. In recent years a wide spectrum of, more sociologically orientated, publications on culture and citizenship have moved the focus beyond multiculturalism (Isin and Wood, 2000; Delanty, 2000; Isin and Turner, 2002; Lurry, 1993; see also the journal *Citizenship Studies*).

There are two broad responses to the general pluralization that has affected contemporary society. The first response expresses anxiety about increasing cultural pluralisation. The American 'culture wars' debate is the exemplar of this response. Widespread anxiety about militant nationalisms and religious extremism, especially in aftermath of the 11th September terror attack have added to fears of a new age of culture wars (the 'clash of civilisations') fought out on a global level. In this view pluralization is closely associated with conflict. In the second response cultural pluralism is viewed as something which enriches rather than threatens the fabric of society. This second approach, one of advocating cultural citizenship, is the one adopted by the two books under review here.

Two Conceptions of Cultural Citizenship

On closer inspection it becomes evident that there is less consensus than might be apparent from a first glance of the literature on cultural citizenship. Roughly speaking this body of writing can be divided into two groups of thinking and which are respectively represented by the two books under review in this essay. On the one side we have an approach that is influenced by cultural sociology, (Nick Stevenson's volume), and on the other we have an approach heavily influenced by political theory (the Kymlicka and Norman volume). The result is in fact a certain intellectual uncertainty as to exactly how culture – which is mostly understood in terms of diversity – is to be brought into the sphere of citizenship.

The first approach, which I think is reflected in most of the contributions to Stevenson's *Culture and Citizenship*, is one that stresses the centrality of culture for an adequate understanding of citizenship while the second, very well represented in the contributions to *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*, seeks to bridge citizenship with diversity. In this the concerns of the first and more sociological approach go beyond the aims of the second approach, which is more characteristic of a highly normative political theory. Perhaps this is too simple a distinction to make, but in terms of the objectives of the volumes and the theoretical traditions and substantive concerns of the various chapters there would appear to be two quite different understandings of culture and, to a lesser extent, of citizenship at stake.

For the sociological approach, the real challenge, it would appear, is to bring about inclusion in the sphere of identity and belonging; whereas the culture debate in political theory is about extending a more or less already established framework to include excluded or marginalized groups. It is in essence a question as to whether cultural citizenship addresses the new 'cultural' needs of the individual or the inclusion of excluded groups. While departing in many respects from the assumptions of multiculturalism, the second approach has mostly remained within the confines of the liberal communitarian debate and is closer to the concerns of multiculturalism, with its concerns around issues of the limits of tolerance, the accommodation of difference, problems of group representation etc.

In my view the new sociological approach to culture and citizenship offers a potentially more far-reaching model for democratic citizenship and which might be useful in addressing, for instance, the urgent need for anti-racism and citizenship policies that might stem the rising tide of xenophobia. However, this approach is very poorly developed. In order to distinguish the two approaches, I term the sociological idea of cultural citizenship 'cosmopolitan citizenship'. This is because it concerns issues that extend beyond the accommodation of minorities and problems of cultural diversity within national societies. In general, as already argued, the concerns of cultural citizenship as expressed in political theory are confined to the established state, which is generally taken to be Canada or the United States, as is evident from the Kymlicka and Norman volume. The version of cultural citizenship I call 'cosmopolitan citizenship' refers to a different dimension of culture than that of political theory, namely the wider cognitive dimension of culture.

Cultural Citizenship and Diversity

The fifteen very substantial chapters in *Citizenship in Diverse Societies* give an immensely comprehensive analysis of some of the key problems in bringing culture into the sphere of citizenship. The objective of the book is clearly stated by the editors in the introduction and is very well elaborated in all the contributions. Kymlicka and Norman seek to connect the growing interest within political philosophy of citizenship with multicultural politics. Until about the early 1990s it is indeed correct that these two areas have developed relatively separately. For instance, much of the American communitarian debate on citizenship has not addressed ethnopolitics. In the tradition influenced by republicanism – as in the work of Etzioni and Putnam for example – the political community was the dominant white population. Kymlicka and Norman link into a different debate, and one which might be said to be more Canadian in its concern with dealing with cultural diversity within a democratic order. The volume is thus heavily anchored in what might be called the political theory of liberal communitarianism, to which Will Kymlicka has already contributed a widely discussed theory of liberal multiculturalism (Kymlicka, 1995).

Communitarian multiculturalism is best represented by Canada, whose constitutional tradition is not based on classical republican democracy. The accommodation of cultural diversity and democracy are not antithetical as they are in the republican constitutional traditions, as in France and the United States. Thus it is possible for different groups to get official recognition by the state, which encourages them to retain their ethnic identity and requires only minimal commitment to a common Canadian identity. This is the basic premise of all the chapters which recognise the validity of minority rights in the sense of limited accommodations of the needs of different communities. In this the traditional equation of citizenship with the individual is abandoned as is the belief that citizenship must be 'difference blind'.

The contributors to the volume all accept that the liberal pursuit of equality must be adjusted to accommodate cultural difference, which very often will include the right to be different. The volume adopts a communitarian version of liberalism in that the basic assumptions of liberalism are accepted but modified by the recognition of ethnopolitical community. The basic belief in the autonomy of the individual is fully accepted but not to a point that the burden of proof must lie with the defenders of multiculturalism. Minority rights are in general compatible with a basic liberal view of the world if that is to take seriously a plural democratic order and the fact that occasionally there may be problems in



reconciling equality and difference is not grounds for avoiding the need to achieve a balance between both. In fact the general thesis is that some recognition of difference is necessary to achieve equality and thus it is more than a matter of striking a balance.

In so far as democracy rests on citizenship – along with representation and constitutionalism – and to the extent that citizenship entails participation in political community, then minority rights are essential. With some 5000 to 8000 ethnocultural groups in the world and only 200 states to accommodate them, clearly democracy must find a way of dealing with the reality of ethnoculturalism, as very few states are, or can be, mono-cultural. For the editors and contributors to this excellent volume, the problem is not the validity of special minority rights but establishing their limits. If one group's rights are accepted, we will be pushed more and more in to conceding other rights to a point that may make the political unit nonviable. There are also problems of reconciling the rights of different groups, and even in defining what constitutes a group in the first instance, and in problems in reconciling the conflict of the autonomy of the individual with the rights of the ethnocultural group.

The general message of the volume is that liberal-individualist fears of minority rights are unwarranted while some of the concerns raised need to be taken seriously.

Chapters by Shachar, Coulombe and Mansfield show that there is a trade-off between the gains and losses in granting minority rights. The dangers of minority rights are easy to document, as these contributors note. For instance, as Shachar argues, serious infringement of individual autonomy can result when religious communities are allowed control aspects of family law. Mansfield notes that minority rights while benefiting some groups in specific districts where they are sufficiently numerous may lead to a loss of influence in other districts. Coulombe argues that Quebec's language laws undermines free speech and threatens equal citizenship. Moreover, minority rights fails to address the problem of other minorities and disadvantaged groups and various other sub groups (the disabled, women) within an ethnic minority.

Notwithstanding these problems, all authors and the editors in their excellent Introduction contend that the denial of equality will be more detrimental to citizenship in the long run than these problems that arise from minority rights. At least four chapters (those by Coulombe, Réaume, Bauböck and Modood) show that concerns about a loss in collective democratic identities are unjustified and that democracy is not threatened by the accommodation of differences. Callan and Spinner-Halev also argue against exaggerating cultural differences such as the detrimental impact of religious schools on civic virtues. The point in these chapters is that this is less of a problem as such universalistic identities do not necessarily exist in the first instance. Moreover, they make clear that the costs will be greater by not granting minority rights as there is likely to be increased resentment and hostility stemming from exclusion. Interesting chapters by Levy and Borrows look at the question of the rights of indigenous peoples and show that recognition of indigenous rights and participation in the wider society are not exclusive.

Perhaps the point is that there are costs and benefits in granting minority rights and it is important not to overstate the dangers. The volume provides some very convincing arguments that minority rights do not involve a zero-sum game

between citizenship and minority rights and that a balance can be achieved between conflicting conceptions of the common good. The view of culture in this volume is one that is far from the culture wars of the 1980s and early 1990s. Culture is not divisive and can be a basis of citizenship. It is unlikely to be a basis of common citizenship in the classic liberal sense, but it is essential to the working of a democratic order.

If the volume has any limits it is that the concerns of many chapters reflect issues that are more pertinent to North American debates, where issues of race and indigenous law are more central than questions of gender and ethnicity. Europeans will find less in the volume to illumine the challenges facing European integration and the problems of nationalism and xenophobia. A small shortcoming of the book is that there is relatively little discussion on dual or multicitizenship, which is one of the main issues in European debates. There is also a need for a greater recognition of the flexible nature of citizenship in terms of multiple loyalties that may transcend any particular state, as a recent study argues (Ong, 1999). Yet there is surely much to be learned from the examples discussed in this volume.

Cultural Citizenship and Cosmopolitanism

The contributions to *Culture and Citizenship* provide a striking contrast to the more normative political theory in *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*. This volume is concerned with a quite different question, namely how to bring together culture and citizenship. By culture is not meant cultural diversity or ethnopolitics as in the Kylimka and Norman volume, but cultural resources, identities and the cultural presuppositions of the polity. For Kylimka and Norman cultural identities are fairly fixed entities that need to be accommodated in the polity in order to enhance citizenship. The contributors to Stevenson's volume would appear to understand that culture and identity are much more fluid and less denoting particular forms of agency that have to be somehow managed. In this sense the volume moves beyond the normative theory of multiculturalism.

Thus citizenship as cultural citizenship is about the status of culture as discursively constructed. In this view what is at stake is cultural rights rather than minority rights. In the chapters by Bryan Turner and Maurice Roche, cultural rights – which can be compared to civil, political and social rights – are important in expanding the legal framework of governance into the cultural sphere, but the main issues are less normative than symbolic and cognitive, since it is about the construction of cultural discourses.

The advantage of cultural citizenship in this sense of, what I would prefer to call, 'cosmopolitan citizenship' is that it shifts the focus of citizenship onto common experiences, learning processes and discourses of empowerment. The power to name, create meaning, construct personal biographies and narratives by gaining control over the flow of information, goods and cultural processes is an important dimension of citizenship as an active process. In this regard what needs to be stressed is the *learning* dimension of citizenship as a *constructivist* process. The volume argues how citizens learn citizenship, which mostly takes place in the informal context of everyday life and is also heavily influenced by critical and formative events in people's lives. Citizenship is not entirely about rights, but is a matter of participation in the political community and begins early in life. It concerns the learning of a capacity for action and for responsibility but, essentially, it is about the learning of the self and of the relationship of self and other. It is a learning process in that it is articulated in perceptions of the self as



an active agency and a social actor shaped by relations with others. In this view, citizenship concerns identity and action; it entails both personal and cognitive dimensions that extend beyond the personal to the wider cultural level of society.

Several chapters nicely reflect this confluence of the personal and the political dimension of citizenship as a cultural discourse. Adopting a psychoanalytical perspective, Stephen Frosh argues that a cultural understanding of citizenship entails looking at the emotional aspects of collective identity. The subjective dimension of citizenship is also discussed in the chapters by Elliott and Crossley for whom citizenship involves the capacity to take on the point of view of the Other. The contributions to this volume are concerned with a broader concept of diversity than in the Kylimka and Norman volume. Diversity relates not merely to ethnic diversity but to all kinds of group difference. We thus find only one of the 13 chapters on race, the final one by John Solomos. Anna Yeatman's chapter on feminism and citizenship argues for a post-patrimonial ethic of difference that breaks with the traditional assumptions of male based citizenship. This concern with difference is also explored in chapters by Richardson on sexual citizenship, Marks with respect to disability, Blackman and France on youth culture.

While the volume offers very useful and interesting discussion on culture and citizenship an overall theory is not to be found. To an extent the first chapter by Byran Turner serves the purpose of a theoretical framework, but is clear that the contributors are not working to a tight framework. Turner discusses the cultural presuppositions of citizenship as connected with specific forms of life and, secondly, the emergence of new forms of participation that suggest the need for 'cultural rights'. The implication here, and in the chapters by McGuigan and Roche on cultural policy, is that what was once social is now becoming more cultural and with this comes new kinds of participation. For instance, as the chapter by Bloomfield and Bianchini illustrates, the context of the city is becoming more important for citizenship. As with McGuigan, they argue that cultural rights are in fact extended social rights.

This is an interesting collection of short chapters on culture and citizenship. However, the reader in search of a theory of cultural citizenship will be frustrated as the volume lacks a clear theory. For instance, it is not clear whether cultural citizenship is to be defined in terms of cultural rights and how these might relate to the well established conception of minority rights, as discussed in the much more cohesive and comprehensive Kymlicka and Norman volume. Although potentially Stevenson's volume is more far-reaching, it lacks the rationale of the former. The problem is the absence of a clear discussion on culture, which at times becomes too all embracing.

Conclusion

The upshot of much of the debate on culture and citizenship is a more open conception of culture than what is often suggested by multiculturalism. While recent political theory also looks to a more open conception of culture as pluralism, the really innovative ideas are coming from sociology, cultural and social theory in this regard. As a learning process, citizenship takes place in communicative situations arising out of quite ordinary life experiences. It appears that an essential dimension of the experience of citizenship is the way in which individual life stories are connected with wider cultural discourses. What I think is interesting is this cultural dimension to citizenship, which goes beyond the institutional dimension of both rights and also participation. We need more information, as well as theoretical tools, for understanding the cultural dimension

of citizenship. However, for present purposes it will suffice to note that one of the most important dimensions of citizenship concerns the styles and forms of language, cultural models, narratives, discourses that people use to make sense of their society, interpret their place in it, construct courses of action and thereby give rise to new demands for rights, which we may call cultural rights. It is important, too, to see the learning component of citizenship not just in individual terms but also as a medium of social construction by which individual learning becomes translated and coordinated into collective learning and ultimately becomes realized in social institutions. Neither volume reviewed here succeeds in this task, although Stevenson's volume comes closer.

A conclusion arrived at by a critical reading of these books might be that cultural citizenship is an extension of the trajectory traced by Marshall of civic, political and social citizenship. However, it is not to be confined to ethnocultural or minority rights but must include all kinds of minority rights. Moreover, as a discourse and practice that seeks to include large areas of human experience, it also addresses other domains of culture. It is not exclusively about rights and freedoms but also concerns the articulation of identity/belonging and other components of citizenship, such as participation and responsibility. Cultural citizenship is particularly relevant to the area of communication (media, virtual reality, popular cultures) and in the context of globalization is a form of citizenship that extends beyond nationality. However, as the two books reviewed here make clear, there is much uncertainty on the relationship between the rights discourse and the wider and more transformative discourse of cultural belonging.

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Nationalism: Theory and its Discontents

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Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural and Multicultural Politics

David Brown

Routledge, 2000

HBK: ISBN: 0-415-17138-5 £55.00

PBK: ISBN: 0-415-17139-3 £17.99

pp. 198 (including: appendix, end-notes, bibliography, index)

Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction

Umut Özkirimli

Macmillan, 2000

HBK: ISBN: 0-333-77711-5 £47.50

PBK: ISBN: 0-333-77712-3 £15.50

pp. 253 (including: Foreword by Fred Halliday, bibliography, index)

Containing Nationalism

Michael Hechter

Oxford University Press, 2000

HBK: ISBN: 0-19-829742-4 £19.99

PBK: ISBN: 0-19-924751-X £13.99

pp. 256 (including: list of figures, list of tables, end-notes, bibliography, index)

Nationalism studies are now well served by a plethora of books meant to present theoretically universal explanations and analyses of the phenomenon. Therefore, the volumes under review, David Brown's *Contemporary Nationalism*, Michael Hechter's *Containing Nationalism* and Umut Özkirimli's *Theories of Nationalism* are part of a competitive corpus of literature. Not surprisingly, the vogue for analyzing and re-analyzing nationalist theory, and its application for novel ends, is driven by the seemingly greater saliency of national identities for explaining, at least in part, some of the more notable developments – wars in the Balkans, mass slaughter in Central Africa, civil conflict in South and South East Asia, problematic peace-processes and increasing xenophobia in Western Europe to indicate a few examples – in contemporary world affairs. Even the recent 'War against Terrorism' in Afghanistan has been increasingly portrayed as a war of nationalities in popular coverage by CNN – not known for the most nuanced of approaches to conflict coverage – with the Pashtun versus other Afghans, as opposed to simply fundamentalists versus the 'civilized' world. Thus there is an optimistic market for textbooks, like the volumes by Brown and Özkirimli, and more sophisticated studies, such as Hechter's, about nationalism. However, the very popularity of the topic also encourages skepticism as to the degree each new work can contribute originally or comprehensively to a crowded field.

Brown's *Contemporary Nationalism* 'provides a clear and illuminating framework for understanding nationalist politics', according to the blurb on the back cover. The titles of its nine chapters are promising in indicating that thematic discussions of nationalist theory and relevant case-studies are covered. And, indeed, the first three chapters, 'The Conceptual Languages of Nationalism' (chapter 1), 'New Nations for Old?' (chapter 2) and 'Are There Two Nationalisms? Good – Civic and Bad –

Ethnocultural' (chapter 3) are clear and illuminating as to important definitional ambiguities and debates endemic in nationalism studies. The rigor of chapters 2 and 3 has been especially assured by prior publication in *Nations and Nationalism* and subsequent revision. The start of demarcated subsections, such as those covering the primordialist, situationalist and constructivist approaches in chapter 1, are concisely preambled by shaded boxes highlighting the subsection's fundamental focus. As such, these chapters are user-friendly and accessible, even if the first-time student of the field may have to take some time to absorb the material.

Perhaps most significantly, Brown breaks with the easy dichotomy deployed by many others of civic nationalism as inherently liberal and ethnocultural nationalism illiberal (p. 68). Instead, Brown argues, the illiberalism of a specific nationalism is contingent on the degree to which its representative elites have a marginalized or insecure status and are members of a national community with a significant perception of external threat which encourages it to 'mobilise itself as a collective entity... and thence to suppress individual liberties so as to promote that mobilisation.' (p. 65) Given this supposition, 'the difference between liberal and illiberal manifestations of nationalism cannot be explained by reference to the distinction between its civic and ethnocultural forms... the political character of both is surely protean rather than Janus-faced.' (pp. 68-9)

Brown's analysis to this point is laudable and useful, allowing as it does a nuanced approach to evaluating the characteristics of particular nationalisms as based on their dynamic development according to context rather than stereotyped ascription of static characteristics. A case in point is Hechter's assertion in *Containing Nationalism* that nationalism is more prevalent in Canada than in the United States (pp. 3-4). But is this still true in the aftermath of the September attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon and then overwhelming public support for U.S. forces to go to war against Afghanistan for the cause of national defence?

Unfortunately for Brown's subsequent chapter, 'Constructing Nationalism: The Case of the Basques' (chapter 4), the depth of required research for contextual appreciation of the Basque 'civic-ethnocultural convergence' (p. 86) in the 1990's as inherited from existing tendencies since the early twentieth century (pp. 81-4) is lacking and indicative of similar problems elsewhere. It is not that Brown's research is fundamentally misguided; but his particular reliance on books by Daniele Conversi (1997) and Juan Díez Medrano (1995), both very adequate initial resources, obscures the relative dearth of independent and up-to-date research conducted by Brown himself on the topic. His use of few recently published sources - the bibliography lists three books (although a number of one volume's chapters appear as different sources), one other chapter and three journal articles in print post-1995 on Spain and/or its peripheral national identities - regarding a region since then undergoing the throes of a developing (and collapsed as of December, 1999) peace-process does not indicate that he has fully grasped the contemporary context of Basque nationalism. Thus, his assertion that 'Basque nationalism is now finally beginning to be modified by an internally generated self-confidence focused on a new optimism for a negotiated... route to self-determination' (p. 88) needs to be taken with a handful of salt.



This said, discussions of Singapore, (chapter 5) where 'civic nationalism has legitimated the authoritarian suppression of individual liberties' (p. 95), and Ghana (chapter 6), in which the regime has been able to, paradoxically according to some theorists, 'generate political support from economic hardship' (p. 125) as based on the success of a re-invigorated nationalist ideology, are based on a fair extent of primary knowledge, as indicated by details of Brown's other writings listed in the bibliography. Both chapters are unusual, informative and relevant to expounding on earlier theoretical premises. This is especially true in his aforementioned questioning of the over-used equation of civic as liberal and ethnocultural as illiberal nationalisms. Brown's use of his primary empirical knowledge of the Australia experience in chapter 8 ('How Can the State Respond to Nationalist Contention?') to critique a corporatist approach to ethnic group claims again places his arguments on a firm footing.

Given his familiarity with the Singaporean, Ghanaian and Australian cases, it is unclear as to why Brown ventured into deploying cases with which he is less competent, except for the possible reasons that inclusion of a more diverse set of cases, and especially some European, would allow him to render a textbook of purportedly global applicability and that some of these cases were among the most politically notable and hence academically fashionable by the late 1990's. This would account for disjointed inclusion of 'brief essays' (p. 152) in the co-authored appendix on Northern Ireland, Rwanda and Kosovo. (pp. 158-67)

The cursory nature of these afterthought essays is evident simply in the extent and content of the cited research. For example, discussion about Northern Ireland is supported by citation of only three websites (pp. 158-60) accessed on two days in November 1998, and May 1999. Brown's coverage of Kosovo is referenced only by two websites accessed on 21 April 1999 (p. 181); there are no sources listed in the bibliography which can be identified as specifically on Kosovo, Serbia or Yugoslavia. As for Rwanda, five sources are cited, but only one from a refereed journal. The other four are brief pieces, each at most four pages in length, all from current affairs magazines or bulletins, and with one from 1992 quoted as pertaining to the 1994 massacres (p. 161); in the bibliography no books particularly about Rwanda appear. Certainly Gérard Prunier's *The Rwanda Crisis* (1995) could have been a source, or at least the more journalistic volume by Philip Gourevitch (1998). In short, Brown's book does not do justice to the intended material as a whole, and instead, despite some good chapters, smacks of a volume cobbled together hurriedly as based mainly on previously published and then revised articles supplemented by insufficient additional research on vogue case studies.

Özkirimli has written a more focused and thorough volume, albeit one of less ambitious scope as its intent is to deal only with theories of nationalism without extensive case studies, although some empirical observations appear. *Theories of Nationalism* is a disciplined book, which adamantly sticks to its stated purposes: '[1] to provide a systemic overview of some key theories of nationalism and to consider the main criticisms raised against them.... [2] to diagnose the deficiencies of the classical debate and to specify the theoretical problems we are still facing...and finally, [3] to propose... an [alternative] analytical framework that can be used in the study of nationalism.' (p. 7) In the first two of the three stated endeavors, the

author succeeds, although the final purpose, to provide an alternative analytical framework, is rather more scant even if interesting.

In a sense, this book is not so much a discussion about nationalism *per se* but rather an epistemology, in this case of nationalism as a subject of academic discourse, in the cast of H. Stuart Hughes' *Consciousness and Society* (1977). The substantive chapters are periodized, as indicated in 'The Introduction' (chapter 1), and preambled by 'Discourses and Debates about Nationalism' (chapter 2) which provides a historical overview and tables central questions and fundamental problems – centered on issues of definition, evolutionary time-frame and typological differentiation (p. 57-62) – in the evolving theoretical discourse about nationalism. The historical section locates the study of nationalism as developing through four time-frames: 1) the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with the nascence of the nationalist concept, and most influenced initially by German romanticism; 2) 1918-45 when nationalism became a subject of academic inquiry, particularly by historians; 3) 1945 to the late 1980's as consideration of nationalism also became pertinent in the social sciences; 4) and from the late 1980's to the present as theorists sought innovative ways to view nationalism apart from prior 'classical' methods and approaches (pp. 15-56). Discrete chapters are then dedicated to the primordialist (chapter 3), modernist (chapter 4) and ethno-symbolist (chapter 5) schools of nationalist theorists working during the third period, with a dip into the approaches of cultural and gender studies as 'New Approaches to Nationalism' (chapter 6) and largely correlating to the fourth time-frame.

Coverage of primordialism (20 pp.) is more truncated than that of modernism (81 pp.), as well as less defined. The relatively brief discussion of primordialist perspectives on nationalism is accounted for by the assertion that a good number of theorists have 'suggested that the sociological usage of primordialism should be abandoned altogether' (p. 83) as overly deterministic, ahistorical, ill-defined and anti-intellectual in its assumptions. However, the resultant comparative brevity doesn't sit well with the author's view that 'primordialists are not unlike the modernists... in terms of the diversity they harbour.' (p. 65) Furthermore and unlike the chapter on modernism as outlined by the table of contents, discussion of primordialism is undertaken in only two sections providing definitions, subdivided as the naturalist, sociobiological and culturalist approaches in the text itself, and a critique. That about modernism is constructed of sections which, beyond covering definitions, are clearly dedicated to sets of specific theorists, Tom Nairn and Michael Hechter as focusing on economic transformation, John Breuilly, Paul Brass and Eric Hobsbawm on the political, and Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and Miroslav Hroch on the socio-cultural. This inflicts some structural imbalance on the comparative analysis, especially as the chapter on ethno-symbolism also revolves around specific theorists, namely John Armstrong and Anthony Smith.

The final chapter 'By Way of Conclusion' (chapter 7) is Özkirimli's presentation of not only his critical summary of the various debates and theoretical differences presented thus far; it also provides a skeleton structure for his suggested framework for analysis of the nationalist phenomenon. This entails the propositions that: there can be no 'grand' theory of nationalism, only partial theories concentrating on specific aspects; there is no single nationalism for any one nation but rather multiple nationalisms with differing ideologies and social constituencies; the common



characteristic of nationalism is the style and content of its discourse promoting the idea that the interests of the nation are of incontrovertibly primary importance, meaning that the nation is therefore the sole source of legitimacy and demarcates a singular realm of identity, loyalty, responsibility and norms; efficacy of this nationalist discourse is dependent on its daily, mundane and popularly socialized usage; and consideration of nationalism must take into account the variation and degree of individuals' national self-definition as influenced by their other social identities contingent, for example, on gender, race, ethnicity, class and age. (pp. 226-32) With this suggested framework, the author seeks to dismantle the monolithic façade of traditional approaches to the study of nationalism whose proponents try to identify singular and universal causal factors and characteristics.

One can't fault Özkirimli for a lack of intellectual courage, taking on as he does much of the pantheon of established nationalist theorists, and it will be interesting to see him apply his analytical proposals to a major empirical study in the future. This is especially true as an intent of his proposals is to help 'address issues neglected or ignored by the mainstream literature.' (p. 233) However, a note of caution must be sounded as to the inward-looking nature of the book's focus on nationalist theorists as though they operated apart from other fields of inquiry and had the last or definitive word on any number of topics. For example, Eric Hobsbawm highlights the case of late eighteenth-century France where only half of the populace actually spoke French, but dedicated discussion about the relationship in France between language and national identity was not 'revealed' (p. 220) by modernist scholars of nationalism; a well-known and definitive work on the topic in English is by the historian Eugen Weber (1976).

The problem with Özkirimli focusing so narrowly on work by scholars of nationalist theory is that he creates, or rather reinforces, a perception that the study of nationalism is the result of a self-referential and -perpetuating academic community. Thus, various theorists are apparently credited with conceptual and empirical innovations or observations obtained and generalized from elsewhere and, on occasion, interpreted at odds with case-study specifics. This self-referential quality of *Theories of Nationalism* limits the book's purpose in covering the idea of nationalism as it developed in academic discourse, as this evolution took place courtesy of much intellectual borrowing from elsewhere. Özkirimli's explanation that nationalism studies is dominated by publications produced in the 'Anglo-Saxon world' and hence his focus on 'Anglo-Saxon literature', (p. 7) rather than simply Anglophone, does not indicate the diversity of influences on and contributions to the field. Leaving aside the pre-1945 Germanophone (pp.16-9, 23-4, 26-34) and Francophone (pp. 19-22, 24, 34-6, 40) thinkers cited as influential on national conceptualization, the number of significant theorists – Hans Kohn, Karl Deutsch, and Elie Kedourie as well as Hobsbawm, Gellner and Hroch - coming from 'cosmopolitan urban settings destroyed by the rise of nationalism' (p. 128), or, in other words, not the Anglo-Saxon world, is substantial. Therefore, while the book is a useful complement to the already existent corpus of works on nationalism, almost by definition it narrows rather than expands the reader's appreciation of the many influences which have given rise to the academic understanding of nationalism today.

Hechter's *Containing Nationalism* is a different volume from those by Brown and Özkirimli. Instead of a textbook, Hechter has written more for the advanced scholar

of nationalism studies and cognate fields. He is already an established name in the field, as indicated by a section dedicated to his past work in Özkirimli's book, and, probably due to this, does not undertake much of the repetitive exercise of discussing at great length the varied definitions of and classical debates about nationalism. This doesn't mean he ignores in chapter 1, 'Nationalist Puzzles', definitions and categories of nationalism, the nation, its distinguishing features and types necessary for his analysis, but rather he covers them with an informed brevity tailored to the rest of the work. This entails an attempt to chart innovative ground through discussing three main themes: the causes of nationalism's modernity (hence placing himself squarely in the modernist school of nationalist theorists); reasons for the different degrees of nationalism in different countries; and, most significantly, possible means of containing nationalism's 'dark side' (pp. 3-4) with its causal relevance, in 1994 alone, to 'eighteen of the world's twenty-four wars' while about three-quarters of the world's refugees were fleeing from or displaced by ethno-nationalist conflicts. (p.3)

Chapter 2, 'Causes of Nationalism', is also concise, managing to provide explanations for group formation, group solidarity, the modernity of nations and national identification. While certainly Özkirimli could pick holes in Hechter's coverage, the striking feature is that the author is able to usefully clarify in only fourteen pages what so many others take entire books to do. Chapter 3, 'Indirect Rule and Absence of Nationalism', and chapter 4, 'State-Building Nationalism', are roughly paired in a before and after sequence in relation to the rise of nationalism. The before phase is pre-nineteenth century when, in both the European and imperial contexts, indirect rule, reliant on 'the existence of groups mediating between individuals and the state' (p. 40), allowed for primary states to arise and function as enlarging and culturally diverse political units. The next phase of state-building nationalism replaced indirect with direct rule which centralized political power and eliminated much of the autonomy of local authorities. Not only was political control centralized; the hitherto cultural heterogeneity of states, which indirect rule catered for, was discouraged to create cultural uniformity through near-compulsory assimilation in an attempt to foster singular political loyalties. Not surprisingly, implementation of assimilationist policies were not always successful and met with some resistance, on state peripheries, among local notables and alienated intellectuals, and by groups resenting the erosion of their prior autonomy.

Chapter 5, 'Other Types of Nationalism', highlights some of the responses to imposition of or attempts to institute direct rule: peripheral nationalism in the Ottoman empire, although with a somewhat ahistorical jump directly from final imperial dissolution at the end of World War I to Kosovo in the 1990's (pp. 76-7); secession of Norway from Sweden in 1905 and Ireland from the UK in 1922, even though the Irish Free State remained nominally linked to the British empire by Dominion Home Rule until proclamation of full sovereignty in 1949; irredentist nationalism as 'the least prevalent form of nationalism' (p. 84) and with the least chance of successful realization; and unification nationalism particularly embodied by Italy and Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century. Hechter then turns to brief discussion of inclusive versus exclusive nationalisms, correlating to state-building and unification nationalisms, and, at odds with Brown, implies the culturally inclusive variant is linked to the liberal ideal of citizenship and the exclusive to an illiberal emphasis on collectivity. (p. 91)



However, and regardless of the significance of material covered to this point, much, if not most, of the discussion reiterates concepts, ideas and analyses found elsewhere. But there is more originality in the final three chapters, especially with Hechter's questioning the assumption 'that national identities are intrinsically salient' (p. 95), even if he then reverts to some already established ideas about the cultural division of labour playing a decisive role in determining the long-term saliency and character of various national identities (chapter 6, 'The Saliency of National Identity'). While experiences of conquest, occupational segregation through institutional arrangements, and/or immigration can mandate the emergence of a cultural division of labour as a foundation for divergent national identities, the effects can perhaps be undone or at least their troublesome political differences contained. This is if provisions are made to provide 'culturally distinct groups with an interest in controlling state policies, or at least those policies that are most directly relevant to their welfare.' (p. 112).

Chapter 7, 'Demands for Sovereignty', explores 'reasons why the demand for sovereignty varies in peripheral nations that are subject to direct rule... [and] concludes by considering some institutional impediments... that may have the paradoxical effect of inhibiting non-violent nationalist groups at the expense of violent ones.' (p. 115) Self-determination may be considered a universal good by some but other benefits – economic welfare especially – can be gained from accepting less than full sovereignty (p. 116). If the central state is responsive, through allowing for state-provided goods and services which cater to the distinctive preferences of its different cultural groups, it may be that there will be a lower demand for sovereignty by such groups (pp. 121-2). But there are countervailing forces: economic and military globalization can still encourage demands for sovereignty 'by reducing the net benefits of attachment to multinational states' while institutionalizing a state's peripheral culture can result in a belief that there will be 'greater net private benefits of sovereignty to people who owe their jobs and social standing to maintenance of this culture.' (p. 124) The development and strength of demands for sovereignty by minority nations is further affected by the emergence and influence of nationalist organizations, as well as the extent of institutional barriers to collective action which, in turn, helps determine the incidence of violence as an apparent strategic imperative where pacific means are disallowed or seen as ineffective in the particular context.

To this point, Hechter's argument has considerable merits, and as a conclusion the author embarks on a prescriptive path as to how 'Containing Nationalism' (chapter 8) can be achieved. He summarily dismisses others' promotion of consociational arrangements and electoral renovation as adequate remedies to offsetting violent conflagrations, and instead looks to federation, a system in which a 'central government incorporates regional units into its decision procedure.' (p.139) While historically federations have both intensified and inhibited nationalist conflicts, and a balance must be struck between regional dependency on and autonomy from the centre to avoid too much or too little decentralization (p.152), efficacy in deterring conflict depends on additional provisions other than just federation. It is at this important juncture that Hechter falters.

While his faith in the necessity of widely perceived procedural fairness by a state's political and bureaucratic institutions is well placed, the concomitant requirements of transparency in state decision-making, a free press and broadcast media, and political representation at the centre for minority nations (pp. 153-4) are not innovative ideas. Indeed these have already been part of many reformist initiatives in democratizing countries and post-conflict regions. Meanwhile, the contention 'that peripheral autonomy is desirable simply because it preserves cultural diversity ... [which] may result in future social pay-offs' is utopian to the point of being useless, despite the economic benefits that could be accrued from tourists visiting culturally anomalous areas (p. 156). Even the stronger argument, that to 'the degree that national solidarity is enhanced by institutional autonomy this sets the stage for a more efficient social order – provided that the central government remains a viable source of relevant collective goods' (p. 157), leaves many crucial issues untouched and despite the assumed benefits of a stable social order to the state.

Any researcher who has spent significant time in what are coyly referred to as 'divided societies' will have run across strong opinions about the character of certain groups, and often these have little to do with economic, social or political analyses of costs versus benefits outside of an over-riding sense that there is a long-term benefit in excluding the 'other.' Over the last fifteen years, this reviewer has been told by more than a few Israelis, Moldovans, Spaniards, ethnic Hungarians, white South Africans and Northern Irish Protestants why, respectively, a good number of Palestinians, Russians, Basques, Rumanians, black South Africans and Irish Catholics are not to be trusted, and, if given just half a chance, would - depending on the more precise context - commit murder, rape or theft. At the very least, the 'other' would not be satisfied until they 'pushed us into the sea' according to one Tel Aviv resident or 'destroyed democracy' as a *Madrileño* put it.

In other words, Hechter provides remedies which have only partial relevance to those parts of the world where they are most needed, as he suggests little real method, in the immediate sense, for dealing with the most troubling aspects of nationalist and ethnic discord, that being the hatred and sometimes willingness to inflict harm on others. But then, he does not intend - despite any assertions of universal applicability - to recommend provisions for areas with non-spatially concentrated groups or groups whose territory does not coincide already with an intermediate political boundary, if we can go by his citation of one data-set relying only on a small number of countries (pp.147). Deriving evidence from this circumscribed data that state centralization encourages nationalist rebellion and therefore balanced decentralization is a primary weapon against nationalist violence leaves aside, by definition, deductive consideration which takes into account areas where some degree of federalization is not already in place or whose national groups are interspersed. So what is to be done for the Kurds or the Roma and Sinti, both groups victimized in more than one state, or in cases of communal conflict within autonomous areas, such as the Spanish Basque Country (despite its implicit inclusion in the data-set) where it is not simply Basques pitted against the Spanish state but, more problematically, against moderate Basques and resident Spaniards?

While instituting or tinkering with federal arrangements could be pacifying in the long run, how many years are being considered? And in that time, how many other conflicts, refugees and reasons to remember communal grievance will have sprung



into existence? Hechter is not necessarily wrong in his prescriptions, but his work lacks a full appreciation, beyond the economic and institutional, of what conflict between ethno-national groups entails. Perhaps Özkirimli could step in and encourage Hechter to take into account alternative partial theories of nationalism which may better pertain to incidences of extreme violence directed not at agents of the state – soldiers, police, politicians, civil servants – but civilians, such as mass rape in Bosnia, Palestinian suicide missions, and genocide in Rwanda while Burundi teetered on the brink.

Finally, there is a question none of the authors considers and perhaps scholars of nationalism are unwilling to take into account given a vested interest in keeping ourselves employed. Maybe the issue is not so much that 'nationalist violence is far greater than may be commonly appreciated' (Hechter, p. 5) with 'a world torn apart by nationalist conflicts.' (Özkirimli, p.232). Given the diversity of cultural, ethnic and national groups worldwide – numbered collectively in the many thousands – coupled with widespread economic and social inequalities, with a concomitant relationship to the exercise of political power and influence, a more relevant issue for theorists to consider may not be why communal violence happens so frequently, but so seldom.

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REVIEWS

The Frontiers of the European Union

Malcolm Anderson with Eberhard Bort
Palgrave, 2001
HBK: ISBN: 03380435X £42.50
pp. 235 + viii (including: bibliography and index)

This book is packed with information on the internal and external frontiers of the European Union. As the authors note in the theoretical chapter (chapter 2), contemporary developments have changed the role of states and territory, increased cultural and economic flows across state frontiers, and problematised the very role of the state. Study of the European Union elucidates both the continuing relevance of internal state frontiers (chapter 3) and the changes in the role of these frontiers (the tour around the external frontiers of France in chapter 4 shows increasing trans-frontier cooperation). The external frontiers of the European union are toured in the next chapter, with a useful and timely discussion of the workings of the Shengen accord: its direction against immigrants from the Southern shores of the Mediterranean is clear, as are the relatively uniform standards of implementation despite the variation in the 'policeability' of the different borders.

In chapter 6 there is specific discussion of the Eastern frontiers of the European Union – at once the most variable, the most politically problematic, and as such the most interesting of the external frontiers. The mass of data is augmented by an impressively long bibliography which lists a wide range of national, regional and EU documents as well as giving a very useful compilation of scholarly literature on issues related to regions, borders and frontiers. The final chapter sums up the significance of much of the data negatively, by contrasting the expansion of the EU with that of the American frontier: 'this expansion cannot be a "manifest destiny"... because there can be no simple understanding of what is expanding, why and to what end.'(p. 183) Unlike the debate on the American frontier, that on the European frontier 'will inevitably be a disorderly one and carry with it the risk of disintegration into highly specialized discussions' (p. 183).

The quotation points to a problem which nagged this reader throughout the book: perhaps no 'simple' understanding is possible, but complex understandings may be possible which are neither disorderly nor disintegrative. Such understandings, however, are not easily found in the book. The methodology used in the research (interviews with border-region elites, a study of EU, national and regional documentation) encourages an outline of a wide range of cross-border projects with little evaluation of their wider significance. The problem was apparent at several points in chapter 6. After a long list of cross-frontier projects on the eastern borders of Germany, it was noted that they were not very effective in fulfilling their explicit objectives (p. 169). Where successful cooperation was noted, the criteria of 'success' were left unclear. Interaction between border-guards was noted, but its significance in terms of security, quality of life or simply lived experience in the region was not questioned.



The problem existed, too, in the discussion of the French internal frontiers of the EU. The coverage was impressive, but often I wanted to ask about the significance of the increasing cross-border linkages for identity, 'stateness', the lived experience of frontiers, of nations, or of Europe. On the Basque side of the Pyrenees, for example, is economic integration seen by the French or Spanish population to have any political meaning, or is the economic cooperation along the seacoast too far from the centers of Basque activism to impact on Basque consciousness? On the Catalan side, does the interaction have any cultural significance in a highly localistic society where traditionally the North began not in Paris but in Carcassonne? The questions are not merely empiricist but concern the significance of the information we are given for national identity, nationalist conflict, cultural distinction, and for assessment of the integrative capacity of the EU. These are, however, bigger questions than the book attempts to tackle. It is content with a level of 'disorder' even 'disintegration' in its presentation of the information. This might be seen as indicative of the newly post-modern world – more simply, however, it may be attributed to the methodology. In my view it is a loss. Malcolm Anderson is in a good position to give some answers about the significance of the developments he describes for identity and state projects in parts of the EU: so too is Eberhard Bort. I hope they will give us some of the answers in their next book.

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Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: An International Security Reader, Revised Edition

Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, (eds.)
MIT Press, 2001

Pbk: ISBN: 0262523159 £19.50 \$27.95

pp. xvi + 491 (including: suggestions for further reading)

This collection of essays, taken from articles previously published in the journal *International Security*, is a revised edition of a 1997 volume of the same name. It is not a second edition, since the original chapters that made up the first version have neither been reworked nor updated (as far as this reviewer can judge). Instead we get the addition of three new chapters culled from later editions of the source journal. All of the pieces are composed by US based academics with an expertise in international relations and comparative government.

The book is divided into three parts. The first explores the sources of nationalism and ethnic conflict. Here the five chapters are very much centred on proximate rather than underlying causes of conflict. Part two is interested in options for international action and includes discussions of military responses to refugee disasters, the role of air power in Kosovo, regional peacekeeping in Liberia and the limits of liberal internationalism as a peacebuilding strategy. The third part is entitled political challenges. Here we find analyses of refugee flows as grounds for international action, spoiler problems in peace processes, designing transitions from civil war, and in the final, provocative article by Kaufmann, possible and impossible solutions to ethnic civil wars. Kaufmann advances a fervent argument in favour of separatism, but it lacks the subtlety of the preceding chapters by Mueller and by Stedman that

recognise that there are internal divisions within each warring community and that ethnic conflicts are not a war of all against all. Mueller is especially good on how a relatively small number of 'empowered and unpoliced thugs' (p. 102) can wreak havoc on intercommunal relations.

The allocation of the articles to each of these three parts appears to be somewhat arbitrary as they all address more or less the same basic issue: what sort of threats do national and ethnic conflicts pose to the international political system and what can concerned states do to reduce or end their destructive impact? The overall tone is how to use coercion and inducements to manipulate conflict situations. Most authors do not address the legality and morality of such actions and the pluralist critique of the implicit solidarist assumptions of most of the authors is ignored. More was needed along the lines of Posner's observation that humanitarian intervention is 'less gentle than it sounds' (p. 232).

This does not mean that there is a consensus about issues. Indeed, in places, there appear to be real disagreements about what the most appropriate strategies should be. For example, Van Evera calls on Western powers to enforce a code of conduct on East European states that includes the adoption of market economic policies and a democratic form of government. On the other hand, several other chapters challenge a simplistic liberal internationalist approach. The chapter by Snyder and Ballentine argues that this 'conventional wisdom' (p. 61) overlooks the damage that can be inflicted on divided societies with a poorly developed civil society by elites that want to peddle explosive ethnic sentiments through a 'free press'. This critique is sustained in the chapter by Paris, which points out that the liberal internationalist 'paradigm' has been an ineffective model for peacebuilding because it does not take into account the destabilizing effects of the 'market democracy' remedy. However, these critics do not want to overthrow the liberal internationalist approach in favour of something more radical. Instead they offer modifications and improvements. Paris, for example, wants to claim both that the liberal internationalist approach is 'fundamentally flawed' (p. 324) and that it should not be abandoned but adjusted towards an approach labelled 'strategic liberalization'.

The most important contribution of this reader is to bring together a set of stimulating pieces on international responses to ethnic conflict. More could have been done, however, to add value to this collection. A tighter focus was needed in places, for example, there are chapters where the concentration on national and ethnic conflict is replaced with an analysis of internal conflict in general, weakening the impact of the volume as a whole. One wishes that the chapters from the 1997 edition had been updated. The economic boom in the Far East has ended and the war in Bosnia is no longer burning (though it has been smouldering for the past six years). It would also have been useful to include suggestions for further reading at the end of each chapter, rather than at the end of the volume. An index would also have been helpful. The value of the volume has also been reduced by the fact that many of the most significant articles have now been expanded on and developed elsewhere – most notably Lake and Rothchild's piece on containing fear and Stephen Stedman's influential examination of the 'spoiler' problem in peacemaking. Brown's own contributions are based on material that appears elsewhere.



Nonetheless, for those who have not had access to these articles before, they provide a fine guide to important (relatively) recent scholarship in this area of study. Readers will be left with a greater awareness of the advantages and problems associated with different strategies used by outside parties that intervene in internal conflicts. Difficulties identified include how to induce compliance, how to promote change that does not add to a sense of insecurity and how to improve on peacebuilding that hitherto appears to have been based on overly-simplistic assumptions. With fifteen articles squeezed into just under 500 pages the book is good value for money. Just don't expect an in-depth analysis of why nationalism and ethnicity remain such important forces in the contemporary world.

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Modern Roots: studies of national identity

Alain Dieckhoff and Natividad Gutiérrez, eds.

Ashgate Publishing, 2001

Hbk ISBN: 0-7546-1152-3 £45.00 \$79.95

pp. 297 + xx (including: list of contributors, endnotes)

This collection was compiled from an Interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative Research in the Social Sciences (ICCR) conference on 'Nationalism and National Identity', held in Paris on 3-6 July 1996, as well as from chapters that were commissioned specifically for this volume. They are united by a focus on the cultural roots of national identity. The book is divided into six sections, the first being the introduction (by Gutiérrez), and the last being the conclusion (by Dieckhoff).

In the introduction, Gutiérrez characterises the study of nationalism as divided between two approaches; the "modernists", especially Ernst Gellner, who emphasise that nationalism is a modern phenomenon, and the "historical culturalists", especially Anthony D. Smith, who see nationalism as part of a continuum of identity.

Gutiérrez and Dieckhoff favour the 'historical culturalist' perspective. Though they accept Gellner's view that nationalism is a modern phenomenon, produced by modern forms of society, they emphasise the importance of the underlying culture that assists in the justification and production of a sense of community. They do not consider this culture to be unchanging or ahistorical, as most nationalisms claim; rather, national culture constantly undergoes transformation and (re)production. At the same time, neither is it totally divorced from the past; nationalism draws upon, reinterprets and sometimes reinvents pre-existing culture in the process of self-definition. Hence the 'modern roots' in the title.

A series of theories of nationalism are presented in the second section. Anthony D. Smith offers a critique of modernist, post-modernist and Marxist approaches to the study of nationalism. He sees them as failing to pay sufficient attention to 'national identity'; the maintenance and reproduction of the cultural heritage of the nation, and the identification with that heritage. Smith has space only to present a summary of the arguments of other theoreticians, and his responses are equally brief.

Nevertheless, he provides a valuable overview of the lines of debate in the field today.

Smith characterises nationalism as arising through a combination of different streams of development, all emphasising cultural identity but some doing so more overtly than others. The importance of culture in all nationalisms is a point to which Dieckhoff returns in the conclusion. It is also supported by Corinne Delmas' chapter on the teaching of history at the end of the nineteenth century in France, the state supposedly most based on political rather than cultural definitions of nationalism.

Philippe Claret provides a summary of the separate Anglo-American and French strands of the psychoanalytical study of nationalism. He considers their differences and the history of their formation. While the psychoanalytical approach focuses on cultural values, thus explaining the chapter's presence, there is no sense of connection between Claret's work and the other texts in this volume. Nevertheless, it is a useful review chapter, especially for those unable to access the French literature.

There is greater connection with the chapter by Montserrat Guibernau, which critiques Gellner's theory of nationalism, representing the modern emphasis on culture as the product of differentiation of society preventing other forms of collective identity being cohesive. Like Smith, Guibernau sees nations as building their identity around cultural elements of the past, shaped in new ways to meet new demands. Guibernau argues that nationalism is experienced and understood through cultural symbols and the rituals which imbue them with meaning.

Guibernau is not alone in this approach; Gutiérrez also considers the symbolism of nationalism, in the form of archetypes and stereotypes. The issue of symbolising the nation is the focus of the third section of the book. Oliver Zimmer examines the geographical component of nationalism, specifically the importance of landscape in national identity. He uses as his model Switzerland, where identification with the landscape was used to counterbalance the threat of surrounding ethno-linguistic identities. Zimmer attempts to provide a theoretical framework for the study of the role of Landscape in the construction of national identity. This reflects a growing interest in the spatial component of nationalism, for example White's (2000) attempt to 'map' the spatial component of national sentiment. The issue of landscape has drawn considerable interest in the study of German nationalism, with the importance of the *Heimat*, the local region, as a means of imagining a broader German nation (Applegate 1990). Given the traditional strength of the cantons in Switzerland, consideration of regional identities within this framework would have been of interest.

Anne-Marie Thiesse and Catherine Bertho-Lavenir consider the process by which 'authentic' symbols and rituals were derived from real and supposed folklore practices, thus producing elements of 'national' cultures throughout Europe. Finally, this section is rounded out by Yolaine Cultiaux, who examines the role of historians in post-Franco Catalan identity.

The fourth section examines the teaching of national identity; the transmission of national culture to the nation, and the educators that carry out that process. This section includes the aforementioned chapter by Corinne Delmes. Julian Dierkes



examines teachers' unions in Japan and the two Germanys, and their attempts to come to terms with issues of national identity in the post-war decade. Defeat and occupation provided a moment of crisis in which national introspection led to the reform of national identity. The strength of the paper lies in the similarity of context of the three cases allowing identification and close analysis of specific differences. The limitation of the chapter is the narrowness of the sources Dierkes consults; he assumes the positions advanced in the official journals of the teaching unions reflect what was taught in the classrooms.

A broader range of sources are utilised by Christophe Jeffrelot. He considers the educational activities of organisations connected to the Party of the Indian People (BJP). Jeffrelot follows a reading of the organisations' official propaganda with case studies of several grass roots initiatives of BJP supporters. The case of India is particularly interesting because of the reinterpretation of pre-existing cultural practices, such as the caste system, into national identities. The intermeshing of the two is perhaps an example of what Chakrabarty (2000) describes as 'double consciousness'; the coexistence in the individual of conflicting modern and other worldviews.

The fifth section is devoted to disrupted national identities; national identities under challenge. Sallie Westwood examines the contestation of national identity in Ecuador, where ethnic, racial, class, indigenous and gender identities fracture the state-imposed nationalism and offer alternatives that are difficult for the state to co-opt. Gérard Groc considers the apparent failure of Kemalist nationalism in Turkey to sway large segments of the population, leading to a situation where the army acts to 'protect' the nation from the people. Finally, this section concludes with Catherine Durandin's examination of Romanian nationalism. Durandin considers the victim-mentality of Romanian nationalism, which arises as justification for the nation frequently failing to match the criteria of the imported model of identity that the intellectual elite attempt to impose upon it.

Overall, the volume has been well-selected with a good balance between theory and case studies. The texts are logically arranged, and drawn together well by the introduction and conclusion. Many chapters have been translated from French, making them more widely available. There was only one significant typesetting error; in Guibernau's chapter the endnotes seem to be out of order. The broad focus and extensive theoretical material mean that most readers will find at least several useful chapters herein.

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Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace

Paul Dixon

Palgrave, 2001

Hbk: ISBN: 0333729684 £47.50

Pbk: ISBN: 0333729692 £15.99

pp.334 (including: index, bibliography, appendix)

One of the best recent texts produced on the subject, *Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace* offers a fair-minded assessment of the roles of contemporary actors post-1968 and in the contemporary peace process. Dixon stresses the interconnections between power, ideology and reality, emphasising the constraints on the various political actors in pursuit of their goals. This three-tiered approach has much value. In analysing power relationships, Dixon assesses the physical force contest involving the British Government, loyalists and republicans. With no decisive winner in that contest (although the British held the upper hand) the ideological 'war' has been of huge importance in shaping the political agenda and mobilising popular support. The author suggests that the British Government failed to win the propaganda war. In assessing reality, as distinct from propaganda, the author attempts to examine whether objective truths can be obtained. Dixon uses the 'reality' approach to offer a sceptical view of several actions of the British Government. The 'no talking to terrorists' mantra had long appeared tired, even prior to the paramilitary ceasefires. Dixon argues that much righteous indignation from the British Government was synthetic, an example being the award of a United States visa to Gerry Adams in the mid-1990s.

Dixon suggests that all actors have moved away from power and ideology approaches towards analyses grounded in reality. This has allowed political elites to accept the necessity of difficult compromises. These compromises have then been sold to electoral constituencies and party members through an educative process and a series of choreographed events. The author asserts that British policy has been marked largely by continuity. In pursuing this argument, Dixon provides a few familiar potshots at the usual academic targets. He goes on to suggest that the British Government has pursued stability and has delivered this through 'appeasement of whatever forces it felt were likely to deliver a stable settlement' (p.293).

More contentiously, the author asserts that the British Government has been unable to impose its will on republicans or loyalists after 30 years of violence. It is true that the Good Friday Agreement is a compromise between the forces of the British Government and Irish republicanism. Yet, with Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom for the foreseeable future; the Irish Government abandoning its constitutional claim; Sinn Fein managing British rule at Stormont; the creation of a mere six new cross border bodies (approval for more only via parallel consent in the Assembly, therefore no more bodies thank you) and the IRA calling off its armed campaign, the compromise, at a constitutional level, is akin to that of a cat and a canary (this is not to underplay the importance of non-constitutional matters).



Dixon might usefully have contrasted the propaganda associated with the Good Friday Agreement – ‘no winners’; ‘historic compromise’; ‘only show in town’; ‘self-determination’ etc with the reality of the preservation of the Union. Tellingly, there are no references (Bean excepted) to the works of those, such as Anthony McIntyre, Mark Ryan or Suzanne Breen, who argue that the peace process has seen the death of republicanism. Instead, the limited material on republicanism is too self-referential and pays insufficient attention to perhaps the most important aspect of the peace process and what Dixon refers to as the propaganda war; the skilful management of Sinn Fein by the party’s leaders in settling for an Agreement considerably short of republican objectives.

The other main criticism of the book is that it overemphasises potential British withdrawal as a serious part of the political agenda. Thus, the author argues Unionist fears in respect of Sunningdale were “reasonable” rather than paranoid’ (p.157). Undoubtedly there has been a distinct lack of emotional commitment to the Union, exemplified, as the author notes, by Harold Wilson’s denunciation of loyalists as ‘spongers’. Obviously enforced power sharing and an Irish dimension were difficult for Unionists to stomach in 1974 (and remain problematic for some), but to conflate such ideas with a withdrawal agenda is to stretch a point. As Merlyn Rees later commented, the aim of British policy was to kid republicans through talk of withdrawal, whilst simultaneously shoring up security policy and the defence of the Union. To call the 1972-74 period the ‘first peace process’ (chapter 6) is surely to mislead, unless Faulkner Unionists, Alliance or the SDLP had hitherto unknown paramilitary wings. Republicans were committed to a united Ireland in 1972 and ended dialogue without reward in July that year; loyalists were not engaged at any time. There was no peace process, merely a brief political experiment in consociationalism in 1974.

The previous two paragraphs may be critical, but it is time to restate the positive aspects of Dixon’s work. His discussion of the civil rights movement, assessment of the growing crisis of British policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the analysis of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement offer some of the best objective treatments of the topics yet seen. The consideration of the roles played by non-republican actors in the peace process in later chapters is judicious. There are soundly based critiques of unionist and nationalist views of the peace process. Many of the conclusions are sensible. In particular, Dixon restates the importance of social class as an exacerbating factor (if not a causal one) in the maintenance of political difficulties. His outline of the lack of sympathy for unionism is cogent, emphasising how unionist moderates may be placed in difficult positions by the British Government due to a lack of empathy. This has been true in respect of the micro agenda of the Good Friday Agreement. The book displays a clear understanding of the nature and conduct of the propaganda war and the limits upon the development of British policy in Northern Ireland. As such, the book’s arguments deserve to be read by students and academics and argued over in seminar discussions.

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Containing Nationalism

Michael Hechter

Oxford University Press, 2000 (PBK: 2001)

HBK: ISBN 0198297424 £19.99

PBK: ISBN 019924751X £13.99

pp. vii + 256 pages (including: index, bibliography, 1 table, 6 figures)

When writing my undergraduate thesis on Northern Ireland at the University of Leipzig, Germany, I came across Michael Hechter's 1975 book *Internal Colonialism. The Celtic Fringe in British National Development*. Even though, in the end, I did not use much of Hechter's argument (nor did I become an advocate of the internal colonialism argument in relation to Northern Ireland), the book made a deep impression on me. Several years on, Hechter's latest book, *Containing Nationalism*, also impressed me – in its clarity, logic, and comprehensiveness of argument. In addition, I would probably subscribe to most of Hechter's contentions.

Containing Nationalism is about three questions: What are the causes of nationalism's modernity? Why is nationalism more prevalent in some countries than in others? How, if at all, is it possible to contain the 'dark side of nationalism', i.e., its association with violence? (pp. 3-4)

Hechter defines nationalism as 'collective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit' (p. 7), with the governance unit being 'that territorial unit which is responsible for providing the bulk of social order and other collective goods – including protection from confiscation, justice and welfare – to its members' and that has 'the capacity to extract the revenue and other resources necessary to defray ... [the] production' of these collective goods (p. 9). This particular approach to nationalism is crucial to Hechter's argument in that it allows him to see nationalism as a political phenomenon in that its impact on the state in which it occurs is politically relevant – questioning the legitimacy of forms and institutions of government, the legitimacy of borders, etc. This approach also allows Hechter to distinguish nationalism from imperialism on the one hand and regionalism on the other. Equally important for the conclusiveness of Hechter's subsequent analysis is that he treats the state (in the sense of a territorial entity) as one particular, but not the only governance unit. From these two definitions, Hechter proceeds to describe nations as 'territorially concentrated ethnic groups' with 'an elaborated sense of collective history' which 'implies the existence of some social recognition of the national category, which leads to an available social identity.' (p. 14) The limitations of this approach are quite obvious: it excludes dispersed ethnic groups from the category of 'nation', and at least casts doubts over whether civic nations that combine multiple ethnic groups within them would qualify in Hechter's sense as nations. While this may limit the applicability of some of the solutions proposed in order to contain nationalism, it does not invalidate them or damage the conclusiveness or persuasiveness of the author's argument.

After exploring the modernity of nationalism, Hechter addresses the more important question why nationalism is more salient in some countries than in others. This question is closely linked to the issue of national identities and, in particular to their salience, and Hechter contends that it is the 'establishment and maintenance of a cultural division of labour' that is the key to understanding this phenomenon. Using



the examples of Quebec, Aruba, and the United States, Hechter makes clear that 'hierarchical and segmental cultural divisions of labour favour the establishment and maintenance of separate social identities' and that such cultural divisions of labour, therefore, 'provide an important social base for the development of nationalism if the relevant groups are territorially concentrated' (p. 107). Consequently, those countries are most likely to be confronted by persistently high levels of (peripheral) nationalism in which a cultural division of labour exists and where the respective groups live territorially concentrated and have little or no control over state policies that are directly relevant to the individual and collective welfare of their members. That is, in these countries national movements are more likely to exist that will demand sovereignty within their own governance unit congruent with the boundaries of their nation. Yet, while the demand for sovereignty is a necessary condition for nationalism, it is not a sufficient one. Rather, as Hechter rightly insists, '[n]ationalism requires the existence of organisations dedicated to pursuing national sovereignty.' (p. 125) They are needed to overcome the free-rider problem and to 'convince prospective members that sovereignty is a realistic prospect', none of which nationalist parties are likely or easily to achieve (p. 125). Over time and space, such organisations have taken various forms and shapes: nonconformist churches in Wales, youth organisations and fraternities in Germany, the Gaelic Athletic Association in Ireland, and a variety of voluntary associations in Africa (pp. 125-126).

In the final chapter of his analysis, Hechter approaches the third question, namely under what conditions (violent) nationalist conflict is likely to be contained. Concluding from the previous examination of the phenomenon, Hechter offers three possibilities: to 'increase the costs of collective action', to 'lower the salience of national identity', and to 'decrease the demand for national sovereignty.' (p. 135) For a variety of reasons, Hechter does not have much hope for the success of the former two, but strongly advocates institutional designs aimed at achieving the third. Such designs include consociationalism, electoral systems, and federalism, and it is the later that Hechter is particularly interested in as it is a form of indirect rule, one of the key concepts that informed much of his entire analysis of nationalism. While he is aware of the various controversies surrounding federalism, some new evidence (more widely discussed in his 1999 paper with Nobuyuki Takahashi, 'Political Decentralisation and Nationalist Conflict') leads him to suggest that '[d]ecentralisation is a spur to mobilisation among minority nations, for it places greater resources ... in the hands of nationalist leaders. As long as these leaders see a benefit in remaining part of the host-state, decentralisation ought to contain nationalist rebellion. If the central state implodes, however, then it has little to offer peripheral leaders and fragmentation is the likely consequence.' (p. 149) Key to any successful implementation of decentralisation is that 'central leaders ... find a way to credibly commit themselves to upholding their institutional commitments' which 'will be enhanced when the government provides for maximal procedural justice' (p. 153). Equally important, minority cultural protectionism must be made feasible by making it desirable for the majority, that is, the majority must be brought to understand that 'social order can be provided more efficiently in a society made up of different national groups' because 'a viable central state can profit from the social control activities of its constituent national groups' who 'can contribute to state-wide social order by regulating the behaviour of their members' (pp. 156-157).

The work is overall logical and consistent, but not without some minor flaws. I would disagree with Hechter's contention that 'Kosovar nationalism arose just after the imposition of direct rule' by Slobodan Milosevic in 1989 (p. 77). On the contrary, it had always been present, but had been contained through a mixture of repression (after 1981) and indirect rule (especially through the 1974 constitution). Equally, I would not accept that the 'distinguishing characteristic of peripheral nationalism is the demand for secession' (p. 78). Hungarian nationalism in Southern Slovakia and South Tyrolean nationalism in Italy, to give just two examples, have since long been associated with demands for increased autonomy within their respective host-states rather than with secession from them. It also seems highly unlikely to me that the 'Ossies', i.e., former citizens of East Germany, can be classified as a new nation in Germany (p. 135). For one, it is over time much more likely that the regional identities of Saxons, Thuringians, and so on will prevail over a common East German national identity, and secondly if such an identity was to become salient it would not be a case of re-emergence, but rather one of persistence as East Germany had existed as an independent state (as much as this was possible at the Cold War frontline in Europe) for forty years. Finally, the Frisians, to my knowledge, are more numerous in Germany and the Netherlands than they are in England (p. 135), and in these two countries they have quite a strong national identity, although there are few signs of nationalism as both their host-states and the supra-national structures of the European Union provide desirable collective goods in a way that a sovereign Frisian governance unit (or independent state) would be unlikely to match. None of that, of course, invalidates Hechter's general argument.

In conclusion, the most important point to be made in this review is that Michael Hechter has written a book that without a doubt makes a significant contribution not only to the theoretical debate on the concept of nationalism, but equally to the various theoretical and practical discourses addressing the ways it can be best managed and prevented from escalating into violence. As such it should find its way into many libraries and become an integrated part of any course on nationalism.

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Language, Ethnicity and the State: Volume 1: Minority Languages in the European Union, Volume 2: Minority Languages in Eastern Europe post-1989

Camille C. O'Reilly (ed.)

Palgrave, 2001

(Vol. 1) Hbk: ISBN: 033392925X £42.50

pp. x + 183 (including: index and chapter references)

(Vol. 2) Hbk: ISBN: 0333929241 £45.00

pp. xii, 228 (including: index and chapter references)

Language has loomed large over European politics since the end of the Middle Ages when, in Western and Central Europe, Latin was replaced by new upstarts in its role of the sole written language of religion, politics and intellectual discourse. Next, at the end of the 18th century Herder's thesis on equality and uniqueness of all idioms allowed for the coupling of political projects with 'their own' languages. People could



not just speak any more. They had to articulate utterances in something reified as a language and readily reducible to writing. In the age of nation-states the ideal of popular sovereignty was reflected in the practice of popular literacy. Literacy in a standardized official/national language not only empowered the citizenry but also enclosed them in the confines of their nation-state and subjected to the power center that controlled this state and the language's usage.

These two volumes provide a valuable examination of the minority languages of contemporary Europe. An initial difficulty encountered in such a study is how to characterize such languages? The concept of 'minority language' is as much fraught with problems of definition as the idea of 'minority' itself. There is no legally-binding definition of 'minority' in international law. Therefore, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities is a weak instrument as it is left to the signatory states' discretion which human groups to grant with stipulated rights. An even greater predicament is suffered by the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, in the scope of which the signatory has the choice of branding a language as 'regional' and, thus, to deny the status of minority to a minority.

The difficulty of definition aside, these two companion volumes offer the reader a rich selection of case studies written from various (inter-)disciplinary perspectives ranging from history, sociology, ethnography, sociolinguistics to the study of nationalism and ethnicity. The first volume focuses on the European Union where multiculturalism and multilingualism is de rigueur of political rhetoric but not practice. The member states' official/national languages construed as EU official languages rule supreme. Some support to pre-selected minority languages is channeled via the Dublin-based European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages. This novel coinage of 'lesser used language' additionally obfuscates the power game between the dominant and minority languages (Dónall Ó Riagáin).

The studies of Corsican (Alexandra Jaffe), Catalan (Susan DiGiacomo), Breton (Lenora Timm) concentrate on the uneasy relationship between the state and the minority language. The latter can be connected to a national project or to reaffirmation of ethnic-cum-regional distinctiveness. The Irish Gaelic is a coupling of socially minority but politically official language that allows the Irish to negotiate their national identity vis-à-vis the Anglophone British (Camille C. O'Reilly). The volume closes with two significant analyses. One scrutinizes the attempt at forging a non-language-based regional identity in Northern Italy that would transcend this area's multilingualism (Jaro Stacul). In the other, Tom Cheesman shows that immigrant languages are not newcomers to Europe (Arabic, Turkish) nor can they be indefinitely denied the status of 'minority' and 'European' languages (Hindi, Kurdish, Vietnamese) with the necessary increase of immigration to well-to-do but aging Europe.

From the second volume, devoted to Eastern Europe after the fall of communism, it is obvious that the ethnic nationalist equation of language with nation and state still rules the postcommunist reality. This region used to be the meeting point of ecclesiastical and diplomatic literacies expressed in Church Slavonic, Byzantine Greek, Ottoman Turkish as well as classical Arabic and Persian prior to the 19th and 20th centuries when a plethora of newly standardized national idioms superseded these languages. Nationalism still creates new languages as in the Yugoslav

successor states (Robert D. Greenberg) and Moldova (Tom J. Hegarty) but certain political choices can unmake them too as in the case of gradually suppressed and Russified Belarusan (Curt Woolhiser).

Religiously and culturally variegated groups can seek to reassert their separateness from their ethnic kin as in the case of Romania's Banat Bulgarians who write their idiom in Latin characters and call it Paulician in order to make it different from Cyrillic-based standard Bulgarian (Rossitza Guentheva). Minorities also have to deal with the rapid language change brought about by the unexpected emergence of the post-Soviet nation-states grounded in ethnic nationalism pegged onto specific national languages. John Dobson analyses the situation of Russian-speakers in Latvia, while Rebecca Gilbert that of the Russophone Jews in Ukraine.

In this context Stefan Wolff's contribution on the German minorities in the Czech Republic and Poland is an odd one as he gives little attention to language. His focus is on international politics. From the picture painted one can hardly see that Poland's Germans concentrated in Upper Silesia overwhelmingly do not speak German. They negotiate their ethnic-national-religious-cultural identity through their bilingualism in their own Slavic dialect/Slavic-Germanic creole and standard Polish. German played the same role as Polish prior to 1945.

O'Reilly's taking of the minority language situation in Europe (along with Barbour and Carmichael's *Language and Nationalism in Europe*) is bound to remain the yardstick for further research into this problematic in near future. There are, however, a number of shortcomings in these two volumes. On the whole, the splitting of the tackled problematic into two volumes sadly reinforces the pre-1989 thinking on Europe as divided by the iron curtain between East and West. This contradicts the extension of membership in the Council of Europe to the post-communist and post-Soviet states, and the EU's imminent eastward enlargement. This stance also neglects the variegated sociolinguistic situation of the Roma – Europe's largest diasporic minority of more than 10 million.

The restriction of the first volume to the European Union has omitted Switzerland, with its intricate but working institutional and administrative structure based on language, religion and canton sovereignty, from scrutiny. Moreover, despite sticking only to the EU, Scandinavia and Greece somehow escaped the purview. The EU's wide-ranging political borders also create the possibility of scrutinizing the Arabic-Spanish interaction in Spain's North African exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla as well as probing into the sociolinguistic situation of French Guyana located in Latin America. Neither are attempted.

The second volume also has its discontents. First, the title's 'Eastern Europe' is not defined. Nowadays, in the post-Cold War discourse one tends to speak of (East-) Central Europe in relation to the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. The post-Yugoslav states, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania are grouped under the badge of 'Southeastern Europe', while the designation of 'Eastern Europe' is limited to the post-Soviet states with the exception of the Baltic republics out of which Lithuania and Latvia aspire to Central Europe, whereas Estonia sees itself as part of Scandinavia. To do justice to the political and social changes in this area, demographically and territorially twice as large as Western Europe, one should



devote to it at least two volumes that would cover the sociolinguistic-cum-political situation also in the Caucasus, Russia and Central Europe.

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Tomasz Kamusella, Opole University, Poland

To Kill a Nation: The Attack on Yugoslavia

Michael Parenti

Verso, 2000 (Paperback, 2002)

Hbk: ISBN: 1859847765 £16.00 \$22.00

PbK: ISBN: 1859843662 £12.00 \$18.00

pp. 246 (including: notes and index)

The title of this book might lead prospective readers to expect another political history chronicling the destruction of Yugoslavia in the wars in the early 1990s. Instead, the reader will quickly find that the subject of this book is the purported destruction of the Serbian people throughout the 1990s by the pro-NATO 'west', culminating in the air strikes against Kosovo in 1999. However, this book is not so much an account of the political and social odyssey of the Serbian people in the 1990s as it is a platform for the author to lash out against his personal enemies - NATO (particularly the US), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and multinational companies. In fact, Michael Parenti fails to achieve either of his presumed goals, as his shallow account of the events in the Balkans in the 1990s is propagandistic in its vacuity, and his anti-globalization ideology lacks the facts and supporting data to win any new converts.

Parenti argues that the west, led by the US, had an interest in bringing about the dissolution of the state of Yugoslavia because it stood as a successful example of a socialist political and economic system that ran afoul of the anti-Communist sentiment of the late 1980s and early 1990s. He refers to the economic success of socialist Yugoslavia, blaming its demise not on the unsustainability of the socialist model, but on the backlash caused by the borrowing, debt financing, strict IMF restructuring requirements, and the general recession of the 1970s.

He selectively cites Susan Woodward's expertly researched work on the economic crisis of socialist Yugoslavia, without reviewing the key point of her thesis: that the confluence of domestic economic liberalism and political conservatism resulted in the inability of the government to respond to the needs of its economy and its citizens in a time of transition. Rather than an example of the painful but natural crises that economies in transition must experience as they liberalize and move toward market principles, Parenti argues that the IMF requirements and US demands were part of a strategy deliberately designed to fragment Yugoslavia.

Against this backdrop, he begins to describe how Slovenia, Croatia, and even Bosnia sought to breakaway from Yugoslavia, while Belgrade sought to keep the country together. He does not address the concerns held by many non-Serbian Yugoslavs concerning rising Serbian nationalism and the belief that Belgrade only wanted a unified state so that it, and therefore Serbia, could be in control of such a unified state.

The author's treatment of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the most egregious exercise of revisionism in the book, and is in itself an insult to the victims of this bloody war. Early on he raises the issue of Alija Izetbegovic's 'real' goal of turning Bosnia into an Islamic state, arguing that the anti-Belgrade west covered up these true intentions for their own purposes (p. 52). He legitimizes indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic by referring to his 'anti-separatist goal', (p. 58) failing to mention his use of tactics of ethnic cleansing as a means toward that goal. When he does address instances of Serb-led ethnic cleansing actions (such as those in Prijedor) he dismisses any potential link or chain of command with leaders in Belgrade by pinning these atrocities on independent gangs of Serbian paramilitaries (p. 64-65). He trivializes the conditions of the sieged city of Sarajevo by suggesting that, 1000 days into the siege, local markets offered 'oranges, lemons and bananas' at reasonable prices (p. 73). He plays with numbers and statistics to dismiss claims of rape as a tool of ethnic cleansing, and questions the scale of the massacre at Srebrenica in 1995 (pp. 82, 89).

In his discussion concerning the air strikes in Kosovo, he again raises the issue of Islamic fundamentalism, the terrorist activities of the KLA, and covert CIA support activities to anti-Serbian parties. He fails to mention the impact of the revocation of Kosovo's autonomy, or of the repression in the region by Belgrade throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Parenti characterizes the Rambouillet meetings and accords as an 'ambush', and the post-airstrike international administration as an attempt by NATO to control the region for their own economic gain. While chronicling the actions of NATO against the Serbian people, and viewing the ICTY as patently un-objective (in spite of the fact that non-Serbian people have been indicted and tried), he refutes the claims of genocidal acts by Belgrade in a chapter entitled, 'Where Are All the Bodies Buried?'

The closing chapters of the book move into a tirade against international investors, 'big business' and 'corporate America', Parenti's true war criminals. In no part of the book does he question the integrity, motives or methods of Slobodan Milosevic, or his role in the tragedies throughout the 1990s. Instead, he acclaims the multiethnicity of Serbia and of Belgrade in particular, while condemning the 'ethnically cleansed Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo' (p. 187).

While Parenti includes a list of notes to document his sources, his presentation and use of sources is selective and deceptive. He often confuses timeframes to achieve his own desired effect. Many of his sources would be welcome reading for conspiracy theorists, while failing to make it past a respected peer-reviewed journal, or even a self-respecting dissertation committee.

A minor positive feature of the book results from the author's zeal to illustrate that non-Serbian parties were guilty of atrocities as well. His portrait of Franjo Tudjman's



policies and practices (particularly the cleansing of Serbs from the Krajina) is a reminder that Croatia has a recent past that must be confronted even in the increasingly moderate and reforming Croatian government.

This book is not simply disappointing, but disturbing in its content and purpose. As a very short book, it lacks the depth and background needed for a topic as complex as the late 20th century Balkans. Parenti's personal ideology and his manipulation of the facts of the past ten years does a disservice to the Balkan people as well as interested outside readers, and fails to lend any substance to scholarly debate on the subject of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the world's response. A critical analysis of Belgrade's role in the break-up of Yugoslavia, of media coverage of the Balkans in the 1990s, of Serbian leadership throughout the 1990s, and of the viewpoints of the Serbian people of the events of the 1990s, would be a welcome addition to the literature. This ideologically motivated work is not such a contribution.

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The Politics of Ethnicity in Settler Societies: States of Unease

David Pearson

Palgrave, 2001

Hbk: ISBN: 0333636872 £42.50

pp. viii + 228 (including: index, bibliography and notes)

Pearson's book provides a powerful sociological argument for why 'settler societies' are (in) 'states of unease' as a result of ethnicity and nationalism. Pearson argues that this unease is partly a product of globalisation and the advent of a post-modern world. Globalisation has led to a questioning of identity in all nations and the fluidity of identities is a key characteristic of the post-modern world. Pearson states that such unease is exacerbated in the settler societies with which he is concerned because they have ongoing histories of nation-building in the context of mass colonisation in areas already inhabited by 'aboriginal' peoples. The modernist master narratives of nation- and state- building and national identity still assume a great importance in the creation of such 'unease.'

Pearson traces in detail how and why such 'unease' develops using case studies of three settler societies in an ambitious comparative study. In order to be able to draw useful comparisons and contrasts to illustrate his argument, Pearson selects the cases of the ex-colonies Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These societies are good examples to use because they display *some* commonalities in terms of history and current political position. All were formerly British colonies and all are currently semi-peripheral in global economic and political terms. At the same time, these nations display some diversity, such as in the unique presence of a strong Francophone community in Canada (Quebec) and in the relatively empowered 'indigenous' community in New Zealand.

These comparisons and contrasts are made through the development of a very useful comparative framework. Refusing to 'hold constant' any of the principal groupings in his discussion of settler societies, Pearson begins with the critique of

definitions of settler societies such as that given by Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis: '[s]ocieties in which Europeans have settled, where their descendants have remained politically dominant over indigenous peoples, and where a heterogeneous society has developed in class, ethnic and racial terms' (1995:3 quoted on p. 5). Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis themselves note that although this definition does describe the balance of power in settler societies, it has limitations. It conceals differentiation within the 'Europeans' category. It also hides important aspects of the dynamics of the relations *between* groups within *and* beyond society. Finally, it relegates the study of indigenous peoples to studies of 'pre-contact' history.

The first way in which Pearson seeks to overcome these problems is by giving *equal* emphasis in his analysis to the aboriginal populations, the settler populations, and other more recently arrived immigrant populations. These three groups form the three points of the 'triangle' in his discussion. Pearson also acknowledges the heterogeneity of each group. Secondly, Pearson traces the pre-colonisation histories of *all* three of these groups, arguing that the way these pre-histories are separately constructed as foundational myths, as well as the way they intermingle, are important areas for the understanding of ethnic politics in settler societies. Thirdly, Pearson does indeed consider both the dynamics of the relations between the three groups and the influence of the relationships between these groups and groupings outside the national context. These are the relationships between European settlers as diasporas with the nations from whence their forebears came, the relationships of recent immigrants and the communities from where they originated and the relationships between aboriginal groups and other indigenous groups which have developed as part of the creation of international social movements within the context of globalisation.

Pearson also notes that other key concepts in the discussion, such as aboriginal, minority and diaspora, need to be problematised. He notes that none of these concepts are neutral or unproblematic. To take one example, he looks at 'aboriginal' and notes the pejorative connotations. He also notes what can be considered distinctive about aboriginal populations. For many intents and purposes, aboriginal populations can be considered as minorities, in the sense of marginalised and disempowered groups of people. However, what makes aboriginal populations different is the history of dispossession and the way in which claims may be made under current legislation to reverse or at least temper some of the negative effects of this dispossession.

It is impossible to give more than a taste of the richness of Pearson's discussion. Pearson traces the broad changes over time for each of the three groups within each of the case study societies, without compromising on descriptions of the contradictions and 'messy' detail. These settler societies were created as societies dominated by the colonial imperative to subordinate and exploit Aboriginal peoples (largely for land, rather than labour, in these cases). Later on, they became societies dominated by assimilationism and then more recently by more multicultural approaches to managing ethnic diversity (a diversity including newer immigrant populations by this stage). Pearson notes the importance within the historical trajectories he traces of these settler states being weak states. This means that the politically dominant settler community has all along needed to offer representation in order to co-opt the indigenous, and later the newer immigrant communities. This



process effectively created a new 'space' in society for pan-tribal indigenous organisation and later, the organisation of new immigrant political groups. In turn, this has facilitated the articulation of new identities, ethnicities and nationalisms and associated claims to self-determination, property and other rights within the new states. In other words, it has been in the very process of nation-building itself that new sources of unease have been created.

Pearson neatly weaves into the argument the wider global context here. He acknowledges the importance of the international self-determination discourse and globalisation, particularly in the refashioning of aboriginal peoples as 'first nations' demanding group rights within the new social contexts of global social movements and the international legal and human rights debates about indigenous peoples held within the UN. Pearson also argues that the unease is a product of the ending of European settlers' strong ties with the colonial power and the international devaluation of the concept of Britishness as an identity to be aspired to, which has led to strong status anxiety amongst this group.

If I would make any criticism of this book, it would be that at times Pearson seems to 'pack too much in'. Having given valid reasons for not including the US amongst the case studies (including the fact that the US can be regarded as a 'core' country, politically and economically speaking), he does in fact make use of US material on aboriginal peoples. Pearson also contrasts the meaning and type of US multiculturalism with that in the case study countries as well as the UK. In addition, Pearson spends perhaps too much time discussing Quebec. In terms of the sociological theory, it might also have been useful to consider a discussion of 'agency' (the new aboriginal groupings that appeared as a result of the representational spaces offered, for example, are characterised as offering 'resistance' rather than 'agency').

The comparisons and contrasts between the case study countries certainly prove enlightening within the framework which Pearson sets out. It would be interesting to explore how far the framework and the general findings are applicable to other settler societies. Pearson's work is not only comprehensive, it is also written in an engaging and accessible style. I would recommend this text to those interested in issues of ethnicity, nationalism and state and nation-building, particularly to those interested in these issues in the context of settler societies.

Reference

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Rachel Naylor, University of Ulster, UK

Cambodia: Change and Continuity in Contemporary Politics

Sorpong Peou (ed)

Ashgate, 2001

Series: The International Library of Social Change in Asia Pacific

HBK: ISBN: 0754621197 £90.00

574 pp (including: name index, chapter references)

This volume is a collection of already published journal articles written by a range of contributors, to which Peou contributes. It does not reflect particularly diverse views, with almost one quarter of the articles derived from one journal. Nor does it include the three leading scholars of Cambodia, DP Chandler (2000), B Kiernan (1996) and M Vickery (1999). In their absence, and in the absence of new, unpublished material, it is not an original contribution to the field of Cambodia studies. The series preface claims that it is intended to collate up to date material for researchers and others, but only one article out of the 25 is later than 1997. For a 2001 publication, this is not particularly helpful. The general themes are peace, political development, economic development, and human and gendered rights

In the context of *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, I will focus on ethnicity and human rights. Chou Meng Tarr provides a very well organised recent history of Cambodian-Viet Nameese relations in an article from the journal *Race and Class* (originally published in 1992). This uses the French colonial experience in all of Indochina to explain the early evolution of 'traditional' Khmer (Cambodian) resentment towards Viet Nameese people. The orthodox view is that race and ethnic tensions stem from the annexation of Lower Cambodia (now South Viet Nam), to the Viet Nameese about three centuries ago. Chou illustrates well the myth constructions and perpetuation of the urban class as a key determinant of negative and racist perceptions of Viet Nameese people. She contrasts this with the more benign and positive rural view. This is important because much previous work generalizes that racist views of ethnic Viet Nameese were universal in Cambodia.

Also at variance from orthodoxy is Chou's analysis of the Viet Nameese presence in the 1980s. After the Viet Nameese overthrew Pol Pot in 1979, the resulting presence has variously been described as 'occupation' or 'liberation', depending on one's ideology/sympathy. Within Cambodia, it was primarily the latter, Chou argues. She moves to argue that views to the contrary were mainly a product of easily propagandized overseas Khmers, keen to continue Western demonisation of Viet Nam, coupled to aggressive media propaganda led by the US and extended in Australia and the UK. Chou's contribution here is important and coincides with other emerging analyses, such as Ramses Amer's (see below) which clearly challenge propagandistic accusation of Viet Nameese imperialism and despotism. It would have been useful if she had provided more detail in her references, (such as; times, locations, and even perhaps names where appropriate), if only to demonstrate the full extent of geographical coverage and the time periods involved.

The second article on Viet Nameese ethnicity is by Ramses Amer for the *Journal of Contemporary Southeast Asia* (1994). Amer offers a very well summarized account of the tensions *within* the Khmer royalty and *between* Thai and Viet Nameese competition for influence over the country prior to the arrival of the French *colons*. He then locates institutional and cultural-historical trends in the persecution of Viet



Nameese people within changing regimes in the wider context of political affiliations with South or North Viet Nam. He emphasises parallels in the manner in which Khmers justified their violent racism.

Amer then turns to the controversial 1980s, and offers primary evidence regarding the attitudes of the ruling elite to the return of Viet Nameese people after their departure during the Democratic Kampuchea period. I would have liked to see the sources discussed but Amer's other work is methodologically reliable and his evidence is corroborated by fieldwork that I conducted between 1991 and 1998 (some of this material is available in: Roberts, 2001). The evidence demonstrates the empowerment of Cambodian authorities to regulate Viet Nameese immigration, in clear contrast to the still-believed propaganda of the 1980s that claimed, without substantive evidence, that Viet Nam was in complete control. The themes Amer identifies are consistent through Khmer history; anti-Viet Nameese racism by Khmers manipulated by urban-socialized elites in the wider context of those elites' relations with pro-US Viet Nameese elements. The not-pro-US PRK regime facilitated by the Viet Nameese after 1979, did not continue such xenophobic policies, but suffered political antagonism by racist pro-US Khmer elements again manipulating politics with the Viet Nameese 'colonisation' card. History both repeated and mirrored itself, and Amer's analysis reveals this with great clarity.

Terence Duffy's article, 'Towards a Culture of Human Rights in Cambodia', while descriptive and easily consumable, is disappointing and tendentious. Intellectually, Duffy's description of the excesses of the Khmer Rouge era is at the expense of thoughtful analysis of *why* it was done. Tendentiously, Duffy is keen to demonise the former Communist leadership and discredit them, adopting what Professor Michael Vickery refers to as the uncritical 'Standard Total View', uncritically repeating questionable and often unsubstantiated secondary sources. He is quick to point out the role of dissident members of the much maligned Cambodian People's Party (CPP) in a post-1993 UN-run election secession, but omits the role of the CPP Prime Minister, Hun Sen, in ending it. He is keen to recall that Mr. Hun Sen was a member of the Khmer Rouge, but omits that he was amongst the first to defect in order to halt the regime's murderous practices. He further demonizes the CPP-dominated government for erecting memorials to the dead because they are political showcases, but appears to have no problem with Belsen and Dachau. There is little room for such nonsense in the scholarly debate on human rights management.

Duffy's uncritical STV finds further expression in his scrutiny of Khmer Rouge policy. He makes no reference to the justifiable anti-imperialist perspectives of the leadership, or to Khieu Samphan's doctoral dissertation that identifies sources of poverty and woe in external industrialization and intervention. He is as uncritical of the mass evacuation of the cities undertaken in April 1975. Whilst few would agree with the rapacity and cruelty with which this was carried out, it was quiet *explicable*, given the swollen urban habitation depopulating the rice-producing rural areas and the attendant food deprivation. The bulk, then, of this article is given over to uncritical renderings and repetitions of views long since discredited in many quarters, based on weak sources (one of which is apparently 'on file with the author' – note 53). The descriptive narrative and discussions of progress have already issued forth in numerous other, better forms than this. In short, this article offers nothing towards its title and lets the volume down.

The book is probably acceptable for undergraduates and postgraduates newly exposed to Cambodia, but it reflects a narrow perspective and does not include any works of the best scholars of the subject. Referencing style is inconsistent and poorly edited, and the print quality is poor. Although it makes some works accessible in a reference format, there are better ways to find out about Cambodia than this book.

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Ethnicity and Nation-building in South Asia (Revised Edition)

Urmila Phadnis & Rajat Ganguly

Sage, 2001

Hbk: ISBN: 0761994386 £ 35.00

Pbk: ISBN: 0761994394 £ 14.99

pp. 470 (including: index, bibliography)

At a time when the world is witnessing the break-up of states and the intensification of ethnic violence in parts of Asia, Africa and Europe, the present book is a timely revised edition. According to the authors, the need for an analysis of ethnic politics is established by the fact that 90% of the world's states are ethnically heterogeneous. South Asia, where nation-states have gained independence from colonial domination and where every state is also beset by ethnic conflicts, provides fertile ground for an exploration of ethnicity and nation-building.

Ethnicity and Nation-building in South Asia covers a wide range of material. The authors: identify various theories and approaches to ethnicity and nation-building, provide an overview of ethnic groups in South Asia, an analysis of the South Asian states' systems, perspectives, policies and strategies of central leadership on ethnicity, analyze the demands of ethnic movements, the dynamics of autonomy and secession and the external dimensions of ethnic separatism. The book is limited in its territorial focus; the authors do not analyze South Asian countries in a comparative/contrastive framework.

As far as the definition of ethnicity is concerned, the authors label it as a fluid concept whose boundaries are porous. Although cultural markers are the prime factors, caste, religion and tribal affinities are also included to explain the case of India, Nepal and Sri Lanka.

In its theoretical application, the book adheres to the modernisation school of thought in order to explain the rise of ethnic politics in South Asia. According to this



school of thought, increasing socio-economic modernisation contains the seeds of both ethnic amelioration and conflagration. The expanding 'power cake' in a society leads to increasing inequality and increasing demands from ethnic groups (which if not satisfied) results in ethno-political violence. Although one would assume that it would be the deprived and relatively backward and marginalised groups who would resort to violence, the authors contend that it is the relatively privileged who express grief and sorrow over loss of political and economic power.

The case of Pakistan provides partial evidence to support this argument. The Bengalis and the Baluch in the post-colonial dynamics of political, economic and social development in Pakistan did not experience a loss of privilege and power, however, both these ethnic movements were quite militant and violent in tone. The Sindhis and Muhajirs, on the other hand, did experience a loss of power and privilege. Ethnic amelioration results if the 'power cake' is too small and thus ethnic demands are less vigorous as in Bhutan. Ethnicity, as the authors rightly point out, is socially constructed and expressed in particular episodes of history. They indicate various ways in which the social construction of ethnicity is influenced by both domestic and international factors.

The book, however, suffers from a number of weaknesses. A crucial problem with Phadnis and Ganguly's analysis is that the authors fail to provide an adequate definition of the 'state'. Thus, the terms 'state', 'central leadership' and 'government' are used synonymously where modern sociological literature differentiates between these terms. This is an important oversight in an analysis of ethnic politics and nation-building since the 'state' is the most important variable in such an analysis. This is specially the case in countries where the colonial legacy of an overdeveloped and centralised state structure, coupled with imbalances in economic development, has been one of the major factors in the consequent hardening and intensification of ethnic conflicts.

The book refers to the expansion of state sponsored activities related to political, social and economic development, increasing centralisation and growing homogenisation as vague indicators of general tendencies in the state systems of South Asia. A more composite analysis of the state structure, however, requires a closer look at the bureaucratic dimension of the state, that is, state administration and military apparatus. With the exception of Pakistan and Bangladesh (and that too briefly and not substantively), the bureaucratic and military apparatus of the state is absent from Phadnis and Ganguly's analysis.

One is appalled by the superficial nature of the analysis found in their discussion of individual South Asian countries. India, according to authors, can be described as an ethnically heterogeneous system while the rest of South Asia as an ethnically centralised system. The basis for this contention is the constitutional guarantees offered to the ethnic groups in India and the lack of it in the rest of the South Asian countries. It may be argued, however, that the real contest for power is at the 'state' level where actual power resides. Often interest groups have complained of bureaucratic hurdles related not to inefficiency but to discrimination on grounds of its particular ethnic composition. In stark contrast, ethnic groups with representation at the governmental level may find themselves in military confrontation with the 'state'. One can indeed argue that governmental politics is being destabilised in India due to

the relative decline of the Congress Party. The ability of the 'state' to deal with ethnic groups, however, remains strong. The crushing of the Sikh movement in the 1980s and the military involvement in Kashmir are major examples of the 'state's' ability to deal with ethnic dissent.

The wide range of material covered in *Ethnicity and Nation-building in South Asia* is both its major strength and its main weakness. A range of, very different, nation-states are covered in the book, but the disparate analysis leaves the reader grasping for truths with reference to ethnicity and nation-building in South Asia. The theoretical framework, and its application on a regional basis, could have been better attempted by signifying the role of the 'state' in augmenting and mediating conflicts between different ethnic groups.

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Stereotyping: the Politics of Representation

Michael Pickering

Palgrave, 2001

Hbk: ISBN 0-333-77209-1 £49.50

Pbk: ISBN 0-333-77210-5 £16.99

pp. 246, (including: preface, list of figures, bibliography, author and subject indices)

'We have met the enemy, and it is us'.

Pogo¹

Stereotyping as a psychological and discourse device is a protean phenomenon running through diverse fields of social sciences like a red thread. This is precisely what makes it so hard to study and at the same time so interesting. In *Stereotyping*, Michael Pickering has taken up this task, delivering a complex critique of the simplifying readings of the stereotyping process.

In all probability, stereotyping, although not perceived as such, has been with man since time immemorial. Yet the mere fact that today it can be named and, if named, will justly draw criticism, does not itself protect us from falling into its trap. After all, as has been confirmed both in natural and social sciences, reality is an elusive beast and does not offer any hard-and-fast reference points to establish an 'objective' perception of a person or phenomenon. Therefore even seemingly objective assessments of others may be tainted by involuntary bias.

The argument of the book starts by pointing out an important misperception of the implication of the dual nature of stereotypes (Chapters 1 and 2). On the one hand, stereotypes are seen as misinformed pictures presenting those reflected in them in a way which does not correspond to reality. On the other, they are regarded as categories, classing perceptual input according to an array of common denominators

¹ A popular saying attributed to Walt Kelly's character, Pogo, in the King Features comic strip (quoted in James Austin, "Zen and the Brain", MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England 1998, p. 43).



and thus enabling us to manipulate big blocks of similar data. Obviously, the second conception relates to the effective use of the processing capacity of our brains and is in many respects essential for human functioning. Yet it does not have to entail stereotyping: 'A stereotype is not identical with a category; it is rather a fixed idea that accompanies a category' (Allport, quoted p. 28). Thus, a category only becomes stereotypical if we refuse to adapt it to incoming information.

The argument continues as follows. Chapter 3 analyses the relationship between the stereotype and the category of the Other, showing how, along with increasing recognition of the arbitrary nature of many social distinctions, the latter came to supplant stereotypes as the prevalent term signifying unwelcome aspects of reality or the self that society tries to keep at bay. The improvement of this substitution upon the stereotype (as an exaggerated and simplifying inclusion in a category on the basis of a limited number of attributes) consists in the fact that where stereotypes circulate below the level of critical attention, 'othering' is liable to raise questions because it categorises by exclusion (as non-something) and thereby points attention also to its opposite, inclusion.

Chapters 4 and 5 respectively examine the inclusive construction of national identity and the exclusive construction of its opposite. Dr Pickering shows how most or all of the many identifications the members of a society subscribe to are likely to be trumped by the 'national', which is 'where the notion of a national "self" is most dangerous, spawning the belief that it has its own inner voice, its own will, its own destiny to which all others are alien' (p. 92). Such self-worship automatically creates the categories 'us' and 'them', with 'them' helping to define 'us' as positive by being negative. 'They' is freely allowed as a composite category, subsuming widely differing groups—yet these can all be conveniently lumped together as 'non-us', in extreme cases paving the road to racism or messianism. Thus, for instance, the concept of the Primitive, as well as—for the British—the Irish (as wild backward drunkards), the French (as promiscuous, effeminate and devious blasphemers) and others.

Chapter 6 examines the stereotyping pitfalls riddling the road to reconstructing the experience of the groups, nations and races subjected to colonisation—both physically, by direct occupation, and mentally, by creating discourses determining the identity of the colonised by reference to the colonisers. We do not have (and will probably never have) any cure-all solution to the problems inherent in any attempts—themselves also socially and ideologically situated—to retell the stories of the colonised and the colonisers 'objectively', weaving them into a complex picture of what actually took place. In spite of this, Dr Pickering succeeds admirably in steering his readers through the shoals of grand-theory historicism and excessive reliance on individual agency, pointing to the eventual (if exceptional) possibility of arriving at an informed understanding of past realities. Indeed, there may be no ready recipe for dismantling the intertwining and multilayered, deeply inculcated ideological constructs underlying patterns of oppression past and present. Yet, we should make every effort to restore them to conscious examination. One way this can be accomplished is to 'reverse-engineer' the stereotypes employed in the representations such patterns generate in their practice, making adjustments where the representation is by triangulation found not to fit with the life of the respective society at the time.

Chapter 7 takes up the question of the nature of social norms and their relation to stereotypes. '[The] relationship to its sustaining environment is what makes anything normal or pathological and informs any distinction between them' (p. 176). This relatively recent realisation took a long time to form because of the XIX-century transfer of the notion of progress onto the 'is'-concept of normality. This effectively added to it a layer which may be described as 'ought' and could not but sow confusion: is it alright to be as we are or is it only alright if we are as we should be? Such a situation is only too happy to piggyback on stereotypes and, indeed, because the dual-yet-one normality needs constant 'normalisation' (consolidation by pointing out additional abnormalities and deviations), induces the creation of more of them.

Chapter 8 sums up the argument by outlining the inherent danger posed to all stereotyped conceptions by the appearance of outsiders who are either unaware of the stereotypical categories or decide to opt out of their framework altogether. With the demise of the closed society of rural communities and the advent of Modernity, the category of the Stranger has in fact become very wide. Contemporary urban agglomerations are a far cry from the *Gemeinschaft*-type villages of pre-modern times and consist of people who have acquired a quasi-right to treat even their neighbours as strangers. Such an attitude, when reciprocated, rids us effectively of a considerable amount of peer pressure, yet does not of itself solve the problem of stereotyping. The latter simply shifts, focussing on farther outgroups and minority in-groups, or starting to rend the individual psyche itself. We may have come a long way from the hardship and tribulations of our early ages, but this has not yet added enough flexibility to our thinking. Yet it is precisely this that we need at the present point in history, where technological advances are overtaking our cognitive habits at ever increasing speeds.

The book covers a vast intellectual territory, engaging with the work of the relevant theorists and researchers of the fields it touches, aligning them to yield an understanding of the habits of our cultures and minds. It is a complex piece of compelling scholarship and represents an important step in consolidating social science insights into the workings of our individual and cultural identities.

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The Work of the UN in Cyprus: Promoting Peace and Development

Oliver P. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay (eds.)

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pp. xxiii + 253 (including: index)



This collection of eight essays, analysing the wide range of UN involvement in Cyprus, fills a major gap in the literature on the Cyprus conflict. Thus far, hardly anything had been written on the UN's development and humanitarian work on the island. Including these aspects, and combining them with the more well known peacekeeping and peacemaking activities, allows for a more nuanced evaluation of the UN's work in Cyprus, which has all too often been deemed an outright failure. Moreover, this volume is an important addition to the literature on the UN as an organisation, giving insights into the various facets and the mechanics of its operations, though I am more sceptical than the editors as to the extent to which the UN endeavour in Cyprus may serve as a prototype for engagements in other parts of the world.

The contributions are drawn from a range of academic disciplines, including political geography, anthropology, and area studies, and are grouped into three main parts. The two chapters of Part One set the scene by providing the historical background to the UN's involvement in Cyprus. Hubert Faustmann presents a very thorough account of repeated Greek attempts, during the 1950s, to internationalise the Greek Cypriot conflict with Britain over ending the latter's colonial rule, through UN fora. He explains why the UN refrained from becoming involved, given the power balance within the organisation and particularly US resistance against active UN engagement. However, as James Ker-Lindsay's contribution shows, the UN was unable to uphold its stance of staying out of Cyprus once it became apparent that Britain saw herself overburdened by the task of peacekeeping, after the constitutional breakdown and resulting inter-communal violence in 1963/64. As the ensuing contributions in this volume make abundantly clear, two issues from these early episodes were to become crucial for the course of UN involvement on the island. First, the dilemma of international organisations having to depend on the willingness, leverage, and resources of their sovereign member states, and second, the problem of maintaining an image of impartiality in the eyes of the conflict parties.

The three chapters of Part Two deal with the peacekeeping and peacemaking activities of the UN. Dan Lindley's assessment of the role of the UN Peacekeeping Force on Cyprus (UNFICYP) shows why the presence of this force remains vital. He argues that UNFICYP has contributed significantly to peace and stability by putting a damper on the approximately 1000 incidents it confronts annually. Removing the Force would therefore increase the odds of conflict escalating into war. In his view these achievements should not be underestimated and any other expectations may simply be too high, especially given the constraints under which UNFICYP must operate. Oliver Richmond provides an in-depth analysis of direct UN mediation in 1964/1965. He shows how the conflict parties used the UN to enhance their negotiating positions vis-à-vis their opponents and how the mediation effort became hostage to, and incapacitated by, this 'game'. Edward Newman's review of four Secretary-Generals' efforts at using their 'Good Offices' in Cyprus is a lucid illustration of the limitations of the Secretary-General's efforts, when his activities are 'out of synch' with those of external actors or do not receive the necessary backing of major powers, 'which are capable of bringing real leverage to bear upon the situation' (p. 127). However, as Newman also points out, the Secretary-Generals were able to use their Office in different ways to contribute to settlement efforts by showing authority, leadership, creativity, and thus helped in keeping the talks process going.

The third and, from my perspective, the most interesting part of the book is dedicated to the UN's contribution to the economic and infrastructural development of the island, and its humanitarian work. In Chapter 6, Peter Hocknell examines the initiatives of the UN Development Programme. While acknowledging that UNDP played an important role in enhancing the development of Cyprus, his main point is on its failure to transcend the political divide and operate on a truly island-wide scale. He argues that in dealing with and through the solely Greek Cypriot government UNDP actually served to legitimise this very divide. In Chapter 7, Paul Sant Cassia explores the activities of the UN appointed Committee of the Missing (CMP), concerning the nearly two and a half thousand Greek and Turkish Cypriots, who disappeared between 1964 and 1974. He maintains that 'the CMP has had no effect in resolving the problem it was set up to resolve' (p. 231). While the politicisation of this deeply humanitarian issue has served as an escape clause, Cassia argues that the main reasons for CMP's failure lie in the different views of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides of what constitutes the 'humanitarian', combined with the UN's failure to acknowledge local sensitivities of this issue. In the final chapter, Madeleine Demetriou analyses the work of the UN High Commission for Refugees. She argues that the UNHCR helped significantly in ameliorating the situation of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, who became displaced as a result of the Turkish intervention in 1974. Moreover, Demetriou notes how the UNHCR as a 'non-political' agency adopted a new and 'political' role over the years, as it became successfully involved in projects fostering bi-communal co-operation, largely due to the wishes of the main donor for these projects, the US.

In sum, this volume gives a critical insight into the multi-faceted activities of the UN in Cyprus, and provides an important resource for all those studying the long-standing conflict on this island.

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Relocating Germanness: Discursive Disunity in Unified Germany

Patrick Stevenson and John Theobald (eds.)

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US edition: Hbk: ISBN: 0312230435 \$75.00

pp. 290 (including: preface, list of figures, list of tables, notes on contributors, chapter references, index)

This new volume on *Relocating Germanness* is the result of an interdisciplinary conference, which took place in Southampton back in April 1998. Selected papers from the conference have been edited and collected in this book, focusing on issues relevant for the continuing east-west division of Germany (p. x). The volume is framed by a thoughtful introduction by Patrick Stevenson and John Theobald, who also have written the conclusion. In-between, 13 chapters investigate selected cases, including television, 'Kabarett', advertising, media reporting, communicative practises, and competing language ideologies. According to the editors, the volume: 'addresses cultural complexities and pluralities, unforeseen at the moment of political



and economic unification in Germany in 1990... the book seeks both to define more closely and sensitively the processes which have occurred at the cultural/linguistic level, and to suggest that it is at this level that socially valuable diagnosis can take place, and that constructive approaches to Germany's continuing east-west cultural divide can be indicated (p.1). Large parts of the book 'are taking forward a tradition of socially active linguistic analysis and criticism of public discourse which spans the twentieth century' (p.8). Thus the contributions should be viewed within the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis.

The reviewer himself being a historian with strong interest in Germany and German studies read the volume with the eyes of an 'outsider', without any knowledge of the scholarly discourse in the field of linguistics, discourse and communication. Many approaches seemed new and surprising. The volume offers many interesting and relevant points, contributing to enlighten and understand contemporary Germany, especially the Eastern parts of it.

Thus, Ulrike Hanna Meinhof in her chapter on the new Germany on the screen offers an analysis of, how November 9th, being both the day of anti-Jewish pogroms in 1938, and marking the events of 1989, when the Wall was overcome, has been reflected on German TV in 1989, 1994, and 1998. She shows, how in 1998 any 'joyful commemoration of the bringing down of the Wall and any celebration of unity between east and west has been superseded by grim and divisive memories of the GDR, at struggle to find new (political) roles in a united Germany, and a continuing deep unease about the legacy of the Third Reich' (p.41).

Joanne McNally's chapter on East German 'Kabarett' shows, how the group 'Die Distle' has reacted and adapted to the realities of unified Germany by contrasting contents before and after 1989. She concludes: 'Despite a stylistic break with the GDR and new themes of interest to both east and west, socialist ideas have not been abandoned. Since unification, there is, to a certain extent, a continuity of strategies in East German Kabarett; former socialist slogans and songs are also deployed for satirical effect. This, in turn, reinforces an east German identity and, with respect to cultural misbehaviour, can be perceived as promoting an 'in-group' with which the west will not always be able to identify' (p.73). As a third example, Helen Kelly-Holmes offers a stimulating analysis of 'Advertising Discourse and Constructions of German Identity'. She shows, how regional identities have prevailed, even have been reinforced, and 'form a key element in advertising strategies' (p.106). Interesting points and conclusions are also found in the other contributions to the volume.

However, in the end, the reviewer was wondering what exactly all these case studies actually tell us about the concept of Germanness. Does the volume 'relocate' Germanness? How so? National identities in general are complex issues. They are multidimensional and contextual. This volume offers valuable details adding to the knowledge on some aspects of Germanness, but it does not attempt to cover the full range. Nor does it explicitly define the meaning, context or concept of Germanness referred to. Germanness in present-day Germany is not only a matter of East and West, but also includes discourses on migrants and minorities, not the least ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet states. The important aspects of Germanness produced or reproduced, caused or (de-)constructed by German refugees and expellees after 1945, and of East Germans fleeing the DDR up till 1989

have to be considered as well. Further, north-south divisions within Germany with considerable differences between the primarily Protestant north and Catholic south and possible consequences for mentalities and levels or intensity of regional and national identification are not addressed in this book, although it very well might be relevant analysing identity of East Germans.

Actually, the contributions in this volume mostly deal with the East German aspects of German identity; studies of West German identity are the exception, although they are found in some chapters. Thus, the book offers interesting and valuable analyses and interpretations of East German patterns of identity; but it does not offer the full and complementary 'other half', and, consequently, also not the 'whole picture'. It mostly relocates eastern Germanness. By stressing this by no doubt important aspect of Germanness, the volume might itself by the choice of chapters confirm the hypothesis of persistent disunity in unified Germany. It might have been relevant to add discussions on how the choice of subjects might influence the perception of the theme as well.

Another key element seems to be underrepresented or even missing in the book: the political aspect, and the consequences of the divide. Especially in the field of political participation and voting preferences, there is an evident divide between East and West. It would have been interesting to include some reflections on how the diagnosed differences between East and West lead to different political identifications – maybe even to some extent alienating West Germans from the ones in the Eastern parts of the state. Here a case study on Berlin would have been extremely relevant, including aspects of language and culture as well. In the most recent elections in Berlin in October 2001, the division between East and West once more became obvious when the PDS won all voting districts in former East Berlin and none in the western parts of the city – with almost 50% of the votes in the East and only 6.6% in the West. What does this persistent divide tell us about Germanness more than a decade after reunification? Reflections on political behaviour might add elements to a differentiated answer to the question, how and why social and cultural disunity still persists. Still, the authors have produced an interesting volume. It is a relevant and timely book, encouraging the interested reader to think about aspects of cultural and linguistic life in reunified Germany.

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